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By Srijan Sharma “You Do One More Mumbai And You Will Loose Balochistan”- The National Security Advisor of India, Ajit Doval’s dramatic explanation in describing the roadmap of India’s shift in India’s National security strategy back in early 2014 has now become a reality. The Doval doctrine has given a significant push to India’s national security makeover and departures from old silent watch and play strategies. This doctrine not only has become a tool of powerful deterrence but also helped India showcasing its iron will in international arena which was earlier wrinkled by anxieties and doubts. A Silent Watch and Play Game: An Asymmetrical Approach and Strategic Restraint Earlier, India’s approach towards National Security Strategy was defensive. India adopted strategic restraint and moved forward for the fulfillment of strategic/tactical national security which proved to be non-effective towards defeating cross-border terrorism and handling Pakistan’s misadventures. A classic example of a defensive approach can be decoded from the response to the 26/11 attacks. The response was defensive- seeking diplomatic solutions instead of initiating a counterattack and taking retaliatory measures against Pakistan. The reason for adoption of such strategy can be attributed to doubtfulness and unwillingness of exercising of force with a failed attempt to understand security and strategic environment of neighborhood and world politics. The defensive strategy also showed a passive attitude in India’s national security strategy which was later projected as a weakness of India’s softness. In the real sense, India was on an approach that was diametrically opposite or asymmetrical from Pakistan’s Doctrine in short, India was on the defensive whereas Pakistan was already taken an offensive approach towards India through capitalizing its unconventional warfare spectrum, the asymmetry had zeroed the effectiveness of India’s national security strategy towards Pakistan. This undue strategic restraint has committed a grave error in India’s national security calculations which was later leveraged by our hostile neighbors. Understanding the Doctrine: Defensive Offensive and Offensive Defensive At one hand back to back terror strikes before 26/11 and post that, targeting India’s key cities- Pune, Hyderabad, Varanasi, Delhi and Bangalore and on the other hand, continued failure of India’s diplomatic efforts under the garb of exercising strategic restraint strategy has called for serious attention to India’s national security strategy. There was urgent need to add realist dimension to India’s national security strategy because in detail, if we see India was failing at both the ends of securing security- neither able to prevent attacks nor able to able deploy effective retaliatory response mechanism involving detection and prevention and mitigation. Therefore India needed an urgent course correction in its national security trajectory. The course correction came in 2014 when Ajit Doval became National Security Advisor of India. Doval’s arrival introduced strategic doctrine which goes by his name: Doval Doctrine or double squeeze strategy which addressed the errors in India’s national security calculus and inserted a realist factor by bringing the hawkish outlook in India’s National Security strategy. This doctrine primarily has two dimensions- Offensive Defensive and Defensive Offensive. Offensive Defensive- Offensive defense is pre-emptive way of carrying out offensive with defensive purpose. Here, the defensive purpose is to carry out offensive to force the larger foe on the back-foot at the outset by seizing the initiative is logic behind this dimension. India’s commitment towards carrying out pre-emptive strikes involving surgical strikes, Air strikes against terror safe havens in Pakistan occupied Kashmir indicates towards offensive defensive posture. Defensive Offensive- Defensive Offensive posture is more focused towards countering the adversary in exploiting its internal conflicts and sharp efforts at international level including sanctions and international isolation. Defensive offensive also means carrying out deterrence through offensive means (offensive deterrence) India’s Air Strikes in Balakot In February 2019 and Uri Strikes In 2016. The Nuclear Factor The Nuclear factor becomes a key constraint for the both the countries to go on a full offensive. During Kargil War In 1999 the nuclear factor did play a role. The New Delhi centric Pakistan nuclear policy with first strike capability is something to watchout during an event of tight conflict between both the countries. However, the Doval doctrine keeps the check on the Nuclear threshold and affirms in delivering the solid response to Pakistan in striking the terror networks. In any case punishing and denying Pakistan room for their nasty terror designs is one of the prime focus of India’s national security strategy in keeping India safe from state sponsored terrorism. A Strategic Doctrine of Deterrence and Comprehensive Response The Doval’s doctrine includes the right amount of deterrence- through denial and punishment and a comprehensive response including detection, prevention and mitigation. With this doctrine in force Pakistan was taken a back from carrying out terror strikes to attaining strategic depth through viz-a viz Afghanistan and West Asia. The Doval doctrine kept a check on every front of the adversary and transformed our national security craft. The Doval doctrine has also contributed substantially in India’s image makeover in security domain internationally. India is now being showcased as major and competitive firepower among key global players. As far as questions of China and emerging threats are considered, this strategic doctrine can reckon with the China factor but the doctrine is required to be backed up with more strong and modern security and military apparatus for countering Chinese hegemonic rise and future threats. There can be no denying that Doval doctrine made India assertive in security and strategic domain and due to which India is able to sail and realize its aspirations of strategic rise in the global power. #AjitDoval #NationalSecurity Srijan Sharma is working as a Research Analyst at India's oldest and prestigious national security and strategic Think Tank United Service Institution Of India (USI). He has served as Defence editor for a journal and authored articles on matters of strategic affairs for national daily like The Telegraph and journals.

By Prof. Swaran Singh Sheikh Hasina plans a four-day visit next week to further already strong bilateral ties World leaders have begun to hold what are now called “offline” meetings to return to the “normal” ways of conducting diplomatic relations where personal chemistry remains the key to success. So after the whirlwind six-hour visit by President Vladimir Putin on December 6, New Delhi will be hosting next week (September 5-8) a four-day visit by Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. She will be accompanied by a high-powered delegation consisting of a number of ministers, advisers, officials and business leaders who will be traveling beyond New Delhi as well. A press briefing by India’s Ministry of External Affairs said the visit aims to reiterate unique historical and cultural linkages that undergird the two countries’ innovative ways to enhance their multifaceted cooperation in such crucial sectors as bilateral trade, investment, energy, defense, connectivity, and above all the sharing of water. Also marking their strong cultural and societal linkages, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina will visit the city of Ajmer in India’s northwest to offer prayers at the historic shrine of Sufi saint Moinuddin Chishti. In New Delhi, other than meeting top leaders, her engagements will include awarding Mujib Scholarships to the descendants of 200 Indian Armed Forces personnel who were martyred or suffered critical injuries during Bangladesh’s Liberation War of 1971. Golden chapter To begin with, the positive message of this visit for the larger South Asian region cannot go unnoticed. It comes in the face of continuing economic and political instability in Sri lanka, Afghanistan and Pakistan and to some degree in Nepal and even Mauritius and Seychelles. In addition to domestic fissures in these countries, a persistent pandemic and six months of the Ukraine crisis have triggered further economic, social and political disruptions. At the least, therefore, this visit is expected to bring respite from the stresses and strains in South Asia. Indeed, recent years of India-Bangladesh relations have been described by some observers as their shonali adhyay (golden chapter). This is because of their economic successes. On the one hand, international observers have been talking of the “Bangladesh model” of development and recognizing Bangladesh as the economic miracle of South Asia. On the other, India has been the the fastest-growing major economy of the last two years. Indeed, creating some concerns of “overheating” and going way beyond World Bank projections of achieving 7-8% growth for this year, India’s gross domestic product hit an astonishing level of 13.5% growth for the first quarter of financial year 2022-23. It is against this backdrop that India and Bangladesh will now begin formal negotiations for signing a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, or CEPA. India’s northeastern region has lately become a special driver of the Act East policy and especially of its increasing engagement with BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation), which has its secretariat in Dhaka. While India has lately been hyperactive in negotiating free-trade deals, this will be the first FTA for Bangladesh, which has granted this privilege to India while others such as China and Japan have been requesting similar negotiations with Dhaka. Bilateral trade between India and Bangladesh has grown substantially in the last five years, expanding from US$9 billion for 2018 to $16 billion last year, making Bangladesh the fastest-growing destination for India’s exports. But this has also made their bilateral trade increasingly one-sided. For instance, Bangladesh’s $12 billon trade deficit in favor of India has be rectified to make quick further progress. Water sharing remains their other major challenge. Water sharing Among a slew of agreements and memoranda of understanding (MoUs) to be signed in New Delhi next week, the two nations will also be signing an agreement on the sharing of Kushiyara River waters. Only last week the 38th ministerial meeting of the India-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Comission (JRC) held in New Delhi on August 25 had India and Bangladesh finalize the text of this interim agreement. The JRC meeting of course also highlighted the urgency of resolving other bilateral water-sharing issues, including the need to begin working on the upcoming renewal of their Ganga (Ganges) Water Treaty. But the fact that this was the JRC’s first meeting since 2010 shows the changed milieu for making bold decisions. Teesta River water sharing has been their most difficult knot where Bangladesh has sought equitable distribution of water from India. The Teesta deal was all set to be signed during Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bangladesh visit of September 2011 but was postponed and has still not yet been signed. The Ganges treaty was signed in 1996 and is due for renewal in 2026, and work on its renewal has already begun. Inspired by the Indus Water Treaty between India and Pakistan, India and newly liberated Bangladesh set up the JRC in 1972 as their bilateral mechanism for evolving shared understanding on common rivers. But more than India and Pakistan, India and Bangladesh share 54 rivers, big and small, of which seven have been identified for developing an earlier framework for negotiation water-sharing agreements. But sustained warmth of leadership from both sides and now a return to post-pandemic interactions give hope of another upswing in India-Bangladesh relations with lessons for rest of the region. Strategic upswing The recent past has seen overall strategic ties between India and Bangladesh on an upswing. In March last year, even in the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic, Modi made an exception to travel restrictions and went to Dhaka to attend events celebrating 50 years of liberation of Bangladesh from Pakistan and the birth centenary of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Indeed, marking India’s unique connection to the liberation of Bangladesh, New Delhi also hosted several events to celebrate the surrender of Pakistani forces in Dhaka to the India Army and “Mukti Bahini” on December 16, 1971. This was also a unique example of 93,000 Pakistani troops being taken as prisoners of war by India and then safely repatriated at great cost and effort, setting a unique example for the world. There are other examples of India-Bangladesh cooperation, including demarcation of their land and maritime borders. This has greatly facilitated their developmental partnership. Dhaka now allows transit of Indian goods to India’s northeast, has approved the Agartala-Dhaka-Kolkata Maitri bus service, and imports electrical power from India. These examples of the changing nature of their bilateral relations have lessons and implications for the larger region. #India #Bangladesh Originally published: Asian Times, September 02, 2022 https://asiatimes.com/2022/09/bangladeshi-pms-india-visit-to-provide-a-positive-spin-for-s-asia/?fbclid=IwAR3xxhvJKJhfLkM8hJl5EMkRCXj2f3133_Hb6WGE8a4H6HbeRfbKT7Dv9eg Posted here with the authorization of the author. Swaran Singh is visiting professor at the University of British Columbia and professor of diplomacy and disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He is president of the Association of Asia Scholars; adjunct senior fellow at the Charhar Institute, Beijing; senior fellow, Institute for National Security Studies Sri Lanka, Colombo; and visiting professor, Research Institute for Indian Ocean Economies, Kunming.

By Prof. Swaran Singh Membership of the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is on the up: 111 countries have ratified the agreement since it came into force in 2014, and a further 30 countries have signed it. The Philippines is the newest member, joining in March 2022. However, the treaty’s efforts to regulate the transfer of conventional weapons continue to be questioned, ignored and breached – by the ATT’s signatories as well as by other powerful nations. August 22-26 will see State Parties to the ATT holding their eighth annual conference in Geneva to discuss its future and its major challenges. All parties to the ATT are required to provide annual reports detailing their trade in conventional weapons in the preceding year. But, with its rising numbers of signatory states, the proportion who comply has fallen from 84 percent in 2015 to just 52 percent in 2021. This means nearly half the signatories are not submitting these reports or do not trade in conventional weapons, which means their actions have little import for the treaty’s aims and objectives. This apparently waning commitment makes the ATT’s growing number of state parties almost irrelevant. No doubt most international conventions have similar limitations and, especially when not supported by major powers, they become vulnerable to breaches. But the ATT has failed to draw into its fold both world’s major importers and exporters of conventional arms. The world’s largest producer and exporter of conventional weapons, the United States, signed the ATT in 2013 but has never ratified it. In April 2019, President Donald Trump announced the US would be “revoking the effect of America’s signature” from the ATT. (The treaty has no such provisions other than withdrawal with advance notice.) President Joe Biden has not yet made any statement about President Trump’s ‘unsigning’. Russia, another major exporter has not signed it yet and remains outside its remit. China had joined it in July 2020 but the world’s largest importer, India, is also yet to sign it. It is not that powerful nations have had no interest in regulating arms trade. They have been especially effective in responding to the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that they believe threaten their own security. They have imposed strong regulatory regimes on transfers of WMD including ballistic missiles and even on proliferation of their technologies, materials and know-how. Likewise, thanks to major powers’ expensive WMD modernization programs, their related arms-control seems to focus only on those weapons they were already planning to discard. This has allowed them to ban those WMDs that less powerful nations were still struggling to invent or acquire, thereby ensuring their security by widening the gap between less powerful nations’ inventories from these dominant nations’ own arsenals. Amongst major WMD-possessing nations, their mutual arms control has been aimed at ensuring robust deterrence through mutually assured destruction strategies disincentivizing initiating an unwinnable nuclear conflict. But driven by major powers’ interests, regulations on conventional weapons bear no comparison with similar multilateral export-control mechanisms for WMDs and ballistic missiles. This is because the same dominant nations are the main exporters of conventional weapons. Indeed, reluctance to regulate conventional weapons trade can be seen amongst both major exporters (the United States, Russia, China) and major importers (India, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, China) of conventional weapons. The lure of financial and political windfalls from the conventional weapons trade has made the ATT’s task a difficult one. Therefore, states and non-state actors continue to fight each other with weapons on both sides supplied by the same manufacturers. The ATT indeed gets further circumscribed by the fact that it seeks to control weapons transfers, especially to state and non-state violators of humanitarian laws, while its remit remains limited only to its state parties’ voluntary actions. Even there, the treaty does not interfere with signatory states’ domestic production and distribution or discourage their exports or use of weapons for self-defense. The ATT depends on signatory states voluntarily enacting national laws to prevent their exports of what the ATT defines as lethal weapons to what it deems to be violators of international norms and conventions; organized-crime cartels and terrorists being easy examples. Following the framework of the UN Register of Conventional Arms, established in 1991, the ATT expects signatory states to submit annual reports on their imports and exports of conventional weapons. Collectively this can help ATT showcase data on broader trends and influence global public opinion against illegal and illegitimate weapons transfers. But as decades of debate has shown, these submissions have remained vulnerable to subjective national perceptions and priorities. States have subjectively interpreted definitions of illegitimate and illegal weapons transfers, which has limited their adherence to ATT’s objectives. It has been nearly impossible to build consensus on preferred guidelines for what constitutes illegal arms transfers and how these should be regulated. One country’s terrorists are another country’s freedom fighters. Nations are often seen supporting groups and nations that others see going against agreed norms and laws dealing with transnational crime and cross-border terrorism and insurgencies. New weapons technologies — even within the domain of conventional weapons — present another complex and constantly unfolding set of challenges for the interpretation of ATT provisions. While expanding the number of signatories to the ATT may have its merit, it is perhaps time to focus on strengthening its efficacy amongst its signatory parties. The eighth ATT conference must revisit their strategies and basic assumptions to explore why powerful states continue to defy its logic. That would be an important step towards ensuring greater control over the world’s increasing inter- and intra-state violence. #ArmsTradeTreaty #UN #ATT Originally published: The Jakarta Post, August 24, 2022 https://www.thejakartapost.com/amp/opinion/2022/08/24/arms-trade-treaty-at-risk-of-irrelevance.html?fbclid=IwAR2-zp-_JUHEcikdDqqS4rEHEDBTxkJuzW49zJqh08rWMXzZDuT_v7YQTRE Posted here with the authorization of the author. Swaran Singh is visiting professor at the University of British Columbia and professor of diplomacy and disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He is president of the Association of Asia Scholars; adjunct senior fellow at the Charhar Institute, Beijing; senior fellow, Institute for National Security Studies Sri Lanka, Colombo; and visiting professor, Research Institute for Indian Ocean Economies, Kunming.

By Prof. Bharat H Desai The beauty, majesty and raison d'être of the humanitarian support is drawn from ancient notion of neighbors helping neighbors. On 19 August 2022, the UN Secretary-General (UNSG) Antonio Guterres invoked the age-old wisdom that it “takes a village to raise a child” in the context of the humanitarian needs. The metaphor of a village by the worldly-wise UNSG “to support people living through a humanitarian crisis” sums up the very nature of the global humanitarian response to the rising tide of global conflicts and disasters that affect millions of people. Humanitarians seek to recover, sustain and rebuild human lives in conflict zones and other emergencies. In 2022, a record 303 million people need humanitarian assistance as the UN aims to reach the most vulnerable 204 million. “Never before have humanitarians been called to respond to this level of need…in ever more dangerous environments,” said Jens Laerke, the spokesperson of the UN Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). According to the Global Humanitarian Overview 2022, the extreme climatic events alone drove an estimated 16 million people into food crises in 15 countries. It causes exacerbated violence against women and children. An OCHA protection officer speaks to vulnerable people in Damascus, Syria. Grave Risks to the Humanitarians Martin Griffiths, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs paid tributes to “all humanitarian workers who often work in dangerous conditions to help others in need” and “those who have lost their lives in the line of duty”. The estimated funding requirement for the UN’s humanitarian projects is pegged at 50 billion US dollars. Still, the pledges of support from donor countries remain at 15 billion dollars wherein the top five contributors are: USA ($61, 380, 000); Sweden ($33,518,199); UK ($29,456,941); Germany ($23,004,148) and Norway ($15,366,301). In the 2021 Annual Report of OCHA, somehow India does not figure in the list of 69 donor countries. However, India did provide humanitarian food grains to Afghanistan (2021) and Sri Lanka (2022). Such a helping hand makes the difference between life and death for the affected people. The World Humanitarian Day (WHD) is commemorated after the Canal Hotel bomb attack in Baghdad (19 August 2003) that killed 22 humanitarian aid workers, including the UNSG’s Special Representative for Iraq, Sergio Vieira de Mello. After five years, the General Assembly adopted resolution 63/139 (11 December 2008) to strengthen of the UN’s coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance. The resolution aimed at “increasing public awareness about humanitarian assistance activities worldwide…to honour all… who have lost their lives in the cause of duty”. The humanitarian aid workers face grave risks in the troubled zones and natural calamities. In 2021 alone, 460 aid workers were attacked: 140 killed, 203 wounded and 117 kidnapped. It shows the graphic reality of the world we live in; growing lawlessness in failed states arising from reigns of terror unleashed by warlords and despotic regimes. Such ‘inhuman’ beings traumatize their own people and others. Can the world remain a silent spectator to watch catastrophe and human misery? It came out vividly on 15 August 2021, when the desperate Afghans stampeded Kabul airport to get out when the notorious Taliban defiantly captured power. It was reminiscent of the marauding hordes running over a territory in medieval times. Thousands of aid workers face grave risks amid violence in countries such as South Sudan, Afghanistan, Syria, Ethiopia, the DR Congo and Yemen. In the first half of 2022, the Humanitarian Outcomes has recorded attacks on 168 aid workers wherein 44 lost their lives. Architecture for the Humanitarian Relief The beauty, majesty and raison d'être of the humanitarian support is drawn from ancient notion of neighbors helping neighbors. It comprises providing health care and education, food and water, shelter and protection and the hope to live. The UN has put into place an institutional framework that provides support in troubled countries. It comprises: OCHA, Refugee Agency, Children’s Agency, World Food Program, World Health Organization and Inter-Agency Standing Committee. Cumulatively, they represent the best of human spirit and empathy-in-action. It transcends across rogue regimes, brutality of wars and inherent risks to the humanitarians. The audacity of faith remains unshaken, for instance, as the UN refuses the abandon the DRC mired in endless conflicts even after its compound came under attack, three peacekeepers were killed and the MONUSCO spokesperson in Kinshasha was expelled (03 August 2022). Apart from the UN system, the global humanitarian sentinel, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has 20,000 staff presence amidst 100 conflicts raging in 60 countries where 100 non-state armed groups play havoc. ICRC’s core policy of neutrality enables it to provide relief, succor and protection to the civilians facing brutal violence in conflicts. As the custodian of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols, ICRC has a strong operational legal basis to grapple with humanitarian needs. It can draw vital ‘red lines’ while negotiating to reign in the armed groups. Taming the Beast The human streak for self-destruction – akin to Duryodhana going berserk in the epic Mahabharata – presents a big challenge, as narrated in conversation with this author by the ICRC President Peter Maurer on 17 August 2022, at the release of a book (Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in International Law). Often the assurances to the humanitarians are belied when the armed groups ambush even a hospital in the middle of a night! It underscores gravity of the challenge in upholding International Humanitarian Law. Not going to the level of the evil provides an eternal hope since, as Peter assured me, “such forces are not invincible”. In this backdrop, as envisioned in this author’s unflinching faith by curating 46 monthly meetings of Making SIS Visible Initiative (2008-2013) as well as batting for the SIS to emerge as a ‘think tank’, it is high time to factor in humanitarian studies as an inextricable part of studies in International Law and International Relations. SIS alumna Santishree (JNU V-C) has called for a fresh Indian “thinking and scholarship”. As a corollary, it would also make great sense to inject ‘humanitarianism’ in the respective research trajectories of SIS colleagues and Ph. D. students to seed futuristic ideas that would provide a basis for India to emerge as a Global Solution Provider (here, here, here, here, here, here). Hopefully, it would pave the way for SIS, as a successor to the pioneer Indian School of International Studies, to become a genuine and indispensable ‘think tank’ in the near future. Part - I: Blog Special Series-I: Use of Food as a Weapon of War: A Challenge for International Law (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com) Part - II: Blog Special Series-II: Use of Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War: A Challenge for International Law (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com) Part - III: Abused Ammunition as a Weapon of War in the DR Congo: A Challenge for International Law (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com) Part – IV: Use of Nuclear Weapons in War (Hiroshima-Nagasaki Day): A Challenge for International Law (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com) #WeaponsofWar #Humanitarians #InternationalLaw Professor Dr. Bharat H. Desai is Jawaharlal Nehru Chair and Professor of International Law at the Centre for International Legal Studies of SIS, JNU. He coordinated the Making SIS Visible initiative (2008-2013) as well as Inter-University Consortium: JNU; Jammu; Kashmir; Sikkim (2012-2020) and is the Editor-in-Chief of Environmental Policy and Law (IOS Press: Amsterdam)

By Pratik Mall The largest multilateral organization outside of the UN is the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), a coalition of around 120 countries, 17 observer states, and ten international organizations. The NAM coalition, which stands for the developing world, is adamantly opposed to bloc politics and power struggles. Founded in 1961 and essentially a cold war construct, NAM was built on the core values of the Bandung Principles, announced at the Afro-Asian Conference in 1955. In the 1979 Havana declaration, Fidel Castro outlined the goals of NAM as follows : NAM guarantees "National Freedom, Autonomy, Territorial Sovereignty, and Protection of Non-Aligned Countries in their struggle against Imperialism, Colonial rule, Neo-Colonialism, Racial prejudice, and all forms of Foreign Belligerence, Annexation, Subjugation, Intervention, and supremacy as well as great Power Politics." One of the most hawkish Secretaries of State in US history, John Foster Dulles, mockingly referred to NAM as "Immoral" in its infancy. It was "India's exceptionalism" that the Americans found challenging to comprehend. Stalin viewed allegiance to NAM as opposition to USSR and aligning the other bloc to sabotage them. Jawaharlal Nehru, one of the five founding fathers of NAM, once said, "NAM is in harmony with India's culture and tradition. India will support global peace and harmony by refusing to join any armed alliances. Since the signing of the Treaty of Friendship between India and the USSR, which made India a "quasi-ally" of the USSR, Americans have largely come to view NAM as "Anti-Americanism" in the 1970s. In the 1960s, NAM made decolonization and disarmament its primary goals. Although the world averted a nuclear winter during the catastrophic 1962 Cuban Missile crisis, the fear of a nuclear holocaust persisted throughout the Cold War. NAM could unite the developing countries worried about maintaining their arduously acquired sovereignty. The NAM gained status and weight when its efforts helped several countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia achieve political freedom. The PTBT and NPT were signed in 1963 and 1968, respectively, in response to the NAM's persistent attempts to portray nuclear weapons as "taboo." The origin of a New International Economic Order, abbreviated as NIEO, was first mooted in 1973 during the NAM conference in Algiers. The rationale was that northern countries offer higher pricing for southern products, supply financing and technology, and control the behaviour of their multinational corporations (MNCs) devoted to indiscriminately plundering southern resources. The gains in this phase were mainly restricted because the west rejected the idea as unrealistic, and the oil economies of the Gulf, which were expected to demonstrate greater unity, failed due to the escalating geopolitical problems. The "detente" phase of the partnership ended in the 1980s, and the arms race started to heat up. A weakening USSR attempted to match the famed "Strategic Defense Initiative" established by the US under the Regan administration with an equivalent expenditure in resources and technology. NAM had failed, having made no notable progress. The INF Treaty, which prohibits all land-based ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and missile launchers with ranges between 500 and 1,000 kilometres (short- to medium-range) and 1,000 to 5,500 kilometres (long-range), is the only significant arms control agreement of this era (intermediate-range). The pact does not cover missiles launched from the air or the sea. Declining Interest in NAM The US emerged as an unopposed hegemon with the collapse of the USSR in the 1990s, and Fukuyama pronounced the "End Of History". The relevance of NAM, primarily a Cold War construct, had become an essential point of debate and discussion. NAM began to seem out of date and lost its purpose. A new era of relative peace and a nuclear-weapons-free world was ushered in by the Cooperative Security Treaty Reduction Treaty (Nunn-Lugar Pact), the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the signing of SALT 1 and 2 and the CTBT in 1996, and the extension of the NPT. All of this occurred even though NATO was not disbanded and has significantly grown since the end of the Cold War. Commentators worldwide stated that NAM should prepare for a "graceful withdrawal," take some of the credit for the end of the Cold War and then declare "Mission Accomplished" to end its existence. At the Jakarta Summit in 1991, immediately following the fall of the USSR, even founder members like Egypt questioned the necessity of the NAM. Narshima Rao, the Prime Minister of India, said without a shadow of a doubt that "NAM has become all the more necessary to control the unilateral activities of the single superpower." The popularity of NAM has steadily waned over time. Only 8 Heads of State out of 120 attended the NAM conference in Tehran in 2012, and PM Modi's decision to send Vice President Venkaiah Naidu instead of himself in 2016 is a glaring sign that the idea of NAM is no longer appealing. This year, India did participate in the NAM virtual summit, although it seemed more out of need than out of choice. Relevance of NAM in Present Context Therefore, the moot question that should trouble us is whether NAM is still relevant or if it has passed into oblivion. It would be inaccurate to claim that supporting NAM demonstrates "intellectual lethargy" and a fixation on a Cold War idea. Since other nations do not seem to be interested in NAM, India is well-positioned to take advantage of its inherent leadership qualities, tap into its potential, and forward its goal of South-South Cooperation. India is well poised to use the platform of NAM to exercise its "strategic autonomy". India cannot help but be fascinated by NAM because it has become a part of its identity. In addition to participating actively in international politics and being able to negotiate power politics successfully, it aided India in pursuing a foreign policy that was primarily independent. India was free to be independent instead of merely becoming a "camp follower". In domestic politics, it had given Prime Minister Nehru the opportunity to manage the polarizing domestic pressures delicately. Even Henry Kissinger, who had nothing but contempt for NAM, now acknowledges that it was the best course of action India could have taken at the time. NAM offers the best model as the arms race heats up, alliances become obsolete, and India struggles to retain an independent foreign policy. According to the US Nuclear Posture Review, China and Russia are becoming more reliant on nuclear weapons, posing a new nuclear threat to the US. The expiration of the NEW START treaty last year and the USA signaling that it may withdraw from the INF treaty further escalates the already dangerous situation. The ongoing Ukraine crisis and the spectre of a nuclear winter further remind us of the horrors of the nuclear holocaust that the world already witnessed in 1945 in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. NAM could play a pivotal role in creating a stigma and a taboo for nuclear weapons, as it successfully did in the early years. Next, for a nation like India that wishes to sit at the high table, the unwavering and ongoing support of NAM countries is equally crucial. NAM desperately needs leadership, direction, and an action plan since it is like an orphan and has to start moving. India must grasp the opportunity's potential and try to use it. India would be wise to use NAM as a forum for inter-civilizational interaction. India can also utilize the NAM to strengthen South-South cooperation and establish its position as a "Standard Bearer for South. The time is apt to harness the enormous potential of NAM to develop the "INDIA WAY" as analogous to the "THIRD WAY" of the 1960s and 1970s. The time has arrived to revive the "Bandung Spirit" and recreate NAM, albeit with a modified objective and fresh vigour, in this period of "Militarization of the Sea" and "Territorial Expansion." #NAM #India Pratik Mall is a Student of M.A PISM batch 2021-2023 SIS, JNU.

By Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli Why the Yuan Wang 5’s Arrival in Sri Lanka is Consequential for South Asia Despite serious reservations expressed by both Sri Lanka and India, and after a clearance delay of five days, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Strategic Support Force vessel Yuan Wang 5 finally docked at Chinese-leased Hambantota port on 16 August 2022. Of course, the Sri Lankan government later clarified that the docking was for supplies and maintenance, and that the vessel wouldn’t undertake any “research” activities in its waters. While this point was reiterated by the ship’s captain, Zhang Hongwang, observers are taking it with a pinch of salt. The resulting shadow-boxing between India and China, in the backdrop of an already strained relationship following the land skirmish in mid-2020 in Galwan, has consequences for the neighbourhood as well. The Yuan Wang 5 incident will strengthen China’s drive to acquire hegemony in South Asia and the Indian Ocean, in four areas. Disrupt South Asia to divide and rule In its quest to impose hegemony in different parts of Asia, China has been displacing dominant powers in several regions. In South Asia, following the ancient stratagem of hexiao kongda (‘cooperate with the small to counter the big’), China has made disruptive inroads into Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and the Maldives, while retaining influence over Pakistan. The aim here is not only to dislodge India, but to also create disequilibrium domestically in South Asian countries. This will lead to China effectively implementing its divide and rule policy and acquiring structural power in the region. Coercion through gunboat diplomacy Yuan Wang 5’s berthing at Hambantota revives historical images of China’s maritime invasions. During the third expedition to the Indian Ocean, Admiral Zheng He’s sailors kidnapped a recalcitrant Vira Alakeshvara of Kotte kingdom (not far from the Chinese-leased Hambantota) in 1410-1411, and presented him to Ming emperor Yongle. China undertook regime change by installing Parakramabahu at Kotte. Now with the Rajapaksas on the run and Ranil Wickremesinghe under siege, Beijing finds an opportune moment to make inroads into Sri Lanka and attempt another regime change in its favour. China’s historical narrative is that the Europeans forced open the decaying Qing China through ‘gunboat diplomacy’—mainly naval vessels and coercive diplomacy. More than a century later, with China having ascended to being the second largest economy in the world, Beijing is attempting similar antics across the globe. Much as the European powers had imposed treaty ports in coastal China—some like Hong Kong on 99-year lease—Beijing grabbed Hambantota also on a 99-year lease. It is no surprise then that the head of the China Merchant Port Holdings that owns Hambantota received the Yuan Wang 5, instead of the vessel docking at the much larger Colombo Port. Coercion through economic arm-twisting China’s economic might allows it to arm-twist the Sri Lankan government, which is already under financial siege and debilitating social unrest. Sri Lanka owes over US$ 51 billion in debt to several lenders, with China’s share amounting between 10 to 20 per cent. Beijing refused to defer loan repayment and threatened Sri Lanka to comply with its diktats. Chinese Foreign minister Wang Yi visited Colombo in January 2022 with no offer of major relief to Sri Lanka, but with his sights set on a forum of Indian Ocean states. Beijing’s stranglehold on Colombo provides it a good start to compete with India in the region. Sri Lanka’s loan payment default on the Chinese-constructed Hambantota Port came in handy to arm-twist Colombo into accommodating the PLA vessel this week. Aggravate space and maritime competition Competition in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR)—and in space—is also further triggered by the Yuan Wang 5 visit. Like China’s post-2008 naval missions to the IOR on the pretext of checking piracy, Yuan Wang 5’s deployment in the region is probably permanent. It is shortly expected to be deployed again to monitor the Mengtian space module. In the past decade, China has launched over 30 satellites for different countries and made ground preparations for permanent missions. In May 2007, Beijing launched a communication satellite at a cost of US$ 311 million—NIGCOMSAT-1—for Nigeria, with ground station support from the capital, Abuja, and Xinjiang’s Kashgar. In 2001, China set up a tracking, telemetry, and command station at Swakopmund in Namibia. It launched a communications satellite for Sri Lanka in November 2012, in which former President Rajapaksa’s son played a crucial role. Yuan Wang was earlier involved in 80 missions related to Zhongxing 2D satellites, Moon and Mars missions, space stations, and for long periods of sailing—more than half a million nautical miles. Since 2005, China has been crafting the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organisation to counter US influence in space. Yuan Wang 5 is expected to support forthcoming ‘fourth dimensional warfare’ in space, with implications for the Quad members. While China highlights Yuan Wang 5’s civilian achievements, no data on its military role, specifically on missile tracking missions, has been made available. Conclusion Yuan Wang’s predecessor, Xiangyang Hong, and another vessel, Dongfang Hong, conducted ‘scientific investigations’ in the Sea of Japan in the early 2000s, and paved the way for intelligence-gathering missions near Sakishima Islands. In a similar pattern, China has reportedly sent several surveillance ships to the Indian Ocean in the past two years. This suggests that the PLA Navy will provide permanent company to the Indian Navy in the region. Yuan Wang’s arrival into Indian Ocean waters is thus cataclysmic. For India, Yuan Wang 5’s presence clearly has major security consequences. For one, India must strengthen its space cooperation agreement with Vietnam. Further, with an extra-regional power like China making forays into the Indian Ocean, India—hesitation aside—needs to go concertedly into the South China Sea and protect its energy and other interests in the region. #China #SriLanka #India #YuanWang Originally published: IPCS, August 22, 2022. http://ipcs.org/comm_select.php?articleNo=5825 Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli is Dean of the School of International Studies (SIS), JNU, & Distinguished Fellow, IPCS.

By Prof. Swaran Singh The tone of Beijing’s latest White Paper on Taiwan differs markedly from those issued before the Xi Jinping era China this week closed its largest ever military drills in the Taiwan Strait with a series of important statements, including the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council issuing its third White Paper, the title of which reveals the “new normal” of its Taiwan policy. The title of this third White Paper on Taiwan reads: “The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era.” The paper contains content quite distinct in tone and tenor from the two earlier White Papers on Taiwan. In a nutshell, the White Paper asserts that reunification is not only the Communist Party of China’s “historic mission” but is also “indispensable for the realization of China’s rejuvenation.” It claims the party has adopted, under President Xi Jinping’s leadership, “new and innovative measures in relation to Taiwan.” This “new starting point for reunification” is referred to as the “new normal” of China’s Taiwan policy. Clearly, in the case of all civilizational states, especially those with imperial impulses and system-shaping capabilities, understanding the symbolism of semantics is significant in interpreting their likely trajectories, with implications far and wide. And given this prognosis, the “new normal” of China-Taiwan ties has become the subject of media commentaries. Shifting saliences To begin with, the title of the White Paper issued this week – the first one under President Xi Jinping – marks a significant change in stance from the earlier two, which were titled “The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue” (February 2000) and “The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China” (August 1993). That change is the inclusion of “New Era” in the title, which is defined by Xi as distancing China from Deng Xiaoping’s “hide your strengthens and bide your time” thesis. Especially now, in the run-up to the 20th Party Congress, where Xi will be seeking an unprecedented third term in office, this radicalization has been there for all to see. Second, the title of this paper also involves an interesting twist of words, from “reunification of China” to “China’s reunification,” which alludes to an assertion toward a more China-driven reunification. This reminds of a similar earlier twist from Chairman Mao Zedong’s “liberation” of Taiwan to Deng’s “integration of Taiwan,” saying the same thing while using different semantics. The third distinction is more operative and much too “in the face” to be missed even by cursory China watchers. Here, compared with the White Papers of August 1993 and February 2000, it has expunged their earlier commitment that “any matter can be negotiated” as long as Taiwan accepts that there is only one China and does not pursue separatist policies. This again reinforces Beijing’s growing conviction in effecting this reunification on its own terms. Fourth, unlike the earlier two, this third White Paper showcases relatively stronger allusion toward use of military power in effecting reunification. It elucidates how in the “new era,” “with significant growth in its political, economic, cultural, technological, and military strength, there is no likelihood that China will allow Taiwan to be separated again.” This assertion, of course, is explained in terms of military advancements of Taiwan and other foreign powers seeking to split China, implying United States and its friends and allies. Fifth, the release of the White Paper this week was accompanied by other statements to reiterate China’s non-renunciation of use of its military. This element was, for example, elucidated on Wednesday in a formal statement issued by the State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office. Announcing the successful completion of military drills in Taiwan Strait, it said, “But we will not renounce the use of force, and reserve the option of taking all necessary measures. This is to guard against external interference and all separatist activities.” All this is now being called the “new normal” of China’s Taiwan policy and China-US ties, where extensive military drills are expected to become more regular to effect blockage of sea routes and the airspace of Taiwan, thereby circumventing its ever growing economic partnerships and further reducing the number of nations that continue to recognize Taipei as a sovereign nation-state. This ratcheting up in cross-Strait relations, however, has implications way beyond China-US-Taiwan triangular ties. Strategic implications The fact that Chinese state media reporting on military drills has been seen as alluding to transgressions across the Taiwan Strait’s median line becoming a “regular” exercise has already had a visible impact on regional supply lines, with companies assessing short-term and long-term costs and strategies. At the least, these military drills have demonstrated Beijing’s capacity to inflict an enormous yet uncontested disruption to regional trade flows as and when it chooses. In the midst of post-pandemic resilience initiatives, these disruptions are bound to trigger panic. Even a cursory glance at these trade flows shows how, for the first half of this year, about half of the world’s container fleet and nearly 90% of its largest vessels by tonnage passed through the Taiwan Strait connecting East Asia to markets worldwide. It is well understood that any tension in the Taiwan Strait will imply trade routes becoming extended, increasing transit times and pushing up freight rates, with goods and services reaching consumers much later and at a much higher price. But would not such disruptions be equally counterproductive for China’s own whopping foreign trade, especially its commerce from its eastern ports of Shanghai, Shenzhen, Ningbo and Guangzhou, the four largest ports facing the Taiwan Strait? The answer to this is obviously negative. China may be world’s largest trading nation, but the world has witnessed President Xi’s sustained willingness to sacrifice economics for his politics; see for example his “zero Covid” strategy that continues to shut down large parts of the country, greatly slowing down its economy. However, what brings relief is the broad consensus around how China remains strongly circumscribed in its tactics. Unleashing a direct military strike seems as yet completely unaffordable among its policy choices. So instead of an incessant amphibious attack, China is likely to choose a strategy of verbose “warrior diplomacy” accompanied by intermittent unannounced and unacknowledged naval and aerial blockades of Taiwan, and make this routine the “new normal” of its time-tested “gray-zone operations,” which will make the American response indecisive. When elephants fight … As the saying goes, when elephants fight it is the grass that suffers. All this “new normal” does not augur well for Taipei. For instance, at end of its recent military drills, the People’s Liberation Army’s East Theater Command said in a statement: “Theater forces will keep an eye on the changes in the situation in the Taiwan Strait, continue to carry out training and preparation for combat, organize regular combat readiness patrols in the direction of the Taiwan Strait, and resolutely defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity.” On Wednesday, this was corroborated by Taiwan’s Defense Ministry reporting that a total of 17 Chinese fighter jets flew across the median line of the Taiwan Strait. China claims that it is the United States that is trying to change the status quo by strengthening and upgrading its relations with Taiwan, which Beijing claims as its territory. So, Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu told China Central Television (CCTV) on Tuesday, “China has no choice but to fight back and defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity.” But while China persists in the view that its relations with Taiwan are an internal matter and that it reserves the right to bring the island under its control, by force if necessary, Taiwan rejects China’s claims, saying that only the island’s people can decide their future. The United States, meanwhile, continues to claim that visits to the island like the recent one by the Speaker of its House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, are routine and that China is using them as pretexts to ratchet up its force posture against Taipei. Then there are internal disjunctions of Taiwan’s democracy, which have witnessed the cyclical nature of the Kuomintang (KMT or Nationalist Party) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) sharing power on a two-term basis. This logic forecasts the KMT, seen as relatively much cozier with Beijing, coming back to power in 2024. Some of this was demonstrated in how, even before China’s military drills had ended, Andrew Hsia, deputy chairman of the KMT, flew to China for what his party said was a prearranged visit to meet the Taiwanese business community. Understandably, President Tsai Ing-wen, leader of the currently ruling DPP, called this “disappointing to our people,” even though Hsia’s China visit involved no official meetings or even a visit to Beijing. China’s neighbors meanwhile are taking notice of this power posturing, though their responses remain disjointed. Whereas newly elected South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol was the only regional leader to give Pelosi the slip even when he was in same city, India is planning high-altitude joint military exercises with the United States less 100 kilometers from the tension-ridden China-India ceasefire line, and its timing in October will coincide with China’s 20th Party Congress in Beijing. All this does not augur well for regional peace and security. #China #Taiwan #US Originally published: Asia Times, August 12, 2022 https://asiatimes.com/2022/08/decoding-chinas-new-normal-taiwan-policy/?fbclid=IwAR1yWI2Gb4Rk71JilrhGZBBYRdXE_xxfsTlUnY3yNFH1y5oahOW8Z-MBuI0&fs=e&s=cl Posted here with the authorization of the author. Swaran Singh is visiting professor at the University of British Columbia and professor of diplomacy and disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He is president of the Association of Asia Scholars; adjunct senior fellow at the Charhar Institute, Beijing; senior fellow, Institute for National Security Studies Sri Lanka, Colombo; and visiting professor, Research Institute for Indian Ocean Economies, Kunming.

By Prof. Bharat H. Desai The first week of August 2022 brought vivid memories of the lethal capacity of the nuclear bombs that were dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima (6 August) and Nagasaki (9 August). It showed the destructive human streak for nuclear annihilation. The United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) Antonio Guterres became the second UN chief to personally go to the Hiroshima bombsite in 2022 to share the collective grief of the Japanese people. The UNSG alerted the world about risk of nuclear miscalculation or misunderstanding. "Nuclear weapons are nonsense. They guarantee no safety - only death and destruction. Three quarters of a century later, we must ask what we've learned from the mushroom cloud that swelled above this city in 1945", the UNSG said on 6 August in exasperation. Hiroshima-Nagasaki as a Metaphor The world was stunned by the atomic bombs dropped by the US bombers on Hiroshima (Little Boy) and Nagasaki (Fat Boy) on 6 August and 9 August 1945, respectively. They instantly killed between 129,000 and 226,000 people and destroyed the infrastructure of both cities. Left with no choice, Japan surrendered on 15 August 1945 and brought to end the World War II. It seems, propelled by the prospects of the Russian advances that would have forced the Japanese to surrender to them, the US President Truman ordered dropping of nuclear bombs. “Japan was already defeated…dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary”, President Dwight Eisenhower said years later. Even Nobel Laurate Albert Einstein spoke out against the nuclear strikes on Japan that were “unjustified and motivated by US−Soviet politicking”. Einstein regretted for urging, in August 1939, President Roosevelt for an atomic weapons program. After 71 years, on 27 May 2016, Barack Obama became the first sitting US President to appear at the Hiroshima bombsite. “We stand here in the middle of this city and force ourselves to imagine the moment the bomb fell...we listen to a silent cry…demonstrated that mankind possessed the means to destroy itself”, Obama spoke for the posterity, while laying wreath at Hiroshima Peace Memorial and bowed head in silence to pay homage to the departed souls. Obama did what people do when a place of horrific incident overwhelms. Quest for Elimination of Nuclear Weapons Over the last 77 years, global efforts have sought to realize the dream of nuclear weapons free world. The 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), with 192 parties, has been an important pillar. Now the Tenth Review Conference on the NPT (New York; 1-26 August 2022) is underway. On 1 August 2022, the UNSG’s address to the NPT review conference expressed grave concern that the “humanity is just one misunderstanding, one miscalculation away from nuclear annihilation”. “Almost 13,000 nuclear weapons are now being held in arsenals around the world”, Guterres said in inaugural address at the NPT Tenth Review. On 4 August, the US Ambassador Scheinman assured that “the United States will continue the long work toward eventual nuclear disarmament”. The Tenth NPT Review is taking place after the 3 January 2022 Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States (China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA) for Preventing Nuclear War and avoiding Arms Races. “We affirm that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. As nuclear use would have far-reaching consequences, we also affirm that nuclear weapons—for as long as they continue to exist—should serve defensive purposes, deter aggression, and prevent war”, the joint statement proclaimed. They reiterated their commitment (NPT article VI) “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament”. Delegitimizing Use of Nuclear Weapons In June 2022, ahead of the NPT review, the International Campaign against Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) carried out legal analysis that shows nuclear arsenals of nuclear weapons states have only grown considerably. Did they pursue negotiations in good faith (NPT article VI obligation) to end the nuclear arms race? In the aftermath of the 24 February 2022 Russian special military operation in Ukraine to protect people “facing humiliation and genocide perpetrated in the Kiev regime”. In the wake of sanctions and NATO inching closer, the Russian drawing of ‘red lines’ on the use of nuclear weapons did cause global consternation. There is a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) adopted vide the General Assembly resolution 50/245 on 10 September 1996. It requires ratification by “all States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty”. The basic obligation under CTBT would be “not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion”. As on 1 August 2022, 174 states have ratified CTBT. Still, seven are left (US; China; India; Pakistan; Israel; Iran; North Korea), out of 44 states (Annex 2, Article XIV) whose ratification is essential for CTBT to come into force. Interestingly, all the states swear by the ultimate objective of elimination of nuclear weapons. Upon request of the UN General Assembly, the International Court of Justice gave an advisory opinion (8 July 1996) on Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons that echoed (paragraph 105 (2) E) Yudhishthira’s ambivalence (अश्वथाम हतः नरो वा कुञ्जरोवा) in the Mahabharata war, by taking a strange view that “in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake”. Contrary to the view of many International Law scholars that the ICJ declared a non-liquet (no law), this author argued in a seminal work (1997 IJIL 37 (2) 218) that the Court could not do so since such an interpretation “would be contrary to the law of the Charter and other corpus juris on the matter and, indeed to the totality of international law”. It drew signed letters (in pre-internet days) from at least six ICJ judges (on file with the author). In the case of India, even after the emphatic position before the ICJ (20 June 1995) that “the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance…is illegal or unlawful under international law”, notwithstanding going nuclear in 11-13 May 1998 (ISQ 58 (3). 342-362. 2021) and pronouncing a no-first use doctrine on 4 January 2003, it still swears by the “commitment to the goal of a nuclear weapon free world, through global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament”. Ironically, a plenty of technical barriers still remain in the operationalization of the existing international legal instruments for the elimination nuclear weapons. These arise from the basic human insecurity and the streak of nuclear weapon states to dominate non-nuclear states. Time shall have to bring sanity among those who ‘swear by the sword’ of nuclear weapons by delegitimizing their use for survival of life on our only one earth. Part - I: Blog Special Series-I: Use of Food as a Weapon of War: A Challenge for International Law (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com) Part - II: Blog Special Series-II: Use of Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War: A Challenge for International Law (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com) Part - III: Abused Ammunition as a Weapon of War in the DR Congo: A Challenge for International Law (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com) #NuclearWeapons #War #HiroshimaNagasaki #InternationalLaw Professor Dr. Bharat H. Desai is Jawaharlal Nehru Chair and Professor of International Law at the Centre for International Legal Studies of SIS, JNU. He coordinated the Making SIS Visible initiative (2008-2013) as well as Inter-University Consortium: JNU; Jammu; Kashmir; Sikkim (2012-2020) and is the Editor-in-Chief of Environmental Policy and Law (IOS Press: Amsterdam)

By Prof. Santishree Dhulipudi Pandit We need to rediscover and reinvent our civilisational journey The journey of India at 75 to India at 100 makes me think of many things. But there are two things in particular that capture my imagination: Making higher education more Indo-centric and reducing the gender gap at the top. Even after 75 years of Independence, women have a long way to go. The journey towards equality and equity with inclusion is still long and tedious and appears to be a pipe dream. Women’s leadership in higher education and education-related decision-making bodies at the government level is largely absent as these remain boys’ clubs. Only seven of India’s 54 central universities have women vice-chancellors. This is despite girls outnumbering boys in higher education admissions and women constituting more than 50 per cent of the entry-level university teaching positions. The situation is even worse if one is from the reserved categories. There are several reasons for this: Women need to multitask; marriage and family are still considered women’s responsibilities; despite being qualified, women continue to be hobbled by the ruthless, identity-based politics that plague our higher education institutions. In addition, women must fight entrenched patriarchy and male hegemony. It takes a lot of courage, time and energy to fight these social ills and many women just do not want to, as the fight can get dirty and time-consuming. The few who dare to fight are maligned. A woman’s assertiveness is seen as aggressiveness. These inequalities are further confirmed by the 2022 World Economic Forum’s Gender Gap Index. India’s overall score has improved from 0.625 (in 2021) to 0.629, its seventh-highest score in the last 16 years. It will now take 132 years to reach gender parity, with the gap reducing only by four years since 2021. This is a dim prospect for a civilisation state that boasts of the elevation of the feminine. We need to rediscover and reinvent our civilisational journey. The emancipation and empowerment of the Indian mind is the first step. We are disconnected and colonised in our thinking and scholarship. In the last 75 years, we have moved between self-hatred and self-loathing and just imitating the West without any understanding of ourselves. It is time that we start this intellectual journey towards the creation of knowledge that is original and goes back to our roots. This journey is a must for every Indian who wants India to be a Vishwa Guru. This is my vision for India at 100. Technology and other means are important but they are just instruments and cannot replace the quality of the human mind. Just take the sad plight that we are in with regard to the status of women, although the present government is doing its best to break the various glass ceilings. For me, the glass ceiling to be broken is the intellectual slavery of the Indian mind where all that is Western is good and anything Indian is seen as being regressive and therefore bad. All events need to be secularised and the invaders humanised. In history, we often tend to sing of the valour of men who conquered cities with violence and forget the women’s side of the story. Even though women generously populate our civilisational stories, there has hardly been any retelling of these stories from a feminine perspective till recently. We are a civilisation which has always elevated the feminine and celebrated the harmony of the masculine and the feminine in the image of the Ardhanarishwar. Goddesses represent the humanisation of various abstract values. In the concept of the Tridevi, Parvati represents power, Lakshmi represents fortune and Saraswati represents knowledge. And unlike Parvati, who is the epitome of motherhood, Saraswati is pretty firm that she doesn’t believe in marriage and love. She is trying to say that it is more important to love yourself as an individual and love your own work; unless you do that, you won’t be a positive asset for society and the people around you. Women characters are misinterpreted. Take Savitri, who outwitted Yama with her determination and argument. Another politically strong person is Tara, Bali and Sugriva’s wife, who is the reason why the vanaras become part of Rama’s army. If one looks at all these women, it is clear that they have been misinterpreted because of social pressure and ignorance. Pativratas are women who broke the rules. Which other tradition has this progressive, even revolutionary, narrative? In one of the earliest recorded protests against a male-dominated world and society, Draupadi’s fight against injustice reflects one of the first acts of feminism — a fight for one’s rights. In this case, it was the right to avenge the wrongs inflicted on her. She is exemplified as one of the earliest feminists, be it in terms of polyandry — regarded as a matter of censure by society, then and now — or in terms of her thirst for revenge. Why can’t Sita be seen as the first single mother? Unless and until India becomes a norm-builder we will go nowhere. We will just be imitating the other while losing all that is our own. Institutions of higher education must open themselves up to multiple Indic narratives because they represent the space where true liberation can begin in the mind. The emancipation and empowerment of women need to be fought for first at the level of ideas and narratives. It is at the level of the mind and intellect where the real battle for us lies, from now to India in 2047. India is a civilisational state that rests on the shoulders of women such as Sita, Draupadi, Kannagi and Manimekalai. They were unconventional, intelligent, strong-willed and capable of taking independent decisions and exercising their autonomy. India at 100 will be where women will be able to reclaim and reconstruct such a strong civilisational heritage by leading the state from the front as leaders across all fields. #India #India@75 #IndependenceDay #WomenLeadership #IndianCivilisation Originally published: The Indian Express, August 15, 2022 https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/india-of-sita-draupadi-kannagi-india-75-independence-day-8090434/ Posted here with the authorization of Dean,SIS. Prof. Santishree Dhulipudi Pandit is the Vice-Chancellor, Jawaharlal Nehru University.

By Srijan Sharma The world order has witnessed three strategic shocks- first is the COVID-19 pandemic; second US unceremonious exit from Afghanistan leading to Talibanization of Afghanistan; and third is the Russia Ukraine War. However, when we look around India, we find that India is in tight position in battling and strategically balancing in these strategic shocks. The situation gets more complicated when India faced a new strategic shock of managing disordered affairs of her neighbors in the South Asian region and therefore, a discussion on India’s strategic environment deserves merit. Internal Strategic Environment Since last two years, India’s internal strategic environment has witnessed spinning changes. The two years went in battling and reviving from the devastating COVID waves. The aftermath of the waves knocked the doors of economic pressure affecting India’s internal environment. Apart from non-traditional threats, the traditional threats have vigorously evolved. Since past few decades while computing India’s internal strategic environment only traditional threats were considered as sole component, but in recent times civil society has assumed a special mention in India’s internal strategic environment. COVID Pandemic First the COVID claimed thousands of lives, made people homeless and jobless. Second the economic pressure- India witnessed inflation pressure and price pressures during COVID times. Though India is recalibrating and at least able to ensure a steady mark for its economy. Thus, putting civil society under pressure due to COVID and economic factor. Civil Society Chanakya stressed on four dangers to national security – one external abetment of external origin and internal abetment of internal origin. Based on this there is consistent threat on the societal cohesiveness of the Indian state. Due to variety of reasons and external abetments of external origin that have exploited the societal fault lines. India witnessed some controversial events which disturbed India’s internal environment- Farmers Agitation, CAA riots etc. This opened a new box of emerging threat to India’s internal strategic environment i.e., psychological warfare where hostile subverted actors try to target and destabilize Indian civil society. Perhaps, that’s why last year the National Security Advisor (NSA) in passing out parade of IPS probationers has said that “Civil Society is New Theater of Warfare". In totality one cannot shut eyes from the fact after 2019 India’s internal strategic environment has been bulldozed with intertwining of traditional and non-traditional threats involving the civil society factor which is going to complicate India’s internal strategic environment. External Strategic Environment As mentioned above that three strategic shocks and the fourth one sums up the present external strategic environment for India where on one hand geopolitical uncertainty is increasing and on the other hand India is navigating in troubled waters of geopolitical realignment using its strategic autonomy focused on maximizing and protecting her interests. However, one may argue that the strategic autonomy comes under a strong pressure when we see adversarial maneuvering of hostile neighbors- China’s charm offensive through CPEC and BRI in South Asia embracing Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar complimented by growing Pakistan-China axis where Pakistan is assuming the role of China’s second tool of deterrence against India. Therefore, in the present tight situation India’s aspirations of strategic rise are guided by strategic autonomy. Apart from challenges, India sees brewing opportunities in Eurasia and Indo Pacific besides, seeing them reeling under strategic uncertainty. The limited interests West and Russia in Central Asia after Afghanistan episode had given regional power a considerable space to weigh options in the region. However, with Russia-Ukraine episode it has been argued that Russia is coming back in its neighborhood using regional power as springboard to fill the strategic vacuum. For India it is needles to mention that India has vast interests in the resource rich region as postulated by Heartland theory and in the pursuance of the same India has been carving out strategies through Iran by sharing room in regional initiative backed up by nurturing close ties with Central Asian countries- NSA level meet In November 2021 and choosing Central Asian Presidents as Republic Day chief guest are also steps in making India and Central Asian connect closer and stronger. However, a counter perspective is that India’s connect central Asian policy with Russia is currently facing a limitation due to heavy sanctions on Russia but operationalization of International North South Transport Corridor has revived some hopes for India’s connect central Asian policy. On the other hand, Iran is under pressure from India’s key strategic partners Israel and US on its nuclear issue and therefore in such scenario India-Iran relations would be tested. But what remains a Eurasian challenge for India is the Strategic alignment of China Russia-Iran and Turkey-Pakistan. Deft diplomacy in blocking Islamic bloc of Turkey-Pakistan and calculatedly managing relations with Iran Russia to keep Chinese influence at bay are some options. India must realize that the geopolitics of trade and connectivity would form the competition base for India’s connect Central Asia policy in coming years. Therefore, India must keep paddling between Iran and Central Asian leaders to gain an all-exclusive access to Central Asian region and further reduce dependence on Russia. Down to Pacific, India is assuming significant importance in the Indo Pacific region both military and diplomatically. It has been argued that US sees India as strategic balancer in the region in countering Chinese hegemonic rise in the region. Further the status of strategic balancer would provide India plethora of opportunities in maximizing sphere of influence in maritime domain. However, a counter argument comes in when Indo Pacific region gets referred as strategic competitive region. With Sino-Russia axis coming into play and Taiwan coming under threat would eventually put India under intense pressure of managing Indo Pacific affairs and countering China. Though Australia is an option for US but Australian Naval architecture still needs improvement. Considering this India has been in center for which India needs to vector the concert of other key Indo Pacific players and middle level powers for ensuring stability in the region. #India #Strategic #CivilSociety #ForeignPolicy Srijan Sharma is working as an Research Analyst at India's oldest and prestigious national security and strategic Think Tank United Service Institution Of India (USI). Views are personal.

By Prof. Swaran Singh and Prof. Yves Tiberghien, UBC There is plenty of blame to go around for the apparent fourth Taiwan Straits crisis of August 2022. Intensely partisan US politics have taken the liberal international order for a dangerous ride. Increasingly nationalistic politics in China have produced assertive foreign policy behaviour and in the age of social media, emotions across the Pacific are boiling over. The delicate diplomatic compromise of constructive ambiguity over Taiwan’s status initiated by former US national security advisor Henry Kissinger and Chinese premier Zhou Enlai in 1972 is fraying beyond repair. We are witnessing a ratcheting up of the struggle between ideational commitments to the rival principles of democracy and national sovereignty. The compromise around a general ‘One China’ policy, coupled with the deterrence inscribed by the 1979 US Taiwan Relations Act and other reassurances which were last reinforced in 1998, have been the foundation of diplomatic relations between China and Western nations. Should this delicate equilibrium break, the global order will be undermined, resulting in heightened tensions to the point of possible conflict. The region is rattled in the wake of US House of Representatives Speaker, Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan and China’s response in the form of massive military exercises and diplomatic bluster. The Chinese navy and air force have entered Taiwan’s territorial waters for the first time. Missiles have landed near the island and in Japan’s exclusive economic zone. China has also severed most diplomatic channels with the United States and walked out of the ASEAN summit, not once but twice. India expressed its concern with a loud silence, Southeast Asia with an urgent call for tension de-escalation and South Korea with the surprising snub of Pelosi during her visit to Seoul. Japan joined the G7 communique supporting Pelosi’s visit and condemned China’s dangerous military response. This enraged China and caused the last-minute cancellation of a planned meeting between China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Japan’s Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi. It is worrisome that the world’s two economic and military superpowers keep escalating their tit-for-tat interactions without a visible endpoint or any institutionalised guardrails. The current fulcrum of domestic politics in each country appears to reward a bottom-line mentality, normative grand standing and mutual discounting. Such a high-risk situation is a flashback to the politics of summer 1914 or the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. The domestic mood in each country discounts the misery that one wrong move could create, especially for the people of Taiwan. There is no incentive to pursue stabilisation through restraint or accommodation or willingness to show any appearance of weakness. Pelosi’s Asia tour was totally overshadowed by speculation about her Taiwan visit. Despite reassurances by the US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, that Washington’s commitment to the ‘One China’ policy remains unchanged, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi called the visit ‘manic, irresponsible and irrational’. As pre-warned by Chinese President Xi Jinping, China used the visit to undertake high-calibre live fire drills —effectively enforcing a four-day blockade of Taiwan and disrupting shipping and flights into Taipei. The visit was preceded by secrecy and press leaks. The initial statement issued by Pelosi’s office made no mention of Taiwan, stating that her ‘visits to Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea and Japan’ aimed to establish ‘mutual security, economic partnership and democratic governance in the Indo-Pacific region’. Amid growing media leaks from Taiwan, Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong reaffirmed ‘the importance of stable US–China relations for regional peace and stability’. For all the talk of a last-minute stop, Taiwan pulled off a carnival-like welcome with a livestream of her arrival and a massive greeting on the Taipei 101 building. Both supporters and protestors showed up in streets. At the Legislative Yuan, Pelosi delivered a strong expression of support for Taiwan’s fight for freedom and democracy. The shockwaves made by Pelosi’s Taiwan visit were felt during her stopover in Seoul. Sensing the mood in Beijing, South Korean President Yoon Suk-Yeol chose not to meet with her because he was reportedly on vacation, making him the only leader not to meet with Pelosi on her Asia tour. President Yoon made this move in spite of his pro-United States leanings, his near historic low approval ratings and Pelosi’s visit to the ‘truce village’ of Panmunjom in the Korean DMZ. No senior officials or legislators welcomed Pelosi upon her landing in Seoul. China was quick to reward South Korea by inviting Foreign Minister Park Jin to Beijing. The reverberations from Taipei were still palpable when she met with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and House Speaker Kiroyuki Hosoda. The meeting came soon after China’s missiles landed in Japan’s exclusive economic zone and Wang Yi’s meeting with Yoshimasa Hayashi was cancelled. In the end, this crisis has offered Nancy Pelosi the chance to establish her legacy of toughness on China and support for democracy ahead of the US mid-term elections. It has also given China an opportunity to test its growing military hardware in Taiwanese waters and demonstrate its commitment to sovereignty ahead of the Fall Party Congress. But the trip as could have been foretold has unleashed a new cycle of mistrust, nationalist escalation and an arms race in the Pacific. The United States and China must urgently establish more robust communication channels, updated arms control mechanisms and bring some stability and peace back to the Taiwan compromise. #China #Taiwan #US #NancyPelosi Originally published: East Asia Forum, August 8, 2022 https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/08/08/pelosis-visit-could-derail-us-china-compromise-over-taiwan/?fbclid=IwAR2nVAAO0Bg3IwyMbCO6a7rmALc6mAkgIGHSUreryEUCOF6Zaf5GJMQuy7g Posted here with the authorization of Prof. Swaran Singh. Swaran Singh is Professor in the School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and President of the Association of Asia Scholars. He is Visiting Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of British Columbia. Yves Tiberghien is Professor of Political Science and Director Emeritus of the Institute of Asian Research at the University of British Columbia. He is also a Distinguished Fellow at the Asia-Pacific Foundation of Canada.

By Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli Nancy Pelosi’s defiant, but unannounced, visit comes in the wake of China’s uncalled for, politically disastrous and military indefensible, escalation for the past few years Nancy Pelosi, the Speaker of the United States Representatives, called off China’s bluff on “playing with fire” by visiting Taiwan on 3 August, amidst the latter’s coercive diplomatic pressures. Nancy Pelosi’s defiant, but unannounced, visit comes in the wake of China’s uncalled for, politically disastrous and military indefensible, escalation for the past few years. Pelosi praised Taiwan’s bubbling democracy and called the beleaguered island a friend and defended it in her speeches during her whirlwind less than a day visit. Even though China threatened to retaliate to the visit, Pelosi continued her visit nonchalantly making China to blink first in this round. The political fallout of Pelosi’s visit on China’s domestic politics is higher than on Taiwan or the US. President Xi Jinping since his ascension in 2012 has been making caustic comments on Taiwan, with the 2017 19th Communist Party Congress stating that “We will never allow anyone, any organisation, or any political party, at any time or in any form, to separate any part of Chinese territory from China!” Further at the communist party’s centennial in July 2021, Xi even threatened to “break the heads” of those who interfere with Taiwan. As China now could not stop Pelosi’s visit, the 20th communist party congress this November, where Xi is seeking a third term, could become decisive. Naturally the upcoming Beidaihe meeting of high-level party leaders and elders could be stormy. The timing of Pelosi’s visit could not be worse for Xi. Rival political factional leaders like Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and others are up in arms with Xi for many reasons but the Taiwan fiasco could provide them with enough reasons to counter Xi. With massive restrictions due to “zero Covid” policies, several millions of Chinese are in partial or complete lockdown with hardships. The economic growth is declining due to these policies and due to the on-going tariff wars with the US. While Xi banked on nationalism and anti-corruption drive to protect himself so far, the escalation on Taiwan could prove to be costly. Also, Pelosi’s aircraft landed in Taiwan with the US Air Force flight escort, thus puncturing one of China’s original “three nos” — that Taiwan should not become independent, no foreign troops in Taiwan soil and no to Taiwan’s nuclear weapon programme. With such military aircraft landing in Taiwan, China’s inability to stop such landing not only exposed China’s weakness but also for possible defiance by other countries in future of such red lines by China. Pelosi was also signalling that China’s recent forays in Asia will be checkmated. In May 2014, addressing the summit meeting of Conference on Interactions in Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) at Shanghai, Xi Jinping suggested that “outside” powers should withdraw from Asia for the eventual imposition of Chinese hegemony. Since then, China’s aggressiveness on South China Sea islands disputes, over Senkaku islands with Japan and on land borders with India knew no bounds. Pelosi not only indirectly questioned China’s ability but also its credentials for the claims. In the aftermath of Pelosi’s visit, China had deployed naval and air forces in six maritime regions close to Taiwan as an intimidating tactic. There are also reports of Chinese cyber-attacks on Taiwan’s foreign ministry, banks and certain market stores, besides banning certain food products. With or with the US tacit support, Taiwan could weather off this challenge. For Taiwan, Pelosi’s visit could be a major turning point in its strategic direction, both at the domestic and external affairs. At the domestic political level, the majority “status quo” public opinion in the political spectrum could change towards an active assertion of Taiwan’s identity far away from China. More the Chinese coercion, more would be the critical responses of the Taiwanese in the near future. At the foreign policy level, the US ambiguous policies could change towards more clarity and purpose in defending Taiwan and its democratic system. Taiwan’s joining of the emerging Indo-Pacific could also be fructified in this milieu. Thus, “internationalisation” of Taiwan issue is likely to pick up pace, as 300,000 who watched Pelosi’s flight path in anticipation indicated. If Taiwan had to go through seven decades of uncertainty, Pelosi’s visit nudged this process for more clear outcomes in the near future. During the Russian invasion of Ukraine, many analysts suggested an imminent Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Pelosi’s visit not only questions this assumption by politically providing American support to Taiwan but provides Taiwan with an opportunity to explore friends and allies in the international system. This could also further intensify the ongoing New Southbound policy’s outreach soon. #China #Taiwan #US #NancyPelosi Originally published: News18, August 07, 2022. https://www.news18.com/news/opinion/nancy-pelosis-visit-to-taiwan-need-to-stand-up-to-china-and-call-its-bluff-5704915.html Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli is Professor in Chinese Studies and Dean of School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University.