Search

By Prof. Bharat H. Desai The Stockholm 2022 at best remained a timid acknowledgement of things going terribly wrong and lacked the courage for a decisive course correction. The time seemed to stand still with the “world problematique” prophesized in the Limits to Growth (1972). The first week of June 2022 became a rare ‘environment week’ as it witnessed two back-to-back global environmental events prior to the World Environment Day (05 June): (i) 50th anniversary celebration of the 1972 Stockholm Conference (2-3 June) and (ii) 30th anniversary of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (4 June). What does it portend for our common environmental future? In his opening remarks on 2 June in Stockholm, the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres lamented about the grim environmental scenario that the global “wellbeing is at risk” and “Earth’s natural systems cannot keep up with our demands”. “We haven’t kept our promises on the environment”, Guterres candidly admitted. As the UNSG pleaded to “lead us out of this mess”, his clarion call to address the “triple planetary crisis” caused by the climate emergency seemed alike a cry in the wilderness before the Stockholm audience. Similarly, the executive director of UN Environment Program, Inger Andersen asked as to what went wrong in the five decades (1972-2022). “If Indira Gandhi or Olof Palme were here today, what excuses would we offer up for our inadequate action? None that they would accept. They would tell us that further inaction is inexcusable”, Andersen unashamedly said. World Problematique The Stockholm+50 Conference remained a low-key affair. Ironically, the moral halo that ushered the world into global environmental consciousness at the Stockholm 1972 seemed to be missing at the Stockholm 2022 Conference. It ended with a listless statement jointly issued by Sweden and Kenya, the two host countries. Instead of the much-expected uplifting Stockholm+50 declaration, it took the shape of a strange ten point “Presidents’ Final Remarks to Plenary”. It didn’t cause any ripple as didn’t issue a clarion call to shake the conscience of peoples and nations for everting the existential planetary crisis. The Stockholm 2022 at best remained a timid acknowledgement of things going terribly wrong and lacked the courage for a decisive course correction. The time seemed to stand still with the “world problematique” prophesized in the Limits to Growth (1972). The Predicament The UN has put into practice the global conferencing technique. The Stockholm 1972 was followed by confabulations in Rio de Janeiro (1992), Johannesburg (2002), Rio de Janeiro (2012) and now Stockholm (2022). Notwithstanding all the global conferences, mega regulatory processes, creation of institutional maze and spending of a staggering amount of funds, the global environmental conditions have only worsened. Was it really worth it? The world seems to be in dire straits with Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 2030 set to go haywire, alarming situation of chronic hunger (2021 Global Hunger Index), 2.37 billion people without access to adequate food (2021 FAO), uncertainty of meeting the 1.5 C GHG targets (2022 IPCC) and climate change exacerbating SGBV against women. The graphic description of “two worlds, two planets, two humanities” for the North-South divide by the economist Mahbub ul Haq before the Stockholm 1972 still haunts the world. Gandhian (1908) warnings about choice between our needs and greed as well as lament of Tagore (1908) on “progress towards what and progress for whom” seems to have been left far behind. What went wrong? The Earth in the Balance The quagmire of global environmental crisis stares us in the face. This author’s 1992 audacious prediction [Social Science & Medicine (Oxford: Pergamon) 35. 4. 1992 at 593] came true when Covid-19 pandemic came: “if the current pace persists, people will be forced to move with gas masks in some of the mega-cities in the not-too-distant future”. With 7.9 billion (2022) world population expected to reach frightening levels of 10 billion (2050), one can only imagine the kind of life the future generations will inherit. Ironically, “human being has reached the moon but does not know how to live on the earth” (former Indian PM Vajpayee). As the world assembled again in the Swedish capital in 2022, the echo of prediction (6 June 1972) of the Swedish Prime Minister (PM) Olof Palme was recalled: “The decisive question is in which direction we will develop, by what means we will grow, which qualities we want to achieve,and what values we wish to guide our future…there is no individual future, neither for people nor for nations”. India was present at the ‘origin’ (Stockholm 1972) with the Indian Delegation led by the PM Indira Gandhi. She drew attention to the wisdom from the Atharva Veda, thus: “What of thee I dig out; Let that quickly grow over; Let me not hit thy vitals or thy heart.” “Indira Gandhi looked at the environment not from an elitist view point. She did it due to her genuine conviction”, Dr. Karan Singh, former JNU Chancellor, shared his recollections with this author on 27 April 2022. Envisioning Our Future After 50 years, it is pertinent to assess the trajectory hitherto followed, assess what went wrong and how we need to move forward. An ideational book curated by this author, Envisioning Our Environmental Future (IOS Press: Amsterdam, 2022) (Road to Stockholm+50 and Beyond | Environmental Policy and Law), has painstakingly brought together futuristic ideas of 22 outstanding scholars from the five continents to look beyond the Stockholm+50 (2022). It presents prognosis and prospects for extricating the world out of the global environmental morass for a better future in the 21st century and beyond. It is a sequel to another ideational work curated by the author with cutting-edge ideas of 21 outstanding scholars from around the world: Our Earth Matters (IOS Press: Amsterdam, 2021) (Our Earth Matters | IOS Press). The address of the Indian PM Narendra Modi, at the 75th anniversary of the UNGA (2020) that “we cannot fight today’s challenges with outdated structures” holds relevance for comprehensive UN reforms. An explicit reference to “trusteeship of the planet” in the Indian PM’s address at G-20 Riyadh virtual summit (2020) provides one such indication for a possible change (The Tribune, 02 December 2020). The 2021 report of the UNSG has alluded to such ‘repurposed’ Trusteeship Council, mooted in this author’s lecture (15 January 1999) at Legal Department of the World Bank DC. Will the UN member states embrace this idea to make the Trusteeship Council the principal instrumentality for the trusteeship of the planet? India can seize this opportunity to galvanize the world as a global solution provider. The ‘Stockholm moment’ of 2022 provided a unique opportunity to all the heads of government to go down in history. Ironically, no world leader stepped forward at Stockholm 2022 to don the mantle to lead the planet earth out of the crisis of survival. As 2020-2022 grueling spell of Covid-19 pandemic showed, Nature has her own ways of drawing the ‘limits’ to our existence. Maybe it has been a wakeup call. One only hopes, peoples and nations come to senses before it is too late. #Stockholm+50 #Environment #UN #India #IPCC #SDG Prof. Bharat H. Desai is Jawaharlal Nehru Chair and Professor of International Law at the Centre for International Legal Studies of SIS, JNU. He coordinated the initiatives on Making SIS Visible during 2008-2013 (Making SIS Visible | Welcome to Jawaharlal Nehru University (jnu.ac.in) as well as Inter-University Consortium (Partner Universities: JNU, Jammu, Kashmir and Sikkim) during 2012-2020 (www.iucccc.in/Contact us.htm).

By Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli In terms of leadership succession, Xi prefers his “new Zhijiang Army” to take over the sixth generation of leadership, while Li is grooming fellow-communist youth league colleague and Vice Premier Hu Chunhua to take over the mantle. The battles lines are drawn. Chinese Premier Li Keqiang is a worried man these days. He is now at the forefront of the “people’s war” to counter the pandemic but also to restore the economy battered by Communist Party chief and Chinese President Xi Jinping’s “zero-Covid” lockdowns and curbs on booming economic powerhouses. This is in sharp contrast to how Li was feeling when I, as part of a group of scholars and think-tankers, met him only a few years ago. In a 90-minute extempore presentation to us, Li was upbeat about the “medium-high growth” targets and the economic pivoting to domestic consumption and services. He was only concerned about the falling purchasing power in the rural areas and to the growing income disparities. Li’s confidence seems eroded now with the massive fall in the economy in the past two years, triggered by mass lockdowns, stringent border controls and quarantine procedures. These were aggravated by a sudden crackdown last year on big businesses such as Alibaba, Tencent and Meituan, while allowing the free fall of real-estate giants like Evergrande and others. Alibaba chief Jack Ma went into hiding after he made comments on the country’s banking system. Its shares tumbled. Xi defended these radical policies under the rubric of “common prosperity”, essentially the same old idea of “robbing the rich to help the poor.” In reality, all it did was to lead to economic disruption and slowing growth. Two distinct economic policies have emerged: Xi’s policy of Communist Party control over businesses versus Li’s “street vendor” economy. Xi bulldozed through a model that allowed big State-owned and private enterprises to flourish under his absolute control. His ‘anti-corruption drive’ targeted only the political and economic base of rival factional leaders Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. Jiang’s “Shanghai gang” and Hu’s communist youth league (to which Li also belonged) suffered the most, while Xi consolidated his control. While Xi had grandiose plans for China’s “rejuvenation” and the “Chinese dream” till 2050, Li’s down-to-earth policies were trying to address the economic problems afflicting the country. While Xi declared victory over poverty alleviation and the ushering in of a “well-off society” last year, Li pointed out to the extensive work needed to alleviate poverty in urban areas, with the per capita income of over 600 million Chinese still under $140 a month. Li addressed 100,000 officers and cadre on May 25 on the restoration of the economy. This is unprecedented. The last time such a meeting was held – though on half the scale of Li’s meeting -- was in the aftermath of Mao’s disastrous Great Leap Forward in the late 1950s. Li admitted to a fall in the value added by Chinese industry and thus to a fall in revenues. Li’s biographers have noted the studious upbringing he had. In fact, then party supremo Deng Xiaoping had noticed Li’s talent on a visit to Henan province and notified his intent to promote Li to the top post in the State Council. In the run-up to the crucial 20th Communist Party congress this November, the Xi-Li tussle is expected to intensify as the stakes for each faction are high. There is, of course, play around the age limit criterion, as well. Li, born 1955, is approaching the age limit for a Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) member – 68 years. Xi, born 1953, has already crossed this limit, but at the parliament session in March 2019, he had his term as President, if not the General Secretary’s post, extended, for possibly an unlimited number of terms. By factional strength, though Xi has absolute majority in the PSC, his mishandling of the pandemic and the economy, the deleterious effects of the tussle with the US, the negative effects of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, etc., have dented his control. While the recent May 5 Politburo meeting drowned any criticism of the “dynamic zero-Covid” handling, interestingly it did not mention the “core” position of Xi in the party. In terms of leadership succession, Xi prefers his “new Zhijiang Army” to take over the sixth generation of leadership, while Li is grooming fellow-communist youth league colleague and Vice Premier Hu Chunhua to take over the mantle. The battles lines are drawn. In China’s political structure, the top political leader and the Premier are by design at loggerheads with each other. In reality, Premiers have generally played a balancing role, if not second fiddle to the top leader. Recall Premier Zhou Enlai vis-à-vis Mao, or General Secretaries Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang during Deng Xiaoping’s reign, or more recently, Zhu Rongji under Jiang Zemin or Wen Jiabao under Hu Jintao. Will the personality and ideas clash in the Xi-Li equation trump the political structure? Will Li, then, break the mould and live to tell the tale? #China #LiKeqiang #XiJinping #Covid #Economy Originally published: Deccan Herald, June 05, 2022. https://www.deccanherald.com/amp/opinion/trouble-in-middle-kingdom-xi-li-tussle-comes-to-the-fore-1115381.html Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli is Professor in Chinese Studies and Dean of School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University.

By Prof. Swaran Singh The two nations’ friendship has often been sorely tested, but common interests regarding the US and China may strengthen ties The prime ministers of Canada and India are expected to meet either next weekend on the sidelines of the Group of Seven summit at Schloss Elmau in Upper Bavaria, Germany, or toward the end of this month at the Commonwealth Heads of Government conference in Kigali, Rwanda. In the view of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, who is to visit India next year to attend the G20 summit, this earlier meeting could not only be groundbreaking for Canada-India bilateral relations, but could carry deeper implications for the evolving Indo-Pacific realignments. These reports are sourced to Wednesday’s phone conversation of two countries’ foreign ministers, Mélanie Joly and Subrahmanyam Jaishankar. Though their official briefs make no mention of a prime-minister-level summit and both underlined their (varying) perspectives about building consensus against “Russia’s invasion of Ukraine” and “misuse of freedoms and the dangers of extremism,” they both reiterated their unity on building a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” which has lately come to be a point of convergence in their flip-flop relations. As recorded in the Canadian readout, the two ministers “affirmed the importance of a free and open Indo-Pacific region.” In the wake of India’s growing recognition as the region’s net security provider and rising regional leader, while Canada seeks new partners in the face of its growing marginalization in this region, this could well become their new glue to stabilize their historically mercurial yet special relations. The roller coaster Independent India got off to a good start, with Jawaharlal Nehru’s October 1949 visit to Ottawa opening doors for Canada’s development assistance leading to supply of the CIRUS (Canada-India Reactor Utility Services) nuclear research reactor in 1954 laying the foundations of India’s nuclear program. But soon, Cold War dynamics were to push them into opposite camps and, in 1974, prime minister Pierre Trudeau, father of current prime minister, was to describe India’s peaceful nuclear explosion as “betrayal,” suspending all cooperation. The early 1980s saw Sikh militancy in India emerge as an added, though sporadic, irritant, the lingering effects of which were seen in Justin Trudeau’s last India visit in February 2018. A few uncanny events were to make this visit the second low point in Canada-India relations. It was on the last day of the Trudeau family’s week-long visit that Prime Minister Narendra Modi met with him briefly. When contrasted with Modi having personally accompanied foreign leaders to multiple Indian cities and holding joint public rallies and roadshows with them, this diplomatic distancing was not lost on anyone. The first friendly follow-up gesture came in October 2018 when Canada, defying strong Sikh lobbies at home, announced that it “would not recognize” Referendum 2020, a campaign that was being promoted by US-based “Sikhs for Justice” for holding a plebiscite on the secession of Punjab province from India. But again, Trudeau’s December 2020 remarks on the farmers protest in India were to unleash public outrage, including India’s Ministry of External Affairs calling it “unwarranted” and telling a Canadian envoy of such remarks having “potential to ‘seriously’ damage bilateral ties.” Soon, Trudeau’s use of emergency provisions in the wake of February’s truckers’ protests in Canada were again to trigger a spate of commentaries calling out his hypocrisy in dealing with protests. However, the two leaders have continued meeting at such forums as the G20 and G7 summits and held online conversations marking rituals of mutual engagement. Last September, Modi congratulated Trudeau on getting elected as prime minister for a third time and tweeted that he looked forward to “strengthening India-Canada relations, as well as our cooperation on global and multilateral issues.” As a sign of positive momentum, their negotiations from 2021 for a full-fledged Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) hoped to achieve “an interim trade deal” before the end of this year. Yet it remains unclear if CEPA can boost their bilateral trade, which slipped during the pandemic. The US disconnect This is where these two friends of the United States – feeling at variance with US Indo-Pacific strategy – may reconnect in building post-pandemic resilience that has become inordinately China-centric, even anti-China. This is because, unlike the US, both Canada and India wish to restrain China by building mutually beneficial engagements with it, and not by alienating it. China’s unprecedented economic rise and resultant political influence remain at the core of Indo-Pacific geopolitical imaginations. The past two decades have seen the Indo-Pacific region, led by China, emerge as the global growth engine and therefore the new global center of gravity. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative has accelerated debate on the United States’ relative decline, causing the US to band together its allies to redress their so-called “shared” China challenge. Canada, as a Pacific nation, has always aligned its policies with the US, becoming an ASEAN Dialogue Partner in 1977 and staying part of US-led Five Eyes Intelligence Sharing Network of World War II vintage. But when Five Eyes was revived by US president Donald Trump as part of his anti-China rhetoric, Canada refused to “share metadata with its Five Eyes allies,” respecting the privacy of its citizens. Last month, Canada also became the last to join Five Eyes’ US-led campaign against accessing China’s fifth-generation (5G) technologies. No doubt, Canada was neither included in the Quadrilateral Security Framework of Indo-Pacific democracies nor added to the AUKUS (Australia, United Kingdom, United States) security mechanism launched in September 2021; the UK was added in the latter though it is not even a Pacific nation. Canada has also so far failed to join the East Asia Summit except once as a special invitee. Now, US President Joe Biden has not included Canada in his Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), though it also excludes Mexico, Chile and Peru, which defies logic as all four nations already have free-trade agreements (FTAs) with the US. Also, all four were part of US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership, which, after the US departure, has been revived as the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Besides the US, seven of the 12 IPEF members also have an FTA with Canada as part of CPTPP. Moreover, unlike IPEF, the CPTPP has been in force since 2018 and offers concrete tariff reductions, market access and dispute settlement provisions. The proposed IPEF, just beginning negotiations, aims to create some open-ended modules for flexible alignments, and it remains open to other aspirants like Canada or even China, which has already applied for inclusion in the CPTPP. One explanation for Biden’s distancing from his close Pacific allies is that he wants to project IPEF as an exclusive US initiative for Asia and “didn’t want to share the stage and photo ops with non-Asian countries.” But others put the blame on Trudeau, saying “the current government is unfocused on the Indo-Pacific.” Exploring alternative alignments Both Canada and India continue to explore autonomous partnerships across the Indo-Pacific region. Both are averse to jumping on the bandwagon of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy, which they feel remains too China-centric. India continues to engage China, which is its largest trading partner. With the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, as its fourth-largest trading partner, India this year celebrates the 30th anniversary of their Dialogue Partnership. Likewise, facing exclusion from US-led Indo-Pacific initiatives, Canada has also been exploring alternative partners and paradigms. But does their growing clash over US Indo-Pacific strategies bring Canada and India closer? Canada has already initiated negotiations for partial FTAs with India and ASEAN that promise to be far more substantive than IPEF. As well, there are good reasons to believe that IPEF is unlikely to win congressional approval in the US. This should open up avenues for Canadian and Indian negotiators. Canada has already applied to join the Digital Economic Partnership Agreement (DEPA) of Chile, New Zealand and Singapore – three Indo-Pacific nations that are already with Canada in the CPTPP. In fact Canada would be better placed in DEPA, which unlike IPEF is a traditional trade agreement with provisions for tariff reductions, rules of origin for market access and dispute settlement mechanisms. This past Tuesday, Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong welcomed Canada’s application to join the DEPA, which aims to explore innovative realignments for post-pandemic resilience by building infrastructure, smart cities and cybersecurity and address other issues of digitization. Likewise, the coming Monday will see Gabriel Boric, the president of Chile – another member of DEPA – arrive in Ottawa to take their relationship forward. Google plans to lay its first sub-sea cable carrying 16 pairs of fiber-optic wires from Vancouver to Japan. Called Topaz, this project will provide faster access to Google services – including its search engine, Gmail, YouTube and Google Cloud – and will be ready by next year. Can all this open new possibilities for middle powers like Canada and India coming together to balance the US anti-China preoccupation? Will the much-awaited Canadian Indo-Pacific Strategy reveal such a rethink and reconnect Canada and India? Since early this year Joly has been reported saying that in spite of the all-consuming Ukraine crisis, she has been “activity working to deliver on a key marching order given her by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau: to create a comprehensive new Indo-Pacific Strategy.” This January saw the India and Canadian navies join the six-nation anti-submarine-warfare drill called Sea Dragon 22 in the Indo-Pacific waters. Their gradual coming together may work to make the US Indo-Pacific strategy more balanced and to their comfort. Alternatively, they could begin to explore alignments in spite of the US. Either way their reconnect in the Indo-Pacific region promises to bring enduring stability to Canada-India relations. #India #Canada #Indo-Pacific #US #IPEF #CPTPP #China #Quad Originally published: Asia Times, June 3, 2022 https://asiatimes.com/2022/06/will-indo-pacific-policies-reconnect-canada-and-india/ Posted here with the authorization of the author. Prof. Swaran Singh is Professor of Diplomacy and Disarmament at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi; President of Association of Asia Scholars (asiascholars.in); Adjunct Senior Fellow at The Charhar Institute, Beijing; Senior Fellow, Institute for National Security Studies Sri Lanka, Colombo; and Visiting Professor, Research Institute for Indian Ocean Economies, Kunming (China).

By Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli The IPEF intends to strengthen digital trade, resilience in supply chain mechanism, green economy and rules- based order although a road map for tariff reductions has not been outlined, and hence cannot be termed as a free trade area. On the other hand, the IPEF intends to accommodate new changes ushered by China’s rise. In a major development last week, the United States President Joseph R Biden announced the formation of a 13-member Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) a day before the Quad Leader’s in-person meeting at Tokyo on May 24. It has 13 members including, the US, India, Japan, Australia, Brunei, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi welcomed the formation of IPEF and attended it's opening ceremony. In late 2021, the US began preparations for the IPEF by despatching commerce and trade secretaries to various countries in the Indo-Pacific for informal discussions, given the mounting economic challenges. These visits came in the wake of the US announcement at the East Asian Summit in October last year expressing its intent to usher in the IPEF. The US-China tariff wars posed the background for this alternative move, as with the unprecedented pandemic related supply-chain disruptions. Currently the IPEF constitutes 40 percent of global production and 60 percent of the population. Interestingly more than half of the IPEF members are from Southeast Asia and an overwhelming majority of them are also part of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) arrangement that came into being in November 2020. The RCEP is seen as China-dominated grouping and the IPEF therefore provides an alternative for many of its members outside China’s pressures. The IPEF intends to strengthen digital trade, resilience in supply chain mechanism, green economy and rules- based order although a road map for tariff reductions has not been outlined, and hence cannot be termed as a free trade area. On the other hand, the IPEF intends to accommodate new changes ushered by China’s rise. The IPEF adds to the Quad’s economic angle and expands the interactions with other countries as well in near future. The revived Quad since 2021 had four Summit meetings and focused on non-traditional security challenges like vaccine production and distribution, critical technologies and maritime order. By including several other “friendly” countries, the IPEF is signalling its expansion and outreach. IPEF appears to challenge China’s unilateral Belt and Road Initiative. Although China had joined the globalisation process, it has claimed leadership and began weaponing global and regional trade, investments, markets and tourism. China became the centre of trade value chain in the world and the problems surfaced as the Covid-19 pandemic worsened the global economy. Russian military action on Ukraine further led to the deterioration of global economy with high inflation and rise in food and energy prices. IPEF intends to wriggle out of this situation. The Quad and the IPEF are seen contributing positively to the Indian economic and technological growth as well as for its security. As a “major developing country” with the fastest growing economy (estimated above 8 percent in 2022), the IPEF provides an opportunity for India to expand its economic cooperation with the Indo-Pacific region. By joining the IPEF, India could explore and be transformed by the economic potential associated with digital economy. In early 2021, India singed an agreement with Japan and Australia for supply chain resilience. With the IPEF, this move will be further strengthened. India also has an ambitious target for “green economy” as reiterated at Paris in December 2015 and recently at COP-26 in Glasgow last year. Joining IPEF further strengthens this process. While IPEF is not a free trade area, New Delhi’s comprehensive economic partnerships with Japan, South Korea and Singapore or its free trade agreement with the Southeast Asian grouping, the recent trade agreement with Australia and similar negotiations with United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Israel and the European Union members–all fit into the framework of linking up and integrating with hi-tech partners and to hence to the elevation of the Indian economy. Also, the emphasis in IPEF on preparing for the economic crisis, strengthens Indian crisis management skills and this is expected to cushion Indian economy. Covid pandemic had disrupted many sectors of the Indian economy and hence working with like-minded countries in a rules-based order strengthens Indian competitiveness. For long, India was denied access to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation grouping, which projected China. However, with China posing existential challenges to many a country, IPEF is seen as a robust and resilient alternative. #IndoPacific #India #US #IPEF #RCEP #APEC #China #Quad Originally aired: External Services Division, AIR, June 01, 2022. Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli is Professor in Chinese Studies and Dean of School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University.

By Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli While Bachelet criticised China’s human rights violations in Xinjiang, critics pointed to her 'controlled visit'. The Uighur internment camps with an estimated 1 million incarcerated minorities in Xinjiang in China continue to prick the global conscience. The issue is snowballing into allegations of genocide, leading to renewed tensions between western countries and China. In addition, Uighur links to turbulent Afghanistan also highlight regional security dimensions. Recently, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet visited Kashgar, Urumqi and Guangzhou from 23 to 28 May, and after discussions with the concerned stakeholders, she stated that she raised the issues of “lack of independent judicial oversight of the operation of the program, the reliance by law enforcement officials on 15 indicators to determine tendencies towards violent extremism, allegations of the use of force and ill-treatment in institutions, and reports of unduly severe restrictions on legitimate religious practices”. This is the first visit of the UN human rights body to China in 17 years. While Bachelet criticised China’s “arbitrary and indiscriminate” human rights violations in Xinjiang, critics pointed to her “controlled visit”, as also her soft position. The 'Xinjiang Police Files' The visit coincided with the release of Xinjiang Police Files, along with a number of classified documents on the situation in these camps. Adrian Zenz, a China expert banned along with European parliament members and others by China for work on exposing the internment camps, had published these files in peer-reviewed journals. The cache included 2,800 images of detainees, 3,00,000 personal records, 23,000 detainee records and more than ten camp police instructions. Considerable evidence thus suggests the precariousness of Uighur lives. They not only became minorities in their own land with the Han nationals’ influx but also lost public positions in legislature, bureaucracy, police, judiciary, economy and media establishments. Infrastructure projects under Western Development Campaign and the recent Belt and Road Initiative exacerbated this. This coincided with the revisions in China’s ethnic policies from an integrationist to an assimilationist agenda, reflected in the “Sinification” campaign in Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia. Intensive residential surveillance – as Bachelet noted in her press briefing – religious curbs, demolition of mosques, disallowing of Friday prayers and wearing beards, all have stifled Uighur lives. Uighur discontent had resulted in a number of incidents, of which the 5 July 2009 violence at Urumqi remains widespread, with the killing of 187 people in just a few hours. There were also periodic bomb explosions, knife attacks at a railway station in Kunming in 2014, a car explosion at Tiananmen Square in 2013, etc. Noticeably, much of the Uighur political violence is against state systems like military, para-military forces and others in the region. China's 'Strike Hard' Policies China, on the other hand, argued that these camps were vocational education and training centres meant for temporary skill up-gradation units. In the light of the spread of extreme religious ideas leading to terror activities across the globe, and taking advantage of the post-9/11 global consensus on counter-terrorism, China intends to eradicate violent incidents involving Uighurs by introducing structural and systematic changes and through a controversial “people’s war on terror” campaign since 2014. They cite the Communist Party’s mission as ushering in ethnic harmony, stability and economic development. Began under the party secretary of Xinjiang Chen Quanguo, these “strike hard” policies have become controversial as they targeted entire communities rather than individual “terrorists”. Xinjiang’s political activities also need to be curbed as it had an independent history in 1933-34 and 1944-49 under the East Turkistan Republic. If such fissiparous sentiments remain, there is the danger of China meeting a Soviet disintegration-like fate. China had roped in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation to curb “three evils” – separatism, extremism and splittism – with diplomatic, political and law and order curbs imposed on member states. It also conducts annual “peace mission” paramilitary exercises to avoid any violent incidents in the region. For China, Xinjiang is a crucial part of its national security, with the region occupying nearly 1/8th of its territory. It has significant oil and strategic resources, such as uranium, as well as transportation hubs. It also occupies a strategic location as it borders eight countries, and hence, has foreign policy implications. The Threat From Taliban Takeover of Afghanistan Also, with the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan last year, the threat of militancy spreading into the Xinjiang borders with Badakhshan has increased significantly. By appointing a new military commander, Wang Haijiang, for the Western Theatre Command, China intends to create a buffer zone in the region to stop any Uighur insurgents from crossing over. Beijing has also raised a mobile military base in cooperation with Tajikistan to address this issue. That China’s handling of the Xinjiang issue has become an international concern is seen in the western sanctions on Chinese officials involved in repressive policies against Uighurs. The US, the European Union, Canada, Japan and others have been critical of such regional leaders and expressed disappointment over Bachelet’s visit. #China #UN #US #Xinjiang #Uighur #Afghanistan #Taliban Originally published: The Quint, June 1, 2022 https://www.thequint.com/voices/opinion/chinas-uighur-camps-why-is-a-un-visit-being-criticised-for-soft-position#read-more Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli is Professor in Chinese Studies and Dean of School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University.

By Prof. Bharat H. Desai The core question before the Arbitration Tribunal was: Should Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, in conformity with the rules of international law, be restored or not be restored by His Britannic Majesty’s Government to the Government of the French Republic? On 28 May 2022, the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi paid generous tributes on the 139th birth anniversary of the feisty Vinayak Damodar Savarkar (VDS). It gave an impetus to write this piece on the little-known facet about VDS who became a subject of an unprecedented international arbitration in 1910 between two global powers of the day – France and Great Britain. As a long-standing teacher of International Law, this author has taught for years the case concerning Arrest and Return of Savarkar (France v. Great Britain) as cause célèbre in the International Law on extradition (earlier known as restitution). Hence, this write-up is strictly based on the international arbitration triggered by the great escape of VDS as it comes within the author’s primary remit of International Law. In the world history, rarely a person – such as VDS – who joined the ranks of London-based group of Indian nationalists with fervor for the liberation of the native land has become the cause of an arbitration between two countries other than the country of nationality (though India was part of the British Empire). Recently, there has been a maelstrom arising from the books published on the persona of VDS. Yet, in the public domain there is rare mention, if any, about VDS’s daredevil slip from the British custody through the porthole of a ship anchored at the French port en route to its India voyage. The Great Escape On 25 October 1910, France and Great Britain reached a compromis signed as the London Agreement for an arbitration, facilitated by Permanent Court of Arbitration (The Hague). This special legal instrument provided the basis to adjudge facts and law arising from 8 July 1910 escape of VDS from the British merchant steamship S.S.Morea, his arrest from Marseilles shore and restoration by the French Police to the British Police. If we look back after more than eleven decades of the original event, it unfolds the saga of tenacity of 27 years old VDS – nothing short of a Hollywood thriller. Exactly 116 years ago, at the age of 23 years, VDS left for England on 26 May 1906 after securing a fellowship. The name of VDS had been recommended by Lokmanya Bal Gangadhar Tilak to Shyamji Krishna Varma, the London based doyen of the Indian freedom fighters. VDS had gone for the study of Bar-at-Law but soon joined the India House based group of nationalists. He was arrested in 1910. The British Police had suspicion about VDS support for his brother Ganesh Savarkar in organizing an armed revolt against the 1909 Morley-Minto reforms. The Indian Imperial Police implicated VDS in the investigation for allegedly plotting the crime. The resultant escape in question took place from the mail steamer Morea while VDS was being transported from England to India to face trial on the charge of abetment to murder. France demanded the ‘restitution’ of the fugitive on the ground that his delivery to the British officers was contrary to the rules of International Law. Since Great Britain refused to comply, the matter was referred to the five-member arbitration panel (M. Beernaert; L. Renault; Earl of Desart; G. Gram; A. F. de Savornin Lohman). The arbitration was facilitated by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (The Hague). While planning to transport VDS, the British Police had duly alerted the French Police by a letter of 29 June 1910. It did indicate possibility of risk of the prisoner’s escape. The French Ministry of the Interior informed the Prefect of the Bouches-du-Rhône by telegram on 4 July 1910 that some "révolutionnaires hindous" might take advantage of the steamer Morea anchoring at Marseilles to engineer “the escape of this foreigner”. In fact, the Prefect was requested to guard against any such attempt. When Morea reached Marseilles on 7 July 1910, the next day between 6 and 7 am, VDS managed in effecting his audacious escape from the ship’s porthole, swam ashore and began to run when his expected pick-up by the local supporters did not materialize. He was arrested “almost naked” by a brigadier of the French maritime gendarmerie and taken back to the vessel. Three persons, who had come ashore from the vessel, assisted the brigadier in taking the fugitive back. Finally, the Morea left Marseilles on 9 July 1910 – with VDS on board. The Arbitral Award After the informal handing over of VDS to the British Police, the French side realized the serious lapse and tried to reclaim the custody of VDS. However, by that time the Morea was out of the French waters onto her voyage to India. Still, the French swung into the legal action after persuasion by the feisty Parsi philanthropist, Madam Bhikaiji Cama, who was then resident of Paris. The core question before the Arbitration Tribunal was: Should Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, in conformity with the rules of international law, be restored or not be restored by His Britannic Majesty’s Government to the Government of the French Republic? The sessions of the Arbitral Tribunal took place during 14 to 17 February 1911, and the Award was swiftly pronounced on 24 February 1911. The Tribunal took on record the account of the French brigadier whose handover of VDS was swift, voluntary and without any kind of brawl. The Award of the Tribunal noted that “The brigadier had seized SAVARKAR by one arm for the purpose of taking him back to the ship, and the prisoner went peaceably with him”. The Tribunal deduced the fact that "Commissaire" of the French Police came on board Morea shortly after her arrival at Marseilles port, and, in accordance with the orders of the Prefect, placed himself at the disposal of the Commander in respect of the watch to be kept. Thus, it became clear from the sequence of events and conduct of the respective agents on the British and the French sides that the incident did not entail any kind of “recourse to fraud or force in order to obtain possession of a person who had taken refuge in foreign territory”. Moreover, it emerged from the testimonies that before the Morea left Marseilles (9 July 1910) “there was not, in the circumstances of the arrest and delivery of Savarkar to the British Authorities and of his removal to India, anything in the nature of a violation of the sovereignty of France, and that all those who took part in the matter certainly acted in good faith”. In view of the above, the Tribunal finally concluded that “an irregularity was committed by the arrest of SAVARKAR, and by his being handed over to the British Police, there is no rule of International Law imposing, in circumstances such as those which have been set out above, any obligation on the Power which has in its custody a prisoner, to restore him because of a mistake committed by the foreign agent who delivered him up to that Power”. In view of this the Tribunal ruled that: “The Arbitral Tribunal decides that the Government of His Britannic Majesty is not required to restore the said VINAYAK DAMODAR SAVARKAR to the Government of the French Republic”. Ironically, this Arbitral Award has remained understated. It has been often neglected among all the extradition cases studied and taught in the field of International Law. Time as the Final Arbiter The Indian freedom struggle comprised many figures, some known, little known and many unknown. These figures were only humans and hence, not infallible. They also had ‘shades of grey’ as seen among the principal players in the great epic Mahabharata. All civilized peoples in the mature democracies need to take a dispassionate view of roles of different personalities irrespective of their subsequent trajectory, beliefs and conduct. In the case of VDS, his arrest on the British soil, the great escape from the steamer Morea in the French waters, being the subject of an international arbitration and surviving the decade long sentence of transportation for life in the dreaded Cellular Jail of the Andaman Islands itself should have been enough to earn him a rightful place in the pantheon of the Indian freedom struggle. The Savarkar case teaches us vital lessons to keep all kinds of ‘gate-keepers’ at bay and give timely credit to whomsoever it is due. We need to strive for wider horizons, magnanimity of heart and humility-in-action – as Time is the final arbiter for all beings. #VinayakDamodarSavarkar #India #Britain #France #InternationalLaw Prof. Bharat H. Desai is Jawaharlal Nehru Chair and Professor of International Law at the Centre for International Legal Studies of SIS, JNU. He coordinated the initiatives on Making SIS Visible during 2008-2013 (Making SIS Visible | Welcome to Jawaharlal Nehru University (jnu.ac.in) as well as Inter-University Consortium (Partner Universities: JNU, Jammu, Kashmir and Sikkim) during 2012-2020 (www.iucccc.in/Contact us.htm).

By Debanjali Ghosh & Lyimee Saikia The Young Researchers’ Conference on Central and Eastern Europe: Three Decades since Transition was organised by the Jean Monnet Module Understanding European Integration Through the Regional Lens and the Centre for European Studies in the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University between May 18th and 19th, 2022. The Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries have undergone momentous developments since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. In this context, the objective of this webinar was to take stock of the domestic developments of the CEE countries in the three decades since transition and evaluate both their achievements as well as the obstacles faced by them. The conference was introduced by Prof Bhaswati Sarkar, Jean Monnet Chair and Chairperson of the Centre for European Studies through her Welcome Address. This was followed by Special Remarks delivered by Dr Erdő Mariann, Director of Liszt Institute, Hungarian Cultural Centre, New Delhi. Dr Mariann emphasised the similar cultural, religious and political backgrounds of the CEE countries and highlighted several aspects of their socio-cultural and economic transformations. Further, she also focused on Indo-Hungarian relations that have for long been underpinned by strong cultural ties, a theme which was continued by her Czech counterpart Mr Roman Masarik, Minister-Counsellor Charge d’affaires at the Embassy of the Czech Republic in India. With India and the Czech Republic set to celebrate 75 years of diplomatic relations in 2023, Mr Masarik underlined India’s strong cultural relations with the Czech Republic and called to attention the pivotal role played by the latter in India’s defence sector as well as the increasing trade and tourism between the two countries with promising expansion potential. The final Special Remarks were given by Prof Gulshan Sachdeva, Jean Monnet Chair and faculty member at the Centre for European Studies. Interestingly, Prof Sachdeva being a PhD student in Hungary in the early 1990s experienced first-hand some of these changes. Like the previous speakers, he too highlighted India’s strategic interest in the CEE countries and succinctly summarised the political and economic transformations experienced by this region from the 1990s up to the onset of the pandemic. Two of the major challenges noted by him during this transition are migration and the ageing population. Complementing the Special Remarks, the Keynote Address was delivered by Prof R.K. Jain, Jean Monnet Chair and former Professor and Chairman at the Centre for European Studies. Prof Jain, with his longstanding interest in the region, traced the history of India’s relations with Central Europe as far back as the 1950s and concluded that the relationship between India and this region had for years been defined by mutual neglect and an information deficit. Nevertheless, amidst the current political scenario marked by Brexit and China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), there is potential for greater engagement between India and Central Europe, not just in terms of trade but also in other areas like defence and technology sharing since Central European countries have the potential to contribute immensely towards India’s modernisation efforts. The inaugural session, which ended with a vote of thanks by Dr Sakti Prasad Srichandan, Assistant Professor at the Centre for European Studies, set the perfect tone for the webinar and was followed by the first working session on the theme Religion and Politics. The session was chaired by Dr Šarūnas Paunksnis, Associate Professor at the Kaunas University of Technology. The presenters addressed various issues related to religion, state and politics especially focusing on Poland. The final session of the first day pertained to Migration and the CEE and was chaired by Dr Srichandan. With a major focus area being Hungary, the presentations shared insights on identity politics, the securitization of migration and the refugee crisis. The second day commenced with the third working session on the theme India & Central and Eastern Europe: Strengthening Engagement, and was chaired by Dr Ankita Dutta, Research Fellow at the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi. The presentations explored a plethora of topics ranging from new economic opportunities in light of the rising partnership between India and the Visegrád Group to understanding the dynamics of their relationship in the contemporary world and the contribution of Polish women in the cultural and public diplomacy of India-Poland relations. The next theme focused on Energy Security and the CEE which was chaired by Dr Amitabh Singh, Associate Professor at the Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies, SIS JNU. It was marked by an exchange of thoughts and arguments on aspects related to energy and the prospects for the Visegrád Four. More specifically, the presentations shared research findings to understand the scope for diversification of energy and the challenges associated with it. Against the backdrop of the Ukrainian crisis, issues such as the impact of the war on energy security and related policies, the dependency on Russia for energy and the ‘Baltic Sea Pipeline’ project was also discussed. The theme for the fifth working session, Right Wing Populism and the CEE, was chaired by Prof. Bhaswati Sarkar. Within the current political circumstances of the Visegrád Four and the rise of populism and right-wing politics, the deliberations focused on the consequences of far-right ascendency in Hungary and Poland. Further, it also took into perspective the changing dynamics of the relationship between Hungary and Poland in the backdrop of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. A recurring theme throughout this session was the emphasis on analysing challenges faced by the existing democratic institutions in these countries and the possible repercussions associated with extremist politics. The final working session explored the theme CEE and the European Union and was chaired by Prof B. Krishnamurthy, former Professor at the Department of Politics and International Studies at Pondicherry University. This session assessed a diverse set of sub-themes which included understanding cyber security in wake of the Ukraine War, identity concerns within the broader European framework and the scope of integration of transition economies. The presentations at the Webinar were made by young researchers from diverse academic backgrounds who are at various stages of their careers. Every session was followed by lively discussions as well as Question-and-Answer rounds which were open to the attendees who hailed from different parts of India, with an overwhelming majority being Research Scholars and Post-graduate students from various institutions of higher education. The event was also attended on the first day by Dr Kristína Gondová of the Embassy of the Slovak Republic in New Delhi. The Webinar came to an end with Prof Bhaswati Sarkar’s concluding remarks where she expressed her sincere gratitude towards the participants and emphasised the need to carry forward the ideas and learnings from the six sessions to encourage further debates on the issues that presently dominate the European landscape. #Europe #EU #CEE #Hungary #Poland Debanjali Ghosh and Lyimee Saikia are Research Scholars at Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University.

By Aarshi Dua The theme of the Africa day celebration for 2022 is Nutrition, and the aim of AU is to strengthen the Agro-Food Systems, Health and Social Protection Systems to Accelerate Human, Social, and Economic Capital Development on the African Continent. Africa Day is commemorated every year on 25 May to honour the day Africa Union’s forerunner, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which was founded on 25 May 1963. The OAU was transformed and remodelled into the African Union on 9 July 2002. The year 2022 signifies the 20th anniversary of the African Union. The theme of the Africa day celebration for 2022 is Nutrition, and the aim of AU is to strengthen the Agro-Food Systems, Health and Social Protection Systems to Accelerate Human, Social, and Economic Capital Development on the African Continent. Covid-19 has revealed African nations’ economic fragility and health and food system inadequacies. With COVID-19, many countries’ human capital gains over the last decade are in danger. In many African nations, keeping the virus at bay has meant sacrificing malnutrition reductions. Due to greater food insecurity concerns, waste will grow. Urgent action is required to protect the poor and vulnerable. Interventions targeting the most disadvantaged are required to invest in human capital. Continued efforts are needed, including advocacy in regions and communities where risks are greatest, strengthening social protection systems, and protecting access to good food and nutrition for the most vulnerable and disadvantaged groups like small children, pregnant and breastfeeding women, older people, and other at-risk groups. The 2022 Africa Day is aimed at generating awareness and consciousness for nutrition and health concerns in Africa. This is also emphasised in the long-term vision encapsulated by Agenda 2063. Where one emphasises the importance of nutrition for the “Africa We Want” with goals on “African people have a high standard of living, quality of life, sound health and wellbeing” and “citizens are healthy, well-nourished, and have a life expectancy of at least 75 years.” For this, preserving and developing high-quality agricultural techniques in Africa is necessary as agriculture is fundamental to Africa’s growth, which is vital to a future where Africa feeds itself and the world. In accord with the Africa Day of 2022, India and Africa have cooperated on food security in the recent decade. India has long-standing bilateral collaboration with various African countries via training programmes, institutional development, and soft loans in agricultural and related sectors to enhance farming practices irrigation, soil quality evaluation and improvement, and farm equipment. On the other hand, India’s trilateral collaborations to promote food security in Africa include India, Brazil, and South Africa (IBSA) Fund, USAID, and the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID)-funded Supporting India’s Trade Preference for Africa (SITA) program. Additionally, the Indian government has suggested the establishment of labs for the testing of foodstuffs in countries such as the Republic of the Congo, Zimbabwe, Gambia, Rwanda, and Nigeria, with International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) serving as the implementing agency. In Nigeria and Zimbabwe, the laboratories have already been established. India fosters private sector partnerships in Africa as well by adopting export-friendly policies. African initiatives to encourage FDI via financial and regulatory systems that simplify corporate procedures welcome this. Lastly, Indian NGOs like SEWA are devoted to sharing information and paradigms on female empowerment and self-reliance from rural India with their African counterparts. Across the last decade, the group has begun women-to-women collaborations in Africa. SEWA delivered their effective learning and experience-sharing technique with smallholder women farmers in Ghana. Currently, Ghanaian women have established a supply chain and export around 200 tonnes of shea butter to Japan. SEWA has been implementing exposure and conversation initiatives with Burkina Faso, Mali, Ghana, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Kenyan women farmers. This is a source of foreign direct investment and capacity development for small-scale and local agricultural techniques. India is also supporting Africa’s agricultural agenda via bilateral and multilateral diplomatic efforts, including the India Africa Forum Summits (2008, 2011 and 2015) and high-level visits from India to Africa. The relationship between India and Africa extends beyond geopolitical and economic issues. This cooperation is set to achieve shared prosperity and food security for all. A robust agricultural sector is vital to attaining food security and reducing poverty in Africa and India. Thus, the 2022 Africa Day theme is to promote food security and strengthen the Agricultural system in Africa. The importance of health, nutrition and protection of at-risk communities is not only vital for Africa as a whole but also is a vital component of India- Africa Relations; therefore, it is a very relevant and must be implemented agenda in context of the contemporary health, agriculture and food crisis in Africa. #Africa #AfricanUnion #AfricaDay2022 Originally published: Financial Express, May 25, 2022 https://www.financialexpress.com/defence/africa-day-2022-the-20-year-celebration-of-the-african-union/2536905/ Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Aarshi Dua is Doctoral Scholar, Centre for African Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University.

By Prof. Swaran Singh Many in the region see the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework as far too US-centric in certain sectors. On the eve of the fourth Quad Leaders Summit in Tokyo this past Monday, US President Joe Biden, along with the other three members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, launched his much-hyped Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). This also presented the novel outline of a “Quad Plus” paradigm, as the online launch was attended virtually by leaders from South Korea and New Zealand plus seven of the 10 ASEAN members, namely Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. The unique selling point of IPEF so far seems to be to counter the so-called China challenge by reviving US economic leadership in the Indo-Pacific region, though it is presented in terms of evolving shared novel processes and standards to socialize (read tame) China into respective international codes of conduct. But as countries now begin negotiating various proposed IPEF modules by building consensus on their evolving contours, this has come to be interpreted as one more reincarnation of extant initiatives such as former US president Donald Trump’s 2019 Blue Dot Network, the 2021 G7 Build Back Better World, or the European Union’s Global Gateway scheme announced this year. What is more, many have been and continue to be reluctant as they see IPEF as far too US-centric to their comfort in certain sectors. Reviving US leadership The US of course is at the forefront of this novel IPEF experiment. Last October, President Biden first presented his vision of IPEF at the online East Asian Summit chaired by Brunei, listing a broad range of sectors where he wished to redefine the processes and standards of international economic transactions. Since then, senior US officials have been proactively building consensus among America’s Asian allies, though some of them even now appear to be reluctant partners, being unsure and uncertain about several subsets of this rather broad outline of a framework. Large economies like India that remain hugely dependent on China could be conscious of extant trade deficits or the digital economy leading to cross-border data flows. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations also remains closely intertwined with China. Experts also see this initiative as guided by domestic politics of the US. They see IPEF as nothing more than Biden reviving former president Barack Obama’s legacy given that in 2009, as part of his “pivot” to Asia, the latter had also visualized “writing the rules of the road” through the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Second, there are also pressures from the US Congress. The US Congressional Research Service paper on IPEF this February, for instance, underlines how since Trump’s withdrawal from the TPP in 2017 the United States “lacks an economic and trade strategy sufficient to counter China’s increasing economic influence in the Indo-Pacific” and how “the US may remain on the sidelines, potentially imparting the administration’s ability to promote its vision of a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific.’” In Biden’s Indo-Pacific Strategy launched in February, a whole paragraph is devoted to IPEF, calling it “a multilateral partnership for the 21st century” and presenting it as the missing economic link in US geo-strategic leadership in Indo-Pacific region. While the Biden administration has removed several of Trump’s tariffs against China and several other Asian allies, it has also made clear that it will not return to the now Japan-led Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which it sees as a “very 20th-century” paradigm. The US has also remained outside world’s largest trade pact, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which includes all the other members of IPEF. This makes the China-led RCEP and US-led IPEF opposing propositions: the former offering trillion-dollar-plus investments by their largest trading partner while the latter proposes to create a shared facilitation mechanism for mutually complementary transactions. Countering China In proposing IPEF, the US therefore is fundamentally proposing to counter China by reviving its economic engagement in the Indo-Pacific, a region that accounts for 60% of the world population and is seen increasingly as the engine of post-pandemic resilience. But hasn’t China been the leader in making this region such a growth engine? Indeed, the China link of the Indo-Pacific resilience has become especially noticeable during the difficult years of the Covid-19 pandemic that saw China being the only major economy to achieve positive growth (though experts now project possibilities of 2022 seeing the US – for the first time since 1976 – growing faster than China). Even that prospect cannot exclude the critical role of China in driving regional growth and development. To cite US national security adviser Jake Sullivan, the Indo-Pacific is what increasingly undergirds this expected US economic resilience; it supports more than 3 million American jobs and is the source of nearly $900 billion of foreign direct investment into the United States. But isn’t China part of that Indo-Pacific region that promises to underwrite US economic resilience? The fact that the US vision excludes China – which remains its strongest trade and investment partner and one that invested $38 billion in the US even in the worst pandemic year of 2020 – makes IPEF far too tinted by US geopolitics, where China is seen as its main competitor and less considerate of the regional economic dynamics where China remains far too deeply entrenched. Also, unlike China, which since the January 2017 Davos speech by President Xi Jinping has appeared to be the flag-bearer of free trade and investment, the US-led IPEF seems aimed to ensure the US does not get impacted by the downsides of trade liberalization. No country today has deep pockets like China to continue with one-sided investments and exports that the myopic national regimes find invariably attractive. The 2016 US presidential election saw Trump unleash a popular sentiment on how the rest of the world was taking advantage of America and walk out of multiple international arrangements while shifting US focus to launching the Five Eyes, Quad and AUKUS security mechanisms. That shift clearly missed this essential economic link that has brought global focus to the Asia-Pacific region, and more recently to its maritime imaginations, the Indo-Pacific region. What IPEF is not Underlying the dilemma is that just like the larger US-led Indo-Pacific narratives, the driver of this regional transformation, China, has remained not just an outlier but the target of US initiatives in engaging the Indo-Pacific minus China. This is being done in spite of China now being a $16 trillion economy – bigger than IPEF minus the US combined – as well as the largest trading and investment partner of the US. Prima facie, the 13 countries of IPEF – representing 2.5 billion people, that is, 32.3% of the world population as of 2020 and a combined gross domestic product of $34.6 trillion, that is, 40.9% of the total – make it a bigger economic grouping than both the 15-member RCEP and the 11-nation CPTPP, where China’s application for membership remains pending. The CPTPP – involving Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Singapore and Vietnam – currently represents 510 million people with $10.8 trillion of GDP. But the CPTPP could become much bigger than IPEF, and potentially even China-led, once the applications of South Korea and China to join it are accepted. Second, unlike the CPTPP or RCEP – the two biggest trade blocs in Asia – the IPEF negotiations have just begun. Third, unlike the CPTPP or RCEP, IPEF does not aim at lowering tariffs or expanding market access, not even gradually over a long- or short-term future. Fourth, it also does not as yet have any dispute settlement mechanisms, which are central to most economic arrangements, including RCEP and CPTPP. In all, this makes IPEF rather distinct from free-trade agreements (FTAs) that usually take decades to negotiate, go through a ratification process, and have sacrosanct membership. Indeed, in proposing IPEF, the Biden administration perhaps wished to avoid the process of ratification, which would require congressional approval and by extension addressing the popular anti-globalization mood of Americans that was most effectively articulated during the 2016 presidential election and reinforced during Trump’s four years in office. Experts believe that the US could not join the CPTPP or RCEP as Congress increasingly sees giving trade concessions in an unfavorable light. Second, the novel experiment of IPEF could face RCEP-like challenges such asa decade of grueling negotiations, which in that case saw the third-largest economy, India, opting out at the very last hour. Or worse, it could face a repeat of the US-led TPP negotiations that saw a successor president withdrawing from the agreement in 2017, though it has since been revived by Japan as CPTPP, which was rafted in 2018. As of now, there exists no precedent of creating such a loosely knitted economic framework, definitely not one of capable of becoming an inflection point of systemic transformation. Skeptics suggest that IPEF imposes obligations without providing incentives, such as providing market access or lowering tariffs, and at best marks only the beginning of a process. What makes IPEF especially an uphill task is its aim of decoupling its members from China-centric global commerce, which seems ambitious given that all its members already have China as their largest trading partner and are tied to China in their RCEP FTA. A reality check Finally, the US seeks to build IPEF to reconnect with the Indo-Pacific region while excluding not just China but several important players. Thus the very announcement of IPEF has made Beijing its ardent opponent. Responding to the IPEF announcement, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin on Wednesday criticized the US, saying that in the name of cooperation, it was excluding certain countries. He cited US Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo describing IPEF as “an alternative to China’s approach” while underlining how “many countries in the region are worried about the huge cost of ‘decoupling’ with China.” Other than China, IPEF also excludes the three ASEAN nations, namely Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar, that are regarded as close allies of Beijing. At the same time, pandering to China’s sensitivities, Taiwan – a close US ally and initially expected to join – was also not included. However, given the nature of IPEF, the door for their future induction remains at least theoretically open, which makes their exclusions more like an uncertain knee-jerk reaction and therefore open to interpretations. #US #IPEF #RCEP #CPTPP #China #Quad Originally published: Asia Times, May 27, 2022 At: https://asiatimes.com/2022/05/can-us-led-ipef-outshine-rcep-or-cptpp/ Posted here with the authorization of the author. Prof. Swaran Singh is Professor of Diplomacy and Disarmament at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi; President of Association of Asia Scholars (asiascholars.in); Adjunct Senior Fellow at The Charhar Institute, Beijing; Senior Fellow, Institute for National Security Studies Sri Lanka, Colombo; and Visiting Professor, Research Institute for Indian Ocean Economies, Kunming (China).

By Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli This round of the Quad meeting will go down in history for its norm-building exercise, democratisation process, ushering in rule-based order, inclusivity, and harmonisation of interests and objectives. The fourth meeting of the Quad leaders and their second in person meeting in the last one year was termed aptly as “positive and practical”. The Tokyo meeting of the United States, Japan, Australia and Indian leaders took place on 24 May. This round of the Quad meeting will go down in history for its norm-building exercise, democratisation process, ushering in rule-based order, inclusivity, harmonisation of interests and objectives, concern for smaller nations in the Southeast Asian region as well as in the Pacific and evolving sustainable practices. It is noticeable that the Russia factor, which created differences in the Quad third meeting, has subsided in this Tokyo round. As with the previous three meetings, the Quad statements are devoid of acrimony or chest-thumping slogans, but exhibit a systematic head down approach to find solutions to the emerging problems in the Indo-Pacific. Democratic institutions and transparent practices at home helped this process of strengthening Quad’s outreach agenda. Conspicuous, as it were, in all the Quad statements is no mention of the elephant in the room, even though the signalling is clear. China was not mentioned explicitly in any of the Quad statements. However, the emphasis on rule of law, free and open Indo-Pacific, explicit mention of challenges in South and East China Seas, Pacific Ocean island states and other issues suggest implicitly to Beijing’s actions in the recent past. The Tokyo meeting reiterated the work on vaccines, critical technologies and maritime order, as with the previous three meetings. However, additional agenda crept into the fourth meeting and suggest to the recent dynamics. For instance, counter terrorism issue has been raised with the explicit mention of Mumbai and Pathankot attacks. The United Nations Security Council resolution 1267 on the subject was cited, indirectly criticising China’s support to Pakistan-based and Afghan-based terrorists. This is in the backdrop of continuing China’s collaboration with the Al Qaeda groups in Afghanistan and its efforts to carve a “Himalayan Quad” in South Asia. The agile nature of the Quad discussions is seen in the mention of mounting debts in the region and the efforts proposed to counter the economic stress levels among several nations. In the backdrop of the economic meltdown of Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Nepal and other countries, the Quad suggested to addressing this issue systematically as against China’s recent rapacious policies. Much thought has gone into the proposal of Quad Debt Management Resource Portal at the Tokyo meeting. The Quad nations also pledged to invest $50 billion for the next five years on infrastructure projects in the region. Even though this figures pale into insignificance compared to China’s Belt and Road Initiative outlays, the latter are racked by dominance of communist party backed state-owned enterprises, lack transparency in contracts and are debt-ridden. Another surprising decision of the Quad in this round is the emphasis on climate change. In the backdrop of the stalemate at the November 2021 Glasgow meeting where both Chinese and Russian leaders were absent, and perhaps reflecting to the strain in India-China relations on environmental issues, the Quad members outlined mitigation and adaptation measures. While the previous Quad meetings mentioned about the work to be done on critical technologies- specifically quantum and 5G telecommunication technologies, a surprising element is the emerging harmonisation among Quad members on cyber security issues. As cyber challenges kept mounting – reflected in the Estonian case more than a decade ago and the increasing cyberattacks, the Tokyo declaration announced constructive measures not only for Quad Cybersecurity Partnership but also for individual internet users. An open and secure telecommunication system was also discussed. The ongoing disruption in the semiconductor supply chain mechanism was also raised by the Quad members. Also, unlike the previous discussions, space applications and technologies entered the Quad discussions in Tokyo with decisions for sharing earth observation data for the common good of the region. In the light of the outer space weaponization programmes of China (and Russia) and their efforts to carve out a “haves and have nots” in Outer Space, the Quad efforts at Tokyo saw some constructive alternatives. Surprising also in the current round of discussions is the faster pace in providing public goods and services to the international community. The Quad members decided at Tokyo to counter non-traditional security challenges, illegal fishing and suggested efforts to enhance Maritime Domain Awareness and provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to the concerned. Such capacity building in the maritime domain is sure to also deter China which has been active in encroaching maritime commons in the Indo-Pacific region recently. Indeed, it was reported that as the Tokyo meeting is underway, China (and Russia) mobilised bombers and other aircraft closer to Japan. For the past decade, China’s naval and air transgressions on Senkaku islands have increased substantially, as with its forays in Bashi Channel (south of Taiwan) and Miyako Straits (closer to Okinawa base). These are clear signals of coercion and highlight the vulnerabilities of Japan and Taiwan. However, while China-Russia coordination increased in the aftermath of the Ukrainian invasion, neither these countries nor the Quad members could openly come to blows. With the relative economic decline of both China and Russia, the Quad members exhibit confidence in their institutional capability and technological prowess. In these circumstances, the Quad chose to work quietly setting the agenda positively and in practical terms. #Quad #India #US #Japan #Australia #China #IndoPacific Originally published: Firstpost, May 25, 2022 At: https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/how-quad-tokyo-outcome-was-both-positive-and-practical-though-it-makes-no-mention-of-china-10716311.html Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Srikanth Kondapalli is Professor in Chinese Studies and Dean of School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University.

By Prof. Santishree Dhulipudi Pandit Indian civilisation has always celebrated development, democracy, diversity, difference, and dissent Reducing India to a civic nation bound only by the Constitution disregards its history, ancient heritage, culture and civilisation. I would describe India as a “civilisation state”. This is not just a view from one part of the country. There have been writings since time immemorial, where you have this concept, and it is very important to revisit them. It predates the freedom struggle and the arrival of those who eventually made India their homeland. Celebrating history beyond religion is very important. We have to face the challenge of a distorted history: Distorted both because history is “his” story — I think the “her” story also has to come. And the overturning of E H Carr’s dictum: “Facts are sacred, interpretations vary.” Unfortunately, in independent India, and to a certain extent a university I belong to, overturned this dictum: “Interpretations are sacred, facts can vary.” And this is very dangerous. This is a civilisation that preached “ekam sat bahudha vadanti”, that the truth may be one but there are different parts to it. This is the basic essence of the celebration of diversity, dissent, difference, as well as democracy. Why are we today trying to re-emphasise this point? It’s because we are made to imagine our history with self-loathing and self-hatred. One period is excessively glorified. And I, who come from the south, feel even worse. The longest-ruling dynasty in India was the Chola dynasty, which ruled this country for 2,000 years. Is there any road named after any of the great kings of the Cholas? Not one in Delhi. There is a huge bias, agenda-setting as well as gatekeeping. And it is extremely important that we revisit these ideas and look into the gaps. As most of you know India is not a post-independent idea of a nation. The Rig Veda defined the geographical existence of Bharatavarsha as well as the Sapta Sindhu, a land encompassing seven principal rivers. The Vishnu Purana descried the geographical location of Bharatavarsha. Composed in the 2nd century BC, it says that the land that lies to the north of the ocean and south of the snowy mountains is called Bharat. And there dwell the progeny of Bharat. The word “rashtra” was used in the Rig Veda, Yajur Veda and the Atharva Veda. Rashtra is not only a merely geopolitical concept, it is also a civilisational concept. It is a kind of thought which keeps a patriot in the frame of mind to transcend all the material and immediate interests and protect the motherland from all calamities, aggression and evil. Love for the country is not the same as love for the nation and self-determination, sovereignty or even structuring a composite culture. Rashtra bhakti is a subconscious feeling of being an Indian or a person belonging to this great civilisation. Unlike the Abrahamic religions, Hinduism is not a proselytising or a structured religion of one book and one God. We are a process. It’s a way of life. Robert Frykenberg, the American historian, described the Indian National Movement as also being a Hindu revivalist and modernist movement, quoting Bankim Chandra Chatterjee with his Vande Mataram, Swami Vivekananda, Swami Dayanand Saraswati, as well as Sri Aurobindo and Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, who redefined Hinduism in modern terms. So cultural civilisation is only a civilisational perception — a sense of belonging and anchoring in a specific cultural and civilisational milieu. Most have heard of Bal Gangadhar Tilak and his book, Gita Rahasya. Tilak was the first to say, “Swaraj is my birthright, and I shall have it”. He infused the spirit of political assertiveness and patriotism, both of which are extremely relevant today, in the people. To inject the spirit of nationalism and awareness among the people, he started the Ganesh festival and Shivaji Mahotsav. These were instrumental in bringing people together, irrespective of caste or creed. And I would say he was the first mass leader before Mahatma Gandhi. Many people think Gandhi is a disciple of Gopal Krishna Gokhale. I would rather say he’s a disciple of Tilak. Both Tilak and Gandhi were greatly influenced by the Bhagavad Gita. They saw it as an instrument of karma yoga, rather than just bhakti yoga. Next, I would like to bring in the ideas of Gopal Krishna Gokhale. He said politics should be a service and not a profession. And I think it is this aspect that we have to bring in and young scholars must use these narratives, which are available in the writings of many of the Indian freedom fighters. Unfortunately, we have forgotten all these great nationalists who existed. I’m going to the more marginalised areas — Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh. There was Subramania Bharati, known as Mahakavi Bharati, to Tamil speakers for his outstanding contributions to nationalism and Tamil literature. A passionate freedom fighter, social revolutionary, mystic and visionary who was active during the late period of British rule, he spent much of his all too brief life exiled from British India, in neighbouring Pondicherry, just like Sri Aurobindo. He died suddenly in 1921. He was just 38 years old. He had little opportunity to provide for his legacy, literary or otherwise. In his writings, he talked about the intangible cultural heritage of India and the unity of this culture. The writings destroy all ambiguity. He clearly said that clarity of mind is very important and he thought that all languages and literatures of India have a single origin. Bharati was a genius. He was also ahead of his time. He also spoke about women’s liberation. Many people believe that feminism or women’s rights movements began only with Marx and ended there. The first feminists are Drapaudi and Sita. Who could be a greater feminist than Draupadi, or Sita who is the first single mother. These concepts are not invented by the West. I’d also like to mention Subramaniya Siva, and two Telugu writers called Duggirala Gopalakrishnayya, who said the nation is not its sand and mud but its people, and Kandukuri Veeresalingam, who was like lshwar Chandra Vidyasagar, a great reformer from the south. The great writer, Ananda K Coomaraswamy said the highlight of Indian civilisation is the dance of Lord Shiva. The temple of Chidambaram has the Nataraja avatar — the lord of dance — of Lord Shiva, or the thillai form as we call it, as do the South Indian copper images of Shri Nataraja. These images vary amongst themselves in minor details, but all express one fundamental conception — our Lord is the dancer who, like the heat latent in firewood, diffuses his power into the mind and matter and makes them dance in their turn. Cosmic activity is the central motif of the dance. Creation arises from the drum, protection proceeds from the hand of hope, and destruction comes from fire and the foot held afloat gives release. You see this legendary argument about Lord Shiva’s dance as the highlight of the Indian civilisational trait in the Cholas. The Cholas occupied the Indo Pacific regions called the Srivijaya and Suvarnabhumi. They defeated the Chinese and it is the image of Lord Shiva that was their ruling symbol. So we ask: can India become a norm builder? When you’re a civilisational state, it is expected that we build narratives that can become norms in international relations, in all aspects of life. The way the Cholas conquered, they did not do it by genocide, rape or loot. It was more by culture, trade and commerce. If you look for an alternative paradigm, you have this. When we talk of cultural nationalism, it should help us to define certain very important identifying characteristics that we need to be a norm builder, a shared value system which includes the acceptance of international norms. Yes, we don’t believe in loot, genocide or rape; we believe in trade and commerce and culture. The existence of institutional mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts. The British did not give us democratic values. If they had, then Myanmar, Pakistan, all countries ruled by the British should have been democracies. India is a democracy because it has a political culture, a culture that can choose from 3,000 crore gods. What more diversity would you require? We are the only country that has sustained a oasis of democracy in the Third World. India’s contribution to multiculturalism and cultural pluralism is extraordinarily important. And it is here that we also have the world-centric paradigm of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam against the state-centric paradigm. And we also believe in a nature-centric paradigm, not an anthropocentric paradigm. We believe that human beings are a part of the cosmos, where every other living and non-living thing has equal space, and a function that has been created for them. We also have the Buddhist philosophy: Lord Gautama, the Buddha, was the first dissenter and we celebrate dissent. Buddhism is a religion of the middle path. And India has always believed in the middle path and non-attachment. Adi Shankaracharya, through Advaita, brought these ideas back into Indian philosophy. At one point, 2,000 years ago, Tamil was the lingua franca of traders across Southeast Asia. These were not Indian colonies, but proto-states that took on the Hindu apparatus of religion, and concepts of kingship to enhance their position and status. While communities of Indian traders settled in important ports along Southeast Asia, they never crossed the line into becoming colonisers. This is our civilisation, we never colonised anybody. What happened instead, was that local rulers imbibed the Indian traditions. Indian cultural nationalism is on a path that is very different from that of the anthropocentric or the Abrahamic religions. So whenever we talk of Indian civilisation, it is something that celebrates development, democracy, diversity, difference, and dissent. #India #Civilisation #Constitution #Nationalism #Diversity #Multiculturalism Originally published: The Indian Express, May 24, 2022. https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/the-idea-of-indian-nationalism-did-not-come-from-the-constitution-it-has-ancient-roots-7932081/ Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of Dean, SIS. Prof. Santishree Dhulipudi Pandit is Vice-Chancellor, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Edited excerpts from a speech delivered at the seminar, “Revisiting the ideas of India from ‘Swaraj’ to ‘New India’” at the University of Delhi, on May 20, 2022.

By Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli The invasion of Ukraine has upended world geopolitics, disrupting the already fragile relationship between India and China. As Ukrainians resist the Russian invasion, a renewed cold war is heating up between Russia and the NATO partners. Western sanctions are intensifying on Russia and the situation threatens to engulf other regions, challenging other tense regional dynamics — including the fragile relationship between India and China. India and China’s relations have been plagued by a territorial dispute that flared into a border skirmish on June 15, 2020, resulting in 20 Indian soldiers being killed and an estimated 43 Chinese soldiers injured. This not only restricted the development of bilateral relations, but also sowed seeds of a new cold war between India and China. The Cold War between the US and Russia featured two countries vying for global and regional leadership, engaged in an ideological conflict of democracy versus socialism, and campaigns of military containment and proxy wars. The two countries never broke into person-to-person warfare, nor were there economic interactions, and the massive nuclear weapons threat lingering in the background remained just that. Just as a reminiscent dynamic emerges between Russia and NATO, so too is a cold war of sorts between India and China, a relationship that has been complicated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. While India and China have exhibited neutrality during United Nations debates over the invasion, and both countries have good relations with Russia, there are qualitative differences in the type of relationship they have. India’s relations with Russia, specifically its importation of arms, serves mainly to address the challenge from China. Meanwhile, China’s support of Russia shows a united front against NATO and the United States’ hegemony and power politics. On the other hand, India had intensified the 2+2 dialogue mechanism — an approach that pairs India’s foreign and defence ministers with their overseas counterparts — not only with the US, but with other Quad partners. Notably, some Chinese commentators have castigated Quad as an “Asian NATO” in the making. Some of the features of the Cold War US-Soviet hostility are now seen in the Ukrainian conflict, and are also reflected in the differences between India and China. For instance, the 19th Chinese Communist Party Congress in 2017 wished for China to “occupy the centre stage” in global and regional orders, suggesting a potential tussle among major powers was on the cards, including in India-China relations. Chinese President Xi Jinping, addressing the May 2014 Conference on Interaction on Confidence Building Measures at Shanghai, said Asian countries should look after their own security (i.e. resisting any help from the US), a posture that was seen as carving out a leadership position in Asia for China. Both of these are not acceptable to India (or for that matter to Japan, Indonesia, Vietnam, Turkey or Kazakhstan). A leadership tussle in Asia could trigger a new cold war-type conflict in Asia in the near future. India has instead advocated for multipolarity in Asia in the face of China’s coercive diplomacy over Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam, Philippines, India and others. It continues to resist China calling the shots in Asia. Much like the Cold War, containment is all the rage again. Since 2013, through its Belt and Road Initiative, China began constructing infrastructure projects in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and is gradually bringing Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Myanmar into its vortex. China’s arms transfers, aid, interference in the internal affairs of these Southern Asian countries has been stepped up to counter India. While China’s efforts may be to acquire allies and friends in different parts of the world as a part of its global hegemonic drive, it could lead to potential full-fledged containment of India. Additionally, the nuclear threat is back. China’s violation of many written agreements, their mobilisation of forces and military casualties have led to both sides mobilising an estimated 200,000 troops across the Line of Actual Control. In addition to the ground forces, air forces have also been on high alert for the past two years. However, unlike in the Cold War between the US and the then Soviet Union, India and China currently have not reported any strategic forces mobilisation. This could be partly due to the fact that both abide by ‘no first use’ nuclear policy. While both tested different types of missile systems, no public display of nuclear deterrence is visible so far unlike between the US and the then Soviet Union. Hence the world has so far avoided another ‘Bay of Pigs’ incident in India-China (although, since 2009, India has been prepared for a ”’two-front war’ under nuclear conditions”). But unlike the Cold War, which saw the US and Russia have no dialogue outside of ‘mutually assured destruction’ posturing and a few secret negotiations, leaders in India and China are amenable to sharing global power in a ‘multipolarity’ phenomenon. India and China interact in multilateral institutions like BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), or at Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit meetings. However, the observable ‘warmth’ generated at Wuhan and Chennai “informal summits” between the Indian and Chinese leaders in 2018 and 2019 has disappeared of late. Trade between the two countries has not only continued, but flourished. Despite the border tensions, the 2021 bilateral trade figures crossed a record US$125 billion, partly due to the items related to the pandemic, such as oxygen concentrators. But, even in the well-performing sector of trade, the tensions are present: India does not allow free trade with China, and will not join China’s Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership or other trade arrangements. This boils down to the lack of market economy status in China, and the restrictions they have imposed on Indian pharmaceutical and IT software products. While both India and China are part of globalisation and cooperate in the World Trade Organisation on protecting developing countries’ interests, at the bilateral level a subtle cold war is emerging. While the Cold War has not been completely copied into the tensions between India and China, the events in Ukraine have unleashed the potential for some type of non-military escalation. #India #China #US #Russia #NATO #Ukraine Originally published: 360info.org, May 24, 2022 At: https://360info.org/india-china-relations-threaten-to-freeze-over/ Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Srikanth Kondapalli is Professor in Chinese Studies and Dean of School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University.