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By Prof. Gulshan Sachdeva Staying away from a key IPEF pillar negotiations is not good optics for a confident nation, and a key Indo-Pacific player At the recently-held ministerial meeting of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), India decided to join its three pillars related to supply chains, tax and anti-corruption, and clean energy. However, due to possible binding commitments on labour, environment, and digital trade, New Delhi opted out of its trade pillar. The United States-led IPEF was launched in May. Currently, it consists of 14 Indo-Pacific nations viz. Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, Vietnam, and the US. The grouping represents 40 percent of the global GDP, and 28 percent of global trade in goods and services. Many view the establishment of the IPEF as a move to counter China’s growing economic influence in the Indo-Pacific. Although growing in economic significance, the region is recognised by all major players, and its economic architecture is still evolving. Both the US and India are out of the Indo-Pacific megadeals. They are not members of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) or the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). So, the IPEF has the potential to provide a solid platform to both of them in framing economic rules in an economically-dynamic Indo-Pacific region. Two years ago, India moved out of the China-dominated RCEP. The 15 nations RCEP now consists of 10 ASEAN nations as well as China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. Similarly, the CPTPP is an FTA between remaining 11 members of the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) when the Donald Trump administration withdrew from it in 2017. The membership now includes Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, New Zealand, Singapore, and Vietnam. The United Kingdom, China, Taiwan, and Ecuador have also applied for its membership. The key provisions of the CPTPP includes goods tariff, digital trade, procurement, IPR, investment, services etc. Unlike the CPTPP, the RCEP does not include labour and environmental issues or support to State-owned enterprises. But it encourages deep supply chain integration among members. Some countries such as Japan, Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Vietnam, and Brunei are members of all three groupings viz. CPTPP, the RCEP and the IPEF. Some of them have close strategic ties with the US. But all of them are also integrated with China-centred value chains. For them, the IPEF is one additional layer of integration in the Indo-Pacific under US patronage. It is also good for rebalancing increasing Chinese economic dominance. Through the IPEF, the US along with its allies and partners wants to enhance its economic engagement in Asia, and the Indo Pacific. Being a large, fastest-growing economy, and an important part of the QUAD, India also has an ambition to play a crucial part in the Indo-Pacific security, and economic architectures. It also wants to emerge as an alternative to companies relocating their value chains from China. Since we are absent both from the CPTPP and the RCEP, the IPEF is an opportunity to build multilateral economic linkages in the Indo-Pacific. As trade and supply chains are deeply integrated with each other, all the IPEF members except India have agreed to take part in negotiations in all four pillars of the IPEF. The labour issue has been cited as one of the major concerns for not joining the IPEF trade pillar. But even in the supply chain pillar, it is clearly mentioned that partner countries “will seek to ensure that the work promotes the labour standards that underpin fair, sustainable, and resilient supply chains”. India’s reluctance to participate in the trade pillar of the IPEF indicates a lack of confidence in its competitiveness. Recent trade agreements with Australia and the United Arab Emirates and fast track negotiations with the UK showed the world that India is changing its cautious approach towards trade pacts. It is not just bilateral deals, India is also hopeful of trade and investment agreements with the 27-member European Union (EU) soon. The agenda with the EU also includes labour and sustainability issues. Today, India’s foreign policy discourse is dominated by the Indo-Pacific. This narrative has to be synchronised with the confident external economic arrangements in the region. A short-term transactional approach may not be helpful in making India a crucial Indo-Pacific player. Staying away even for negotiations in a key IPEF pillar is not good optics for a confident nation. #India #IndoPacific #IPEF Originally published: Money Control, September 14, 2022 https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/opinion/what-message-does-india-send-by-opting-out-of-ipef-trade-policy-pillar-9175611.html Posted here with the authorization of the author. Gulshan Sachdeva is Professor at the Centre for European Studies and Coordinator, Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, Jawaharlal Nehru University. Views are personal.

By Prof. Amita Batra India's ability to successfully conclude its FTAs with the EU and Australia, according to schedule, will signal to the world its readiness and capability to play the role envisioned of it in the IPEF The US is hosting the first in-person ministerial meeting of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) on September 8-9 in Los Angeles. Earlier discussions with trade ministers, in which India participated as an “observer”, were held at the end of July in Singapore. No joint statement was issued after the July discussions but it is envisioned that the participating countries will declare the formal launch of rule-setting at the end of the September meeting. It may be useful to note some relevant considerations in developing India’s negotiating strategy in the IPEF trade pillar. It is important to emphasise that while the IPEF has a trade pillar, it is not a trade agreement and, therefore, should not be considered as an alternative to the mega regionals in Asia, namely, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). More specifically, the TPP, of which the CPTPP is a subset, both in terms of provisions and membership, was an economic instrument at the heart of the US’s pivot to Asia strategy aimed at containment of China. By instituting WTO++ provisions, especially with respect to state-owned enterprises, intellectual property rights (IPRs) and investor-state dispute settlement, the idea was to establish a rules-based trade order that China would have either found difficult to abide by and/or incur substantial costs in terms of difficult domestic reforms. The CPTPP, in comparison, is a watered-down version of the TPP, especially with respect to provisions relating to investment and labour and environment standards. Most importantly, the IPR provisions have been substantively altered, thus making it easier for China to seek membership of the agreement. China applied for the CPTPP in September 2021. While it has been argued that the actual membership for China may take a long time given some member countries’ (e.g. Japan, Australia and Canada) discomfort with the Chinese membership, it is also a fact that Australia and Japan are both members of the other mega-regional in Asia, the RCEP, which is inclusive of China and was signed in the midst of the pandemic when sentiments against China were running high. Given its centrality in regional supply chains and trade, membership of both the regional agreements, CPTPP and the RCEP, will give China a dominant position in setting the trade rules in the region. The IPEF, which excludes China and is promoted by the US, acquires salience in this context. For India, which is not a member of either of the mega-regional trade agreements, the IPEF, with nine members from East Asia (seven of which are Asean member economies) and two of its four pillars focused on trade connectivity and supply chains resilience, offers another opportunity to integrate with the dynamic East Asian value chain hub. Post-pandemic and in the wake of the Ukraine crisis, the regional economies are most likely to emerge as the preferred, secure alternative in the large corporations’ “China plus one” relocation strategy. Also, as evident in its post-pandemic comprehensive recovery framework, Asean is looking for supply chain resilience through diversification beyond the region (and beyond the RCEP) through its bilateral free-trade agreements (FTAs). The flexible format of the IPEF could be an opportunity, especially under its trade facilitation component, for India to seek remedial action against the non-tariff barriers that it has long complained about in the context of Asean-India FTA. The opportunity, however, comes with challenges. The IPEF does not include tariff preferences and hence, the scope for enhanced market access. Non-inclusion of tariffs has been attributed to domestic political constraints in the US. An additional consideration may have been the already low (0-5 per cent) global average most-favoured nation tariffs in the manufacturing sector achieved through both unilateral trade liberalisation policies of the developed and many developing countries and preferential trade agreements. The IPEF may have therefore been deliberately designed to focus on more modern-day provisions like digital trade, regulatory policies, trade facilitation and sustainable social development provisions relating to labour and environmental standards. Led by the US, the IPEF is likely to reflect its revealed position in the US-Mexico Canada Agreement (USMCA), which has forward-looking labour standards, including a mechanism to ensure minimum wages through the innovatively-defined rules of origin that could become a template for the IPEF. The provisions pertaining to digital trade and environmental standards in the USMCA are considered to be even more stringent than those under the CPTPP. The trade facilitation component in the IPEF may likely draw from the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) rules. Other than India, all members of the IPEF are also members of the APEC. Countries like Vietnam, which is a member of RCEP, CPTPP and APEC, have, in the past, used their membership of FTAs as a means to lock in necessary domestic reforms. A majority of Vietnam’s FTAs are with the APEC member economies. Interestingly, the consensus towards taking forward the high grade, WTO++, CPTPP (post-US withdrawal from the TPP) was achieved at the APEC 2017 summit when Vietnam was the chair. India, therefore, will need to overcome its handicap of non-membership of mega-regional trade agreements, RCEP and CPTPP as well as the regional cooperation forum, the APEC. The fact that India is in the midst of advanced negotiations with the EU and is aiming at accomplishing the CECA with Australia in the next few months could prove propitious in this context. The EU leads the way, globally, in negotiating and concluding modern-day FTAs with emphasis, in particular, on labour and environment-related commitments. Australia is a founding and leading member of the APEC, which, even with its soft regulations and non-binding/ voluntary mechanisms, has been acknowledged for its contribution to trade and investment facilitation and establishing regulatory ease for cross-border supply chains. India’s ability to conclude successfully, according to the schedule, its FTAs with these countries will not just help to prepare the ground by undertaking necessary domestic policy and tariff reforms but could also, very significantly, be a signalling mechanism to the world, of India’s readiness and capability to play the role envisioned of it in the IPEF. Thus, India’s stance in the next round of FTA negotiations with the EU, expected to be held next month, should provide evidence of whether it has stepped up its FTA game and its willingness for necessary domestic policy and tariff reforms. #IPEF #RCEP #FTA #CPTPP #APEC #US #India Originally published: Business Standard, September 09, 2022 https://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/indo-pacific-economic-framework-opportunity-and-challenge-122090801390_1.html?code=RElORERUeGMweGp6R2svc2UyclhtbmlQcXZKMi9rSHd1Y3MyZTQra29FTT0=#.YxrLVfb2Z9Y.gmail Posted here with the authorization of the author. Amita Batra is Professor of Economics, SIS, JNU. The views are personal.

By Prof. Swaran Singh BRICS expansion is inevitable in light of developed countries' unwillingness to give developing countries greater say in global governance, but will take efforts. Although BRICS has engaged several other nations under the rubric of "BRICS Plus "and "BRICS Outreach" summits, the group has remained cautious about adding new members. Lately, however, expanding its membership has become a subject of discussion at the BRICS summits, especially those of 2013, 2017 and 2022 when China was the chair, as it is noticeably in favor of additional members. Russia and South Africa have also become increasingly agreeable though they believe no single nation should be allowed to decide on the new entrants. Brazil and India, on the other hand, are still cautious. Nevertheless the die has been cast and expansion is bound to happen sooner rather than later. The Beijing Declaration from their 2022 summit, for instance, agreed on "promoting discussions … on the expansion process … to clarify the guiding principles, standards, criteria and procedures" in order to expand cooperation with other emerging markets and developing countries. This sentiment for expansion was also visible in their 2021"terms of reference" for their Sherpas. Five new nations could be joining BRICS in 2023 during the presidency of South Africa, which joined the original group of four BRIC countries in 2010.Applications from Iran and Argentina are already under consideration while Saudi Arabia, Turkiye and Egypt have begun the process of applying for membership. Turkiye, in particular, is keen on fast forwarding the application process. In addition, Algeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sudan, Syria, the United Arab Emirates and Venezuela have also expressed interest in joining. Several of them participated in the May 2022 "BRICS Plus" foreign ministers' meeting convened by China. Among the arguments in favor of expansion, BRICS remains under-represented in global financial governance. Collectively the five members account for more than 50 percent of global growth, 40 percent of global currency reserves, 25 percent of global GDP and 16 percent of world trade, and yet, they hold no more than 15 percent of the voting rights in both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. BRICS' advocating for free, fair and equitable global commerce has made it the flag bearer of the aspirations of the Global South that believes its interests are not adequately protected under the existing global financial governance system. The BRICS' GDP is set to surpass the G7 economies' GDP by 2032 if not earlier. However, the criteria for expansion may not be GDP or market size. The inclusion of South Africa was based on it being the gateway of BRIC into Africa, the next center of growth, and the inclusion of a country from the African continent would make BRICS global. Today the criteria for inclusion may include geographical, civilizational and religious representation or resources. Indonesia, Iran, Egypt and Saudi Arabia could represent the Muslim countries, each one with its unique strengths. Saudi Arabia may also stand out as the world's largest oil exporting nation. Consensus on expansion will also be constrained by intra-BRICS relations. The equation between the largest and second largest BRICS economies－China and India－is an apt example. Applications from Argentina or Pakistan may face serious trust deficit from Brazil and India. The original logic of BRICS as "emerging economies" might be a problem for its current formation. Brazil, Russia and South Africa are not just smaller but face economic disruptions. During the pandemic years, even China and India saw periods of negative growth and a general slowdown. But the Russia-Ukraine conflict and resultant volatility in food and fuel prices and shortages have provided a boost to BRICS expansion. The resultant rise in Russia's trade with other BRICS nations－especially with China and India－has revived their efforts at reducing their dependence on the US dollar through ruble-rupee and rubble-renminbi transactions. The abrasive policies of the Donald Trump administration had already accelerated demands for BRICS to raise its voice on the international stage. The pandemic has further amplified those calls, exposing the West's "vaccine apartheid".Now, the Ukraine crisis has revealed the West's failure to stand united even in imposing economic sanctions. Indeed, new revelations about food and energy leverages of several aspirant emerging economies over G7 nations have strengthened the conviction of BRICS to expand. Also, faced with Western sanctions, Russia is far more agreeable to expanding its circle of friends. But instead of heralding another Cold War, the expansion of BRICS is aimed at obtaining a greater say for the developing countries in global decision-making. As post-pandemic resilience brings BRICS an opportunity to redefine global financial governance, BRICS has begun expanding beyond the time-tested "BRICS Plus" and "BRICS Outreach" summits to include new members. But an expanded BRICS will have neither the desire nor potential to become a counterweight to the G7 or the G20, or to disrupt financial institutions led by Western nations. BRICS expansion is making Western nations rethink their reluctance to make space for emerging economies, only further strengthening their realization that making space for emerging economies remains a prerequisite for making global financial governance inclusive, representative and effective. #BRICS #China #India Originally published: China Daily, September 07, 2022 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202209/07/WS6317d97ea310fd2b29e76537.html Posted here with the authorization of the author. Swaran Singh is a Professor of International Relations at Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Delhi) and currently visiting professor at the University of British Columbia (Vancouver, Canada).

By Prof. Swaran Singh As part of the hyperactive senior official- and minister-level talks launched during US President Joe Biden's visit to Japan in May, the United States is hosting the first in-person ministerial meeting of "Indo-Pacific Economic Framework" signatory states on Thursday and Friday. Led by the US Trade Representative Katherine Tai and Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo, the last three months have seen several such online and hybrid meetings aimed at "scoping" the "arrangements" for the four IPEF pillars — trade rules, clean energy, supply chains and tax and anti-corruption. Notwithstanding the speed, the IPEF remains a work-in-progress and no joint statements have so far made clear what it has achieved. The US, on the other hand, wants to finalize the basic tenets of the IPEF before it hosts the APEC Leaders' Meeting in November 2023. But the 18 months between May 2022 and November 2023 is not its only challenge. To begin with, India has already emerged as a country of concern, igniting speculations on its possible exit from the IPEF. India's refusal to denounce Russia's "special military operation" in Ukraine and increased imports of Russian oil during the past six months have exposed growing disjunctions that could come in the way of India becoming a permanent member of the grouping. SHI YU/CHINA DAILY India's case has also brought to light similar palpable disjunctions between the US and other IPEF signatory states. In fact, India's last-minute decision to walk out of the world's largest free trade agreement — the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership agreement — in 2019 reinforces concerns about India choosing to do the same with the IPEF. And the fact that India joined the IPEF's trade negotiations only as an "observer" in August adds more credence to such speculations. Also, India has recently gone on a trade deal signing spree. It has signed trade deals with Australia and the United Arab Emirates, and it’s taking negotiations fast forward with Canada, Israel, the European Union and the United Kingdom. Yet Indo-US free trade agreement remains in suspended animation with implications for India permanently joining the US-led IPEF. The flexibility of the IPEF outlined in Tokyo may have made New Delhi align with it. The IPEF was presented as a framework to "advance resilience, sustainability, inclusiveness, economic growth, fairness and competitiveness" by creating flexible arrangements where member states are free to join or not to join initiatives under any of the stipulated pillars, and both pillars and members could be expanded beyond the original four and 14. Like the RCEP, the IPEF is not expected to be another free trade agreement involving tariff reductions, greater market access or dispute-settlement mechanisms. But now that, after moving from sublime vision to mundane reality, it considers creating a regulatory mechanism, building alternative supply chains and fighting corruption as necessary, India could face some of the old challenges of the RCEP. Besides, the consciousness about the infrastructure and connectivity deficit among the "Indo-Pacific" countries have exacerbated, especially because of the formation of the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership during the Barack Obama administration and the way it was abandoned by previous US president Donald Trump in 2017. Meanwhile, the last five years have witnessed several of these countries aligning with the China-proposed Belt and Road Initiative. That makes the vision of IPEF too China-centric, which will make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for member states to choose sides if push comes to shove. China has not just helped establish the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which now has 105 economies as its members and become the new flag bearer of economic globalization and technically the "leader" of world's largest FTA, the RECP, it has also applied to join the TPP's reincarnation — the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement on Trans-Pacific Partnership. This is where India's parallel engagement with China and the US also complicates its negotiations in the IPEF. China remains a close competitor of the US and yet it is the largest trading partner of, and major investor in, India. This has prompted US interlocutors to see motives where none exist. For instance, in the wake of continued border standoffs with China, why has India refused to accept mediation from the US? Plus, India-US trade partnership has had its hiccups, with India insisting on data localization and the US expecting India to improve its environmental and labor standards. All this may circumscribe the IPEF from accommodating New Delhi's concerns. Finally, many members of the IPEF are also members of the RCEP. India remains sensitive to negative trade deficits, to protecting its small and medium-sized industries and exploring opportunities for its skilled manpower. But more than the RCEP, the IPEF has added knots to be untied: Washington wishes to explore avenues for cheap manufacturing for its high-end designs and yet has not been able to trust recipients with its advanced technology. The US is a master at building old style political alignments with an eye on capturing global markets for its goods and services and for exporting its weapons. This explains its recent announcements of opening new embassies in Kiribati and Tonga and holding an ASEAN-US special summit. But economic multilateralism involving complex coexistence with, and coordinating and accommodating contrarian impulses may stretch the US to the seams and push India into making difficult choices it wants to avoid. #China #IPEF #US #India Originally published: China Daily, September 07, 2022 https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202209/07/WS63184cfba310fd2b29e767aa.html Posted here with the authorization of the author. Swaran Singh is a Professor of International Relations at Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Delhi) and currently visiting professor at the University of British Columbia (Vancouver, Canada).

By Prof. Gulshan Sachdeva Though new British Prime Minister Liz Truss’ initial focus will be on domestic economic agenda, and the war in Ukraine, the momentum in India-UK relations is likely to be maintained British Prime Minister Liz Truss is not new to India-UK ties. Earlier as an International Trade Secretary, and later as a Secretary of State in the Boris Johnson government, she had many virtual interactions with Indian policy-makers. She also visited India a few times in the recent past. India-UK ties have already been elevated to a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’, and an ambitious ‘Roadmap 2030’ have been adopted. Fast track negotiations on bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA), and the British ‘Indo-Pacific tilt’ have provided new impetus to relations. As trade minister, Truss saw India as a “big, major opportunity” and “UK and India in a sweet spot of the trade dynamics”. She launched the India-UK Enhanced Trade Partnership (ETP) in early 2021, and believed that “working with India will help enhance the UK’s position as a global hub for digital and services”. While interacting with the Conservative Friends of India during her campaign, Truss asserted that she is “very, very committed to the UK-India relationship”. As the fourth British Prime Minister in six years, she is taking over at a time when the UK is facing serious economic, political, and foreign policy challenges. The Conservative Party is badly divided. The post-Brexit disruptions are still being felt. The post-pandemic recovery is rocked by the war in Ukraine, higher energy prices, and unprecedented inflation. So, managing different factions within the party, and announcing a new growth and energy strategy will be on top of her agenda. During the campaign, she asserted that her plan for growth is to “built on Conservative ideas: tax cuts, supply-side reform and deregulation”. Now she wants to “transform Britain into an aspiration nation” with the priorities on economy, energy, and National Health Service (NHS). In the coming days, her government has to roll out specific details of these plans. Apart from broader convergence of Britain’s post-Brexit ambitions, and India’s economic and strategic priorities, a major deliverable expected is a bilateral FTA. During Johnson’s India visit early this year, a deadline of an agreement by Diwali was fixed. As 19 out of 26 chapters are already closed, Indian policy-makers are confident that an agreement by the deadline is within reach. Even if we are able to see an agreement by the end of 2022, it will be quite an achievement as negotiations started only in January. An India-UK FTA also has the potential to provide a broader template to India’s other trade negotiations including with the European Union. However, if negotiations are prolonged, it will impact momentum created by the newly-signed FTA’s with Australia and the United Arab Emirates. Normally, countries sign trade agreements when economic conditions are more favourable. The conditions in the UK are clearly not encouraging when inflation is at a 40-year-high, and the economy is heading towards recession. Although Indian policy-makers are making positive statements, economic difficulties along with change in leadership in the UK may delay the conclusion of negotiations. Although the UK's Indo-Pacific tilt has been discussed widely, at the moment, London is focused more on war in Ukraine. This is an area where Indian and British perceptions differ. In March when Truss visited India as part of Britain’s ‘wider diplomatic push’ on war in Ukraine, she hoped that Indian views in Russia would change. Her trip to India had also coincided with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s visit to New Delhi at the same time. On sanctions against Russia, sharp exchanges were witnessed between Truss and Indian Foreign Minister S Jaishankar. As she is quite hawkish on Russia at the moment, convergence on many foreign policy issues may not happen automatically. This may impact slowly developing India-UK defence and security cooperation. Domestic economic priorities, and evolving geopolitical developments including the rise of assertive China have helped boost India-UK ties. Many of the new initiatives were facilitated by Johnson’s close bond with Prime Minister Narendra Modi. As Truss has been part of this process, it will be easy for her to continue with the same agenda. At the moment she may be occupied with domestic economic issues, and Russia. But the broad direction of India-UK ties has already been set. This will be further strengthened by the bilateral FTA whenever it is signed. #LizTruss #UK #India #IndiaUK Originally published: Money Control, September 07, 2022 https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/opinion/india-uk-ties-prime-minister-liz-truss-will-further-boost-bilateral-relations-9142151.html Posted here with the authorization of the author. Gulshan Sachdeva is Professor at the Centre for European Studies and Coordinator, Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, Jawaharlal Nehru University. Views are personal.

By Srijan Sharma “You Do One More Mumbai And You Will Loose Balochistan”- The National Security Advisor of India, Ajit Doval’s dramatic explanation in describing the roadmap of India’s shift in India’s National security strategy back in early 2014 has now become a reality. The Doval doctrine has given a significant push to India’s national security makeover and departures from old silent watch and play strategies. This doctrine not only has become a tool of powerful deterrence but also helped India showcasing its iron will in international arena which was earlier wrinkled by anxieties and doubts. A Silent Watch and Play Game: An Asymmetrical Approach and Strategic Restraint Earlier, India’s approach towards National Security Strategy was defensive. India adopted strategic restraint and moved forward for the fulfillment of strategic/tactical national security which proved to be non-effective towards defeating cross-border terrorism and handling Pakistan’s misadventures. A classic example of a defensive approach can be decoded from the response to the 26/11 attacks. The response was defensive- seeking diplomatic solutions instead of initiating a counterattack and taking retaliatory measures against Pakistan. The reason for adoption of such strategy can be attributed to doubtfulness and unwillingness of exercising of force with a failed attempt to understand security and strategic environment of neighborhood and world politics. The defensive strategy also showed a passive attitude in India’s national security strategy which was later projected as a weakness of India’s softness. In the real sense, India was on an approach that was diametrically opposite or asymmetrical from Pakistan’s Doctrine in short, India was on the defensive whereas Pakistan was already taken an offensive approach towards India through capitalizing its unconventional warfare spectrum, the asymmetry had zeroed the effectiveness of India’s national security strategy towards Pakistan. This undue strategic restraint has committed a grave error in India’s national security calculations which was later leveraged by our hostile neighbors. Understanding the Doctrine: Defensive Offensive and Offensive Defensive At one hand back to back terror strikes before 26/11 and post that, targeting India’s key cities- Pune, Hyderabad, Varanasi, Delhi and Bangalore and on the other hand, continued failure of India’s diplomatic efforts under the garb of exercising strategic restraint strategy has called for serious attention to India’s national security strategy. There was urgent need to add realist dimension to India’s national security strategy because in detail, if we see India was failing at both the ends of securing security- neither able to prevent attacks nor able to able deploy effective retaliatory response mechanism involving detection and prevention and mitigation. Therefore India needed an urgent course correction in its national security trajectory. The course correction came in 2014 when Ajit Doval became National Security Advisor of India. Doval’s arrival introduced strategic doctrine which goes by his name: Doval Doctrine or double squeeze strategy which addressed the errors in India’s national security calculus and inserted a realist factor by bringing the hawkish outlook in India’s National Security strategy. This doctrine primarily has two dimensions- Offensive Defensive and Defensive Offensive. Offensive Defensive- Offensive defense is pre-emptive way of carrying out offensive with defensive purpose. Here, the defensive purpose is to carry out offensive to force the larger foe on the back-foot at the outset by seizing the initiative is logic behind this dimension. India’s commitment towards carrying out pre-emptive strikes involving surgical strikes, Air strikes against terror safe havens in Pakistan occupied Kashmir indicates towards offensive defensive posture. Defensive Offensive- Defensive Offensive posture is more focused towards countering the adversary in exploiting its internal conflicts and sharp efforts at international level including sanctions and international isolation. Defensive offensive also means carrying out deterrence through offensive means (offensive deterrence) India’s Air Strikes in Balakot In February 2019 and Uri Strikes In 2016. The Nuclear Factor The Nuclear factor becomes a key constraint for the both the countries to go on a full offensive. During Kargil War In 1999 the nuclear factor did play a role. The New Delhi centric Pakistan nuclear policy with first strike capability is something to watchout during an event of tight conflict between both the countries. However, the Doval doctrine keeps the check on the Nuclear threshold and affirms in delivering the solid response to Pakistan in striking the terror networks. In any case punishing and denying Pakistan room for their nasty terror designs is one of the prime focus of India’s national security strategy in keeping India safe from state sponsored terrorism. A Strategic Doctrine of Deterrence and Comprehensive Response The Doval’s doctrine includes the right amount of deterrence- through denial and punishment and a comprehensive response including detection, prevention and mitigation. With this doctrine in force Pakistan was taken a back from carrying out terror strikes to attaining strategic depth through viz-a viz Afghanistan and West Asia. The Doval doctrine kept a check on every front of the adversary and transformed our national security craft. The Doval doctrine has also contributed substantially in India’s image makeover in security domain internationally. India is now being showcased as major and competitive firepower among key global players. As far as questions of China and emerging threats are considered, this strategic doctrine can reckon with the China factor but the doctrine is required to be backed up with more strong and modern security and military apparatus for countering Chinese hegemonic rise and future threats. There can be no denying that Doval doctrine made India assertive in security and strategic domain and due to which India is able to sail and realize its aspirations of strategic rise in the global power. #AjitDoval #NationalSecurity Srijan Sharma is working as a Research Analyst at India's oldest and prestigious national security and strategic Think Tank United Service Institution Of India (USI). He has served as Defence editor for a journal and authored articles on matters of strategic affairs for national daily like The Telegraph and journals.

By Prof. Swaran Singh Sheikh Hasina plans a four-day visit next week to further already strong bilateral ties World leaders have begun to hold what are now called “offline” meetings to return to the “normal” ways of conducting diplomatic relations where personal chemistry remains the key to success. So after the whirlwind six-hour visit by President Vladimir Putin on December 6, New Delhi will be hosting next week (September 5-8) a four-day visit by Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. She will be accompanied by a high-powered delegation consisting of a number of ministers, advisers, officials and business leaders who will be traveling beyond New Delhi as well. A press briefing by India’s Ministry of External Affairs said the visit aims to reiterate unique historical and cultural linkages that undergird the two countries’ innovative ways to enhance their multifaceted cooperation in such crucial sectors as bilateral trade, investment, energy, defense, connectivity, and above all the sharing of water. Also marking their strong cultural and societal linkages, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina will visit the city of Ajmer in India’s northwest to offer prayers at the historic shrine of Sufi saint Moinuddin Chishti. In New Delhi, other than meeting top leaders, her engagements will include awarding Mujib Scholarships to the descendants of 200 Indian Armed Forces personnel who were martyred or suffered critical injuries during Bangladesh’s Liberation War of 1971. Golden chapter To begin with, the positive message of this visit for the larger South Asian region cannot go unnoticed. It comes in the face of continuing economic and political instability in Sri lanka, Afghanistan and Pakistan and to some degree in Nepal and even Mauritius and Seychelles. In addition to domestic fissures in these countries, a persistent pandemic and six months of the Ukraine crisis have triggered further economic, social and political disruptions. At the least, therefore, this visit is expected to bring respite from the stresses and strains in South Asia. Indeed, recent years of India-Bangladesh relations have been described by some observers as their shonali adhyay (golden chapter). This is because of their economic successes. On the one hand, international observers have been talking of the “Bangladesh model” of development and recognizing Bangladesh as the economic miracle of South Asia. On the other, India has been the the fastest-growing major economy of the last two years. Indeed, creating some concerns of “overheating” and going way beyond World Bank projections of achieving 7-8% growth for this year, India’s gross domestic product hit an astonishing level of 13.5% growth for the first quarter of financial year 2022-23. It is against this backdrop that India and Bangladesh will now begin formal negotiations for signing a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, or CEPA. India’s northeastern region has lately become a special driver of the Act East policy and especially of its increasing engagement with BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation), which has its secretariat in Dhaka. While India has lately been hyperactive in negotiating free-trade deals, this will be the first FTA for Bangladesh, which has granted this privilege to India while others such as China and Japan have been requesting similar negotiations with Dhaka. Bilateral trade between India and Bangladesh has grown substantially in the last five years, expanding from US$9 billion for 2018 to $16 billion last year, making Bangladesh the fastest-growing destination for India’s exports. But this has also made their bilateral trade increasingly one-sided. For instance, Bangladesh’s $12 billon trade deficit in favor of India has be rectified to make quick further progress. Water sharing remains their other major challenge. Water sharing Among a slew of agreements and memoranda of understanding (MoUs) to be signed in New Delhi next week, the two nations will also be signing an agreement on the sharing of Kushiyara River waters. Only last week the 38th ministerial meeting of the India-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Comission (JRC) held in New Delhi on August 25 had India and Bangladesh finalize the text of this interim agreement. The JRC meeting of course also highlighted the urgency of resolving other bilateral water-sharing issues, including the need to begin working on the upcoming renewal of their Ganga (Ganges) Water Treaty. But the fact that this was the JRC’s first meeting since 2010 shows the changed milieu for making bold decisions. Teesta River water sharing has been their most difficult knot where Bangladesh has sought equitable distribution of water from India. The Teesta deal was all set to be signed during Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bangladesh visit of September 2011 but was postponed and has still not yet been signed. The Ganges treaty was signed in 1996 and is due for renewal in 2026, and work on its renewal has already begun. Inspired by the Indus Water Treaty between India and Pakistan, India and newly liberated Bangladesh set up the JRC in 1972 as their bilateral mechanism for evolving shared understanding on common rivers. But more than India and Pakistan, India and Bangladesh share 54 rivers, big and small, of which seven have been identified for developing an earlier framework for negotiation water-sharing agreements. But sustained warmth of leadership from both sides and now a return to post-pandemic interactions give hope of another upswing in India-Bangladesh relations with lessons for rest of the region. Strategic upswing The recent past has seen overall strategic ties between India and Bangladesh on an upswing. In March last year, even in the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic, Modi made an exception to travel restrictions and went to Dhaka to attend events celebrating 50 years of liberation of Bangladesh from Pakistan and the birth centenary of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Indeed, marking India’s unique connection to the liberation of Bangladesh, New Delhi also hosted several events to celebrate the surrender of Pakistani forces in Dhaka to the India Army and “Mukti Bahini” on December 16, 1971. This was also a unique example of 93,000 Pakistani troops being taken as prisoners of war by India and then safely repatriated at great cost and effort, setting a unique example for the world. There are other examples of India-Bangladesh cooperation, including demarcation of their land and maritime borders. This has greatly facilitated their developmental partnership. Dhaka now allows transit of Indian goods to India’s northeast, has approved the Agartala-Dhaka-Kolkata Maitri bus service, and imports electrical power from India. These examples of the changing nature of their bilateral relations have lessons and implications for the larger region. #India #Bangladesh Originally published: Asian Times, September 02, 2022 https://asiatimes.com/2022/09/bangladeshi-pms-india-visit-to-provide-a-positive-spin-for-s-asia/?fbclid=IwAR3xxhvJKJhfLkM8hJl5EMkRCXj2f3133_Hb6WGE8a4H6HbeRfbKT7Dv9eg Posted here with the authorization of the author. Swaran Singh is visiting professor at the University of British Columbia and professor of diplomacy and disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He is president of the Association of Asia Scholars; adjunct senior fellow at the Charhar Institute, Beijing; senior fellow, Institute for National Security Studies Sri Lanka, Colombo; and visiting professor, Research Institute for Indian Ocean Economies, Kunming.

By Prof. Swaran Singh Membership of the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is on the up: 111 countries have ratified the agreement since it came into force in 2014, and a further 30 countries have signed it. The Philippines is the newest member, joining in March 2022. However, the treaty’s efforts to regulate the transfer of conventional weapons continue to be questioned, ignored and breached – by the ATT’s signatories as well as by other powerful nations. August 22-26 will see State Parties to the ATT holding their eighth annual conference in Geneva to discuss its future and its major challenges. All parties to the ATT are required to provide annual reports detailing their trade in conventional weapons in the preceding year. But, with its rising numbers of signatory states, the proportion who comply has fallen from 84 percent in 2015 to just 52 percent in 2021. This means nearly half the signatories are not submitting these reports or do not trade in conventional weapons, which means their actions have little import for the treaty’s aims and objectives. This apparently waning commitment makes the ATT’s growing number of state parties almost irrelevant. No doubt most international conventions have similar limitations and, especially when not supported by major powers, they become vulnerable to breaches. But the ATT has failed to draw into its fold both world’s major importers and exporters of conventional arms. The world’s largest producer and exporter of conventional weapons, the United States, signed the ATT in 2013 but has never ratified it. In April 2019, President Donald Trump announced the US would be “revoking the effect of America’s signature” from the ATT. (The treaty has no such provisions other than withdrawal with advance notice.) President Joe Biden has not yet made any statement about President Trump’s ‘unsigning’. Russia, another major exporter has not signed it yet and remains outside its remit. China had joined it in July 2020 but the world’s largest importer, India, is also yet to sign it. It is not that powerful nations have had no interest in regulating arms trade. They have been especially effective in responding to the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that they believe threaten their own security. They have imposed strong regulatory regimes on transfers of WMD including ballistic missiles and even on proliferation of their technologies, materials and know-how. Likewise, thanks to major powers’ expensive WMD modernization programs, their related arms-control seems to focus only on those weapons they were already planning to discard. This has allowed them to ban those WMDs that less powerful nations were still struggling to invent or acquire, thereby ensuring their security by widening the gap between less powerful nations’ inventories from these dominant nations’ own arsenals. Amongst major WMD-possessing nations, their mutual arms control has been aimed at ensuring robust deterrence through mutually assured destruction strategies disincentivizing initiating an unwinnable nuclear conflict. But driven by major powers’ interests, regulations on conventional weapons bear no comparison with similar multilateral export-control mechanisms for WMDs and ballistic missiles. This is because the same dominant nations are the main exporters of conventional weapons. Indeed, reluctance to regulate conventional weapons trade can be seen amongst both major exporters (the United States, Russia, China) and major importers (India, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, China) of conventional weapons. The lure of financial and political windfalls from the conventional weapons trade has made the ATT’s task a difficult one. Therefore, states and non-state actors continue to fight each other with weapons on both sides supplied by the same manufacturers. The ATT indeed gets further circumscribed by the fact that it seeks to control weapons transfers, especially to state and non-state violators of humanitarian laws, while its remit remains limited only to its state parties’ voluntary actions. Even there, the treaty does not interfere with signatory states’ domestic production and distribution or discourage their exports or use of weapons for self-defense. The ATT depends on signatory states voluntarily enacting national laws to prevent their exports of what the ATT defines as lethal weapons to what it deems to be violators of international norms and conventions; organized-crime cartels and terrorists being easy examples. Following the framework of the UN Register of Conventional Arms, established in 1991, the ATT expects signatory states to submit annual reports on their imports and exports of conventional weapons. Collectively this can help ATT showcase data on broader trends and influence global public opinion against illegal and illegitimate weapons transfers. But as decades of debate has shown, these submissions have remained vulnerable to subjective national perceptions and priorities. States have subjectively interpreted definitions of illegitimate and illegal weapons transfers, which has limited their adherence to ATT’s objectives. It has been nearly impossible to build consensus on preferred guidelines for what constitutes illegal arms transfers and how these should be regulated. One country’s terrorists are another country’s freedom fighters. Nations are often seen supporting groups and nations that others see going against agreed norms and laws dealing with transnational crime and cross-border terrorism and insurgencies. New weapons technologies — even within the domain of conventional weapons — present another complex and constantly unfolding set of challenges for the interpretation of ATT provisions. While expanding the number of signatories to the ATT may have its merit, it is perhaps time to focus on strengthening its efficacy amongst its signatory parties. The eighth ATT conference must revisit their strategies and basic assumptions to explore why powerful states continue to defy its logic. That would be an important step towards ensuring greater control over the world’s increasing inter- and intra-state violence. #ArmsTradeTreaty #UN #ATT Originally published: The Jakarta Post, August 24, 2022 https://www.thejakartapost.com/amp/opinion/2022/08/24/arms-trade-treaty-at-risk-of-irrelevance.html?fbclid=IwAR2-zp-_JUHEcikdDqqS4rEHEDBTxkJuzW49zJqh08rWMXzZDuT_v7YQTRE Posted here with the authorization of the author. Swaran Singh is visiting professor at the University of British Columbia and professor of diplomacy and disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He is president of the Association of Asia Scholars; adjunct senior fellow at the Charhar Institute, Beijing; senior fellow, Institute for National Security Studies Sri Lanka, Colombo; and visiting professor, Research Institute for Indian Ocean Economies, Kunming.

By Prof. Bharat H Desai The beauty, majesty and raison d'être of the humanitarian support is drawn from ancient notion of neighbors helping neighbors. On 19 August 2022, the UN Secretary-General (UNSG) Antonio Guterres invoked the age-old wisdom that it “takes a village to raise a child” in the context of the humanitarian needs. The metaphor of a village by the worldly-wise UNSG “to support people living through a humanitarian crisis” sums up the very nature of the global humanitarian response to the rising tide of global conflicts and disasters that affect millions of people. Humanitarians seek to recover, sustain and rebuild human lives in conflict zones and other emergencies. In 2022, a record 303 million people need humanitarian assistance as the UN aims to reach the most vulnerable 204 million. “Never before have humanitarians been called to respond to this level of need…in ever more dangerous environments,” said Jens Laerke, the spokesperson of the UN Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). According to the Global Humanitarian Overview 2022, the extreme climatic events alone drove an estimated 16 million people into food crises in 15 countries. It causes exacerbated violence against women and children. An OCHA protection officer speaks to vulnerable people in Damascus, Syria. Grave Risks to the Humanitarians Martin Griffiths, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs paid tributes to “all humanitarian workers who often work in dangerous conditions to help others in need” and “those who have lost their lives in the line of duty”. The estimated funding requirement for the UN’s humanitarian projects is pegged at 50 billion US dollars. Still, the pledges of support from donor countries remain at 15 billion dollars wherein the top five contributors are: USA ($61, 380, 000); Sweden ($33,518,199); UK ($29,456,941); Germany ($23,004,148) and Norway ($15,366,301). In the 2021 Annual Report of OCHA, somehow India does not figure in the list of 69 donor countries. However, India did provide humanitarian food grains to Afghanistan (2021) and Sri Lanka (2022). Such a helping hand makes the difference between life and death for the affected people. The World Humanitarian Day (WHD) is commemorated after the Canal Hotel bomb attack in Baghdad (19 August 2003) that killed 22 humanitarian aid workers, including the UNSG’s Special Representative for Iraq, Sergio Vieira de Mello. After five years, the General Assembly adopted resolution 63/139 (11 December 2008) to strengthen of the UN’s coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance. The resolution aimed at “increasing public awareness about humanitarian assistance activities worldwide…to honour all… who have lost their lives in the cause of duty”. The humanitarian aid workers face grave risks in the troubled zones and natural calamities. In 2021 alone, 460 aid workers were attacked: 140 killed, 203 wounded and 117 kidnapped. It shows the graphic reality of the world we live in; growing lawlessness in failed states arising from reigns of terror unleashed by warlords and despotic regimes. Such ‘inhuman’ beings traumatize their own people and others. Can the world remain a silent spectator to watch catastrophe and human misery? It came out vividly on 15 August 2021, when the desperate Afghans stampeded Kabul airport to get out when the notorious Taliban defiantly captured power. It was reminiscent of the marauding hordes running over a territory in medieval times. Thousands of aid workers face grave risks amid violence in countries such as South Sudan, Afghanistan, Syria, Ethiopia, the DR Congo and Yemen. In the first half of 2022, the Humanitarian Outcomes has recorded attacks on 168 aid workers wherein 44 lost their lives. Architecture for the Humanitarian Relief The beauty, majesty and raison d'être of the humanitarian support is drawn from ancient notion of neighbors helping neighbors. It comprises providing health care and education, food and water, shelter and protection and the hope to live. The UN has put into place an institutional framework that provides support in troubled countries. It comprises: OCHA, Refugee Agency, Children’s Agency, World Food Program, World Health Organization and Inter-Agency Standing Committee. Cumulatively, they represent the best of human spirit and empathy-in-action. It transcends across rogue regimes, brutality of wars and inherent risks to the humanitarians. The audacity of faith remains unshaken, for instance, as the UN refuses the abandon the DRC mired in endless conflicts even after its compound came under attack, three peacekeepers were killed and the MONUSCO spokesperson in Kinshasha was expelled (03 August 2022). Apart from the UN system, the global humanitarian sentinel, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has 20,000 staff presence amidst 100 conflicts raging in 60 countries where 100 non-state armed groups play havoc. ICRC’s core policy of neutrality enables it to provide relief, succor and protection to the civilians facing brutal violence in conflicts. As the custodian of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols, ICRC has a strong operational legal basis to grapple with humanitarian needs. It can draw vital ‘red lines’ while negotiating to reign in the armed groups. Taming the Beast The human streak for self-destruction – akin to Duryodhana going berserk in the epic Mahabharata – presents a big challenge, as narrated in conversation with this author by the ICRC President Peter Maurer on 17 August 2022, at the release of a book (Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in International Law). Often the assurances to the humanitarians are belied when the armed groups ambush even a hospital in the middle of a night! It underscores gravity of the challenge in upholding International Humanitarian Law. Not going to the level of the evil provides an eternal hope since, as Peter assured me, “such forces are not invincible”. In this backdrop, as envisioned in this author’s unflinching faith by curating 46 monthly meetings of Making SIS Visible Initiative (2008-2013) as well as batting for the SIS to emerge as a ‘think tank’, it is high time to factor in humanitarian studies as an inextricable part of studies in International Law and International Relations. SIS alumna Santishree (JNU V-C) has called for a fresh Indian “thinking and scholarship”. As a corollary, it would also make great sense to inject ‘humanitarianism’ in the respective research trajectories of SIS colleagues and Ph. D. students to seed futuristic ideas that would provide a basis for India to emerge as a Global Solution Provider (here, here, here, here, here, here). Hopefully, it would pave the way for SIS, as a successor to the pioneer Indian School of International Studies, to become a genuine and indispensable ‘think tank’ in the near future. Part - I: Blog Special Series-I: Use of Food as a Weapon of War: A Challenge for International Law (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com) Part - II: Blog Special Series-II: Use of Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War: A Challenge for International Law (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com) Part - III: Abused Ammunition as a Weapon of War in the DR Congo: A Challenge for International Law (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com) Part – IV: Use of Nuclear Weapons in War (Hiroshima-Nagasaki Day): A Challenge for International Law (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com) #WeaponsofWar #Humanitarians #InternationalLaw Professor Dr. Bharat H. Desai is Jawaharlal Nehru Chair and Professor of International Law at the Centre for International Legal Studies of SIS, JNU. He coordinated the Making SIS Visible initiative (2008-2013) as well as Inter-University Consortium: JNU; Jammu; Kashmir; Sikkim (2012-2020) and is the Editor-in-Chief of Environmental Policy and Law (IOS Press: Amsterdam)

By Pratik Mall The largest multilateral organization outside of the UN is the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), a coalition of around 120 countries, 17 observer states, and ten international organizations. The NAM coalition, which stands for the developing world, is adamantly opposed to bloc politics and power struggles. Founded in 1961 and essentially a cold war construct, NAM was built on the core values of the Bandung Principles, announced at the Afro-Asian Conference in 1955. In the 1979 Havana declaration, Fidel Castro outlined the goals of NAM as follows : NAM guarantees "National Freedom, Autonomy, Territorial Sovereignty, and Protection of Non-Aligned Countries in their struggle against Imperialism, Colonial rule, Neo-Colonialism, Racial prejudice, and all forms of Foreign Belligerence, Annexation, Subjugation, Intervention, and supremacy as well as great Power Politics." One of the most hawkish Secretaries of State in US history, John Foster Dulles, mockingly referred to NAM as "Immoral" in its infancy. It was "India's exceptionalism" that the Americans found challenging to comprehend. Stalin viewed allegiance to NAM as opposition to USSR and aligning the other bloc to sabotage them. Jawaharlal Nehru, one of the five founding fathers of NAM, once said, "NAM is in harmony with India's culture and tradition. India will support global peace and harmony by refusing to join any armed alliances. Since the signing of the Treaty of Friendship between India and the USSR, which made India a "quasi-ally" of the USSR, Americans have largely come to view NAM as "Anti-Americanism" in the 1970s. In the 1960s, NAM made decolonization and disarmament its primary goals. Although the world averted a nuclear winter during the catastrophic 1962 Cuban Missile crisis, the fear of a nuclear holocaust persisted throughout the Cold War. NAM could unite the developing countries worried about maintaining their arduously acquired sovereignty. The NAM gained status and weight when its efforts helped several countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia achieve political freedom. The PTBT and NPT were signed in 1963 and 1968, respectively, in response to the NAM's persistent attempts to portray nuclear weapons as "taboo." The origin of a New International Economic Order, abbreviated as NIEO, was first mooted in 1973 during the NAM conference in Algiers. The rationale was that northern countries offer higher pricing for southern products, supply financing and technology, and control the behaviour of their multinational corporations (MNCs) devoted to indiscriminately plundering southern resources. The gains in this phase were mainly restricted because the west rejected the idea as unrealistic, and the oil economies of the Gulf, which were expected to demonstrate greater unity, failed due to the escalating geopolitical problems. The "detente" phase of the partnership ended in the 1980s, and the arms race started to heat up. A weakening USSR attempted to match the famed "Strategic Defense Initiative" established by the US under the Regan administration with an equivalent expenditure in resources and technology. NAM had failed, having made no notable progress. The INF Treaty, which prohibits all land-based ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and missile launchers with ranges between 500 and 1,000 kilometres (short- to medium-range) and 1,000 to 5,500 kilometres (long-range), is the only significant arms control agreement of this era (intermediate-range). The pact does not cover missiles launched from the air or the sea. Declining Interest in NAM The US emerged as an unopposed hegemon with the collapse of the USSR in the 1990s, and Fukuyama pronounced the "End Of History". The relevance of NAM, primarily a Cold War construct, had become an essential point of debate and discussion. NAM began to seem out of date and lost its purpose. A new era of relative peace and a nuclear-weapons-free world was ushered in by the Cooperative Security Treaty Reduction Treaty (Nunn-Lugar Pact), the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the signing of SALT 1 and 2 and the CTBT in 1996, and the extension of the NPT. All of this occurred even though NATO was not disbanded and has significantly grown since the end of the Cold War. Commentators worldwide stated that NAM should prepare for a "graceful withdrawal," take some of the credit for the end of the Cold War and then declare "Mission Accomplished" to end its existence. At the Jakarta Summit in 1991, immediately following the fall of the USSR, even founder members like Egypt questioned the necessity of the NAM. Narshima Rao, the Prime Minister of India, said without a shadow of a doubt that "NAM has become all the more necessary to control the unilateral activities of the single superpower." The popularity of NAM has steadily waned over time. Only 8 Heads of State out of 120 attended the NAM conference in Tehran in 2012, and PM Modi's decision to send Vice President Venkaiah Naidu instead of himself in 2016 is a glaring sign that the idea of NAM is no longer appealing. This year, India did participate in the NAM virtual summit, although it seemed more out of need than out of choice. Relevance of NAM in Present Context Therefore, the moot question that should trouble us is whether NAM is still relevant or if it has passed into oblivion. It would be inaccurate to claim that supporting NAM demonstrates "intellectual lethargy" and a fixation on a Cold War idea. Since other nations do not seem to be interested in NAM, India is well-positioned to take advantage of its inherent leadership qualities, tap into its potential, and forward its goal of South-South Cooperation. India is well poised to use the platform of NAM to exercise its "strategic autonomy". India cannot help but be fascinated by NAM because it has become a part of its identity. In addition to participating actively in international politics and being able to negotiate power politics successfully, it aided India in pursuing a foreign policy that was primarily independent. India was free to be independent instead of merely becoming a "camp follower". In domestic politics, it had given Prime Minister Nehru the opportunity to manage the polarizing domestic pressures delicately. Even Henry Kissinger, who had nothing but contempt for NAM, now acknowledges that it was the best course of action India could have taken at the time. NAM offers the best model as the arms race heats up, alliances become obsolete, and India struggles to retain an independent foreign policy. According to the US Nuclear Posture Review, China and Russia are becoming more reliant on nuclear weapons, posing a new nuclear threat to the US. The expiration of the NEW START treaty last year and the USA signaling that it may withdraw from the INF treaty further escalates the already dangerous situation. The ongoing Ukraine crisis and the spectre of a nuclear winter further remind us of the horrors of the nuclear holocaust that the world already witnessed in 1945 in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. NAM could play a pivotal role in creating a stigma and a taboo for nuclear weapons, as it successfully did in the early years. Next, for a nation like India that wishes to sit at the high table, the unwavering and ongoing support of NAM countries is equally crucial. NAM desperately needs leadership, direction, and an action plan since it is like an orphan and has to start moving. India must grasp the opportunity's potential and try to use it. India would be wise to use NAM as a forum for inter-civilizational interaction. India can also utilize the NAM to strengthen South-South cooperation and establish its position as a "Standard Bearer for South. The time is apt to harness the enormous potential of NAM to develop the "INDIA WAY" as analogous to the "THIRD WAY" of the 1960s and 1970s. The time has arrived to revive the "Bandung Spirit" and recreate NAM, albeit with a modified objective and fresh vigour, in this period of "Militarization of the Sea" and "Territorial Expansion." #NAM #India Pratik Mall is a Student of M.A PISM batch 2021-2023 SIS, JNU.

By Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli Why the Yuan Wang 5’s Arrival in Sri Lanka is Consequential for South Asia Despite serious reservations expressed by both Sri Lanka and India, and after a clearance delay of five days, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Strategic Support Force vessel Yuan Wang 5 finally docked at Chinese-leased Hambantota port on 16 August 2022. Of course, the Sri Lankan government later clarified that the docking was for supplies and maintenance, and that the vessel wouldn’t undertake any “research” activities in its waters. While this point was reiterated by the ship’s captain, Zhang Hongwang, observers are taking it with a pinch of salt. The resulting shadow-boxing between India and China, in the backdrop of an already strained relationship following the land skirmish in mid-2020 in Galwan, has consequences for the neighbourhood as well. The Yuan Wang 5 incident will strengthen China’s drive to acquire hegemony in South Asia and the Indian Ocean, in four areas. Disrupt South Asia to divide and rule In its quest to impose hegemony in different parts of Asia, China has been displacing dominant powers in several regions. In South Asia, following the ancient stratagem of hexiao kongda (‘cooperate with the small to counter the big’), China has made disruptive inroads into Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and the Maldives, while retaining influence over Pakistan. The aim here is not only to dislodge India, but to also create disequilibrium domestically in South Asian countries. This will lead to China effectively implementing its divide and rule policy and acquiring structural power in the region. Coercion through gunboat diplomacy Yuan Wang 5’s berthing at Hambantota revives historical images of China’s maritime invasions. During the third expedition to the Indian Ocean, Admiral Zheng He’s sailors kidnapped a recalcitrant Vira Alakeshvara of Kotte kingdom (not far from the Chinese-leased Hambantota) in 1410-1411, and presented him to Ming emperor Yongle. China undertook regime change by installing Parakramabahu at Kotte. Now with the Rajapaksas on the run and Ranil Wickremesinghe under siege, Beijing finds an opportune moment to make inroads into Sri Lanka and attempt another regime change in its favour. China’s historical narrative is that the Europeans forced open the decaying Qing China through ‘gunboat diplomacy’—mainly naval vessels and coercive diplomacy. More than a century later, with China having ascended to being the second largest economy in the world, Beijing is attempting similar antics across the globe. Much as the European powers had imposed treaty ports in coastal China—some like Hong Kong on 99-year lease—Beijing grabbed Hambantota also on a 99-year lease. It is no surprise then that the head of the China Merchant Port Holdings that owns Hambantota received the Yuan Wang 5, instead of the vessel docking at the much larger Colombo Port. Coercion through economic arm-twisting China’s economic might allows it to arm-twist the Sri Lankan government, which is already under financial siege and debilitating social unrest. Sri Lanka owes over US$ 51 billion in debt to several lenders, with China’s share amounting between 10 to 20 per cent. Beijing refused to defer loan repayment and threatened Sri Lanka to comply with its diktats. Chinese Foreign minister Wang Yi visited Colombo in January 2022 with no offer of major relief to Sri Lanka, but with his sights set on a forum of Indian Ocean states. Beijing’s stranglehold on Colombo provides it a good start to compete with India in the region. Sri Lanka’s loan payment default on the Chinese-constructed Hambantota Port came in handy to arm-twist Colombo into accommodating the PLA vessel this week. Aggravate space and maritime competition Competition in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR)—and in space—is also further triggered by the Yuan Wang 5 visit. Like China’s post-2008 naval missions to the IOR on the pretext of checking piracy, Yuan Wang 5’s deployment in the region is probably permanent. It is shortly expected to be deployed again to monitor the Mengtian space module. In the past decade, China has launched over 30 satellites for different countries and made ground preparations for permanent missions. In May 2007, Beijing launched a communication satellite at a cost of US$ 311 million—NIGCOMSAT-1—for Nigeria, with ground station support from the capital, Abuja, and Xinjiang’s Kashgar. In 2001, China set up a tracking, telemetry, and command station at Swakopmund in Namibia. It launched a communications satellite for Sri Lanka in November 2012, in which former President Rajapaksa’s son played a crucial role. Yuan Wang was earlier involved in 80 missions related to Zhongxing 2D satellites, Moon and Mars missions, space stations, and for long periods of sailing—more than half a million nautical miles. Since 2005, China has been crafting the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organisation to counter US influence in space. Yuan Wang 5 is expected to support forthcoming ‘fourth dimensional warfare’ in space, with implications for the Quad members. While China highlights Yuan Wang 5’s civilian achievements, no data on its military role, specifically on missile tracking missions, has been made available. Conclusion Yuan Wang’s predecessor, Xiangyang Hong, and another vessel, Dongfang Hong, conducted ‘scientific investigations’ in the Sea of Japan in the early 2000s, and paved the way for intelligence-gathering missions near Sakishima Islands. In a similar pattern, China has reportedly sent several surveillance ships to the Indian Ocean in the past two years. This suggests that the PLA Navy will provide permanent company to the Indian Navy in the region. Yuan Wang’s arrival into Indian Ocean waters is thus cataclysmic. For India, Yuan Wang 5’s presence clearly has major security consequences. For one, India must strengthen its space cooperation agreement with Vietnam. Further, with an extra-regional power like China making forays into the Indian Ocean, India—hesitation aside—needs to go concertedly into the South China Sea and protect its energy and other interests in the region. #China #SriLanka #India #YuanWang Originally published: IPCS, August 22, 2022. http://ipcs.org/comm_select.php?articleNo=5825 Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli is Dean of the School of International Studies (SIS), JNU, & Distinguished Fellow, IPCS.

By Prof. Swaran Singh The tone of Beijing’s latest White Paper on Taiwan differs markedly from those issued before the Xi Jinping era China this week closed its largest ever military drills in the Taiwan Strait with a series of important statements, including the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council issuing its third White Paper, the title of which reveals the “new normal” of its Taiwan policy. The title of this third White Paper on Taiwan reads: “The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era.” The paper contains content quite distinct in tone and tenor from the two earlier White Papers on Taiwan. In a nutshell, the White Paper asserts that reunification is not only the Communist Party of China’s “historic mission” but is also “indispensable for the realization of China’s rejuvenation.” It claims the party has adopted, under President Xi Jinping’s leadership, “new and innovative measures in relation to Taiwan.” This “new starting point for reunification” is referred to as the “new normal” of China’s Taiwan policy. Clearly, in the case of all civilizational states, especially those with imperial impulses and system-shaping capabilities, understanding the symbolism of semantics is significant in interpreting their likely trajectories, with implications far and wide. And given this prognosis, the “new normal” of China-Taiwan ties has become the subject of media commentaries. Shifting saliences To begin with, the title of the White Paper issued this week – the first one under President Xi Jinping – marks a significant change in stance from the earlier two, which were titled “The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue” (February 2000) and “The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China” (August 1993). That change is the inclusion of “New Era” in the title, which is defined by Xi as distancing China from Deng Xiaoping’s “hide your strengthens and bide your time” thesis. Especially now, in the run-up to the 20th Party Congress, where Xi will be seeking an unprecedented third term in office, this radicalization has been there for all to see. Second, the title of this paper also involves an interesting twist of words, from “reunification of China” to “China’s reunification,” which alludes to an assertion toward a more China-driven reunification. This reminds of a similar earlier twist from Chairman Mao Zedong’s “liberation” of Taiwan to Deng’s “integration of Taiwan,” saying the same thing while using different semantics. The third distinction is more operative and much too “in the face” to be missed even by cursory China watchers. Here, compared with the White Papers of August 1993 and February 2000, it has expunged their earlier commitment that “any matter can be negotiated” as long as Taiwan accepts that there is only one China and does not pursue separatist policies. This again reinforces Beijing’s growing conviction in effecting this reunification on its own terms. Fourth, unlike the earlier two, this third White Paper showcases relatively stronger allusion toward use of military power in effecting reunification. It elucidates how in the “new era,” “with significant growth in its political, economic, cultural, technological, and military strength, there is no likelihood that China will allow Taiwan to be separated again.” This assertion, of course, is explained in terms of military advancements of Taiwan and other foreign powers seeking to split China, implying United States and its friends and allies. Fifth, the release of the White Paper this week was accompanied by other statements to reiterate China’s non-renunciation of use of its military. This element was, for example, elucidated on Wednesday in a formal statement issued by the State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office. Announcing the successful completion of military drills in Taiwan Strait, it said, “But we will not renounce the use of force, and reserve the option of taking all necessary measures. This is to guard against external interference and all separatist activities.” All this is now being called the “new normal” of China’s Taiwan policy and China-US ties, where extensive military drills are expected to become more regular to effect blockage of sea routes and the airspace of Taiwan, thereby circumventing its ever growing economic partnerships and further reducing the number of nations that continue to recognize Taipei as a sovereign nation-state. This ratcheting up in cross-Strait relations, however, has implications way beyond China-US-Taiwan triangular ties. Strategic implications The fact that Chinese state media reporting on military drills has been seen as alluding to transgressions across the Taiwan Strait’s median line becoming a “regular” exercise has already had a visible impact on regional supply lines, with companies assessing short-term and long-term costs and strategies. At the least, these military drills have demonstrated Beijing’s capacity to inflict an enormous yet uncontested disruption to regional trade flows as and when it chooses. In the midst of post-pandemic resilience initiatives, these disruptions are bound to trigger panic. Even a cursory glance at these trade flows shows how, for the first half of this year, about half of the world’s container fleet and nearly 90% of its largest vessels by tonnage passed through the Taiwan Strait connecting East Asia to markets worldwide. It is well understood that any tension in the Taiwan Strait will imply trade routes becoming extended, increasing transit times and pushing up freight rates, with goods and services reaching consumers much later and at a much higher price. But would not such disruptions be equally counterproductive for China’s own whopping foreign trade, especially its commerce from its eastern ports of Shanghai, Shenzhen, Ningbo and Guangzhou, the four largest ports facing the Taiwan Strait? The answer to this is obviously negative. China may be world’s largest trading nation, but the world has witnessed President Xi’s sustained willingness to sacrifice economics for his politics; see for example his “zero Covid” strategy that continues to shut down large parts of the country, greatly slowing down its economy. However, what brings relief is the broad consensus around how China remains strongly circumscribed in its tactics. Unleashing a direct military strike seems as yet completely unaffordable among its policy choices. So instead of an incessant amphibious attack, China is likely to choose a strategy of verbose “warrior diplomacy” accompanied by intermittent unannounced and unacknowledged naval and aerial blockades of Taiwan, and make this routine the “new normal” of its time-tested “gray-zone operations,” which will make the American response indecisive. When elephants fight … As the saying goes, when elephants fight it is the grass that suffers. All this “new normal” does not augur well for Taipei. For instance, at end of its recent military drills, the People’s Liberation Army’s East Theater Command said in a statement: “Theater forces will keep an eye on the changes in the situation in the Taiwan Strait, continue to carry out training and preparation for combat, organize regular combat readiness patrols in the direction of the Taiwan Strait, and resolutely defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity.” On Wednesday, this was corroborated by Taiwan’s Defense Ministry reporting that a total of 17 Chinese fighter jets flew across the median line of the Taiwan Strait. China claims that it is the United States that is trying to change the status quo by strengthening and upgrading its relations with Taiwan, which Beijing claims as its territory. So, Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu told China Central Television (CCTV) on Tuesday, “China has no choice but to fight back and defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity.” But while China persists in the view that its relations with Taiwan are an internal matter and that it reserves the right to bring the island under its control, by force if necessary, Taiwan rejects China’s claims, saying that only the island’s people can decide their future. The United States, meanwhile, continues to claim that visits to the island like the recent one by the Speaker of its House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, are routine and that China is using them as pretexts to ratchet up its force posture against Taipei. Then there are internal disjunctions of Taiwan’s democracy, which have witnessed the cyclical nature of the Kuomintang (KMT or Nationalist Party) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) sharing power on a two-term basis. This logic forecasts the KMT, seen as relatively much cozier with Beijing, coming back to power in 2024. Some of this was demonstrated in how, even before China’s military drills had ended, Andrew Hsia, deputy chairman of the KMT, flew to China for what his party said was a prearranged visit to meet the Taiwanese business community. Understandably, President Tsai Ing-wen, leader of the currently ruling DPP, called this “disappointing to our people,” even though Hsia’s China visit involved no official meetings or even a visit to Beijing. China’s neighbors meanwhile are taking notice of this power posturing, though their responses remain disjointed. Whereas newly elected South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol was the only regional leader to give Pelosi the slip even when he was in same city, India is planning high-altitude joint military exercises with the United States less 100 kilometers from the tension-ridden China-India ceasefire line, and its timing in October will coincide with China’s 20th Party Congress in Beijing. All this does not augur well for regional peace and security. #China #Taiwan #US Originally published: Asia Times, August 12, 2022 https://asiatimes.com/2022/08/decoding-chinas-new-normal-taiwan-policy/?fbclid=IwAR1yWI2Gb4Rk71JilrhGZBBYRdXE_xxfsTlUnY3yNFH1y5oahOW8Z-MBuI0&fs=e&s=cl Posted here with the authorization of the author. Swaran Singh is visiting professor at the University of British Columbia and professor of diplomacy and disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He is president of the Association of Asia Scholars; adjunct senior fellow at the Charhar Institute, Beijing; senior fellow, Institute for National Security Studies Sri Lanka, Colombo; and visiting professor, Research Institute for Indian Ocean Economies, Kunming.