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By Sanjay Turi In the wake of the Pahalgam Terrorism attack on April 22, India launched Operation Sindoor  and gave a befitting reply to Pakistan, giving an additional message to the world of having zero tolerance for terrorism. Subsequently, India also launched a diplomatic drive globally, giving special focus on the Global South. Ahead of the BRICS ’ scheduled meeting in Brazil, Prime Minister Modi’s recent visit  to Ghana, Trinidad & Tobago, Argentina, and Namibia sought to focus on wide-ranging economic, energy and cultural cooperation, which would go a long way in strengthening India’s diplomatic drive  to foster cooperation to fight against terrorism with a zero-tolerance approach. Although oil trading began in the late 19 th  century and dominated the global trade in the mid-20 th  century, its predominant role of hydrocarbon trade is now being challenged by the strategic shift of focus towards rare earth minerals and clean energy technologies . As countries from the Global South hold a significantly large reserve of both light and heavy  rare earth minerals such as uranium, lithium, cobalt, manganese, dysprosium, terbium (widely used for making permanent magnet for electric vehicle), PM Modi’s subsequent visit to these countries ahead of his participation in the BRICS meeting is a masterstroke. In light of Vision 2047 , India’s aspiration to rapidly transition to sustainable development, though initiatives like that of green energy and the manufacturing of electric vehicles, will obviously require the above-mentioned mineral resources in industrial development. Therefore, the recent visit of PM Modi is undoubtedly a step towards achieving one of the crucial goals of Viksit Bharat . Compared to other interior countries in the region, Ghana (located in the Gulf of Guinea) and Namibia, being situated on the coast of the Atlantic Ocean, are strategically more important, giving India geopolitical access to engage with other African countries where China is already showing its active presence. Namibia has become the first country  in the region to embrace the UPI(Unified Payment Interface ) digital network, and Rwanda is in line to join the services.  India is gradually expanding its engagement in the region. Ghana and Namibia, located on the Atlantic coast, offer India strategic access to West and Southern African countries where China has already established a strong presence. Ghana’s strategic location in the Gulf of Guinea in Western Africa also offers India an opening to the Atlantic Ocean. Ghana, having a large and significant Indian diaspora , shares a strong historical connection with India since its very independence.   The Economic Community of West African States( ECOWAS ) is considered a regional entity to govern the West African economic community. Therefore, for India, engaging with Ghana means engaging with ECOWAS. West Africa has abundant reserves of natural resources, and Ghana has significant portion of these mineral resources. West African countries face severe challenge of sea piracy. India, being a strong naval power in the Indian Ocean, showcasing the prominence of the SAGAR initiative, can potentially work in collaboration with West African countries of the Gulf of Guinea to fight piracy. Ghana, also being an important member of the India-Africa Forum Summit , is likely to serve as a launchpad for India to engage with the countries situated in the Global South. A Tectonic Shift in India-Ghana Bilateral Relations: Ghana’s previous engagements with China have not benefited Ghana that much ; Instead, China developed its infrastructure in the country in such a way that China has been the larger beneficiary. On the contrary, India is strategically more inclusive,  initially engaging with the common people of the country. The Indian government intends to connect with Ghanaians through several welfare initiatives, such as Feed Ghana  and skill development  programs for the youth in the country. As Ghana is the largest producer of gold  in the region, India is the world’s largest gold consumer . This contrast clearly shows how important and strong our bilateral relations are going to be in the future. Once the gold supply chain is established between the two countries, it will certainly help India to stabilise the  gold prices. India, with its rich socio-religious and ethnic diversity, is one of the biggest hubs of many religions and cultural functions, where the demand for gold can be seen persisting throughout the year. It is estimated that Ghana holds more than 960 million  tonnes of Bauxite reserves, which are used as an important component of several industries such as construction, aviation, defence, electric vehicle manufacturing, etc. Apart from this, Bauxite and Manganese are used in production of steel. As both countries have signed a trade deal for Bauxite, once India starts importing Bauxite from Ghana, it will give India an edge over other countries to excel in the industries mentioned above. Therefore, this trade deal between Ghana and India is expected to boost the Indian Semiconductor Mission  by augmenting the upstream industrial inputs.Ghana additionally has a great lithium reserve , and its import will help India excel in the manufacturing of batteries . Ghana’s trade of Lithium may provide India with an alternative, reducing its dependency on Australia and Latin America . Ghana has also requested that India conduct an ISRO-backed survey to explore other hidden mineral resources, primarily lithium, in the country. In return, India has promised to popularise Ghana’s lithium reserves in the entire Global South region, where India already has a greater influence . Therefore, the promotion of Ghana in the global south region is expected to help India deepen its strategic influence in the pro-Ghana West African countries, where China is already gradually expanding its wings. India has also founded a critical mineral working group under the India-Ghana strategic mineral partnership agreement , through which India, without any conditionality or coercion, will help Ghana in the exploration of natural minerals of the country. Hence, Ghana and Namibia, being located on the coast of the Atlantic Ocean, have not only become a strategic trade partner of India but also an important gateway to trade with other landlocked central African countries in the region. Considering China’s extensive penetration in the region, the Indian government must prioritise engaging with the strategically located countries in the region. As India is consistently seeking to champion the Global South, it would soon overshadow China’s debt-driven influence in the region. This is an Original Contribution to the SIS Blog.   Sanjay Turi is a Doctoral Candidate at the Centre for West Asian Studies(CWAS), School of International Studies(SIS), Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

By Sanjay Turi In the wake of the shifting regional power dynamics, the emerging alliance between China, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Taliban is a warning call for India to give more emphasis on engaging with the region. Ignoring China’s multilateral engagement with the neighbouring countries will pose a significant threat to India's strategic interests in the region.   In light of India’s Operation Sindoor  post Pahalgam Attack, the Chinese government hosted a meeting  between Pakistan and Afghanistan’s Taliban government led by Ishaq Dar  and Amir Khan Muttaqi, respectively. India’s earlier dream of benefiting from the rising conflict between Pakistan and the Taliban seems to have shattered as the Taliban has stepped towards joining  the China-led CPEC projects. In addition to the Taliban’s recent association with BRI, China’s simultaneous multilateral engagements with Pakistan and Bangladesh appear to have paved the way for the establishment of an anti-India bloc in the region. It has sent a shockwave to Delhi regarding the future bilateral relations between Delhi and Kabul, as well as Dhaka. The geopolitical dynamics of South and Central Asia are now poised for a notable shift with the Taliban's recent decision to officially join the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor ( CPEC ). Inaugurated in 2015  as a key project under China's Belt and Road Initiative ( BRI),  CPEC bridges China's Xinjiang region with Pakistan's Gwadar Port. With Afghanistan’s recent aspiration to join this crucial infrastructure network under the Taliban government, India is likely to face a significant strategic challenge in the entire Central Asian region. For New Delhi, which has historically held strong economic and diplomatic relations with Afghanistan, this decision of Kabul poses a significant threat to India's strategic influence in the region and raises major concerns regarding encirclement and influence. Picture Source: DD News From a geostrategic perspective, the deepening ties between India and Afghanistan in recent times, amid rising border tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, were well expected to work in favour of India. However, Kabul's recent shocking decision to join CPEC has completely changed the geopolitical landscape of this region. It can also be argued that as India has consistently been severely critical of CPEC (BRI), given that it passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir , Kabul’s landmark decision to cooperate with China and Pakistan on this project will not only deteriorate its bilateral relationship with India, but also, this diplomatic initiative by Kabul is likely to alter the entire geopolitics of Central Asia soon, further pushing India towards facing a significant geostrategic dilemma in the region.   China has long patiently sought to utilise CPEC as a gateway to the Gulf and other West Asian countries. Therefore, the Taliban’s recent decision to join CPEC will undoubtedly make the Chinese Dream Project inevitable, which will potentially help China counter India’s stronghold in the region. Once China manages to bridge this gap, it may aggressively disrupt India’s increasing influence in the region. As India has already made massive infrastructural investments and developmental projects such as Chabahr-Zahedan Railway line, Zaranj-Delaram Highway etc in Afghanistan, aiming to add to the International North-South Transport Corridor ( INSTC ) as a new gateway to carry out trade with Central Asia, Europe and Russia, the recent geopolitical dynamics in the post trilateral cooperation between China, Pakistan and Taliban will most likely disrupt India’s penetration in the region. China has recently hosted another trilateral meeting with Bangladesh and Pakistan in Kunming, and this meeting seems to be showing China’s strong determination to strengthen the String of Pearls Policy in the Indian Ocean. China’s increasing aspiration to get access to the Bay of Bengal through Bangladesh and the Arabian Sea through Pakistan is not only challenging the Indian influence in the region, but also significantly challenging the US influence in the Indo-Pacific region. Many experts believe that China, through this Kunming Diplomacy, seems to be creating an alternative bloc  to SAARC , where China, in the absence of India, will be dominating the entire South Asia and possibly the India ocean too. China’s focus on extending CPEC It has been widely observed that CPEC is slowly becoming less effective, as it encounters strong opposition from the locals in the Sindh and Baluchistan regions, which together make up 44%  of Pakistan's total land area. The people’s resistance to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor has reached the extent that local groups have begun targeting Chinese workers and engineers. Incidents involving the murder of Chinese officials and engineers have become increasingly common. Recently, there was an attempted attack  on some Japanese engineers at the CPEC project site because they looked like Chinese nationals. This clearly shows the degree of anger and resistance to this project in the region. Therefore, China has been looking for an alternative to both CPEC and the Gwadar port, given that India has already been promoting its Chabahar port  as a counter to China in the Persian Gulf region. Considering the political instability of Pakistan a significant challenge, China, after including the Taliban with the CPEC project, may be considering using the Wakhan Corridor  as an alternative to bypass Pakistan’s volatile regions of Sindh and Balochistan, and reach the Persian Gulf via the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) and Afghanistan. After the Taliban’s successful inclusion in this project, China’s aim of overshadowing Indian influence in the region seems to be working now. Additionally, the construction of the Peshawar-Kabul Highway  and other connectivity projects, an extension of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor in Afghanistan, will possibly provide China with direct access to the Middle East Region, the Central Asian Region, the Eastern African Region, the Gulf Region, the European Market, as well as the Indian Ocean through the Arabian Sea. Although the recent border conflict between Afghanistan and the Taliban was expected to benefit India strategically  in the region against Pakistan and China, the recent announcement of the Taliban joining the CPEC has completely disappointed India, while giving an edge to China over Indian influence in the region. Geopolitical implications for India As China manages to enhance its economic and strategic influence in Afghanistan and continues to expand the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) along India's northwestern border, India is very likely to face an inevitable challenge of being ‘encircled on two fronts’ - militarily by Pakistan and China, and economically through their increasing regional collaboration. Additionally, India is also facing a geostrategic challenge in the region, especially in the post Israel-Iran conflict, where India, unlike China , maintained strategic silence and chose not to extend its support to either country directly. In the face of India’s increasing strategic dilemma in the region, China’s direct access to the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal through Pakistan and Bangladesh, respectively, will additionally challenge India’s overall maritime security in the region, too. In terms of security challenges in Kashmir , the deepening ties between the Taliban and Pakistan raise concerns about the possible resurgence of militant networks that could potentially affect the Kashmir valley. Additionally, securing CPEC routes through the Wakhan Corridor of Afghanistan may give Pakistan space to shift its attention and resources toward its eastern border with India, which will undoubtedly help China keep India engaged with its own issues. As far as China’s political behaviour is concerned, the inclusion of Afghanistan in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is potentially oriented towards cutting India off from essential connectivity networks in Central Asia. While the IMEC project has been partially paralysed by the regional conflict of the Middle East, India's goals, including the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC)  and the Chabahar Port initiative, are now encountering heightened competition and potential diplomatic challenges from a growing China-led coalition in the region. In light of the shifting regional power dynamics, the emerging alliance between China, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and the Taliban is likely to pose a significant threat to India's strategic interests in the region. As China is looking forward to filling the void  left by Russia (Soviet Union) and the USA, one after the other, in Afghanistan, it has probably managed to trap Bangladesh and Pakistan along with the Taliban within its debt trap policy  network. With China offering political support and economic incentives, this strategic grouping has the potential to undermine and erode India's image as a regional stabiliser. As the new strategic alignment of the Taliban complicates the security dynamics in the region, it seems to be undermining India's ability to dictate and influence its own neighbourhood.  Consequently, it is high time for India to play a proactive role in exploring alternative strategies to recalibrate its foreign policy approach, primarily giving greater attention to the Link and Act West Policy  (formerly called Look West ).   This is an Original Contribution to the SIS Blog Sanjay Turi is a Doctoral Candidate at the Centre for West Asian Studies (CWAS), School of International Studies(SIS), Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

By Kuldeep Ojha Introduction The world’s oceans, long viewed as open frontiers of commerce and conquest, are fast emerging as the next battleground of climate politics. As new currents redefine maritime politics, Costa Rica— a land known more for its rainforests than its naval doctrine — has carved out a distinct role in steering the high seas conversation through law and diplomacy. At the Third United Nations Ocean Conference (UNOC3)  in Nice (France) this June, Costa Rica co-hosted the summit alongside France, calling for a fossil fuel exploration ban and a moratorium on deep-sea mining, while pushing for expedited ratification of the High Seas Treaty . As it looks toward COP30 in Belém, Brazil, Costa Rica’s ocean diplomacy offers more than moral suasion; it signals the arrival of small, values-driven states as active architects of a new environmental multilateralism. Photo credit: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Ocean Diplomacy as Statecraft: Costa Rica’s Turn to the High Seas For much of the twentieth century, ocean governance was the preserve of naval powers and trading giants. The rules were set by those who commanded the seas, not those who merely bordered them. However, as climate change unsettles traditional hierarchies in the twenty-first century, Costa Rica’s ascent as a maritime norm entrepreneur underscores how environmental diplomacy is increasingly becoming a theatre for small state agencies. In contrast to earlier summits, at UNOC3, Costa Rica did not serve as ceremonial; it was the thematic tone. President Rodrigo Chaves’ call for a global ban on fossil fuel exploration and a moratorium on deep-sea mining was far from symbolic; it challenged the inertia of the climate regime. Backed by years of legal activism  and environmental credibility, Costa Rica’s insistence on fast-tracking the implementation of the Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) Treaty  placed it at the heart of a diplomatic effort long stalled by geopolitical hesitation. It is not merely environmental idealism. Costa Rica understands that moral clarity can be converted into diplomatic capital in a fractured multilateral order. Its ocean diplomacy is strategic — deploying law, coalition-building, and convening power to influence norms that larger states often struggle to shape. It is not the statecraft of fleets but of principled persistence. Marine Protected Areas and the New Geography of Conservation Although not a maritime military power; Costa Rica quietly redefines its oceanic jurisdiction. The recent designation of new Marine Protected Areas (MPAs)  — notably near Cocos Island  —signals a shift where conservation zones are doubling as instruments of geopolitical relevance. Backed by a €1.8 million EU fund secured at UNOC3, Costa Rica conserves biodiversity and asserts sovereignty through sustainability. MPAs are not just conservation maps; they are diplomatic assets. The scaling-up of protection zones aligns with global targets such as the 30x30 goal , safeguarding 30 percent of the planet’s land and seas by 2030. More than symbolic gestures, these conservation areas embed Costa Rica into evolving international architectures that bind marine life protection with climate targets and carbon market mechanisms . This redefinition of maritime space reflects a broader shift in geopolitical relevance in the climate age. Costa Rica’s MPAs, legally codified and internationally backed, represent soft assertion — a model of how ecological stewardship can translate into geopolitical voice. Photo Credit- Xinhua News From UNOC3 to COP30: Maritime Climate Governance and the Ocean Breakthroughs Agenda Diplomacy rarely moves in straight lines. It advances through alignments. Costa Rica’s role has expanded — from co-leading discussions at UNOC3 to framing key priorities ahead of COP30 in Belém. In doing so, San José positions itself as a link between marine stewardship and the evolving architecture of international climate governance. The Ocean Breakthroughs Agenda, which Costa Rica champions alongside like-minded states, represents an inspiring effort to embed ocean governance into climate frameworks. New instruments such as the Ocean Equity Index  and the Ocean Investment Protocol mark the beginning of a financing and accountability architecture that gives coastal developing states a meaningful stake in shaping future ocean governance. President Chaves’ pledge to integrate marine protection into national climate policy is not just domestic reform. It is foreign policy, a signal to COP30 that oceans are integral to mitigation and adaptation, not peripheral. As many states hesitate, Costa Rica is pushing a Global South proposition: that the maritime commons must be governed with equity, not expedience. Strategic Implications: Can Small States Shape Big Ocean Norms? In today’s fractured international landscape, small-state efforts are often brushed aside as moral theatre. Costa Rica’s maritime strategy suggests otherwise. Its advocacy for the High Seas Treaty, smart leverage of blue finance and quiet leadership in conservation forums suggest a recalibration: norms can constrain even powerful actors when persistently advanced and legally codified. The road ahead is steeper. As the UNCLOS  framework attracts political friction and COP30’s stakes grow, Costa Rica will need more than principled leadership. Converting commitments into durable regulation will hinge on domestic capability and international alignment. Moreover, normative gains may trigger backlash from fossil lobbies, deep-sea mining consortiums, or maritime security hawks. Nevertheless, it is in moments of flux that small states matter most. Anchoring action in law and legitimacy, rather than coercion or extraction, allows countries like Costa Rica to influence global norms with outsized effect. While naval might still matters, it is consensus that increasingly defines the rules at sea. Furthermore, voices from the periphery are no longer silent in crafting that consensus — their voices now register where they count. Conclusion Costa Rica’s maritime diplomacy is more than a soft power story; it marks an inflection point. As COP30 approaches, the real challenge will be endurance. Can Costa Rica, and others like it, convert summit-stage credibility into sustained normative authority? If it succeeds, it may secure its marine ecosystems and widen the aperture for small-state agencies in global affairs. Ultimately, the high seas will not be governed solely by great power prerogatives. They will be shaped by those willing to defend them — legally, diplomatically, and morally. Costa Rica, for now, leads from the periphery. #CostaRica #HighSeasTreaty #UNOC3 #COP30 #OceanDiplomacy #MarineProtectedAreas #ClimateJustice #SmallStateDiplomacy This is an Original Contribution to the SIS Blog. Kuldeep Ojha is a PhD scholar in Latin American Studies at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU). His research focuses on environmental governance in Central America, and his interests extend to the Latin American region and its geopolitics.

ABOUT THE BLOG The 'SIS Blog' is an initiative of the School of International Studies (SIS), Jawaharlal Nehru University to disseminate contemporary debates, comments and opinions related to international relations. This blog will publish posts written by faculty members, students, alumni of SIS and invited contributors. Blogging is a dynamic way to complement other channels of knowledge and engage vast audiences with new perspectives.

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