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Implications of the Hamas-Israel War


By Md. Muddassir Quamar (PhD)


While it is difficult to suggest how the war might pan out, the likelihood of any immediate ceasefire appears remote given the anger and public sentiment in Israel, which wants to take revenge of extraordinary proportions.


Hamas’s attack on southern Israel on 7 October 2023 is reminiscent of the surprise attack against Israel by Egypt and Syria in October 1973, which led to the Yom Kippur or Ramadan War. Hamas—Harkat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya or Islamic Resistance Movement—has controlled the Gaza Strip, a conclave of 365 square kilometers and a population of over 2 million, since 2007. Hamas fought an armed battle with the Fatah—Harkat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filastini or Palestinian National Liberation Movement—in 2006-07 to take control of the Strip after Fatah refused to hand over the power of the Palestinian Authority (PA) to Hamas despite its victory in the 2006 Palestinian Council elections. Since then, Hamas and Fatah, the two major factions in the Palestinian movement, have shared an acrimonious relationship.


Since the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2007, the enclave has remained blockaded by Israel and Egypt and cut off from the world and the other Palestinian territory of the West Bank. Israel and Hamas have also fought several wars, with numerous intermittent clashes between them. The first war between Israel and Hamas erupted in 2008-09, which caused severe loss of life and infrastructure damage in the Strip. Since then, Hamas and Israel have fought on and off, with significant clashes in October 2012, July-August 2014, and May 2021 before the ongoing phase of the Hamas-Israel war started.


The 7 October attack on Israel by Hamas was different because of its scale, ability to breach the border walls, and state-of-the-art surveillance system installed by Israel. Reportedly, thousands of Hamas fighters and ordinary Gazan residents crossed into southern Israel and mounted sieges of several Israeli neighborhoods, causing the death of nearly 1,300 Israelis while also taking dozens of hostages, including elderly, women, and children. Simultaneously, Hamas fired thousands of rockets indiscriminately targeting residential and civilian buildings to inflict maximum damage. Undoubtedly, the attack of such a proportion was launched to evoke an extraordinary Israeli response and underline the Israeli-Palestinian conflict’s continued relevance to the world.


Expectedly, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), after recollecting itself from the initial jolt of the surprise attack, launched an immediate response. Within 24 hours, it took back control of the borders and freed southern Israel of any siege by Hamas. The IDF then began the bombardment of Gaza while simultaneously planning a ground incursion. On 13 October, the IDF released pamphlets in northern Gaza directing its over 1 million residents to leave as it prepared a ground incursion. The Israeli action bombardments in Gaza have already led to over 2,000 Palestinians, including civilians, children, and women losing their lives.


While it is difficult to suggest how the war might pan out, the likelihood of any immediate ceasefire appears remote given the anger and public sentiment in Israel, which wants to take revenge of extraordinary proportions. At the same time, there are fears of the war expanding to other regional countries, especially Lebanon, Syria, and even Iraq and Iran, given that Hezbollah in Lebanon has carried out some rocket launches in northern Israel while Israel has attacked locations inside Syria. The probability of an expanded regional war mainly depends on the actions of Iran and its regional proxies in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. At this point, Iran has denied any direct involvement in the planning and execution of Hamas, and Israel and the US, too, have until now not held Iran directly responsible for the attack by Hamas. Hence, given the situation at the time of writing, the likelihood of a major regional war appears limited.


As far as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is concerned, the ongoing war between Israel and Hamas, and in hindsight, the earlier wars the two sides have fought since 2007, leads to two primary conclusions. One is that Israel’s continued occupation of the Palestinian territories is untenable, and the world community and regional actors in the Middle East, including Israel, cannot wholly ignore the Palestinian issue. Conversely, it can be argued that maintaining the status quo in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will incur huge humanitarian costs on both sides. Secondly, the terror tactics by Hamas against Israel are unlikely to resolve the conflict. If at all, it only delegitimizes the Palestinian cause and underlines Hamas’s brutality and war crimes against its targeted Israelis and against innocent Palestinian civilians who are used as human shields or become the victim of the attacks and counterattacks between Hamas and Israel. Hence, both occupation and terrorism cannot be justified by any means.


Notwithstanding the immediate repercussions on the Israelis and Palestinians and whether the war escalates into a broader regional crisis, the ongoing crisis will have regional implications. The first question it raises is about the regional trend of normalization of relations between Arab countries and Israel. While the process of Gulf Arab rapprochement with Israel started earlier, the Abraham Accords signed in September 2020 among UAE, Bahrain, and Israel, and later joined by Morocco and Sudan, underlined the possibility of normalization between Arab countries and Israel without necessarily taking the Palestinian view into account. The Abraham Accords were followed by discussions between Saudi Arabia and Israel, mediated by the US, to normalize relations. Notably, Saudi Arabia, during the negotiations, continued to highlight the need for taking the Palestinian view into account and held some discussions with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and other representatives.


For the time being, the Hamas-Israel war has halted the discussions on Saudi-Israel normalization, and Saudi Arabia has announced that it is no longer engaging in negotiations on normalization with Israel. The possibility of resumption of the normalization talks will depend on how and when the war ends. The process will be delayed if the Hamas-Israel conflict expands to Lebanon and further into Syria and other regional countries. Some have suggested that the ongoing Israel-Hamas war is a death knell for the Abraham Accords and all the regional geopolitical and geo-economic developments it had ensued. Such a narrow understanding of the regional situation is fallacious, at best. The reversal of all the gains made after the Abraham Accords, including the I2U2 and IMEC, cannot be assured. The fate of both will depend on a multiplicity of factors. I2U2, for example, is a joint forum of four regional and extra-regional countries focused on food and energy security, and the economic projects announced under it will likely continue despite the ongoing war. Similarly, the IMEC is a multi-nation partnership for infrastructure development and cross-border trade. Although it depends on the relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel, both important IMEC constituents, none have made any statements against it.


For Saudi Arabia to continue with the IMEC is vital, given that it aligns with its Vision 2030 program. It fits in its quest for an economic transformation in preparation for a post-oil economy. Moreover, the three primary components of the IMEC are India, the Gulf Arab countries, and Europe and the European Union, and Jordan, Israel, and Greece are critical nodal points. One must also consider that the Saudi-Israeli secret political and security engagements predate the Abraham Accords. And, there remains the possibility of economic contacts and connectivity projects despite the disruption of the Saudi-Israel normalization. Hence, the Hamas-Israel war likely will delay the regional geopolitical reconciliations and normalization rather than announcing its death, and therein lies the need for continuing diplomatic efforts towards normalization as well as infrastructure development and economic integration. What is essential, however, is to recognize the significance of the Palestinian issue in seeking normalization for Israel and economic integration among the regional states.


Posted in SIS Blog with the Authorisation of the Author

Md. Muddassir Quamar (PhD) is an Associate Professor at Centre for West Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India

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