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By Shibhankita Pradhan When German Chancellor Friedrich Merz arrived at Ahmedabad on 12th of January for his first official visit to Asia, the choice of destination by the newly elected German government spoke louder than any other official statement could. Not Beijing, not Tokyo, not Seoul but India’s commercial hub in Gujarat, Ahmedabad. He was accompanied by a 23 member CEO delegation  which further signalled serious economic intent. For a German Chancellor whose predecessor Olaf Scholz had prioritised China in his Asia engagement, Merz’s choice represented more than mere itinerary logistics rather it reflected an evolving strategic orientation enabled by conservative pragmatism reshaping Germany’s eastward engagement. A comparison to Scholz’s foreign policy choices helps shed some light on this change of course. Scholz’s visit to China in November 2022 was a representation of his coalition’s measured approach towards German foreign policy , as the visit attracted widespread domestic criticism and a wider European unease over Beijing’s partnership with Moscow following the Russia-Ukraine war. However, the newly elected government led by the Christian Democrats showcases a different approach to these strategic engagements. The decision to make India his first destination during his Asia visit appears less improvised than a calculated move by the German Chancellor. This shift in emphasis manifests in discernible policy signals . While Scholz’s China engagement is rooted in economic interdependence, Merz has more explicitly emphasised de-risking from Germany’s €300 billion annual trade exposure to Beijing. His decision to visit India first seems to indicate an acknowledgement that such dependence increasingly constitutes vulnerability rather than just an economic opportunity. On defence cooperation, where Scholz’s Zeitenwende  rhetoric encountered implementation challenges owing to the coalition politics, Merz’s visit provided a political momentum to the long running Project 75I submarine negotiations , including discussion of a framework understanding as the formal contract remains in the final stages of negotiation. On trade, though structural EU-level constraints remain unchanged, Merz’s call to “urgently conclude” the India-EU Free Trade Agreement  is far more explicitly stated when compared to Scholz. The timing of Merz’s visit to India acquires added significance against the backdrop of wider geopolitical uncertainty. The United States imposed 50 percent tariffs on Indian goods in August 2025, combining reciprocal measures with penalties linked to Russian oil purchase. Germany itself faces renewed trade and tariff unpredictability under Trump’s second term. Yet rather than viewing India’s strategic autonomy on Russian energy as an obstacle, Merz appears to be more pragmatic and accepting of partners maintaining divergent positions on specific issues. It seems to have a better compatible structure for Modi’s policy of multi-alignment than Scholz’s value-centred perspective, even as both governments ultimately support deepening India-Germany ties. Most importantly, India and Germany are also aligned through their shared membership in the G4 grouping,  along with Brazil and Japan as aspirants for permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council. On September 2024 G4 meetings,  the foreign ministers of the member nations reiterated that comprehensive reform in the current UNSC structure remains essential in restoring the Council’s equitable representativeness across the world. Seen in this light, Merz’s decision to prefer India over China also stems from the fact that China, being a P5 member has always shown little incentive to advance this structural reform. This can also be perceived as a strategic choice to build partnerships with fellow aspirants. This underscores how common ambition of UNSC reform may prioritise coalition building among like-minded states over reliance on slow-moving institutional processes. However, more often this partnership remains overshadowed by structural constraints that the theory of realism acknowledges. Divergent threat perceptions persist as Russia looms largest for Germany and China for India. Along with this, neither side can replace U.S. security guarantees, and India-U.S. cooperation continues across counterterrorism , military exercises and strategic dialogue despite tariff tensions. Consequently, the relationship between both countries in not a strategic realignment rather it aims at preserving flexibility and enhancing leverage through multi-directional engagement. As of now, the nineteen agreements  concluded during Merz’s visit which included defence, semiconductors, critical minerals, renewable energy and skills migration illustrate this convergence in practice. The semiconductor ecosystem partnership addresses shared concerns over Chinese supply chain dominance with India’s emerging manufacturing base complementing German design expertise. Cooperation on critical minerals which is also essential for EVs, batteries, defence systems, and renewable technologies, helps hedge against China’s estimated 60 percent control over global processing capacity. Also, Green hydrogen agreements position India as a potential future clean energy supplier to Europe, thereby, contributing to Germany’s diversification away from Russian dependence. Apart from this, healthcare workforce mobility initiatives also create opportunities for India’s skilled professionals, reinforcing long-term demographic complementarity between the two countries. Internal patterns of political shift from Scholz’s compromises in his coalition policies to Merz’s conservatism, can potentially speed up foreign policy shifts that were hitherto slowed down by ideological discrepancies or partnerships of governance. Destination diplomacy matters because leaders’ choices of destinations of their official foreign visits send twin signals, both symbolic priorities and substantive strategic intent to international partners and domestic audiences. Taken together, the defence, supply chain, energy, and mobility agreements concluded during the visit help explain why Germany increasingly views India not merely as one among many partners but as a central pillar of its own Indo-Pacific strategy , which encapsulates in Berlin’s effort to integrate trade, manufacturing, supply chain resilience and energy security across the Indian Ocean and East Asia to reduce overdependence over China. India offers what China potentially cannot, a democratic partner with massive manufacturing scale and a shared interest of reform in global governance. Prioritising Ahmedabad over Beijing thus reflects a strategic reorientation shaped by pragmatism. With this reconfiguration, India is increasingly recognised as a potential anchor for Germany’s Indo-Pacific engagement, a partial manufacturing alternative to China and a coalition partner in efforts toward UNSC reform. As both countries pursue permanent Security Council seats while managing complex ties with the United States, China, and Russia, their partnership offers a test of whether emerging powers can reshape aspects of global order through strategic coalitions rather than waiting for great power consensus. Whether this conservative convergence translates into sustained implementation remains uncertain. Even so, Merz’s arrival in India sent a clear signal that Germany’s new conservative government increasingly frames India not merely as an alternative to China, but as a priority partner in the twenty first century geopolitics. Whether symbolic or transformative, Ahmedabad before Beijing sent an unmistakable signal about Germany’s evolving priorities in Asia. #IndoGerman This is an Original Article Contribution to the SIS Blog. Shibankita Pradhan is a Ph.D. Candidate at the Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, JNU. Her academic pursuits are centred around research and writing on pressing political issues and global dynamics and transitions.

By Sanjay Turi In the wake of the Pahalgam Terrorism attack on April 22, India launched Operation Sindoor  and gave a befitting reply to Pakistan, giving an additional message to the world of having zero tolerance for terrorism. Subsequently, India also launched a diplomatic drive globally, giving special focus on the Global South. Ahead of the BRICS ’ scheduled meeting in Brazil, Prime Minister Modi’s recent visit  to Ghana, Trinidad & Tobago, Argentina, and Namibia sought to focus on wide-ranging economic, energy and cultural cooperation, which would go a long way in strengthening India’s diplomatic drive  to foster cooperation to fight against terrorism with a zero-tolerance approach. Although oil trading began in the late 19 th  century and dominated the global trade in the mid-20 th  century, its predominant role of hydrocarbon trade is now being challenged by the strategic shift of focus towards rare earth minerals and clean energy technologies . As countries from the Global South hold a significantly large reserve of both light and heavy  rare earth minerals such as uranium, lithium, cobalt, manganese, dysprosium, terbium (widely used for making permanent magnet for electric vehicle), PM Modi’s subsequent visit to these countries ahead of his participation in the BRICS meeting is a masterstroke. In light of Vision 2047 , India’s aspiration to rapidly transition to sustainable development, though initiatives like that of green energy and the manufacturing of electric vehicles, will obviously require the above-mentioned mineral resources in industrial development. Therefore, the recent visit of PM Modi is undoubtedly a step towards achieving one of the crucial goals of Viksit Bharat . Compared to other interior countries in the region, Ghana (located in the Gulf of Guinea) and Namibia, being situated on the coast of the Atlantic Ocean, are strategically more important, giving India geopolitical access to engage with other African countries where China is already showing its active presence. Namibia has become the first country  in the region to embrace the UPI(Unified Payment Interface ) digital network, and Rwanda is in line to join the services.  India is gradually expanding its engagement in the region. Ghana and Namibia, located on the Atlantic coast, offer India strategic access to West and Southern African countries where China has already established a strong presence. Ghana’s strategic location in the Gulf of Guinea in Western Africa also offers India an opening to the Atlantic Ocean. Ghana, having a large and significant Indian diaspora , shares a strong historical connection with India since its very independence.   The Economic Community of West African States( ECOWAS ) is considered a regional entity to govern the West African economic community. Therefore, for India, engaging with Ghana means engaging with ECOWAS. West Africa has abundant reserves of natural resources, and Ghana has significant portion of these mineral resources. West African countries face severe challenge of sea piracy. India, being a strong naval power in the Indian Ocean, showcasing the prominence of the SAGAR initiative, can potentially work in collaboration with West African countries of the Gulf of Guinea to fight piracy. Ghana, also being an important member of the India-Africa Forum Summit , is likely to serve as a launchpad for India to engage with the countries situated in the Global South. A Tectonic Shift in India-Ghana Bilateral Relations: Ghana’s previous engagements with China have not benefited Ghana that much ; Instead, China developed its infrastructure in the country in such a way that China has been the larger beneficiary. On the contrary, India is strategically more inclusive,  initially engaging with the common people of the country. The Indian government intends to connect with Ghanaians through several welfare initiatives, such as Feed Ghana  and skill development  programs for the youth in the country. As Ghana is the largest producer of gold  in the region, India is the world’s largest gold consumer . This contrast clearly shows how important and strong our bilateral relations are going to be in the future. Once the gold supply chain is established between the two countries, it will certainly help India to stabilise the  gold prices. India, with its rich socio-religious and ethnic diversity, is one of the biggest hubs of many religions and cultural functions, where the demand for gold can be seen persisting throughout the year. It is estimated that Ghana holds more than 960 million  tonnes of Bauxite reserves, which are used as an important component of several industries such as construction, aviation, defence, electric vehicle manufacturing, etc. Apart from this, Bauxite and Manganese are used in production of steel. As both countries have signed a trade deal for Bauxite, once India starts importing Bauxite from Ghana, it will give India an edge over other countries to excel in the industries mentioned above. Therefore, this trade deal between Ghana and India is expected to boost the Indian Semiconductor Mission  by augmenting the upstream industrial inputs.Ghana additionally has a great lithium reserve , and its import will help India excel in the manufacturing of batteries . Ghana’s trade of Lithium may provide India with an alternative, reducing its dependency on Australia and Latin America . Ghana has also requested that India conduct an ISRO-backed survey to explore other hidden mineral resources, primarily lithium, in the country. In return, India has promised to popularise Ghana’s lithium reserves in the entire Global South region, where India already has a greater influence . Therefore, the promotion of Ghana in the global south region is expected to help India deepen its strategic influence in the pro-Ghana West African countries, where China is already gradually expanding its wings. India has also founded a critical mineral working group under the India-Ghana strategic mineral partnership agreement , through which India, without any conditionality or coercion, will help Ghana in the exploration of natural minerals of the country. Hence, Ghana and Namibia, being located on the coast of the Atlantic Ocean, have not only become a strategic trade partner of India but also an important gateway to trade with other landlocked central African countries in the region. Considering China’s extensive penetration in the region, the Indian government must prioritise engaging with the strategically located countries in the region. As India is consistently seeking to champion the Global South, it would soon overshadow China’s debt-driven influence in the region. This is an Original Contribution to the SIS Blog.   Sanjay Turi is a Doctoral Candidate at the Centre for West Asian Studies(CWAS), School of International Studies(SIS), Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

By Sanjay Turi In the wake of the shifting regional power dynamics, the emerging alliance between China, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Taliban is a warning call for India to give more emphasis on engaging with the region. Ignoring China’s multilateral engagement with the neighbouring countries will pose a significant threat to India's strategic interests in the region.   In light of India’s Operation Sindoor  post Pahalgam Attack, the Chinese government hosted a meeting  between Pakistan and Afghanistan’s Taliban government led by Ishaq Dar  and Amir Khan Muttaqi, respectively. India’s earlier dream of benefiting from the rising conflict between Pakistan and the Taliban seems to have shattered as the Taliban has stepped towards joining  the China-led CPEC projects. In addition to the Taliban’s recent association with BRI, China’s simultaneous multilateral engagements with Pakistan and Bangladesh appear to have paved the way for the establishment of an anti-India bloc in the region. It has sent a shockwave to Delhi regarding the future bilateral relations between Delhi and Kabul, as well as Dhaka. The geopolitical dynamics of South and Central Asia are now poised for a notable shift with the Taliban's recent decision to officially join the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor ( CPEC ). Inaugurated in 2015  as a key project under China's Belt and Road Initiative ( BRI),  CPEC bridges China's Xinjiang region with Pakistan's Gwadar Port. With Afghanistan’s recent aspiration to join this crucial infrastructure network under the Taliban government, India is likely to face a significant strategic challenge in the entire Central Asian region. For New Delhi, which has historically held strong economic and diplomatic relations with Afghanistan, this decision of Kabul poses a significant threat to India's strategic influence in the region and raises major concerns regarding encirclement and influence. Picture Source: DD News From a geostrategic perspective, the deepening ties between India and Afghanistan in recent times, amid rising border tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, were well expected to work in favour of India. However, Kabul's recent shocking decision to join CPEC has completely changed the geopolitical landscape of this region. It can also be argued that as India has consistently been severely critical of CPEC (BRI), given that it passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir , Kabul’s landmark decision to cooperate with China and Pakistan on this project will not only deteriorate its bilateral relationship with India, but also, this diplomatic initiative by Kabul is likely to alter the entire geopolitics of Central Asia soon, further pushing India towards facing a significant geostrategic dilemma in the region.   China has long patiently sought to utilise CPEC as a gateway to the Gulf and other West Asian countries. Therefore, the Taliban’s recent decision to join CPEC will undoubtedly make the Chinese Dream Project inevitable, which will potentially help China counter India’s stronghold in the region. Once China manages to bridge this gap, it may aggressively disrupt India’s increasing influence in the region. As India has already made massive infrastructural investments and developmental projects such as Chabahr-Zahedan Railway line, Zaranj-Delaram Highway etc in Afghanistan, aiming to add to the International North-South Transport Corridor ( INSTC ) as a new gateway to carry out trade with Central Asia, Europe and Russia, the recent geopolitical dynamics in the post trilateral cooperation between China, Pakistan and Taliban will most likely disrupt India’s penetration in the region. China has recently hosted another trilateral meeting with Bangladesh and Pakistan in Kunming, and this meeting seems to be showing China’s strong determination to strengthen the String of Pearls Policy in the Indian Ocean. China’s increasing aspiration to get access to the Bay of Bengal through Bangladesh and the Arabian Sea through Pakistan is not only challenging the Indian influence in the region, but also significantly challenging the US influence in the Indo-Pacific region. Many experts believe that China, through this Kunming Diplomacy, seems to be creating an alternative bloc  to SAARC , where China, in the absence of India, will be dominating the entire South Asia and possibly the India ocean too. China’s focus on extending CPEC It has been widely observed that CPEC is slowly becoming less effective, as it encounters strong opposition from the locals in the Sindh and Baluchistan regions, which together make up 44%  of Pakistan's total land area. The people’s resistance to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor has reached the extent that local groups have begun targeting Chinese workers and engineers. Incidents involving the murder of Chinese officials and engineers have become increasingly common. Recently, there was an attempted attack  on some Japanese engineers at the CPEC project site because they looked like Chinese nationals. This clearly shows the degree of anger and resistance to this project in the region. Therefore, China has been looking for an alternative to both CPEC and the Gwadar port, given that India has already been promoting its Chabahar port  as a counter to China in the Persian Gulf region. Considering the political instability of Pakistan a significant challenge, China, after including the Taliban with the CPEC project, may be considering using the Wakhan Corridor  as an alternative to bypass Pakistan’s volatile regions of Sindh and Balochistan, and reach the Persian Gulf via the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) and Afghanistan. After the Taliban’s successful inclusion in this project, China’s aim of overshadowing Indian influence in the region seems to be working now. Additionally, the construction of the Peshawar-Kabul Highway  and other connectivity projects, an extension of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor in Afghanistan, will possibly provide China with direct access to the Middle East Region, the Central Asian Region, the Eastern African Region, the Gulf Region, the European Market, as well as the Indian Ocean through the Arabian Sea. Although the recent border conflict between Afghanistan and the Taliban was expected to benefit India strategically  in the region against Pakistan and China, the recent announcement of the Taliban joining the CPEC has completely disappointed India, while giving an edge to China over Indian influence in the region. Geopolitical implications for India As China manages to enhance its economic and strategic influence in Afghanistan and continues to expand the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) along India's northwestern border, India is very likely to face an inevitable challenge of being ‘encircled on two fronts’ - militarily by Pakistan and China, and economically through their increasing regional collaboration. Additionally, India is also facing a geostrategic challenge in the region, especially in the post Israel-Iran conflict, where India, unlike China , maintained strategic silence and chose not to extend its support to either country directly. In the face of India’s increasing strategic dilemma in the region, China’s direct access to the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal through Pakistan and Bangladesh, respectively, will additionally challenge India’s overall maritime security in the region, too. In terms of security challenges in Kashmir , the deepening ties between the Taliban and Pakistan raise concerns about the possible resurgence of militant networks that could potentially affect the Kashmir valley. Additionally, securing CPEC routes through the Wakhan Corridor of Afghanistan may give Pakistan space to shift its attention and resources toward its eastern border with India, which will undoubtedly help China keep India engaged with its own issues. As far as China’s political behaviour is concerned, the inclusion of Afghanistan in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is potentially oriented towards cutting India off from essential connectivity networks in Central Asia. While the IMEC project has been partially paralysed by the regional conflict of the Middle East, India's goals, including the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC)  and the Chabahar Port initiative, are now encountering heightened competition and potential diplomatic challenges from a growing China-led coalition in the region. In light of the shifting regional power dynamics, the emerging alliance between China, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and the Taliban is likely to pose a significant threat to India's strategic interests in the region. As China is looking forward to filling the void  left by Russia (Soviet Union) and the USA, one after the other, in Afghanistan, it has probably managed to trap Bangladesh and Pakistan along with the Taliban within its debt trap policy  network. With China offering political support and economic incentives, this strategic grouping has the potential to undermine and erode India's image as a regional stabiliser. As the new strategic alignment of the Taliban complicates the security dynamics in the region, it seems to be undermining India's ability to dictate and influence its own neighbourhood.  Consequently, it is high time for India to play a proactive role in exploring alternative strategies to recalibrate its foreign policy approach, primarily giving greater attention to the Link and Act West Policy  (formerly called Look West ).   This is an Original Contribution to the SIS Blog Sanjay Turi is a Doctoral Candidate at the Centre for West Asian Studies (CWAS), School of International Studies(SIS), Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

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