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By Dr. Sameena Hameed Biden blamed the current global energy crisis on Russian invasion of Ukraine, but people perceive it as domestic and foreign policy failings with consequent loss in his popularity. The Americans are fuming over the reported export of 5 million barrels of oil from the Strategic Reserves, while gas prices remain high. Though gas prices fallen in the last 20 days, yet its painfully high for the American. Inflation few weeks ago had touched a 7-year record peak and natural gas prices at the pumps raced ahead of US 5 per gallon. The voters anger is hitting the roof before November 8 midterm elections. The US President Joe Biden’s both energy and environment policies are facing embarrassing reversals. Not long ago Biden said, “I guarantee you we’re going to end fossil fuels” ushering in new Green Deal that aimed at ending the use of fossil fuels; and promote electric vehicles. Passing more than two dozens of executive orders he shut down the Keystone Pipeline and committed non- renewal of oil and gas leases on Federal public lands and waters producing about 10% of US oil. Faced with rising gas prices and diesel shortages, many Americans blame Biden's new Green Deal. Biden blamed the current global energy crisis on Russian invasion of Ukraine, but people perceive it as domestic and foreign policy failings with consequent loss in his popularity. To add insult to the injury of the average Americans, not only attempts to isolate Russian oil has failed miserably but other countries are gaining at their cost. Displacing Saudi Arabia, Russia became the largest supplier to China, which purchased record volume of 8.42 million tons of crude oil for about US$ 5.8 billion. India has not only imported around 20% of total Russian crude export at discounted price but has re-exporting refined products to EU and the US. The Russian Rouble hit a 7 year high against the US Dollar just three months after Biden said “The Russian Rouble is rubble”. Though, the US oil production, has increased between May 2020-March 2022 from 9,711 barrels per day to 11,655 bpd (EIA figures). But the US production is of sweet light variety, that yields limited production of middle distillates like diesel and kerosene. The US imported heavier crude variety from countries like Saudi Arabia (6%), Russia (8%) and also previously Venezuela and Iran. The US imported about 200,000 bpd of oil from Russia in October 2021, which went offline after the imposition of sanctions. This coalescing with the shortage of domestic refining capacity have put upward pressure on gasoline and diesel prices in the US. With soaring temperatures, the power plants in the US were guzzling increased volumes of gas. Biden vowed to supply Europe all the gas it needed in the face of Russian supply disruption. More than 60 percent of US LNG exports went to Europe selling at exorbitant prices; making obvious the causative link with the pains of the Americans. The outage at the Freeport LNG export terminal cooling the domestic gas prices is telling. Biden also started a war of words with the big oil companies; blaming them of making exorbitant profits. While the US oil and gas Association President Tim Stewart called Biden’s “colossal failure of leadership” in arresting record high gas prices. Biden shot off letters to the big oil companies asking them to explain why they were not putting more gasoline into the market but real constraint is limited domestic refining capacity. Nevertheless, the big oil companies have made a killing with profits more than doubled in the first quarter of 2022 over the same period in the previous year. Biden’s new Green Deal also falls on its head as energy crisis looms over Europe and is snowballing into rising cost of living. Thousands of people marched on 18 June in central London protesting against the soaring prices. EU imported 20% of its oil from Russia (about 2.2 million barrels per day of crude oil and 1.2 mbpd of petroleum products) and several nations are phasing out Russian oil and gas imports imposing sanctions over the Russian aggression in Ukraine. In retaliation as Russia reduces gas supply with consequent price hikes; Germany, Austria and Netherlands are ready to restart their phased-out coal-fired power plants. Biden’s pro-environment measures face reversal with emergency measures like authorising (earlier banned) use of more ethanol in gas and reported continued leasing of public lands and water for oil and gas. The American see a loss of US energy independence as the President had to bite the bullet of talking to the Saudis to cool the international oil prices during his forthcoming visit to the Kingdom. Biden’s attempt to mend fences with Saudi Arabia would be seen by many in his administration as betrayal of vowed policies to keep human rights at the pivotal of its foreign policy. For a common American, Chinese and Indians snapping up discounted Russian oil, Biden having to visit Saudi Arabia, which he vowed to treat as a “pariah” state for pumping more oil into the market and is both material and moral loss. For Biden, his domestic credibility and foreign policy posturing are both under fire. #US #Biden #Russia #Oil #Energy Dr. Sameena Hameed is an Assistant Professor in Centre for West Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Email: hameed.sameena@gmail.com

By Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli Abe was convinced that China’s military forays on the Senkaku islands since September 2010 China’s official response to the assassination of former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe as “shocking” and “unexpected incident” is at variance with the scorn being poured out on its rabid Communist Party-backed nationalist social networking sites. In some Chinese quarters, there is even elation, depicting Abe’s assassin as a hero! These conflicting views of Abe is an outcome of the complex relationship between him and China’s leaders in the past decade and a half. Although Abe’s visit to China in October 2006 was considered an “ice-breaker” visit, as was his last visit in 2018, and though Japan developed substantial economic interdependency with China in those years, China’s rise created the conditions for Abe to hedge and explore balancing mechanisms against China in both economic and security terms. China viewed Abe’s revoking of crucial aspects of Japan’s 1950s’ “peace constitution” negatively, without acknowledging that it was Beijing’s brazen territorial and irredentist claims that were at the root of Abe’s gradual rethinking on China. Abe was convinced that China’s military forays on the Senkaku islands since September 2010, its “six nos” policy on Taiwan, and militarisation of the disputed South China Sea islands, were pointers to Beijing’s self-aggrandisement bid. China’s nearly 600 transgressions a year on the Senkaku islands, which are administered by Japan, was to consume much of Abe’s energies and that of Tokyo’s ties with ally United States. Abe also took the bull by the horns by visiting the Yasukuni shrine in December 2013 – a temple where the war-dead were honoured. While Abe discontinued such visits, he exposed the double-standards of China on historical issues, conveying the message that what happens in Japan’s politics is the domain of the Japanese and China has no veto over it. Abe also did away with the routine annual offering of apology by Japan’s leaders to China and other countries in the region for past wrongs. Abe suggested that the current generation of Japanese are not responsible for what happened in the 1930s and need not apologise for them. Over time, Abe also reduced the quantum of Official Development Assistance that Japan disburses to these countries as “compensation” for historical issues – including for the modernisation of China and the iconic Pudong Special Economic Zone in Shanghai -- and increased such assistance for India and other countries. But it was Abe’s renewal of a debate on enhancing Japan’s defence budget (capped previously at 1% of GDP, but marginally increased to 1.2%), on operating its Self-Defence Forces beyond the 1,000 nautical miles limit, the exporting of arms to Philippines, Vietnam and others, and his recent comments on nuclear deployments in the face of China’s muscle-flexing in the Taiwan Straits that raised China’s hackles the most. On the other hand, Abenomics, as his economic thinking came to be known, acknowledged the importance of reviving the economic “lost decades” of Japan and, for this reason, Abe had sent his senior-most party colleague to China’s Belt and Road Initiative meetings, seeking to invest in infrastructure projects and enhancing economic interdependencies. Abe also tried the “quality infrastructure” route by committing over $100 billion, but the progress was lax. To combine efforts with the Chinese was a way to reduce conflict with China. This was also Abe’s consideration for moving faster on the 15-member Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership agreement that was cobbled up last year. There were also the East Asian free trade negotiations with South Korea and China. Most significantly, Abe, tirelessly and against all odds, pushed the idea of the Indo-Pacific into mainstream strategic thinking in the last decade. As China walked away from UN maritime convention law and its arbitration procedures in July 2016, the writing on the wall was clear to Abe and others. Much of global trade is dependent on maritime areas and China’s stealthy grabbing and militarisation of islands unnerved many countries dependent on the seas. In 2007, Abe spoke to the Indian Parliament on the need for an overarching initiative in this regard, proposing to create an “arc of freedom and prosperity”. In time, the Quad idea came about but could not take shape immediately. It was revived and finally took off in 2017 and has been gaining strength since then. Abe wanted to usher in a rules-based order and a concert of powers in Asia that could stop any aggrandisement in the region. While he continues to be hated in China, the creation of certain strategic alternatives for Japan and like-minded countries, his work to institutionalise norms, and his efforts for predictable and stable outcomes and decent living standards for several countries remain his positive legacy. #ShinzoAbe #Japan #China Originally published: Deccan Herald, July 09, 2022. https://www.deccanherald.com/amp/opinion/shinzo-abe-is-dead-but-the-chinese-still-love-to-hate-him-1125310.html Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli is Professor in Chinese Studies and Dean of School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University.

By Prof. Swaran Singh The I2U2 Group comprising India, Israel, the UAE and the US has offered a new template to tackle unfolding challenges On Thursday, the leaders of the new I2U2 Group (India-Israel, United Arab Emirates-United States), whose foreign ministers had held an inaugural meeting last October, held their inaugural online summit. Thanks to the footwork by their officials, the four leaders were able to clinch a short, crisp, two-page joint statement identifying projects with specific details on redressing their challenges in food security and clean energy by leveraging “more innovative, inclusive, and science-based” initiatives. Without doubt, in the face of two and half years of the pandemic followed by five months of the Ukraine crisis, this looks impressive. Apart from disrupting political equations, these twin crises have deeply rattled the global food and energy supply lines. Resultant loss of livelihoods and economic disruptions and deceleration in much of the world have triggered soaring inflation with punishing uncertainties. Experts are talking of the irreversibility of a global famine in the making. Non-availability of fuel, food and medicines creating political vacuum and financial ruin in Sri Lanka presents a microcosm of challenges that have emerged. This is where I2U2 presents one more attempt at exploring alternative templates for redressing these unfolding challenges to protect their own citizens and potentially protect the citizens of their friends and allies. Institutionalizing I2U2 The key to the success of I2U2, also called the West Asian Quad, is sustaining its credibility. As of now, its survival instincts appear promising given this being a follow-up to two US-led initiatives: the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue of Australia, India, Japan, and the US in the Indo-Pacific and the Abraham Accords of August 2020. The latter, normalizing Israel’s diplomatic relations with the UAE, Bahrain and later Morocco, has since opened possibilities of Israel-centric regional-level development initiatives. And this may see more Arab nations endorsing normalization with Israel, helping to institutionalize this I2U2 grouping. Equally reassuring so far has been the support of trends in US domestic politics involving a bipartisan endorsement of its strategy of burden sharing. This is reflected in both the Trump and Biden administrations’ shift to multilateral soft-balancing and gradual reduction of US presence in the Middle East. March saw Israel hosting the inaugural meeting of the Negev Summit that included foreign ministers from Bahrain, Egypt, Morocco and the UAE, with their first meeting focusing on Israel’s main enemy, Iran, though both its agenda and membership may expand in coming times. As US President Joe Biden makes history this week with the first ever direct flight from Tel Aviv to Jeddah as well as marking a U-turn on his demonization of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, there remain deep differences in US and Israeli strategy in engaging major regional powers like Saudi Arabia and Iran that could undermine this effort at institutionalizing the I2U2 grouping. This is what perhaps explains the Biden administration’s desire to bring sobering influences of India and the UAE into I2U2. In particular, the US engagement of India in the Indo-Pacific has been instructive as India has withstood all pressure toward militarizing the region, leading to the US finally outsourcing security responses to the AUKUS security regime. Sans geopolitics While the US and Israeli engagement of I2U2 will be suspected of being guided by geo-strategy for tackling their rivals Russia, China and Iran, the brief joint statement from this “West Asian Quad” shows promise of gradually building credibility of being focused on geoeconomics. Indeed, in the online meeting during Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar’s visit to Israel in October 2021, when I2U2 was first conceptualized, the press statement from the host Israel called it “an international forum for economic cooperation.” Six major areas were then identified for their mutual financial and technical investments: water, energy, transportation, space, health, and food security. However, in view of changed circumstances such as the Covid-19 pandemic and the Ukraine crisis, the inaugural I2U2 summit chose to focus narrowly “on the food-security crisis and clean energy.” Second, as US State Department spokesman Ned Price recently underlined, while all four of these countries “are technological hubs,” India has come to be viewed as the “massive consumer market” offering opportunities for the other three to invest their financial and technical resources as well as their expertise. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has been talking of digital India alone having scope for attracting investments worth US$1 trillion or more. The UAE also has its priorities. Being home to the International Renewable Energy Agency and host for the 2023 Climate Change COP28, the UAE’s president, Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, at the I2U2 summit pledged to invest $2 billion in developing integrated food parks in India. Meanwhile Israel and the US will contribute climate-smart technologies and expertise to reduce food waste, conserve water and employ renewable energy aimed at tackling food insecurity in their respective regions. The grouping will also help India build a 300-megawatt hybrid (wind and solar) renewable energy project. In fact, the joint statement makes India appear as the main beneficiary of their inaugural summit, though India has also come to be valued as a food-exporting country. India’s interests In fact individually India has for long been engaged with the member states of the I2U2 Group, only this now is being explored as their first multilateral initiative. The US has invariably remained India’s largest trading partner and there has been constant talk of their trade potential, taking it from the current value of a little over $100 billion to $500 billion. Similarly, the UAE, India’s third-largest trading partner, recently signed a free-trade agreement (FTA) that is expected to increase their bilateral trade from the current $59 billion to $100 billion or more in five years’ time. India and Israel are also currently at an advanced stage of their FTA negotiations and their ties have seen exponential growth in recent years. India’s ties with Israel have been transformed, making it India’s major defense supplier and the value of their bilateral trade moving from $200 million in 1992 – when India formally established its embassy in Tel Aviv – to $6.35 billion last year. With the UAE as well, the idea of food corridors connecting farmers to food parks was first mooted before the pandemic, but the Ukraine crisis has since revived this initiative. Major Dubai-based firms like Emaar Group are expected to invest billions to rejuvenate India’s agricultural productivity. The pandemic and the Ukraine crisis have seen India emerge as an important exporter of agricultural products, marking a 20% increase in its food exports, reaching $49.6 billion for 2021-22 compared with $37.3 billion for the previous year. Interventions from I2U2 are expected improve India’s storage capabilities for both food and renewable energy using innovative technologies. The big idea here seems to be to enhance intermittency and decentralization of power generation and storage to make deep penetrations in India’s national electricity grid while providing stability from fluctuating prices. This will also promise to help India achieve its target of tripling its renewable power generation to reach 500 gigawatts by 2030 and achieve a net-zero emissions by 2070. Defying divergences But with each of the four I2U2 nations having its own emotional and historical baggage, it will not be easy for them to stay on course and overcome their divergences. Some critics have already denounced it as nothing more than a “hedging” strategy devoid of “logic” and having “no strategic value,” as they see it driven by Joe Biden’s China-containment policy, along with Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid pushing for his “punish Iran” thesis. India and the UAE as of now seem more focused on geoeconomics, and they see I2U2 as a platform for greater global recognition as well as complementary for their management of global shocks in food and fuel supplies. While this Quad in the Middle East will always be compared to the Quad in the Indo-Pacific, the sustained success of the latter so far – four summits in 14 months – could also inspire it. Its inaugural summit has surely survived headwinds, but how far I2U2 will be able to expand on their convergences and build synergies remains to be seen. #India #Israel #UAE #US #I2U2 Originally published: Asia Times, July 15, 2022 https://asiatimes.com/2022/07/new-west-asian-quad-makes-bold-promises/ Posted here with the authorization of the author. Prof. Swaran Singh is visiting professor at the University of British Columbia and professor of diplomacy and disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He is president of the Association of Asia Scholars; adjunct senior fellow at the Charhar Institute, Beijing; senior fellow, Institute for National Security Studies Sri Lanka, Colombo; and visiting professor, Research Institute for Indian Ocean Economies, Kunming.

प्रोफेसर स्वर्ण सिंह राष्ट्रमंडल व गुटनिरपेक्षता आंदोलन जैसे ऐतिहासिक संगठनों से हटकर विश्व की उभरती हुई ताकतों व अर्थव्यवस्थाओं के नए समीकरणों से जुड़ने के संदर्भ में सम्मेलन में भारत की शिरकत को आंक सकते हैं। इ स सप्ताह अफ्रीका के रवांडा देश की राजधानी किगाली में राष्ट्रमंडल के 54 देशों से 5,000 से ज्यादा प्रतिनिधि अलग-अलग सरकारी और गैर सरकारी संगठनों के अधिवेशनों में शामिल हो रहे हैं। इनमें खिलाड़ी, पत्रकार, महिलाएं, प्रकाशक, शिक्षाविद और खासकर इस बार स्वास्थ्य से जुड़े विशेषज्ञ और संगठन अपने-अपने देशों का यहां नेतृत्व कर रहे हैं। सप्ताह भर की इन द्विवार्षिक व्यस्त और रंग-बिरंगी बैठकों का समापन शुक्रवार से शुरू हो रहे दो दिवसीय राष्ट्रमंडल शिखर या ‘चोगम’ (कॉमनवेल्थ हैड्स ऑफ गवर्नमेंट मीटिंग) सम्मेलन से होगा। सर्वव्यापी महामारी के चलते 2020 में होने वाले ‘चोगम’ के कई बार तय और फिर स्थगित होने से इसकी प्रासंगिकता और प्रभाव पर उभरते हुए प्रश्नचिह्न और गहरे हो गए हैं। चोगम के इस शिखर सम्मेलन से ही इसके सचिवालय और दूसरे संस्थानों को बजट और नीति-निर्देश मिलते हैं। पिछला चोगम 2018 में लंदन में हुआ था और चार साल के अंतराल ने इसकी कार्यशैली और कामकाज पर काफी नकारात्मक असर डाला है। चोगम 2022 के सामने सबसे जटिल प्रश्न इसकी महासचिव पैट्रीशिया स्कॉटलैंड को दूसरा कार्यकाल अनुमोदित करने का है। वह 2016 में चार वर्ष के कार्यकाल के लिए महासचिव चुनी गई थीं। क्योंकि महामारी के चलते चोगम न तो किसी नए महासचिव का चुनाव कर पाया और न ही मौजूदा महासचिव के दूसरे कार्यकाल पर निर्णय ले सका तो इस असमंजस में पैट्रीशिया स्कॉटलैंड पहले ही अपने दूसरे कार्यकाल के दो वर्ष पूरे कर चुकी हैं। मुश्किल यह है कि इतिहास में कभी किसी महासचिव को दूसरा कार्यकाल लेने से कभी रोका नहीं गया। यदि इस पर मतभेद हुआ भी तो वह सार्वजनिक नहीं हुआ। पर इस बार पैट्रीशिया स्कॉटलैंड अपना दूसरा कार्यकाल पूरा करना चाहती हैं, यह जानते हुए भी ब्रिटेन, ऑस्ट्रेलिया, कनाडा, न्यूजीलैंड, भारत जैसे बड़े राष्ट्रमंडल देश अपना रुझान नया महासचिव चुनने पर सार्वजनिक कर चुके हैं। अखबारों में भी पैट्रीशिया पर कई तरह के घपलों के आरोप लगते रहे हैं। राष्ट्रमंडल के स्थायी अध्यक्ष ब्रिटेन के प्रधानमंत्री बोरिस जॉनसन और विदेश मंत्री लिज ट्रस खुलकर पैट्रीशिया के दूसरे कार्यकाल को स्वीकृति देने पर विरोध जता चुके हैं। ब्रिटेन व ऑस्ट्रेलिया ने तो वित्तीय सहायता भी निलंबित कर दी थी। यहां तक कि इसके चलते ब्रिटेन की महारानी और उनकी सरकार में भी दरार नजर आई है। हमेशा से ब्रिटेन का राजपरिवार रोजमर्रा के राजनीति के पचड़ों से दूर रहकर औपचारिकता और संयम के इस्तेमाल से शासन में निरंतरता को बनाए रखने में योगदान करता रहा है। पर हाल ही में राष्ट्रमंडल के कुछ सदस्य देशों के राष्ट्राध्यक्षों के मानवाधिकार हनन को लेकर और खासकर ब्रिटेन की गृह मंत्री प्रीति पटेल के रवांडा से आ रहे शरणार्थियों के प्रति सख्ती से पेश आने से सरकार के कड़े रुख और राजपरिवार की औपचारिकताओं में तनातनी सार्वजनिक हो गई है। इसी बीच, केन्या ने अपने देश की पूर्व रक्षा मंत्री मोनिका जुमा को महासचिव चुने जाने के लिए दावा पेश किया है। मोनिका जुमा को प्रधानमंत्री बोरिस जॉनसन की सरकार के अलावा चीन (जो कि राष्ट्रमंडल का सदस्य भी नहीं है) का समर्थन इस मुद्धे को और भी जटिल बना देता है। इसके अलावा, मेजबान देश रवांडा के राष्ट्रपति पॉल कगामे का दो दशकों से ज्यादा का कार्यकाल भी अक्सर विवादों में रहा है। उनकी सरकार पर बार-बार मनावधिकारों के हनन के आरोप लगते रहे हैं। हालांकि कगामे भी चोगम का इस्तेमाल अपनी सरकार की सफलताएं गिनाने के लिए करना चाहते हैं। रवांडा की 7 प्रतिशत आर्थिक वृद्धि दर, संसद में विश्व में सर्वाधिक 60 प्रतिशत महिलाओं का निर्वाचन और तुत्सी-हुतु साम्प्रदायिक हिंसा पर संयम-सुलह को वह व्यक्तिगत योगदान मनवाना चाहते हैं। तो क्या राजकुमार चार्ल्स, जो महारानी एलिजाबेथ द्वितीय के बढ़ती उम्र के चलते चोगम की अध्यक्षता के लिए आ रहे हैं, राष्ट्रमंडल का प्रतिनिधित्व कर सकेंगे? क्या वह इन हालात का सही विश्लेषण कर पाएंगे? राष्ट्रमंडल ब्रिटेन के पूर्व-उपनिवेशित राष्ट्रों का एक परिवार जैसा है। बीसवीं सदी की शुरुआत से ही ब्रिटेन ने इन राष्ट्रों को धीमे-धीमे शांतिपूर्ण ढंग से सत्ता हस्तांतरण करके स्वतंत्रता के बाद भी इन्हें अपने साथ जोड़े रखने के लिए 1948 में राष्ट्रमंडल का गठन किया था, जबकि कुछ स्वतंत्र हुए राष्ट्र — जैसे भारत — गणराज्य बन गए जहां राज्य के मुखिया का वे स्वयं चुनाव करते हैं। पर आज भी 15 राष्ट्र अपने को ब्रिटेन का अधिराज्य मानते हैं और महारानी को राज्य का मुखिया। इस बार महारानी एलिजाबेथ द्वितीय के अलावा ऑस्ट्रेलिया के नए प्रधानमंत्री एंथनी ऐल्बनीज भी शामिल नहीं होंगे। उन्होंने एक ‘गणराज्य’ मंत्रालय भी बनाया है और अटकलें हैं कि महारानी के बाद वह ऑस्ट्रेलिया को गणराज्य बनाना चाहते हैं। अन्य राष्ट्रों में भी यह सोच उभर रही है। हालांकि इस बार के चोगम सम्मेलन में मेजबान देश ने 40 से ज्यादा राष्ट्राध्यक्षों के शामिल होने की उम्मीद जताई है पर प्रधानमंत्री नरेंद्र मोदी के जी-7 और ब्रिक्स देशों के शिखर सम्मेलनों में व्यस्त होने के कारण किगाली के चोगम में भारत का प्रतिनिधित्व विदेश मंत्री जयशंकर कर रहे हैं। भारत के इस निर्णय को राष्ट्रमंडल व गुटनिरपेक्षता आंदोलन जैसे ऐतिहासिक संगठनों से हटकर विश्व की उभरती हुई ताकतों व अर्थव्यवस्थाओं के नए समीकरणों से जुड़ने की दृष्टि से आंक सकते हैं। इस बार चोगम के समक्ष संगठन की चरमराती अंदरूनी एकजुटता व उभरते हुए नए बहुराष्ट्रीय संगठनों से मिल रही चुनौतियां ही अहम मुद्दा हैं। राजस्थान पत्रिका, 22 जून 2022 विजिटिंग प्रोफेसर, यूनिवर्सिटी ऑफ ब्रिटिश कोलम्बिया; फेलो, कनेडियन ग्लोबल अफेयर्स इंस्टीट्यूट और प्रोफेसर, जेएनयू, नई दिल्ली

By Prof. Gulshan Sachdeva The G7 knows that global green transition and SDG targets cannot be achieved without India. For its ambitions, India needs G7 investment, technology, and green finance. The just-concluded G7 summit took place under the shadows of the Ukraine war, which has threatened economic recovery. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic is still not over, and there are many points of tension in the Indo-Pacific Region. To tackle these challenges, the group of rich industrialised nations resolved to “continue to impose severe and immediate economic costs on President Putin’s regime” along with stepping up efforts to “secure global energy and food security”, and stabilising post-pandemic economic recovery. The major outcomes included the Global Alliance on Food Security; Climate Club, and a $600 billion Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment. Besides, the G7 nations underscored their commitment to humanitarian aid and reconstruction in Ukraine. On foreign and security policy, the major focus was also on China. The G7 nations reiterated the “importance of maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific”, and reminded China to “abstain from threats, coercion, intimidation measures or use of force”. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, along with the leaders of Argentina, Indonesia, Senegal, and South Africa, also attended some of the sessions. Their participation strengthened the goal of the G7 German presidency — ‘Progress towards an equitable world’. India is going to take over the G20 presidency soon. It is also an important member of the BRICS grouping. Since most of the issues discussed at the summit have broader implications and need wider ownership, India can become an important link between the G7, G20, and BRICS. Practically, the G7 is not just seven rich countries, but a group of more than 30 Western nations. The European Union as a whole also participates in all meetings, and Europe has been very influential in setting the G7’s agenda. After all, it was Germany and France which launched the World Economic Summit in the 1970s, which later became the G7. Since India now has very strong economic and strategic ties with all of them, it does not see this group with distrust. It is negotiating an FTA with the United Kingdom and has re-started negotiations for trade and investment agreements with the EU. As the Indian economy is likely to be one of the fastest growing economies in the post-pandemic phase, partnership with India is attractive for the West. In fact, for its sustainable modernisation and energy transition, India is keen to attract investment, technology, and green finance from these very nations. So India will be pleased to be partnering with initiatives such as Just Energy Transition Partnership, and extra funding for global infrastructure. Most summit discussions were influenced by the Ukraine war. As India has different perceptions about this crisis, Modi rightly focused on strengths of the Indian economy, its ambitious climate targets and performance, and contribution to global food security. Through the Resilient Democracies Statement, India along with G7 has affirmed its commitment to “protecting the freedom of expression and opinion online and offline and ensuring a free and independent media landscape”. In addition, it has agreed to “promoting academic freedom” and “guarding the freedom, independence and diversity of civil society actors” as well as “protection of human rights defenders and all those exposing corruption”. This is an important development in the context of some criticism in Western media about Indian democracy which is seen under stress. The G7 relations with Russia are bad, and tensions with China have grown. The main focus of NATO’s Madrid summit which is taking place immediately after the G7 meeting is the direct security threat from Moscow, and challenges posed by China. In these circumstances, strengthening partnership with New Delhi is useful for the G7. Moreover, major global targets related to green transition and Sustainable Development Goals cannot be met without robust and equitable Indian economic growth. India also has the potential to scale up new emerging technologies, bringing costs down, and making it affordable to other developing countries. Some of the success stories of Indian development experiences can be replicated in other countries through triangular projects with the G7 nations. India has already developed such partnerships with Germany, the UK, and the US. In the current geopolitical situation, where the West is facing threats from the authoritarian states, partnering and strengthening other democracies like India is also an important G7 objective. #G7 #G20 #BRICS #India Originally published: Money Control, June 29, 2022. At: https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/opinion/india-is-an-important-link-between-g7-g20-and-brics-8754151.html Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Gulshan Sachdeva is Professor at the Centre for European Studies and Coordinator, Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, Jawaharlal Nehru University.

By Abhishek Khajuria There is a possibility that Johnson and Sunak are able to steer the country out of the present crisis and improve their political fortunes. But the mood at present is pessimistic. British PM Boris Johnson has survived the no-confidence motion brought against him by the lawmakers of his own Conservative party in the intra-party vote. However, it can be said that this success might not be a durable one for Johnson as the road till the next elections is a tough one (if stays at helm till then). Of the 359 Conservative MPs in the Commons, 211 voted in Johnson’s favour in the secret ballot while 148 were and remain in opposition. On the face of it, it might look like a comfortable victory for him. But we need to get into the finer details of it, and it will become clear how dire difficult the situation for Johnson is. One, only 59% of his Tories now support him. It is significantly less than what former PMs Theresa May and Margaret Thatcher got in their respective confidence votes. Even then, both resigned in the ensuing months. Two out of the 648 MPs in the Commons (total number is 650 with 2 up for bye-elections in the coming weeks where the Conservatives are projected to lose), Johnson is only supported by 32.5% of members. This is significantly less than the number he won in the election of 2019. The numbers outlined above indicate a clear question of moral dilemma for the leader to continue in office after the vote has weakened his authority. But as Johnson has clarified previously, he won’t be relinquishing office. This statement is further cemented by the fact that the PM refused to resign when the partygate scandal emerged. His assertion of ‘victory’ in the no-confidence vote further adds to the above statement. It is worth highlighting here that as per the Conservative party rules, he is now immune from a leadership challenge for the next 12 months. However, this rule is subject to a change, which means that the Prime Minister’s path is still difficult. All this adds to the already precarious condition in the UK, which has emerged as a divided country in the wake of Brexit with resurgent Scottish nationalism and fears of a re-emergence of a pre-1998 situation in Northern Ireland (a political deadlock at present); added to it the severely wounded economy due to the pandemic after which the UK now faces a cost-of-living crisis today. Inflationary pressures are on and household spending has squeezed. The British Chambers of Commerce (BCC) has warned that the “UK economy will grind to a halt and then shrink”. The government is struggling to find responses to the crisis, and the situation remains precarious. Returning to the political scenario, two things need to be looked at. One, if Johnson resigns as has previously happened in the cases of Margaret Thatcher and Theresa May, the questions of succession would come up. Rishi Sunak, the head of the Treasury, was the favourite until recently, but partygate and his wife’s tax avoidance issues have harmed his chances. Others like Liz Truss and Sajid Javid are also seen as contenders. But there is no clear-cut alternative to the PM at the moment. His possible resignation might lead to an uncertain situation over the Irish question due to Brexit once again. Then, if the PM ultimately stays on till the next election scheduled in late 2024, what effect it has on the Conservatives remains to be seen. There is a possibility that he and Sunak are able to steer the country out of the present crisis and improve their political fortunes. But the mood at present is pessimistic. Two, how much of an alternative does the opposition provide. After a humiliating defeat in 2019, it still seems a long way back for Labour. In that election, it lost its traditional strongholds in the West Midlands, which it had not conceded for more than 30 years. It has also not completely recovered from the antisemitism issues (the party as a whole was accused of Antisemitism), which resulted in the suspension of the previous leader Jeremy Corbyn. Though there is some optimism in labour circles after victories in the recent local elections, nothing concrete can be predicted yet. A silver lining is for Labour though is leader Keir Starmer leading Johnson in opinion polls. In the ultimate analysis, it is safe to say that there are many possible scenarios. Johnson emerging winner is one. Others include a new leader curing the Tories or the party totally losing plot and Labour providing an alternative. But one thing is for sure, the future is a tough one for the UK with the political uncertainty coinciding with the cost-of-living crisis. Still, for the time being, it is upon Mr. Johnson to lead a divided country out of its travails which continue to be punctuated by his own. #UK #Politics #BorisJohnson Abhishek Khajuria is a PhD Candidate at the Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University.

By Prof. Bharat H. Desai Sexual violence against women during conflicts has been used as a tactic and weapon of war. It is not just rape out of control, but rape under orders, as means of pursuing military, political or economic ends. On 19 June 2022, the world stood up to say ‘NO’ to sexual violence (SV) against women in conflicts and call for its elimination. Notwithstanding the worldwide reality of use of SV as a ‘weapon of war’, this International Day will witness powerful protest against SV. This write-up is a sequel to the 28 May 2022 article on “Use of Food as a Weapon of War” (https://sisblogjnu.wixsite.com/website/post/blog-exclusive-use-of-food-as-a-weapon-of-war-a-challenge-for-international-law ). The global humanitarian watchdog, the Geneva based International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) brought to the public on 19 June 2022 the two uprooted dead trees at the place du Rhône and in Palais des Nations. Instead of treetops, irritating, blood-red roots will invade the sky. It will be symbolic outcry for “all the persons whose human dignity and integrity have been torn down and violated by SV in conflicts” (ICRC campaign on the international day for the elimination of sexual violence in conflict | International Committee of the Red Cross). In most of the conflicts, SV in general and ‘rape’ in particular as predominant form of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) against women has been used with fatal consequences. The warring factions seek to hit the ‘soft belly’ where it hurts the most. Mass rapes have been used as cheaper and lethal weapons than even bullets. Brutality of Wars This author has, for years, taught the MA Winter Semester Core Course on Legal Controls of International Conflicts. The CILS course emanated from the 1959 treatise by the same name by Julius Stone, who visited predecessor of SIS, the Indian School of International Studies at its infancy. Notwithstanding teaching of the legal framework for control of international conflicts, one is always alive to the reality that wars have been as old as human existence and perceived as ‘extra-legal’ – neither legal no illegal. Yet there has always been a quest for ‘outlawry’ of war as seen in 1899 & 1907 Hague Peace Conferences, 1919 Treaty of Versailles and 1928 Pact of Paris. Even after the advent of the 1945 UN Charter with a ‘blueprint’ for prohibition of threat or use of force [Article 2 (4)], scores of conflicts have taken toll of “millions of people”, as warned by the US President Truman, at San Francisco Opera House on 26 June 1945, about consequences for not taking the UN seriously. In view of this reality, all right-thinking peoples and genuine scholars, have been left with the only option of ‘taming the beast’ of war, dubbed as a ‘scourge’ by Preamble to the UN Charter. It came out vividly in the award of 2018 Nobel Peace Prize to Congolese gynaecologist Denis Mukwege and Nadia Murad, the Yezidi victim of the IS brutality in Iraq. “If we want people to say ‘no more war’, we have to show how brutal it is”, Berit Reiss-Andersen, Chair of the Norwegian Nobel Committee said. It was emphatic global call to end the use of SV as a weapon of war in the 21st century. Rape under Orders: A Neglected crime SV against women during conflicts has been used as a tactic and weapon of war. It is not just rape out of control, but rape under orders, as means of pursuing military, political or economic ends. SV against women has occurred and continues to occur before, during, and after most of the wars. The horrors of Pakistani army’s brutal efforts to crush 1971 Bangladeshi liberation movement are etched in collective memory. The systematic mass rapes in final days of Bangladesh war, the Tamil Eelam war in Sri Lanka, Maoist insurgency in Nepal and during partition of the Indian sub-continent are instances of large-scale SV against women. All have remained unaccounted for. It shows that SV in conflicts persists due to acceptance of brutalities and resultant trauma that remains frozen in ‘walls of silence’. Wars leave behind gory incidents, horrid stories, painful past and many wounds that refuse to heal with the passage of time. During the Second World War, the Japanese ‘comfort stations’ massively abused women drawn from its empire as sex slaves. It remains a festering wound in the Japan-Korea relations even after 2015 Japanese apology. It shows how wounds of the past refuse to heal. Big Challenge for the UN At the 68th UN General Assembly (2014), 122 Member States endorsed a Declaration of Commitment to End Sexual Violence in Conflict. It resolved to end pernicious culture of impunity by bringing perpetrators of SV in conflicts to justice. There have been appointments of special envoy by the UNSG, special rapporteurs by the HRC and the UN Women remains the focal point for SV against women. Similarly, the UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008) have brought the agenda item ‘women, peace and security’. The Statutes of the UNSC mandated international criminal tribunals (ICT) in Rwanda, Yugoslavia and Sierra Leone contain crimes of sexual violence. The 1998 Rome Statute of ICC became the first global treaty that recognized rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, and other forms of SV as distinct types of war crimes. These ICTs had limited capacity to provide justice to SV inflicted upon women during conflicts. They recognize only a small set of the SV against women, fell short of addressing gender-based harms and gender biases. The Sierra Leone civil war infamously gave birth to notorious tradition of ‘bush wife’ wherein abducted girls and women were forcibly assigned to rebel commanders and routinely tormented by their rapists. Survivors’ Right to Heal In view of such institutionalized practices, there is a tendency to dismiss SV as inevitable by-product of war, random acts of few renegades, or mere collateral damage! Nobel Laurate Desmond Tutu, Chairman of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, once remarked that “we needed to look the beast in the eye, so that past wouldn’t hold us hostage anymore”. There has been persistent search for appropriate institutional designs that could deal with mass atrocities in conflict-ridden societies and foster justice in the post-conflict period. The scholarly discourses hover around the Transitional Justice (TJ). TJ processes deal with the aftermath of violent conflicts and systematic human rights abuses to create conditions for peaceful future for tormented societies. It comprises a number of instruments and mechanisms including criminal tribunals, truth commissions, memory work, reparation and institutional reforms. Cumulatively, these measures aim at uncovering the truth about past crimes, holding perpetrators accountable, vindicating the dignity of victims-survivors and contributing to reconciliation. Ironically, the post-war accountability jamboree, the quest for justice of women survivors is aggravated by shame, stigma, fear and futility. In the legal and political maze of ending or transmuting conflict, women survivors rarely find space to influence policies, laws and institutional structures adversely affect them. In a sign of new hope, gender-based approaches have gained significant attention in recent years in international criminal law, transitional justice mechanisms and peace building processes. SV not Inevitable Due to an overwhelming emphasis on sexual and penetrative violations of women’s bodies, there has been insensitivity towards emotional harm, harm to the homes, personal spaces, to children and to others with whom women are intimately connected. It calls for sovereign states, the UN and international relief and humanitarian agencies such as the ICRC as well as scholars to come out with urgent ideational solutions. The ICRC’s call that wartime SV is “not inevitable” is an emphatic declaration. This would, however, necessitate concrete inter-governmental legal framework of action under a global treaty, pre-emptive measures to end SV against women, socio-economic-psychological support structures for the survivors and mechanism to hold states and non-state actors accountable for violations of IHL and ICL. An in-depth study of conceptual, legal and institutional framework for the challenge of SGBV has been provided separately in the author’s just released 2022 work, with a foreword by Peter Maurer, the President of the ICRC (Geneva): Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in International Law: Making International Institutions Work (Singapore: Springer Nature, 2022); Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in International Law | SpringerLink #SexualViolence #War #ICRC #UN #InternationalLaw Professor Dr. Bharat H. Desai is Jawaharlal Nehru Chair and Professor of International Law at the Centre for International Legal Studies of SIS, JNU. He coordinated the Making SIS Visible initiative during 2008-2013 (Making SIS Visible | Welcome to Jawaharlal Nehru University (jnu.ac.in) as well as Inter-University Consortium (Partner Universities: JNU, Jammu, Kashmir and Sikkim) during 2012-2020 (www.iucccc.in/Contact us.htm).

By Prof. Bharat H. Desai In the third decade of the 21st century, the growing use of food as a weapon to starve civilians and others presents great challenge. It is used by the armed groups as ‘scorched earth’ strategy that works as a double-edge sword. The UN Security Council (UNSC) held an unprecedented ministerial level open debate on 19 May 2022 on conflict and food security. The widening of the ambit of the UNSC’s primary remit of maintenance of international peace and security underscores that the world is facing a different nature of the security threat. It took place amidst reports that conflicts have been the primary driver of hunger for 139 million people in 24 countries and territories. It grew from 99 million in 2020. The situation is expected to worsen in 2022 due the conflict in Ukraine. Both Russia and Ukraine are major exporters of agricultural commodities. The concept notes by the US Presidency of the UNSC (May) ominously stated: “a sharp increase in global food insecurity threatens to destabilize fragile societies and exacerbate armed conflicts and regional instability.” On 12 April 2021, the UN Secretary-General (UNSG) reported to the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on Implementation of the United Nations Decade of Action on Nutrition (2016–2025). The report, highlighted the underlying drivers of all forms of malnutrition. It called upon the states to act with urgency for elimination of “all forms of malnutrition and achieving the SDGs by 2030”. Similarly, the 2021 report on the State of Food Security and Nutrition by the five agencies (FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO) also graphically noted that “The world has not been generally progressing either towards Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) Target 2.1, of ensuring access to safe, nutritious and sufficient food for all people all year round, or towards SDG Target 2.2, of eradicating all forms of malnutrition”. It ominously reported that “between 720 and 811 million people in the world faced hunger in 2020 (161 million more than in 2019)” and nearly “2.37 billion people did not have access to adequate food in 2020 (320 million more than 2019). Hunger as a Global Problematique The large part of the problematique on hunger, inadequacy of food and nutrition has been contributed by various kinds of armed conflicts that rage across the world. This is a harsh global reality notwithstanding the UN Charter [Article 2 (4) ‘blueprint’] prohibition (refrain) of “threat or use of force”. Similarly, another facet of global concern, as per 2021 Global Gender Gap report, shows the huge gender disparity that widened by a “generation from 99.5 years to 135.6 years” since there is no letup in the persistence of global inequality, discrimination and violence against women. Maybe it is now high time we need to work on measuring the Global Misery Index (instead of happiness or hunger) to assess as to how much of the 7.9 billion (2022) population on planet earth lives in misery in spite of all the riches, scientific and technical prowess and the advent of the Digital and Internet Age. It seems, the words of late Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, expressed poetically in Hindi, have come true that the “human being has reached the moon but does not know how to live on the earth”! Hunger as a Tool of Warfare It was the UNSC resolution 2417 of 24 May 2018 that expressed grave concern about the direct impact of armed conflicts on food security due to the “threat of famine presently facing millions of people in armed conflicts, as well as about the number of undernourished people in the world”. In the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic (2020-2022), the global food insecurity has only worsened. The Indian humanitarian supplies of wheat to save starvation in post-Taliban Afghanistan and rice for the Sri Lankan people are vivid reminder of the world we live in. According to FAO, vicious cycle of hunger is largely fueled by extreme climatic events, economic slowdowns and crises (such as Covid-19 pandemic). In the cocktail, the violent conflicts and wars exacerbate hunger, poverty and sexual violence against women around the world. Poverty and hunger are closely correlated. FAO estimates show 842 million people suffer from ‘chronic hunger’. With the world population expected to reach the staggering figure of 10 billion in 2050, it presents a monumental challenge to sustainably feed the population explosion. It will necessitate fundamental changes in the global food system even as there is very slow move towards attaining ‘zero hunger’ goal under the UN’s 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The 2021 Global Hunger Index forecast shows 47 countries with alarming levels of hunger and 47 others will fail to reach ‘zero hunger’ by 2030. India was placed at 101, just above Afghanistan. 2020 Nobel Prize for WFP The award of the 2020 Nobel Peace Prize for the World Food Program (WFP) became a landmark. The citation made the rationale for WFP choice amply clear: “for its efforts to combat hunger, for its contribution to bettering conditions for peace in conflict-affected areas and for acting as a driving force in efforts to prevent the use of hunger as a weapon of war and conflict." The recognition of WFP for “combating use of hunger as a weapon of war” came close on the heels of the 2019 Nobel Economics Prize on “alleviating poverty” (Abhijit Banerjee et al.) as well as the 2018 Nobel Peace Prize on “use of sexual violence as a weapon of war” (Danis Mukwege and Nadia Muard). Ironically, hunger, poverty and sexual violence against women all three have become endemic in the global armed conflicts and accentuate the human misery. “Until the day we have a medical vaccine, food is the best vaccine against chaos”, the WFP has strongly contended. The humanitarian task of WFP has been aptly termed as the “modern version of peace congresses” that the Nobel Peace Prize is intended to promote. The Norwegian Nobel Committee felt that it is this noble task of providing assistance to increase food security prevents hunger and in turn helps in improving prospects for stability and peace. “WFP gives significant contribution to combat hunger as such and to combat hunger used as a weapon in war and armed conflicts”, Berit Reiss-Andersen, Chair of the Norwegian Nobel Committee said on 9 October 2020. A Challenge for International Law In the third decade of the 21st century, the growing use of food as a weapon to starve civilians and others presents great challenge. It is used by the armed groups as ‘scorched earth’ strategy that works as a double-edge sword. It affects the rival armed groups, causes an exodus of refugees and starves the civilians trapped therein. Such aggressive method of warfare has been prohibited by International Humanitarian Law (IHL). All parties to an armed conflict have an obligation to comply with IHL, in particular their obligations under the 1949 Geneva Conventions as well as the 1977 Additional Protocols thereto. It also presents a challenge to the edifice of rules and principles of International Human Rights and Refugee Laws. However, with rising human greed, arrogance of power and primitive streak to subjugate others results in brutalities, death and destruction. It calls for empowering the only neutral humanitarian organ on the ground, the ICRC as the custodian of the IHL, to grapple with the challenge. One needs to admire the concern and courage of the ICRC President, Peter Maurer, as he moves to supervise work from one conflict zone to another (from Haiti to Syria to Ukraine). His prophetic words, shared in conversation with this author, provide us a beacon of hope: “These destructive forces are not invincible”. Still, the growing use of hunger (food) as a weapon of war presents a challenge to the global scholarship in the fields of International Law and International Relations. #War #Hunger #Food #UN #FAO #WFP #InternationalLaw Prof. Bharat H. Desai is Jawaharlal Nehru Chair and Professor of International Law at the Centre for International Legal Studies of SIS, JNU. He coordinated the Making SIS Visible initiative during 2008-2013 (Making SIS Visible | Welcome to Jawaharlal Nehru University (jnu.ac.in) as well as Inter-University Consortium (Partner Universities: JNU, Jammu, Kashmir and Sikkim) during 2012-2020 (www.iucccc.in/Contact us.htm).

By Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli Since early 2022, clear political signals are visible to Xi’s relative decline. Let's read tea leaves for portents. As the 20th communist party congress of China is round the corner this November, the continuation or otherwise of its leader Xi Jinping has been debated extensively. There is also his tumultuous legacy since coming to power in 2012. Last one decade had seen meteoric rise of Xi—with the dramatic arrest of his political rivals Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang and to his political consolidation. His anti-corruption drive nearly decimated the base of his political rivals like Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. Xi soon acquired the sobriquet of “Chairman of everything” by centralising all levers of power. At the last count, Xi was holding 13 crucial positions of the party, state and the armed forces. Xi Jinping's Military Might Against the World Although there is a decline in economy growth rates from over 10 percent before 2010 to 2.4 percent in 2020, Xi’s period coincided with massive military modernisation and breakthroughs in science and technology. This further wetted Xi’s “accomplishing something” philosophy and to his grandiose plans for “socialist modernisation” by 2050. Xi’s assertiveness also brought gains to China in South China Sea and other areas, although this led to an estrangement in relations with the neighbours. Xi’s identification of red lines with Taiwan has raised nationalist rhetoric. Xi decimated Hong Kong opposition through national security law. Instead of Deng Xiaoping’s restraint policies, Xi not only grabbed disputed reefs in South China Sea but also refurbished them with military assets. Xi also crafted a policy of occupying disputed lands with India, despite his rhetoric of “developmental partnership”. Xi also alienated Japan with aggressive transgressions in Senkaku islands administered by Japan. How Strong is Xi Jinping on Home Ground? At home, Xi rebooted the political spectrum by first filling crucial party-state posts with his “new Zhijiang Army” cadres and his home province Shaanxi leaders. Xi also ushered in a “new era” with ideological and political firmness. Everything seemed to be going Xi’s way. However, since early this year, clear political signalling is visible to Xi’s relative decline, although in the intensive cesspool of Chinese politics and its opaqueness, it is hard to predict the outcome of the 20th party congress. Let's read the tea leaves for portents. Even though the 6th plenary meeting of the central committee in November last year at its third “historical resolution” glorified Xi, putting him at par with Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping and thereby downgrading his predecessors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, the 5 May party meeting this year skipped mentioning Xi as the “core of the leadership” – an ominous signal for Xi’s decline. Besides, Xi’s selective extension of his Presidential term at the March 2018 parliament session had alerted his detractors in the party. What Might Trouble Xi Jinping? Firstly, Xi’s pet Belt and Road Initiative project is under stress from several quarters: decline in investments and interest, with debts of several nations increasing and their assets seized such as Hambantota port in Sri Lanka and challenged by the United States-led Build Back Better World and others for lack of transparency, violation of sovereignty principles and environmental disasters. Secondly, Xi’s “dynamic zero Covid” policy is under attack given the massive impact on the welfare of the people, their livelihood, economic decline and the overall inconvenience to an estimate 400 million people in lockdown. China’s concerted narrative that its pandemic policies have been transparent and effective ignores the all-round debilitating effect these have had on the public. These were compounded by Xi’s “common prosperity” policies of curbing big businesses. Thirdly, political factional struggles have intensified given the relative economic decline and rise in unemployment. With at least five out of seven members of the core decision-making body, the politburo standing committee, expected to retire based on age limit, intense political jockeying for these posts have been unleashed. This is a do or die situation for rival factions in China as stakes are high. Will the 'Shanghai Gang' Beat Xi Jinping in His Own Game? The reform oriented “Shanghai gang” faction—still under Jiang Zemin, Zeng Qinghong and others' influence—is said to be concerned about the economic slowdown, restrictions on domestic businesses, decline in investments, gradual shift of manufacturing sector to other greener pastures in Vietnam and other countries, possible sanctions of western countries due to China’s position on the ongoing war in Ukraine. As the political stakes are high, the Shanghai gang is likely to step up multiple attacks on Xi. Already in January this year, an article traced to Jiang’s faction titled “An objective evaluation of Xi Jinping” emerged with full invectives on Xi. This trend is expected to increase. On the other hand, the conservative Communist Youth League—headed by Premier Li Keqiang and supported by a possible 6th generation of leader and vice premier Hu Chunhua—have been quietly working behind the scenes to checkmate Xi. In the coming weeks the relative publicity given in the official media to Xi’s close aides like Chen Min’er, Li Hongzhang, Chen Xi, Shen Haixiong and others on the one hand and Communist Youth League leaders like Hu Chunhua, Wang Yang and others will indicate the rising stock of these factions. It would be cataclysmic if Xi steps down at the next party congress. In such an unlikely scenario, the 6th generation of leaders would have to start afresh with its attendant political uncertainties. Despite all these set-backs, Xi may scrape through, possibly with his wings clipped with reduced majority support among the politburo members and ensuing compromises at all levels of governance. #China #XiJinping Originally published: The Quint, June 21, 2022. https://www.thequint.com/voices/opinion/chinas-chequered-games-are-president-xi-jinpings-days-of-glory-over-or-will-he-prevail#read-more Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli is Professor in Chinese Studies and Dean of School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University.

By Prof. Swaran Singh The coming BRICS Summit - to be hosted online by China on June 23 - is already drawing attention for becoming the first multilateral forum of this year where Russian President Vladimir Putin will be seen interacting directly with national leaders from China, India, Brazil, South Africa and several other invited nations. The summit likely would be read in the West as the BRICS countries' enhanced support and endorsement of Putin's policies. This is because they have been extremely uncomfortable with all BRICS members resisting the US-led campaign to denounce Russian actions and slap unbearable sanctions against Russia. The reality is that China stands out as the largest importer of Russian energy and India as the largest importer of Russian defense equipment. What adds to US discomfiture is that most of its own allies have also been and continued to be major importers of Russian energy. But while the Ukraine crisis has seen US allies reduce their Russian imports, China and India have increased theirs. This has been facilitated by the BRICS' shared policy stance on Ukraine: refusing to denounce Russia, urging both sides for immediate cessation of hostilities and for initiating direct talk to resolve this crisis. Second, the most novel proposition of this summit - BRICS expansion - also makes the presence of Putin and several new invitees open to various interpretations. The Ukraine crisis has seen fissures emerge in the G20 and adding new members to BRICS could make it an alternative minus US and its allies. This could also mean an expanded BRICS overtaking G7 earlier than imagined. BRICS has been shy of adding new members and South Africa was the last to be added in 2010. But a change in mood is in the making. Last year, BRICS added Bangladesh, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Uruguay to its New Development Bank. Last month, BRICS foreign ministers were joined by representatives from Argentina, Egypt, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Senegal and Thailand. National leaders of some of these countries are expected to join the summit and several others will join the BRICS usual leaders' outreach summit. Third, BRICS has always stood as a unique forum that holds dozens of pentagonal meetings that precede their annual summits. These include meetings of their think-tanks, academics, experts, corporates, journalists, followed by advisors, several officials and senior ministers including their foreign ministers. This building of an annual momentum and the resultant institutionalization with relatively lesser media glare have helped BRICS create favorable grassroots constituencies for building trust. Fourth, though they also deliberated on issues of geopolitics and security, BRICS nations are known for their technocratic focus. This has resulted in piecemeal building of credibility reflected in their debates on creating an independent Credit Rating Agency as also in their initiatives like the Currency Reserves Arrangement and now nine-member New Develop-ment Bank which has already disbursed more than $15 billion and completed and/or sanctioned support for hundreds of projects. The bank now has regional offices in South Africa and India and its style of functioning has pushed Bretton Woods institutions into structural reforms. Of course BRICS camaraderie has had its own share of challenges. Externally, BRICS has come to be compared with the US-led Quadrilateral Security Framework that includes Australia, Japan and India. Quad has had four summits in 14 months and precipitously expanded its agenda. At least US presents Quad as aimed at containing China though others vary in their engagement with Beijing. Internally, BRICS' members like Brazil or India are sometimes suspect for being closely aligned to the US. India is a member of both BRICS and the Quad. Comparisons get drawn on how India had walked out of China-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership but joined US President Joe Biden's Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity last month. India is not just the second-largest and the fastest growing economy in BRICS but has had issues with Beijing. Also members like India, Brazil, South Africa may not be just sensitive to some of the proposed names for new additions and changes but perhaps susceptible to Western criticism of BRICS' evolving dynamics. Moreover, most leaders attending the BRICS summit find themselves focused on their domestic challenges flowing from ongoing pandemic and Ukraine crisis and their economic and political fallouts like rising prices especially wheat and crude oil. The pandemic has seen China and India engaged in supplying healthcare to the Global South and more recently providing humanitarian assistance to countries from Ukraine to Sri Lanka. In view of these being unusual times, modest expectations like the BRICS Summit consolidating its extant initiatives and launching negotiations to build consensus on criteria for adding new members and other future initiatives should suffice. #BRICS #China #India #Quad Originally published: Global Times, June 19, 2022 https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202206/1268451.shtml Posted here with the authorization of the author. Prof. Swaran Singh is Professor of Diplomacy and Disarmament at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi; President of Association of Asia Scholars (asiascholars.in); Adjunct Senior Fellow at The Charhar Institute, Beijing; Senior Fellow, Institute for National Security Studies Sri Lanka, Colombo; and Visiting Professor, Research Institute for Indian Ocean Economies, Kunming (China).

By Prithvi Naresh Rathod Realism devalues the role of norms as a big constraint in the great-power behaviour, but in reality, norms have actually played a significant role in explaining the effective response to Russia’s invasion. Right after the escalation of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, an old video of Prof. Mearsheimer has been doing rounds on social media which clearly justify Russian actions in Ukraine. The video got so popular that in fact, the Russian Foreign Ministry also reshared the video in order to justify their actions. This can be taken as a good example of how precisely ‘academia’ explains the ‘real world’. This has opened up a new discussion among the IR Theorists who are presenting their analysis of events based on some theory or the other. In my opinion, realism can explain the overall conflict very well, but still other aspects of the war can also be explained by Liberalism. The Russian invasion of Ukraine The Russian invasion of Ukraine can be explained well by Realism since it portrays a world without any central authority which can protect states from each other. This makes the states worry about a dangerous aggressor that might threaten them in the future. This forces the states, especially great powers, to be concerned about their security and leads to great power competition. This is the concept of classical realism called the ‘security dilemma’. To understand this concept, we need to go back to the US move for expansion of NATO in the 1990s by offering countries like Georgia and Ukraine a theoretical chance to join NATO. This triggered a security dilemma for Russia that led to the Russian invasions of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 and 2022. The security dilemma arises because the steps taken by one state to make itself more secure often makes other states less secure. In the end, both countries end up being poorer and less safer than they were before. This explains why Eastern European states wanted to get into NATO and why Russian leaders became insecure due to it. The Western response the Invasion The Western response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine can again be explained by Realism. The quick response by the west can be understood by the concept of ‘alliance politics’. Russia’s actions threatened the West which thus commanded a swift response by displaying a balancing behaviour. This alliance politics worked since shared values bring alliances closer and abiding; but serious commitments to collective defence security is possible only if there is perception of a common threat. The level of threat, in turn, depends on the power, proximity, and the enemy’s capabilities and intentions. I believe that Liberal institutionalism helps us understand the unified Western response more aptly. If an institution like NATO did not exist, the response couldn’t have been so effective. Even though International institutions cannot resolve conflicts of interest or stop great powers from acting as per their wishes, they still facilitate effective collective responses. The shortcomings of Liberal Institutionalism In the recent past, there have been instances when the international institutions and international law have proved to be weak when it comes to keeping the great powers in control. Even in 2022, economic interdependence did not stop Russia from launching its invasion of Ukraine, despite the costs that it will have to face as a result. Even the public opinion could not stop Russia. The General Assembly’s one-sided 141-5 vote (with 35 abstentions) condemning the Russian invasion didn't have much impact either. This war has thus demolished the liberal belief that war was no longer “thinkable” in Europe. The shortcomings of Realism Realism devalues the role of norms as a big constraint in the great-power behaviour, but in reality, norms have actually played a significant role in explaining the effective response to Russia’s invasion. Russia had trampled over most of the norms pertaining to the use of force and that partly explains why countries and corporations around the world have judged Russia so harshly and their rapid response. This shows that even if nothing can stop a country from violating global norms, obvious transgressions will customarily affect how its intentions are judged. This whole tragic war could have been avoided if the US and its NATO allies had not given way to liberal idealism. If they would have stuck to the core insights of realism, this crisis would not have occurred and Russia would have never invaded Crimea and Ukraine would have been safe. According to Realism, wars occur because the international system is anarchic and states compete for power and may use force to make themselves more secure or gain advantages. Also, since there is no way that the states can know exactly what other states may do in the future, this makes them more reluctant to trust each other and thus encourages them to sidestep against the possibility that another more powerful state may try to harm them at some point in the future. This is exactly what makes us understand the behaviour of Russia in response to the NATO expansion by the US and its allies. #Russia #Ukraine #War #NATO #Realism #Liberalism Prithvi Naresh Rathod is pursuing MA in Politics (with specialization in International Studies) at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

By Prof. Swaran Singh Three-day visit to Hanoi by Defense Minister Rajnath Singh underscored the evolving nature of their bilateral ties. Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh on Friday concluded a three-day visit to Hanoi. This not only reinforced but showcased how, other than the Quadrilateral Security Framework of Australia, Japan, India and the United States, Vietnam has come to be the most powerful pillar of India’s Indo-Pacific strategy. This rapidly strengthening bilateral partnership portends far-reaching implications for the larger Indo-Pacific region. Singh’s visit also marked one more instance of India’s assertive foreign policy in the making. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s last eight years have seen New Delhi becoming increasingly firm in pushing its own line and withstanding pressures from friends and foes alike. And observers in Vietnam see this change being most aptly appreciated in Hanoi, undergirding an enduring future for their strategic cooperation. For these last eight years, for instance, bilateral India-Vietnam trade has more than doubled, rising from US$7 billon for the 2015-16 fiscal year to $14.14 billion for 2021-22, with India’s exports to Vietnam last year marking impressive 34% growth over the preceding year. But what has brought India and Vietnam closer is also their increasing concerns about China’s expanding footprint in the South China Sea, where both have serious commercial and strategic interests. And here, the recent past has especially witnessed China being further emboldened by its expanding engagements with the larger littoral across the Indo-Pacific region. Apart from building known naval facilities from Djibouti in Africa to Solomon Islands in the Pacific, and leasing the ports of Gwadar and Hambantota or exploring naval access to ports in Bangladesh and Myanmar in South Asia, China has been secretly building naval facilities in Vietnam’s neighbor Cambodia, though officials both in Beijing and Phnom Penh have denied it. This is where New Delhi and Hanoi find their larger visions – like the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific and India’s Act East policy or Indo-Pacific Ocean’s Initiative – synergizing their rapidly transforming defense-centric partnership that promises to make this novel axis an influential factor in emerging Indo-Pacific dynamics. Defense-centric axis In short, India’s relationship with Vietnam has transformed from their millennia-old civilizational and cultural linkages and 20th-century camaraderie of anti-colonial struggles to the 21st-century geopolitics prodding a whole range of robust defense-centric partnerships. Today these partnerships involve a whole spectrum of regular high-level visits, military training and exchanges, joint naval exercises, defense supplies and co-production, intelligence sharing and cooperation in UN peace operations. The fact that their partnerships have lately begun to drift toward greater maritime and multilateral bonhomie makes their axis an interesting ingredient for prognosis on the evolving realignments in the Indo-Pacific region. Recent years have witnessed India’s arms exports leading this transformation. No other nation has received the kind of defense supplies that have been destined from India to Hanoi. In this three-day visit itself, India’s defense minister formally handed over 12 high-speed boats for Vietnam’s border guards. Underlining the move from defense exports to joint defense production, the first five boats were built in the Larsen & Toubro shipyard in India and the other seven at Vietnam’s Hong Ha shipyard. Rajnath Singh also announced a monetary grant for setting up language and IT labs for the Vietnamese armed forces. Plus India is expected to gift Vietnam a Khukri-class corvette, the INS Kirpan (“Dagger”), which is currently in service with the Indian Navy. All this is bound to be read in Beijing as aimed at constraining China in the South China Sea and beyond. Singh and Vietnam’s minister of national defense, General Phan Van Giang, also revived talks on India supplying its state-of-the-art BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles as well as Akash short-range ground-to-air missiles. This proposal was originally initiated way back during the 2016 visit of India’s then-defense minister Manohar Parrikar, who had also launched a $100 million line of credit facilitating India’s ongoing defense supplies. However, after India’s recent $375 million contract to supply of an anti-ship variant of the BrahMos cruise missile to the Philippines, which is also expected to sign another deal for India’s light combat aircraft and advanced light helicopter, Vietnam and Indonesia may also soon receive versions of India’s BrahMos missiles. Alluding to these trends in the making, India’s line of credit to Vietnam is now being expanded to $500 million, and the two defense ministers agreed for its “early finalization” as the two sides signed a slew of agreements signaling this changing nature of their future cooperation. Future roadmap outlined Without doubt, their shared China challenge remains the main driver guiding and accelerating future trajectories of this evolving India–Vietnam axis of the two fastest-growing economies of this region. This could not be more vividly underlined than this visit clinching a first-of-its-kind Memorandum of Understanding on Mutual Logistics Support. This will not only allow but both facilitate and simplify their administrative procedures to enable their militaries use of each other’s bases for repair and replenishment of supplies. These new arrangements should greatly enhance their operational outreach empowering their naval explorations across the South China Sea and also enable them to operate far away home: India around the Pacific and Vietnam in the Indian Ocean rim. This context was most aptly underlined by Rajnath Singh explaining how their “broader convergence of interests and common interest” and the resultant “close defense and security cooperation is an important factor of stability in the Indo-Pacific region.” What is most interesting is that Vietnam has been traditionally reluctant to allow such free access to its military facilities to foreign militaries. This in turn makes India the first to achieve this feat. India, on the other hand, has had similar arrangements with a whole range of countries including the United States, Australia, Japan, France, South Korea, Singapore and so on. The second groundbreaking clincher of this visit by India’s defense minister is their issuing of a Joint Vision Statement on India-Vietnam Defense Partnership toward 2030 that aims to “significantly enhance the scope and scale” to their defense partnership. This roadmap for coming eight years allows long-term planning and initiatives. Strategic partners on the go Vietnam remembers that when it comes to its national defense, India was the only non-communist nation to support Hanoi both during its prolonged war with France and then against the United States and later in its conflict with Cambodia. Of course structural factors like expansion of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and launch of India’s Look East policy in 1990s have also laid strong foundations. The two remain connected in regular bilateral and regional forums. India has since also come to be Vietnam’s major partner in the fields of oil exploration, agriculture and manufacturing, though focus has clearly since moved toward military supplies and co-production, intelligence sharing and joint military exercises and other maritime and multilateral cooperation. Over the years, their bilateral ties were consequently upgraded to a strategic partnership during then-prime minister Nguyen Tan Dung’s India visit of 2007 and then to a comprehensive strategic partnership during Modi’s Vietnam visit of 2016. Without playing down the autonomy of shared values and interest and mutual stakes and institutionalization of their cooperation, it is primarily China’s continued unprecedented rise during last few decades and especially its muscle-flexing in the South China Sea that has sustained the momentum of India-Vietnam cooperation. Given their shared territorial disputes and geopolitical contestations with rising China, this reflects their shared determination to ensure China’s compliance with international laws and norms, especially around the Indo-Pacific region. But what is important to underline is that unlike some Western powers, both India and Vietnam have kept engaging with a rising and assertive China. Guided by their civilizational values, both believe in socializing and restraining China’s behavior by engaging with it and not by confronting or alienating it altogether. This is what promises to see the India-Vietnam axis emerging as a novel alternative locomotive of change in evolving realignments in the Indo-Pacific region. #India #Vietnam #China #IndoPacific Originally published: Asia Times, June 10, 2022 https://asiatimes.com/2022/06/novel-india-vietnam-axis-emerging-in-indo-pacific/ Posted here with the authorization of the author. Prof. Swaran Singh is Professor of Diplomacy and Disarmament at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi; President of Association of Asia Scholars (asiascholars.in); Adjunct Senior Fellow at The Charhar Institute, Beijing; Senior Fellow, Institute for National Security Studies Sri Lanka, Colombo; and Visiting Professor, Research Institute for Indian Ocean Economies, Kunming (China).