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By Pratik Mall The tragic saga in Ukraine is also clear evidence of the USA's fundamentally faulty policy towards Russia and the lack of consensus in Europe over Russia. Ukraine's conflict has snowballed into a full-scale crisis with grave consequences for the world order, great power contestation and, more importantly, world peace and stability. Dubbed the grimmest crisis since the 1990's when the cold war ended, the crisis has severe consequences for humanity. It has brought into focus the critical questions of international relations such as notions of security, the balance of power politics, revanchism of Russia and misplaced priorities of the USA and West in the post cold war world order. The genesis of the crisis can be traced back to the politics of the post-cold war period and especially the revanchist and irredentist behaviour of Russia in the wake of radically altered post-pandemic global order. The ascendancy of Putin and the feeling of being betrayed on the promises made to a militarily weak and economically tamed Russia has given a rational and eminently logical basis to Russian actions in Ukraine. The idea of controlling eastern Europe and keeping it under Moscow's orbit and the rivalries with the West over NATO expansion since the end of the cold war has got amplified in the current crisis. In the theoretical framework, one could understand the salience of the contemporary theatre through Mackinder's heartland theory, wherein he pointed out that the country controlling Eastern Europe would rule the world. The idea was mooted in 1904 when the area in question was a part of the Russian empire. Later on, the region witnessed a significantly heated contestation throughout the Cold War. The differing notions of Russia and the West's security have contributed significantly to the crisis. On the one hand, the USA didn't disband NATO and instead justified its existence and even carried out two distinct rounds of its expansion, thereby increasing the suspicion of Russia about its covert and, over some time, its overt ambitions. Russia, which believed in indivisible security, opposed the idea of NATO as a collective defence. First mooted at the Helsinki agreement of 1975 and later on reaffirmed in the 1990 Charter of Paris for A New Europe, 1997 NATO- Russia agreement, and at the Istanbul and Astana summit of OSCE, the idea talked of not enhancing one's security in a manner as to jeopardize the security of others. Therefore, it emphasized the security of Russia and its neighbours as one. Putin's Russia viewed the NATO expansion as a blatant violation of this guarantee. The dissatisfaction was quite apparent if one looks at Putin's 2007 Munich security dialogue speech, where he warned the West not to overstep. The sense of hostilities since then has only increased. The 2008 annexation of Georgia and 2014 annexation of Crimea, and now the 2022 invasion of Ukraine to ultimately integrate the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk into the Donbas region is a clear manifestation of the dissatisfaction. In addition to Putin's perceived sense of injustice, the memories of humiliation that Russia faced after the collapse further cemented his resolve to make Russia a global great power again and restore the old glory. It was very much reflected in Putin's speech that he recently gave about the history of Ukraine. This very idea of Russia securing its rightful place among the comity of nations further emboldened Putin's irredentist and revanchist tendencies. The tragic saga in Ukraine is also clear evidence of the USA's fundamentally faulty policy towards Russia and the lack of consensus in Europe over Russia. A close look at the level of economic engagement between Russia and Germany, and France in the oil and gas sectors, among many other industries, brings to the surface the contradictions in the EU. Many realist scholars like John Mearsheimer and the likes such as Henry Kissinger and Stephen Walt have pointed out the misplaced priorities of USA foreign policy. According to Mearsheimer, the USA is militarily and actively engaged in a region that is not even its core and vital national security interest. Whereas if we look from a Russian perspective, the region forms an integral part of its vital and core strategic and national security interest. Howsoever biting it may be, the economic sanctions could not stop Russia from doing what it intends to do. Therefore, realistically speaking, the need for the hour is to focus on the real and serious existential threat, i.e. China. The Biden administration must start to believe in the balance of power politics. Rather than further alienating Russia and pushing it into the Chinese lap, it must try to work out peace with Russia and, if possible, take it on its side to contain china. A few give and takes with Russia for a larger purpose are justified in the case of the severe Chinese threat. Neutralizing Ukraine and establishing it as an ideal buffer zone remains the most pragmatic solution from a realist viewpoint. It will make eminent sense if one starts to look at the Chinese challenge from Mahanian wisdom, which talked about the nation controlling the sea and ultimately controlling the world. #EU #NATO #USA #Russia #Ukraine Pratik Mall is an M.A. PISM (First Year), Batch 2021-2023 student of School of International Studies, JNU. Email ID: pratikmall.h@gmail.com

By Dr. Sheetal Sharma With vacillating opinion in favour of war to suppression of opposition of war, the world will start seeing the Ukranian aggression more as a humanitarian crisis sooner than later and will coalesce against Russia as a threat to world peace and global order in the long run. The current situation on eastern border of Europe is grim and involves many actors and factors in its making. Depending on what position and/or perspective an individual holds, one can call it war, aggression, invasion or attack, but in sum total the ground situation remains grave. On April 2, 2019, Evelyn Farkas, senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, delivered a testimony in front of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, on the future challenges and opportunities for NATO ahead of the alliance’s 70th anniversary. Farkas was deliberating upon the challenges, threats and opportunities facing NATO within the context of its Open Door policy, and he opened up by saying that ‘our international system, NATO, and democracy in America and around the world have never been in graver danger since the Cold War than they are today’. The transatlantic organisation faced challenges from both the sides of the Atlantic. In the EU there was a division of opinion between the federalist who advocated for a fully integrated defence under an EU framework and the (pro) Atlantist who relied and considered NATO as central pillar for European defence initiatives; and yet another group calling for more intergovernmental approach setting aside collective structures in favour of ad hoc coalitions in the region between stakeholder countries. NATO was perceived as adhering to the conventional style of response even when others and Russia particularly, was posing grave challenges using unconventional threats to NATO and its allies in the form of cyber-attacks, chemical-grade weapons, election meddling, misinformation, disinformation, and exhibition of military might in Baltics region and what not. In sum, NATO was increasingly seen as sluggish and sticking to a routine approach of operations involving planning, command structure, troop deployment and, often, long negotiations. However Russian aggression has created conditions for NATO to reinfuse life in the collective. Some of the obvious indicators are that Sweden and Finland are considering accession to NATO. While delivering a speech to the EU parliament in Strasbourg, the French President Emmanuel Macron said that “it will take decades for Ukraine to be accepted into the European Union (EU)”. Macron suggested that “Ukraine could join a parallel European community as it awaits the EU’s decision on its membership. If Ukraine decided to join the parallel European community then the community could also host non-EU members who could be part of Europe’s security architecture”. Macron further added that the “new organisation would allow democratic European nations to “find a new space of political cooperation” in the areas of security, energy, transport, infrastructure investment and freedom of movement. Such statements are proof of consolidation of the EU on various parallel lines and aspects. The support that Ukraine is receiving from the western club has helped Ukraine stay in the defence of aggression for more than two months now. The attack has also put the scepticism regarding the European integration on back burner. Suddenly Europe seems to be more united, at least temporarily in the wake of the Russian threat. The European countries find themselves more close and safe in the European security umbrella and ambit as compared to a situation where they struggle alone and becoming vulnerable to Russian threat. In fact the Russian intervention in Ukraine has resulted in conditions that were faintly existing or were under stress at the beginning of 2022. The threat of Russia has resulted in seemingly greater integration of the EU. The shocks of post Brexit restructuring, looming threats of other exits, political crisis and economic stress, the chasm between the eastern and western Europe, etc. for a while have given way to greater faith in collective existence rather than fissiparous tendencies. Germany, despite being slightly reluctant initially in imposition of sanctions against Russia finally reflected the EU’s sentiment in opposing the war and clear disassociation. Further, after more than 7 decades Germans are mulling for remilitarisation in case of any security threat. In the light of the energy crisis that the European countries are and may have to face, there can be some differences of opinion on Russia (such as Hungary demanded full exemption from Russia oil import ban, as it will place an unfair burden on countries that import crude oil from Russia. Slovakia, Czech Republic and Bulgaria too are resisting the oil import ban) but all of these countries largely converge on anti-aggression stand. In more than two months it is evident that the skirmish has reached an impasse with both sides claiming victory and reclaiming areas under siege from each other. Which countries support Russia and why they support military action and intervention in Ukraine are well known to the world, but beyond a point Russian aggression cannot be an answer to the perceived threat of NATO’s presence at its doorstep. Russia acted out of proportion on a (perceived) threat of NATO coming to its doorstep, but it has itself created conditions for NATO to come and camp in its neighbourhood. The complete capture of Ukraine will make Poland as its neighbour. As and when Sweden and Finland joins NATO, which shares 810 mile long border with Russia, NATO will be its next door neighbour. The more the war drags, with every passing day Russia may or may not accept that it is losing militarily, but in the medium to long run it will suffer economically, and also on many other indexes of humanitarian concerns. Driven by western sanction and facing grave economic situations, four regional governors, from Tomsk, Saratov, Kirov and Mari El regions, resigned from their offices. With vacillating opinion in favour of war to suppression of opposition of war, the world will start seeing the Ukranian aggression more as a humanitarian crisis sooner than later and will coalesce against Russia as a threat to world peace and global order in the long run. The global community in general has to envisage ways to bring the intervention to an end. Compromises and negotiations have to be done from both the sides. Both from a near and/or a distant perspective it is not a win-lose situation, it is a lose-lose for all the actors involved. #EU #NATO #Russia #Ukraine Dr. Sheetal Sharma is Assistant Professor, Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, JNU.

By Prof. Swaran Singh While the US is preoccupied with Ukraine and China, ASEAN has other concerns, including prodigal member Myanmar The United States seems determined to dismiss growing suspicions that its preoccupation with the Ukraine crisis has allowed China a freer hand across the Indo-Pacific region. The backdrop of the prolonged Covid-19 pandemic – where, unlike the US and its allies, China has managed to contain its health and economic consequences – has only reinforced such scary pontifications. It is against this backdrop that finally May 12-13 will see US President Joe Biden hosting a special in-person summit with the ASEAN leaders in Washington. This summit, to commemorate the 45 years of US-ASEAN relations, was originally planned for the end of March but was delayed because of scheduling problems claimed by some of the ASEAN leaders. The originally scheduling had been meant as a follow-up to the release of Biden’s Indo-Pacific Strategy in February that reiterated the centrality of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in the region. But now, this special summit is coinciding with the Biden administration’s much-awaited China Policy outline and will be followed, later this month, by Biden’s visits South Korea and Japan. Among his engagements during his Asia tour, Biden will be joining the Quad leaders’ summit. China-centricity This changed backdrop of the US-ASEAN summit clearly sharpens the focus on the China-centricity of US engagement with the Southeast Asian bloc. Indeed, Biden’s efforts at uniting America’s Asian allies in knitting together his larger Indo-Pacific narratives by offering economic alternatives to China’s Belt and Road Initiative have continued to betray the China-centricity of multifaceted US engagements. It has aways been tricky for the United States to avoid publicizing the China fixation of its Indo-Pacific discourses, and ASEAN perhaps presents the most apt example. ASEAN, which was originally created to contain the spread of communism, has since come to be a close economic partner, if not friend, of China. Last November, President Xi Jinping, marking the 30th anniversary of China-ASEAN relations, even endorsed ASEAN centrality as well as the ASEAN Outlook for the Indo-Pacific region. ASEAN’s most vehement supporter of China in recent times, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, is be about to be replaced by Ferdinand Marcos Jr, who swept the recent election and is due to be sworn in as president of the Philippines on June 30. However, the outgoing president’s daughter Sara Duterte will be the new vice-president, and is expected to continue Rodrigo Duterte’s legacies for the next six years. According to some experts, in spite of the late dictator Ferdinand Marcos Sr having once had a strong security partnership with the United States, his son is more likely to continue Duterte’s policies by “engaging China while keeping the United States close by.” Others believe that Marcos Jr may actually push relations closer to China, increasing the growing awkwardness in US-ASEAN relations. But as the Philippines will reportedly not be represented at the Washington summit, this issue will likely remain murky for now. ASEAN centrality To play it safe, the US interlocutors are expected to parrot the “ASEAN centrality” mantra. This has come to be one most agreed formulas that could keep the US closer to its Asian allies, as well as European allies interested in the Indo-Pacific region. This also explains why the recent press release on the subject from ASEAN chair Cambodia also alludes to the expectation that the US would continue to uphold ASEAN centrality as a key to fostering larger regional peace and stability. The press release also underlines how this week’s event will be the second special US-ASEAN summit since 2016 and the first in-person US presidential engagement for ASEAN leaders since 2017, alluding perhaps to Washington’s relative neglect of the bloc during the Donald Trump era. No doubt Biden has gradually distanced himself from his predecessor’s narrowly focused, confrontationist, China-centric approach to the Indo-Pacific region, yet what worries ASEAN is that Washington has failed so far to go beyond its China-centric focus. Creation of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and the AUKUS (Australia, United Kingdom, United States) security mechanism have only reinforced such concerns regarding likely marginalization of ASEAN. With Secretary of State Antony Blinken testing positive for Covid-19, his planned May 5 George Washington University speech to outline US-China policy was postponed and may end up happening very close to the US-ASEAN summit. Until then, Blinken’s speech of March 2021 continues to be the blueprint of Biden’s China policy; that is, to be “competitive when it should be, collaborative when it can be, and adversarial when it must be.” At its face value, this may align well with the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, yet the US increasingly feels the need to wean ASEAN away from getting attracted to China-centric multilateralism in the region. Way back in 2009, China had become ASEAN’s largest trading partner, in 2020 ASEAN became China’s largest trading partner. This says a lot about their changing equations. The ASEAN-China Maritime Exercise 2021 plus the expected conclusion of a China-ASEAN Code of Conduct for the disputed South China Sea before the end of 2022 has surely ignited anxieties among US interlocutors. And now Xi Jinping’s Global Security Initiative (GSI) that warns Asian nations of “hegemonism, power politics and confrontations” that alludes to US initiatives like Quad and AUKUS making ASEAN concerned about this increasing brinkmanship between the US and China. Xi’s call for “Asian unity” in the GSI has to be seen in the context of the continuing Ukraine crisis that has further sharpened the divide between the US and China, where ASEAN fears being sidelined. This may see interlocutors at the US-ASEAN Summit pulling and pushing in different directions. Ukraine vs Myanmar For instance, while ensuring ASEAN support on Ukraine would be the expected priority for the US interlocutors, ensuring greater US engagement on resolving continuing tensions in Myanmar would be ASEAN’s priority in this summit. While most nations around the world have put the onus of resolving the Myanmar problem on ASEAN, the bloc has become increasingly ineffective in making of this member state comply with even a minimum of basic international norms. Other than broad issues deliberating on principles and broad praxis for addressing various international challenges, Ukraine and Myanmar therefore are likely to become issues of contention, even competitive in seeking greater traction. It is interesting to see that other than Singapore, the nine other ASEAN members have so far remained cautious in supporting the pet American project of slapping severe sanctions on Russia. The short two-paragraph statement issued by the ASEAN foreign ministers’ meet in March expressed their being “deeply troubled” by “worsening humanitarian conditions resulting from ongoing military hostilities in Ukraine” and called for an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine, but without naming Russia or calling it an invasion. For ASEAN, Myanmar remains their strongest aberration. The prime minister of Cambodia, the ASEAN Chair for 2022, Hun Sen, traveled to Myanmar in January to explore ways to untie knots in the Five Point Consensus signed in April last year. At a summit in Jakarta on April 24, 2021, General Min Aung Hlaing agreed to end the violence in Myanmar immediately, start dialogue with elected leaders, and accept humanitarian assistance and appointment of a special envoy for visits to Myanmar and meetings with all parties. This has since failed, primarily because of Min Aung Hlaing going back on his commitments to ASEAN and continuing to incarcerate Aung San Suu Kyi, her party leaders and her supporters. On May 1, Hun Sen again called on the junta leader, asking him to allow a second visit by the ASEAN Chair’s special envoy to meet with deposed national leader Suu Kyi, but to no avail so far. But the dilemma is that ASEAN may be seeking solutions to Myanmar while its military leader, Min Aung Hlaing, has not been invited to the summit. How the US, the strongest votary of protecting democracy, will manage to restore ASEAN confidence in its commitment will be an uphill task at this week’s meeting. #US #ASEAN #Ukraine #China #Myanmar Originally published: Asia Times, May 12, 2022 At: https://asiatimes.com/2022/05/us-asean-need-to-restore-mutual-trust-at-summit/ Posted here with the authorization of the author. Prof. Swaran Singh is Professor of Diplomacy and Disarmament at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi; President of Association of Asia Scholars (asiascholars.in); Adjunct Senior Fellow at The Charhar Institute, Beijing; Senior Fellow, Institute for National Security Studies Sri Lanka, Colombo; and Visiting Professor, Research Institute for Indian Ocean Economies, Kunming (China).

By Prof. Swaran Singh The Taliban of 2022 have showcased themselves as being no different from the Taliban of 1996-2001 This week saw the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (read Taliban) ban the issuing of driver’s licenses to its female citizens. Before that, in March, the regime prohibited girls from attending secondary schools. And the list of Taliban regression from their promises on gender equality go on and on. Media continue to report on the Taliban’s ban on women from most paid employment, preventing their free movement, shutting down the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, and silencing female journalists. So when it comes to gender equality, the Taliban of 2022 have increasingly showcased themselves as being no different from the Taliban of 1996-2001. Indeed, the last nine months of Taliban rule have witnessed irreversible rollbacks on what the Western powers flaunt as their groundbreaking achievements on gender equality in Afghanistan over the two decades of their presence in that country. But now, the Taliban are unstoppable in spite of all the Western censure and sanctions-driven denial and deprivations inflicted on their leadership. Especially for the last two months, while the world has been busy with the Ukraine crisis, continued suffering of Afghans has been pushed to the periphery, raising serious questions on Western post-exit strategies to redress this catastrophe. Islamic disunity Indeed, it is not only Western nations that claim surprise at the Taliban turning their back on the promises they made on their way to capturing power. Their harsh anti-women measures are equally at variance from much of the Islamic world. However, in spite of their celebrated “Muslim brotherhood” doctrine, even the Islamic world has remained just a silent spectator. Among the Taliban’s time-tested funders and mentors, Saudi Arabia had described the Taliban’s takeover last August as a “step in the right direction,” but maintains a rather muted response in terms of sending humanitarian assistance and working through regional stakeholders like Pakistan and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). During the Taliban’s last stint in power from 1996 to 2001, Saudi Arabia was one the three countries formally to recognize the Taliban government in Afghanistan, the other two being the United Arab Emirates and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. But this time around, none of those three nations have yet recognized the Taliban regime; nor has any another other sovereign nation recognized Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Indeed, during the last few years of Prince Mohammed bin Salman emerging as its de facto ruler, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia – one of the most powerful but also most conservative among Islamic nations – has witnessed a monumental shift in policies allowing its citizens free access to modern technologies, entertainment and leisure, including allowing women to drive and have freedom of movement. But given their close relations with the United States, which was forced to exit Afghanistan by the Taliban, both the UAE and Saudi Arabia have “curiously maintained a distance” from the Taliban regime. Meanwhile, among the other multiple impacts of the ongoing Ukraine crisis, it has clearly pushed global spotlights away from Afghanistan while leaving hapless masses to their destiny. In some ways, Ukraine provides an alibi for both the West – which controlled Afghanistan for the last two decades – and much of the Muslim world – which prides itself on a Muslim brotherhood doctrine – to acquit themselves of what is happening to Afghan people, especially women and children. Western alibis Most of the Western powers that controlled Afghanistan and supported the governments of Hamid Karzai and and Ashraf Ghani have stopped bothering even about the loyal members of their former local support staff. Large numbers of those Afghans were promised evacuation by their Western employers. They have since become easy prey for the Taliban’s intolerance often expressed against former local officials and staff of foreign missions, such as former security guards and military interpreters. Meanwhile, most Afghan embassies around the world have also become dysfunctional for lack of funds, thus destroying an entire diplomatic service built up over the last two decades. This also means a breakdown of the Taliban’s connections with those nations and leaving Afghan nationals living in those countries without any consular services. Having lost Afghanistan to the Taliban, Western nations have also kind of pushed the onus on to its neighboring countries that are bound to be immediate targets of any Afghan instability. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan claims to have 45 embassies and 20 consulates, mostly in Asia and Europe, functioning under Taliban command or in alignment with them. In fact four important neighboring nations – China, Pakistan, Russia and Turkmenistan – recently accredited Taliban-appointed diplomats, even though they have not formally recognized the regime itself. In the midst of the Ukraine crisis, Russia has handed over the Afghan Embassy to Taliban-appointed Jamal Garwal as their new chargé d’affaires in Moscow. Likewise, on November 30, 2021, the Saudi Embassy in Kabul resumed its work, and this “profound step” was amply welcomed by the provisional government of Taliban. But all this has not brought much relief to the Afghan masses. Situation on the ground grim Recently released reports raise questions about inefficient and incomplete distribution of foreign aid as well as how sanctions continue creating difficulties for donors attempting to deliver on their promises. They also raise questions on whether the international community has failed to use its assistance leverage to obtain good behavior from the Taliban leadership. As studies have shown, in any conflict situation, women are not only the last to access aid but are the most vulnerable to discriminations and violence. The same is true of continued violence in Afghanistan. In spite of the Taliban’s claims of having eliminated the presence of Islamic State (ISIS), bombings have continued across Afghanistan, hitting innocent civilians including schools. Even the OIC, which has given two hearings to the Taliban in Islamabad and created a special relief fund for them, has expressed only muted concerns about continued bombings inside Afghanistan, expecting the Taliban to “take a resolute stand against whoever sponsors or orchestras them.” Though there is little doubt that the Taliban leadership had projected strong central command and control in their removal of foreign forces and continue to be in command of the nation-state of Afghanistan, reports of their being internally at loggerheads with one another have become alarming. Even their strongest benefactor, Pakistan, has been warning the Taliban of surgical strikes inside Afghanistan to destroy so-called sanctuaries provide to cadres of Tehreeke-e-Taliban Pakistan and other Baloch militants’ hideouts. For women in Afghanistan, no relief seems to be yet in sight, unless and until the end of the Ukraine crisis may redirect global spotlights to their plight. #Ukraine #Afghanistan #Taliban Originally published: Asia Times, May 6, 2022. At: https://asiatimes.com/2022/05/focus-on-ukraine-has-pushed-afghans-plight-to-periphery/ Posted here with the permission of the author. Prof. Swaran Singh is Professor of Diplomacy and Disarmament at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi; President of Association of Asia Scholars (asiascholars.in); Adjunct Senior Fellow at The Charhar Institute, Beijing; Senior Fellow, Institute for National Security Studies Sri Lanka, Colombo; and Visiting Professor, Research Institute for Indian Ocean Economies, Kunming (China).

By Prof. Bharat H. Desai On 6 April 2022 the Permanent Representative of Pakistan (PRP), Munir Akram, sent a letter to the President of the UN Security Council (UNSC). It carried, as an annex, a resolution (No. 8/48-POL) and a joint communiqué adopted on “the Jammu and Kashmir dispute” at the 48th Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) held in Islamabad on 22 and 23 March 2022. Annex I carried a detailed five-page preface with 43 paragraphs whereas annex II also contains 5 pages. Pakistan has successively used the OIC platform for its own purposes. However, the last item in the 60 paragraphs of the preamble to the said resolution contains a blatant lie. It states: “repeated consideration of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute by the UN Security Council”. It is factually incorrect and legally untenable in view of the fact that the UNSC has never dealt with any agenda item under this rubric. In fact, the UNSC has not dealt with any issue concerning either the India-Pakistan Question (IPQ) or the situation in the subcontinent after the UNSC resolution 307 of 21 December 1971. Even as the bilateral relations with India are at the nadir, Pakistan’s ranting and use of the OIC and other forums are in sharp contrast to its obligation arising from the Shimla Agreement (02 July 1972) to settle “any differences” through “bilateral negotiations”. Pakistani Filibuster Pakistan has been routinely sending communications to the UNSC. On the first day of January 2022, the PRP sent a letter to the UNSC President (S/2022/1 of 04 January 2022) to seek the three “items retained” (India-Pakistan question; the Hyderabad question and the situation in the India/Pakistan subcontinent) on the list of “seized” issues of the UNSC. It follows two similar Pakistani letters of 2 December (S/2021/1004) and 27 October 2021 (S/2021/ 901). Pakistan’s penchant for conducting diplomacy-through-letters can be seen from a flurry of letters sent in 2021 (5), 2020 (6) and 2019 (7). They harp on the proverbial “IPQ” widely construed as a ‘dead horse’ in the UN circles. Ostensibly, Pakistani moves – during the India’s current UNSC membership for 2021-2022 serve the purposes of being a ‘persistent objector’ and seek to cloud India’s moral high ground in the UN system. In a communication with the author, Ambassador Tirumurti, the Indian PR, has underscored the Indian position that “all outstanding issues with Pakistan are discussed only bilaterally”. As a corollary, the Shimla Agreement (1972) and the Lahore Declaration (1999) provide the basis for bilateral resolution of all issues between India and Pakistan. The latest summary statement of the UNSG (S/2022/10/Add.14 of 4 April 2022) contains three matters of which the UNSC is ‘seized’ and of the stage reached in their consideration: (i) The Hyderabad question (16 September 1948; 24 May 1949) (ii) The India-Pakistan question (6 January 1948; 5 November 1965) and (iii) The situation in the India/Pakistan subcontinent (4 December 1971; 27 December 1971). The status speaks volumes about the first time the matter was taken up by the UNSC as well as the last time each of the item was addressed by it: 73, 57 and 51 years ago, respectively. Finality of Accession The Pakistani desperation to harp on retaining these ‘dead’ issues on the UNSC’s ‘seized’ item lists appears to be in ‘bad faith’ and at best aimed at ‘needling’ India. As compared to the Pakistani stridency to harp on the J&K, India does not make a big pitch to reclaim the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK) from Pakistan’s ‘belligerent occupation’. It arose from forcible occupation of a sizeable part of the princely State of J&K by the raiders, sent with support of the new state of Pakistan when Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession to join India on 26 October 1947 (Bharat H. Desai, " 'Surgical Strikes by India: Taking International Law Seriously", EPW, 52 (5), 2017; Commentary_4Feb2017.indd (epw.in)). The Indian title to the entire territory of erstwhile princely state of J&K provides de facto and de jure legal basis to reclaim the POK. Since the UNSC, after the last resolution 307 (1971), has remained silent on the IPQ issue underscores that the subsequent developments have overtaken the legal dynamics of the original issue. It came out vividly after the Indian action on 5 August 2019 to settle the remaining issues of State of J&K’s relationship as a constituent unit of India. Thus, in spite of Pakistan’s hue and cry and strident moves to push the UNSC to “take stock of an issue”, not addressed “in several decades”, the Council chose to organize a closed-door meeting and did not issue even any formal statement. In international legal parlance and consistent UN practice, for all practical purposes, the SC has ended any consideration of the IPQ ‘seized’ item. Need for an Effective Indian Response In view of the above, the Pakistani quest for retention of the three items on the UNSC ‘seized’ matters have outlived their utility. This author has earlier called for taking up the deletion of these seized items on a priority basis in The Tribune (9 August 2021). India needs to invoke its best diplomatic, political and international law tools for final closure of this past baggage. The items not considered by the Council during the preceding three calendar years are subject to deletion unless a Member State notifies the President that the item be retained on the list for an additional year. Still the Council can decide otherwise as per the Provisional Rules of Procedure. So, it would make a sense to set in motion a targeted process to get the IPQ and other two items deleted from the UNSC agenda possibly before the end of India’s current UNSC term on 31 December 2022. The issue necessitates legal and political decision at the Prime Minister level who, in turn, could entrust the task to the External Affairs Minister (EAM). EAM, an alumnus of SIS/JNU, need to marshal his diplomatic experience to finally nail the ghost of the IPQ from the UNSC’s ‘seized’ list. EAM could take over the reins in place of the PMI to personally lead the consultations in the matter with dramatis personae in New York as well as in the capitals of the UNSC member states. The current geo-political situation and the stand-off over the Ukraine crisis, makes India relevant and provides some basis to address this issue seriously. #India #Pakistan #UNSC Prof. Bharat H. Desai is Jawaharlal Nehru Chair and Professor of International Law at the Centre for International Legal Studies of SIS, JNU. He coordinated the Making SIS Visible initiative during 2008-2013 (Making SIS Visible | Welcome to Jawaharlal Nehru University (jnu.ac.in).

By Prof. Gulshan Sachdeva A new, positive momentum created during UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson's and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s India visit will be felt during Narendra Modi’s Europe tour. Prime Minister Narendra Modi is visiting Germany, Denmark and France at a time when the Ukraine issue continues to occupy the attention of most European leaders. He will participate in the sixth India-Germany Inter-Governmental Consultations, in Berlin. Apart from bilateral meetings in Copenhagen, he will also participate in the second India-Nordic Summit where leaders of all five Nordic nations viz. Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Iceland will join. In Paris, he will briefly meet newly re-elected President Emmanuel Macron. Since these European nations and India have different perceptions about the Ukraine war, Modi is likely to concentrate on a bilateral agenda. A new, positive momentum created during United Kingdom Prime Minister Boris Johnson and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s India visit will also be felt during Modi’s Europe tour. There is a new optimism for both India-UK and India-European Union trade agreements. Without naming Russia, Modi may also talk about cessation of hostilities, diplomacy and dialogue, and killing of civilians in Ukraine. Apart from trade, investment, and technology, these nations are also important for India’s ambitious clean energy transition. Together with France, India launched the International Solar Alliance (ISA). New Delhi has established a green strategic partnership with Denmark. Germany is also trying to be a leader in green technologies. Under Energiewende, a national transition to a low carbon and renewable energy supply, Germany is not only transforming its energy sector, but the whole economy. During his meetings with business leaders in Germany and Denmark, Modi is likely to highlight India’s strong post-COVID-19 recovery, all-time high exports in goods and services as well as newly-signed FTAs with Australia and the United Arab Emirates. Germany, and France now constitute more than 40 percent of the EU economy. Both are central to the European integration project. Impact of recent elections in both the countries will be felt in Europe in the years to come. For a generation, Angela Merkel was an undisputed leader of Germany and Europe. She also managed German relations with Russia and China in a pragmatic manner. Under Macron, France is likely to take over some of the German leadership roles in Europe. Since India has strong strategic partnerships with both, this is unlikely to have any major impact on our bilateral ties with Europe. Although Chancellor Olaf Scholz and his Social Democratic Party (SPD) were in a coalition in the Merkel government, Greens and Free Democrats have come back to government after many years. So the visit will be useful to work out a new agenda with Germany for the next few years. The German economic model is largely based on exports, particularly in the manufacturing sector. Automobiles, chemicals, metals, electrical equipment, high-precision equipment, pharmaceuticals, retail trade, and healthcare are some of its leading sectors. Although the services sector contributes more than 70 percent of the economy, manufacturing exports are still key to its economic development. For years, Germany has been pushing for India-EU trade agreement and will be pleased with new optimism and the launch of EU-India Trade and Technology Council. With altogether 25 million-plus population, the five Nordic countries are perhaps the best governed countries in the world. These countries are at the top in human development index, happiness index, innovation index, freedom of speech, and transparency. It is not just that they are prosperous and innovative; they are more equal than many other western countries. They are also seriously working on green technologies to check Climate Change. In the last few years, India is looking at the region systematically. The attempt has been to link Nordic solutions to Indian flagship programmes. But many of these solutions have also emerged in a socio-political environment which is genuinely free, gender sensitive, egalitarian, and citizens have high trust in the government. Indians continue to receive the largest number of EU Blue Cards meant to attract high-skilled professionals to Europe. Germany has issued the largest number of Blue Cards within the EU, and more than one-fourth of these cards have been issued to Indians. New Delhi has already signed a migration and mobility agreement with France. A movement on a similar agreement with Germany is possible during the visit. Public statements on the Indo-Pacific are also likely. But the European approach to the Indo-Pacific is slightly different than India’s. They also want to deal with the China issue in a different manner. The centrality of the Indian narrative on the Indo-Pacific is to build forums and platforms to balance the impact of assertive China. In European understanding China is very much part of the Indo-Pacific. #India #Europe #EU #Germany #Denmark #France #Nordic Originally published: Money Control, May 2, 2022. At: https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/opinion/pm-in-europe-narendra-modi-may-focus-on-trade-technology-and-green-transition-8441081.html Posted here with the permission of the author. Gulshan Sachdeva is Professor at the Centre for European Studies and Coordinator, Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, Jawaharlal Nehru University. Views are personal.

By Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli China is reeling under a massive resurgence of the coronavirus, affecting an estimated 400 million people and their livelihoods. People are seething with anger, and China’s growth rate, currency, stock markets are all down. Major cities are witnessing “hard lockdowns”, forcible mass testing, border controls, travel curbs, excessive quarantines, massive surveillance measures, hoarding of food stuffs, and millions of migrant workers are suffering, just as Indian migrant workers did during the lockdown here. Even as the pandemic situation has worsened in the 25-million people commercial capital, Shanghai, the epidemic threatens the 20-million people political capital, Beijing, with its Chaoyang district coming under lockdown. Having propagated the virtues of its ‘Zero Covid’ policy since the Wuhan lockdown, China’s leadership is at pains to explain to its people, and to the world, why infections have risen and why they are being forced to bear the overall disproportionate costs. As the pandemic spread across the globe, killing six million and infecting half-a-billion people, China reported only 120,000 infections and some 4,000-odd deaths – figures that are suspect due to the utter lack of transparency. Today, infections are said to have jumped to 900,000, as per the same nontransparent official figures, affecting nearly 50 cities. In June 2020, China released a white paper crediting President Xi Jinping’s “personal command” and “decisive” leadership in its “victory” over the spread of the virus. It also mentioned the “swift, effective and comprehensive” response for containing the virus across the country, although the then Wuhan Mayor had stated that over five million people had left the city before it was locked down on January 23, 2020. Subsequently, China carried out one of the most intensive holier-than-thou propaganda campaigns globally, critiquing democracies as inefficient and downright callous in addressing the pandemic. At the same time, China took pride in its ‘Zero Covid’ policies of total lockdowns, app-based intensive and intrusive surveillance methods, mass testing, constructing temporary hospital beds, vaccination, and oppressive quarantine procedures. The Communist Party organs even lampooned India for our death toll in April/May last year. With the current resurgence in the epidemic across the country, China insists on following its draconian Covid policies as it sees the political legitimacy of the Communist Party is increasingly being questioned. When the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests erupted, the Communist Party tied its legitimacy to ensuring economic growth rates which, of course, have declined from an estimated 14% in 1994 to 10% in 2010 to 2.2% in 2020. Managing the virus has now become the new goalpost for the Communist Party -- at the cost of people’s livelihoods and aspirations. Of course, the internal blame game is shifting as well. Politburo member and Vice Premier Sun Chunlan, spearheading the Covid-related campaign since late 2019, stated that Shanghai has no “solid foundation” in anti-epidemic work. With the 20th Communist Party congress due this November, political factional struggles are intensifying. While Xi Jinping may escape demands for political accountability over the spread of the pandemic across the country, Shanghai party leader Li Qiang and and others may be ‘disciplined’. The virus has spread despite 85% of the population being vaccinated – suggesting its ineffectiveness, although the Covid death rate may be low. Indeed, Brazil found Chinese-supplied vaccines to be only 54% effective. It was also critiqued that the vaccination drive in China has been uneven, with the elderly and those in remote areas left out. China also refuses to allow vaccines from abroad, given its negative propaganda about them earlier. A major casualty of the ‘Zero Covid’ policy is the economy. China’s growth rate fell to 2.2% in 2020 but regained to 8% in 2021. The IMF has predicted 4% for this year, well below China’s own target of over 5%. The Politburo announced a stimulus package on April 29. The Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets have nose-dived. The China Securities Index 300 has fallen from over 5,211 points in 2020 to just over 4,016 points now. Supply chain disruptions continue with production at Tesla, Foxconn and others due to the ‘Zero Covid’ lockdowns. The real estate and technology sectors have been unable to rebound, thanks to the demands of Xi’s “common prosperity” campaign. Investors are pulling out. Thus, while many countries have successfully experimented with mass vaccination, herd immunity, and relative and non-lethal dispersal of the virus, China’s hard lockdowns are testing the patience of hundreds of millions of its citizens. #China #Covid Originally published: Deccan Herald, 30.04.2022 At: https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/xi-s-zero-covid-policy-the-pitfalls-of-authoritarianism-1105402.html Posted here with the permission of the author. Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli is the Dean, School of International Studies, JNU.

Dr. Sana Hashmi India has kept a low profile with Taiwan due to a protracted border issue and repeated standoffs with China The Russia-Ukraine conflict has posed uncertainties about the future of the liberal international order. One of the immediate consequences of the Ukraine crisis has been a flurry of speculations about China’s territorial (mis)adventures vis-a-vis its neighbours, notably in relation to Taiwan. The international community’s response to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, ranging from Russia’s increasing isolation to slapping a range of sanctions on it, might work as a warning to China regarding the consequences if it decides to take any militarily hostile action. As a revisionist power seeking to change the balance of power in Asia, China has clearly sided with Russia, tacitly supporting it at the logistical level and at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as well. China’s support to Russia, however, must not be mistaken as an ally’s behaviour. By endorsing Russia, China is obliging its own self-interest and military designs in the region. As a smaller democratic neighbour of a belligerent China, Taiwan finds itself in a similar situation with China as Ukraine with Russia, with striking geo-strategic and geo-economic similarities between Taiwan and Ukraine. Despite the fact that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is not imminent, Taiwan sees the Ukraine situation as a lesson in how to deal with China’s military adventurism. Other countries have also raised similar concerns. For instance, Japan has been expressing its worries over a possible Chinese incursion into the Taiwanese territory. This was explicitly mentioned in the Japanese White Paper published earlier this year. If recent US and Japan initiatives are any indication, both countries are speeding up efforts to bolster Taiwan’s resolve to deal with the Chinese security threat. This is a logical step taken by the US and Japan, and it opens the door for fellow democracies and like-minded countries to contribute in keeping the Indo-Pacific free of any geopolitical instability. This is primarily due to the fact that a conflict in the Indo-Pacific region would have long-term implications for countries including India and Japan. Regardless of how some foreign policy experts project a controlled West-only scenario, the consequences of the Russia-Ukraine conflict would be felt well beyond the Western world. Given Japan and India’s similar experiences with China, it makes sense for the countries in the Indo-Pacific region to assess such challenges their region is faced with, especially in the context of the security threat emanating from China and particularly in the context of cross-Strait relations. While Japan has made its position somewhat clear on the possibility of a cross-Strait military conflict, India is yet to formally pronounce its policy decision. While realpolitik and national security compulsions dictate New Delhi to not overtly criticise Russia for its war in Ukraine, the same factors may motivate New Delhi to shed its neutrality for a more forthright response in dealing with China’s deceptive and manipulative tactics which have always been a major source of concern for India. India’s experience with Wuhan and Mamallapuram summits are a case in point here. India has kept a low profile with Taiwan due to a protracted border issue and repeated standoffs with China. There has been a popular perception that any move to engage Taiwan will elicit a furious retaliation from China. After Galwan clashes, preceded by decades of deception by China and its attempts to forestall India’s growth, it would be timely for India to stop paying attention to China at the cost of engaging Taiwan. China poses a formidable threat to India, a challenge originating from their unresolved border dispute, and China’s repeated territorial incursions into the Indian territory. India and Taiwan share similar challenges. In the event of cross-Strait conflict, India should consider its role, where it should be aimed at discouraging China from adopting such an action. India must recognise that Taiwan’s security is as intertwined with the regional security order as it is with its own. As a fast-rising major stakeholder in the Indo-Pacific region, it is critically important for India to not refrain from engaging Taiwan because of China. Rather it should join Japan and the US in standing up for Taiwan as a fellow democracy facing similar challenges. Any solution to the China problem will necessitate a regional response and Taiwan cannot be excluded from such a response. #India #Taiwan #China Originally published: News18, April 27, 2022 At: https://www.news18.com/news/opinion/why-india-must-engage-taiwan-even-if-it-ruffles-a-few-chinese-feathers-5061271.html Posted here with the permission of the author. Dr. Sana Hashmi is Visiting Fellow, Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation. She was a scholar of Chinese Studies division, Centre for East Asian Studies, School of International Studies (2012-2020).