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By Rohan Ranjan Raut Ray The ongoing War in the Middle East has once again reminded us of a truth in this interconnected World: A Conflict in one region sends shockwaves across the Global System. This crisis in the Gulf is no d ifferent, as Iran, through its control over the Strait of Hormuz, has held the energy security of the entire world hostage. The Strait of Hormuz is one of the most critical chokepoints for global energy, as about 20-25% of the world’s daily petroleum needs and around 20% of LNG pass through it. This makes the region strategically vulnerable, and Iran has used this to its advantage. India, being a major importer of crude oil and LNG from the region, is also exposed to these disruptions. India is the third largest consumer of crude oil in the world, and imports more than 88.5% of its domestic consumption, of which nearly 55% comes from the Gulf countries: 16.6% from Iraq, 17.5% from Saudi Arabia, 10.4% from the UAE, 6.1% from Kuwait, and 3.6% from Qatar. Most of these oil imports pass through the Strait of Hormuz, and as Iran has closed this Strait, oil supplies from these countries are at risk. In this scenario, to sustain its large oil-consuming economy, India has to employ multiple strategies: looking for alternative supply channels, increasing domestic capacity and most importantly, using its Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPR). In India, the first Strategic Petroleum Reserve facilities were established by the ISPRL at Visakapatnam, Mangaluru, and Padur, with a capacity of 39 million barrels. In Phase II, the government has approved the establishment of two additional Commercial-cum strategic facilities in Chandikol and Padur, adding an additional capacity of 47.8 million barrels. When Phase II gets online, our total strategic reserves will be about 87 million barrels. As of April 2026, India’s total Crude oil reserves are about 250 million barrels, of which 211 million barrels are commercial reserves, and only 39 million barrels constitute the strategic ones. As our daily oil consumption is about 5.43 million barrels/day (MB/D), that means our current strategic reserves will only last for 9 to 10 days, and our total reserves may last for about 50 to 74 days. For an economy of India’s scale, its strategic reserves remain inadequate, making the economy very vulnerable during crises. India is also behind in building its Strategic Petroleum Reserves compared to its peers like the USA, China, and Japan. The United States has a total petroleum reserve of around 854 million barrels, of which 415 million barrels are in its strategic reserves. However, the United States, as a net oil exporter, does not face a similar risk profile, as it may not even face an oil shortage unless its domestic capacities are hit. China maintains total reserves of about 1.2-1.3 billion barrels, which can last for around 3 to 4 months, and has strategic reserves of about 400-500 million barrels. Japan’s total petroleum reserves of about 470 million barrels can last for around 254 days, and its strategic reserves of 260 million barrels are the third largest after the USA and China. Japan’s petroleum reserves are considered the “Gold Standard”, as its SPR alone can last for about 146 days. Notably, Japan’s daily crude oil consumption (3.2 MB/D) is about 60% of India’s, yet Japan’s Strategic Petroleum Reserves capacity is about 6.7 times India’s current strategic capacity. Given India’s dependence on imports, the projected capacity of 87 million barrels will be insufficient. In this increasingly uncertain energy environment, India will require a far bigger strategic buffer. It is also misleading to look at the number of days of Strategic Reserves countries require in a vacuum, as countries like the United States, a net oil exporter, can rely on domestic production during a crisis and may not require their strategic reserves. In contrast, Net oil-importing countries, like India (over 88%), Japan (over 95%), and China (over 74%), are far more vulnerable to external shocks as they depend on foreign supplies and also do not have sufficient domestic capacity to meet their domestic demands. Therefore, Strategic reserves become even more important for these countries. However, maintaining these Strategic Reserves comes at a cost. Also, these reserves remain untapped for a very long time, only in use during a crisis. Therefore, it is really difficult to know what the ideal amount of strategic reserves a country should keep. The IEA mandates a 90-day benchmark for full Energy security. But as we discussed, different countries have different metrics to calculate the reserves they require. The 1973 oil crisis, the Gulf War of 1990-91, and the Western Sanctions on Russian and Iranian oil, all these past incidents have reminded us repeatedly of our dependence on external sources and how a crisis far away can suddenly create disruptions at home. Looking at our current Strategic Reserves, we clearly have not learned our lessons. As projected, if our future consumption goes up to 7 million barrels/day by 2030, we will atleast require a Strategic Reserves capacity of 630 million barrels, just to maintain the 90-day benchmark mandated by the IEA. The ISPRL Phase II was announced in 2010, received its cabinet approval in 2021, and now, in April 2026, the Chanhikol project is still facing delays due to issues in land acquisition. This inadequacy in Strategic Reserves is an urgent national crisis, and its current projects must be fast-tracked. Additionally, a high-level committee must be constituted to look into the expansion of these strategic reserves. Otherwise, we are just keeping India’s Energy security on borrowed time, waiting for the next crisis to hit us. This War is another lesson and a reminder: Build Capacity or Risk Crises. This is an Original Contribution to the SIS Blog. Rohan Ranjan Raut Ray is currently a postgraduate student at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. His academic pursuits are centred around geopolitical issues and changing global dynamics.

By Ambassador: Asoke Mukerji Permanent representative to the United Nations in New York Ambassador of India to the Republic of Kazakhstan 2005-2007   Three referendums have been held in Kazakhstan so far on its Constitution – in 1991, in 1995 and in 2022. The first referendum in 1991 and the second referendum in 1995 were the most significant. They helped to chart the identity of independent Kazakhstan, and its way forward. Kazakhstan had three priorities at its independence in December 1991. The first priority was on internal harmony between the different ethnic groups, with a conscious decision to name the country “Kazakhstan” and not “Kazakhistan”. The second priority was on the territorial integrity of the country, particularly two challenges – the position of the large ethnic Russian population in the northern third of the country, and the potential challenges to the stability of the country from radical Islamic political movements from the south in Afghanistan. The third priority was on the socio-economic growth of the country. Natural resources and agriculture were already prominent contributors to the socio-economic activities, with coal mining in Karaganda and agriculture in the southern regions. The decision to have a strong Presidential system of governance emanated from these three considerations. A strong Presidential system has provided stability, resulting in strong economic growth, based on country’s natural resources – its coal, Caspian Sea oilfields, gold and uranium. Between 1992 and 2026, Kazakhstan has maintained internal harmony. It has navigated its territorial integrity without challenges from either Russia or from its southern borders. In 1998, after 5 years of negotiations, it has demarcated its national borders with China. This has been a catalyst for China Kazakhstan relations, both in terms of trade and investment, and for infrastructure of the east-west alignment, providing land locked Kazakhstan and Central Asia with an outlet to the Pacific Ocean. India’s current trade with Central Asia uses this economic corridor between China and Kazakhstan. Since March 2025, India’s port of Mundra in Gujarat has been used to access Kazakhstan using the International North South Transport Corridor’s eastern alignment. In economic terms, Kazakhstan has used its Constitutional framework to enter into international agreements for developing its natural resources for development. This is visible in the Caspian Sea oilfields since 1994, and in the mining of minerals such as gold and uranium. In 2006, India obtained a stake in the Satpayev Caspian Sea oilfield of Kazakhstan. Today India is the largest importer of uranium from Kazakhstan for its nuclear energy programme. The prosperity of Kazakhstan has been used to develop its human resources, including by skilling abroad under state-funded programmes like Bolashak since 1993, and by inviting international partners to deliver and/or upgrade skilling institutions in Kazakhstan. Since 1992, India’s ITEC programme has been used actively by Kazakhstan to develop its skilled human resources in Indian institutions. Over 12,000 Indian students currently study medicine in Kazakhstan’s medical institutes. In terms of foreign policy, the internal priority for harmony manifested itself in Kazakhstan’s initiative for cooperation and security in Asia, known as CICA, proposed at the UNGA in 1992 itself. India joined the CICA in June 2002 at its first Summit and joined the decision to create the CICA Secretariat in 2006. From 2007, India has seconded a diplomat to work in the CICA Secretariat. Kazakhstan has been proactive in supporting the United Nations. President Tokayev is the only Central Asian who has served as Deputy Secretary General and Director of the UN Geneva Office, and as Secretary General of the Conference on Disarmament. Kazakhstan supported India’s bid to be elected a member of the UN Security Council for 2011-12. It became the first Central Asian state to be elected to the UN Security Council for 2017-18. It is the only Central Asian state to have deployed its troops jointly with Indian troops in UN peacekeeping in Lebanon as part of IndBatt since 2018. For India, the proposed creation of a framework for digitalization and Artificial Intelligence adds a significant dimension to expanding bilateral digital cooperation, including through a India-Kazakhstan Digital Corridor. This will impact on the Eurasian Economic Union and its FTA negotiations with India, as Kazakhstan chairs EAEU bodies in 2026. The fact that one of Kazakhstan’s best-known Eurasian legal experts chairs its Constitutional Commission provides comfort in taking the FTA forward.   Remarks of Ambassador Asoke Mukerji at the Round Table on the Constitutional Referendum of Kazakhstan, JNU/SIS, New Delhi 12.03.2026

By Shibhankita Pradhan When German Chancellor Friedrich Merz arrived at Ahmedabad on 12th of January for his first official visit to Asia, the choice of destination by the newly elected German government spoke louder than any other official statement could. Not Beijing, not Tokyo, not Seoul but India’s commercial hub in Gujarat, Ahmedabad. He was accompanied by a 23 member CEO delegation  which further signalled serious economic intent. For a German Chancellor whose predecessor Olaf Scholz had prioritised China in his Asia engagement, Merz’s choice represented more than mere itinerary logistics rather it reflected an evolving strategic orientation enabled by conservative pragmatism reshaping Germany’s eastward engagement. A comparison to Scholz’s foreign policy choices helps shed some light on this change of course. Scholz’s visit to China in November 2022 was a representation of his coalition’s measured approach towards German foreign policy , as the visit attracted widespread domestic criticism and a wider European unease over Beijing’s partnership with Moscow following the Russia-Ukraine war. However, the newly elected government led by the Christian Democrats showcases a different approach to these strategic engagements. The decision to make India his first destination during his Asia visit appears less improvised than a calculated move by the German Chancellor. This shift in emphasis manifests in discernible policy signals . While Scholz’s China engagement is rooted in economic interdependence, Merz has more explicitly emphasised de-risking from Germany’s €300 billion annual trade exposure to Beijing. His decision to visit India first seems to indicate an acknowledgement that such dependence increasingly constitutes vulnerability rather than just an economic opportunity. On defence cooperation, where Scholz’s Zeitenwende  rhetoric encountered implementation challenges owing to the coalition politics, Merz’s visit provided a political momentum to the long running Project 75I submarine negotiations , including discussion of a framework understanding as the formal contract remains in the final stages of negotiation. On trade, though structural EU-level constraints remain unchanged, Merz’s call to “urgently conclude” the India-EU Free Trade Agreement  is far more explicitly stated when compared to Scholz. The timing of Merz’s visit to India acquires added significance against the backdrop of wider geopolitical uncertainty. The United States imposed 50 percent tariffs on Indian goods in August 2025, combining reciprocal measures with penalties linked to Russian oil purchase. Germany itself faces renewed trade and tariff unpredictability under Trump’s second term. Yet rather than viewing India’s strategic autonomy on Russian energy as an obstacle, Merz appears to be more pragmatic and accepting of partners maintaining divergent positions on specific issues. It seems to have a better compatible structure for Modi’s policy of multi-alignment than Scholz’s value-centred perspective, even as both governments ultimately support deepening India-Germany ties. Most importantly, India and Germany are also aligned through their shared membership in the G4 grouping,  along with Brazil and Japan as aspirants for permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council. On September 2024 G4 meetings,  the foreign ministers of the member nations reiterated that comprehensive reform in the current UNSC structure remains essential in restoring the Council’s equitable representativeness across the world. Seen in this light, Merz’s decision to prefer India over China also stems from the fact that China, being a P5 member has always shown little incentive to advance this structural reform. This can also be perceived as a strategic choice to build partnerships with fellow aspirants. This underscores how common ambition of UNSC reform may prioritise coalition building among like-minded states over reliance on slow-moving institutional processes. However, more often this partnership remains overshadowed by structural constraints that the theory of realism acknowledges. Divergent threat perceptions persist as Russia looms largest for Germany and China for India. Along with this, neither side can replace U.S. security guarantees, and India-U.S. cooperation continues across counterterrorism , military exercises and strategic dialogue despite tariff tensions. Consequently, the relationship between both countries in not a strategic realignment rather it aims at preserving flexibility and enhancing leverage through multi-directional engagement. As of now, the nineteen agreements  concluded during Merz’s visit which included defence, semiconductors, critical minerals, renewable energy and skills migration illustrate this convergence in practice. The semiconductor ecosystem partnership addresses shared concerns over Chinese supply chain dominance with India’s emerging manufacturing base complementing German design expertise. Cooperation on critical minerals which is also essential for EVs, batteries, defence systems, and renewable technologies, helps hedge against China’s estimated 60 percent control over global processing capacity. Also, Green hydrogen agreements position India as a potential future clean energy supplier to Europe, thereby, contributing to Germany’s diversification away from Russian dependence. Apart from this, healthcare workforce mobility initiatives also create opportunities for India’s skilled professionals, reinforcing long-term demographic complementarity between the two countries. Internal patterns of political shift from Scholz’s compromises in his coalition policies to Merz’s conservatism, can potentially speed up foreign policy shifts that were hitherto slowed down by ideological discrepancies or partnerships of governance. Destination diplomacy matters because leaders’ choices of destinations of their official foreign visits send twin signals, both symbolic priorities and substantive strategic intent to international partners and domestic audiences. Taken together, the defence, supply chain, energy, and mobility agreements concluded during the visit help explain why Germany increasingly views India not merely as one among many partners but as a central pillar of its own Indo-Pacific strategy , which encapsulates in Berlin’s effort to integrate trade, manufacturing, supply chain resilience and energy security across the Indian Ocean and East Asia to reduce overdependence over China. India offers what China potentially cannot, a democratic partner with massive manufacturing scale and a shared interest of reform in global governance. Prioritising Ahmedabad over Beijing thus reflects a strategic reorientation shaped by pragmatism. With this reconfiguration, India is increasingly recognised as a potential anchor for Germany’s Indo-Pacific engagement, a partial manufacturing alternative to China and a coalition partner in efforts toward UNSC reform. As both countries pursue permanent Security Council seats while managing complex ties with the United States, China, and Russia, their partnership offers a test of whether emerging powers can reshape aspects of global order through strategic coalitions rather than waiting for great power consensus. Whether this conservative convergence translates into sustained implementation remains uncertain. Even so, Merz’s arrival in India sent a clear signal that Germany’s new conservative government increasingly frames India not merely as an alternative to China, but as a priority partner in the twenty first century geopolitics. Whether symbolic or transformative, Ahmedabad before Beijing sent an unmistakable signal about Germany’s evolving priorities in Asia. #IndoGerman This is an Original Article Contribution to the SIS Blog. Shibankita Pradhan is a Ph.D. Candidate at the Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, JNU. Her academic pursuits are centred around research and writing on pressing political issues and global dynamics and transitions.

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