Search

By Prof. (Dr.) Bharat H. Desai I. The Context: Saying No to War   On January 09, 2025 , inaugurating the 18th  Pravasi Bhartiya Divas  (Bhubaneswar), the Indian Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi, thought it fit “to tell the world that the future lies not in war, but in Buddha ( भविष्य युद्ध में नहीं है, बुद्ध में है )”. Hopefully, this crisp but sagacious primer would become an Indian mantra  for 2025 to be a global solution provider for some 59 conflicts in 34 countries ( PRIO, June 10, 2024 ) that play havoc with global peace and prosperity. It is significant to have the prime ministerial assertion to “say no to war” in the land where Emperor Ashok renounced throne after witnessing brutality resulting from the Kalinga war.   There has been a persistent hammering by the Indian PM that this is “not an era of war” and to reject idea of strength “on the battlefield”. It has come out vividly in some of the PM’s recent addresses such as the UN Summit of the Future  (September 23, 2024) , Indian diaspora in Warsaw (August 22, 2024) , G20 Summit (September 09, 2023)  and the Joint Sitting of the US Congress  (June 23, 2023) . The PM has suggested the time tested tools of “dialogue and diplomacy” that are the basic tools for peaceful settlement of international disputes ( Part VI and VII of the UN Charter ). The elevation of such foreign policy posture at the highest level makes great sense even as it fits into the Indian civilizational ethos too. For instance, in 1942, Mahatma Gandhi , in the context of Second World War had called for imbibing the no-war  mantra and observed: “The warring nations are destroying themselves with such fury and ferocity that the end will be mutual exhaustion. The victor will share the fate that awaited the surviving (victorious) Pandavas”. Historically, war has been regarded as an appalling evil.     II. War: An Appalling Evil It is worrisome that in the third decade of the 21st century, some 2 billion people live in global conflict zones. Therefore, it makes great sense to raise the Indian foreign policy bar to ‘say no to war’. Emerging from the ashes of the Second World War and the League of Nations, UN Charter (adopted June 26, 1945)  ushered the humankind  “ to find a way to end wars”.  The US President Harry Truman humbly expressed thanks to the Almighty God to usher 50 founding ‘United Nations’ to “ search for peace through world organization”. “If we had had this Charter a few years ago-and above all, the will to use it--millions now dead would be alive. If we should falter in the future in our will to use it, millions now living will surely die”, Truman prophesized in the closing address (UNCIO; San Francisco) . Yet, within 41 days, same Truman ordered first dropping of the two nuclear bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima (August 6) and Nagasaki (August 9) . It killed between 150,000 and 246,000 people and inflicted the first major blow to the Charter blueprint wherein all members “shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force” [ Article 2 (4) ]. In its 80th year, the UN is struggling to douse all raging warfare even as the UN Security Council (UNSC) struggles to adopt even ceasefire resolutions since invisible hands of P5 lurks behind many of the conflicts.       Let Us Beat Swords into Ploughshares : A sculpture by  Evgeniy Vuchetich ; UN Art Collection The question of Legal Controls of International Conflicts , taught for years by this author, has remained a scholarly quest for elimination of the scourge of war that has been considered ‘extra-legal’ – neither legal nor illegal. There has been a persistent quest for ‘outlawry’ as seen in 1907 Hague Peace Conferences , 1919 Treaty of Versailles  and 1928 Pact of Paris . After the advent of the 1945 UN Charter, notwithstanding the  ‘blueprint’ for the prohibition of war [ Article 2 (4) ; Article 51 ], wars have remained a scourge for the humankind.  In 2018, the Nobel Peace Prize  was awarded, to Denis Mukwege and Nadia Murad, “ for their efforts to end the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war and armed conflict" . Growing weaponization of sexual & gender-based violence ( Author: SGBV in International Law  ( 2022 ; 2023 ) has become the biggest menace in all conflicts. “If we want people to say ‘no more war’, we have to show how brutal it is”, Berit Reiss-Andersen, Chair of the Norwegian Nobel Committee said.   The world has experienced the highest number of 59 conflicts (2024)  with military spending reaching US dollar 2.2 trillion (2024)  and Global Humanitarian Overview  (2024)  predicting 300 million people in need for humanitarian aid. A s per UN Women estimates of 2024, 6oo million women and girls   (300 million in 2017) faced risks of violence in conflict zones. In a worrisome 2025 UNICEF Global Outlook , armed conflicts also pose serious risks to over 473 million children living in conflict zones. Picture Source : A sculpture at Mujibnagar (Dhaka), vividly depicts the mass rape of the Bangladeshi woman during the 1971 Liberation war.  Mike Walz, US Congressman and incoming national security adviser, observed on January 12, 2025  that the Ukraine war has become a World War One-style "meat grinder of people and resources" with "World War Three consequences". “I just don't think it's realistic to say we're going to expel every Russian from every inch of Ukrainian soil, even Crimea”, Walz said. On the other hand, though news of a ceasefire deal (January 18, 2025) in the Gaza war , has brought relief, Hamas is insisting for full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, whereas Israel won’t end the war until Hamas is dismantled. During last 3 years, these two wars alone have killed thousands and displaced millions of people.   III. Invoking Dialogue and Diplomacy   Since seeds of warfare lie in human minds, complete elimination remains a utopian goal. How to give effect to the assertion that “this is not an era of war”? What will it take to bring about sanity among the warring groups driven by greed for power, past baggage, control over resources, proxy wars and sheer banality. Therefore, it would be the biggest service to the humanity, if India can rise as a “global solution provider” ( SIS Blog : March 22, 2024 ; October 01, 2022 ) to end some major conflicts especially impinging upon vital national interests. The tools of ‘dialogue and diplomacy’, based upon the bedrock of International Law, could comprise use of negotiations, good offices, mediation and roles as deal maker or trouble shooter. It would entail reaping ‘peace dividends’ through select constructive engagements by leveraging civilizational links, democratic credentials, reservoir of goodwill, economic capacity, military prowess and intellectual wherewithal. Any such Indian engagement would require meandering through diverse players, processes and problematique.     Picture Source : UNICEF/Diego Ibarra Sánchez: A child walks amongst the ruins of houses in southern Lebanon IV. Conclusion   Within the limit of time and space of this blog, the primer on ‘dialogue and diplomacy’ entails adherence to the PM’s assertions on “relevance” and “commitment” to International Law to work out appropriate conflict-specific solutions. Such an audacious Indian role, would necessitate entrusting the task to a resolute person duly backed by a university-based scholarly architecture to lay groundwork for conflict resolution. There is no substitute for cutting-edge solution-oriented research. To institutionalize an Indian role as a global solution provider including ‘saying no to war’ calls for setting up of a diplomatic university led by a genuine and forward-looking thought leader.     This Article is an Original Contribution to the SIS Blog. It is the 12th article in the author's SIS Blog series on : USE OF WEAPONS OF WAR. Prof. (Dr.) Bharat H. Desai is the former Chairperson and Professor of International Law at the Centre for International Legal Studies (SIS, JNU), who served as a member of the Official Indian Delegations to various multilateral negotiations (2002-2008), initiated and coordinated the futuristic knowledge initiatives for the SIS Faculty Wall of Honor (2023-24) , the Inter-University Consortium: JNU; Jammu; Kashmir; Sikkim (2012-2020)  and the Making SIS Visible (2008-2013)  as well as contributes as the Editor-in-Chief  of Environmental Policy and Law (IOS Press: Amsterdam) .

By Kuldeep Ojha Donald Trump’s re-election in 2024 marks the beginning of a potentially transformative era for U.S.-Latin America relations. Trump promises to promote his ‘America First’ policy, based on a combination of neo-conservative thought, and the Monroe Doctrine's principles of “American dominance” in the Americas, given that Republicans dominate the Senate and House . If the first Trump presidency and his campaign rhetoric are any indication of things to come, his policy approach on trade, border security, immigration, and energy transition are likely to shape Latin America’s own policy choices. President Trump’s affinity with right-wing nationalist leaders in the region might also play a role in shaping bilateral ties. However, Trump’s transactional and personalistic approach would translate into uncertainty and even policy reversals. Within this scenario of an ‘America First’ presidency that will withdraw from the leadership role, Latin American countries are likely to resort to bilateral diplomacy to wrest concession and avoid conflagrations.   The Protectionist Disruption Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy, evident during his first term, treats international relations as a series of deals prioritizing the US economic interests. By withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)  and renegotiating the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) into the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA ), Trump clarified that multilateral arrangements would take a back seat to bilateral deals designed to boost the US influence. Since most Latin American countries rely significantly on commercial activity with the United States, this position could pose serious difficulties. For example, Trump's proposed 10% import tariff could severely impact Latin American economies, which are heavily dependent on exports to the U.S. market. While Mexico is particularly prone to tariff-induced disruption, Brazil and Argentina’s already troubled economies may face a double whammy . On one hand, Trump’s proposed tariffs would negate their excess to the lucrative US market. At the same time, sapping demand from China might deprive them of an alternative destination. In kind, the protectionism used by Trump may have reciprocal measures such as tariffs and devaluations of currencies. This may lead to the collapse of mutually trading system with smaller countries, that will ensure the weaker economies become volatile and unstable. Concretely, Trump’s policies may affect Latin American Agrarian and Industrial products that define the continent’s export baskets. Especially Brazilian soybeans and Argentine beef are imported to a large extent into the United States and would particularly be harmed by a high tax on agriculture imports. Moreover, it seems that Trump’s bolder ways of achieving the economy through reduction of corporate taxes and increased spending in the US may lead to the larger fiscal deficit and cause inflation to increase the unadjusted interest rates. This may, in turn, lead to the Latin American currencies decline by even a larger extent; thus, negatively affecting the region’s economy growth rate. According to the Pew Research, Latin American gross domestic product may have difficulty breaking the 3% growth mark in the following years. The unpredictable and skeptic decision making, that defines Trump policies around the region, could prompt regional leaders to continue applying a persuasive leadership principle to secure political favor or trade export permits for certain key sectors. However, in the long-run, the most potent way of countering protectionism and policy risks that are evident in the American inward turning strategy, is to build relationships with Asian, European and African markets. After Trump withdrew from the TPP, the redesigning of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), negotiated by Japan, shows the potential of such an approach.     Crackdown on Illegal Immigration Trump 1.0 took a zero-tolerance stance on non-traditional security issues emanating from Latin America, including drug trafficking, gang violence, and illegal immigration. It is reasonable to expect a continuation of the hard-line approach in his second term, including stricter border control and potential military action against the Mexican drug cartels. More recently, Trump’s Vice President-elect J.D. Vance has sought consent to let the US president launch strikes against cartel compounds in Mexico. This could distort the relationship between Mexico and the US. The effects of these policies would be felt most acutely in countries like Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, where poverty and violence drive thousands to seek refuge in the US. Trump’s strict immigration stance has translated into policies of family separations and deportations, with significant impacts on the economies of Central American countries. However, illegal immigration was a hot political issue in the recent presidential campaign, in which the Republican candidate associated the issue with its impact on economy and ethno- cultural identity. In this case, Trump’s immigration policies will be harmful to immigrants and Latin American economy particularly because of issues of deportation and construction of Camps.  For example, nearly 5 million Mexicans and 2 million Central Americans reside illegally in the United States.  Remittances sent by migrants from the US, contribute substantially to these economies, particularly in Guatemala and Honduras. If deportations go through and the erstwhile illegal residents are forced to return to their home countries, it will add to the pressure on the Latin American governments to generate suitable opportunities for the influx of returnee population. The failure to meet the economic aspirations of deported people would cause social and political discontent. Therefore, massive deportations or restrictions in remittances may further destabilize these economies. This situation may lead Latin American countries to increased unemployment, poverty, and, in essence, pressures towards more human movements.   The Green Transition Setback Trump's re-election also means that he shall continue to have the same policy on climate that he has laid in his first presidency, which is pro-fossil fuels. He has continuously supported such measures to bring back coal and oil industries . This could help oil rich countries in Latin America such as Guyana, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago get more US investments in fossil fuel. Nevertheless, for the countries such as Brazil and Colombia, the members of the rainforest, Trump’s attitude towards climate action might be costly. For instance, Brazil, which will be hosting the COP 30 climate conference in 2025 , has cited the Lula presidency to its readiness to gain a place among world powers in the preservation of the environment. Nevertheless, Trump’s support of fossil energy and his previous exit from the Partnership with Paris Agreement may alienate the better cooperation with Brazil regarding climatic conservation programs. Additionally, Trump’s policies could strain biodiversity in Latin America’s tropical rainforests, crucial for absorbing global carbon emissions.  Trump’s disregard for climate action may not sit well with the environmentally conscious Latin American leaders like Lula. The green transition sceptics constituency that Trump represents would cause harm to the American reputation for leadership on climate change in the eyes of Latin America. Trump’s disregard for green energy transition may also dash hopes for a Marshall Plan-like endeavour on the part of the US to enable technology transfer to the Global South. Ironically enough, the void created by the US in this domain shall allow China to step in with its ‘green transition diplomacy’. Since clean energy is increasingly going to dominate economic activity, China’s aid and technology transfer to enable this economic transformation in Latin America will provide it with economic gains in terms of market access and diplomatic support in terms of favourable bilateral relationship China’s green energy leadership in the US backyard then will amount to a strategic setback for the US. While Latin American countries may partially hitch their wagon to Chinese tech and services, they would do well to find alternatives to reduce the risks of excessive dependency. Such a diversification bid may also involve cooperating with the US by engaging with the private sector, civil society experts, and provincial governors more attuned to the climate risk.   Diplomatic Shifts and Future Relations Trump’s re-election has galvanized right-wing leaders across Latin America, including Argentina’s Javier Milei and El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele, who share with Trump an affinity for “tough” policies and nationalist rhetoric. Central American countries such as Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Panama, as well as South American countries such as Paraguay, Chile, and Uruguay, that are in synergy with the US economic and security agenda are likely to benefit from this Trump regime. Trump support for conservative right- wing governments in these countries could foster enhanced economic and security cooperation mainly in the fight against drug cartels, and management of economic risks. However, Trump’s re-election could create diplomatic hurdles for left-leaning governments, such as those in Mexico, Chile, and Brazil, which will find it hard to deal with his militaristic, unilateralist approach to foreign policy with a disregard for diplomatic norms. He proposed an aggressive approach to so-called anti-American states, including Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, which he calls, the “ Troika of Tyranny ”. His aggressive policy could only deepen the measures to impose more sanctions and a more profound isolation of these countries. For instance, Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela could get even heavier sanctions that will imply limitation or even total banning of the export of petroleum, which is the main exportable commodity of Venezuela, and could exacerbate a present scarcity of foodstuffs and drugs. Furthermore, Trump's focus on alleviating China's clout in Latin America adds another dimension of geopolitical rivalry.  Under The America Crece  initiative, the US seeks to promote private investments in Latin American infrastructure sector. If done rightly, this initiative could counter China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and help revitalize the Latin American economy. However, during the COVID-19 pandemic, China’s ‘ mask diplomacy ’ helped it gain a foothold in Latin American markets, where public sentiment towards China has become increasingly favourable. Pew Research Centre further reveals that most of the Latin Americans view China as an economic- ally and, at some point, even as a geopolitical ally. Conclusion Trump’s second term is set to redefine the US-Latin American relations through a transactional lens, where bilateral treaties, strict immigration reforms, and strategic anti-China measures take precedence. For Latin America, where the pace of growth is still low, estimated at 1.8%, Trump can increase existing economic and social problems, and some can turn to other partners and cooperate with China or Russia. While Latin America struggles with how to cope with the aftermath of the downturns, its leaders will have no choice but to be business-like in relation to Trump while relying on diplomacy to obtain the best possible conditions for their countries. Trump’s neo-conservative policy and, in addition, the absolute adherence to an ‘America First’ doctrine may catalyze a new phase of Latin American diplomacy in front of a binary choice: cooperation or divergence. Sustainable foundations for this new bilateral the US-Latin America relationship will be predicated on how the two regions will maneuver around the swirl of economic relations, security, and environmental concerns caused by evolving power realignments This Article is an Original Contribution to the SIS Blog Kuldeep Ojha is a PhD scholar in Latin American Studies at SIS, JNU. His research focuses on environmental governance in Central America, and his interests extend to the Latin American region and its geopolitics.

By Prof. (Dr.) Bharat H. Desai I. Views of the States   On the whole, all the presentations (written and oral) made by the States and IOs brought a variety of legal arguments that constituted the mosaic of different approaches in addressing the challenge of global climate change. For instance, Brazil  ( Written Statement, March 21, 2024 ; Oral Presentation, December 03, 2024 ) highlighted its commitment to ambitious emissions reductions, stressing that despite being a developing country, it faces significant challenges like poverty eradication and extreme climate impacts. The Brazilian envoy underscored the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”. China ( Written Statement, March 22, 2024 ; Oral Presentation, December 03, 2024 ) urged the ICJ to avoid creating new legal obligations and focus on existing frameworks and underscored the developed countries’ historical responsibility.   The Indian approach has been reflected in the Written Statement of March 21, 2024 ; Oral Presentation, December 05, 2024 . Since this author prepared the initial draft of the Indian Written Statement, it is worth spelling out the stance emphasizing that the “Court may exercise due caution to avoid devising new or additional obligations beyond what is already agreed under the existing climate change regime”. [ Indian Written Statement, March 21, 2024; conclusion, page 39, paragraph 106 (iii) ]. However, the two leading players on the climate chessboard, European Union (EU) and the United States took different positions. The EU ( Written Statement, March 22, 2024 ; Oral Presentation, December 13, 2024 ) emphasized cooperation and stressed the non-adversarial nature of the advisory proceedings and pointed to the importance of existing treaties in addressing climate change but stopped short of calling for enforcement mechanisms. On the other hand, the United States ( Written Statement, March 22, 2024 ; Oral Presentation, December 04, 2024 ) acknowledged the severity of the climate crisis but rejected by the notion that “common but differentiated responsibilities” is a fundamental principle of international law.   Picture Source : UNICEF/ Lasse Bak Mejlvang: Small Island nations, such as Tuvalu face greater risk from sea level rise arising from extreme climatic changes. II. What Would the World Court Do? Upon perusal of the Written Statements and hearing the Oral Presentations ( December 13, 2024 ), some ICJ judges asked the States and IOs specific questions and sought responses by December 20, 2024 ( ENB , December 16, 2024 ) It did elicite good clarifications from 60 States and 5 IOs, till December 20, 2024 .  The Court is expected to deliver its considered Advisory Opinion, hopefully, in the first half of 2025. After the ICJ renders an opinion, the ball would revert back to the UNGA who could further decide on the course correction.   Since there are indications of floundering of the UNFCCC process, as seen in the outcomes of last three successive COP meetings at Baku ( COP29, November 11-24, 2024 ), Dubai ( COP28, November 30-December 12, 2023 ) and Sharm-al-Sheikh ( COP27, November 6-18, 2022 ), it could possibly yield critical space to the ICJ to illuminate upon some seminal aspects for affixing obligations of the states within and beyond the three principal international legal instruments on climate change ( 1992 UNFCCC , 1997 Kyoto Protocol ; 2015 Paris Agreement ) .   It presents an ideational challenge for International Law and Relations scholars, the UNGA and the UNFCCC process. As argued in one of this author’s ideational papers ( Environmental Policy and Law  52 (5-6) 2022, 331-347 ),  the climate crisis calls for earnestly elevating the normative ambit of climate change regulation from a common concern to a planetary concern ( here , EPL , 54 (1) 2024, 3-14 ; here, EPL Blog , January 5, 2023 ; here , EPL , 52 (5-6) 2022, 331-347 ). The UNGA could take the charge by adopting a normative resolution at the 80th session (after the ICJ renders its Opinion in 2025) to provide future directions to the global regulatory approach on climate change. The ICJ would need to find answers to the specific questions in the UNGA request (March 29, 2023 ) . W hat would the World Court do to nudge the UNGA and the States to squarely address the global climate riddle? Picture Source: ICJ: Oral Presentations Venue: The Great Hall of Justice, Peace Palace: December 02-13, 2024 III. Making International Law Work In view of the above legal stratagems and crafting of tools and techniques to stabilize GHG emissions enshrined in the three legal instruments ( 1992 UNFCCC , 1997 Kyoto Protocol  and 2015 Paris Agreement ) , the regulatory approach appears to be stagnating. It has brought in fatigue effect, proliferation of national climate change litigations and the UNGA request . Ironically, the Baku COP29 (November 11-24, 2024   resulted in literal abandonment of the multilateral climate negotiations by some States and lukewarm attitudes of others. The Baku COP29 decision ( CMA.6: New collective quantified goal on climate finance, paragraph 8 ; Press Release, November 24, 2024 ) “to set a goal, in extension of the goal referred to in paragraph 53 of decision 1/CP.21, with developed country Parties taking the lead, of at least USD 300 billion per year by 2035 for developing country Parties for climate action” requires cautious optimism in view of the previous experience of such climate funding commitments remaining on paper. The outcomes of the three back-to-back global events, Summit of the Future ( New York; September 22-23, 2024 ), Sustainable Development Goals  ( New York; September 18-19, 2023 ) and Stockholm+50 Conference  ( Stockholm; June 2-3, 2022 ) have dampened prospects for squarely addressing the climate emergency. As we look ahead, it is high time for the States Parties to the climate change regime ( 1992 UNFCCC , 1997 Kyoto Protocol  and 2015 Paris Agreement ) to engage in a major course correction, as preliminarily spelled out above. It calls for audacity of hope for wiser counsels to prevail. As an immediate goal, the State Parties need to elevate the normative ambit as a planetary concern . Thus, the forthcoming Advisory Opinion of the World Court can provide a nudge and a robust basis to locate “obligations of the states” within the realm of the said larger planetary concern.   In this respect, some of this author’s ideational works ( here , EPL , 54 (1) 2024, 3-14 ; here, EPL Blog , January 5, 2023 ; here , EPL , 52 (5-6) 2022, 331-347 ), done on his home turf of SIS, modestly provide some solutions to the problematique . IV. Conclusion It is in the above-mentioned larger context, in designing an Opinion expected in the first half of 2025, the ICJ has sufficient room for ‘widening the horizons’ through the instrumentality of interpretation on “obligations of states” in International Law. It remains to be seen as to how far the ICJ draws upon its past practices, precedents and processes. The content and futuristic trajectory of the Opinion would depend upon current composition of the Court wherein the judges with academically strong backgrounds could venture to innovate and extrapolate by reading within the fine texts of the three climate change instruments. It may yield “decisive course correction”, as suggested in this author’s recent ideational works ( here , EPL , 54 (1) 2024, 3-14 ; here, EPL Blog , January 5, 2023 ; here , EPL , 52 (5-6) 2022, 331-347 ). After the Court delivers an Opinion, the UNGA would consider it and give shape to the views of the UN Member States through an appropriate resolution, possibly at the 80th session of the UNGA. It could suggest the road ahead for addressing the planetary level climate emergency. As of now, for deciphering obligations of states in respect of climate change  under international Law, we need to trust the wisdom of the ICJ judges who represent the principal legal systems of the world. This Article is an Original Contribution to the SIS Blog. The Article is a sequel to the article Planetary Climate Emergency Part -I Prof. (Dr.) Bharat H. Desai is the former Chairperson and Professor of International Law at the Centre for International Legal Studies (SIS, JNU), who served as a member of the Official Indian Delegations to various multilateral negotiations (2002-2008), initiated and coordinated the futuristic knowledge initiatives for the SIS Faculty Wall of Honor (2023-24) , the Inter-University Consortium: JNU; Jammu; Kashmir; Sikkim (2012-2020)  and the Making SIS Visible (2008-2013)  as well as contributes as the Editor-in-Chief  of Environmental Policy and Law (IOS Press: Amsterdam) .

ABOUT THE BLOG The 'SIS Blog' is an initiative of the School of International Studies (SIS), Jawaharlal Nehru University to disseminate contemporary debates, comments and opinions related to international relations. This blog will publish posts written by faculty members, students, alumni of SIS and invited contributors. Blogging is a dynamic way to complement other channels of knowledge and engage vast audiences with new perspectives.

Index of International Studies Quarterly Dr. MD Naushad Archival Superintendent Room No. 132, Editorial Office, School of International Studies-I Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi-110067 Email ID: naushadk112@yahoo.com Mob. No. 9899621554

Editorial Collective Blog Coordinator Prof. Sameena Hameed Chairperson Centre for West Asian Studies Dr. Sheetal Sharma Associate Professor Centre for European Studies Dr. Sakti Prasad Srichandan Assistant Professor Centre for European Studies Dr. Ankita Dutta Assistant Professor Centre for European Studies Aarshiya Chowdhary PhD Research Scholar Centre for European Studies