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By Prof. Swaran Singh Many in the region see the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework as far too US-centric in certain sectors. On the eve of the fourth Quad Leaders Summit in Tokyo this past Monday, US President Joe Biden, along with the other three members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, launched his much-hyped Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). This also presented the novel outline of a “Quad Plus” paradigm, as the online launch was attended virtually by leaders from South Korea and New Zealand plus seven of the 10 ASEAN members, namely Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. The unique selling point of IPEF so far seems to be to counter the so-called China challenge by reviving US economic leadership in the Indo-Pacific region, though it is presented in terms of evolving shared novel processes and standards to socialize (read tame) China into respective international codes of conduct. But as countries now begin negotiating various proposed IPEF modules by building consensus on their evolving contours, this has come to be interpreted as one more reincarnation of extant initiatives such as former US president Donald Trump’s 2019 Blue Dot Network, the 2021 G7 Build Back Better World, or the European Union’s Global Gateway scheme announced this year. What is more, many have been and continue to be reluctant as they see IPEF as far too US-centric to their comfort in certain sectors. Reviving US leadership The US of course is at the forefront of this novel IPEF experiment. Last October, President Biden first presented his vision of IPEF at the online East Asian Summit chaired by Brunei, listing a broad range of sectors where he wished to redefine the processes and standards of international economic transactions. Since then, senior US officials have been proactively building consensus among America’s Asian allies, though some of them even now appear to be reluctant partners, being unsure and uncertain about several subsets of this rather broad outline of a framework. Large economies like India that remain hugely dependent on China could be conscious of extant trade deficits or the digital economy leading to cross-border data flows. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations also remains closely intertwined with China. Experts also see this initiative as guided by domestic politics of the US. They see IPEF as nothing more than Biden reviving former president Barack Obama’s legacy given that in 2009, as part of his “pivot” to Asia, the latter had also visualized “writing the rules of the road” through the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Second, there are also pressures from the US Congress. The US Congressional Research Service paper on IPEF this February, for instance, underlines how since Trump’s withdrawal from the TPP in 2017 the United States “lacks an economic and trade strategy sufficient to counter China’s increasing economic influence in the Indo-Pacific” and how “the US may remain on the sidelines, potentially imparting the administration’s ability to promote its vision of a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific.’” In Biden’s Indo-Pacific Strategy launched in February, a whole paragraph is devoted to IPEF, calling it “a multilateral partnership for the 21st century” and presenting it as the missing economic link in US geo-strategic leadership in Indo-Pacific region. While the Biden administration has removed several of Trump’s tariffs against China and several other Asian allies, it has also made clear that it will not return to the now Japan-led Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which it sees as a “very 20th-century” paradigm. The US has also remained outside world’s largest trade pact, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which includes all the other members of IPEF. This makes the China-led RCEP and US-led IPEF opposing propositions: the former offering trillion-dollar-plus investments by their largest trading partner while the latter proposes to create a shared facilitation mechanism for mutually complementary transactions. Countering China In proposing IPEF, the US therefore is fundamentally proposing to counter China by reviving its economic engagement in the Indo-Pacific, a region that accounts for 60% of the world population and is seen increasingly as the engine of post-pandemic resilience. But hasn’t China been the leader in making this region such a growth engine? Indeed, the China link of the Indo-Pacific resilience has become especially noticeable during the difficult years of the Covid-19 pandemic that saw China being the only major economy to achieve positive growth (though experts now project possibilities of 2022 seeing the US – for the first time since 1976 – growing faster than China). Even that prospect cannot exclude the critical role of China in driving regional growth and development. To cite US national security adviser Jake Sullivan, the Indo-Pacific is what increasingly undergirds this expected US economic resilience; it supports more than 3 million American jobs and is the source of nearly $900 billion of foreign direct investment into the United States. But isn’t China part of that Indo-Pacific region that promises to underwrite US economic resilience? The fact that the US vision excludes China – which remains its strongest trade and investment partner and one that invested $38 billion in the US even in the worst pandemic year of 2020 – makes IPEF far too tinted by US geopolitics, where China is seen as its main competitor and less considerate of the regional economic dynamics where China remains far too deeply entrenched. Also, unlike China, which since the January 2017 Davos speech by President Xi Jinping has appeared to be the flag-bearer of free trade and investment, the US-led IPEF seems aimed to ensure the US does not get impacted by the downsides of trade liberalization. No country today has deep pockets like China to continue with one-sided investments and exports that the myopic national regimes find invariably attractive. The 2016 US presidential election saw Trump unleash a popular sentiment on how the rest of the world was taking advantage of America and walk out of multiple international arrangements while shifting US focus to launching the Five Eyes, Quad and AUKUS security mechanisms. That shift clearly missed this essential economic link that has brought global focus to the Asia-Pacific region, and more recently to its maritime imaginations, the Indo-Pacific region. What IPEF is not Underlying the dilemma is that just like the larger US-led Indo-Pacific narratives, the driver of this regional transformation, China, has remained not just an outlier but the target of US initiatives in engaging the Indo-Pacific minus China. This is being done in spite of China now being a $16 trillion economy – bigger than IPEF minus the US combined – as well as the largest trading and investment partner of the US. Prima facie, the 13 countries of IPEF – representing 2.5 billion people, that is, 32.3% of the world population as of 2020 and a combined gross domestic product of $34.6 trillion, that is, 40.9% of the total – make it a bigger economic grouping than both the 15-member RCEP and the 11-nation CPTPP, where China’s application for membership remains pending. The CPTPP – involving Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Singapore and Vietnam – currently represents 510 million people with $10.8 trillion of GDP. But the CPTPP could become much bigger than IPEF, and potentially even China-led, once the applications of South Korea and China to join it are accepted. Second, unlike the CPTPP or RCEP – the two biggest trade blocs in Asia – the IPEF negotiations have just begun. Third, unlike the CPTPP or RCEP, IPEF does not aim at lowering tariffs or expanding market access, not even gradually over a long- or short-term future. Fourth, it also does not as yet have any dispute settlement mechanisms, which are central to most economic arrangements, including RCEP and CPTPP. In all, this makes IPEF rather distinct from free-trade agreements (FTAs) that usually take decades to negotiate, go through a ratification process, and have sacrosanct membership. Indeed, in proposing IPEF, the Biden administration perhaps wished to avoid the process of ratification, which would require congressional approval and by extension addressing the popular anti-globalization mood of Americans that was most effectively articulated during the 2016 presidential election and reinforced during Trump’s four years in office. Experts believe that the US could not join the CPTPP or RCEP as Congress increasingly sees giving trade concessions in an unfavorable light. Second, the novel experiment of IPEF could face RCEP-like challenges such asa decade of grueling negotiations, which in that case saw the third-largest economy, India, opting out at the very last hour. Or worse, it could face a repeat of the US-led TPP negotiations that saw a successor president withdrawing from the agreement in 2017, though it has since been revived by Japan as CPTPP, which was rafted in 2018. As of now, there exists no precedent of creating such a loosely knitted economic framework, definitely not one of capable of becoming an inflection point of systemic transformation. Skeptics suggest that IPEF imposes obligations without providing incentives, such as providing market access or lowering tariffs, and at best marks only the beginning of a process. What makes IPEF especially an uphill task is its aim of decoupling its members from China-centric global commerce, which seems ambitious given that all its members already have China as their largest trading partner and are tied to China in their RCEP FTA. A reality check Finally, the US seeks to build IPEF to reconnect with the Indo-Pacific region while excluding not just China but several important players. Thus the very announcement of IPEF has made Beijing its ardent opponent. Responding to the IPEF announcement, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin on Wednesday criticized the US, saying that in the name of cooperation, it was excluding certain countries. He cited US Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo describing IPEF as “an alternative to China’s approach” while underlining how “many countries in the region are worried about the huge cost of ‘decoupling’ with China.” Other than China, IPEF also excludes the three ASEAN nations, namely Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar, that are regarded as close allies of Beijing. At the same time, pandering to China’s sensitivities, Taiwan – a close US ally and initially expected to join – was also not included. However, given the nature of IPEF, the door for their future induction remains at least theoretically open, which makes their exclusions more like an uncertain knee-jerk reaction and therefore open to interpretations. #US #IPEF #RCEP #CPTPP #China #Quad Originally published: Asia Times, May 27, 2022 At: https://asiatimes.com/2022/05/can-us-led-ipef-outshine-rcep-or-cptpp/ Posted here with the authorization of the author. Prof. Swaran Singh is Professor of Diplomacy and Disarmament at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi; President of Association of Asia Scholars (asiascholars.in); Adjunct Senior Fellow at The Charhar Institute, Beijing; Senior Fellow, Institute for National Security Studies Sri Lanka, Colombo; and Visiting Professor, Research Institute for Indian Ocean Economies, Kunming (China).

By Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli This round of the Quad meeting will go down in history for its norm-building exercise, democratisation process, ushering in rule-based order, inclusivity, and harmonisation of interests and objectives. The fourth meeting of the Quad leaders and their second in person meeting in the last one year was termed aptly as “positive and practical”. The Tokyo meeting of the United States, Japan, Australia and Indian leaders took place on 24 May. This round of the Quad meeting will go down in history for its norm-building exercise, democratisation process, ushering in rule-based order, inclusivity, harmonisation of interests and objectives, concern for smaller nations in the Southeast Asian region as well as in the Pacific and evolving sustainable practices. It is noticeable that the Russia factor, which created differences in the Quad third meeting, has subsided in this Tokyo round. As with the previous three meetings, the Quad statements are devoid of acrimony or chest-thumping slogans, but exhibit a systematic head down approach to find solutions to the emerging problems in the Indo-Pacific. Democratic institutions and transparent practices at home helped this process of strengthening Quad’s outreach agenda. Conspicuous, as it were, in all the Quad statements is no mention of the elephant in the room, even though the signalling is clear. China was not mentioned explicitly in any of the Quad statements. However, the emphasis on rule of law, free and open Indo-Pacific, explicit mention of challenges in South and East China Seas, Pacific Ocean island states and other issues suggest implicitly to Beijing’s actions in the recent past. The Tokyo meeting reiterated the work on vaccines, critical technologies and maritime order, as with the previous three meetings. However, additional agenda crept into the fourth meeting and suggest to the recent dynamics. For instance, counter terrorism issue has been raised with the explicit mention of Mumbai and Pathankot attacks. The United Nations Security Council resolution 1267 on the subject was cited, indirectly criticising China’s support to Pakistan-based and Afghan-based terrorists. This is in the backdrop of continuing China’s collaboration with the Al Qaeda groups in Afghanistan and its efforts to carve a “Himalayan Quad” in South Asia. The agile nature of the Quad discussions is seen in the mention of mounting debts in the region and the efforts proposed to counter the economic stress levels among several nations. In the backdrop of the economic meltdown of Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Nepal and other countries, the Quad suggested to addressing this issue systematically as against China’s recent rapacious policies. Much thought has gone into the proposal of Quad Debt Management Resource Portal at the Tokyo meeting. The Quad nations also pledged to invest $50 billion for the next five years on infrastructure projects in the region. Even though this figures pale into insignificance compared to China’s Belt and Road Initiative outlays, the latter are racked by dominance of communist party backed state-owned enterprises, lack transparency in contracts and are debt-ridden. Another surprising decision of the Quad in this round is the emphasis on climate change. In the backdrop of the stalemate at the November 2021 Glasgow meeting where both Chinese and Russian leaders were absent, and perhaps reflecting to the strain in India-China relations on environmental issues, the Quad members outlined mitigation and adaptation measures. While the previous Quad meetings mentioned about the work to be done on critical technologies- specifically quantum and 5G telecommunication technologies, a surprising element is the emerging harmonisation among Quad members on cyber security issues. As cyber challenges kept mounting – reflected in the Estonian case more than a decade ago and the increasing cyberattacks, the Tokyo declaration announced constructive measures not only for Quad Cybersecurity Partnership but also for individual internet users. An open and secure telecommunication system was also discussed. The ongoing disruption in the semiconductor supply chain mechanism was also raised by the Quad members. Also, unlike the previous discussions, space applications and technologies entered the Quad discussions in Tokyo with decisions for sharing earth observation data for the common good of the region. In the light of the outer space weaponization programmes of China (and Russia) and their efforts to carve out a “haves and have nots” in Outer Space, the Quad efforts at Tokyo saw some constructive alternatives. Surprising also in the current round of discussions is the faster pace in providing public goods and services to the international community. The Quad members decided at Tokyo to counter non-traditional security challenges, illegal fishing and suggested efforts to enhance Maritime Domain Awareness and provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to the concerned. Such capacity building in the maritime domain is sure to also deter China which has been active in encroaching maritime commons in the Indo-Pacific region recently. Indeed, it was reported that as the Tokyo meeting is underway, China (and Russia) mobilised bombers and other aircraft closer to Japan. For the past decade, China’s naval and air transgressions on Senkaku islands have increased substantially, as with its forays in Bashi Channel (south of Taiwan) and Miyako Straits (closer to Okinawa base). These are clear signals of coercion and highlight the vulnerabilities of Japan and Taiwan. However, while China-Russia coordination increased in the aftermath of the Ukrainian invasion, neither these countries nor the Quad members could openly come to blows. With the relative economic decline of both China and Russia, the Quad members exhibit confidence in their institutional capability and technological prowess. In these circumstances, the Quad chose to work quietly setting the agenda positively and in practical terms. #Quad #India #US #Japan #Australia #China #IndoPacific Originally published: Firstpost, May 25, 2022 At: https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/how-quad-tokyo-outcome-was-both-positive-and-practical-though-it-makes-no-mention-of-china-10716311.html Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Srikanth Kondapalli is Professor in Chinese Studies and Dean of School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University.

By Prof. Santishree Dhulipudi Pandit Indian civilisation has always celebrated development, democracy, diversity, difference, and dissent Reducing India to a civic nation bound only by the Constitution disregards its history, ancient heritage, culture and civilisation. I would describe India as a “civilisation state”. This is not just a view from one part of the country. There have been writings since time immemorial, where you have this concept, and it is very important to revisit them. It predates the freedom struggle and the arrival of those who eventually made India their homeland. Celebrating history beyond religion is very important. We have to face the challenge of a distorted history: Distorted both because history is “his” story — I think the “her” story also has to come. And the overturning of E H Carr’s dictum: “Facts are sacred, interpretations vary.” Unfortunately, in independent India, and to a certain extent a university I belong to, overturned this dictum: “Interpretations are sacred, facts can vary.” And this is very dangerous. This is a civilisation that preached “ekam sat bahudha vadanti”, that the truth may be one but there are different parts to it. This is the basic essence of the celebration of diversity, dissent, difference, as well as democracy. Why are we today trying to re-emphasise this point? It’s because we are made to imagine our history with self-loathing and self-hatred. One period is excessively glorified. And I, who come from the south, feel even worse. The longest-ruling dynasty in India was the Chola dynasty, which ruled this country for 2,000 years. Is there any road named after any of the great kings of the Cholas? Not one in Delhi. There is a huge bias, agenda-setting as well as gatekeeping. And it is extremely important that we revisit these ideas and look into the gaps. As most of you know India is not a post-independent idea of a nation. The Rig Veda defined the geographical existence of Bharatavarsha as well as the Sapta Sindhu, a land encompassing seven principal rivers. The Vishnu Purana descried the geographical location of Bharatavarsha. Composed in the 2nd century BC, it says that the land that lies to the north of the ocean and south of the snowy mountains is called Bharat. And there dwell the progeny of Bharat. The word “rashtra” was used in the Rig Veda, Yajur Veda and the Atharva Veda. Rashtra is not only a merely geopolitical concept, it is also a civilisational concept. It is a kind of thought which keeps a patriot in the frame of mind to transcend all the material and immediate interests and protect the motherland from all calamities, aggression and evil. Love for the country is not the same as love for the nation and self-determination, sovereignty or even structuring a composite culture. Rashtra bhakti is a subconscious feeling of being an Indian or a person belonging to this great civilisation. Unlike the Abrahamic religions, Hinduism is not a proselytising or a structured religion of one book and one God. We are a process. It’s a way of life. Robert Frykenberg, the American historian, described the Indian National Movement as also being a Hindu revivalist and modernist movement, quoting Bankim Chandra Chatterjee with his Vande Mataram, Swami Vivekananda, Swami Dayanand Saraswati, as well as Sri Aurobindo and Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, who redefined Hinduism in modern terms. So cultural civilisation is only a civilisational perception — a sense of belonging and anchoring in a specific cultural and civilisational milieu. Most have heard of Bal Gangadhar Tilak and his book, Gita Rahasya. Tilak was the first to say, “Swaraj is my birthright, and I shall have it”. He infused the spirit of political assertiveness and patriotism, both of which are extremely relevant today, in the people. To inject the spirit of nationalism and awareness among the people, he started the Ganesh festival and Shivaji Mahotsav. These were instrumental in bringing people together, irrespective of caste or creed. And I would say he was the first mass leader before Mahatma Gandhi. Many people think Gandhi is a disciple of Gopal Krishna Gokhale. I would rather say he’s a disciple of Tilak. Both Tilak and Gandhi were greatly influenced by the Bhagavad Gita. They saw it as an instrument of karma yoga, rather than just bhakti yoga. Next, I would like to bring in the ideas of Gopal Krishna Gokhale. He said politics should be a service and not a profession. And I think it is this aspect that we have to bring in and young scholars must use these narratives, which are available in the writings of many of the Indian freedom fighters. Unfortunately, we have forgotten all these great nationalists who existed. I’m going to the more marginalised areas — Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh. There was Subramania Bharati, known as Mahakavi Bharati, to Tamil speakers for his outstanding contributions to nationalism and Tamil literature. A passionate freedom fighter, social revolutionary, mystic and visionary who was active during the late period of British rule, he spent much of his all too brief life exiled from British India, in neighbouring Pondicherry, just like Sri Aurobindo. He died suddenly in 1921. He was just 38 years old. He had little opportunity to provide for his legacy, literary or otherwise. In his writings, he talked about the intangible cultural heritage of India and the unity of this culture. The writings destroy all ambiguity. He clearly said that clarity of mind is very important and he thought that all languages and literatures of India have a single origin. Bharati was a genius. He was also ahead of his time. He also spoke about women’s liberation. Many people believe that feminism or women’s rights movements began only with Marx and ended there. The first feminists are Drapaudi and Sita. Who could be a greater feminist than Draupadi, or Sita who is the first single mother. These concepts are not invented by the West. I’d also like to mention Subramaniya Siva, and two Telugu writers called Duggirala Gopalakrishnayya, who said the nation is not its sand and mud but its people, and Kandukuri Veeresalingam, who was like lshwar Chandra Vidyasagar, a great reformer from the south. The great writer, Ananda K Coomaraswamy said the highlight of Indian civilisation is the dance of Lord Shiva. The temple of Chidambaram has the Nataraja avatar — the lord of dance — of Lord Shiva, or the thillai form as we call it, as do the South Indian copper images of Shri Nataraja. These images vary amongst themselves in minor details, but all express one fundamental conception — our Lord is the dancer who, like the heat latent in firewood, diffuses his power into the mind and matter and makes them dance in their turn. Cosmic activity is the central motif of the dance. Creation arises from the drum, protection proceeds from the hand of hope, and destruction comes from fire and the foot held afloat gives release. You see this legendary argument about Lord Shiva’s dance as the highlight of the Indian civilisational trait in the Cholas. The Cholas occupied the Indo Pacific regions called the Srivijaya and Suvarnabhumi. They defeated the Chinese and it is the image of Lord Shiva that was their ruling symbol. So we ask: can India become a norm builder? When you’re a civilisational state, it is expected that we build narratives that can become norms in international relations, in all aspects of life. The way the Cholas conquered, they did not do it by genocide, rape or loot. It was more by culture, trade and commerce. If you look for an alternative paradigm, you have this. When we talk of cultural nationalism, it should help us to define certain very important identifying characteristics that we need to be a norm builder, a shared value system which includes the acceptance of international norms. Yes, we don’t believe in loot, genocide or rape; we believe in trade and commerce and culture. The existence of institutional mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts. The British did not give us democratic values. If they had, then Myanmar, Pakistan, all countries ruled by the British should have been democracies. India is a democracy because it has a political culture, a culture that can choose from 3,000 crore gods. What more diversity would you require? We are the only country that has sustained a oasis of democracy in the Third World. India’s contribution to multiculturalism and cultural pluralism is extraordinarily important. And it is here that we also have the world-centric paradigm of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam against the state-centric paradigm. And we also believe in a nature-centric paradigm, not an anthropocentric paradigm. We believe that human beings are a part of the cosmos, where every other living and non-living thing has equal space, and a function that has been created for them. We also have the Buddhist philosophy: Lord Gautama, the Buddha, was the first dissenter and we celebrate dissent. Buddhism is a religion of the middle path. And India has always believed in the middle path and non-attachment. Adi Shankaracharya, through Advaita, brought these ideas back into Indian philosophy. At one point, 2,000 years ago, Tamil was the lingua franca of traders across Southeast Asia. These were not Indian colonies, but proto-states that took on the Hindu apparatus of religion, and concepts of kingship to enhance their position and status. While communities of Indian traders settled in important ports along Southeast Asia, they never crossed the line into becoming colonisers. This is our civilisation, we never colonised anybody. What happened instead, was that local rulers imbibed the Indian traditions. Indian cultural nationalism is on a path that is very different from that of the anthropocentric or the Abrahamic religions. So whenever we talk of Indian civilisation, it is something that celebrates development, democracy, diversity, difference, and dissent. #India #Civilisation #Constitution #Nationalism #Diversity #Multiculturalism Originally published: The Indian Express, May 24, 2022. https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/the-idea-of-indian-nationalism-did-not-come-from-the-constitution-it-has-ancient-roots-7932081/ Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of Dean, SIS. Prof. Santishree Dhulipudi Pandit is Vice-Chancellor, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Edited excerpts from a speech delivered at the seminar, “Revisiting the ideas of India from ‘Swaraj’ to ‘New India’” at the University of Delhi, on May 20, 2022.

By Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli The invasion of Ukraine has upended world geopolitics, disrupting the already fragile relationship between India and China. As Ukrainians resist the Russian invasion, a renewed cold war is heating up between Russia and the NATO partners. Western sanctions are intensifying on Russia and the situation threatens to engulf other regions, challenging other tense regional dynamics — including the fragile relationship between India and China. India and China’s relations have been plagued by a territorial dispute that flared into a border skirmish on June 15, 2020, resulting in 20 Indian soldiers being killed and an estimated 43 Chinese soldiers injured. This not only restricted the development of bilateral relations, but also sowed seeds of a new cold war between India and China. The Cold War between the US and Russia featured two countries vying for global and regional leadership, engaged in an ideological conflict of democracy versus socialism, and campaigns of military containment and proxy wars. The two countries never broke into person-to-person warfare, nor were there economic interactions, and the massive nuclear weapons threat lingering in the background remained just that. Just as a reminiscent dynamic emerges between Russia and NATO, so too is a cold war of sorts between India and China, a relationship that has been complicated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. While India and China have exhibited neutrality during United Nations debates over the invasion, and both countries have good relations with Russia, there are qualitative differences in the type of relationship they have. India’s relations with Russia, specifically its importation of arms, serves mainly to address the challenge from China. Meanwhile, China’s support of Russia shows a united front against NATO and the United States’ hegemony and power politics. On the other hand, India had intensified the 2+2 dialogue mechanism — an approach that pairs India’s foreign and defence ministers with their overseas counterparts — not only with the US, but with other Quad partners. Notably, some Chinese commentators have castigated Quad as an “Asian NATO” in the making. Some of the features of the Cold War US-Soviet hostility are now seen in the Ukrainian conflict, and are also reflected in the differences between India and China. For instance, the 19th Chinese Communist Party Congress in 2017 wished for China to “occupy the centre stage” in global and regional orders, suggesting a potential tussle among major powers was on the cards, including in India-China relations. Chinese President Xi Jinping, addressing the May 2014 Conference on Interaction on Confidence Building Measures at Shanghai, said Asian countries should look after their own security (i.e. resisting any help from the US), a posture that was seen as carving out a leadership position in Asia for China. Both of these are not acceptable to India (or for that matter to Japan, Indonesia, Vietnam, Turkey or Kazakhstan). A leadership tussle in Asia could trigger a new cold war-type conflict in Asia in the near future. India has instead advocated for multipolarity in Asia in the face of China’s coercive diplomacy over Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam, Philippines, India and others. It continues to resist China calling the shots in Asia. Much like the Cold War, containment is all the rage again. Since 2013, through its Belt and Road Initiative, China began constructing infrastructure projects in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and is gradually bringing Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Myanmar into its vortex. China’s arms transfers, aid, interference in the internal affairs of these Southern Asian countries has been stepped up to counter India. While China’s efforts may be to acquire allies and friends in different parts of the world as a part of its global hegemonic drive, it could lead to potential full-fledged containment of India. Additionally, the nuclear threat is back. China’s violation of many written agreements, their mobilisation of forces and military casualties have led to both sides mobilising an estimated 200,000 troops across the Line of Actual Control. In addition to the ground forces, air forces have also been on high alert for the past two years. However, unlike in the Cold War between the US and the then Soviet Union, India and China currently have not reported any strategic forces mobilisation. This could be partly due to the fact that both abide by ‘no first use’ nuclear policy. While both tested different types of missile systems, no public display of nuclear deterrence is visible so far unlike between the US and the then Soviet Union. Hence the world has so far avoided another ‘Bay of Pigs’ incident in India-China (although, since 2009, India has been prepared for a ”’two-front war’ under nuclear conditions”). But unlike the Cold War, which saw the US and Russia have no dialogue outside of ‘mutually assured destruction’ posturing and a few secret negotiations, leaders in India and China are amenable to sharing global power in a ‘multipolarity’ phenomenon. India and China interact in multilateral institutions like BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), or at Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit meetings. However, the observable ‘warmth’ generated at Wuhan and Chennai “informal summits” between the Indian and Chinese leaders in 2018 and 2019 has disappeared of late. Trade between the two countries has not only continued, but flourished. Despite the border tensions, the 2021 bilateral trade figures crossed a record US$125 billion, partly due to the items related to the pandemic, such as oxygen concentrators. But, even in the well-performing sector of trade, the tensions are present: India does not allow free trade with China, and will not join China’s Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership or other trade arrangements. This boils down to the lack of market economy status in China, and the restrictions they have imposed on Indian pharmaceutical and IT software products. While both India and China are part of globalisation and cooperate in the World Trade Organisation on protecting developing countries’ interests, at the bilateral level a subtle cold war is emerging. While the Cold War has not been completely copied into the tensions between India and China, the events in Ukraine have unleashed the potential for some type of non-military escalation. #India #China #US #Russia #NATO #Ukraine Originally published: 360info.org, May 24, 2022 At: https://360info.org/india-china-relations-threaten-to-freeze-over/ Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Srikanth Kondapalli is Professor in Chinese Studies and Dean of School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University.

By Prof. Swaran Singh While their shared China challenge has kept them together, continuing Ukraine crisis and winds of change predicted in Australian federal election this Saturday, may distract Quad Leaders from their actual reason to stand together. On Monday, national leaders of Australia, India and the United States will arrive in Tokyo for the fourth Quad Leaders Summit. While China frowns at the frequency of Quad meetings these days – four in just 14 months – this one will be spiced up by the Ukraine crisis and political uncertainty in one of the four members, Australia. That country holding a general election on Saturday that could well see Prime Minister Scott Morrison voted out of office just days before the summit. Speculation has been raging over who in that case should represent Australia in Tokyo on Monday, the outgoing PM or his incoming replacement, Labor Party leader Anthony Albanese. Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine rages on, and the Quad leaders have not been on the same page on that issue, especially when it comes to sanctions against Russia. And, as always, China’s influence in the Asia-Pacific region will be the major backdrop. A recent article in Foreign Affairs urges that Quad leaders “must adapt to fast-moving crises such as regional military conflicts and natural disasters, and manage expectations … [and] do more to deliver on its core security goals.” But are the Quad leaders listening? Australian elections The most immediate challenge for this summit is the Australian federal election this Saturday. With opinion polls suggesting that the Labor Party will form the next government, opposition leader Anthony Albanese addressed the National Press Club on Wednesday claiming that he will be the one to be sworn in on Sunday or Monday and will attend the Quad summit. Under Australian law, if Scott Morrison loses the election, he will have to submit his resignation immediately to Governor General David Hurley to allow Albanese to be sworn in. Morrison, who has been Australia’s caretaker prime minister since April 10 when the elections were called, has not clarified this point beyond saying that there are “conventions in place” that are being interpreted differently by both sides. It could even transpire that the elections result in a hung parliament. While some support continuity and suggest that if he loses the election, Morrison should join the summit using “observer status,” others believe he should withdraw from the summit or quickly make space for the next elected leader to join. To reinforce this quandary, shadow foreign minister Penny Wong has also been claiming she intends to join the Quad summit. Australian power transitions have historically taken longer than 48 hours. The 2010 elections left the two major parties, Labor and Liberal, with 72 seats each in the lower house, four short of the 76 needed for a majority. It took Julia Gillard, of the same Labor Party that is in opposition now, as much as 17 days to muster enough support from Independent lawmakers to form a majority government. With Morrison defending his one-seat majority and opinion polls showing a shrinking gap between the two major parties, Independent candidates are expected to hold the key. All this adds interesting spice and spin for other Quad leaders scheduling bilateral meetings at Monday’s summit. China’s challenge To begin with, Albanese has been critical of Morrison’s leaking of information on submarine negotiations with France in the run-up to the launch of AUKUS, and more recently on the prime minister’s failure to redress China signing a military pact with neighboring Solomon Islands. Both of these indicate China staying as the centerpiece of Albanese’s foreign policy if he becomes PM. But in spite of media proddings, Albanese has avoided answering questions on China, calling it just “a challenging” relationship. Compared with this rollercoaster electioneering, the Quad remains subtle in addressing its China challenge, saying only that it is not targeting any third country. For its part, Beijing has continued its blitzkrieg against Quad meetings. For example, on the Quad being revived in November 2017, Foreign Minister Wang Yi denounced it as a “headline grabbing” idea that would “dissipate like sea foam.” Later, Wang called it an “Indo-Pacific NATO” that has severely undermined regional security. Last month, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin called the Quad a group “steeped in the obsolete Cold War and zero-sum mentality [that] reeks of military confrontation” that “runs counter to the trend of [the] times and is doomed to be rejected.” The same sentiment was expressed in February by China’s ambassador to the UN, Zhang Jun, who, while speaking at the Security Council debate on the Ukraine crisis, accused the US of being the “one country that refuses to renounce the Cold War mentality” and “creating trilateral and quadrilateral small cliques” in the Asia-Pacific region that he said were “bent on provoking confrontation.” Ukraine crisis While restraining China’s unprecedented rise was the Quad’s original mandate, China’s support to Russia will be another immediate worry for the Monday summit. US President Joe Biden would like to achieve a unanimous denunciation of Russia, which is unlikely. While the United States has been steadfast in its anti-Russia campaign – providing relief and defense materials to Ukraine and slapping harsh sanctions on Moscow – attitudes in Australia, Japan and India, in that order, have varied widely from Washington’s. While it is not clear who will represent Australia at the summit, the attitude of host Japan makes an interesting read. Japan first appeared cautious on anti-Russia sanctions and unwelcoming to Ukrainian refugees. And while the continued death and destruction in Ukraine has seen a clear change in Japan’s policy, it remains driven by its own domestic yearnings for assertive posturing and aligning with allies, largely a byproduct of its seeking autonomy from its biggest ally, the United States. In a number of opinion polls recently, from Nikkei’s 61% to Yomiuri’s 80%, respondents supported this policy of assertive posturing. As a result. Japan has imposed sanctions on Russia and is now urging China to “play a responsible role” in the Ukraine crisis – but this again shifts the focus from Ukraine to China. Among the four Quad partners, India’s posture of neutrality has so far been the most challenging for Washington. Variance in the response of America’s European allies has facilitated India asserting its autonomy. But taking advantage of this situation, America’s peer competitor Beijing has been busy publicizing how China and India share a posture of neutrality – seeking immediate cessation of violence and immediate initiatives of direct apex-level dialogue – on the Ukrainian crisis. But here again, the continuing Ukraine crisis has seen India evolving its strategy from showing concern to calling for independent investigations. India may have increased imports of oil, coal and other commodities from Russia, yet it has kept this increase within the anticipated limits of US tolerance. Meanwhile, the US has continued with its nudging of New Delhi, and the continuing death and destruction in Ukraine have created added pressures for India. All in all, the Quad’s deliveries have been piecemeal compared with its lofty objectives, and its US tilt needs to be rectified to ensure efficacy of its initiatives. #Quad #India #US #Australia #Japan #Ukraine #China Originally published: Asia Times, May 20, 2022 At: https://asiatimes.com/2022/05/ukraine-oz-election-to-complicate-quad-leaders-summit/ Posted here with the authorization of the author. Prof. Swaran Singh is Professor of Diplomacy and Disarmament at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi; President of Association of Asia Scholars (asiascholars.in); Adjunct Senior Fellow at The Charhar Institute, Beijing; Senior Fellow, Institute for National Security Studies Sri Lanka, Colombo; and Visiting Professor, Research Institute for Indian Ocean Economies, Kunming (China).

By Prof. Gulshan Sachdeva If NATO expansion was considered to be a major cause of the Ukraine war, its enlargement in the Nordics could be another setback for Russia’s efforts to redraw European security architecture. Both Finland and Sweden have officially announced that they will be applying for the membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Feeling vulnerable after the Russian military action in Ukraine, both countries would like to acquire security guarantees under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Other three Nordic countries, viz. Denmark, Norway, and Iceland, are already founding members of NATO, a 30-nation military alliance founded in 1949. For more than 200 years, Sweden has been neutral, including during the two World Wars. In recent decades, it has been following the policy of military non-alignment. Finland has a long 1,340 km border with Russia, which will be added to existing Russia-NATO borders with Estonia and Latvia. During the 1939-40 Soviet-Finnish winter war, Finland lost more than 10 percent of its territory. Later, under the 1948 agreement, the Soviet Union agreed not to bother Finland so long as it stayed out of western military alliance. This phenomena for long has been described as ‘Finlandization’, which was earlier rumoured to be mentioned as one of the models being considered even for Ukraine, before the war began. If NATO’s expansion was considered to be a major cause of the Ukraine war, its enlargement in the Nordics could be another setback for Russia’s efforts to redraw European security architecture. However, Russia may view the expansion in the former Soviet space and in the Nordics differently. Even being neutral, both Finland and Sweden were working closely with NATO. Both joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme in 1994, and participated in NATO operations in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, Kosovo, and Libya. Since February, their co-ordination with NATO has increased significantly. While speaking at the Collective Security Treaty Organization’s summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin asserted that NATO expansion to these countries “does not create any immediate threat to Russia, but the expansion of military infrastructure into this territory will certainly provoke our response”. Finnish President Sauli Niinisto’s talk to Putin about his country’s decision to join NATO was “calm and cool” and did not contain any threats from Moscow. Niinisto said that Putin thinks “it’s a mistake. We are not threatening you”. However, earlier Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov warned that "Brussels, Washington and other NATO capitals should be under no illusion we will simply put up with the fact”. Russian company RAO Nordic says it will suspend electricity supply to Finland due to payment problems. Finland gets about 10 percent of its electricity from Russia. These countries also expect some cyber-attacks. Since the membership bid has to be approved unanimously by all members, Turkey could create problems. Turkey’s President Tayyip Erdogan is against their membership as he feels “neither of the countries has a clear stance against terror organizations.” Other members are hopeful that they will be able to find a solution. Ankara wants end of these countries’ support to Kurdish groups, extradition of Kurdistan Worker Party (PKK) activists, and the removal of their arms export ban imposed on Turkey since 2019. Interestingly, the decision to join NATO by Finland and Sweden is taken at a time when these countries are ruled by Social Democrat prime ministers. For decades, these parties opposed joining any military alliance. This shows how much the Ukraine war has affected Nordic and European politics in the last three months. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, who himself is a former Social Democrat Prime Minister of Norway, feels that their decision to join NATO is “historic”, and it “would increase our shared security, demonstrate that NATO’s door is open and that aggression does not pay.” Apart from securing its interests in the post-Soviet space, one of the major Russian objectives to launch the Ukraine war has been to re-assert its influence in the European security architecture. Much will still depend on the final outcome of the war. However, Finland and Sweden’s historic shift towards NATO will complicate matters for Russia further. NATO, which according to French President Emmanuel Macron was experiencing brain death just over two years ago, is seen again as the main pillar of European collective security. This is not the outcome Russia might be aiming for from the Ukraine war. #NATO #Russia #Ukraine #Finland #Sweden Originally published: Money Control, May 17, 2022. At: https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/opinion/nato-expansion-to-finland-and-sweden-may-complicate-russian-designs-in-europe-8524131.html Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Gulshan Sachdeva is Professor at the Centre for European Studies, SIS and Coordinator, Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, Jawaharlal Nehru University.

By Prof. Bharat H. Desai All civilized democratic societies practice the adage that a law must keep in tune with changing needs of a society. It vividly came true on May 11, when the Supreme Court of India (SCI) took the historic step to heed to the chorus for review of the 162-year-old colonial era section 124 A of the 1860 Indian Penal Code (IPC). It also brought to the fore relevance of the SCI’s own wisdom in the Kedarnath Singh v. State of Bihar (1962). It appears the stage was set, notwithstanding the proforma protests of the top law officers of the Union of India (UOI), after the Prime Minister’s assertion in the meeting of the chief ministers and chief justices in doing away with outdated laws. The SCI order duly took note of this. “The Hon'ble PM believes that…we need to, as a nation, work even harder to shed colonial baggage…In that spirit, the Government of India has scrapped over 1500 outdated law since 2014-15…(as they) have no place in today's India,” the May 9 affidavit of the UOI said. The tool of ‘sedition’ was used by the British government in trials against Mahatma Gandhi (1922) and Lokmanya Tilak (1897, 1909 and 1916). Their steadfast stand in these trials gave fillip to our freedom struggle. However, gross misuse of the sedition tool in independent India has proved indecent. In 1962 the five-judge bench of the SCI refused to see if the compulsions of the British rulers were applicable to the rulers of free India. “We may add that provisions of the impugned sections, impose restrictions on the fundamental freedom of speech and expression, but those restrictions cannot but be said to be in the interest of public order and within the ambit of permissible legislative interference”, the 1962 SCI judgement said. Not in Tune with Social Milieu The successive governments at the center and the states have widely invoked this criminal law tool to keep at bay all kinds of critics and opponents. The figures presented by the lawyers have riled the conscience of the SCI. Out of 800 sedition cases filed across India, 326 cases were registered between 2014-2019, only 6 have been convicted and 13,000 people are reported to be in jail. These excesses have forced both the UOI and the SCI to review the sedition law. “It is clear that the Union of India agrees with the prima facie opinion expressed by this Court that the rigors of Section 124A of IPC is not in tune with the current social milieu, and was intended for a time when this country was under the colonial regime”, the SCI order said. It is indeed significant that after consistent opposition by the counsels for the UOI for review of the 1962 judgement, the U-turn seems well calibrated. The UOI affidavit has explicitly placed on record views of the Indian Prime Minister. It’s a rarity in the legal history. It seems to have melted the anguish of the SCI judges and obviated the potential striking down of the ‘sedition’ provision. Is it a big surprise that changed times have placed section 124 A itself on trial? What the top law officers of the UOI could not read, the political minds have done. It speaks volumes that UOI affidavit had to take shelter under the persona of the Prime Minister to ward off potential SCI sledgehammer. The UOI affidavit has said it all. This dramatic turn has changed the dynamics, gave a leeway to the SCI and saved the face for the UOI. In this saga, the phrase “section 124A of IPC is not in tune with the current social milieu” sounds loud and clear. Global Trends in Sedition Law At the global level, the human rights renaissance has swept the peoples and nations. Under the hawk-eyes of the United Nations Human Rights Council, all the UN member countries provide their performance cards. Through the growing mosaic of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) and the instrumentality of special rapporteurs and experts, countries laboriously seek to come clear on how they treat their own people. Several democratic countries such as the UK and Australia have abolished their sedition laws though some have retained ‘treason’. In abolishing the offence of ‘sedition’ in 2009, the UK government kept in view how the former colonies justified their laws: "Sedition and seditious and defamatory libel are arcane offences – from a bygone era when freedom of expression wasn't seen as the right it is today... the existence of these obsolete offences in this country had been used by other countries as justification for retention of similar laws which have been actively used to suppress political dissent and restrict freedom." In Australia, the sedition law remained defunct for half a century. It surfaced when the Howard government introduced Anti-Terror Act (2005). However, under public pressure, it had to provide defense for acts in ‘good faith in Schedule 7 (Sedition) especially for the reporting of news and matters of public interest The First Amendment to the US Constitution provides emphatic guarantees against any “abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press”. It was enacted as the Bill of Rights (1791) to that forbids the Congress to infringe upon the freedoms concerning religion, expression, assembly and the right to petition. Still, in 1798 US Congress enacted “An act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States”. With its expiry, another act in 1918 came during the first World War. However, it was repealed in 1921. In a landmark ruling in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964), the US Supreme Court upheld the freedom of speech guaranteed under the First Amendment. It used the threshold of "actual malice" i.e. “made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of whether it was true or false”. Thus, the SCI’s May 11 order is a great balancing act that concedes space to the democratically elected government to pursue the legislative pathway. However, the halo of legitimacy earned by the PM in the ‘repeal’ of the colonial laws has been placed at the altar to thwart judicial inroads. Who will now bell the proverbial cat of section 124 A? Time will provide the answer. #SeditionLaw #India #US #UK Originally published: The Tribune, May 16, 2022. At: https://epaper.tribuneindia.com/c/68053541 Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Prof. Bharat H. Desai is Jawaharlal Nehru Chair and Professor of International Law at the Centre for International Legal Studies of SIS, JNU. He coordinated the Making SIS Visible initiative during 2008-2013 (Making SIS Visible | Welcome to Jawaharlal Nehru University (jnu.ac.in) as well as Inter-University Consortium (Partner Universities: JNU, Jammu, Kashmir and Sikkim) during 2012-2020 (www.iucccc.in/Contact us.htm).

By Pratik Mall The tragic saga in Ukraine is also clear evidence of the USA's fundamentally faulty policy towards Russia and the lack of consensus in Europe over Russia. Ukraine's conflict has snowballed into a full-scale crisis with grave consequences for the world order, great power contestation and, more importantly, world peace and stability. Dubbed the grimmest crisis since the 1990's when the cold war ended, the crisis has severe consequences for humanity. It has brought into focus the critical questions of international relations such as notions of security, the balance of power politics, revanchism of Russia and misplaced priorities of the USA and West in the post cold war world order. The genesis of the crisis can be traced back to the politics of the post-cold war period and especially the revanchist and irredentist behaviour of Russia in the wake of radically altered post-pandemic global order. The ascendancy of Putin and the feeling of being betrayed on the promises made to a militarily weak and economically tamed Russia has given a rational and eminently logical basis to Russian actions in Ukraine. The idea of controlling eastern Europe and keeping it under Moscow's orbit and the rivalries with the West over NATO expansion since the end of the cold war has got amplified in the current crisis. In the theoretical framework, one could understand the salience of the contemporary theatre through Mackinder's heartland theory, wherein he pointed out that the country controlling Eastern Europe would rule the world. The idea was mooted in 1904 when the area in question was a part of the Russian empire. Later on, the region witnessed a significantly heated contestation throughout the Cold War. The differing notions of Russia and the West's security have contributed significantly to the crisis. On the one hand, the USA didn't disband NATO and instead justified its existence and even carried out two distinct rounds of its expansion, thereby increasing the suspicion of Russia about its covert and, over some time, its overt ambitions. Russia, which believed in indivisible security, opposed the idea of NATO as a collective defence. First mooted at the Helsinki agreement of 1975 and later on reaffirmed in the 1990 Charter of Paris for A New Europe, 1997 NATO- Russia agreement, and at the Istanbul and Astana summit of OSCE, the idea talked of not enhancing one's security in a manner as to jeopardize the security of others. Therefore, it emphasized the security of Russia and its neighbours as one. Putin's Russia viewed the NATO expansion as a blatant violation of this guarantee. The dissatisfaction was quite apparent if one looks at Putin's 2007 Munich security dialogue speech, where he warned the West not to overstep. The sense of hostilities since then has only increased. The 2008 annexation of Georgia and 2014 annexation of Crimea, and now the 2022 invasion of Ukraine to ultimately integrate the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk into the Donbas region is a clear manifestation of the dissatisfaction. In addition to Putin's perceived sense of injustice, the memories of humiliation that Russia faced after the collapse further cemented his resolve to make Russia a global great power again and restore the old glory. It was very much reflected in Putin's speech that he recently gave about the history of Ukraine. This very idea of Russia securing its rightful place among the comity of nations further emboldened Putin's irredentist and revanchist tendencies. The tragic saga in Ukraine is also clear evidence of the USA's fundamentally faulty policy towards Russia and the lack of consensus in Europe over Russia. A close look at the level of economic engagement between Russia and Germany, and France in the oil and gas sectors, among many other industries, brings to the surface the contradictions in the EU. Many realist scholars like John Mearsheimer and the likes such as Henry Kissinger and Stephen Walt have pointed out the misplaced priorities of USA foreign policy. According to Mearsheimer, the USA is militarily and actively engaged in a region that is not even its core and vital national security interest. Whereas if we look from a Russian perspective, the region forms an integral part of its vital and core strategic and national security interest. Howsoever biting it may be, the economic sanctions could not stop Russia from doing what it intends to do. Therefore, realistically speaking, the need for the hour is to focus on the real and serious existential threat, i.e. China. The Biden administration must start to believe in the balance of power politics. Rather than further alienating Russia and pushing it into the Chinese lap, it must try to work out peace with Russia and, if possible, take it on its side to contain china. A few give and takes with Russia for a larger purpose are justified in the case of the severe Chinese threat. Neutralizing Ukraine and establishing it as an ideal buffer zone remains the most pragmatic solution from a realist viewpoint. It will make eminent sense if one starts to look at the Chinese challenge from Mahanian wisdom, which talked about the nation controlling the sea and ultimately controlling the world. #EU #NATO #USA #Russia #Ukraine Pratik Mall is an M.A. PISM (First Year), Batch 2021-2023 student of School of International Studies, JNU. Email ID: pratikmall.h@gmail.com

By Prof. Swaran Singh While the US is preoccupied with Ukraine and China, ASEAN has other concerns, including prodigal member Myanmar The United States seems determined to dismiss growing suspicions that its preoccupation with the Ukraine crisis has allowed China a freer hand across the Indo-Pacific region. The backdrop of the prolonged Covid-19 pandemic – where, unlike the US and its allies, China has managed to contain its health and economic consequences – has only reinforced such scary pontifications. It is against this backdrop that finally May 12-13 will see US President Joe Biden hosting a special in-person summit with the ASEAN leaders in Washington. This summit, to commemorate the 45 years of US-ASEAN relations, was originally planned for the end of March but was delayed because of scheduling problems claimed by some of the ASEAN leaders. The originally scheduling had been meant as a follow-up to the release of Biden’s Indo-Pacific Strategy in February that reiterated the centrality of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in the region. But now, this special summit is coinciding with the Biden administration’s much-awaited China Policy outline and will be followed, later this month, by Biden’s visits South Korea and Japan. Among his engagements during his Asia tour, Biden will be joining the Quad leaders’ summit. China-centricity This changed backdrop of the US-ASEAN summit clearly sharpens the focus on the China-centricity of US engagement with the Southeast Asian bloc. Indeed, Biden’s efforts at uniting America’s Asian allies in knitting together his larger Indo-Pacific narratives by offering economic alternatives to China’s Belt and Road Initiative have continued to betray the China-centricity of multifaceted US engagements. It has aways been tricky for the United States to avoid publicizing the China fixation of its Indo-Pacific discourses, and ASEAN perhaps presents the most apt example. ASEAN, which was originally created to contain the spread of communism, has since come to be a close economic partner, if not friend, of China. Last November, President Xi Jinping, marking the 30th anniversary of China-ASEAN relations, even endorsed ASEAN centrality as well as the ASEAN Outlook for the Indo-Pacific region. ASEAN’s most vehement supporter of China in recent times, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, is be about to be replaced by Ferdinand Marcos Jr, who swept the recent election and is due to be sworn in as president of the Philippines on June 30. However, the outgoing president’s daughter Sara Duterte will be the new vice-president, and is expected to continue Rodrigo Duterte’s legacies for the next six years. According to some experts, in spite of the late dictator Ferdinand Marcos Sr having once had a strong security partnership with the United States, his son is more likely to continue Duterte’s policies by “engaging China while keeping the United States close by.” Others believe that Marcos Jr may actually push relations closer to China, increasing the growing awkwardness in US-ASEAN relations. But as the Philippines will reportedly not be represented at the Washington summit, this issue will likely remain murky for now. ASEAN centrality To play it safe, the US interlocutors are expected to parrot the “ASEAN centrality” mantra. This has come to be one most agreed formulas that could keep the US closer to its Asian allies, as well as European allies interested in the Indo-Pacific region. This also explains why the recent press release on the subject from ASEAN chair Cambodia also alludes to the expectation that the US would continue to uphold ASEAN centrality as a key to fostering larger regional peace and stability. The press release also underlines how this week’s event will be the second special US-ASEAN summit since 2016 and the first in-person US presidential engagement for ASEAN leaders since 2017, alluding perhaps to Washington’s relative neglect of the bloc during the Donald Trump era. No doubt Biden has gradually distanced himself from his predecessor’s narrowly focused, confrontationist, China-centric approach to the Indo-Pacific region, yet what worries ASEAN is that Washington has failed so far to go beyond its China-centric focus. Creation of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and the AUKUS (Australia, United Kingdom, United States) security mechanism have only reinforced such concerns regarding likely marginalization of ASEAN. With Secretary of State Antony Blinken testing positive for Covid-19, his planned May 5 George Washington University speech to outline US-China policy was postponed and may end up happening very close to the US-ASEAN summit. Until then, Blinken’s speech of March 2021 continues to be the blueprint of Biden’s China policy; that is, to be “competitive when it should be, collaborative when it can be, and adversarial when it must be.” At its face value, this may align well with the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, yet the US increasingly feels the need to wean ASEAN away from getting attracted to China-centric multilateralism in the region. Way back in 2009, China had become ASEAN’s largest trading partner, in 2020 ASEAN became China’s largest trading partner. This says a lot about their changing equations. The ASEAN-China Maritime Exercise 2021 plus the expected conclusion of a China-ASEAN Code of Conduct for the disputed South China Sea before the end of 2022 has surely ignited anxieties among US interlocutors. And now Xi Jinping’s Global Security Initiative (GSI) that warns Asian nations of “hegemonism, power politics and confrontations” that alludes to US initiatives like Quad and AUKUS making ASEAN concerned about this increasing brinkmanship between the US and China. Xi’s call for “Asian unity” in the GSI has to be seen in the context of the continuing Ukraine crisis that has further sharpened the divide between the US and China, where ASEAN fears being sidelined. This may see interlocutors at the US-ASEAN Summit pulling and pushing in different directions. Ukraine vs Myanmar For instance, while ensuring ASEAN support on Ukraine would be the expected priority for the US interlocutors, ensuring greater US engagement on resolving continuing tensions in Myanmar would be ASEAN’s priority in this summit. While most nations around the world have put the onus of resolving the Myanmar problem on ASEAN, the bloc has become increasingly ineffective in making of this member state comply with even a minimum of basic international norms. Other than broad issues deliberating on principles and broad praxis for addressing various international challenges, Ukraine and Myanmar therefore are likely to become issues of contention, even competitive in seeking greater traction. It is interesting to see that other than Singapore, the nine other ASEAN members have so far remained cautious in supporting the pet American project of slapping severe sanctions on Russia. The short two-paragraph statement issued by the ASEAN foreign ministers’ meet in March expressed their being “deeply troubled” by “worsening humanitarian conditions resulting from ongoing military hostilities in Ukraine” and called for an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine, but without naming Russia or calling it an invasion. For ASEAN, Myanmar remains their strongest aberration. The prime minister of Cambodia, the ASEAN Chair for 2022, Hun Sen, traveled to Myanmar in January to explore ways to untie knots in the Five Point Consensus signed in April last year. At a summit in Jakarta on April 24, 2021, General Min Aung Hlaing agreed to end the violence in Myanmar immediately, start dialogue with elected leaders, and accept humanitarian assistance and appointment of a special envoy for visits to Myanmar and meetings with all parties. This has since failed, primarily because of Min Aung Hlaing going back on his commitments to ASEAN and continuing to incarcerate Aung San Suu Kyi, her party leaders and her supporters. On May 1, Hun Sen again called on the junta leader, asking him to allow a second visit by the ASEAN Chair’s special envoy to meet with deposed national leader Suu Kyi, but to no avail so far. But the dilemma is that ASEAN may be seeking solutions to Myanmar while its military leader, Min Aung Hlaing, has not been invited to the summit. How the US, the strongest votary of protecting democracy, will manage to restore ASEAN confidence in its commitment will be an uphill task at this week’s meeting. #US #ASEAN #Ukraine #China #Myanmar Originally published: Asia Times, May 12, 2022 At: https://asiatimes.com/2022/05/us-asean-need-to-restore-mutual-trust-at-summit/ Posted here with the authorization of the author. Prof. Swaran Singh is Professor of Diplomacy and Disarmament at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi; President of Association of Asia Scholars (asiascholars.in); Adjunct Senior Fellow at The Charhar Institute, Beijing; Senior Fellow, Institute for National Security Studies Sri Lanka, Colombo; and Visiting Professor, Research Institute for Indian Ocean Economies, Kunming (China).

By Dr. Sheetal Sharma With vacillating opinion in favour of war to suppression of opposition of war, the world will start seeing the Ukranian aggression more as a humanitarian crisis sooner than later and will coalesce against Russia as a threat to world peace and global order in the long run. The current situation on eastern border of Europe is grim and involves many actors and factors in its making. Depending on what position and/or perspective an individual holds, one can call it war, aggression, invasion or attack, but in sum total the ground situation remains grave. On April 2, 2019, Evelyn Farkas, senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, delivered a testimony in front of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, on the future challenges and opportunities for NATO ahead of the alliance’s 70th anniversary. Farkas was deliberating upon the challenges, threats and opportunities facing NATO within the context of its Open Door policy, and he opened up by saying that ‘our international system, NATO, and democracy in America and around the world have never been in graver danger since the Cold War than they are today’. The transatlantic organisation faced challenges from both the sides of the Atlantic. In the EU there was a division of opinion between the federalist who advocated for a fully integrated defence under an EU framework and the (pro) Atlantist who relied and considered NATO as central pillar for European defence initiatives; and yet another group calling for more intergovernmental approach setting aside collective structures in favour of ad hoc coalitions in the region between stakeholder countries. NATO was perceived as adhering to the conventional style of response even when others and Russia particularly, was posing grave challenges using unconventional threats to NATO and its allies in the form of cyber-attacks, chemical-grade weapons, election meddling, misinformation, disinformation, and exhibition of military might in Baltics region and what not. In sum, NATO was increasingly seen as sluggish and sticking to a routine approach of operations involving planning, command structure, troop deployment and, often, long negotiations. However Russian aggression has created conditions for NATO to reinfuse life in the collective. Some of the obvious indicators are that Sweden and Finland are considering accession to NATO. While delivering a speech to the EU parliament in Strasbourg, the French President Emmanuel Macron said that “it will take decades for Ukraine to be accepted into the European Union (EU)”. Macron suggested that “Ukraine could join a parallel European community as it awaits the EU’s decision on its membership. If Ukraine decided to join the parallel European community then the community could also host non-EU members who could be part of Europe’s security architecture”. Macron further added that the “new organisation would allow democratic European nations to “find a new space of political cooperation” in the areas of security, energy, transport, infrastructure investment and freedom of movement. Such statements are proof of consolidation of the EU on various parallel lines and aspects. The support that Ukraine is receiving from the western club has helped Ukraine stay in the defence of aggression for more than two months now. The attack has also put the scepticism regarding the European integration on back burner. Suddenly Europe seems to be more united, at least temporarily in the wake of the Russian threat. The European countries find themselves more close and safe in the European security umbrella and ambit as compared to a situation where they struggle alone and becoming vulnerable to Russian threat. In fact the Russian intervention in Ukraine has resulted in conditions that were faintly existing or were under stress at the beginning of 2022. The threat of Russia has resulted in seemingly greater integration of the EU. The shocks of post Brexit restructuring, looming threats of other exits, political crisis and economic stress, the chasm between the eastern and western Europe, etc. for a while have given way to greater faith in collective existence rather than fissiparous tendencies. Germany, despite being slightly reluctant initially in imposition of sanctions against Russia finally reflected the EU’s sentiment in opposing the war and clear disassociation. Further, after more than 7 decades Germans are mulling for remilitarisation in case of any security threat. In the light of the energy crisis that the European countries are and may have to face, there can be some differences of opinion on Russia (such as Hungary demanded full exemption from Russia oil import ban, as it will place an unfair burden on countries that import crude oil from Russia. Slovakia, Czech Republic and Bulgaria too are resisting the oil import ban) but all of these countries largely converge on anti-aggression stand. In more than two months it is evident that the skirmish has reached an impasse with both sides claiming victory and reclaiming areas under siege from each other. Which countries support Russia and why they support military action and intervention in Ukraine are well known to the world, but beyond a point Russian aggression cannot be an answer to the perceived threat of NATO’s presence at its doorstep. Russia acted out of proportion on a (perceived) threat of NATO coming to its doorstep, but it has itself created conditions for NATO to come and camp in its neighbourhood. The complete capture of Ukraine will make Poland as its neighbour. As and when Sweden and Finland joins NATO, which shares 810 mile long border with Russia, NATO will be its next door neighbour. The more the war drags, with every passing day Russia may or may not accept that it is losing militarily, but in the medium to long run it will suffer economically, and also on many other indexes of humanitarian concerns. Driven by western sanction and facing grave economic situations, four regional governors, from Tomsk, Saratov, Kirov and Mari El regions, resigned from their offices. With vacillating opinion in favour of war to suppression of opposition of war, the world will start seeing the Ukranian aggression more as a humanitarian crisis sooner than later and will coalesce against Russia as a threat to world peace and global order in the long run. The global community in general has to envisage ways to bring the intervention to an end. Compromises and negotiations have to be done from both the sides. Both from a near and/or a distant perspective it is not a win-lose situation, it is a lose-lose for all the actors involved. #EU #NATO #Russia #Ukraine Dr. Sheetal Sharma is Assistant Professor, Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, JNU.

By Prof. Swaran Singh The Taliban of 2022 have showcased themselves as being no different from the Taliban of 1996-2001 This week saw the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (read Taliban) ban the issuing of driver’s licenses to its female citizens. Before that, in March, the regime prohibited girls from attending secondary schools. And the list of Taliban regression from their promises on gender equality go on and on. Media continue to report on the Taliban’s ban on women from most paid employment, preventing their free movement, shutting down the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, and silencing female journalists. So when it comes to gender equality, the Taliban of 2022 have increasingly showcased themselves as being no different from the Taliban of 1996-2001. Indeed, the last nine months of Taliban rule have witnessed irreversible rollbacks on what the Western powers flaunt as their groundbreaking achievements on gender equality in Afghanistan over the two decades of their presence in that country. But now, the Taliban are unstoppable in spite of all the Western censure and sanctions-driven denial and deprivations inflicted on their leadership. Especially for the last two months, while the world has been busy with the Ukraine crisis, continued suffering of Afghans has been pushed to the periphery, raising serious questions on Western post-exit strategies to redress this catastrophe. Islamic disunity Indeed, it is not only Western nations that claim surprise at the Taliban turning their back on the promises they made on their way to capturing power. Their harsh anti-women measures are equally at variance from much of the Islamic world. However, in spite of their celebrated “Muslim brotherhood” doctrine, even the Islamic world has remained just a silent spectator. Among the Taliban’s time-tested funders and mentors, Saudi Arabia had described the Taliban’s takeover last August as a “step in the right direction,” but maintains a rather muted response in terms of sending humanitarian assistance and working through regional stakeholders like Pakistan and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). During the Taliban’s last stint in power from 1996 to 2001, Saudi Arabia was one the three countries formally to recognize the Taliban government in Afghanistan, the other two being the United Arab Emirates and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. But this time around, none of those three nations have yet recognized the Taliban regime; nor has any another other sovereign nation recognized Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Indeed, during the last few years of Prince Mohammed bin Salman emerging as its de facto ruler, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia – one of the most powerful but also most conservative among Islamic nations – has witnessed a monumental shift in policies allowing its citizens free access to modern technologies, entertainment and leisure, including allowing women to drive and have freedom of movement. But given their close relations with the United States, which was forced to exit Afghanistan by the Taliban, both the UAE and Saudi Arabia have “curiously maintained a distance” from the Taliban regime. Meanwhile, among the other multiple impacts of the ongoing Ukraine crisis, it has clearly pushed global spotlights away from Afghanistan while leaving hapless masses to their destiny. In some ways, Ukraine provides an alibi for both the West – which controlled Afghanistan for the last two decades – and much of the Muslim world – which prides itself on a Muslim brotherhood doctrine – to acquit themselves of what is happening to Afghan people, especially women and children. Western alibis Most of the Western powers that controlled Afghanistan and supported the governments of Hamid Karzai and and Ashraf Ghani have stopped bothering even about the loyal members of their former local support staff. Large numbers of those Afghans were promised evacuation by their Western employers. They have since become easy prey for the Taliban’s intolerance often expressed against former local officials and staff of foreign missions, such as former security guards and military interpreters. Meanwhile, most Afghan embassies around the world have also become dysfunctional for lack of funds, thus destroying an entire diplomatic service built up over the last two decades. This also means a breakdown of the Taliban’s connections with those nations and leaving Afghan nationals living in those countries without any consular services. Having lost Afghanistan to the Taliban, Western nations have also kind of pushed the onus on to its neighboring countries that are bound to be immediate targets of any Afghan instability. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan claims to have 45 embassies and 20 consulates, mostly in Asia and Europe, functioning under Taliban command or in alignment with them. In fact four important neighboring nations – China, Pakistan, Russia and Turkmenistan – recently accredited Taliban-appointed diplomats, even though they have not formally recognized the regime itself. In the midst of the Ukraine crisis, Russia has handed over the Afghan Embassy to Taliban-appointed Jamal Garwal as their new chargé d’affaires in Moscow. Likewise, on November 30, 2021, the Saudi Embassy in Kabul resumed its work, and this “profound step” was amply welcomed by the provisional government of Taliban. But all this has not brought much relief to the Afghan masses. Situation on the ground grim Recently released reports raise questions about inefficient and incomplete distribution of foreign aid as well as how sanctions continue creating difficulties for donors attempting to deliver on their promises. They also raise questions on whether the international community has failed to use its assistance leverage to obtain good behavior from the Taliban leadership. As studies have shown, in any conflict situation, women are not only the last to access aid but are the most vulnerable to discriminations and violence. The same is true of continued violence in Afghanistan. In spite of the Taliban’s claims of having eliminated the presence of Islamic State (ISIS), bombings have continued across Afghanistan, hitting innocent civilians including schools. Even the OIC, which has given two hearings to the Taliban in Islamabad and created a special relief fund for them, has expressed only muted concerns about continued bombings inside Afghanistan, expecting the Taliban to “take a resolute stand against whoever sponsors or orchestras them.” Though there is little doubt that the Taliban leadership had projected strong central command and control in their removal of foreign forces and continue to be in command of the nation-state of Afghanistan, reports of their being internally at loggerheads with one another have become alarming. Even their strongest benefactor, Pakistan, has been warning the Taliban of surgical strikes inside Afghanistan to destroy so-called sanctuaries provide to cadres of Tehreeke-e-Taliban Pakistan and other Baloch militants’ hideouts. For women in Afghanistan, no relief seems to be yet in sight, unless and until the end of the Ukraine crisis may redirect global spotlights to their plight. #Ukraine #Afghanistan #Taliban Originally published: Asia Times, May 6, 2022. At: https://asiatimes.com/2022/05/focus-on-ukraine-has-pushed-afghans-plight-to-periphery/ Posted here with the permission of the author. Prof. Swaran Singh is Professor of Diplomacy and Disarmament at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi; President of Association of Asia Scholars (asiascholars.in); Adjunct Senior Fellow at The Charhar Institute, Beijing; Senior Fellow, Institute for National Security Studies Sri Lanka, Colombo; and Visiting Professor, Research Institute for Indian Ocean Economies, Kunming (China).

By Prof. Bharat H. Desai On 6 April 2022 the Permanent Representative of Pakistan (PRP), Munir Akram, sent a letter to the President of the UN Security Council (UNSC). It carried, as an annex, a resolution (No. 8/48-POL) and a joint communiqué adopted on “the Jammu and Kashmir dispute” at the 48th Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) held in Islamabad on 22 and 23 March 2022. Annex I carried a detailed five-page preface with 43 paragraphs whereas annex II also contains 5 pages. Pakistan has successively used the OIC platform for its own purposes. However, the last item in the 60 paragraphs of the preamble to the said resolution contains a blatant lie. It states: “repeated consideration of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute by the UN Security Council”. It is factually incorrect and legally untenable in view of the fact that the UNSC has never dealt with any agenda item under this rubric. In fact, the UNSC has not dealt with any issue concerning either the India-Pakistan Question (IPQ) or the situation in the subcontinent after the UNSC resolution 307 of 21 December 1971. Even as the bilateral relations with India are at the nadir, Pakistan’s ranting and use of the OIC and other forums are in sharp contrast to its obligation arising from the Shimla Agreement (02 July 1972) to settle “any differences” through “bilateral negotiations”. Pakistani Filibuster Pakistan has been routinely sending communications to the UNSC. On the first day of January 2022, the PRP sent a letter to the UNSC President (S/2022/1 of 04 January 2022) to seek the three “items retained” (India-Pakistan question; the Hyderabad question and the situation in the India/Pakistan subcontinent) on the list of “seized” issues of the UNSC. It follows two similar Pakistani letters of 2 December (S/2021/1004) and 27 October 2021 (S/2021/ 901). Pakistan’s penchant for conducting diplomacy-through-letters can be seen from a flurry of letters sent in 2021 (5), 2020 (6) and 2019 (7). They harp on the proverbial “IPQ” widely construed as a ‘dead horse’ in the UN circles. Ostensibly, Pakistani moves – during the India’s current UNSC membership for 2021-2022 serve the purposes of being a ‘persistent objector’ and seek to cloud India’s moral high ground in the UN system. In a communication with the author, Ambassador Tirumurti, the Indian PR, has underscored the Indian position that “all outstanding issues with Pakistan are discussed only bilaterally”. As a corollary, the Shimla Agreement (1972) and the Lahore Declaration (1999) provide the basis for bilateral resolution of all issues between India and Pakistan. The latest summary statement of the UNSG (S/2022/10/Add.14 of 4 April 2022) contains three matters of which the UNSC is ‘seized’ and of the stage reached in their consideration: (i) The Hyderabad question (16 September 1948; 24 May 1949) (ii) The India-Pakistan question (6 January 1948; 5 November 1965) and (iii) The situation in the India/Pakistan subcontinent (4 December 1971; 27 December 1971). The status speaks volumes about the first time the matter was taken up by the UNSC as well as the last time each of the item was addressed by it: 73, 57 and 51 years ago, respectively. Finality of Accession The Pakistani desperation to harp on retaining these ‘dead’ issues on the UNSC’s ‘seized’ item lists appears to be in ‘bad faith’ and at best aimed at ‘needling’ India. As compared to the Pakistani stridency to harp on the J&K, India does not make a big pitch to reclaim the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK) from Pakistan’s ‘belligerent occupation’. It arose from forcible occupation of a sizeable part of the princely State of J&K by the raiders, sent with support of the new state of Pakistan when Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession to join India on 26 October 1947 (Bharat H. Desai, " 'Surgical Strikes by India: Taking International Law Seriously", EPW, 52 (5), 2017; Commentary_4Feb2017.indd (epw.in)). The Indian title to the entire territory of erstwhile princely state of J&K provides de facto and de jure legal basis to reclaim the POK. Since the UNSC, after the last resolution 307 (1971), has remained silent on the IPQ issue underscores that the subsequent developments have overtaken the legal dynamics of the original issue. It came out vividly after the Indian action on 5 August 2019 to settle the remaining issues of State of J&K’s relationship as a constituent unit of India. Thus, in spite of Pakistan’s hue and cry and strident moves to push the UNSC to “take stock of an issue”, not addressed “in several decades”, the Council chose to organize a closed-door meeting and did not issue even any formal statement. In international legal parlance and consistent UN practice, for all practical purposes, the SC has ended any consideration of the IPQ ‘seized’ item. Need for an Effective Indian Response In view of the above, the Pakistani quest for retention of the three items on the UNSC ‘seized’ matters have outlived their utility. This author has earlier called for taking up the deletion of these seized items on a priority basis in The Tribune (9 August 2021). India needs to invoke its best diplomatic, political and international law tools for final closure of this past baggage. The items not considered by the Council during the preceding three calendar years are subject to deletion unless a Member State notifies the President that the item be retained on the list for an additional year. Still the Council can decide otherwise as per the Provisional Rules of Procedure. So, it would make a sense to set in motion a targeted process to get the IPQ and other two items deleted from the UNSC agenda possibly before the end of India’s current UNSC term on 31 December 2022. The issue necessitates legal and political decision at the Prime Minister level who, in turn, could entrust the task to the External Affairs Minister (EAM). EAM, an alumnus of SIS/JNU, need to marshal his diplomatic experience to finally nail the ghost of the IPQ from the UNSC’s ‘seized’ list. EAM could take over the reins in place of the PMI to personally lead the consultations in the matter with dramatis personae in New York as well as in the capitals of the UNSC member states. The current geo-political situation and the stand-off over the Ukraine crisis, makes India relevant and provides some basis to address this issue seriously. #India #Pakistan #UNSC Prof. Bharat H. Desai is Jawaharlal Nehru Chair and Professor of International Law at the Centre for International Legal Studies of SIS, JNU. He coordinated the Making SIS Visible initiative during 2008-2013 (Making SIS Visible | Welcome to Jawaharlal Nehru University (jnu.ac.in).