Search

By Prof. (Dr.) Gulshan Sachdeva This year marks a decade since China’s ambitious infrastructure funding project, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), was first outlined by President Xi Jinping. Spanning countries from Africa to Asia and seeing investments of hundreds of billions of dollars, it has also come under criticism over the years about how sustainable these debts may be. Why did China launch the project in 2013, and how does it stand at present? How has India responded to it? Prof. Gulshan Sachdeva explains key aspects of the project and where it stands now after a decade since its inception : What was the idea behind the BRI, and how did these goals evolve over the years? President Xi Jinping announced the Silk Road Economic ‘Belt’ during his visits to Kazakhstan in 2013. The ‘Belt’ plan was to revitalise a series of trading and infrastructure routes between Asia and Europe. Connectivity through Central Asia was a key element of the initiative. Subsequently, President Xi announced a sea trade infrastructure called ‘Road’. This maritime ‘Road’ would connect China with Southeast Asia, Europe and Africa. The major focus has been to build ports, bridges, industry corridors and other infrastructure throughout South East Asia and the Indian Ocean. For some time, together these initiatives were referred to as the One Belt One Road Initiative (OBOR). Since 2015, it has been mostly referred to as the BRI. Initially, the BRI was based on five principles: (1) policy coordination (2) infrastructure connectivity (3) trade (4) financial integration and (5) people-to-people connections. Later, the sixth principle of ‘Industrial cooperation’ was also added. Basically through the BRI, China wanted to resolve two major concerns, viz capital surplus and industrial overcapacity. It was also about increasing Chinese political influence in broader regions. Between 2013 and 2018, the World Bank estimated that investment in BRI projects including energy projects was about $575 billion. Earlier, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) also estimated that the BRI investment projects were likely to add $1 trillion in funding between 2017 and 2027. China has hosted three BRI Forums in the years 2017, 2019, and 2023. These gatherings attracted significant participation from world leaders, leading to the signing of numerous agreements during each of these forums. At the tenth anniversary of the initiative, the Chinese government declared that more than 150 countries and 30 international organisations have embraced the BRI. It was also reported that 3,000 BRI projects valued at $1 trillion, are currently underway across the globe. Originally, the initiative proposed six international Economic Corridors (EC): the New Eurasia Land Bridge; China-Central Asia-West Asia-EC; China-Mongolia-Russia-EC, China-Indochina Peninsula-EC, the China-Pakistan-EC (CPEC); and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM)-EC. At the second BRI Forum in 2019, a list of 35 major corridors/projects was released. As large number of BRI projects are being carried out in nearly all parts of the world, they are affecting all major economies even if they are not participating in the initiative. Some countries in Africa have praised the project, whereas the likes of India and the United States have accused China of engaging in ‘debt trap diplomacy’ – aiming to own countries’ assets if they are unable to repay the loans. Today, what is its status? Building infrastructure is never risk-free. Any large initiative like the BRI having thousands of infrastructure projects will have many failures as well as success stories. India was the first to point out issues concerning debt trap, lack of transparency and sustainability of BRI projects. Later, the US and the EU also raised similar concerns. But there continues to be a huge infrastructure deficit in the Global South. So despite the criticism, BRI is still an attractive proposition to many developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Strong Chinese strategic financial support has played a crucial role. Economic conditions today are much more difficult than a decade ago. The Chinese have realised some weaknesses. They have already started talking about open, green and clean corridors and linking these projects with Sustainable Developments Goals. But if they follow these rules, some of the projects may not be feasible for funding. At the latest BRI forum held in Beijing earlier this month, a reduced number of heads of state was noticed compared to previous meetings. Can it be said that there has been a cooling off regarding some of the initial enthusiasm? All participants in the BRI projects have learned in the last ten years. Because of geopolitical tensions, the United States has sharpened its criticism of the BRI. In the beginning European policy makers looked at the BRI in a positive manner. The EU itself has been promoting regional integration initiatives throughout the world for decades. The EU and China, in fact, established a connectivity platform in 2015. A large number of European leaders participated in the first two BRI Forums. Of late, however, there has been growing scepticism and apprehensions about Beijing’s intentions and the way many of the projects are being implemented. These evolving perceptions also mirror the EU's reassessment of its relationship with China. Italy’s recent apprehensions of the project and its possible departure from the BRI will be a symbolic setback as it was the only G7 country which had formally joined the initiative. What has progress been like on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) front? The CPEC has been a flagship BRI project from the beginning. Pakistan is going through a very difficult political and economic phase. But despite some analysts indicating that CPEC projects may create long term problems for the economy, Pakistan is unlikely to abandon the CPEC. The $60 billion CPEC is now central to China-Pakistan “all weather” strategic partnership and bilateral free trade agreement. A large part of the CPEC is energy related projects. The rest of the projects are in the road and railway infrastructure and Gwadar port. There has been some progress: the Sukkur-Multan section of Peshawar-Karachi Motorway, the Havelian-Thakot section of the Karakoram Highway Phase II and the Lahore Orange Line Metro are operational. Many energy projects including coal-fired plants at Sahiwal, Port Qasim and Hub are also operational. Now, a few CPEC projects are also likely to be extended to Afghanistan. What have India’s views been on the BRI? India's position on the BRI has remained relatively consistent since 2013. From the beginning, India had reservations about the BRI – mainly due to sovereignty related issues, as the CPEC goes through the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), and geopolitical implication of projects in the Indian Ocean. The importance of the Indian Ocean for China has increased significantly due to its expanding trade, energy transport and investments. It started expanding its footprints in India’s neighbourhood through investments in various ports in Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar. As commercial ports could be easily converted into military use, these developments have troubled Indian policy makers and analysts. China's economic presence in India’s neighbourhood, including in South Asia, has already undergone substantial expansion. Moreover, many negative developments in broader India-China ties (trade deficit, border tensions, etc.) have also affected India’s perceptions about the BRI. While India has refrained from endorsing the BRI and has not taken part in any BRI Forums, it has been an active participant in the China-headquartered Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) since its inception. The Silk Road Fund (SRF) and the AIIB are the two main channels for BRI investment and financing. With about $10 billion in borrowing, which is about 20 per cent of AIIB’s total lending, India has emerged as a top market for the agency. Many in the West have flagged the slowdown in the Chinese economy in recent years. Could this impact BRI projects? For a long time, the world was used to the narrative of the rise and rise of China. In 2019, the Chinese economy was 42 times larger than what it was in 1980. In the last fifteen years, China was also a major contributor to global growth. As the economy matured, “going out” through the BRI was expected to provide another push for growth. Some slowdown in growth was already factored into the BRI strategy. However, current geopolitical tensions resulting in “decoupling’ or ‘de-risking’ measures by the US, Europe, and many others to reduce their own economic dependence on China might adversely affect the Chinese economy as well as BRI expansion. In the wake of these developments, China will have to re-strategize some of the BRI projects. How do these domestic worries impact the standing of Xi Jinping, who is now in his third term as the head of the Chinese state and the Communist Party? Undoubtedly, the BRI stands as President Xi's most ambitious foreign policy endeavour. In 2017, he dubbed it the "project of the century" and it is a part of his long-term dream of a China-dominated world. Despite facing criticism, the BRI has already cultivated substantial diplomatic and geopolitical leverage for China within the Global South. The West is still scrambling to provide an alternative to the BRI in terms of infrastructure investments. Faced with a challenging geopolitical and economic landscape, China is now adjusting its ambitions, aiming to pivot towards green and smaller-scale development projects. Indeed, the success of other ambitious China-led diplomatic and economic plans, like the Global Security Initiative and the Global Development Initiative, hinges largely on the BRI's success. #BRI #TenYears Originally Published : The Indian Express, 30th October' 2023 https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-global/expert-explains-10-years-chinas-bri-xi-jinping-status-explained-9004356/ Posted on SIS Blog with the Authorisation of the Author Prof. (Dr.) Gulshan Sachdeva is a Professor, at the Centre for European Studies and Coordinator, at the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.

By Prof. (Dr.) Santishree Dhulipudi Pandit Universal values form the foundation for moral and ethical judgments, distinguishing right from wrong. Failure to adhere to these values is viewed as a breach of morality and ethics. The gruesome barbaric attack on Israel on 7 October 2023 by Hamas terrorists needs to be condemned by all. Many celebrated the attack, even though it involved the gruesome killing of the elderly, raping of women, parading them naked and beheading of children. No State can remain a mute spectator to this. Where were the wokes, the peacefuls and the human rights lobby then? There was silence of the graveyard. Let me congratulate PM Modi for the courageous stand of supporting peace and order against terror where rape, loot and plunder are being normalized. This war is about order versus terror. These people tell us that Terror has no religion. Then why is there support to terror groups? Indiscriminate violence and barbarity cannot be part of any peaceful religions. Then there are issues of interpreting values; are values universal or unique? Values, defined as “desirable, trans situational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in people’s lives” play a pivotal role in shaping human behaviour and societal norms. However, the landscape of values is intricate, marked by universal principles, objections to their universality, and the nuanced use of values in different contexts. Universality in values involves shared core principles across diverse cultures, societies, and historical periods. Isaiah Berlin’s perspective emphasizes that universal values are held by many individuals across various situations, consciously or expressed in behaviour. Amartya Sen offers an alternative lens, suggesting universality when all people have a reason to believe a value is valuable. Universal values form the foundation for moral and ethical judgments, distinguishing right from wrong. Failure to adhere to these values is viewed as a breach of morality and ethics. The existence of universal values sparks debates in moral philosophy and cultural anthropology. The transcendence of cultural, religious, and geographical boundaries characterizes these values. Samuel Huntington’s influential thesis on the “Clash of Civilizations” adds a layer to the discourse on universal values. Huntington suggests cultural and civilizational differences will be the primary sources of conflict in the post-Cold War world. This challenges the assumption of universal values, proposing a world where distinct civilizations have divergent values and interests. He believes that some of the factors contributing to this conflict are that both Christianity (upon which Western civilization is based) and Islam are missionary religions, seeking conversion of others and Universal, “all-or-nothing” religions, in the sense that it is believed by both sides that only their faith is the correct one. These teleological religions represent the goals of existence and purpose in human existence. More recent factors contributing to a Western-Islamic clash, Huntington wrote, are the Islamic resurgence and demographic explosion in Islam, coupled with the values of Western universalism—that is, the view that all civilizations should adopt Western values—that infuriate Islamic fundamentalists. All these historical and modern factors combined, Huntington wrote briefly in his Foreign Affairs article and in much more detail in his 1996 book, would lead to a bloody clash between the Islamic and Western civilizations. Core state conflicts can arise out of fault line conflicts when core states become involved. Huntington suggests cultural and civilizational differences will be the primary sources of conflict in the post-Cold War world. This challenges the assumption of universal values, proposing a world where distinct civilizations have divergent values and interests. Moral relativism opposes the concept of universal moral values, asserting that moral principles are context-dependent. Aesthetic relativism extends beyond aesthetics, challenging the universality of values within different cultural norms. The universal values are justice that emphasizes fairness, impartiality, and equitable resource distribution. It guides ethical judgments and interventions promoting equality. Promotes empathy and kindness, particularly towards those in need. It is essential in designing interventions that enhance social support networks. It acknowledges the intrinsic value of all living beings and guides behaviours prioritizing environmental care and well-being. Finally, integrity emphasizes honesty, truthfulness, and adherence to moral principles and informs interventions fostering trust and reliability in societal interactions. Individuals and organizations often camouflage parochial values as “universal” to gain acceptance and popularity. Terrorism, disguised as “freedom movement,” exemplifies the misuse of universal values for political ends. Woke culture often positions itself as a champion of universal values, emphasizing principles like equality, justice, and inclusivity. Advocates argue that these values should be universally accepted, yet challenges arise in the selective application and potential clash with cultural relativism. It is hardly surprising to realize woke culture’s impact on freedom of expression, potential polarization, and the fostering of an “us vs. them” mentality. Huntington predicts and describes the great clashes that will occur among civilizations. First, he anticipates a coalition or cooperation between Islamic and Sinic cultures to work against a common enemy, the West. Three issues that separate the West from the rest are identified by Huntington as: The West’s ability to maintain military superiority through the nonproliferation of emerging powers. The promotion of Western political values such as human rights and democracy. The restriction of non-Western immigrants and refugees into Western societies. Non-western countries see all three aspects as a western attempt to enforce and maintain their status as the cultural hegemon. Unique values are beliefs and principles specific to particular cultures, communities, or individuals. This is Influenced by history, geography, religion, and tradition. Examples include cultural traditions, religious beliefs, and personal values shaped by individual experiences. Cultural tradition includes specific customs, rituals, and practices that are important within a culture. It may not be shared universally, contributing to cultural diversity. Religious beliefs include teachings and doctrines of various religions guiding moral and ethical conduct and significant differences exist between faiths, influencing diverse values. Personal values: but one should remember the common quote here: “You don’t need religion to have morals. If you can’t determine right from wrong, then you lack empathy not religion.” Individual values are shaped by personal experiences, upbringing, and belonging. Priorities such as family, career, or environmental stewardship are examples. Certain values are unique to specific cultures, religions, and societies, resisting easy implementation in other contexts. Contentious ideas like tolerance for violence or marriage practices showcase the diversity of unique values. Unique values often become instrumental in propaganda dissemination. Groups package their ideas as unique values but strive to connect them with larger universal values to gain mass support. Conflicts arise when universal values clash with a nation’s unique values, such as cultural or religious practices. International organizations and diplomatic negotiations traditionally mediate these conflicts by facilitating discussions for mutually acceptable solutions. However, recent trends suggest a shift in international organizations from platforms for engagement to instruments of power projection and manipulation. In instances like the Hamas-Israel war, international organizations have diverted discussions towards the morality of Israel’s retaliation towards a terrorist attack. Furthermore, failed experiments with forced multiculturalism in some Western countries highlight the dangers of prioritizing unique values at the expense of universal values, challenging the very foundations of cooperation and stability. #ClashOfCivilisations #IsraelHamasWar Originally Published : The Sunday Guardian, 22nd October' 2023 https://sundayguardianlive.com/opinion/universal-vs-unique-values-multiculturalism-vs-monoculturalism Prof. Santishree Dhulipudi Pandit is the Vice Chancellor of the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.

By Srijan Sharma Introduction The Middle East region is reeling under the burning ashes of war between Israel and Hamas. Once again, the Israel and Palestine conflict has come into focus, not by light flare but uncontrolled fire, which has pushed the Middle East back into its old days of heightened tensions snowballing into full-fledged war. After Russia-Ukraine crisis in Europe, another war frontier opened in the Middle East, which will alter the regional geopolitical balance. A three-pronged invasion by Hamas terrorists into the Southern part of Israel and later wreaking havoc on Israeli citizens across regions have stunned the whole world, making a 26/11 for Israelis. However, Hamas pulling off an attack of such magnitude has raised serious questions over its sterling Intel agencies, Mossad and domestic Intelligence Agency Shinbet. Didn't they see it coming, or did they underestimate it? However, the changing dynamics of Middle East geopolitics in overhang also played some role in misting Israel's Intelligence glass. Changing Middle East Power Balance The thaw between Israel and Arab began with a series of agreements from Camp David, Oslo to Abraham Accord which have acted as a catalyst in placing the power base of the Middle East to some rest, giving way for regional forces to converge for their regional and national interests like Saudi Arabia is doing to add pace to its Vision 2030. China- Pakistan, India- US quadrilateral on wide-ranging strategic interests also get some breathing space to up their ante in the region. Operation Sankalp's India's maritime engagement in the Middle Eastern region to ensure the security of Indian vessels in Middle Eastern waters got some breather when the Abraham Accords happened as accords to some extent will help the routes along major trade centers- Dubai and Abu Dabi do not become targets between Jerusalem and Tehran covert warfare. Similarly, New Delhi's Look West Policy got the fillip to engage with Arab, the visit of former Army Chief General M.M Narvane to UAE and Saudi in December 2020 (first Army Chief to do so) to strengthen strategic cooperation. China brokering peace between Iran and Saudi Arabia prepared a base for its economic ingressions in the region. US's mounting West Asian QUAD and IU2U to increase its geopolitical relevance in the Middle East amid the cold war with Saudi and checkmating China and Russia are some examples of geopolitical crisscrossing. From time to time, these geopolitical configurations control the possibility of conflict in the region and attempt to increase stability. Still, at the same time, the thawing of relations antagonises the Arab players sitting at the extreme ends- Lebanon, and their proxies, which again puts the Middle East on the burning matchbox. Recently, when various initiatives such as the Middle East Corridor at G20 and normalisation phenomena between Saudi Arabia and Israel came into focus, a trigger perhaps went off where the extreme ends of the region stirred the hornet nest and, therefore, the intermixing of power games with ideologies and fundamentalism kept the balance of power in a capacious position. Israel's Vengeance Hamas's deadliest terror strike on Israel has triggered a spine-chilling retaliation by Israel launching Operation Iron Sword, which involves heavily striking Hamas locations across Gaza. Continued pounding bombs, air strikes, targeting banks, media houses, and whatnot have paralysed the Gaza strip. There is little doubt that Israel will not stop sooner or later, and its wrath will continue. It wouldn't be correct now to say that the balance of power or the geopolitical force of the Middle East is in a capacious position; it is on the verge of collapse. Israel won't stop; the Arab world, involving, Syria, Lebanon, and Qatar, would mobilise along with Hezbollah and Hamas backed by Iran. This hot axis of the Middle East will give another strategic shock not only to the region but to the world again if not controlled as it did in 1973 by let losing the oil crises. Interestingly, Israel's vengeance mode will provide the US a small opening to establish its hard power relevance in Middle East after decades which will to some extent revive its security architecture which came under heavy storm during Russia-Ukraine war. However, the US will have some risks in navigating its hard power influence viz-a viz Israel, as many more regional players, especially Saudi Arabia, won't let this go unnoticed. How many power alterations will the Middle East see, especially the conflict of territories, which have a chance to see some makeovers in a few days? Perhaps its answer requires some patience and tight observance in the coming days. Mossad's Colossal Miss The memories of the 1973 Yim Kippur War seem to be refreshed when, for the first time, Israel was caught off guard in failing to rightly assess Egypt's intentions and threats emanating from them in a war-like situation. This led to a surprise hit at Israel, though it wasn't a total surprise as almost at the last moment Mossad did get some intel of Egypt launching an offensive, but as far as Mossad’s assessment was concerned, it fell flat. This failure perhaps significantly contributed to the departure of Golda'Meir's Government and the sacking of its Military Intelligence chief, Eli Ziera, after the Agranant Commission investigated the failure of Israel's defence forces and Intelligence. A close examination of Mossad's miss says that the real problem in Israel's famed intel agency does not lie in Intelligence gathering or awareness of the threat; the real problem lies in the assessment and feedback part, which is an integral part of the Intelligence cycle. Often, biased or half-baked assessments and underestimated feedback have made nations pay a heavy price. There is a difference where perhaps Mossad faltered, not in Intelligence gathering but in Intelligence management, where the Intel agency often makes errors with Intelligence in hand either by assessing it through prejudiced or biased perspective or the feedback on the Intel in hand is underestimated. The same episode of Intelligence management failure with Mossad happened in 1973, when the Intel agency failed to realise that Egypt, having no counter to Israeli air power, would attack Israel, but to surprise, Egypt hit hard from the ground by well-designed complex offensive plans through missiles. Similarly, the 7th October attack intel was perhaps well received by Mossad, but they underestimated Hamas's capability of carrying out a well-coordinated three-pronged attack. The reasons for not endorsing a good feedback and threat assessment on this intel would perhaps be three reasons: 1) Too much confidence investment in Israel's technological drive- Iron Dome, border security, surveillance capabilities, etc. 2) Middle East normalisation perhaps misted Israel's lenses as thawing rules out misadventures. 3) Israel's divided attention in domestic politics(West Bank politics) and Iran's nuclear obsession kept Mossad under the impression that Iran won't sabotage as Iran is already engaged in a diplomatic circus around JCPOA. As strategic affairs expert and national security analyst Praveen Swami notes, "successful conduct of war demands endless intellectual creativity.". Another senior Israeli journalist notes that intelligence failure is attributed to "sinful arrogance of the Israeli defence establishment". The three-pronged attack was almost a construct of intellectual creativity that defeated Israeli famed technologies at the borders. Such realisation of error is required in the Intelligence agencies, especially those with gold status, to build strategic foresight and prevent misting their intelligence glass with prejudiced or underestimated feedback. Iran has allegedly sabotaged Middle East normalisation for now, and what scenario lies ahead is more blazing and anxiety-ridden. #IsraelHamarWar #WestAsia #MiddleEast #IsraelPalestineConflict This Article is an Original Contribution to the SIS Blog. Srijan Sharma is a national security analyst specializing in Intelligence and security analysis and working as a Research Assistant in India's premier and prestigious national security and foreign policy think tank United Service Institution of India(USI). Previously, he has extensively written on matters of security and strategic affairs for various institutions, journals, and newspapers (Telegraph), The Print, and the Organiser. Also, he served as Defence Editor for a journal.

By Prof. (Dr.) Gulshan Sachdeva Europe’s support to Israel is fine but justifying many of the actions by Tel Aviv including the seize of Gaza is not going to be easy for the EU. Europeans have accused Russia of war crimes for similar activities in Ukraine. While the war in Ukraine served to unite the European Union (EU) as a cohesive bloc, the Israel-Hamas war has underscored its existing weaknesses. The varying interests among European nations naturally lead to divisions on numerous foreign policy matters. In this case, however, even the European Council President Charles Michel, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, and their foreign policy chief Josep Borrell initially did not share a unified stance. The EU also reversed its decision to halt financial assistance to Palestine. From the initial disorganised response, it appears that there is now a greater level of co-ordination occurring both within the EU and among its member states. During an extraordinary European Council meeting, the EU nations condemned the terrorist attack by Hamas, recognised Israel's right to self-defence, and highlighted their commitment to lasting and sustainable peace based on the two-state solution. In an unfolding situation, the European Parliament later shared similar points and also called for both an independent investigation of the Al-Ahli hospital blast in Gaza, and a humanitarian pause. So far, Israel's air strikes have resulted in the loss of more than 5,000 lives in Gaza. The UNRWA reported that more than 400,000 internally displaced people are now being sheltered by the agency in Gaza. As Israel prepares for a ground offensive, the EU foreign ministers have not yet reached a consensus to request a ‘humanitarian pause’, as advised by the European Parliament. It is a different issue whether Israel or Hamas are heeding the EU's appeal. French President Emmanuel Macron is the latest European leader to make a ‘solidarity’ visit to Tel Aviv since Hamas’ October 7 attack. So far, von der Leyen, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, and British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak have visited Israel to show their support. To ease tensions, many European leaders also took part in the recent Cairo peace summit, organised by the Egyptian President. This included the President of the European Council, along with prime ministers from Italy, Spain, and Greece, as well as foreign ministers from France, and Germany, the British foreign secretary, and the EU foreign policy chief. A few days ago, German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier, alongside the majority of major political parties, participated in a pro-Israel rally in Berlin. Similar events have taken place in Paris, London, and other European cities. Meanwhile, the two EU countries with the largest Jewish and Muslim communities, Germany and France, have prohibited pro-Palestine protests due to concerns about public order and the increase in antisemitic incidents. Still, thousands of pro-Palestine protestors continue to march across Europe including in London, Paris, Rome, Berlin, and Marseille. Traditionally, many of the far-Right parties in Europe have been synonymous with antisemitism. Interestingly, some of them now see an opportunity to push for their anti-Islamist agenda through the Israel-Hamas war. This is especially evident when many liberal and Leftist parties have somewhat nuanced positions on the activities associated with Hamas and other groups. The liberal-Leftist positions reflect the complex nature of the Israel-Palestine issue, and their strong support base among immigrant communities. The war in Ukraine has already impacted growth and pushed up inflation in Europe. The current economic situation in the Eurozone is showing worrying signs. Furthermore, the emerging political tensions resulting from Israel's military campaign and the possibility of a new wave of refugees from Gaza heading towards Europe could further bolster far-Right populists. The situation will also become increasingly untenable as civilian casualties in Gaza continue to rise daily. The support to Israel is fine but justifying many of the actions by Tel Aviv including the seize of Gaza is not going to be easy for the EU. Europeans have accused Russia of war crimes for similar activities in Ukraine. While many European leaders are advocating for the relaunch of the Palestinian peace process, the extent of Europe's influence on the process remains uncertain, even if it were to be initiated. In the past Europe along with the US had some influence over the events in West Asia. However, in the altered geopolitical landscape, Europe must also deal with other key players, including China, Russia, Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. Moreover, within Europe, there is a perspective as articulated by the Latvian Foreign Minister, emphasising that alongside other endeavours, Europe should not divert its attention from Ukraine. The Israel-Hamas war and the potential for it to escalate into a broader regional crisis have exposed Europe for its spillover effects. It has also revealed Europe's constraints, particularly when it is already dealing with the war in Ukraine. #IsraelHamasWar #Europe #Security #ForeignPolicy #Palestine Originally Published : The Deccan Herald, 26th October' 2023 https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/israel-hamas-war-exposes-europes-vulnerabilities-2742421 Posted in SIS Blog with the Authorisation of the Author Prof. (Dr.) Gulshan Sachdeva is Professor at the Centre for European Studies and Coordinator, Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.

By Md. Muddassir Quamar (PhD) While it is difficult to suggest how the war might pan out, the likelihood of any immediate ceasefire appears remote given the anger and public sentiment in Israel, which wants to take revenge of extraordinary proportions. Hamas’s attack on southern Israel on 7 October 2023 is reminiscent of the surprise attack against Israel by Egypt and Syria in October 1973, which led to the Yom Kippur or Ramadan War. Hamas—Harkat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya or Islamic Resistance Movement—has controlled the Gaza Strip, a conclave of 365 square kilometers and a population of over 2 million, since 2007. Hamas fought an armed battle with the Fatah—Harkat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filastini or Palestinian National Liberation Movement—in 2006-07 to take control of the Strip after Fatah refused to hand over the power of the Palestinian Authority (PA) to Hamas despite its victory in the 2006 Palestinian Council elections. Since then, Hamas and Fatah, the two major factions in the Palestinian movement, have shared an acrimonious relationship. Since the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2007, the enclave has remained blockaded by Israel and Egypt and cut off from the world and the other Palestinian territory of the West Bank. Israel and Hamas have also fought several wars, with numerous intermittent clashes between them. The first war between Israel and Hamas erupted in 2008-09, which caused severe loss of life and infrastructure damage in the Strip. Since then, Hamas and Israel have fought on and off, with significant clashes in October 2012, July-August 2014, and May 2021 before the ongoing phase of the Hamas-Israel war started. The 7 October attack on Israel by Hamas was different because of its scale, ability to breach the border walls, and state-of-the-art surveillance system installed by Israel. Reportedly, thousands of Hamas fighters and ordinary Gazan residents crossed into southern Israel and mounted sieges of several Israeli neighborhoods, causing the death of nearly 1,300 Israelis while also taking dozens of hostages, including elderly, women, and children. Simultaneously, Hamas fired thousands of rockets indiscriminately targeting residential and civilian buildings to inflict maximum damage. Undoubtedly, the attack of such a proportion was launched to evoke an extraordinary Israeli response and underline the Israeli-Palestinian conflict’s continued relevance to the world. Expectedly, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), after recollecting itself from the initial jolt of the surprise attack, launched an immediate response. Within 24 hours, it took back control of the borders and freed southern Israel of any siege by Hamas. The IDF then began the bombardment of Gaza while simultaneously planning a ground incursion. On 13 October, the IDF released pamphlets in northern Gaza directing its over 1 million residents to leave as it prepared a ground incursion. The Israeli action bombardments in Gaza have already led to over 2,000 Palestinians, including civilians, children, and women losing their lives. While it is difficult to suggest how the war might pan out, the likelihood of any immediate ceasefire appears remote given the anger and public sentiment in Israel, which wants to take revenge of extraordinary proportions. At the same time, there are fears of the war expanding to other regional countries, especially Lebanon, Syria, and even Iraq and Iran, given that Hezbollah in Lebanon has carried out some rocket launches in northern Israel while Israel has attacked locations inside Syria. The probability of an expanded regional war mainly depends on the actions of Iran and its regional proxies in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. At this point, Iran has denied any direct involvement in the planning and execution of Hamas, and Israel and the US, too, have until now not held Iran directly responsible for the attack by Hamas. Hence, given the situation at the time of writing, the likelihood of a major regional war appears limited. As far as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is concerned, the ongoing war between Israel and Hamas, and in hindsight, the earlier wars the two sides have fought since 2007, leads to two primary conclusions. One is that Israel’s continued occupation of the Palestinian territories is untenable, and the world community and regional actors in the Middle East, including Israel, cannot wholly ignore the Palestinian issue. Conversely, it can be argued that maintaining the status quo in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will incur huge humanitarian costs on both sides. Secondly, the terror tactics by Hamas against Israel are unlikely to resolve the conflict. If at all, it only delegitimizes the Palestinian cause and underlines Hamas’s brutality and war crimes against its targeted Israelis and against innocent Palestinian civilians who are used as human shields or become the victim of the attacks and counterattacks between Hamas and Israel. Hence, both occupation and terrorism cannot be justified by any means. Notwithstanding the immediate repercussions on the Israelis and Palestinians and whether the war escalates into a broader regional crisis, the ongoing crisis will have regional implications. The first question it raises is about the regional trend of normalization of relations between Arab countries and Israel. While the process of Gulf Arab rapprochement with Israel started earlier, the Abraham Accords signed in September 2020 among UAE, Bahrain, and Israel, and later joined by Morocco and Sudan, underlined the possibility of normalization between Arab countries and Israel without necessarily taking the Palestinian view into account. The Abraham Accords were followed by discussions between Saudi Arabia and Israel, mediated by the US, to normalize relations. Notably, Saudi Arabia, during the negotiations, continued to highlight the need for taking the Palestinian view into account and held some discussions with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and other representatives. For the time being, the Hamas-Israel war has halted the discussions on Saudi-Israel normalization, and Saudi Arabia has announced that it is no longer engaging in negotiations on normalization with Israel. The possibility of resumption of the normalization talks will depend on how and when the war ends. The process will be delayed if the Hamas-Israel conflict expands to Lebanon and further into Syria and other regional countries. Some have suggested that the ongoing Israel-Hamas war is a death knell for the Abraham Accords and all the regional geopolitical and geo-economic developments it had ensued. Such a narrow understanding of the regional situation is fallacious, at best. The reversal of all the gains made after the Abraham Accords, including the I2U2 and IMEC, cannot be assured. The fate of both will depend on a multiplicity of factors. I2U2, for example, is a joint forum of four regional and extra-regional countries focused on food and energy security, and the economic projects announced under it will likely continue despite the ongoing war. Similarly, the IMEC is a multi-nation partnership for infrastructure development and cross-border trade. Although it depends on the relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel, both important IMEC constituents, none have made any statements against it. For Saudi Arabia to continue with the IMEC is vital, given that it aligns with its Vision 2030 program. It fits in its quest for an economic transformation in preparation for a post-oil economy. Moreover, the three primary components of the IMEC are India, the Gulf Arab countries, and Europe and the European Union, and Jordan, Israel, and Greece are critical nodal points. One must also consider that the Saudi-Israeli secret political and security engagements predate the Abraham Accords. And, there remains the possibility of economic contacts and connectivity projects despite the disruption of the Saudi-Israel normalization. Hence, the Hamas-Israel war likely will delay the regional geopolitical reconciliations and normalization rather than announcing its death, and therein lies the need for continuing diplomatic efforts towards normalization as well as infrastructure development and economic integration. What is essential, however, is to recognize the significance of the Palestinian issue in seeking normalization for Israel and economic integration among the regional states. #WestAsia #IsraelHamasWar #IsraelPalestineConflict Originally Published : The Financial Express, 16th October 2023 https://www.financialexpress.com/opinion/implications-of-the-hamas-israel-war/3273409/ Posted in SIS Blog with the Authorisation of the Author Md. Muddassir Quamar (PhD) is an Associate Professor at Centre for West Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India

By Prof. (Dr.) Bharat H. Desai On October 10, 2023, the United Nations Secretary-General (UN SG) Antonio Guterres addressed the Fifth Committee (Admin and Budget) of the General Assembly (GA). “Inequalities are growing wider and the prospects of achieving the Sustainable Development Goals are growing more distant. And climate disasters are becoming more frequent, more deadly, and more costly. One in three countries is at high risk of a fiscal crisis, and almost half of those in extreme poverty live in countries with severe fiscal problems. The role of the United Nations has never been more vital – and we are stepping up our efforts”, the UNSG said. The above mentioned prognosis of the UNSG corroborates what this author underscored as “world we live in” in three of his 2023 talks: (i) Prof. R. P. Anand Memorial Lecture; Sept. 14, 2023; (ii) India’s G20 Presidency Lectures at SIS, Sept. 05, 2023; and (iii) Indian Society of International Law, Valedictory Address, March 04, 2023, It is this graphic reality that haunts us as the human driven global challenges (along with nature driven processes). Ironically, the latest ferocious Israeli air pounding in civilian areas of Gaza in response to Hamas strikes in Israeli civilian areas (UN News, Oct 9, 2023), as violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention 1949, has vindicated the grave concerns about more than 2 billion people (out of global population of 8 billion) living in conflict zones. With this grim scenario, the chances for realization of 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are practically bleak. It found an explicit echo in the G20 New Delhi Leaders’ Declaration (Sept. 9-10, 2023) noted with “deep concern immense human suffering and the adverse impact of wars and conflicts around the world” (para 7) as well as “adverse impact that conflicts have on the security of civilians thereby exacerbating existing socio-economic fragilities and vulnerabilities and hindering an effective humanitarian response” (para 12). It presents an ideational challenge – as global solution provider – for the potential Indian leadership through the concrete plank flagged by the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi for “dialogue and diplomacy” as well as “today’s era must not be of war” (para 14, G20 Declaration). UNGA: Conductor of a Grand Orchestra Along with its six committees, the UNGA has played a pivotal role in norm-setting, organizing international law-making processes and institution building on a variety of global problematique. It has resorted to a remarkable engineering skill to engage a host of actors in contentious issues from the past (colonialism, racial discrimination, slavery, apartheid), existing global problems (climate change, SDGs, violence against women, conflicts) and future challenges (artificial intelligence, planetary crisis, future generations). Notwithstanding the legal quibbling due to the limits placed by Article 11 of the UN Charter on the UNGA’s principal instrumentality of resolutions as “recommendations” has never per se come in the way of making the resolutions work or their legitimacy. As a corollary to the UNGA’s consistent engagements to address some of the global challenges as a “conductor of a grand orchestra” [Bharat H. Desai (2004). Institutionalizing International Environmental Law, Chapter 5, 144. New York: Transnational], the President of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Csaba Kőrösi, invited (program; letter of July 17, 2023) the Heads of State and Government (HoS&G) for the 2023 High-level political forum on sustainable development under the auspices of the UNGA’s 2023 SDG Summit (September 18-19, 2023). It became significant mid-point (2015-2030) event. The 2023 SDG special edition report provides graphic account of the utopian goals in the troubles world we live in. They were adopted vide UNGA resolution 70/1 of September 25, 2015 with a mission for Transforming Our World. The 2023 SDG Summit could be considered as a last-ditch effort to address the “impact of multiple and interlocking crises facing the world”. The SDG Summit coincided with the commencement of the UNGA 78th session (2023-2024). It took place exactly one year ahead of the forthcoming Summit of the Future (September 22-23, 2024) that will provide yet another chance in quick succession for further review and push for realization of the SDGs in the remaining seven years (2023-2030). The New York SDG Summit: Outcome The 2023 SDG Summit can be construed as a ‘stitch in time’ as one of the crucial processes to save humankind from the planetary level crisis that has set in. The Summit sought to respond to the consequences of multiple and interlocking crises that the world is facing. The deliberations and the resultant outcome document – Political Declaration – supported by the UNSG’s Stimulus Plan (Feb. 2023), may yield high-level political guidance on transformative and accelerated actions to usher in a new phase for attaining SDGs in the remaining seven years of the current cycle (2015-2030). As the UNSG underscored, the SDG Summit was “to provide a renewed impetus and accelerated action for reaching the SDGs” and was “expected to reignite a sense of hope, optimism, and enthusiasm for the 2030 Agenda.” However, a “great finance divide” threatens the SDG targets since ability of a large number of poorer countries, reeling under mountains of debt, has been sharply curtailed for investment in recovery, climate action, and sustainable development. As a consequence, the Zero Draft of the Political Declaration (June 08, 2023), prepared for adoption at the High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF), under the auspices of the UNGA mandated 2023 SDG Summit, underscored the ominous ground reality that: “The achievement of the SDGs is in peril. At the midpoint of the 2030 Agenda, we are alarmed that only 12 per cent of the SDGs are on track and 30 per cent remain unchanged or below the 2015 baseline. The progress on most of the SDGs is either moving much too slowly or has regressed”. Interestingly, the final Political Declaration, adopted as an outcome of the 2023 SDG Summit, chose to eschew the uncomfortable reality of the “world we live in” contained in the in the chilling figures (“12 per cent of the SDGs are on track and 30 per cent remain unchanged”; Zero Draft). As already mentioned, the mounting debt burden due to high borrowing costs is one of the principal factors that cripples fragile economies of most the developing countries. It reflects deep rooted inequitable international financial and monetary system. In the end, the SDG Summit’s Political Declaration vowed that: We will act with urgency to realize its vision as a plan of action for people, planet, prosperity, peace and partnership, leaving no one behind. We will endeavour to reach the furthest behind first. As a result, the Political Declaration chose to give a priority to implementation of the 2030 Agenda and committed to upholding all the principles contained therein. (i) Shared Commitment It has been emphasized that eradication of poverty including extreme poverty is the biggest global challenge and one of the indispensable requirements for sustainable development. It was reaffirmed that the 2030 Agenda is universal in nature and comprises three dimensions of sustainable development: economic, social, and environmental (see Figure: three dimensions of sustainable development agenda). The empowerment of women “to achieve gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls.” are crucial pillars of the SDGs as it emphasized. It reaffirmed that the 2030 Agenda was guided by the UN Charter including “respect for international law” since it is “grounded in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, international human rights treaties, the Millennium Declaration and the 2005 World Summit Outcome. It is informed by other instruments such as the Declaration on the Right to Development”. Moreover, climate change has been regarded as one of the “triple planetary crisis” (here, here) of our times. As greenhouse gases (GHG) continue to rise globally, and with all countries, the special vulnerability of the developing countries has been addressed. It emphasized that climate change mitigation and adaptation are an immediate priority. Increased inequality due to poverty, hunger and malnutrition have become more prevalent, humanitarian costs are rising (339 million need assistance), and the impacts of climate change, etc. weaken international solidarity and the trust deficit mars collective efforts to overcome these crises. Cumulatively, it appeared clear that an effective and global cooperation is a sine qua non at all levels to realize the 2030 SDGs. It was, in turn, reflected in a political vow that we “will promote a systemic shift towards a more inclusive, just, peaceful, resilient and sustainable world for people and planet, for present and future generation”. The Declaration has recognized that many countries are facing challenges in pursuing SDGs. It mostly comprises developing countries including African countries, landlocked countries, island countries and least developed countries. Most of these countries are middle-income countries and countries in conflict and post-conflict situations. The gender agenda emerging at the top of the list as women's empowerment, the elimination of violence against women and girls would require concrete policy, legal and institutional responses at global and domestic levels. Some other strands in the global concerns and discourse include discrimination based on race, hate speech, stigmatization, xenophobia and related intolerance etc. These can be addressed only through cooperation, partnership, inclusion and respect for diversity. There are cross-cutting actions comprising quality education, universal health and related issues like food etc. that would provide long-term cohesion, sustenance and peaceful future. As a corollary to the urgent steps required for planetary level crisis, the SDG Summit sought to address several other pillars to conserve and sustainably use oceans and seas, freshwater resources, as well as forests, mountains and drylands and protect biodiversity, ecosystems and wildlife. It would need concerted commitments through global, regional, national and legal partnerships for sustainable development to achieve the 2030 Agenda. (ii) Identified Gaps and Challenges The challenges and gaps identified and reflected in the 2023 SDG Summit and its outcome instrumentality of Political Declaration, are mostly based on the world before and after COVID-19. Climate change, poverty, forced displacement, economic issues like cost-of-living, conflicts, gender inequality, the problems relating to migration, increased SDG financing gap, problems of landlocked countries, etc. have been identified as the most important challenges in the implementation of the 2030 SDGs that especially affecting developing and least developed countries. Thus, they welcomed the UN Development system to implement reforms championed by the UNSG and endorsed by the UNGA to support the countries in realizing the 2030 Agenda. The importance of sustainable funding has given priority to the UN development system and its programmatic activities. Moreover, voluntary national reviews have been regarded as suitable mechanism to monitor progress and integrate the SDGs into national policies and plans. (iii) Moving Forward to Achieve Agenda 2030 As the SDG Summit and speeches at the 78th UNGA opening high-level segment (late Sept. 2023) showed, most of the States have renewed their commitment for taking an urgent action at all levels to achieve the goals that would be fundamental and transformative for the planetary future. The SDG Summit has identified States that are doing well and to support those who are left behind. The needs of “all children, youth, persons with disabilities, people living with HIV/AIDS, older persons, indigenous peoples, refugees, internally displaced persons, and migrants have been duly reflected in the Agenda. In fact, the need for a concrete global partnership has emerged as one of the important tools to achieve the SDG targets by 2030. In this wake, the Political Declaration has zeroed in on prioritization of digitalization in the developing countries. There have been serious concerns for global water scarcity and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all as well as identifying gaps for addressing issues like global pandemic and the global health coverage so that no one is left behind. Similarly, implementation of the ‘New Urban Agenda’, global sustainable consumption patterns and zero-waste initiatives would matter most in the saga of realization of 2030 SDGs. Some other important tasks flagged as important targets comprise: renewable energy, full implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015–2030), implementation of all the provisions of the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), call for ‘climate action’ for the implementation of the 1992 UNFCCC and the 2015 Paris Agreement as well as implementation of the strategic objectives of the 1994 United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD). The Declaration has reiterated “the need to accelerate the transfer of environmentally sound technologies to developing countries on favourable terms, including on concessional and preferential terms, as mutually agreed”. Similarly, the need for funding SDGs related research and innovation and address the emerging challenges of global regulation of artificial intelligence (AI). It pledged to act on international, national, and local data systems efforts that should be based on high quality, timely, relevant, disaggregated and reliable data on SDG. The outcome also sought full implementation of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda and take further actions to scale up financing to sustainable development and provide the means of implementation to the developing countries. It appears good omen that through the SDG Summit Declaration, the UN member states renewed their commitments to multilateralism to find ways of working together and ensure that multilateral institutions deliver results. Similarly, they swore by peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for international law and the principles and purposes of the UN Charter including the right to self-determination, territorial integrity and political independence of the States. As an icing on the cake, the SDG Summit Declaration finally vowed and as the UNSG has emphasized (Sept. 18, 2023) that: “We pledge to act now, for present and future generations, turning our world towards a sustainable and resilient path by 2030, and leaving no one behind”. This final sentence crystallizes the essence of what will it take for the UN member states to pursue in the remaining seven years of the current SDG cycle (2015-2030). In fact, walking-the-talk would hold the key to the rescue plan for 2030 SDGs. Audacity of Hope In the midst of a “planetary level crisis” [see Bharat H. Desai, SIS Blog Special – I and II (March 29, 2023); Green Diplomacy (Feb. 14, 2023)], it is audacious to hope that the resolve of the 2023 New York SDG Summit (September 18-19, 2023) would pay heed to the emergency button pushed by the UNSG (Stockholm+50; June 02, 2022) and ensure that the SDGs do not remain “hot air” and we decisively “end our senseless and suicidal war against nature”. The 2023 SDG Summit outcome would also impinge upon the prospects for the 2024 New York Summit of the Future (UNGA Reso. 76/307: here, Our Common Agenda, para 125: here) to be held during September 22-23, 2024. Hopefully, notwithstanding the graphic reality and challenges of the “world we live in”, the key mantra for the UN member states will need to be “leaving no one behind”. This solemn declaration of the SDG Summit’s outcome document of Political Declaration provides a beacon of hope for bold, ambitious, accelerated and transformative actions for a sustainable world for people and planet. It is indeed an audacity of hope (and possibly a miracle) to expect realization of all the 2030 SDGs in the coming seven years (2023-2030). If the UN member states can walk-the-talk, it would set the stage for concrete action plan for saving the planet Earth at the 2024 Summit of the Future. #UNSG #UNSC#UNGA #MEA #PMOIndia #WEF #2023 SDG Summit The Article is a sequel to Blog Special -I posted on 12th August 2023 on the SIS Blog. This Article is an Original Contribution to the SIS Blog. Prof. (Dr.) Bharat H. Desai is Professor of International Law, Jawaharlal Nehru Chair and Chairperson of the Centre for International Legal Studies (SIS, JNU), who served as a member of the Official Indian Delegations to various multilateral negotiations (2002-2008), coordinated the knowledge initiatives for (i) Making SIS Visible (2008-2013) and the (ii) Inter-University Consortium: JNU; Jammu; Kashmir; Sikkim (2012-2020) as well as contributes as the Editor-in-Chief of Environmental Policy and Law (IOS Press: Amsterdam)

By Prof. (Dr.) Gulshan Sachdeva The IMEC holds promise but it must contend with West Asian politics, and demonstrate a clear cost and time advantage over the Suez Canal and the INSTC routes The Hamas-Israel war and shifting geopolitical dynamics in West Asia could potentially cast a significant shadow over the much-discussed India-Middle-East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). The IMEC was announced on the sidelines of the G20 Summit just a month ago. United States President Joe Biden called it a “real big deal”. The European Commission President labelled it as the “most ambitious project of our generation”. Given India's robust economic ties with both Europe and West Asia, the proposition looked attractive. Prime Minister Narendra Modi asserted that the IMEC “is going to become the basis of world trade for hundreds of years to come, and history will always remember that this corridor was initiated on Indian soil". The proposed multi-modal corridor will link India to Europe through the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel and Greece. While the economics of the IMEC route compared to the tested Suez Canal route is still not clear, it made a lot of geopolitical sense to most observers. Currently, the IMEC seems to be off-track even before the intricate land, sea and railroad corridor details have been fully developed. The Israel-Palestine conflict is going to impact the broader process of normalisation between Israel and many Arab states. While the US-led IMEC initiative is based on the new dynamics in the region, the Hamas-Israel war has rekindled the relevance of traditional regional politics. The inclusion of 'Middle East' in naming the corridor suggested that this was more in line with a US design rather than a connectivity strategy originating from New Delhi. So far, the US has not committed any funding for the project. The idea has been to mobilise funding from the partners, private sector and multilateral organisations. External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar called the US a “guarantor partner of the project” . The US was trying to build upon the successes of the Abraham Accords of 2020, India-Israel-UAE-US (I2U2) grouping and reconciliation efforts between Saudi Arabia and Israel. Although many analysts clubbed the IMEC with the Delhi G20 Summit outcomes, it is actually an outcome of the G7 initiative called Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), announced in the United Kingdom in 2021 and launched in Germany in 2022. The PGII is also being aligned with the EU’s Global Gateway Strategy as well as other Western initiatives viz Build Back Better World (B3W) and Blue Dot Network. Without waiting for the IMEC details, many enthusiastic analysts have declared it as a counter to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Both these initiatives have different logics and timelines. The BRI is now 10 years old. Close to 100 countries will be participating in the third BRI Forum in China later this month. Chinese officials claim that they have already established 3,000 projects and galvanised $1 trillion investments. Moreover, many of the IMEC partners are not looking at it as an alternative to the BRI. Some of them are already participating in the BRI. China has also established strategic partnerships with Greece (2006), Jordan (2015), the UAE (2018) and Saudi Arabia (2022). Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are also now members of the BRICS. The IMEC is the second US led connectivity project in which India is participating. Incidentally, the New Silk Road (NSR) strategy project was also announced on Indian soil by the then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2011. The idea was to develop trade and energy corridors linking South and Central Asian economies via Afghanistan. While US never put any serious money behind the NSR, India wholeheartedly embraced the narrative until the US’ withdrawal from Afghanistan. Now China and the Taliban have agreed to link Afghanistan with the BRI. Despite the current phase of globalisation being significantly shaped by connectivity designs, India has yet to unveil a comprehensive connectivity strategy. Over the years, the International North-South Trade Corridor (INSTC) initiated by India, Iran and Russia was considered a key component of India's connectivity strategy. Additionally, joint initiatives like the India-Japan Asia-Africa Growth Corridor and the India-EU connectivity partnership were announced. However, to date, none of these projects have really taken off. The IMEC holds promise, primarily owing to existing trade volumes, but it must contend with West Asian politics, and demonstrate a clear cost and time advantage over the Suez Canal and the INSTC routes. #Israel #Hamas #IMEC #War Originally Published : Deccan Herald, 11th October' 2023 https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/israel-hamas-war-what-happens-to-imec-now-2721745 Posted in SIS Blog with the Authorisation of the Author Prof. (Dr.) Gulshan Sachdeva is Professor at the Centre for European Studies and Coordinator, Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India

By Prof. Santishree Dhulipudi Pandit This episode shows how even developed countries externalise domestic issues by transforming a bilateral partner into an adversary for domestic electoral gains. In a recent development in India-Canada relations, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s statements have sparked diplomatic controversy that breached diplomatic decorum and indicated his immature leadership. Just to keep himself in power, he is ready to go to any lengths to appease terror and people involved in hate speech, human and drug trafficking. His choice of language and actions have jeopardised bilateral ties and the safety of Indians (especially Indian Hindus) currently residing in Canada. To gain insights into how Canada, traditionally a favoured foreign destination for Indians, became a source of anger and frustration, four key observations warrant attention. First, Trudeau’s hubris and romanticised commitment to woke values of hate speech and Hinduphobia injure relations with India and expose his divisive politics—not only of domestic politics but also as a disruptive instrument of foreign policy. One can better understand Trudeau’s actions in the context of his political career, which embraces identity politics and divisive policies. Trudeau has sought to promote what appears to be disingenuous empathy stemming from his ideological commitments towards woke politics. His approach has frequently worsened divisions in Canada rather than solving them. Whether one looks at his vaccine mandate or his handling of the trucker protests (earlier this year), he leaves no room for doubt regarding the potential dangers and authoritarian tendencies accompanying far-Left politics. Furthermore, it is essential to recognise that Trudeau and his supporters mistakenly yet regularly conflate his persona as synonymous with Canada. Second, Trudeau’s approach illustrates how not to handle a diplomatic situation. The episode seemingly emerged following Trudeau’s visit to India after the G20 Summit. His decision to present information regarding a still-investigated killing, where crucial facts remain elusive, within the Parliament was both deplorable and irresponsible. The utilisation of terms like “credible allegations” and “potential link” to implicate the Indian government without providing evidence or engaging in discussions with Indian representatives demonstrated not only an immature approach to this sensitive matter but also endangered the substantial Indian diaspora in Canada. Canada is no longer a safe and prosperous nation with low crime rates. Instead, akin to many Western countries like France and Germany, Canada faces growing concerns related to organised crime networks, hate crimes and anti-immigration sentiments against which Trudeau is not only ignorant but also ideologically blinded. For instance, the significant number of individuals involved in criminal activities who seek refuge in Canada under the guise of political asylum should have garnered the attention of the self-proclaimed proactive Prime Minister of Canada. However, his actions and policies remain misguided due to ideological bias, reflecting significant irresponsibility and a lack of diplomatic finesse. Third, the episode shows how even developed countries externalise domestic issues by transforming a bilateral partner into an adversary for electoral gains. Trudeau’s handling of the situation strongly suggests a primarily political motive driven by domestic concerns and a blunt pursuit of self-interest, illustrated vividly by his coddling of pro-Khalistan groups, notably Jagmeet Singh and his New Democratic Party. This must also consider his waning popularity in his re-election campaign, poor handling of the economy and disparaged vaccination policy. At this juncture, let’s also analyse the allegations against India. Senior researcher and former Pentagon official Michael Rubin eloquently articulated two scenarios. First, if India was not involved, Trudeau acted without much foresight and damaged diplomatic relations that could take years to mend. Second, if substantial evidence points to Indian involvement, it would signify a grave lapse within Canada’s security apparatus that harboured a known terrorist, a matter that India repeatedly urged it to address. Both of which demonstrate poor leadership by PM Trudeau. Moreover, this also implies that the Trudeau government is not a reliable ally in the fight against organised crime and terrorism. Instead, it seems inclined to protect these elements under the guise of free speech. It is worth recalling that this is the same Trudeau government that introduced bill C-16, which aimed to penalise certain forms of speech as legal offences without substantial evidence, potentially undermining the concept of free speech it professed to uphold. Many observers of this incident have also speculated that Trudeau’s sentiments may be linked to his perception of treatment during his visit to India. In all fairness, he was accorded respect and protocol due to a Head of State. When his plane encountered technical issues, India even extended the gracious offer to use the Air India One aircraft for his travel. However, any perceived snub that Trudeau and his supporters may have felt was largely of his own making. It’s crucial to harken back to his previous visit to India in 2018, during which a dinner hosted by the Canadian High Commission in New Delhi extended an invitation to Sikh extremist Jaspal Atwal, who had been convicted of attempted murder. Extending such an invitation to a Sikh extremist for an embassy event in a foreign nation implies a calculated mischief designed to elicit sympathy and publicity from a particular voter base back home. Fourthly, the incident illustrated India’s mastery of diplomacy. India’s response to Trudeau’s politically motivated actions showcased a diplomatic masterclass. India effectively defended its position and presented its narrative in the face of Trudeau’s assertive behaviour, demonstrating diplomacy at its best. This was further emphasised by the support from the United States and the United Kingdom, as reports indicated that Canada had sought their help against India but was denied. The amicable interactions between India and other Western nations during the 78th UNGA session underscore this point. Furthermore, India’s response made it clear that it will not tolerate finger-wagging or condescending attitudes reminiscent of the Cold War era. It sends a strong message that the world order is evolving. Trudeau should consider this reality and rise beyond the notion of a “White Man’s Burden” to educate the Global South. Above all, Trudeau should understand that promoting supporters of terrorism, organised crime, and secessionist movements is something no government appreciates and is detrimental for an inclusive democracy. Any phobia cannot be legitimized, whether Islamic, Jewish or for that matter Hindu. Ultimately, such irresponsible actions by the Canadian Prime Minister have yielded negative consequences for everyone. It has undermined the years of collaborative efforts and diplomacy and adversely impacted ordinary citizens, particularly India’s sizable diaspora residing in Canada. This situation starkly revealed the hypocrisy and pretence inherent in Trudeau’s professed inclusivity and social justice values. Essentially, it serves as a cautionary tale, highlighting how ideology and hubris can sorely damage the amicable relations between K-anada and the largest democracy and emerging power in a highly polarised world. #Canada #India #ForeignPolicy Originally Published : Sunday Guardian, 1st October 2023 https://sundayguardianlive.com/opinion/trudeaus-domestic-politics-masquerades-as-foreign-policy#:~:text=First%2C%20Trudeau's%20hubris%20and%20romanticised,disruptive%20instrument%20of%20foreign%20policy. Prof. Santishree Dhulipudi Pandit is the Vice Chancellor of the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India

By Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli Inscrutable China The US-China technology Cold War and China’s quest to expand indigenous capacity and self-reliance, as the US denies seeks to deny China hi-tech components for military use, are all shaping recent dynamics. The US restrictions on semiconductor components and technologies to China is a gathering storm, with retaliation and counter-retaliation measures spilling over into the supply chains and geopolitics. The ominous signals of the US restrictions on China are visible of late. It began with the Trump administration’s tariffs on China’s exports. A second sign was the semiconductor export controls imposed by the US in April 2018 on China’s telecom giant ZTE (Zhongxing) for repeatedly violating US laws on exports to Iran. A third sign was the arrest of Meng Wanzhou, the daughter of Huawei chief Ren Zhengfei. Meng was taken into custody by Canadian authorities at the behest of the US, for her alleged links to Iran. China retaliated by arresting two Canadian citizens not linked to this episode. Meng was finally released in a “hostage swap” deal, only for it to intensify the semiconductor war. The US restrictions are expected to constrain China’s expansion programmes, specifically in AI-enabled military applications, but also trigger intensive indigenous efforts. China’s vulnerability is reflected in the fact that it imports half of global chip sales, estimated at about $500 billion. China undertook two countermeasures. It retaliated by banning export of germanium and gallium to the US, essential for the production of semiconductors. Beijing also took the complaint to WTO. Previously, China banned the export of rare earth metals to Japan citing historical issues between the two countries. In another measure, it began subsidising domestic IT industry with more than $150 billion. China had assiduously built its domestic industry under Party-State dominance and priorities. Yangtze Memory Technologies Corp, Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation, HuaHong and other companies have expanded substantially in enhancing semiconductor capacity. However, despite many successes, the industry is wracked by its dependence on State subsidies, lack of R&D investments, rampant corruption, and being copycats. The Chinese countermeasures appear to be counterproductive. While China put up a brave face by announcing a 7-nanometer chip (compared to its predominantly 24-nm capability) and Huawei released the 5G-capable Mate-60 Pro. But this appears to be for demonstrative effect. The US, Taiwan and South Korean companies produce 3- and 4-nm chips already. In March this year, the US cobbled up a multilateral pact with Japan and Netherlands to stop chip-making technology from going to China. Beijing has been assiduously pursuing measures to acquire such technologies from the US and Netherlands. With ambitions of becoming a “digital superpower” and sourcing 70% of integrated circuits and other parts through the ‘Made in China 2025’ campaign launched in 2015, China wanted to seize the opportunity but with initial US support. That dream has become an uphill task now. Beijing seems to have opened its cards too early, especially at a time when it is still recovering from the Covid pandemic, with declining economic growth and restrictions on its own big businesses. China had imposed restrictions on the US company Micron and even arrested its employees last year on espionage charges. Many US tech companies are toying with the idea of relocating from China to other green pastures in Southeast Asia and India. These technology and geopolitical issues occur alongside China’s threat to invade Taiwan, the major semiconductor exporter in the world today. Taiwan invasion scenarios have created tensions in the US and Taiwan and brought back options of relocating the semi-conductor industry to other markets. Taiwan’s TSMC has agreed to open a plant in Arizona and explore other markets. Despite public postures of openness, transparency, WTO-compliance and level-playing field, China is a highly restricted market for the US, European, Japanese or even Indian products. For instance, none of the Indian software products are allowed in China’s State-owned enterprises, not to mention extensive restrictions and firewalls embedded in China’s IT platforms. The US-China semiconductor war could be an opportunity for India in terms of relocation of the global industry in a phased manner, upgradation of India’s capacities, and supply chain reorganisation. Already, Micron, which was victimised in China, is setting up a testing and packaging centre in Gujarat, with over $830 million in investments. Taiwan’s TSMC and Foxconn companies are actively in talks or have established their presence in the semiconductor industry in India. #SinoUS #TechRivalry #ChipWar #India Originally Published : Deccan Herald, 8th October' 2023 https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/us-china-chip-war-is-indias-opportunity-2717261 Posted in SIS Blog with the Authorisation of the Author. Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli is Dean of School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India

By Prof. Santishree Dhulipudi Pandit The biggest challenge for Jawaharlal Nehru University is to include the multiple intellectual narratives in India, without excluding any The goal of becoming a vishwaguru in the knowledge society requires transformational reforms in education. The National Education Policy (NEP) 2020, is indeed a unique framework, for it brings in continuity with change, and merges specialisation with a holistic approach. The stress on interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary aspects of knowledge introduces a balance between science, technology, social sciences, humanities and languages; between the local and the regional, the national and the international, as well as the universal. The State’s role in education is very important, for it is public education that bridges the gap between social, economic and regional disparities. Private players can never replace the State as the autonomy of educational institutions is guaranteed by democracies such as India. The weighty yet indispensable responsibility of fostering education and driving innovation is intricately tied to the architecture of our education system. Within this framework, the role of higher education institutions, particularly exemplified by institutions such as Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), assumes an outsized and pivotal significance. This calls for a higher investment in education by the State to more than 10 per cent of the GDP. The role ascribed to institutions of higher learning, including JNU, is to facilitate education, foster innovation, and contribute to the construction of a society characterised by openness, diversity, compassion, self-reliance, self-dignity and high-calibre competitiveness. Since its inception, JNU has been a vital chapter in India’s narrative of higher education. It has functioned as a nurturing crucible for emerging leaders across diverse domains and sectors, from politics to bureaucracy to the armed forces. It has also produced a Nobel Prize winner. Moreover, JNU has championed inclusive, democratic and creative spaces for discourse, deliberation and discussion, significantly influencing the trajectory of public debates. While we rightfully take pride in many aspects of JNU, its history, and the institution itself, some challenges demand our attention. The first challenge confronting higher education institutions in India, including JNU, revolves around enhancing their outcomes and outputs. Subsequent challenges, though relevant, complement or augment this central concern. The primary objective at JNU is to extend its impact by assuming a heightened social responsibility — cultivating a workforce that is not only characterised by parity, equity, diversity, and enhanced competitiveness but also one that wields the agency to influence and guide the global future. JNU nurtures a workforce that not only conforms to prevailing global paradigms but also possesses the capacity to shape and lead them. Failing to fulfil this pivotal mission would render JNU’s identity as a university and higher education institution incomplete. The second significant challenge is extending our outreach to marginalised and underrepresented segments of society. JNU has steadfastly positioned itself as an institution that fosters an environment conducive to the progress of women and marginalised groups. In doing this, JNU has not only propagated and extended the concept of “nari shakti” (women-led development) but has also served as an embodiment of it. In a remarkable stride, the institution has witnessed appointments of women as chairpersons and deans over the past one-and-half years as well as an increase in the number of women students during the period — a historical precedent that resonates with its commitment to equity and women’s empowerment. The third challenge revolves around infrastructural limitations. Financing remains an enduring struggle for higher education institutions worldwide, presenting fluctuations in resource availability. Though JNU faces fiscal constraints, it has adroitly harnessed technology and alternative sources of revenue to mitigate a range of deficiencies. Pioneering the landscape, JNU is set to become India’s first higher education institution with a fully operational 5G-enabled campus, exploring private-public collaboration in infrastructure development. This transformative step underscores our resolve to recalibrate ourselves and bolster competitiveness and efficiency. Such adaptations equip us to effectively address contemporary issues and anticipate the challenges of tomorrow to enable us to yield tangible outcomes. The fourth imperative is to link tradition with modernity, excellence with empathy, equality with equity and inclusion with integrity and innovation. This transition necessitates a concentrated emphasis on fostering and advancing Indian knowledge systems. The setting up of Vidyaranya Institute of Knowledge and Advance Studies (VIKAS) is a step in this direction. This includes various aspects, including the promotion of Indian languages. JNU envisions a School of Indian Languages, Culture and Civilisation to foster better understanding of each other. Under this initiative, a Centre for Tamil Language Studies has been established in JNU, and this will be followed by centres for Assamese, Odia, Kannada, and Marathi languages. While JNU is not the only entity engaged in this endeavour, it aims to assume a leadership role to actualise the visionary NEP 2020. The challenges elucidated thus far are indeed formidable, but they are not insurmountable. Nonetheless, amidst these considerations, there is also a new-found sense of optimism. We find ourselves fortunate to have access to the guidelines outlined in NEP 2020, which furnishes us with a robust blueprint. What is remarkable about NEP 2020 is that it straddles the delicate balance between a structured framework on the one hand and the flexibility to effect adaptive changes on the other. The 15 schools, 10 special centres, and our 140 affiliated defence, research, travel and tourism institutes are implementing many features of NEP 2020. The biggest challenge is to include the multiple intellectual narratives in India, without excluding any. We aim to cultivate a proficiency that attracts the world to us rather than us seeking validation from the world. Looking ahead, our strategy encompasses leveraging the prowess of our alumni network and building upon our notable achievements. Concurrently, we are committed to forging new avenues, exemplified by our emphasis on Indian knowledge systems. Our Indic civilisation State is a feminist and a nature-centric one. We celebrate the Six Ds in JNU — democracy, difference, debate, dialogue, dissent and development. They are very much a part of our values. We have students and faculty from all parts of the country working for the nation’s progress in peace and harmony. Our mission at JNU involves promoting equity with equality, intertwining tradition with modernity, seamlessly transitioning between continuity and change, harmonising the universal with the regional, and bridging the gap between theory and practice. Critics might argue that pursuing such an ambitious agenda is rife with inherent contradictions. Yet, in light of India’s current aspirations and trajectory, these ambitions are plausible and desirable. Indeed, time will substantiate the veracity of these ambitions. For such reasons, our goal is clear: We wish to become an integral contributor to India’s success story as the country inches towards its Independence centenary through innovation, inclusion, diversity, respect, and responsibility. #JNU #IndicCivilisation #NEP2020 #Diversity #Inclusion #Education Originally Published : The Indian Express, 22nd September'2023 https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/seek-world-not-its-validation-8950579/ Posted in SIS Blog with the Authorisation of the Author Prof. Santishree Dhulipudi Pandit is Vice Chancellor of the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India

By Prof. (Dr.) Gulshan Sachdeva As Ukraine's counteroffensive falters, potential for India's peace initiative emerges The war in Ukraine has again entered a new phase, with both Russia and Western powers actively reevaluating and adjusting their strategies. Despite some minor periodic gains, the widely discussed Ukrainian counteroffensive initiated in early June has not yielded significant results thus far. Russia has been able to consolidate and defend most occupied territories. In the meanwhile, Russian forces continue to target Ukrainian assets with drones and missiles. Some leaked US intelligence reports indicate that Kyiv will not be able to achieve one of the key objectives of the counteroffensive – severing Russia’s land bridge to Crimea. Numerous leaked reports and analyses offer a range of explanations for the counteroffensive's lack of success. These factors include Ukraine's overly optimistic expectations for a rapid breakthrough, insufficient Western support in terms of weaponry and training, and overly enthusiastic reports by Western media. West Tempers Its Expectations The idea of Russia’s “strategic defeat” is still alive in the Western policy circles and media. It had two major dimensions. First, isolating Russia diplomatically and squeezing Moscow economically through sanctions. Second, providing military, financial and diplomatic support including the promise of European Union membership to Ukraine. The success of the strategy depended on Ukrainian military breakthroughs on the ground and Russia’s economic isolation and collapse. On both these counts, the strategy has not been proved very effective so far. With the expectation of a quick military breakthrough fading, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg now says that “we must prepare ourselves for a long war in Ukraine”. The American strategist Edward Luttwak also asserts that the war in Ukraine “has entered its "grin and bear it" period”. It is not clear, however, if Ukraine’s Western allies are really ready for a long war. Aid To Ukraine Will Remain Generous At the moment, the Western support to Ukraine is still strong in terms of military, financial and humanitarian assistance. So far, the United States has provided $77 billion which includes $47 billion in military aid. The EU and its member states have committed altogether $140 billion including military aid since the war began in February 2022. This encompasses the Euro 50 billion new Ukraine facility announced in June and to be implemented by 2027. Military aid from Germany and the UK is about $18 billion and $7 billion respectively. Despite some signs of weakening support in a few countries like Hungary in Eastern Europe, overall European support to Ukraine is likely to continue. Only last week, Germany announced $428 million additional military support for Ukraine. President Biden has been pressing the Congress to provide an additional $24 billion aid for Ukraine. During his recent visit to Washington, Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelenskyy was promised additional $325 million aid including advance air defence systems. There are also discussions on providing Army Tactical Missile Systems. However, due to domestic politics and the election cycle, things are going to be less certain in the United States. Moreover, without any solid military success in Ukraine, the war fatigue may easily spread among allies. What Russia Wants Learning from its initial mistakes, Russia seems to have consolidated military gains, even amid the counteroffensive. In a changed situation, Moscow is not in favour of a ceasefire. Instead, it has provided some hints regarding how to bring an end to the conflict. During the recent press conference at the UN, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov mentioned that 10 point peace plan prepared by Kiev is not realistic and conflict would be resolved at the battlefield, if the West sticks to this plan. But he also asserted that Russia recognised Ukrainian sovereignty way back in 1991. Apart from respect for minorities, he argues that the 1991 declaration also mentioned that “Ukraine would be a non-bloc, non-alliance country; it would not join any military alliances. In that version, on those conditions, we support Ukraine’s territorial integrity”. Put simply, Russia is willing to respect territorial integrity of Ukraine provided it promises not to join NATO. Still, there was no mention of Crimea. Obviously, these are early days for any serious discussion on the resolution. India As Mediator These developments, however, do indicate that there is a potential for a fresh diplomatic initiative to resolve the Ukrainian crisis. Amidst a changing global order, New Delhi has shown that it has the capacity, both in terms of diplomatic skills and personal relationships, to shape a compromise. This was clearly evident at the recently concluded G20 summit. Despite the world being geopolitically divided, a consensus declaration was produced. Along with some key Global South leaders, this may be an appropriate time for New Delhi to launch a fresh initiative to resolve a major geopolitical crisis of our time. #UkraineCrisis #India #GlobalSouth Originally Published : Money Control, 29th September' 2023 https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/opinion/time-for-a-negotiated-peace-in-ukraine-11448951.html Posted in SIS Blog with the Authorisation of the Author Prof. (Dr.) Gulshan Sachdeva is Professor at the Centre for European Studies and Coordinator, Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India

By Md. Muddassir Quamar (PhD) A simultaneous foreign policy recalibration focused on economic considerations resulted in ‘Look East’ and ‘Look West’ policies For long since independence, India’s external approach revolved around geopolitical considerations. Decolonization, Asianism, and non-alignment defined New Delhi’s foreign relations and policies. While leaders made periodic attempts earlier, a clear shift came about only after the end of the Cold War when Prime Minister Narasimha Rao began the process of economic liberalization. A simultaneous foreign policy recalibration focused on economic considerations resulted in ‘Look East’ and ‘Look West’ policies. With trade and business taking center stage, India’s foreign relations moved away from non-alignment to multi-alignment. Nonetheless, domestic and international compulsions often led New Delhi to tread cautiously, balancing economic interest with political messaging. In relations with the Gulf and West Asia, while trade, business, and energy gradually took center stage since the 1990s, several domestic and external factors compelled New Delhi to remain cautious and, at times, indifferent to the economic potential in relation to the region. The proximity of the Gulf States to Pakistan, fascination with Iran, the lack of trust vis-à-vis the United States and European Union, strategic risks due to political instability, and security challenges meant that despite growing economic ties, India did not make efforts toward realizing the potentials in relations with the Arab Gulf countries. In the 2000s, besides trade, business, energy, and expatriates, the two sides witnessed limited issue-based cooperation, such as in fighting piracy, enhancing maritime security, and combating organized crime and terrorism. It did not, however, translate into strategic partnerships with the regional countries. In some cases, such as with Oman and Saudi Arabia, India took essential initiatives—still, these needed follow-ups, which could not be done due to domestic preoccupation or political ineptitude. Further, the obsession of the strategic community and decision-makers with Iran meant that much energy was invested in developing the Chabahar Port, which took almost a decade and a half to become functional and became mired in troubles due to US-Iran problems. Projects such as the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline were stillborn due to geopolitical challenges and inflated assumptions of economic potential. And, though New Delhi took initiatives to expedite economic engagements with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States, such as signing the framework agreement on India-GCC free trade agreement (FTA) in August 2004, these got interrupted due to domestic problems or external factors. The India-GCC FTA negotiations stopped after two rounds in 2006 and 2008 due to differences in economic priorities. Moreover, the Middle East faced unprecedented political upheavals since 2011, resulting in New Delhi’s somewhat dispirited approach towards the region. The change of government in New Delhi in 2014 brought a shift in approach towards the Gulf and West Asia. Building on the groundwork done over the two decades, Prime Minister Narendra Modi undertook a diplomatic blitz to engage the Arab Gulf countries and Israel while also adopting a friendlier approach towards the United States, European Union, and Japan. The deterioration in relations with China due to border skirmishes (Doklam and Galwan) and the increased focus of the United States in the Indo-Pacific due to the rise of China brought a convergence of Indian interests with the United States and Japan. Economic disruptions caused by COVID-19 highlighted the need for greater economic cooperation among like-minded global powers. In the meantime, the Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, expedited their quest for economic transformation, partly motivated by the events of the Arab Spring. The gradual change of approach towards Israel, the eventual breakthrough in the form of the Abraham Accords in September 2020, the decision to end the altercation with Qatar in January 2021 through the AlUla Declaration, and Saudi decision to renew diplomatic ties with Iran indicated the intent to focus on economic revival and avoid political instability and conflicts. The India, Israel, United Arab Emirates, and the United States (I2U2) quadrilateral initiative indicated a change in India’s approach to the Middle East, complementing bilateralism with minilateralism. Improvement in relations with Egypt and Greece underlined that India’s economic interest extends beyond the ‘extended neighborhood’. The announcement of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEEEC) during the G20 summit in New Delhi and the enthusiastic response from the partnering countries, including Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Israel, Greece, Italy, Spain, and other members of the EU underline the significant of the proposed corridor. The possibilities of economic growth and regeneration for the three regions are notable. There are also speculations on how it can prove a competitor to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Simultaneously, the historic significance of the Gulf and West Asia region as the trading hub connecting Asia to Europe and Africa is noteworthy. In that respect, the IMEEEC represents the possibilities of reviving the centrality of the Indian Ocean region as the center of global trade, business, and mercantile activities. The trading route passing through the western Indian Ocean has a historical significance. The IMEEEC proposes an eastern corridor connecting India to the Gulf and a northern corridor connecting the Gulf to Europe. This will be complemented with a rail network connecting the east coast of the Arabian Peninsula to the Eastern Mediterranean region. The intent is to use the logistics and supply chain infrastructure coming up in the Gulf and West Asia to revive the historical trading connections between India, West Asia, and Europe. Undoubtedly, there remain challenges regarding political and security risks, the financial viability of investments in mega infrastructure projects, and the broader question of environmental hazards. However, the countries involved have already discussed these challenges and will undoubtedly examine and fine-tune them as they go forward. The resumption of India-GCC FTA negotiations is significant in this context. India and UAE signed a comprehensive economic partnership agreement in March 2022, and in November 2022, after a gap of 14 years, India revived FTA talks with the GCC. After some hiccups and a change in chief negotiator from the GCC’s side, the talks have resumed, and the sides are likely to sign a comprehensive economic partnership agreement soon. The preferential trade agreement would mean greater trade, business, and investments with the GCC countries. Notably, the Gulf and West Asia region is already the biggest trading block for India, with a US$240 billion bilateral trade in 2022-23. There is robust commodity and services trade, and with an FTA, it will likely get a boost. Thus, both the IMEEEC and India-GCC FTA are interlinked and will contribute to the success of each other. Indeed, the economic feasibility of these economic and connectivity projects are yet to be tested. These, nonetheless, show the intent of India’s economic aspirations and globalized outlook. In West Asia, it means boosting economic activities with business, trade, and investments, and connectivity projects underlining a nuanced shift in India’s approach to the region. The geopolitical risks remain but they no longer inhibit New Delhi from exploring economic possibilities and interests. The growing degree of trust and confidence between India and the Gulf countries, a sense of urgency towards economic rejuvenation at the highest level among the regional governments, and a show of intent on the part of the United States to facilitate the realization of Gulf economic visions has brought a change in how India is engaging the Gulf and West Asian countries. This is indeed the beginning of India’s geoeconomic pivot to West Asia. #WestAsia #IndianForeignPolicy #IMEEEC #NewDelhi Originally Published : The Financial Express, 18th September 2023 https://www.financialexpress.com/business/defence-indias-geoeconomic-pivot-to-west-asia-3247038/ Posted in SIS Blog with the Authorisation of the Author Md. Muddassir Quamar is an Associate Professor at Centre for West Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India