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By Kuldeep Ojha Introduction The world’s oceans, long viewed as open frontiers of commerce and conquest, are fast emerging as the next battleground of climate politics. As new currents redefine maritime politics, Costa Rica— a land known more for its rainforests than its naval doctrine — has carved out a distinct role in steering the high seas conversation through law and diplomacy. At the Third United Nations Ocean Conference (UNOC3)  in Nice (France) this June, Costa Rica co-hosted the summit alongside France, calling for a fossil fuel exploration ban and a moratorium on deep-sea mining, while pushing for expedited ratification of the High Seas Treaty . As it looks toward COP30 in Belém, Brazil, Costa Rica’s ocean diplomacy offers more than moral suasion; it signals the arrival of small, values-driven states as active architects of a new environmental multilateralism. Photo credit: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Ocean Diplomacy as Statecraft: Costa Rica’s Turn to the High Seas For much of the twentieth century, ocean governance was the preserve of naval powers and trading giants. The rules were set by those who commanded the seas, not those who merely bordered them. However, as climate change unsettles traditional hierarchies in the twenty-first century, Costa Rica’s ascent as a maritime norm entrepreneur underscores how environmental diplomacy is increasingly becoming a theatre for small state agencies. In contrast to earlier summits, at UNOC3, Costa Rica did not serve as ceremonial; it was the thematic tone. President Rodrigo Chaves’ call for a global ban on fossil fuel exploration and a moratorium on deep-sea mining was far from symbolic; it challenged the inertia of the climate regime. Backed by years of legal activism  and environmental credibility, Costa Rica’s insistence on fast-tracking the implementation of the Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) Treaty  placed it at the heart of a diplomatic effort long stalled by geopolitical hesitation. It is not merely environmental idealism. Costa Rica understands that moral clarity can be converted into diplomatic capital in a fractured multilateral order. Its ocean diplomacy is strategic — deploying law, coalition-building, and convening power to influence norms that larger states often struggle to shape. It is not the statecraft of fleets but of principled persistence. Marine Protected Areas and the New Geography of Conservation Although not a maritime military power; Costa Rica quietly redefines its oceanic jurisdiction. The recent designation of new Marine Protected Areas (MPAs)  — notably near Cocos Island  —signals a shift where conservation zones are doubling as instruments of geopolitical relevance. Backed by a €1.8 million EU fund secured at UNOC3, Costa Rica conserves biodiversity and asserts sovereignty through sustainability. MPAs are not just conservation maps; they are diplomatic assets. The scaling-up of protection zones aligns with global targets such as the 30x30 goal , safeguarding 30 percent of the planet’s land and seas by 2030. More than symbolic gestures, these conservation areas embed Costa Rica into evolving international architectures that bind marine life protection with climate targets and carbon market mechanisms . This redefinition of maritime space reflects a broader shift in geopolitical relevance in the climate age. Costa Rica’s MPAs, legally codified and internationally backed, represent soft assertion — a model of how ecological stewardship can translate into geopolitical voice. Photo Credit- Xinhua News From UNOC3 to COP30: Maritime Climate Governance and the Ocean Breakthroughs Agenda Diplomacy rarely moves in straight lines. It advances through alignments. Costa Rica’s role has expanded — from co-leading discussions at UNOC3 to framing key priorities ahead of COP30 in Belém. In doing so, San José positions itself as a link between marine stewardship and the evolving architecture of international climate governance. The Ocean Breakthroughs Agenda, which Costa Rica champions alongside like-minded states, represents an inspiring effort to embed ocean governance into climate frameworks. New instruments such as the Ocean Equity Index  and the Ocean Investment Protocol mark the beginning of a financing and accountability architecture that gives coastal developing states a meaningful stake in shaping future ocean governance. President Chaves’ pledge to integrate marine protection into national climate policy is not just domestic reform. It is foreign policy, a signal to COP30 that oceans are integral to mitigation and adaptation, not peripheral. As many states hesitate, Costa Rica is pushing a Global South proposition: that the maritime commons must be governed with equity, not expedience. Strategic Implications: Can Small States Shape Big Ocean Norms? In today’s fractured international landscape, small-state efforts are often brushed aside as moral theatre. Costa Rica’s maritime strategy suggests otherwise. Its advocacy for the High Seas Treaty, smart leverage of blue finance and quiet leadership in conservation forums suggest a recalibration: norms can constrain even powerful actors when persistently advanced and legally codified. The road ahead is steeper. As the UNCLOS  framework attracts political friction and COP30’s stakes grow, Costa Rica will need more than principled leadership. Converting commitments into durable regulation will hinge on domestic capability and international alignment. Moreover, normative gains may trigger backlash from fossil lobbies, deep-sea mining consortiums, or maritime security hawks. Nevertheless, it is in moments of flux that small states matter most. Anchoring action in law and legitimacy, rather than coercion or extraction, allows countries like Costa Rica to influence global norms with outsized effect. While naval might still matters, it is consensus that increasingly defines the rules at sea. Furthermore, voices from the periphery are no longer silent in crafting that consensus — their voices now register where they count. Conclusion Costa Rica’s maritime diplomacy is more than a soft power story; it marks an inflection point. As COP30 approaches, the real challenge will be endurance. Can Costa Rica, and others like it, convert summit-stage credibility into sustained normative authority? If it succeeds, it may secure its marine ecosystems and widen the aperture for small-state agencies in global affairs. Ultimately, the high seas will not be governed solely by great power prerogatives. They will be shaped by those willing to defend them — legally, diplomatically, and morally. Costa Rica, for now, leads from the periphery. #CostaRica #HighSeasTreaty #UNOC3 #COP30 #OceanDiplomacy #MarineProtectedAreas #ClimateJustice #SmallStateDiplomacy This is an Original Contribution to the SIS Blog. Kuldeep Ojha is a PhD scholar in Latin American Studies at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU). His research focuses on environmental governance in Central America, and his interests extend to the Latin American region and its geopolitics.

By Shreya Nautiyal Europe must realise that key to its credibility in South Asia lies in adopting a more nuanced and principled stance in the region   Credibility in foreign policy is seldom secured by rhetoric alone - it requires steady and context-sensitive engagement . Europe’s reflexive call for “ restraint and dialogue” when India is acting against terrorism suggests a disconnect between principled rhetoric and strategic empathy. The equal treatment of both states in question, despite one being clearly under assault, reflects a striking blindness.  While the world mourns the loss of innocent lives in what was supposed to be an eden of tranquility in India’s Kashmir valley, the international response remained notably uneven. As India asserted its moral and strategic agency through Operation Sindoor on May 7, 2025, the international response was not met with collective support but rather with a calculated silence from certain quarters. In particular, Europe’s stance was marked less by an unequivocal condemnation of terrorism and more by a disturbing pattern of discretionary indignation - a phenomenon that raises questions about the West’s inconsistent moral compass.   Europe’s Selective Outrage In the event of Pakistan’s disproportionate shelling  on Indian border towns post Operation Sindoor, an egregious example of Europe’s double standards emerged when European Union’s (EU) top diplomat Kaja Kallus prompted India and Pakistan to “ exercise restraint and pursuit dialogue” amid regional tensions. Such a flawed equivalence between the perpetrator and the victim of terrorism reflects a complete disregard for the loss of twenty six lives  and clearly lacks strategic nuance. It is, however, important to acknowledge that India’s initial response was measured and calculated - characterised by economic and diplomatic measures aimed at curtailing the privileges extended to Pakistan - before resorting to the use of military might . In fact, India’s operation Sindoor was meticulously designed to target terrorist bases  in Pakistan, ensuring no harm to Pakistan’s military installations or civilian areas , thus conforming to the principles outlined in the Geneva Convention .   Ironically, Kallas has previously underscored the importance of a robust defence mechanism, cautioning against what she terms as the “ trap of self-deterrence ” and asserting that “ appeasement only strengthens the aggressor ”. Yet, even as Brussels demands global cognisance and solidarity when its own interests are at stake, it uses a separate yardstick for humanitarian crises and terrorism elsewhere - issues in the Global South barely receive a whisper within Brussels’ corridors. The Western media often spotlights the humanitarian suffering in Ukraine crisis - often labeled as the ‘ white man’s war ’- as well as in the discussions concerning terrorism in Europe or the migration crisis, constructing a moral narrative that concerns European fragilities. However, when it comes to the issues beyond its borders, Europe’s unwavering advocacy championing values and human rights often takes a backseat.   Its hyphenated approach and a neutral stance on the ongoing Indo-Pak crisis exposes Europe’s wilful neglect and a deliberate marginalisation of non-European issues. Dr. Jaishankar in his 2022 speech , astutely remarked that “Europe’s problems are world’s problems but world’s problems are not Europe’s problems”.  In a similar vein, in  2024, European Commissions’s former Vice President, Josep Borrell highlighted the “ double standards ” of the west in cases of international law, wars and climate change and therefore called out Europe for compartmentalising the world into two sub-divisions - “ West against the Rest ” conceding that “diplomacy is the art of managing double standards ”. Its strategic silence and selective amnesia reveals the deep-seated disparities that define global diplomacy in the 21st century.   A Timeline of the 21st Century that Europe Ignores   EU has been following an equidistant approach even when Pakistan’s defence minister Khwaja Asif has recently admitted the country’s history of supporting, training and funding terrorist organisations as “ dirty work ” for the West, a mistake for which he said Pakistan had suffered. Brussels’ selective outrage becomes even more indefensible when viewed against the backdrop of terrorism India has endured, all backed by Pakistan-based terrorist organisations :   •    2000  : Chittisinghpura massacre  (36 Sikhs killed by Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) terrorists), Kashmir •    2001  : Indian Parliament attack  (terrorists affiliated with Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and LeT), New Delhi •    2006  : 7/11 train bombing  (responsibility claimed by LeT), Mumbai •    2008 : 26/11 attacks  ( Ajmal Kasab , LeT terrorist, the only surviving terrorist; his subsequent arrest confirmed Pakistan’s role ), Mumbai •    2016 : Uri attack  (attack backed by JeM ), Kashmir •    2019 : Pulwama attack (attack on Indian security forces by JeM), Kashmir •    2024 : Reasi attack on Hindu pilgrims (responsibility taken by The Resistance Front  (TRF)), Jammu •    2025 : Pahalgam attack  (backed by TRF), Kashmir West pays no heed to the miseries of the local populace of Global South. Despite clear proofs of Islamabad disturbing the peace of New Delhi, International Monetary Fund (IMF) is willing to loan $1 billion  to Pakistan under its Extended Fund Facility. However, amidst the Russia-Ukraine war ,  EU consistently urged India to reduce its Russian ties and ban the import of Russian oil, even as a number of European countries continued to remain Russia’s top fossil fuel buyers. This shows a clear stance of Europe’s strategic convenience - preaching peace and restraint on the global front while pursuing national interests at home.   Partners, Not Preachers : A Need for Coherence   In his recent address on a global platform, Dr. Jaishankar unequivocally stated “When we look out at the world, we look for partners not preachers. Particularly preachers who do not practice at home but preach abroad…..Some of Europe is still struggling with that problem.” India looks up for friends in need, to develop a meaningful partnership which requires a caution and sensitivity towards the realities of the present world. Europe has to be cautious in its fence-sitting diplomacy in Indo-Pak realities, one that cannot be simply overlooked based on their geographical proximity and shared history. Europe cannot and should not turn a blind eye to the current realities of the world. It must shed its moral duplicity and adopt a principled stance on the issues of terrorism, human rights and sovereignty - one that not just accrues to its own states internationally too. There is no room for double standards . If a rules-based order is to be maintained, then it should not turn to be a rules-for-others order. An approach adopting inconsistent moral stand erodes credibility and reinforces the belief that the rules of the West dictate only the rest. #OperationSindoor   This is an Original Contribution to the SIS Blog. Shreya Nautiyal is a PhD scholar at the Centre for European Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. She holds a bachelor’s degree in Economics from the University of Delhi, and a Master’s degree from Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) in International Relations and Area Studies. Her research focuses on the intersection of economics, governance, and efforts aimed towards counter-terrorism, particularly within South Asia and Europe.

By Aman J Thomas In Romeo and Juliet , Shakespeare asked ‘What’s in a name’? and the answer is ‘a lot’. Words have meanings and those words in the form of language and map making can shape the material realities and political choices. Donald Trump, in one of his first presidential orders, has decided to rename Mount Denali to Mount McKinley after President McKinley , an imperialist under whom the U.S. brought Hawaii and Guam under its control, and whom Trump refers to as a model president he would like to emulate. He has also ordered the renaming of the Gulf of Mexico to the Gulf of America , reflecting his expansionist rhetoric.    George Orwell’s ‘1984’ is strikingly relevant today . Orwell reminds us that ‘Big Brother’ is really keeping an eye on us. In the novel ‘1984’, the notorious "Ministry of Truth," and its mission to adapt the past to the present, and its attempt to change history. The names of people from street signs, scholarships, dorms, monuments, and the like are struck down using the clear magnifying glass of "Presentism". Colonial and imperial powers have imposed their identity and culture by renaming places in colonial lands and later native people have reclaimed their identity and culture by self-determination. Renaming places also has geopolitical and ideological interests. Colonialism has effectively used renaming as a tool to oppress the history, culture and tradition of native people. Through place naming, colonialism aimed to imprint meaning and order onto human landscapes. The colonial place names that were imposed or codified served to legitimize territorialization and strengthened settlers' rights to the land. Alfred Mahan is credited to have coined the term Middle East in 1902 but it does not reflect any sense from a geographic point of view. The Middle East vaguely represents the identity or geographical positioning of the place, it rather points that it is Middle East of another region or state, which brings up the question: the Middle East of what? The term Middle East reflects the colonial imperial identity that the British gave and later the U.S. has adopted. There have been movements against colonialism, especially those headed by organizations that identify as indigenous, have been increasingly instrumental in mobilizing support for self-determination. For instance,  renaming cities in India has been an effort to do rid of the lingering effects of British rule. In 1995, Bombay reclaimed its name from the Marathi language and became Mumbai. A return to regional linguistic and cultural origins was also reflected in the renaming of Madras as Chennai and Calcutta as Kolkata. These changes weren't only aesthetic; they were a part of a larger effort to reshape the country's identity according to its own standards. The renaming process has had an equally revolutionary effect throughout Africa. As Robert Kaplan reminds us , the way maps are created and labeled also matters since it influences how the strong perceive the world. There are numerous instances of renaming places for geopolitical interests. As Machiavelli emphasized that states also act out of pride and prestige , thereby from a realist perspective, we can grasp why states tend to change the toponym of strategic places, China has been employing the strategy of renaming places with countries that it has maritime and border disputes with. The Chinese call the Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands as Xisha and Nansha islands which are in the South China Sea and the Senkaku islands as Diaoyu islands  over which they have disputes with the Japanese. They refer to Aksai Chin as the southwestern part of Hotan prefecture of Xinjiang, which India considers as an integral part of Jammu & Kashmir. As the age-old axiom goes “If you rebel against someone, someone will rebel against you” and thus the effort to rename places is not only limited to the Chinese. To counter the Chinese expansion, countries led by the U.S. are also actively trying to balance China in the region and as a part of it, the U.S has opted for the use of the term Indo-Pacific which was earlier referred as Asia-Pacific . The term "Indo-Pacific" was hardly used ten years ago, but today the U.S., India, Japan and other countries refer to the region as Indo- Pacific.  There can also be ideological and political reasons for renaming places. In the last century, the city of St. Petersburg has had two name changes . Peter the Great founded St. Petersburg in the early 1700s, and while it retained its founder’s name, it also clearly showed the influence of Europe. The name’s Germanic "burg" was a reference to the Westernization movement that characterized Peter's rule. But the moniker became an intolerable encumbrance when World War I broke out and Russia was at war with Germany. As nationalist sentiment grew in 1914, the city was renamed Petrograd , changing its suffix to the Slavic “grad”, signifying its transition from a multicultural outpost to a distinctly Russian bastion. The city thereafter experienced yet another change following Lenin's passing in 1924. The Bolshevik leader’s legacy was woven into the very foundation of the Soviet Union’s urban setting when Petrograd was transformed into Leningrad . Residents chose to return it to its previous name, St. Petersburg , years after the USSR collapsed in 1991, making a full cycle of historical revision. Place names are important as they inscribe ideological messages about past practices and they permeate daily vocabulary through visual and verbal cues like road signs, addresses, advertising billboards and maps. Place names not only mould history, but they also mend group and cultural identity because of the shared context of using these toponyms. #US #Mexico This is an Original Contribution to the SIS Blog   Aman J Thomas is currently a second-year student pursuing a Master’s in Politics with Specialization in International Studies (M.A PISM) from the School of International Studies (SIS), Jawaharlal Nehru University, JNU.

By Simran Mishra In its 2024-2029 institutional cycle , the EU’s approach focuses on combining technological proficiency with geopolitical realism, making it a rule-setter and not a rule-taker in the global technology race, reflecting in its Digital Compass 2030  initiative which aims at digitally transformed Europe by the end of the decade. The European Union, regarded as a normative power - an actor that promotes its values and principles through diplomacy, trade and cooperation. In the context of emerging technologies, the EU has positioned itself as a leader in shaping global norms and values, in areas such as data protection , AI ethics and digital governance , evident in its effort to promote the Brussels Effect  - the phenomenon whereby EU regulations and standards are adopted globally due to the EU’s market power and regulatory reach, e.g., The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)  has inspired similar legislation globally. As emerging technologies continue to redefine IR, through the assertion of the technological sovereignty the EU enters into a critical arena of 21st century tech-competition. Through proactive leadership in regulatory frameworks and research partnerships, the EU is shaping the technological revolution. Its approach intertwines geopolitical strategy with ethical principles and multinational cooperation. This leadership positions the EU at the forefront of responsible technology governance, ensuring alignment with human rights, democratic values, and sustainable development . Balancing Autonomy and Openness The EU emphasises responsible innovation , strategic foresight and anticipatory governance mechanisms to ensure that technological development aligns with European values and promotes societal well-being while preparing for future technological challenges and opportunities. The EU advocates the promotion of democratic values in technology governance, sustainability and equitability in digital growth worldwide.  The EU faces a trilemma in its technology policy: Innovation, Protection, and Influence. In addressal of geopolitical risks, The EU views the essentiality of strengthening cybersecurity  and digital resilience while navigating geopolitical risks associated with emerging technologies such as cyberwarfare, election interference and misinformation. For instance, the EU is leading in sustainable technology development, by integrating emerging technologies and digital strategies with green objectives, under the EU’s Green Deal  objectives.   Precaution Meets Innovation The EU's position shows a precautionary mindset, in contrast to the United States, which is more of a laissez-faire nature. Emerging technologies are seen by the EU as important facilitators of economic growth and societal progress, for instance, when referring to the Horizon Europe  or Digital Compass  initiatives. The EU-US Trade and Technology Council  (TTC),2021 and the Global Gateway  project exemplify the strategy to improve digital diplomacy and lessen up on strategic dependencies. As the EU views, these technologies are also critical for the attainment of strategic autonomy - a development goal which aims to lessen external dependencies and enhance industrial resilience. The EU has a framework for governance and promotion of emerging technologies - the' framework' covers policies, regulations, and funding programs aimed at fostering innovation while ensuring their ethical and safe uses, such as Horizon Europe, Digital Single Market Strategy. Ethical Considerations and Regulation Quite emphatically, the EU has indeed taken the issue to the emerging technologies. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) ,2018 is perhaps one of the most striking expressions of the encouragement the EU gave for protecting privacy and data in the digital age. The most significant regulatory initiative in the EU’s policy is the Artificial Intelligence (AI) Act , hailed as a landmark piece that could set a global standard for AI regulation, which aims to create a comprehensive framework for AI applications, categorizing then based on their level of risk: unacceptable, high, limited, minimal.  In addition to the AI Act, the EU has two more key legislation aimed at regulating the digital economy: the Digital Services Act (DSA ), to combat illegal content, disinformation and harmful practices and the Digital Markets Act (DMA), to impose rules to ensure fair competition and prevent anti-competitive practices targeting the market power of large tech companies, known as “gatekeepers”. International Collaboration The rise of techno-nationalism , have created a fragmented global landscape, which emphasizes the importance of international cooperation and multilateralism, recognizing that the challenges posed by ETs are global in nature. The EU has been actively promoting Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence (GPAI ), bringing governments, industry and civil society together for a responsible AI development. Amidst the US-China rivalry  in digital diplomacy, the EU-US Trade and Technology Council strengthened transatlantic cooperation on trade, technology and digital policy while the EU is balancing its economic interests with its concerns over China’s technological ambitions and human rights record. Policy Recommendations To accelerate technological sovereignty, the EU should focus upon reducing its reliance on non-EU suppliers for critical components like semiconductors, and support domestic production capacities through targeted subsidies while fostering public-private partnerships to accelerate innovation. The EU should establish additional Trade and Technology Councils (TTCs) with key democracies like Japan, South Korea and India to enhance technological cooperation and reduce reliance on external suppliers and shall also promote European values about digital diplomacy  through development initiatives in the Global South, ensuring AI ethics, emerging technologies and data governance align with democratic principles. Way forward The EU being prominently capable of reinforcing its position as a key actor in global technology governance and tech competitiveness must boost R&D investments to be at par with the US and China in development of emerging technologies, while regulating harmonization and balancing innovation in critical supply chains and digital infrastructure with stringent regulations remains a challenge for the EU, global cooperation by strengthening multilateral initiatives will be essential for addressing geopolitical risks.     Conclusion Amidst the evolving geopolitical scenario, technology has become a critical battleground. As global digital competition intensifies, the EU has the potential to drive sustainable growth, enhance competitiveness, and contribute to global governance framework. Strengthening R&D investments, fostering innovation ecosystems, and balancing internal policy with external diplomacy will be crucial for achieving strategic autonomy and securing the EU's position in global technology governance. This Article is an Original Contribution to the SIS Blog.   Simran Mishra is a postgraduate student of Politics with specialization in International Relations (PISM) at the School of International Studies, JNU. Her academic interests revolve around contemporary global affairs influencing international engagements, multilateral cooperation and digital diplomacy.

By Prof. Dr. Bharat H. Desai   I. INTRODUCTION   March 08, 2025, the 50th anniversary of the UN’s International Women’s Day (IWD), also coincides  with 30 years after the historic 1995 Beijing Declaration and Program of Action  that solemnly resolved “to advance the goals of equality, development and peace for all women everywhere in the interest of all humanity”. It was endorsed by 189 countries. Now, after three decades, almost one-fourth countries are facing a backlash   and backsliding. A series of factors such as economic instability, the climate crisis, rising conflicts and political pushback have contributed to a worsening global landscape for gender equality.  In his annual   2025 IWD message , the UN Secretary-General (UNSG) Antonio Guterres observed that “When women and girls can rise, we all thrive…(yet) instead of mainstreaming equal rights, we are seeing the mainstreaming of misogyny.”   Picture Source : UN Women: Session of the Commission on the Status of Women II.   GLOBAL STATE OF WOMEN’S RIGHTS The above scenario underscores the graphic reality that in spite of the advocacy by the entire UN system, the UN member states, international developmental agencies and the civil society groups, it has not been possible to make a desired change in securing women’s rights. The UN Women Strategic Plan (2022-2025)  adopted a three-pronged approach: (1) to promote coordination across the UN system (2) to support to member states in strengthening global norms and standards for gender equality and (3) to carry out operational activities at country and regional levels. With a paltry budget of US $ 1.03 billion (2024-2025; projected contributions) , the UN Women faces a herculean task to turn the tide. Significantly, the Pact for the Future  ( UNGA resolution 79/1 of September 22, 2024 ), stated: “None of our goals can be achieved without the full, safe, equal and meaningful participation and representation of all women in political and economic life. We reaffirm our commitment to the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action” (paragraph 15). Ironically, notwithstanding all solemn declarations at the UN summits and inter-governmental confabulations,  Goal 5 (Gender Equality and empowerment of all women and girls)  of the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)  faces dismal prospects due to very slow progress or has regressed below the 2015 baseline. Picture Source: UN Women Thus, the global state of women is worsening. It is reflected in spine-chilling figures including plight of 2 billion women without any social protection coverage , 612 million women and girls living in global conflict zones  and 393 million women and girls mired in extreme poverty . In growing worldwide gender-based violence, a women or girl is killed every 10 minutes by a family member or an intimate partner. There has been 50% rise in conflict related sexual violence wherein 95% victim-survivors are women and girls.  In fact, the home has also become the “most dangerous place for women and girls”. As per the 2024 report published by the UNODC , 60.2% women were killed in 2023 by their intimate partners (45%) or other family members (55%). Gender based violence is a global challenge ( Author: The Tribune, November 02, 2021 ). The ‘femicide’ reflects entrenched gender-based hatred and sadistic mindsets that assume “most brutal and extreme manifestation of violence against women and girls”.    III.  REVITALIZING THE UN SYSTEM PROCESSES The 69th session of the Commission of the Status of Women (CSW )  will be held in New York during March 10 to 21, 2025. It was established by the ECOSOC resolution 11(II) of 21 June 1946 . The CSW has been instrumental in promoting women’s and girls' rights, and shaping global standards on gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls. At Beijing+30, CSW 69 will do a crucial stocktaking process by reviewing implementation of the  Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action  and the outcomes of the  23rd special session of the General Assembly .   The digital technologies have been a cause of concern for the CSW. Barring women in a few privileged settings, well-educated women and otherwise already empowered women, the digital technologies have heightened already serious gender inequalities, discrimination and violence against women. Since the adoption of the resolution 1325 of October 31, 2000 , the UN Security Council (UNSC) has been periodically addressing the agenda item “women, peace and security” (WPS). Several UNSC members have sought to prioritize the WPS agenda during their monthly presidency. Now a fter 25 years and adoption of some ten additional UNSC resolutions later , WPS agenda has become one of the main thematic pillars of the UNSC’s work. Moreover, the UNSG’s 14 annual reports (between 2011 to 2024) on the implementation of the WPS agenda (since resolution 1325/ 2000 ; and requested by the UNSC Presidential Statement; S/PRST/2010/22 of October 26, 2010 ), as well as 13 reports (2012-2024)  on conflict related sexual violence, have provided a remarkable corpus of action on the issue. The 2024 UNSG report ( S/2024/671 of September 24, 2024 ) has graphically underscored the gravity of the challenge faced by women and girls: “ Amid record levels of armed conflict and violence, progress made over decades is vanishing before our eyes. Generational gains in women’s rights hang in the balance around the world, undercutting the transformative potential of women’s leadership and inclusion in the pursuit of peace”.    The WPS agenda of the UNSC has been justified on the ground that due to the arme d conflic t s, women and girls face the consequences including sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) . Rape as a weapon of war ( Author SIS Blog : March 11, 2023 ; June 22, 2022 ) has been widely used by all the combatants (State and non-State). It has been analyzed in this author’s scholarly work [ Sexual and Gender Based Violence in International Law  (Singapore: Springer: English 2022 ; German 2023 ] as well as highlighted in the 2018 Nobel Peace Prize  awarded (Denis Mukhwege and Nadia Murad) for “ efforts to end the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war and armed conflict" . IV.  CONCLUSION: ROAD AHEAD In view of the above global state of play, the ideational and cutting-edge scholarly works need to be geared up to provide concrete solutions for protection of rights of women and girls. As the things stand today, it will take 131 years to bridge the global gender gap. Between 1995 and 2024, 1,531 legal reforms around the world  have sought to advance gender equality. Yet the grim scenario shows deep rooted patriarchy and misogyny at work since it largely remains a question of mindsets. The legalese, policy and institutional measures (commissions on women and human rights etc) per se  will not be able to turn the tide in near future unless the empowered women themselves feel obliged to ‘light the lamp’ and carry the torch forward. Many of the empowered women get coopted by the patriarchy and they pursue the same path as male counterparts. Hence, mere adding the numbers will not result in empathy and upliftment of other disadvantaged women and girls. As a research supervisor, this author knows firsthand, a large number of female students, barring honorable exceptions, adopt the same attitude of male students for personal advancement. They abhor mentoring and reaching out to others. As a consequence, it remains a big challenge to carry forward the torch to empower other disadvantaged women and girls. Thus, the desired change will be accelerated if the empowered women take the lead to become the agents of change the world needs for securing our common future. #CSW69 #UN Women #UNSG #UNSC #UNGA #MEA #PMIndia #JNU_official_50 This is an Original Contribution to the SIS Blog Prof. (Dr.) Bharat H. Desai is the former Chairperson and Professor of International Law at the Centre for International Legal Studies (SIS, JNU), who served as a member of the Official Indian Delegations to various multilateral negotiations (2002-2008), initiated & coordinated the futuristic knowledge initiatives for the SIS Faculty Wall of Honor (2023-24) , the Inter-University Consortium: JNU; Jammu; Kashmir; Sikkim (2012-2020)  and the Making SIS Visible (2008-2013)  as well as contributes as the Editor-in-Chief  of Environmental Policy and Law (Sage: Amsterdam) .

By Tashi Dorje Gyamba JD Vance in his Munich Security Conference speech  made it clear that America is rerouting its focus. The apparent process and structural geopolitical shift, became visible in the uneasiness with which Vance delivered the speech, and the uneasiness with which the European participants received it. German Minister Pistorius pronounced the speech as unacceptable, as it questioned not just a nation’s, but all of Europe's democratic values. This picture presents a critical point in the ongoing Trans-Atlantic divergence. But across the Pacific signalling strengthening convergences, a day prior to the speech, POTUS Trump met Indian PM Narender Modi. They signed multiple agreements . Deepening ties between the world’s oldest and the world’s largest democracy. Old Tradition Cracks Picture Source : APCO website Reason, liberalism and democracy are traditional western enlightenment values. Post Second World War, the Trans-Atlantic relations hinged on them. It bound the western liberal world order, and gave space to both America and Europe to continue pursuing their respective national interests. European society began integrating and flourishing as a bloc. After the formation of the European Union, its unified heft allowed it to flaunt its Brussels effect—power to guide global norms. On the other side of the Atlantic, firstly, America maintained its pole position with the Soviet, and then its status of global primacy after the Soviet collapse. This equilibrium tied by security agreements like NATO endured and drove well into the twenty first century. As geopolitical realities changed, it began restructuring this relationship. The common denominator of values moulded as a common heritage of the “West” began to recede. With the arrival of the Trump 2.0 administration, and recent American posturing in Europe, fissures created by American interests made the writing on the wall clear. Interpretation on carrying-out of these values began to differ, blames arose and political capacities to support each other flipped. For example, JD Vance’s remark on  great internal threats of Europe , and Pete Hegseth’s call on Europe to actually defend its own backyard. Structural shifts driven by various drivers have sharpened the divergence. Firstly, the arrival of DeepSeek at the end of January, largely hailed as the Sputnik moment , narrowed the tech-gap between America and its primary competitor China, down to nearly six months. Prior to Munich, at the Paris AI Summit , Vance made it clear that America intends to retain global technological primacy. Secondly, the Draghi Competitiveness report  has highlighted that Europe is behind other nations on innovation and productivity. Structural economic issues like regulatory fragmentation, labor market rigidity, and underinvestment in innovation all make for a blunt Europe heading for  “slow agony” . Demographic wintering and focus on costly clean energy further add to the bill. And   thirdly, nations on both sides of the Trans-Atlantic are undergoing political and ideological changes that push for politics of nationalism and unilateralism against commitments to internationalism, free trade, and multilateralism. Firewalls  have fallen as globally political support drifts rightward. And nationalist movements like MAGA and MEGA  are gaining traction. Rerouting As winter hits Trans-Atlantic ties, geopolitical reconfigurations have pivoted  America towards the Indo-Pacific. China’s rising status in the persisting global order has aligned and brought America closer to India. Democratic values which had been a part and parcel of both political systems, have begun to blossom as reasonable connectors. Meanwhile, the idea of MAGA and MIGA , going hand in hand, has also caught the imagination of the respective leaders. In International Relations, when states begin to share such interests and values, together they create a sense of security , and a desire to create a certain harmony. On account of this bonhomie, the undermined Trans-Atlantic relations have been superseded by the will to conserve the spirit of Free and Open Indo-Pacific. This framework allows America to pursue its purpose of offshore balancing China by using India as a counterweight. And allows India to build its security against regional primacy of China. As PM Modi noted, this has been possible in the wake of the two nations overcoming mutually-mistrusted “ hesitations of history .” Former American National Security Advisor, Jake Sullivan’s   visit to India, as the last in his official capacity, demonstrated the importance of this newfound love and comprehensive global strategic partnership. Recent defence and tech progressions such as the broad new COMPACT framework  enables the two to work together on defence, trade and investment, energy security, technology, multilateralism and people to people cooperation. ASIA for underwater domain awareness, INDUS-innovation for defence industry, TRUST promoting critical technologies and Strategic Mineral Recovery Partnership addressing the problem of Sino-American rocks versus chips , are some of the key agreements signed. As these interests, values and workings continue to provide momentum to a close American and India relationship. It is also to be noted that Europe is also showing interest, and is gravitating towards the Indian summer or as called the arrival of India . Be it a free trade agreement between India and EFTA—Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland—or EU’s College of Commissioners  unprecedented maiden visit to india. Shape of Water On the heels of democratic backsliding trends across  democratic indices , POTUS Trump teases with a third term . Arguments have been made that America is on path towards a competitive authoritarianism —free elections but on a non level playing field—and that American exceptionalism  resting on moral superiority of democracy and human rights, stands eroded.  Still, with the gains in sight and values in its heart, India has begun to dance the water  for America. Warning shots about the perils of being a proxy  in great power competition, and facing a “boss” partner  that uses over leveraging for deal-making, have already been shot from the scholarly corner. Yet, Trans-Atlantic divergences and Indo-Pacific convergences continue to intensify. Aligned mega partnership  of America and India has become a thing of the foreseeable “ westless” world . And yet maybe, as global competition augurs, the world’s oldest and the world’s largest democracy hold promise to a better balance of powers in the next phase of the multi-civilization and multipolar world. The two nations share interests and values. If the architecture sits and allows India to maintain its strategic autonomy with a tilt towards America, while enabling America to sustain its global primacy, both nations' combined determination to guard values and prophylactic moves to protect valuable sea lanes of open communication will be fruitive. This Article is an Original Contribution to the SIS Blog Tashi Dorje Gyamba is a Ph.D. candidate in the Diplomacy and Disarmament division at the Centre for International Politics, Organisation and Disarmament (CIPOD), School of International Studies (SIS), Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

By Prof. (Dr.) Gulshan Sachdeva Even if a trade deal remains elusive, the current geopolitical environment offers numerous opportunities for the two large democratic entities to collaborate on technology, connectivity, and green transition From today , President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen, accompanied by the College of Commissioners is on an  unprecedented visit  to India. In addition to der Leyen, the college consists of Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas, five executive vice-presidents, and 20 commissioners overseeing their respective portfolios. The 27 commissioners represent each of the EU's member states, with one from each country. They will meet Prime Minister Narendra Modi and their other counterparts in the Indian government.   During the visit, the India-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) meeting will also take place. Historically, Europe has been crucial for India's trade and investment. As India pursues its modernisation ambitions, the EU will remain a key partner in trade, technology, investment, and energy transition. In 2021, Modi  met all 27 EU leaders ,  leading to the resumption  of three separate negotiations on trade, investment, and Geographical Indications (GI) agreements as well as a ‘connectivity partnership’.   Last year, bilateral trade in goods and services reached  nearly $200 billion  and has remained balanced for many years. India has also attracted approximately  $120 billion  in investment from the EU. After exercising caution on trade deals for nearly a decade, India recently signed several agreements, including one with the four-nation European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Momentum  is also building  in India-UK trade negotiations.   The 10th round of India-EU trade talks is expected next month. Similarly, six rounds of negotiations have been held on investment and GI agreements. With the EU’s trade agreements cover 76 countries, India faces challenges in some of its exports. While a trade deal would be mutually beneficial, several issues  still need to be resolved .   Even if the FTA remains elusive, the current global geopolitical fragmentation offers new opportunities for the world’s two largest democratic entities to collaborate in many other areas. With a growing convergence of interests in the Indo-Pacific, both sides are actively exploring new avenues through initiatives like the TTC and the India Middle-East Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC).    Russia has become a major strategic challenge for the EU. For the past three years, India's perspective on the Ukraine war has differed from that of the EU. While the EU and several member states were disappointed with India’s stance, co-operation continued as their interests aligned in many areas. Now, the EU finds itself side-lined as the Donald Trump administration engages directly with Russia to resolve the conflict.  Picture Source: Deccan Herald Ursula von der Leyen has advocated for a ‘geopolitical Europe’ for the past four years, but European leaders are now confronted with real geopolitical shifts driven by the US and Russia. This has sparked discussions among European leaders about achieving greater ‘independence’ from the US in strategic affairs. Against this backdrop, India could emerge as a key partner for the EU in the evolving global order. In fact, the EU, India, and other partners could develop a joint strategy to counter Trump's tariff war.   In recent years, India’s engagement with the EU has expanded beyond its traditional focus on key member states like Germany, France, and the UK (when it was part of the EU). India has strengthened ties with the Nordics, Central, and Eastern Europe, and the Mediterranean region. It has launched India-Nordic summits, Baltic-Nordic business conclave, and established new strategic partnerships with Greece, Italy, and Poland.   Energy transition challenges in Europe differ significantly from those in India. New Delhi also has serious reservations about the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). However, the threat of climate change remains real. With the US once again withdrawing from the Paris Agreement, India and the EU have an opportunity to lead global climate initiatives. The International Solar Alliance is one such example. Since 2004, they have collaborated through various bilateral action plans. Additionally, India and the EU could also collaborate on transferring climate technology solutions to countries in the Global South.   Despite anti-immigrant rhetoric, particularly from far-Right political forces, most European nations are grappling with labour shortages. Unemployment rates are low, and the EU is facing a decline in competitiveness. This makes skilled and semi-skilled migration, as well as student mobility from India, beneficial for the EU. Since migration policies fall under the jurisdiction of individual member states, New Delhi has already signed — or is in the process of signing — migration and mobility agreements with several EU countries.   The EU College of Commissioners’ visit to India signals the EU’s strong intent to build a meaningful partnership with India. Geopolitical developments have opened new avenues for collaboration. However, both the EU and India must make serious intellectual efforts to understand each other. Otherwise, discussions will remain focused on peripheral issues rather than engaging on matters of real significance. Originally published : Deccan Herald, 27th February 2025 https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/can-india-eu-trade-ties-withstand-global-geopolitical-fragmentation-3423872   Prof. Gulshan Sachdeva is the Chief Coordinator of DAKSHIN-Global South Centre of Excellence at RIS, New Delhi, and a Professor and Jean Monnet Chair at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India

By Prof. (Dr.) Bharat H. Desai I. The Context: Fear of the ICC   On February 06, 2025 , the maverick President of the United States of America (USA), Donald Trump, chose to take up cudgels against the International Criminal Court (ICC) based at The Hague (The Netherlands). Invoking the grouse of “ International Criminal Court (ICC), as established by the Rome Statute , has engaged in illegitimate and baseless actions targeting America and our close ally Israel”, President Trump chose to designate it as a “national emergency to address that threat” and pronounced a series of ‘sanctions’ against the ICC and its officials. The US action has virtually placed the ICC on trial, as it did earlier when the Trump 1.0 Administration imposed similar sanctions on the ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda on September 02, 2020 . They were subsequently revoked on April 02, 2021  by the Biden Administration. This targeting of the ICC as a judicial body reflects the time we live in. It shows that sovereign states prefer international judicial institutions to deliver but don’t want their arrogant and authoritarian leaders hauled up for brazen use of force in violation of the UN Charter and the Laws of War. It is reminiscent of the US attack on the International Court of Justice (The Hague) in the aftermath of the 1986 Nicaragua Judgement  that held the USA responsible for “ breach of its obligations under customary international law not to use force against another State, not to intervene in its affairs, not to violate its sovereignty” ( page 136, paragraph 292 ). ICC President Judge Tomoko Akane (source: ICC website). The US action elicited a swift response from the President of the ICC on February 07, 2025 . “The announced Executive Order is only the latest in a series of unprecedented and escalatory attacks aiming to undermine the Court’s ability to administer justice in all Situations. Such threats and coercive measures constitute serious attacks against the Court’s States Parties, the rule of law based international order and millions of victims”, Judge Tomoko Akane said. The ICC has remained under attack from some of the powerful States that are not parties to the Rome Statute. Some leading non-member States include: China, India, Israel, Russia, United States etc. II.  Idea of International Criminal Justice   The idea of international criminal justice i.e. prosecuting the perpetrators before an independent tribunal or court of law having an international character has been in vogue for more than a century. It was works of scholars such as James L. Brierly ( 8 Brit. YB Int'l L. , 1927 ), Manley Hudson ( 38 American JIL 1938 549-554 ) and others that gave fillip to the idea and justification for a permanent International Criminal Court. Over the years, different models of institutional designs have emerged – international military tribunals (Nuremberg and Tokyo), international criminal tribunals (Yugoslavia and Rwanda), hybrid courts (Sierra Leone, Lebanon, Kosovo, East Timor and Cambodia) and national court with competence to try international crimes (Bangladesh). Jean-Paul Akayesu, former Rwandan politician prosecuted before the Int. Criminal Tribunal for Rwanada The permanent form, multilateral structure, judicial independence, fairness, expertise, transparency, among others, provided much legitimacy, credibility and an edge to the idea of the ICC. It performs functions to enforce universally recognised rules of international law, including the law of armed conflicts and human rights law. Has the ICC overcome the shortcomings and pitfalls of other tribunals?   It grapples with problems faced by the ICTY and ICTR in terms of distance from the conflict zone, cost factor, delay in trial and non-participation of local population. It follows ‘retributive model’ by focusing on criminal prosecution of the offenders instead of promoting post-conflict justice mechanisms. The Preambular paragraph 10 of the Statute as well as Articles 1, 17 and 18 lay down the principle of complementarity.   It implies the ICC shall “ exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern” as “complementary to the jurisdiction of national criminal courts” wherein they fail, or are unwilling or unable to act. Thus, availing cooperation of the States holds the key to compliance with the ICC orders to arrest and deliver the indicted persons for trial. ICC Trial Chamber in session  (source: ICC website) Governed through the Rome Statute (1998) , the ICC  came into being on July 01, 2002   ( vide  Article 125). With the seat in The Hague and 125 States Parties (February 11, 2025) [Africa: 33; Asia-Pacific: 19; Eastern Europe: 20; Latin America & Caribbean States: 28 and Western Europe & other States: 25], as a treaty-based independent international organization, the ICC aims to end impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the international community. The ICC structure comprises: Presidency (3 Judges), Judicial Division (Appeal; Trial; Pre-Trial); Office of the Prosecutor and the Registry. The Court has jurisdiction to prosecute and punish individuals for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and aggression.  The ICC process starts with the Prosecutor determining a formal charge or accusation of a serious crime and identifying an individual who bears the greatest criminal responsibility for the crimes. However, the ICC’s role is circumscribed and hence it may exercise jurisdiction wherein national legal systems fail to do so or are unwilling or unable to genuinely carry out criminal proceedings. III. Future of the ICC   All international institutions come under attack including the UN when they seek to give effect to their mandate that impinges upon vital national interests or adversely affect people in power in the member States. Things become precarious when a judicial body such as the ICC seeks to arraign key individuals of non-member States. Hence the recent outburst and attack on the ICC. For instance, on March 17, 2023 , the ICC issued  arrest warrants  for Russian president  Vladimir Putin  and other officials for alleged crimes committed in the wake of Russia’s ‘special military operation” in Ukraine.  Russia promptly denounced the arrest warrants as "outrageous" and Russia's Ministry of Internal Affairs  retaliated by placing several ICC officials on its wanted list. Similarly, on November 21, 2024 , the ICC announced arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister  Benjamin Netanyahu , and  Defense Minister  Yoav Gallant  for the war crimes committed in the Israel-Gaza war . It is in this backdrop that the US sanctions ( February 06, 2025 ) were announced on the ICC coinciding with an official visit of the Israeli PM . The ICC arrest warrants do infuriate the powerful people as they retaliate against the ICC Judges, the Prosecutor and the institution. It is a serious hazard for the judicial body to hold such individuals accountable for crimes under the Rome Statute as compared to affixing responsibility of their States (Russia or Israel) per se .   IV. Conclusion   As mentioned in this author’s previous twelve SIS Blogs on   Weapons of War   ( January 24, 2025 ), the question of Legal Controls of International Conflicts , taught by the author in SIS programs (MA and Ph.D.), has always remained a scholarly quest to eliminate warfare as an evil. Notwithstanding persistent quest for ‘outlawry’  of war ( 1907 Hague Peace Conferences ; 1919 Treaty of Versailles ; 1928 Pact of Paris ; 1945 UN Charter , Article 2 (4) ; Article 51 ), they continue to be a scourge for the humankind. It is truism that our “future lies not in war” ( Indian PM, January 09, 2025 ). Hence, Gandhi’s prophetic words provide us a ray of hope: “When I despair, I remember that all through history the way of truth and love has always won. There have been tyrants and murderers and for a time they seem invincible, but in the end, they always fall...think of it, always.” In the end, as asserted by President Tomoko Akane, the ICC staying the course amidst attacks matters since some 2 billion people face grave risks in 59 conflicts raging in 34 countries ( PRIO, June 10, 2024 ) in our troubled world.   This is an Original Contribution, the13th article in “Weapons of War” series, to the SIS Blog. Prof. (Dr.) Bharat H. Desai is the former Chairperson and Professor of International Law at the Centre for International Legal Studies (SIS, JNU), who served as a member of the Official Indian Delegations to various multilateral negotiations (2002-2008), initiated & coordinated the futuristic knowledge initiatives for the SIS Faculty Wall of Honor (2023-24) , the Inter-University Consortium: JNU; Jammu; Kashmir; Sikkim (2012-2020)  and the Making SIS Visible (2008-2013)  as well as contributes as the Editor-in-Chief  of Environmental Policy and Law (Sage: Amsterdam) .

By Sazia Azgar Recently US President Donald Trump remarked that, Turkey will “hold the key”  to what happens in Syria. Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been an ardent supporter of the anti-Assad Syrian opposition since the Syrian uprisings of 2011 and backed the protesters opposing the Bashar al-Assad regime. In December 2024, the government of Bashar al Assad was toppled by the rebels backed by Ankara, after which Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) took power under the leadership of commander-in-chief of the new administration Ahmad Al Sharaa and President Erdogan pledged full cabinet support to Syria’s new government. Since then relation between Syria and Turkey has been on an upswing, with high-level visits of figures like Syria's new foreign minister, Asaad Al Shaibani, to Turkey on January 15th, and Turkish foreign minister  Hakan Fidan recently met Syria's new leader, Ahmad al Shaara,  in Damascus. The Turkish flag was raised at the embassy in Damascus, which had reopened after a 12-year hiatus, within a week after former Syrian tyrant Bashar al-Assad's departure from Syria.   Picture Source : Aljazeera Syria in turkey's strategic calculus   On 25 December, Turkey's President, while addressing his Justice and Development, or AK Party’s parliamentary group meeting,  said  that “Syria’s security and peace might be secondary for others, but we can't have such luxury with a country with which we have a 910km long border.” President Erdogan has time and again emphasized on the creation of stable Syria with national reconciliation and economic development which will enable all Syrian refugees in Turkey to return to their homeland.” This is partly because Turkey is home to  3.6 million registered Syrian refugees  – the most in the world – opposition has been accusing the government of mismanaging refugee crisis and put the blame on refugees for Turkey's economic problems. There is significant domestic unrest fueled by growing anti-Syrian sentiments in Turkey which has resulted, in many places, in Syrian riots.   Turkey has been involved militarily along the northern Syria border, where the presence of the People’s Protection Unit (YPG) has been prominent. Turkey regards YPG as an affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a group that has fought for secession of the Kurdish region from Turkey to establish an independent Kurdish state, and  this conflict has claimed the lives of up to 40,000 people . Hence Turkey has designated it as a “terrorist” group and it remains at the center of the security strategy of Ankara. Turkey already occupies significant parts of Syria after it launched offensives against the YPG, and threatening to launch more attacks against the American-backed YPG. The Turkish government sees the overthrow of the Assad regime as an opportunity  to tackle the Kurdish  threat to its security. Regarding the YPG, Turkiye is now working with the new Syrian government and wishes to allow the new leadership to resolve the matter.   Another critical security threat for Turkey is the increasing encroachment of Israel into Syrian territory beyond the occupied Golan Heights. Since the fall of the al-Assad regime, Israel has increased its attack on Syria  to expand the occupation of Golan Heights,  with hundreds of air attacks, tanks, and illegal settlements. Therefore Israel is not only violating Syrian sovereignty and territorial integrity but also posing threats to Turkey’s national security.     Turkey’s approach to rebuild Syria   Turkey is the first country to engage with a new Syrian government after the fall of Assad. The reopening of the Turkish embassy signifies that Turkey is all set to play a crucial role in reconstruction and development post-Assad. Turkey believes that the reconstruction of Syria is essential for the return of 3.6 million Syrian refugees living in Turkey. As one of the biggest economies in the region with a robust construction industry, Turkey is conscious of its ability to restore Syria, which has been devastated in terms of infrastructure, services, and the economy during the past ten years. As Syria is to be rebuilt, Ankara is providing lucrative contracts for a Turkish reconstruction company. Turkey's ministries of transportation, energy, and natural resources have already declared their plans to repair Syria’s roads, airports, energy, and electrical infrastructure. These developments are already evident as  Turkish airlines resume flights to Damascus starting from 23 January , after a halt of more than a decade. Turkey’s President Erdogan has offered to help Syria in the  formation of a new constitution.  Turkey wants to train and modernize the Syrian army.      Challenges and Way Forward   There are many challenges to Turkey’s ambition in Syria as the situation in Syria remains unstable, Turkey's role in the reconstruction of Syria is getting the attention of other contending rival powers in the region. Since Ankara has emerged as the most influential powerbroker in Syria, the deepening of its influence is making some Arab governments uncomfortable. There has always been a rivalry between Turkey and Saudi Arabia for the leadership of the Sunni Muslim world. Some Arab countries like UAE and Egypt are upset with Turkey’s explicit support for Islamist groups.  Managing Kurdish autonomy aspirations is also a major challenge for Turkey. Though, HTS has assured that, Syrian grounds will not again be used for launching an attack against Turkey. The Turkish foreign minister remarked that  the Kurdish-led armed group YPG will be eliminated.   HTS doesn't want to put all its eggs in one basket. The new government of Syria is following the strategy of getting support from all sides. For instance, Saudi Arabia is also sending humanitarian aid to Syria. During the Assad regime, Syria served as an Iranian foothold in the Arab world. HTS wants to break from Iranian influence not only to come under Turkey’s.   Reports from the Israeli government suggest that Turkey and Israel could be on a collision course in Syria. Israel is backing the YPG against Turkey and Israel’s growing encroachment in Syria is jeopardizing the national security of Turkey. Therefore these geopolitical struggles suggest that Turkey is one of the main actors in Syria, not the dominant one. To have a say in the future of Syria, Turkey needs to control the northern part of Syria, however for this to happen, Turkey will have to make a compromise with the US which has been strengthening YPG. Also, Turkey will have to walk on a tightrope while pursuing its ambitions in Syria without making other regional powers uneasy.    #Syria #Turkey #Geopolitics This is an Original Contribution to the SIS Blog.   Saziya Asgar is a 2nd year masters student in Politics (with specialization in international politics), School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

By Prof. (Dr.) Bharat H. Desai I. The Context: Saying No to War   On January 09, 2025 , inaugurating the 18th  Pravasi Bhartiya Divas  (Bhubaneswar), the Indian Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi, thought it fit “to tell the world that the future lies not in war, but in Buddha ( भविष्य युद्ध में नहीं है, बुद्ध में है )”. Hopefully, this crisp but sagacious primer would become an Indian mantra  for 2025 to be a global solution provider for some 59 conflicts in 34 countries ( PRIO, June 10, 2024 ) that play havoc with global peace and prosperity. It is significant to have the prime ministerial assertion to “say no to war” in the land where Emperor Ashok renounced throne after witnessing brutality resulting from the Kalinga war.   There has been a persistent hammering by the Indian PM that this is “not an era of war” and to reject idea of strength “on the battlefield”. It has come out vividly in some of the PM’s recent addresses such as the UN Summit of the Future  (September 23, 2024) , Indian diaspora in Warsaw (August 22, 2024) , G20 Summit (September 09, 2023)  and the Joint Sitting of the US Congress  (June 23, 2023) . The PM has suggested the time tested tools of “dialogue and diplomacy” that are the basic tools for peaceful settlement of international disputes ( Part VI and VII of the UN Charter ). The elevation of such foreign policy posture at the highest level makes great sense even as it fits into the Indian civilizational ethos too. For instance, in 1942, Mahatma Gandhi , in the context of Second World War had called for imbibing the no-war  mantra and observed: “The warring nations are destroying themselves with such fury and ferocity that the end will be mutual exhaustion. The victor will share the fate that awaited the surviving (victorious) Pandavas”. Historically, war has been regarded as an appalling evil.     II. War: An Appalling Evil It is worrisome that in the third decade of the 21st century, some 2 billion people live in global conflict zones. Therefore, it makes great sense to raise the Indian foreign policy bar to ‘say no to war’. Emerging from the ashes of the Second World War and the League of Nations, UN Charter (adopted June 26, 1945)  ushered the humankind  “ to find a way to end wars”.  The US President Harry Truman humbly expressed thanks to the Almighty God to usher 50 founding ‘United Nations’ to “ search for peace through world organization”. “If we had had this Charter a few years ago-and above all, the will to use it--millions now dead would be alive. If we should falter in the future in our will to use it, millions now living will surely die”, Truman prophesized in the closing address (UNCIO; San Francisco) . Yet, within 41 days, same Truman ordered first dropping of the two nuclear bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima (August 6) and Nagasaki (August 9) . It killed between 150,000 and 246,000 people and inflicted the first major blow to the Charter blueprint wherein all members “shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force” [ Article 2 (4) ]. In its 80th year, the UN is struggling to douse all raging warfare even as the UN Security Council (UNSC) struggles to adopt even ceasefire resolutions since invisible hands of P5 lurks behind many of the conflicts.       Let Us Beat Swords into Ploughshares : A sculpture by  Evgeniy Vuchetich ; UN Art Collection The question of Legal Controls of International Conflicts , taught for years by this author, has remained a scholarly quest for elimination of the scourge of war that has been considered ‘extra-legal’ – neither legal nor illegal. There has been a persistent quest for ‘outlawry’ as seen in 1907 Hague Peace Conferences , 1919 Treaty of Versailles  and 1928 Pact of Paris . After the advent of the 1945 UN Charter, notwithstanding the  ‘blueprint’ for the prohibition of war [ Article 2 (4) ; Article 51 ], wars have remained a scourge for the humankind.  In 2018, the Nobel Peace Prize  was awarded, to Denis Mukwege and Nadia Murad, “ for their efforts to end the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war and armed conflict" . Growing weaponization of sexual & gender-based violence ( Author: SGBV in International Law  ( 2022 ; 2023 ) has become the biggest menace in all conflicts. “If we want people to say ‘no more war’, we have to show how brutal it is”, Berit Reiss-Andersen, Chair of the Norwegian Nobel Committee said.   The world has experienced the highest number of 59 conflicts (2024)  with military spending reaching US dollar 2.2 trillion (2024)  and Global Humanitarian Overview  (2024)  predicting 300 million people in need for humanitarian aid. A s per UN Women estimates of 2024, 6oo million women and girls   (300 million in 2017) faced risks of violence in conflict zones. In a worrisome 2025 UNICEF Global Outlook , armed conflicts also pose serious risks to over 473 million children living in conflict zones. Picture Source : A sculpture at Mujibnagar (Dhaka), vividly depicts the mass rape of the Bangladeshi woman during the 1971 Liberation war.  Mike Walz, US Congressman and incoming national security adviser, observed on January 12, 2025  that the Ukraine war has become a World War One-style "meat grinder of people and resources" with "World War Three consequences". “I just don't think it's realistic to say we're going to expel every Russian from every inch of Ukrainian soil, even Crimea”, Walz said. On the other hand, though news of a ceasefire deal (January 18, 2025) in the Gaza war , has brought relief, Hamas is insisting for full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, whereas Israel won’t end the war until Hamas is dismantled. During last 3 years, these two wars alone have killed thousands and displaced millions of people.   III. Invoking Dialogue and Diplomacy   Since seeds of warfare lie in human minds, complete elimination remains a utopian goal. How to give effect to the assertion that “this is not an era of war”? What will it take to bring about sanity among the warring groups driven by greed for power, past baggage, control over resources, proxy wars and sheer banality. Therefore, it would be the biggest service to the humanity, if India can rise as a “global solution provider” ( SIS Blog : March 22, 2024 ; October 01, 2022 ) to end some major conflicts especially impinging upon vital national interests. The tools of ‘dialogue and diplomacy’, based upon the bedrock of International Law, could comprise use of negotiations, good offices, mediation and roles as deal maker or trouble shooter. It would entail reaping ‘peace dividends’ through select constructive engagements by leveraging civilizational links, democratic credentials, reservoir of goodwill, economic capacity, military prowess and intellectual wherewithal. Any such Indian engagement would require meandering through diverse players, processes and problematique.     Picture Source : UNICEF/Diego Ibarra Sánchez: A child walks amongst the ruins of houses in southern Lebanon IV. Conclusion   Within the limit of time and space of this blog, the primer on ‘dialogue and diplomacy’ entails adherence to the PM’s assertions on “relevance” and “commitment” to International Law to work out appropriate conflict-specific solutions. Such an audacious Indian role, would necessitate entrusting the task to a resolute person duly backed by a university-based scholarly architecture to lay groundwork for conflict resolution. There is no substitute for cutting-edge solution-oriented research. To institutionalize an Indian role as a global solution provider including ‘saying no to war’ calls for setting up of a diplomatic university led by a genuine and forward-looking thought leader.     This Article is an Original Contribution to the SIS Blog. It is the 12th article in the author's SIS Blog series on : USE OF WEAPONS OF WAR. Prof. (Dr.) Bharat H. Desai is the former Chairperson and Professor of International Law at the Centre for International Legal Studies (SIS, JNU), who served as a member of the Official Indian Delegations to various multilateral negotiations (2002-2008), initiated and coordinated the futuristic knowledge initiatives for the SIS Faculty Wall of Honor (2023-24) , the Inter-University Consortium: JNU; Jammu; Kashmir; Sikkim (2012-2020)  and the Making SIS Visible (2008-2013)  as well as contributes as the Editor-in-Chief  of Environmental Policy and Law (IOS Press: Amsterdam) .

By Kuldeep Ojha Donald Trump’s re-election in 2024 marks the beginning of a potentially transformative era for U.S.-Latin America relations. Trump promises to promote his ‘America First’ policy, based on a combination of neo-conservative thought, and the Monroe Doctrine's principles of “American dominance” in the Americas, given that Republicans dominate the Senate and House . If the first Trump presidency and his campaign rhetoric are any indication of things to come, his policy approach on trade, border security, immigration, and energy transition are likely to shape Latin America’s own policy choices. President Trump’s affinity with right-wing nationalist leaders in the region might also play a role in shaping bilateral ties. However, Trump’s transactional and personalistic approach would translate into uncertainty and even policy reversals. Within this scenario of an ‘America First’ presidency that will withdraw from the leadership role, Latin American countries are likely to resort to bilateral diplomacy to wrest concession and avoid conflagrations.   The Protectionist Disruption Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy, evident during his first term, treats international relations as a series of deals prioritizing the US economic interests. By withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)  and renegotiating the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) into the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA ), Trump clarified that multilateral arrangements would take a back seat to bilateral deals designed to boost the US influence. Since most Latin American countries rely significantly on commercial activity with the United States, this position could pose serious difficulties. For example, Trump's proposed 10% import tariff could severely impact Latin American economies, which are heavily dependent on exports to the U.S. market. While Mexico is particularly prone to tariff-induced disruption, Brazil and Argentina’s already troubled economies may face a double whammy . On one hand, Trump’s proposed tariffs would negate their excess to the lucrative US market. At the same time, sapping demand from China might deprive them of an alternative destination. In kind, the protectionism used by Trump may have reciprocal measures such as tariffs and devaluations of currencies. This may lead to the collapse of mutually trading system with smaller countries, that will ensure the weaker economies become volatile and unstable. Concretely, Trump’s policies may affect Latin American Agrarian and Industrial products that define the continent’s export baskets. Especially Brazilian soybeans and Argentine beef are imported to a large extent into the United States and would particularly be harmed by a high tax on agriculture imports. Moreover, it seems that Trump’s bolder ways of achieving the economy through reduction of corporate taxes and increased spending in the US may lead to the larger fiscal deficit and cause inflation to increase the unadjusted interest rates. This may, in turn, lead to the Latin American currencies decline by even a larger extent; thus, negatively affecting the region’s economy growth rate. According to the Pew Research, Latin American gross domestic product may have difficulty breaking the 3% growth mark in the following years. The unpredictable and skeptic decision making, that defines Trump policies around the region, could prompt regional leaders to continue applying a persuasive leadership principle to secure political favor or trade export permits for certain key sectors. However, in the long-run, the most potent way of countering protectionism and policy risks that are evident in the American inward turning strategy, is to build relationships with Asian, European and African markets. After Trump withdrew from the TPP, the redesigning of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), negotiated by Japan, shows the potential of such an approach.     Crackdown on Illegal Immigration Trump 1.0 took a zero-tolerance stance on non-traditional security issues emanating from Latin America, including drug trafficking, gang violence, and illegal immigration. It is reasonable to expect a continuation of the hard-line approach in his second term, including stricter border control and potential military action against the Mexican drug cartels. More recently, Trump’s Vice President-elect J.D. Vance has sought consent to let the US president launch strikes against cartel compounds in Mexico. This could distort the relationship between Mexico and the US. The effects of these policies would be felt most acutely in countries like Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, where poverty and violence drive thousands to seek refuge in the US. Trump’s strict immigration stance has translated into policies of family separations and deportations, with significant impacts on the economies of Central American countries. However, illegal immigration was a hot political issue in the recent presidential campaign, in which the Republican candidate associated the issue with its impact on economy and ethno- cultural identity. In this case, Trump’s immigration policies will be harmful to immigrants and Latin American economy particularly because of issues of deportation and construction of Camps.  For example, nearly 5 million Mexicans and 2 million Central Americans reside illegally in the United States.  Remittances sent by migrants from the US, contribute substantially to these economies, particularly in Guatemala and Honduras. If deportations go through and the erstwhile illegal residents are forced to return to their home countries, it will add to the pressure on the Latin American governments to generate suitable opportunities for the influx of returnee population. The failure to meet the economic aspirations of deported people would cause social and political discontent. Therefore, massive deportations or restrictions in remittances may further destabilize these economies. This situation may lead Latin American countries to increased unemployment, poverty, and, in essence, pressures towards more human movements.   The Green Transition Setback Trump's re-election also means that he shall continue to have the same policy on climate that he has laid in his first presidency, which is pro-fossil fuels. He has continuously supported such measures to bring back coal and oil industries . This could help oil rich countries in Latin America such as Guyana, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago get more US investments in fossil fuel. Nevertheless, for the countries such as Brazil and Colombia, the members of the rainforest, Trump’s attitude towards climate action might be costly. For instance, Brazil, which will be hosting the COP 30 climate conference in 2025 , has cited the Lula presidency to its readiness to gain a place among world powers in the preservation of the environment. Nevertheless, Trump’s support of fossil energy and his previous exit from the Partnership with Paris Agreement may alienate the better cooperation with Brazil regarding climatic conservation programs. Additionally, Trump’s policies could strain biodiversity in Latin America’s tropical rainforests, crucial for absorbing global carbon emissions.  Trump’s disregard for climate action may not sit well with the environmentally conscious Latin American leaders like Lula. The green transition sceptics constituency that Trump represents would cause harm to the American reputation for leadership on climate change in the eyes of Latin America. Trump’s disregard for green energy transition may also dash hopes for a Marshall Plan-like endeavour on the part of the US to enable technology transfer to the Global South. Ironically enough, the void created by the US in this domain shall allow China to step in with its ‘green transition diplomacy’. Since clean energy is increasingly going to dominate economic activity, China’s aid and technology transfer to enable this economic transformation in Latin America will provide it with economic gains in terms of market access and diplomatic support in terms of favourable bilateral relationship China’s green energy leadership in the US backyard then will amount to a strategic setback for the US. While Latin American countries may partially hitch their wagon to Chinese tech and services, they would do well to find alternatives to reduce the risks of excessive dependency. Such a diversification bid may also involve cooperating with the US by engaging with the private sector, civil society experts, and provincial governors more attuned to the climate risk.   Diplomatic Shifts and Future Relations Trump’s re-election has galvanized right-wing leaders across Latin America, including Argentina’s Javier Milei and El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele, who share with Trump an affinity for “tough” policies and nationalist rhetoric. Central American countries such as Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Panama, as well as South American countries such as Paraguay, Chile, and Uruguay, that are in synergy with the US economic and security agenda are likely to benefit from this Trump regime. Trump support for conservative right- wing governments in these countries could foster enhanced economic and security cooperation mainly in the fight against drug cartels, and management of economic risks. However, Trump’s re-election could create diplomatic hurdles for left-leaning governments, such as those in Mexico, Chile, and Brazil, which will find it hard to deal with his militaristic, unilateralist approach to foreign policy with a disregard for diplomatic norms. He proposed an aggressive approach to so-called anti-American states, including Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, which he calls, the “ Troika of Tyranny ”. His aggressive policy could only deepen the measures to impose more sanctions and a more profound isolation of these countries. For instance, Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela could get even heavier sanctions that will imply limitation or even total banning of the export of petroleum, which is the main exportable commodity of Venezuela, and could exacerbate a present scarcity of foodstuffs and drugs. Furthermore, Trump's focus on alleviating China's clout in Latin America adds another dimension of geopolitical rivalry.  Under The America Crece  initiative, the US seeks to promote private investments in Latin American infrastructure sector. If done rightly, this initiative could counter China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and help revitalize the Latin American economy. However, during the COVID-19 pandemic, China’s ‘ mask diplomacy ’ helped it gain a foothold in Latin American markets, where public sentiment towards China has become increasingly favourable. Pew Research Centre further reveals that most of the Latin Americans view China as an economic- ally and, at some point, even as a geopolitical ally. Conclusion Trump’s second term is set to redefine the US-Latin American relations through a transactional lens, where bilateral treaties, strict immigration reforms, and strategic anti-China measures take precedence. For Latin America, where the pace of growth is still low, estimated at 1.8%, Trump can increase existing economic and social problems, and some can turn to other partners and cooperate with China or Russia. While Latin America struggles with how to cope with the aftermath of the downturns, its leaders will have no choice but to be business-like in relation to Trump while relying on diplomacy to obtain the best possible conditions for their countries. Trump’s neo-conservative policy and, in addition, the absolute adherence to an ‘America First’ doctrine may catalyze a new phase of Latin American diplomacy in front of a binary choice: cooperation or divergence. Sustainable foundations for this new bilateral the US-Latin America relationship will be predicated on how the two regions will maneuver around the swirl of economic relations, security, and environmental concerns caused by evolving power realignments This Article is an Original Contribution to the SIS Blog Kuldeep Ojha is a PhD scholar in Latin American Studies at SIS, JNU. His research focuses on environmental governance in Central America, and his interests extend to the Latin American region and its geopolitics.

By Prof. (Dr.) Bharat H. Desai I. Views of the States   On the whole, all the presentations (written and oral) made by the States and IOs brought a variety of legal arguments that constituted the mosaic of different approaches in addressing the challenge of global climate change. For instance, Brazil  ( Written Statement, March 21, 2024 ; Oral Presentation, December 03, 2024 ) highlighted its commitment to ambitious emissions reductions, stressing that despite being a developing country, it faces significant challenges like poverty eradication and extreme climate impacts. The Brazilian envoy underscored the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”. China ( Written Statement, March 22, 2024 ; Oral Presentation, December 03, 2024 ) urged the ICJ to avoid creating new legal obligations and focus on existing frameworks and underscored the developed countries’ historical responsibility.   The Indian approach has been reflected in the Written Statement of March 21, 2024 ; Oral Presentation, December 05, 2024 . Since this author prepared the initial draft of the Indian Written Statement, it is worth spelling out the stance emphasizing that the “Court may exercise due caution to avoid devising new or additional obligations beyond what is already agreed under the existing climate change regime”. [ Indian Written Statement, March 21, 2024; conclusion, page 39, paragraph 106 (iii) ]. However, the two leading players on the climate chessboard, European Union (EU) and the United States took different positions. The EU ( Written Statement, March 22, 2024 ; Oral Presentation, December 13, 2024 ) emphasized cooperation and stressed the non-adversarial nature of the advisory proceedings and pointed to the importance of existing treaties in addressing climate change but stopped short of calling for enforcement mechanisms. On the other hand, the United States ( Written Statement, March 22, 2024 ; Oral Presentation, December 04, 2024 ) acknowledged the severity of the climate crisis but rejected by the notion that “common but differentiated responsibilities” is a fundamental principle of international law.   Picture Source : UNICEF/ Lasse Bak Mejlvang: Small Island nations, such as Tuvalu face greater risk from sea level rise arising from extreme climatic changes. II. What Would the World Court Do? Upon perusal of the Written Statements and hearing the Oral Presentations ( December 13, 2024 ), some ICJ judges asked the States and IOs specific questions and sought responses by December 20, 2024 ( ENB , December 16, 2024 ) It did elicite good clarifications from 60 States and 5 IOs, till December 20, 2024 .  The Court is expected to deliver its considered Advisory Opinion, hopefully, in the first half of 2025. After the ICJ renders an opinion, the ball would revert back to the UNGA who could further decide on the course correction.   Since there are indications of floundering of the UNFCCC process, as seen in the outcomes of last three successive COP meetings at Baku ( COP29, November 11-24, 2024 ), Dubai ( COP28, November 30-December 12, 2023 ) and Sharm-al-Sheikh ( COP27, November 6-18, 2022 ), it could possibly yield critical space to the ICJ to illuminate upon some seminal aspects for affixing obligations of the states within and beyond the three principal international legal instruments on climate change ( 1992 UNFCCC , 1997 Kyoto Protocol ; 2015 Paris Agreement ) .   It presents an ideational challenge for International Law and Relations scholars, the UNGA and the UNFCCC process. As argued in one of this author’s ideational papers ( Environmental Policy and Law  52 (5-6) 2022, 331-347 ),  the climate crisis calls for earnestly elevating the normative ambit of climate change regulation from a common concern to a planetary concern ( here , EPL , 54 (1) 2024, 3-14 ; here, EPL Blog , January 5, 2023 ; here , EPL , 52 (5-6) 2022, 331-347 ). The UNGA could take the charge by adopting a normative resolution at the 80th session (after the ICJ renders its Opinion in 2025) to provide future directions to the global regulatory approach on climate change. The ICJ would need to find answers to the specific questions in the UNGA request (March 29, 2023 ) . W hat would the World Court do to nudge the UNGA and the States to squarely address the global climate riddle? Picture Source: ICJ: Oral Presentations Venue: The Great Hall of Justice, Peace Palace: December 02-13, 2024 III. Making International Law Work In view of the above legal stratagems and crafting of tools and techniques to stabilize GHG emissions enshrined in the three legal instruments ( 1992 UNFCCC , 1997 Kyoto Protocol  and 2015 Paris Agreement ) , the regulatory approach appears to be stagnating. It has brought in fatigue effect, proliferation of national climate change litigations and the UNGA request . Ironically, the Baku COP29 (November 11-24, 2024   resulted in literal abandonment of the multilateral climate negotiations by some States and lukewarm attitudes of others. The Baku COP29 decision ( CMA.6: New collective quantified goal on climate finance, paragraph 8 ; Press Release, November 24, 2024 ) “to set a goal, in extension of the goal referred to in paragraph 53 of decision 1/CP.21, with developed country Parties taking the lead, of at least USD 300 billion per year by 2035 for developing country Parties for climate action” requires cautious optimism in view of the previous experience of such climate funding commitments remaining on paper. The outcomes of the three back-to-back global events, Summit of the Future ( New York; September 22-23, 2024 ), Sustainable Development Goals  ( New York; September 18-19, 2023 ) and Stockholm+50 Conference  ( Stockholm; June 2-3, 2022 ) have dampened prospects for squarely addressing the climate emergency. As we look ahead, it is high time for the States Parties to the climate change regime ( 1992 UNFCCC , 1997 Kyoto Protocol  and 2015 Paris Agreement ) to engage in a major course correction, as preliminarily spelled out above. It calls for audacity of hope for wiser counsels to prevail. As an immediate goal, the State Parties need to elevate the normative ambit as a planetary concern . Thus, the forthcoming Advisory Opinion of the World Court can provide a nudge and a robust basis to locate “obligations of the states” within the realm of the said larger planetary concern.   In this respect, some of this author’s ideational works ( here , EPL , 54 (1) 2024, 3-14 ; here, EPL Blog , January 5, 2023 ; here , EPL , 52 (5-6) 2022, 331-347 ), done on his home turf of SIS, modestly provide some solutions to the problematique . IV. Conclusion It is in the above-mentioned larger context, in designing an Opinion expected in the first half of 2025, the ICJ has sufficient room for ‘widening the horizons’ through the instrumentality of interpretation on “obligations of states” in International Law. It remains to be seen as to how far the ICJ draws upon its past practices, precedents and processes. The content and futuristic trajectory of the Opinion would depend upon current composition of the Court wherein the judges with academically strong backgrounds could venture to innovate and extrapolate by reading within the fine texts of the three climate change instruments. It may yield “decisive course correction”, as suggested in this author’s recent ideational works ( here , EPL , 54 (1) 2024, 3-14 ; here, EPL Blog , January 5, 2023 ; here , EPL , 52 (5-6) 2022, 331-347 ). After the Court delivers an Opinion, the UNGA would consider it and give shape to the views of the UN Member States through an appropriate resolution, possibly at the 80th session of the UNGA. It could suggest the road ahead for addressing the planetary level climate emergency. As of now, for deciphering obligations of states in respect of climate change  under international Law, we need to trust the wisdom of the ICJ judges who represent the principal legal systems of the world. This Article is an Original Contribution to the SIS Blog. The Article is a sequel to the article Planetary Climate Emergency Part -I Prof. (Dr.) Bharat H. Desai is the former Chairperson and Professor of International Law at the Centre for International Legal Studies (SIS, JNU), who served as a member of the Official Indian Delegations to various multilateral negotiations (2002-2008), initiated and coordinated the futuristic knowledge initiatives for the SIS Faculty Wall of Honor (2023-24) , the Inter-University Consortium: JNU; Jammu; Kashmir; Sikkim (2012-2020)  and the Making SIS Visible (2008-2013)  as well as contributes as the Editor-in-Chief  of Environmental Policy and Law (IOS Press: Amsterdam) .