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By Rohan Ranjan Raut Ray The ongoing War in the Middle East has once again reminded us of a truth in this interconnected World: A Conflict in one region sends shockwaves across the Global System. This crisis in the Gulf is no d ifferent, as Iran, through its control over the Strait of Hormuz, has held the energy security of the entire world hostage. The Strait of Hormuz is one of the most critical chokepoints for global energy, as about 20-25% of the world’s daily petroleum needs and around 20% of LNG pass through it. This makes the region strategically vulnerable, and Iran has used this to its advantage. India, being a major importer of crude oil and LNG from the region, is also exposed to these disruptions. India is the third largest consumer of crude oil in the world, and imports more than 88.5% of its domestic consumption, of which nearly 55% comes from the Gulf countries: 16.6% from Iraq, 17.5% from Saudi Arabia, 10.4% from the UAE, 6.1% from Kuwait, and 3.6% from Qatar. Most of these oil imports pass through the Strait of Hormuz, and as Iran has closed this Strait, oil supplies from these countries are at risk. In this scenario, to sustain its large oil-consuming economy, India has to employ multiple strategies: looking for alternative supply channels, increasing domestic capacity and most importantly, using its Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPR). In India, the first Strategic Petroleum Reserve facilities were established by the ISPRL at Visakapatnam, Mangaluru, and Padur, with a capacity of 39 million barrels. In Phase II, the government has approved the establishment of two additional Commercial-cum strategic facilities in Chandikol and Padur, adding an additional capacity of 47.8 million barrels. When Phase II gets online, our total strategic reserves will be about 87 million barrels. As of April 2026, India’s total Crude oil reserves are about 250 million barrels, of which 211 million barrels are commercial reserves, and only 39 million barrels constitute the strategic ones. As our daily oil consumption is about 5.43 million barrels/day (MB/D), that means our current strategic reserves will only last for 9 to 10 days, and our total reserves may last for about 50 to 74 days. For an economy of India’s scale, its strategic reserves remain inadequate, making the economy very vulnerable during crises. India is also behind in building its Strategic Petroleum Reserves compared to its peers like the USA, China, and Japan. The United States has a total petroleum reserve of around 854 million barrels, of which 415 million barrels are in its strategic reserves. However, the United States, as a net oil exporter, does not face a similar risk profile, as it may not even face an oil shortage unless its domestic capacities are hit. China maintains total reserves of about 1.2-1.3 billion barrels, which can last for around 3 to 4 months, and has strategic reserves of about 400-500 million barrels. Japan’s total petroleum reserves of about 470 million barrels can last for around 254 days, and its strategic reserves of 260 million barrels are the third largest after the USA and China. Japan’s petroleum reserves are considered the “Gold Standard”, as its SPR alone can last for about 146 days. Notably, Japan’s daily crude oil consumption (3.2 MB/D) is about 60% of India’s, yet Japan’s Strategic Petroleum Reserves capacity is about 6.7 times India’s current strategic capacity. Given India’s dependence on imports, the projected capacity of 87 million barrels will be insufficient. In this increasingly uncertain energy environment, India will require a far bigger strategic buffer. It is also misleading to look at the number of days of Strategic Reserves countries require in a vacuum, as countries like the United States, a net oil exporter, can rely on domestic production during a crisis and may not require their strategic reserves. In contrast, Net oil-importing countries, like India (over 88%), Japan (over 95%), and China (over 74%), are far more vulnerable to external shocks as they depend on foreign supplies and also do not have sufficient domestic capacity to meet their domestic demands. Therefore, Strategic reserves become even more important for these countries. However, maintaining these Strategic Reserves comes at a cost. Also, these reserves remain untapped for a very long time, only in use during a crisis. Therefore, it is really difficult to know what the ideal amount of strategic reserves a country should keep. The IEA mandates a 90-day benchmark for full Energy security. But as we discussed, different countries have different metrics to calculate the reserves they require. The 1973 oil crisis, the Gulf War of 1990-91, and the Western Sanctions on Russian and Iranian oil, all these past incidents have reminded us repeatedly of our dependence on external sources and how a crisis far away can suddenly create disruptions at home. Looking at our current Strategic Reserves, we clearly have not learned our lessons. As projected, if our future consumption goes up to 7 million barrels/day by 2030, we will atleast require a Strategic Reserves capacity of 630 million barrels, just to maintain the 90-day benchmark mandated by the IEA. The ISPRL Phase II was announced in 2010, received its cabinet approval in 2021, and now, in April 2026, the Chanhikol project is still facing delays due to issues in land acquisition. This inadequacy in Strategic Reserves is an urgent national crisis, and its current projects must be fast-tracked. Additionally, a high-level committee must be constituted to look into the expansion of these strategic reserves. Otherwise, we are just keeping India’s Energy security on borrowed time, waiting for the next crisis to hit us. This War is another lesson and a reminder: Build Capacity or Risk Crises. This is an Original Contribution to the SIS Blog. Rohan Ranjan Raut Ray is currently a postgraduate student at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. His academic pursuits are centred around geopolitical issues and changing global dynamics.

By Ambassador: Asoke Mukerji Permanent representative to the United Nations in New York Ambassador of India to the Republic of Kazakhstan 2005-2007   Three referendums have been held in Kazakhstan so far on its Constitution – in 1991, in 1995 and in 2022. The first referendum in 1991 and the second referendum in 1995 were the most significant. They helped to chart the identity of independent Kazakhstan, and its way forward. Kazakhstan had three priorities at its independence in December 1991. The first priority was on internal harmony between the different ethnic groups, with a conscious decision to name the country “Kazakhstan” and not “Kazakhistan”. The second priority was on the territorial integrity of the country, particularly two challenges – the position of the large ethnic Russian population in the northern third of the country, and the potential challenges to the stability of the country from radical Islamic political movements from the south in Afghanistan. The third priority was on the socio-economic growth of the country. Natural resources and agriculture were already prominent contributors to the socio-economic activities, with coal mining in Karaganda and agriculture in the southern regions. The decision to have a strong Presidential system of governance emanated from these three considerations. A strong Presidential system has provided stability, resulting in strong economic growth, based on country’s natural resources – its coal, Caspian Sea oilfields, gold and uranium. Between 1992 and 2026, Kazakhstan has maintained internal harmony. It has navigated its territorial integrity without challenges from either Russia or from its southern borders. In 1998, after 5 years of negotiations, it has demarcated its national borders with China. This has been a catalyst for China Kazakhstan relations, both in terms of trade and investment, and for infrastructure of the east-west alignment, providing land locked Kazakhstan and Central Asia with an outlet to the Pacific Ocean. India’s current trade with Central Asia uses this economic corridor between China and Kazakhstan. Since March 2025, India’s port of Mundra in Gujarat has been used to access Kazakhstan using the International North South Transport Corridor’s eastern alignment. In economic terms, Kazakhstan has used its Constitutional framework to enter into international agreements for developing its natural resources for development. This is visible in the Caspian Sea oilfields since 1994, and in the mining of minerals such as gold and uranium. In 2006, India obtained a stake in the Satpayev Caspian Sea oilfield of Kazakhstan. Today India is the largest importer of uranium from Kazakhstan for its nuclear energy programme. The prosperity of Kazakhstan has been used to develop its human resources, including by skilling abroad under state-funded programmes like Bolashak since 1993, and by inviting international partners to deliver and/or upgrade skilling institutions in Kazakhstan. Since 1992, India’s ITEC programme has been used actively by Kazakhstan to develop its skilled human resources in Indian institutions. Over 12,000 Indian students currently study medicine in Kazakhstan’s medical institutes. In terms of foreign policy, the internal priority for harmony manifested itself in Kazakhstan’s initiative for cooperation and security in Asia, known as CICA, proposed at the UNGA in 1992 itself. India joined the CICA in June 2002 at its first Summit and joined the decision to create the CICA Secretariat in 2006. From 2007, India has seconded a diplomat to work in the CICA Secretariat. Kazakhstan has been proactive in supporting the United Nations. President Tokayev is the only Central Asian who has served as Deputy Secretary General and Director of the UN Geneva Office, and as Secretary General of the Conference on Disarmament. Kazakhstan supported India’s bid to be elected a member of the UN Security Council for 2011-12. It became the first Central Asian state to be elected to the UN Security Council for 2017-18. It is the only Central Asian state to have deployed its troops jointly with Indian troops in UN peacekeeping in Lebanon as part of IndBatt since 2018. For India, the proposed creation of a framework for digitalization and Artificial Intelligence adds a significant dimension to expanding bilateral digital cooperation, including through a India-Kazakhstan Digital Corridor. This will impact on the Eurasian Economic Union and its FTA negotiations with India, as Kazakhstan chairs EAEU bodies in 2026. The fact that one of Kazakhstan’s best-known Eurasian legal experts chairs its Constitutional Commission provides comfort in taking the FTA forward.   Remarks of Ambassador Asoke Mukerji at the Round Table on the Constitutional Referendum of Kazakhstan, JNU/SIS, New Delhi 12.03.2026

By Shibhankita Pradhan When German Chancellor Friedrich Merz arrived at Ahmedabad on 12th of January for his first official visit to Asia, the choice of destination by the newly elected German government spoke louder than any other official statement could. Not Beijing, not Tokyo, not Seoul but India’s commercial hub in Gujarat, Ahmedabad. He was accompanied by a 23 member CEO delegation  which further signalled serious economic intent. For a German Chancellor whose predecessor Olaf Scholz had prioritised China in his Asia engagement, Merz’s choice represented more than mere itinerary logistics rather it reflected an evolving strategic orientation enabled by conservative pragmatism reshaping Germany’s eastward engagement. A comparison to Scholz’s foreign policy choices helps shed some light on this change of course. Scholz’s visit to China in November 2022 was a representation of his coalition’s measured approach towards German foreign policy , as the visit attracted widespread domestic criticism and a wider European unease over Beijing’s partnership with Moscow following the Russia-Ukraine war. However, the newly elected government led by the Christian Democrats showcases a different approach to these strategic engagements. The decision to make India his first destination during his Asia visit appears less improvised than a calculated move by the German Chancellor. This shift in emphasis manifests in discernible policy signals . While Scholz’s China engagement is rooted in economic interdependence, Merz has more explicitly emphasised de-risking from Germany’s €300 billion annual trade exposure to Beijing. His decision to visit India first seems to indicate an acknowledgement that such dependence increasingly constitutes vulnerability rather than just an economic opportunity. On defence cooperation, where Scholz’s Zeitenwende  rhetoric encountered implementation challenges owing to the coalition politics, Merz’s visit provided a political momentum to the long running Project 75I submarine negotiations , including discussion of a framework understanding as the formal contract remains in the final stages of negotiation. On trade, though structural EU-level constraints remain unchanged, Merz’s call to “urgently conclude” the India-EU Free Trade Agreement  is far more explicitly stated when compared to Scholz. The timing of Merz’s visit to India acquires added significance against the backdrop of wider geopolitical uncertainty. The United States imposed 50 percent tariffs on Indian goods in August 2025, combining reciprocal measures with penalties linked to Russian oil purchase. Germany itself faces renewed trade and tariff unpredictability under Trump’s second term. Yet rather than viewing India’s strategic autonomy on Russian energy as an obstacle, Merz appears to be more pragmatic and accepting of partners maintaining divergent positions on specific issues. It seems to have a better compatible structure for Modi’s policy of multi-alignment than Scholz’s value-centred perspective, even as both governments ultimately support deepening India-Germany ties. Most importantly, India and Germany are also aligned through their shared membership in the G4 grouping,  along with Brazil and Japan as aspirants for permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council. On September 2024 G4 meetings,  the foreign ministers of the member nations reiterated that comprehensive reform in the current UNSC structure remains essential in restoring the Council’s equitable representativeness across the world. Seen in this light, Merz’s decision to prefer India over China also stems from the fact that China, being a P5 member has always shown little incentive to advance this structural reform. This can also be perceived as a strategic choice to build partnerships with fellow aspirants. This underscores how common ambition of UNSC reform may prioritise coalition building among like-minded states over reliance on slow-moving institutional processes. However, more often this partnership remains overshadowed by structural constraints that the theory of realism acknowledges. Divergent threat perceptions persist as Russia looms largest for Germany and China for India. Along with this, neither side can replace U.S. security guarantees, and India-U.S. cooperation continues across counterterrorism , military exercises and strategic dialogue despite tariff tensions. Consequently, the relationship between both countries in not a strategic realignment rather it aims at preserving flexibility and enhancing leverage through multi-directional engagement. As of now, the nineteen agreements  concluded during Merz’s visit which included defence, semiconductors, critical minerals, renewable energy and skills migration illustrate this convergence in practice. The semiconductor ecosystem partnership addresses shared concerns over Chinese supply chain dominance with India’s emerging manufacturing base complementing German design expertise. Cooperation on critical minerals which is also essential for EVs, batteries, defence systems, and renewable technologies, helps hedge against China’s estimated 60 percent control over global processing capacity. Also, Green hydrogen agreements position India as a potential future clean energy supplier to Europe, thereby, contributing to Germany’s diversification away from Russian dependence. Apart from this, healthcare workforce mobility initiatives also create opportunities for India’s skilled professionals, reinforcing long-term demographic complementarity between the two countries. Internal patterns of political shift from Scholz’s compromises in his coalition policies to Merz’s conservatism, can potentially speed up foreign policy shifts that were hitherto slowed down by ideological discrepancies or partnerships of governance. Destination diplomacy matters because leaders’ choices of destinations of their official foreign visits send twin signals, both symbolic priorities and substantive strategic intent to international partners and domestic audiences. Taken together, the defence, supply chain, energy, and mobility agreements concluded during the visit help explain why Germany increasingly views India not merely as one among many partners but as a central pillar of its own Indo-Pacific strategy , which encapsulates in Berlin’s effort to integrate trade, manufacturing, supply chain resilience and energy security across the Indian Ocean and East Asia to reduce overdependence over China. India offers what China potentially cannot, a democratic partner with massive manufacturing scale and a shared interest of reform in global governance. Prioritising Ahmedabad over Beijing thus reflects a strategic reorientation shaped by pragmatism. With this reconfiguration, India is increasingly recognised as a potential anchor for Germany’s Indo-Pacific engagement, a partial manufacturing alternative to China and a coalition partner in efforts toward UNSC reform. As both countries pursue permanent Security Council seats while managing complex ties with the United States, China, and Russia, their partnership offers a test of whether emerging powers can reshape aspects of global order through strategic coalitions rather than waiting for great power consensus. Whether this conservative convergence translates into sustained implementation remains uncertain. Even so, Merz’s arrival in India sent a clear signal that Germany’s new conservative government increasingly frames India not merely as an alternative to China, but as a priority partner in the twenty first century geopolitics. Whether symbolic or transformative, Ahmedabad before Beijing sent an unmistakable signal about Germany’s evolving priorities in Asia. #IndoGerman This is an Original Article Contribution to the SIS Blog. Shibankita Pradhan is a Ph.D. Candidate at the Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, JNU. Her academic pursuits are centred around research and writing on pressing political issues and global dynamics and transitions.

By Sanjay Turi In the wake of the Pahalgam Terrorism attack on April 22, India launched Operation Sindoor  and gave a befitting reply to Pakistan, giving an additional message to the world of having zero tolerance for terrorism. Subsequently, India also launched a diplomatic drive globally, giving special focus on the Global South. Ahead of the BRICS ’ scheduled meeting in Brazil, Prime Minister Modi’s recent visit  to Ghana, Trinidad & Tobago, Argentina, and Namibia sought to focus on wide-ranging economic, energy and cultural cooperation, which would go a long way in strengthening India’s diplomatic drive  to foster cooperation to fight against terrorism with a zero-tolerance approach. Although oil trading began in the late 19 th  century and dominated the global trade in the mid-20 th  century, its predominant role of hydrocarbon trade is now being challenged by the strategic shift of focus towards rare earth minerals and clean energy technologies . As countries from the Global South hold a significantly large reserve of both light and heavy  rare earth minerals such as uranium, lithium, cobalt, manganese, dysprosium, terbium (widely used for making permanent magnet for electric vehicle), PM Modi’s subsequent visit to these countries ahead of his participation in the BRICS meeting is a masterstroke. In light of Vision 2047 , India’s aspiration to rapidly transition to sustainable development, though initiatives like that of green energy and the manufacturing of electric vehicles, will obviously require the above-mentioned mineral resources in industrial development. Therefore, the recent visit of PM Modi is undoubtedly a step towards achieving one of the crucial goals of Viksit Bharat . Compared to other interior countries in the region, Ghana (located in the Gulf of Guinea) and Namibia, being situated on the coast of the Atlantic Ocean, are strategically more important, giving India geopolitical access to engage with other African countries where China is already showing its active presence. Namibia has become the first country  in the region to embrace the UPI(Unified Payment Interface ) digital network, and Rwanda is in line to join the services.  India is gradually expanding its engagement in the region. Ghana and Namibia, located on the Atlantic coast, offer India strategic access to West and Southern African countries where China has already established a strong presence. Ghana’s strategic location in the Gulf of Guinea in Western Africa also offers India an opening to the Atlantic Ocean. Ghana, having a large and significant Indian diaspora , shares a strong historical connection with India since its very independence.   The Economic Community of West African States( ECOWAS ) is considered a regional entity to govern the West African economic community. Therefore, for India, engaging with Ghana means engaging with ECOWAS. West Africa has abundant reserves of natural resources, and Ghana has significant portion of these mineral resources. West African countries face severe challenge of sea piracy. India, being a strong naval power in the Indian Ocean, showcasing the prominence of the SAGAR initiative, can potentially work in collaboration with West African countries of the Gulf of Guinea to fight piracy. Ghana, also being an important member of the India-Africa Forum Summit , is likely to serve as a launchpad for India to engage with the countries situated in the Global South. A Tectonic Shift in India-Ghana Bilateral Relations: Ghana’s previous engagements with China have not benefited Ghana that much ; Instead, China developed its infrastructure in the country in such a way that China has been the larger beneficiary. On the contrary, India is strategically more inclusive,  initially engaging with the common people of the country. The Indian government intends to connect with Ghanaians through several welfare initiatives, such as Feed Ghana  and skill development  programs for the youth in the country. As Ghana is the largest producer of gold  in the region, India is the world’s largest gold consumer . This contrast clearly shows how important and strong our bilateral relations are going to be in the future. Once the gold supply chain is established between the two countries, it will certainly help India to stabilise the  gold prices. India, with its rich socio-religious and ethnic diversity, is one of the biggest hubs of many religions and cultural functions, where the demand for gold can be seen persisting throughout the year. It is estimated that Ghana holds more than 960 million  tonnes of Bauxite reserves, which are used as an important component of several industries such as construction, aviation, defence, electric vehicle manufacturing, etc. Apart from this, Bauxite and Manganese are used in production of steel. As both countries have signed a trade deal for Bauxite, once India starts importing Bauxite from Ghana, it will give India an edge over other countries to excel in the industries mentioned above. Therefore, this trade deal between Ghana and India is expected to boost the Indian Semiconductor Mission  by augmenting the upstream industrial inputs.Ghana additionally has a great lithium reserve , and its import will help India excel in the manufacturing of batteries . Ghana’s trade of Lithium may provide India with an alternative, reducing its dependency on Australia and Latin America . Ghana has also requested that India conduct an ISRO-backed survey to explore other hidden mineral resources, primarily lithium, in the country. In return, India has promised to popularise Ghana’s lithium reserves in the entire Global South region, where India already has a greater influence . Therefore, the promotion of Ghana in the global south region is expected to help India deepen its strategic influence in the pro-Ghana West African countries, where China is already gradually expanding its wings. India has also founded a critical mineral working group under the India-Ghana strategic mineral partnership agreement , through which India, without any conditionality or coercion, will help Ghana in the exploration of natural minerals of the country. Hence, Ghana and Namibia, being located on the coast of the Atlantic Ocean, have not only become a strategic trade partner of India but also an important gateway to trade with other landlocked central African countries in the region. Considering China’s extensive penetration in the region, the Indian government must prioritise engaging with the strategically located countries in the region. As India is consistently seeking to champion the Global South, it would soon overshadow China’s debt-driven influence in the region. This is an Original Contribution to the SIS Blog.   Sanjay Turi is a Doctoral Candidate at the Centre for West Asian Studies(CWAS), School of International Studies(SIS), Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

By Sanjay Turi In the wake of the shifting regional power dynamics, the emerging alliance between China, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Taliban is a warning call for India to give more emphasis on engaging with the region. Ignoring China’s multilateral engagement with the neighbouring countries will pose a significant threat to India's strategic interests in the region.   In light of India’s Operation Sindoor  post Pahalgam Attack, the Chinese government hosted a meeting  between Pakistan and Afghanistan’s Taliban government led by Ishaq Dar  and Amir Khan Muttaqi, respectively. India’s earlier dream of benefiting from the rising conflict between Pakistan and the Taliban seems to have shattered as the Taliban has stepped towards joining  the China-led CPEC projects. In addition to the Taliban’s recent association with BRI, China’s simultaneous multilateral engagements with Pakistan and Bangladesh appear to have paved the way for the establishment of an anti-India bloc in the region. It has sent a shockwave to Delhi regarding the future bilateral relations between Delhi and Kabul, as well as Dhaka. The geopolitical dynamics of South and Central Asia are now poised for a notable shift with the Taliban's recent decision to officially join the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor ( CPEC ). Inaugurated in 2015  as a key project under China's Belt and Road Initiative ( BRI),  CPEC bridges China's Xinjiang region with Pakistan's Gwadar Port. With Afghanistan’s recent aspiration to join this crucial infrastructure network under the Taliban government, India is likely to face a significant strategic challenge in the entire Central Asian region. For New Delhi, which has historically held strong economic and diplomatic relations with Afghanistan, this decision of Kabul poses a significant threat to India's strategic influence in the region and raises major concerns regarding encirclement and influence. Picture Source: DD News From a geostrategic perspective, the deepening ties between India and Afghanistan in recent times, amid rising border tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, were well expected to work in favour of India. However, Kabul's recent shocking decision to join CPEC has completely changed the geopolitical landscape of this region. It can also be argued that as India has consistently been severely critical of CPEC (BRI), given that it passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir , Kabul’s landmark decision to cooperate with China and Pakistan on this project will not only deteriorate its bilateral relationship with India, but also, this diplomatic initiative by Kabul is likely to alter the entire geopolitics of Central Asia soon, further pushing India towards facing a significant geostrategic dilemma in the region.   China has long patiently sought to utilise CPEC as a gateway to the Gulf and other West Asian countries. Therefore, the Taliban’s recent decision to join CPEC will undoubtedly make the Chinese Dream Project inevitable, which will potentially help China counter India’s stronghold in the region. Once China manages to bridge this gap, it may aggressively disrupt India’s increasing influence in the region. As India has already made massive infrastructural investments and developmental projects such as Chabahr-Zahedan Railway line, Zaranj-Delaram Highway etc in Afghanistan, aiming to add to the International North-South Transport Corridor ( INSTC ) as a new gateway to carry out trade with Central Asia, Europe and Russia, the recent geopolitical dynamics in the post trilateral cooperation between China, Pakistan and Taliban will most likely disrupt India’s penetration in the region. China has recently hosted another trilateral meeting with Bangladesh and Pakistan in Kunming, and this meeting seems to be showing China’s strong determination to strengthen the String of Pearls Policy in the Indian Ocean. China’s increasing aspiration to get access to the Bay of Bengal through Bangladesh and the Arabian Sea through Pakistan is not only challenging the Indian influence in the region, but also significantly challenging the US influence in the Indo-Pacific region. Many experts believe that China, through this Kunming Diplomacy, seems to be creating an alternative bloc  to SAARC , where China, in the absence of India, will be dominating the entire South Asia and possibly the India ocean too. China’s focus on extending CPEC It has been widely observed that CPEC is slowly becoming less effective, as it encounters strong opposition from the locals in the Sindh and Baluchistan regions, which together make up 44%  of Pakistan's total land area. The people’s resistance to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor has reached the extent that local groups have begun targeting Chinese workers and engineers. Incidents involving the murder of Chinese officials and engineers have become increasingly common. Recently, there was an attempted attack  on some Japanese engineers at the CPEC project site because they looked like Chinese nationals. This clearly shows the degree of anger and resistance to this project in the region. Therefore, China has been looking for an alternative to both CPEC and the Gwadar port, given that India has already been promoting its Chabahar port  as a counter to China in the Persian Gulf region. Considering the political instability of Pakistan a significant challenge, China, after including the Taliban with the CPEC project, may be considering using the Wakhan Corridor  as an alternative to bypass Pakistan’s volatile regions of Sindh and Balochistan, and reach the Persian Gulf via the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) and Afghanistan. After the Taliban’s successful inclusion in this project, China’s aim of overshadowing Indian influence in the region seems to be working now. Additionally, the construction of the Peshawar-Kabul Highway  and other connectivity projects, an extension of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor in Afghanistan, will possibly provide China with direct access to the Middle East Region, the Central Asian Region, the Eastern African Region, the Gulf Region, the European Market, as well as the Indian Ocean through the Arabian Sea. Although the recent border conflict between Afghanistan and the Taliban was expected to benefit India strategically  in the region against Pakistan and China, the recent announcement of the Taliban joining the CPEC has completely disappointed India, while giving an edge to China over Indian influence in the region. Geopolitical implications for India As China manages to enhance its economic and strategic influence in Afghanistan and continues to expand the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) along India's northwestern border, India is very likely to face an inevitable challenge of being ‘encircled on two fronts’ - militarily by Pakistan and China, and economically through their increasing regional collaboration. Additionally, India is also facing a geostrategic challenge in the region, especially in the post Israel-Iran conflict, where India, unlike China , maintained strategic silence and chose not to extend its support to either country directly. In the face of India’s increasing strategic dilemma in the region, China’s direct access to the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal through Pakistan and Bangladesh, respectively, will additionally challenge India’s overall maritime security in the region, too. In terms of security challenges in Kashmir , the deepening ties between the Taliban and Pakistan raise concerns about the possible resurgence of militant networks that could potentially affect the Kashmir valley. Additionally, securing CPEC routes through the Wakhan Corridor of Afghanistan may give Pakistan space to shift its attention and resources toward its eastern border with India, which will undoubtedly help China keep India engaged with its own issues. As far as China’s political behaviour is concerned, the inclusion of Afghanistan in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is potentially oriented towards cutting India off from essential connectivity networks in Central Asia. While the IMEC project has been partially paralysed by the regional conflict of the Middle East, India's goals, including the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC)  and the Chabahar Port initiative, are now encountering heightened competition and potential diplomatic challenges from a growing China-led coalition in the region. In light of the shifting regional power dynamics, the emerging alliance between China, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and the Taliban is likely to pose a significant threat to India's strategic interests in the region. As China is looking forward to filling the void  left by Russia (Soviet Union) and the USA, one after the other, in Afghanistan, it has probably managed to trap Bangladesh and Pakistan along with the Taliban within its debt trap policy  network. With China offering political support and economic incentives, this strategic grouping has the potential to undermine and erode India's image as a regional stabiliser. As the new strategic alignment of the Taliban complicates the security dynamics in the region, it seems to be undermining India's ability to dictate and influence its own neighbourhood.  Consequently, it is high time for India to play a proactive role in exploring alternative strategies to recalibrate its foreign policy approach, primarily giving greater attention to the Link and Act West Policy  (formerly called Look West ).   This is an Original Contribution to the SIS Blog Sanjay Turi is a Doctoral Candidate at the Centre for West Asian Studies (CWAS), School of International Studies(SIS), Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

By Kuldeep Ojha Introduction The world’s oceans, long viewed as open frontiers of commerce and conquest, are fast emerging as the next battleground of climate politics. As new currents redefine maritime politics, Costa Rica— a land known more for its rainforests than its naval doctrine — has carved out a distinct role in steering the high seas conversation through law and diplomacy. At the Third United Nations Ocean Conference (UNOC3)  in Nice (France) this June, Costa Rica co-hosted the summit alongside France, calling for a fossil fuel exploration ban and a moratorium on deep-sea mining, while pushing for expedited ratification of the High Seas Treaty . As it looks toward COP30 in Belém, Brazil, Costa Rica’s ocean diplomacy offers more than moral suasion; it signals the arrival of small, values-driven states as active architects of a new environmental multilateralism. Photo credit: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Ocean Diplomacy as Statecraft: Costa Rica’s Turn to the High Seas For much of the twentieth century, ocean governance was the preserve of naval powers and trading giants. The rules were set by those who commanded the seas, not those who merely bordered them. However, as climate change unsettles traditional hierarchies in the twenty-first century, Costa Rica’s ascent as a maritime norm entrepreneur underscores how environmental diplomacy is increasingly becoming a theatre for small state agencies. In contrast to earlier summits, at UNOC3, Costa Rica did not serve as ceremonial; it was the thematic tone. President Rodrigo Chaves’ call for a global ban on fossil fuel exploration and a moratorium on deep-sea mining was far from symbolic; it challenged the inertia of the climate regime. Backed by years of legal activism  and environmental credibility, Costa Rica’s insistence on fast-tracking the implementation of the Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) Treaty  placed it at the heart of a diplomatic effort long stalled by geopolitical hesitation. It is not merely environmental idealism. Costa Rica understands that moral clarity can be converted into diplomatic capital in a fractured multilateral order. Its ocean diplomacy is strategic — deploying law, coalition-building, and convening power to influence norms that larger states often struggle to shape. It is not the statecraft of fleets but of principled persistence. Marine Protected Areas and the New Geography of Conservation Although not a maritime military power; Costa Rica quietly redefines its oceanic jurisdiction. The recent designation of new Marine Protected Areas (MPAs)  — notably near Cocos Island  —signals a shift where conservation zones are doubling as instruments of geopolitical relevance. Backed by a €1.8 million EU fund secured at UNOC3, Costa Rica conserves biodiversity and asserts sovereignty through sustainability. MPAs are not just conservation maps; they are diplomatic assets. The scaling-up of protection zones aligns with global targets such as the 30x30 goal , safeguarding 30 percent of the planet’s land and seas by 2030. More than symbolic gestures, these conservation areas embed Costa Rica into evolving international architectures that bind marine life protection with climate targets and carbon market mechanisms . This redefinition of maritime space reflects a broader shift in geopolitical relevance in the climate age. Costa Rica’s MPAs, legally codified and internationally backed, represent soft assertion — a model of how ecological stewardship can translate into geopolitical voice. Photo Credit- Xinhua News From UNOC3 to COP30: Maritime Climate Governance and the Ocean Breakthroughs Agenda Diplomacy rarely moves in straight lines. It advances through alignments. Costa Rica’s role has expanded — from co-leading discussions at UNOC3 to framing key priorities ahead of COP30 in Belém. In doing so, San José positions itself as a link between marine stewardship and the evolving architecture of international climate governance. The Ocean Breakthroughs Agenda, which Costa Rica champions alongside like-minded states, represents an inspiring effort to embed ocean governance into climate frameworks. New instruments such as the Ocean Equity Index  and the Ocean Investment Protocol mark the beginning of a financing and accountability architecture that gives coastal developing states a meaningful stake in shaping future ocean governance. President Chaves’ pledge to integrate marine protection into national climate policy is not just domestic reform. It is foreign policy, a signal to COP30 that oceans are integral to mitigation and adaptation, not peripheral. As many states hesitate, Costa Rica is pushing a Global South proposition: that the maritime commons must be governed with equity, not expedience. Strategic Implications: Can Small States Shape Big Ocean Norms? In today’s fractured international landscape, small-state efforts are often brushed aside as moral theatre. Costa Rica’s maritime strategy suggests otherwise. Its advocacy for the High Seas Treaty, smart leverage of blue finance and quiet leadership in conservation forums suggest a recalibration: norms can constrain even powerful actors when persistently advanced and legally codified. The road ahead is steeper. As the UNCLOS  framework attracts political friction and COP30’s stakes grow, Costa Rica will need more than principled leadership. Converting commitments into durable regulation will hinge on domestic capability and international alignment. Moreover, normative gains may trigger backlash from fossil lobbies, deep-sea mining consortiums, or maritime security hawks. Nevertheless, it is in moments of flux that small states matter most. Anchoring action in law and legitimacy, rather than coercion or extraction, allows countries like Costa Rica to influence global norms with outsized effect. While naval might still matters, it is consensus that increasingly defines the rules at sea. Furthermore, voices from the periphery are no longer silent in crafting that consensus — their voices now register where they count. Conclusion Costa Rica’s maritime diplomacy is more than a soft power story; it marks an inflection point. As COP30 approaches, the real challenge will be endurance. Can Costa Rica, and others like it, convert summit-stage credibility into sustained normative authority? If it succeeds, it may secure its marine ecosystems and widen the aperture for small-state agencies in global affairs. Ultimately, the high seas will not be governed solely by great power prerogatives. They will be shaped by those willing to defend them — legally, diplomatically, and morally. Costa Rica, for now, leads from the periphery. #CostaRica #HighSeasTreaty #UNOC3 #COP30 #OceanDiplomacy #MarineProtectedAreas #ClimateJustice #SmallStateDiplomacy This is an Original Contribution to the SIS Blog. Kuldeep Ojha is a PhD scholar in Latin American Studies at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU). His research focuses on environmental governance in Central America, and his interests extend to the Latin American region and its geopolitics.

By Shreya Nautiyal Europe must realise that key to its credibility in South Asia lies in adopting a more nuanced and principled stance in the region   Credibility in foreign policy is seldom secured by rhetoric alone - it requires steady and context-sensitive engagement . Europe’s reflexive call for “ restraint and dialogue” when India is acting against terrorism suggests a disconnect between principled rhetoric and strategic empathy. The equal treatment of both states in question, despite one being clearly under assault, reflects a striking blindness.  While the world mourns the loss of innocent lives in what was supposed to be an eden of tranquility in India’s Kashmir valley, the international response remained notably uneven. As India asserted its moral and strategic agency through Operation Sindoor on May 7, 2025, the international response was not met with collective support but rather with a calculated silence from certain quarters. In particular, Europe’s stance was marked less by an unequivocal condemnation of terrorism and more by a disturbing pattern of discretionary indignation - a phenomenon that raises questions about the West’s inconsistent moral compass.   Europe’s Selective Outrage In the event of Pakistan’s disproportionate shelling  on Indian border towns post Operation Sindoor, an egregious example of Europe’s double standards emerged when European Union’s (EU) top diplomat Kaja Kallus prompted India and Pakistan to “ exercise restraint and pursuit dialogue” amid regional tensions. Such a flawed equivalence between the perpetrator and the victim of terrorism reflects a complete disregard for the loss of twenty six lives  and clearly lacks strategic nuance. It is, however, important to acknowledge that India’s initial response was measured and calculated - characterised by economic and diplomatic measures aimed at curtailing the privileges extended to Pakistan - before resorting to the use of military might . In fact, India’s operation Sindoor was meticulously designed to target terrorist bases  in Pakistan, ensuring no harm to Pakistan’s military installations or civilian areas , thus conforming to the principles outlined in the Geneva Convention .   Ironically, Kallas has previously underscored the importance of a robust defence mechanism, cautioning against what she terms as the “ trap of self-deterrence ” and asserting that “ appeasement only strengthens the aggressor ”. Yet, even as Brussels demands global cognisance and solidarity when its own interests are at stake, it uses a separate yardstick for humanitarian crises and terrorism elsewhere - issues in the Global South barely receive a whisper within Brussels’ corridors. The Western media often spotlights the humanitarian suffering in Ukraine crisis - often labeled as the ‘ white man’s war ’- as well as in the discussions concerning terrorism in Europe or the migration crisis, constructing a moral narrative that concerns European fragilities. However, when it comes to the issues beyond its borders, Europe’s unwavering advocacy championing values and human rights often takes a backseat.   Its hyphenated approach and a neutral stance on the ongoing Indo-Pak crisis exposes Europe’s wilful neglect and a deliberate marginalisation of non-European issues. Dr. Jaishankar in his 2022 speech , astutely remarked that “Europe’s problems are world’s problems but world’s problems are not Europe’s problems”.  In a similar vein, in  2024, European Commissions’s former Vice President, Josep Borrell highlighted the “ double standards ” of the west in cases of international law, wars and climate change and therefore called out Europe for compartmentalising the world into two sub-divisions - “ West against the Rest ” conceding that “diplomacy is the art of managing double standards ”. Its strategic silence and selective amnesia reveals the deep-seated disparities that define global diplomacy in the 21st century.   A Timeline of the 21st Century that Europe Ignores   EU has been following an equidistant approach even when Pakistan’s defence minister Khwaja Asif has recently admitted the country’s history of supporting, training and funding terrorist organisations as “ dirty work ” for the West, a mistake for which he said Pakistan had suffered. Brussels’ selective outrage becomes even more indefensible when viewed against the backdrop of terrorism India has endured, all backed by Pakistan-based terrorist organisations :   •    2000  : Chittisinghpura massacre  (36 Sikhs killed by Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) terrorists), Kashmir •    2001  : Indian Parliament attack  (terrorists affiliated with Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and LeT), New Delhi •    2006  : 7/11 train bombing  (responsibility claimed by LeT), Mumbai •    2008 : 26/11 attacks  ( Ajmal Kasab , LeT terrorist, the only surviving terrorist; his subsequent arrest confirmed Pakistan’s role ), Mumbai •    2016 : Uri attack  (attack backed by JeM ), Kashmir •    2019 : Pulwama attack (attack on Indian security forces by JeM), Kashmir •    2024 : Reasi attack on Hindu pilgrims (responsibility taken by The Resistance Front  (TRF)), Jammu •    2025 : Pahalgam attack  (backed by TRF), Kashmir West pays no heed to the miseries of the local populace of Global South. Despite clear proofs of Islamabad disturbing the peace of New Delhi, International Monetary Fund (IMF) is willing to loan $1 billion  to Pakistan under its Extended Fund Facility. However, amidst the Russia-Ukraine war ,  EU consistently urged India to reduce its Russian ties and ban the import of Russian oil, even as a number of European countries continued to remain Russia’s top fossil fuel buyers. This shows a clear stance of Europe’s strategic convenience - preaching peace and restraint on the global front while pursuing national interests at home.   Partners, Not Preachers : A Need for Coherence   In his recent address on a global platform, Dr. Jaishankar unequivocally stated “When we look out at the world, we look for partners not preachers. Particularly preachers who do not practice at home but preach abroad…..Some of Europe is still struggling with that problem.” India looks up for friends in need, to develop a meaningful partnership which requires a caution and sensitivity towards the realities of the present world. Europe has to be cautious in its fence-sitting diplomacy in Indo-Pak realities, one that cannot be simply overlooked based on their geographical proximity and shared history. Europe cannot and should not turn a blind eye to the current realities of the world. It must shed its moral duplicity and adopt a principled stance on the issues of terrorism, human rights and sovereignty - one that not just accrues to its own states internationally too. There is no room for double standards . If a rules-based order is to be maintained, then it should not turn to be a rules-for-others order. An approach adopting inconsistent moral stand erodes credibility and reinforces the belief that the rules of the West dictate only the rest. #OperationSindoor   This is an Original Contribution to the SIS Blog. Shreya Nautiyal is a PhD scholar at the Centre for European Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. She holds a bachelor’s degree in Economics from the University of Delhi, and a Master’s degree from Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) in International Relations and Area Studies. Her research focuses on the intersection of economics, governance, and efforts aimed towards counter-terrorism, particularly within South Asia and Europe.

By Aman J Thomas In Romeo and Juliet , Shakespeare asked ‘What’s in a name’? and the answer is ‘a lot’. Words have meanings and those words in the form of language and map making can shape the material realities and political choices. Donald Trump, in one of his first presidential orders, has decided to rename Mount Denali to Mount McKinley after President McKinley , an imperialist under whom the U.S. brought Hawaii and Guam under its control, and whom Trump refers to as a model president he would like to emulate. He has also ordered the renaming of the Gulf of Mexico to the Gulf of America , reflecting his expansionist rhetoric.    George Orwell’s ‘1984’ is strikingly relevant today . Orwell reminds us that ‘Big Brother’ is really keeping an eye on us. In the novel ‘1984’, the notorious "Ministry of Truth," and its mission to adapt the past to the present, and its attempt to change history. The names of people from street signs, scholarships, dorms, monuments, and the like are struck down using the clear magnifying glass of "Presentism". Colonial and imperial powers have imposed their identity and culture by renaming places in colonial lands and later native people have reclaimed their identity and culture by self-determination. Renaming places also has geopolitical and ideological interests. Colonialism has effectively used renaming as a tool to oppress the history, culture and tradition of native people. Through place naming, colonialism aimed to imprint meaning and order onto human landscapes. The colonial place names that were imposed or codified served to legitimize territorialization and strengthened settlers' rights to the land. Alfred Mahan is credited to have coined the term Middle East in 1902 but it does not reflect any sense from a geographic point of view. The Middle East vaguely represents the identity or geographical positioning of the place, it rather points that it is Middle East of another region or state, which brings up the question: the Middle East of what? The term Middle East reflects the colonial imperial identity that the British gave and later the U.S. has adopted. There have been movements against colonialism, especially those headed by organizations that identify as indigenous, have been increasingly instrumental in mobilizing support for self-determination. For instance,  renaming cities in India has been an effort to do rid of the lingering effects of British rule. In 1995, Bombay reclaimed its name from the Marathi language and became Mumbai. A return to regional linguistic and cultural origins was also reflected in the renaming of Madras as Chennai and Calcutta as Kolkata. These changes weren't only aesthetic; they were a part of a larger effort to reshape the country's identity according to its own standards. The renaming process has had an equally revolutionary effect throughout Africa. As Robert Kaplan reminds us , the way maps are created and labeled also matters since it influences how the strong perceive the world. There are numerous instances of renaming places for geopolitical interests. As Machiavelli emphasized that states also act out of pride and prestige , thereby from a realist perspective, we can grasp why states tend to change the toponym of strategic places, China has been employing the strategy of renaming places with countries that it has maritime and border disputes with. The Chinese call the Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands as Xisha and Nansha islands which are in the South China Sea and the Senkaku islands as Diaoyu islands  over which they have disputes with the Japanese. They refer to Aksai Chin as the southwestern part of Hotan prefecture of Xinjiang, which India considers as an integral part of Jammu & Kashmir. As the age-old axiom goes “If you rebel against someone, someone will rebel against you” and thus the effort to rename places is not only limited to the Chinese. To counter the Chinese expansion, countries led by the U.S. are also actively trying to balance China in the region and as a part of it, the U.S has opted for the use of the term Indo-Pacific which was earlier referred as Asia-Pacific . The term "Indo-Pacific" was hardly used ten years ago, but today the U.S., India, Japan and other countries refer to the region as Indo- Pacific.  There can also be ideological and political reasons for renaming places. In the last century, the city of St. Petersburg has had two name changes . Peter the Great founded St. Petersburg in the early 1700s, and while it retained its founder’s name, it also clearly showed the influence of Europe. The name’s Germanic "burg" was a reference to the Westernization movement that characterized Peter's rule. But the moniker became an intolerable encumbrance when World War I broke out and Russia was at war with Germany. As nationalist sentiment grew in 1914, the city was renamed Petrograd , changing its suffix to the Slavic “grad”, signifying its transition from a multicultural outpost to a distinctly Russian bastion. The city thereafter experienced yet another change following Lenin's passing in 1924. The Bolshevik leader’s legacy was woven into the very foundation of the Soviet Union’s urban setting when Petrograd was transformed into Leningrad . Residents chose to return it to its previous name, St. Petersburg , years after the USSR collapsed in 1991, making a full cycle of historical revision. Place names are important as they inscribe ideological messages about past practices and they permeate daily vocabulary through visual and verbal cues like road signs, addresses, advertising billboards and maps. Place names not only mould history, but they also mend group and cultural identity because of the shared context of using these toponyms. #US #Mexico This is an Original Contribution to the SIS Blog   Aman J Thomas is currently a second-year student pursuing a Master’s in Politics with Specialization in International Studies (M.A PISM) from the School of International Studies (SIS), Jawaharlal Nehru University, JNU.

By Simran Mishra In its 2024-2029 institutional cycle , the EU’s approach focuses on combining technological proficiency with geopolitical realism, making it a rule-setter and not a rule-taker in the global technology race, reflecting in its Digital Compass 2030  initiative which aims at digitally transformed Europe by the end of the decade. The European Union, regarded as a normative power - an actor that promotes its values and principles through diplomacy, trade and cooperation. In the context of emerging technologies, the EU has positioned itself as a leader in shaping global norms and values, in areas such as data protection , AI ethics and digital governance , evident in its effort to promote the Brussels Effect  - the phenomenon whereby EU regulations and standards are adopted globally due to the EU’s market power and regulatory reach, e.g., The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)  has inspired similar legislation globally. As emerging technologies continue to redefine IR, through the assertion of the technological sovereignty the EU enters into a critical arena of 21st century tech-competition. Through proactive leadership in regulatory frameworks and research partnerships, the EU is shaping the technological revolution. Its approach intertwines geopolitical strategy with ethical principles and multinational cooperation. This leadership positions the EU at the forefront of responsible technology governance, ensuring alignment with human rights, democratic values, and sustainable development . Balancing Autonomy and Openness The EU emphasises responsible innovation , strategic foresight and anticipatory governance mechanisms to ensure that technological development aligns with European values and promotes societal well-being while preparing for future technological challenges and opportunities. The EU advocates the promotion of democratic values in technology governance, sustainability and equitability in digital growth worldwide.  The EU faces a trilemma in its technology policy: Innovation, Protection, and Influence. In addressal of geopolitical risks, The EU views the essentiality of strengthening cybersecurity  and digital resilience while navigating geopolitical risks associated with emerging technologies such as cyberwarfare, election interference and misinformation. For instance, the EU is leading in sustainable technology development, by integrating emerging technologies and digital strategies with green objectives, under the EU’s Green Deal  objectives.   Precaution Meets Innovation The EU's position shows a precautionary mindset, in contrast to the United States, which is more of a laissez-faire nature. Emerging technologies are seen by the EU as important facilitators of economic growth and societal progress, for instance, when referring to the Horizon Europe  or Digital Compass  initiatives. The EU-US Trade and Technology Council  (TTC),2021 and the Global Gateway  project exemplify the strategy to improve digital diplomacy and lessen up on strategic dependencies. As the EU views, these technologies are also critical for the attainment of strategic autonomy - a development goal which aims to lessen external dependencies and enhance industrial resilience. The EU has a framework for governance and promotion of emerging technologies - the' framework' covers policies, regulations, and funding programs aimed at fostering innovation while ensuring their ethical and safe uses, such as Horizon Europe, Digital Single Market Strategy. Ethical Considerations and Regulation Quite emphatically, the EU has indeed taken the issue to the emerging technologies. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) ,2018 is perhaps one of the most striking expressions of the encouragement the EU gave for protecting privacy and data in the digital age. The most significant regulatory initiative in the EU’s policy is the Artificial Intelligence (AI) Act , hailed as a landmark piece that could set a global standard for AI regulation, which aims to create a comprehensive framework for AI applications, categorizing then based on their level of risk: unacceptable, high, limited, minimal.  In addition to the AI Act, the EU has two more key legislation aimed at regulating the digital economy: the Digital Services Act (DSA ), to combat illegal content, disinformation and harmful practices and the Digital Markets Act (DMA), to impose rules to ensure fair competition and prevent anti-competitive practices targeting the market power of large tech companies, known as “gatekeepers”. International Collaboration The rise of techno-nationalism , have created a fragmented global landscape, which emphasizes the importance of international cooperation and multilateralism, recognizing that the challenges posed by ETs are global in nature. The EU has been actively promoting Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence (GPAI ), bringing governments, industry and civil society together for a responsible AI development. Amidst the US-China rivalry  in digital diplomacy, the EU-US Trade and Technology Council strengthened transatlantic cooperation on trade, technology and digital policy while the EU is balancing its economic interests with its concerns over China’s technological ambitions and human rights record. Policy Recommendations To accelerate technological sovereignty, the EU should focus upon reducing its reliance on non-EU suppliers for critical components like semiconductors, and support domestic production capacities through targeted subsidies while fostering public-private partnerships to accelerate innovation. The EU should establish additional Trade and Technology Councils (TTCs) with key democracies like Japan, South Korea and India to enhance technological cooperation and reduce reliance on external suppliers and shall also promote European values about digital diplomacy  through development initiatives in the Global South, ensuring AI ethics, emerging technologies and data governance align with democratic principles. Way forward The EU being prominently capable of reinforcing its position as a key actor in global technology governance and tech competitiveness must boost R&D investments to be at par with the US and China in development of emerging technologies, while regulating harmonization and balancing innovation in critical supply chains and digital infrastructure with stringent regulations remains a challenge for the EU, global cooperation by strengthening multilateral initiatives will be essential for addressing geopolitical risks.     Conclusion Amidst the evolving geopolitical scenario, technology has become a critical battleground. As global digital competition intensifies, the EU has the potential to drive sustainable growth, enhance competitiveness, and contribute to global governance framework. Strengthening R&D investments, fostering innovation ecosystems, and balancing internal policy with external diplomacy will be crucial for achieving strategic autonomy and securing the EU's position in global technology governance. This Article is an Original Contribution to the SIS Blog.   Simran Mishra is a postgraduate student of Politics with specialization in International Relations (PISM) at the School of International Studies, JNU. Her academic interests revolve around contemporary global affairs influencing international engagements, multilateral cooperation and digital diplomacy.

By Prof. Dr. Bharat H. Desai   I. INTRODUCTION   March 08, 2025, the 50th anniversary of the UN’s International Women’s Day (IWD), also coincides  with 30 years after the historic 1995 Beijing Declaration and Program of Action  that solemnly resolved “to advance the goals of equality, development and peace for all women everywhere in the interest of all humanity”. It was endorsed by 189 countries. Now, after three decades, almost one-fourth countries are facing a backlash   and backsliding. A series of factors such as economic instability, the climate crisis, rising conflicts and political pushback have contributed to a worsening global landscape for gender equality.  In his annual   2025 IWD message , the UN Secretary-General (UNSG) Antonio Guterres observed that “When women and girls can rise, we all thrive…(yet) instead of mainstreaming equal rights, we are seeing the mainstreaming of misogyny.”   Picture Source : UN Women: Session of the Commission on the Status of Women II.   GLOBAL STATE OF WOMEN’S RIGHTS The above scenario underscores the graphic reality that in spite of the advocacy by the entire UN system, the UN member states, international developmental agencies and the civil society groups, it has not been possible to make a desired change in securing women’s rights. The UN Women Strategic Plan (2022-2025)  adopted a three-pronged approach: (1) to promote coordination across the UN system (2) to support to member states in strengthening global norms and standards for gender equality and (3) to carry out operational activities at country and regional levels. With a paltry budget of US $ 1.03 billion (2024-2025; projected contributions) , the UN Women faces a herculean task to turn the tide. Significantly, the Pact for the Future  ( UNGA resolution 79/1 of September 22, 2024 ), stated: “None of our goals can be achieved without the full, safe, equal and meaningful participation and representation of all women in political and economic life. We reaffirm our commitment to the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action” (paragraph 15). Ironically, notwithstanding all solemn declarations at the UN summits and inter-governmental confabulations,  Goal 5 (Gender Equality and empowerment of all women and girls)  of the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)  faces dismal prospects due to very slow progress or has regressed below the 2015 baseline. Picture Source: UN Women Thus, the global state of women is worsening. It is reflected in spine-chilling figures including plight of 2 billion women without any social protection coverage , 612 million women and girls living in global conflict zones  and 393 million women and girls mired in extreme poverty . In growing worldwide gender-based violence, a women or girl is killed every 10 minutes by a family member or an intimate partner. There has been 50% rise in conflict related sexual violence wherein 95% victim-survivors are women and girls.  In fact, the home has also become the “most dangerous place for women and girls”. As per the 2024 report published by the UNODC , 60.2% women were killed in 2023 by their intimate partners (45%) or other family members (55%). Gender based violence is a global challenge ( Author: The Tribune, November 02, 2021 ). The ‘femicide’ reflects entrenched gender-based hatred and sadistic mindsets that assume “most brutal and extreme manifestation of violence against women and girls”.    III.  REVITALIZING THE UN SYSTEM PROCESSES The 69th session of the Commission of the Status of Women (CSW )  will be held in New York during March 10 to 21, 2025. It was established by the ECOSOC resolution 11(II) of 21 June 1946 . The CSW has been instrumental in promoting women’s and girls' rights, and shaping global standards on gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls. At Beijing+30, CSW 69 will do a crucial stocktaking process by reviewing implementation of the  Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action  and the outcomes of the  23rd special session of the General Assembly .   The digital technologies have been a cause of concern for the CSW. Barring women in a few privileged settings, well-educated women and otherwise already empowered women, the digital technologies have heightened already serious gender inequalities, discrimination and violence against women. Since the adoption of the resolution 1325 of October 31, 2000 , the UN Security Council (UNSC) has been periodically addressing the agenda item “women, peace and security” (WPS). Several UNSC members have sought to prioritize the WPS agenda during their monthly presidency. Now a fter 25 years and adoption of some ten additional UNSC resolutions later , WPS agenda has become one of the main thematic pillars of the UNSC’s work. Moreover, the UNSG’s 14 annual reports (between 2011 to 2024) on the implementation of the WPS agenda (since resolution 1325/ 2000 ; and requested by the UNSC Presidential Statement; S/PRST/2010/22 of October 26, 2010 ), as well as 13 reports (2012-2024)  on conflict related sexual violence, have provided a remarkable corpus of action on the issue. The 2024 UNSG report ( S/2024/671 of September 24, 2024 ) has graphically underscored the gravity of the challenge faced by women and girls: “ Amid record levels of armed conflict and violence, progress made over decades is vanishing before our eyes. Generational gains in women’s rights hang in the balance around the world, undercutting the transformative potential of women’s leadership and inclusion in the pursuit of peace”.    The WPS agenda of the UNSC has been justified on the ground that due to the arme d conflic t s, women and girls face the consequences including sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) . Rape as a weapon of war ( Author SIS Blog : March 11, 2023 ; June 22, 2022 ) has been widely used by all the combatants (State and non-State). It has been analyzed in this author’s scholarly work [ Sexual and Gender Based Violence in International Law  (Singapore: Springer: English 2022 ; German 2023 ] as well as highlighted in the 2018 Nobel Peace Prize  awarded (Denis Mukhwege and Nadia Murad) for “ efforts to end the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war and armed conflict" . IV.  CONCLUSION: ROAD AHEAD In view of the above global state of play, the ideational and cutting-edge scholarly works need to be geared up to provide concrete solutions for protection of rights of women and girls. As the things stand today, it will take 131 years to bridge the global gender gap. Between 1995 and 2024, 1,531 legal reforms around the world  have sought to advance gender equality. Yet the grim scenario shows deep rooted patriarchy and misogyny at work since it largely remains a question of mindsets. The legalese, policy and institutional measures (commissions on women and human rights etc) per se  will not be able to turn the tide in near future unless the empowered women themselves feel obliged to ‘light the lamp’ and carry the torch forward. Many of the empowered women get coopted by the patriarchy and they pursue the same path as male counterparts. Hence, mere adding the numbers will not result in empathy and upliftment of other disadvantaged women and girls. As a research supervisor, this author knows firsthand, a large number of female students, barring honorable exceptions, adopt the same attitude of male students for personal advancement. They abhor mentoring and reaching out to others. As a consequence, it remains a big challenge to carry forward the torch to empower other disadvantaged women and girls. Thus, the desired change will be accelerated if the empowered women take the lead to become the agents of change the world needs for securing our common future. #CSW69 #UN Women #UNSG #UNSC #UNGA #MEA #PMIndia #JNU_official_50 This is an Original Contribution to the SIS Blog Prof. (Dr.) Bharat H. Desai is the former Chairperson and Professor of International Law at the Centre for International Legal Studies (SIS, JNU), who served as a member of the Official Indian Delegations to various multilateral negotiations (2002-2008), initiated & coordinated the futuristic knowledge initiatives for the SIS Faculty Wall of Honor (2023-24) , the Inter-University Consortium: JNU; Jammu; Kashmir; Sikkim (2012-2020)  and the Making SIS Visible (2008-2013)  as well as contributes as the Editor-in-Chief  of Environmental Policy and Law (Sage: Amsterdam) .

By Tashi Dorje Gyamba JD Vance in his Munich Security Conference speech  made it clear that America is rerouting its focus. The apparent process and structural geopolitical shift, became visible in the uneasiness with which Vance delivered the speech, and the uneasiness with which the European participants received it. German Minister Pistorius pronounced the speech as unacceptable, as it questioned not just a nation’s, but all of Europe's democratic values. This picture presents a critical point in the ongoing Trans-Atlantic divergence. But across the Pacific signalling strengthening convergences, a day prior to the speech, POTUS Trump met Indian PM Narender Modi. They signed multiple agreements . Deepening ties between the world’s oldest and the world’s largest democracy. Old Tradition Cracks Picture Source : APCO website Reason, liberalism and democracy are traditional western enlightenment values. Post Second World War, the Trans-Atlantic relations hinged on them. It bound the western liberal world order, and gave space to both America and Europe to continue pursuing their respective national interests. European society began integrating and flourishing as a bloc. After the formation of the European Union, its unified heft allowed it to flaunt its Brussels effect—power to guide global norms. On the other side of the Atlantic, firstly, America maintained its pole position with the Soviet, and then its status of global primacy after the Soviet collapse. This equilibrium tied by security agreements like NATO endured and drove well into the twenty first century. As geopolitical realities changed, it began restructuring this relationship. The common denominator of values moulded as a common heritage of the “West” began to recede. With the arrival of the Trump 2.0 administration, and recent American posturing in Europe, fissures created by American interests made the writing on the wall clear. Interpretation on carrying-out of these values began to differ, blames arose and political capacities to support each other flipped. For example, JD Vance’s remark on  great internal threats of Europe , and Pete Hegseth’s call on Europe to actually defend its own backyard. Structural shifts driven by various drivers have sharpened the divergence. Firstly, the arrival of DeepSeek at the end of January, largely hailed as the Sputnik moment , narrowed the tech-gap between America and its primary competitor China, down to nearly six months. Prior to Munich, at the Paris AI Summit , Vance made it clear that America intends to retain global technological primacy. Secondly, the Draghi Competitiveness report  has highlighted that Europe is behind other nations on innovation and productivity. Structural economic issues like regulatory fragmentation, labor market rigidity, and underinvestment in innovation all make for a blunt Europe heading for  “slow agony” . Demographic wintering and focus on costly clean energy further add to the bill. And   thirdly, nations on both sides of the Trans-Atlantic are undergoing political and ideological changes that push for politics of nationalism and unilateralism against commitments to internationalism, free trade, and multilateralism. Firewalls  have fallen as globally political support drifts rightward. And nationalist movements like MAGA and MEGA  are gaining traction. Rerouting As winter hits Trans-Atlantic ties, geopolitical reconfigurations have pivoted  America towards the Indo-Pacific. China’s rising status in the persisting global order has aligned and brought America closer to India. Democratic values which had been a part and parcel of both political systems, have begun to blossom as reasonable connectors. Meanwhile, the idea of MAGA and MIGA , going hand in hand, has also caught the imagination of the respective leaders. In International Relations, when states begin to share such interests and values, together they create a sense of security , and a desire to create a certain harmony. On account of this bonhomie, the undermined Trans-Atlantic relations have been superseded by the will to conserve the spirit of Free and Open Indo-Pacific. This framework allows America to pursue its purpose of offshore balancing China by using India as a counterweight. And allows India to build its security against regional primacy of China. As PM Modi noted, this has been possible in the wake of the two nations overcoming mutually-mistrusted “ hesitations of history .” Former American National Security Advisor, Jake Sullivan’s   visit to India, as the last in his official capacity, demonstrated the importance of this newfound love and comprehensive global strategic partnership. Recent defence and tech progressions such as the broad new COMPACT framework  enables the two to work together on defence, trade and investment, energy security, technology, multilateralism and people to people cooperation. ASIA for underwater domain awareness, INDUS-innovation for defence industry, TRUST promoting critical technologies and Strategic Mineral Recovery Partnership addressing the problem of Sino-American rocks versus chips , are some of the key agreements signed. As these interests, values and workings continue to provide momentum to a close American and India relationship. It is also to be noted that Europe is also showing interest, and is gravitating towards the Indian summer or as called the arrival of India . Be it a free trade agreement between India and EFTA—Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland—or EU’s College of Commissioners  unprecedented maiden visit to india. Shape of Water On the heels of democratic backsliding trends across  democratic indices , POTUS Trump teases with a third term . Arguments have been made that America is on path towards a competitive authoritarianism —free elections but on a non level playing field—and that American exceptionalism  resting on moral superiority of democracy and human rights, stands eroded.  Still, with the gains in sight and values in its heart, India has begun to dance the water  for America. Warning shots about the perils of being a proxy  in great power competition, and facing a “boss” partner  that uses over leveraging for deal-making, have already been shot from the scholarly corner. Yet, Trans-Atlantic divergences and Indo-Pacific convergences continue to intensify. Aligned mega partnership  of America and India has become a thing of the foreseeable “ westless” world . And yet maybe, as global competition augurs, the world’s oldest and the world’s largest democracy hold promise to a better balance of powers in the next phase of the multi-civilization and multipolar world. The two nations share interests and values. If the architecture sits and allows India to maintain its strategic autonomy with a tilt towards America, while enabling America to sustain its global primacy, both nations' combined determination to guard values and prophylactic moves to protect valuable sea lanes of open communication will be fruitive. This Article is an Original Contribution to the SIS Blog Tashi Dorje Gyamba is a Ph.D. candidate in the Diplomacy and Disarmament division at the Centre for International Politics, Organisation and Disarmament (CIPOD), School of International Studies (SIS), Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

By Prof. (Dr.) Gulshan Sachdeva Even if a trade deal remains elusive, the current geopolitical environment offers numerous opportunities for the two large democratic entities to collaborate on technology, connectivity, and green transition From today , President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen, accompanied by the College of Commissioners is on an  unprecedented visit  to India. In addition to der Leyen, the college consists of Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas, five executive vice-presidents, and 20 commissioners overseeing their respective portfolios. The 27 commissioners represent each of the EU's member states, with one from each country. They will meet Prime Minister Narendra Modi and their other counterparts in the Indian government.   During the visit, the India-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) meeting will also take place. Historically, Europe has been crucial for India's trade and investment. As India pursues its modernisation ambitions, the EU will remain a key partner in trade, technology, investment, and energy transition. In 2021, Modi  met all 27 EU leaders ,  leading to the resumption  of three separate negotiations on trade, investment, and Geographical Indications (GI) agreements as well as a ‘connectivity partnership’.   Last year, bilateral trade in goods and services reached  nearly $200 billion  and has remained balanced for many years. India has also attracted approximately  $120 billion  in investment from the EU. After exercising caution on trade deals for nearly a decade, India recently signed several agreements, including one with the four-nation European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Momentum  is also building  in India-UK trade negotiations.   The 10th round of India-EU trade talks is expected next month. Similarly, six rounds of negotiations have been held on investment and GI agreements. With the EU’s trade agreements cover 76 countries, India faces challenges in some of its exports. While a trade deal would be mutually beneficial, several issues  still need to be resolved .   Even if the FTA remains elusive, the current global geopolitical fragmentation offers new opportunities for the world’s two largest democratic entities to collaborate in many other areas. With a growing convergence of interests in the Indo-Pacific, both sides are actively exploring new avenues through initiatives like the TTC and the India Middle-East Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC).    Russia has become a major strategic challenge for the EU. For the past three years, India's perspective on the Ukraine war has differed from that of the EU. While the EU and several member states were disappointed with India’s stance, co-operation continued as their interests aligned in many areas. Now, the EU finds itself side-lined as the Donald Trump administration engages directly with Russia to resolve the conflict.  Picture Source: Deccan Herald Ursula von der Leyen has advocated for a ‘geopolitical Europe’ for the past four years, but European leaders are now confronted with real geopolitical shifts driven by the US and Russia. This has sparked discussions among European leaders about achieving greater ‘independence’ from the US in strategic affairs. Against this backdrop, India could emerge as a key partner for the EU in the evolving global order. In fact, the EU, India, and other partners could develop a joint strategy to counter Trump's tariff war.   In recent years, India’s engagement with the EU has expanded beyond its traditional focus on key member states like Germany, France, and the UK (when it was part of the EU). India has strengthened ties with the Nordics, Central, and Eastern Europe, and the Mediterranean region. It has launched India-Nordic summits, Baltic-Nordic business conclave, and established new strategic partnerships with Greece, Italy, and Poland.   Energy transition challenges in Europe differ significantly from those in India. New Delhi also has serious reservations about the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). However, the threat of climate change remains real. With the US once again withdrawing from the Paris Agreement, India and the EU have an opportunity to lead global climate initiatives. The International Solar Alliance is one such example. Since 2004, they have collaborated through various bilateral action plans. Additionally, India and the EU could also collaborate on transferring climate technology solutions to countries in the Global South.   Despite anti-immigrant rhetoric, particularly from far-Right political forces, most European nations are grappling with labour shortages. Unemployment rates are low, and the EU is facing a decline in competitiveness. This makes skilled and semi-skilled migration, as well as student mobility from India, beneficial for the EU. Since migration policies fall under the jurisdiction of individual member states, New Delhi has already signed — or is in the process of signing — migration and mobility agreements with several EU countries.   The EU College of Commissioners’ visit to India signals the EU’s strong intent to build a meaningful partnership with India. Geopolitical developments have opened new avenues for collaboration. However, both the EU and India must make serious intellectual efforts to understand each other. Otherwise, discussions will remain focused on peripheral issues rather than engaging on matters of real significance. Originally published : Deccan Herald, 27th February 2025 https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/can-india-eu-trade-ties-withstand-global-geopolitical-fragmentation-3423872   Prof. Gulshan Sachdeva is the Chief Coordinator of DAKSHIN-Global South Centre of Excellence at RIS, New Delhi, and a Professor and Jean Monnet Chair at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India