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Déjà vu in Ukraine and the tragic saga of not learning from the past


By Pratik Mall


The tragic saga in Ukraine is also clear evidence of the USA's fundamentally faulty policy towards Russia and the lack of consensus in Europe over Russia.


Ukraine's conflict has snowballed into a full-scale crisis with grave consequences for the world order, great power contestation and, more importantly, world peace and stability. Dubbed the grimmest crisis since the 1990's when the cold war ended, the crisis has severe consequences for humanity. It has brought into focus the critical questions of international relations such as notions of security, the balance of power politics, revanchism of Russia and misplaced priorities of the USA and West in the post cold war world order.


The genesis of the crisis can be traced back to the politics of the post-cold war period and especially the revanchist and irredentist behaviour of Russia in the wake of radically altered post-pandemic global order. The ascendancy of Putin and the feeling of being betrayed on the promises made to a militarily weak and economically tamed Russia has given a rational and eminently logical basis to Russian actions in Ukraine. The idea of controlling eastern Europe and keeping it under Moscow's orbit and the rivalries with the West over NATO expansion since the end of the cold war has got amplified in the current crisis. In the theoretical framework, one could understand the salience of the contemporary theatre through Mackinder's heartland theory, wherein he pointed out that the country controlling Eastern Europe would rule the world. The idea was mooted in 1904 when the area in question was a part of the Russian empire. Later on, the region witnessed a significantly heated contestation throughout the Cold War.



The differing notions of Russia and the West's security have contributed significantly to the crisis. On the one hand, the USA didn't disband NATO and instead justified its existence and even carried out two distinct rounds of its expansion, thereby increasing the suspicion of Russia about its covert and, over some time, its overt ambitions. Russia, which believed in indivisible security, opposed the idea of NATO as a collective defence. First mooted at the Helsinki agreement of 1975 and later on reaffirmed in the 1990 Charter of Paris for A New Europe, 1997 NATO- Russia agreement, and at the Istanbul and Astana summit of OSCE, the idea talked of not enhancing one's security in a manner as to jeopardize the security of others. Therefore, it emphasized the security of Russia and its neighbours as one. Putin's Russia viewed the NATO expansion as a blatant violation of this guarantee.


The dissatisfaction was quite apparent if one looks at Putin's 2007 Munich security dialogue speech, where he warned the West not to overstep. The sense of hostilities since then has only increased. The 2008 annexation of Georgia and 2014 annexation of Crimea, and now the 2022 invasion of Ukraine to ultimately integrate the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk into the Donbas region is a clear manifestation of the dissatisfaction. In addition to Putin's perceived sense of injustice, the memories of humiliation that Russia faced after the collapse further cemented his resolve to make Russia a global great power again and restore the old glory. It was very much reflected in Putin's speech that he recently gave about the history of Ukraine. This very idea of Russia securing its rightful place among the comity of nations further emboldened Putin's irredentist and revanchist tendencies.


The tragic saga in Ukraine is also clear evidence of the USA's fundamentally faulty policy towards Russia and the lack of consensus in Europe over Russia. A close look at the level of economic engagement between Russia and Germany, and France in the oil and gas sectors, among many other industries, brings to the surface the contradictions in the EU. Many realist scholars like John Mearsheimer and the likes such as Henry Kissinger and Stephen Walt have pointed out the misplaced priorities of USA foreign policy. According to Mearsheimer, the USA is militarily and actively engaged in a region that is not even its core and vital national security interest. Whereas if we look from a Russian perspective, the region forms an integral part of its vital and core strategic and national security interest. Howsoever biting it may be, the economic sanctions could not stop Russia from doing what it intends to do. Therefore, realistically speaking, the need for the hour is to focus on the real and serious existential threat, i.e. China. The Biden administration must start to believe in the balance of power politics. Rather than further alienating Russia and pushing it into the Chinese lap, it must try to work out peace with Russia and, if possible, take it on its side to contain china. A few give and takes with Russia for a larger purpose are justified in the case of the severe Chinese threat. Neutralizing Ukraine and establishing it as an ideal buffer zone remains the most pragmatic solution from a realist viewpoint. It will make eminent sense if one starts to look at the Chinese challenge from Mahanian wisdom, which talked about the nation controlling the sea and ultimately controlling the world.



Pratik Mall is an M.A. PISM (First Year), Batch 2021-2023 student of School of International Studies, JNU. Email ID: pratikmall.h@gmail.com



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