Search

By Prof. Swaran Singh and Prof. Yves Tiberghien, UBC There is plenty of blame to go around for the apparent fourth Taiwan Straits crisis of August 2022. Intensely partisan US politics have taken the liberal international order for a dangerous ride. Increasingly nationalistic politics in China have produced assertive foreign policy behaviour and in the age of social media, emotions across the Pacific are boiling over. The delicate diplomatic compromise of constructive ambiguity over Taiwan’s status initiated by former US national security advisor Henry Kissinger and Chinese premier Zhou Enlai in 1972 is fraying beyond repair. We are witnessing a ratcheting up of the struggle between ideational commitments to the rival principles of democracy and national sovereignty. The compromise around a general ‘One China’ policy, coupled with the deterrence inscribed by the 1979 US Taiwan Relations Act and other reassurances which were last reinforced in 1998, have been the foundation of diplomatic relations between China and Western nations. Should this delicate equilibrium break, the global order will be undermined, resulting in heightened tensions to the point of possible conflict. The region is rattled in the wake of US House of Representatives Speaker, Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan and China’s response in the form of massive military exercises and diplomatic bluster. The Chinese navy and air force have entered Taiwan’s territorial waters for the first time. Missiles have landed near the island and in Japan’s exclusive economic zone. China has also severed most diplomatic channels with the United States and walked out of the ASEAN summit, not once but twice. India expressed its concern with a loud silence, Southeast Asia with an urgent call for tension de-escalation and South Korea with the surprising snub of Pelosi during her visit to Seoul. Japan joined the G7 communique supporting Pelosi’s visit and condemned China’s dangerous military response. This enraged China and caused the last-minute cancellation of a planned meeting between China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Japan’s Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi. It is worrisome that the world’s two economic and military superpowers keep escalating their tit-for-tat interactions without a visible endpoint or any institutionalised guardrails. The current fulcrum of domestic politics in each country appears to reward a bottom-line mentality, normative grand standing and mutual discounting. Such a high-risk situation is a flashback to the politics of summer 1914 or the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. The domestic mood in each country discounts the misery that one wrong move could create, especially for the people of Taiwan. There is no incentive to pursue stabilisation through restraint or accommodation or willingness to show any appearance of weakness. Pelosi’s Asia tour was totally overshadowed by speculation about her Taiwan visit. Despite reassurances by the US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, that Washington’s commitment to the ‘One China’ policy remains unchanged, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi called the visit ‘manic, irresponsible and irrational’. As pre-warned by Chinese President Xi Jinping, China used the visit to undertake high-calibre live fire drills —effectively enforcing a four-day blockade of Taiwan and disrupting shipping and flights into Taipei. The visit was preceded by secrecy and press leaks. The initial statement issued by Pelosi’s office made no mention of Taiwan, stating that her ‘visits to Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea and Japan’ aimed to establish ‘mutual security, economic partnership and democratic governance in the Indo-Pacific region’. Amid growing media leaks from Taiwan, Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong reaffirmed ‘the importance of stable US–China relations for regional peace and stability’. For all the talk of a last-minute stop, Taiwan pulled off a carnival-like welcome with a livestream of her arrival and a massive greeting on the Taipei 101 building. Both supporters and protestors showed up in streets. At the Legislative Yuan, Pelosi delivered a strong expression of support for Taiwan’s fight for freedom and democracy. The shockwaves made by Pelosi’s Taiwan visit were felt during her stopover in Seoul. Sensing the mood in Beijing, South Korean President Yoon Suk-Yeol chose not to meet with her because he was reportedly on vacation, making him the only leader not to meet with Pelosi on her Asia tour. President Yoon made this move in spite of his pro-United States leanings, his near historic low approval ratings and Pelosi’s visit to the ‘truce village’ of Panmunjom in the Korean DMZ. No senior officials or legislators welcomed Pelosi upon her landing in Seoul. China was quick to reward South Korea by inviting Foreign Minister Park Jin to Beijing. The reverberations from Taipei were still palpable when she met with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and House Speaker Kiroyuki Hosoda. The meeting came soon after China’s missiles landed in Japan’s exclusive economic zone and Wang Yi’s meeting with Yoshimasa Hayashi was cancelled. In the end, this crisis has offered Nancy Pelosi the chance to establish her legacy of toughness on China and support for democracy ahead of the US mid-term elections. It has also given China an opportunity to test its growing military hardware in Taiwanese waters and demonstrate its commitment to sovereignty ahead of the Fall Party Congress. But the trip as could have been foretold has unleashed a new cycle of mistrust, nationalist escalation and an arms race in the Pacific. The United States and China must urgently establish more robust communication channels, updated arms control mechanisms and bring some stability and peace back to the Taiwan compromise. #China #Taiwan #US #NancyPelosi Originally published: East Asia Forum, August 8, 2022 https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/08/08/pelosis-visit-could-derail-us-china-compromise-over-taiwan/?fbclid=IwAR2nVAAO0Bg3IwyMbCO6a7rmALc6mAkgIGHSUreryEUCOF6Zaf5GJMQuy7g Posted here with the authorization of Prof. Swaran Singh. Swaran Singh is Professor in the School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and President of the Association of Asia Scholars. He is Visiting Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of British Columbia. Yves Tiberghien is Professor of Political Science and Director Emeritus of the Institute of Asian Research at the University of British Columbia. He is also a Distinguished Fellow at the Asia-Pacific Foundation of Canada.

By Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli Nancy Pelosi’s defiant, but unannounced, visit comes in the wake of China’s uncalled for, politically disastrous and military indefensible, escalation for the past few years Nancy Pelosi, the Speaker of the United States Representatives, called off China’s bluff on “playing with fire” by visiting Taiwan on 3 August, amidst the latter’s coercive diplomatic pressures. Nancy Pelosi’s defiant, but unannounced, visit comes in the wake of China’s uncalled for, politically disastrous and military indefensible, escalation for the past few years. Pelosi praised Taiwan’s bubbling democracy and called the beleaguered island a friend and defended it in her speeches during her whirlwind less than a day visit. Even though China threatened to retaliate to the visit, Pelosi continued her visit nonchalantly making China to blink first in this round. The political fallout of Pelosi’s visit on China’s domestic politics is higher than on Taiwan or the US. President Xi Jinping since his ascension in 2012 has been making caustic comments on Taiwan, with the 2017 19th Communist Party Congress stating that “We will never allow anyone, any organisation, or any political party, at any time or in any form, to separate any part of Chinese territory from China!” Further at the communist party’s centennial in July 2021, Xi even threatened to “break the heads” of those who interfere with Taiwan. As China now could not stop Pelosi’s visit, the 20th communist party congress this November, where Xi is seeking a third term, could become decisive. Naturally the upcoming Beidaihe meeting of high-level party leaders and elders could be stormy. The timing of Pelosi’s visit could not be worse for Xi. Rival political factional leaders like Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and others are up in arms with Xi for many reasons but the Taiwan fiasco could provide them with enough reasons to counter Xi. With massive restrictions due to “zero Covid” policies, several millions of Chinese are in partial or complete lockdown with hardships. The economic growth is declining due to these policies and due to the on-going tariff wars with the US. While Xi banked on nationalism and anti-corruption drive to protect himself so far, the escalation on Taiwan could prove to be costly. Also, Pelosi’s aircraft landed in Taiwan with the US Air Force flight escort, thus puncturing one of China’s original “three nos” — that Taiwan should not become independent, no foreign troops in Taiwan soil and no to Taiwan’s nuclear weapon programme. With such military aircraft landing in Taiwan, China’s inability to stop such landing not only exposed China’s weakness but also for possible defiance by other countries in future of such red lines by China. Pelosi was also signalling that China’s recent forays in Asia will be checkmated. In May 2014, addressing the summit meeting of Conference on Interactions in Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) at Shanghai, Xi Jinping suggested that “outside” powers should withdraw from Asia for the eventual imposition of Chinese hegemony. Since then, China’s aggressiveness on South China Sea islands disputes, over Senkaku islands with Japan and on land borders with India knew no bounds. Pelosi not only indirectly questioned China’s ability but also its credentials for the claims. In the aftermath of Pelosi’s visit, China had deployed naval and air forces in six maritime regions close to Taiwan as an intimidating tactic. There are also reports of Chinese cyber-attacks on Taiwan’s foreign ministry, banks and certain market stores, besides banning certain food products. With or with the US tacit support, Taiwan could weather off this challenge. For Taiwan, Pelosi’s visit could be a major turning point in its strategic direction, both at the domestic and external affairs. At the domestic political level, the majority “status quo” public opinion in the political spectrum could change towards an active assertion of Taiwan’s identity far away from China. More the Chinese coercion, more would be the critical responses of the Taiwanese in the near future. At the foreign policy level, the US ambiguous policies could change towards more clarity and purpose in defending Taiwan and its democratic system. Taiwan’s joining of the emerging Indo-Pacific could also be fructified in this milieu. Thus, “internationalisation” of Taiwan issue is likely to pick up pace, as 300,000 who watched Pelosi’s flight path in anticipation indicated. If Taiwan had to go through seven decades of uncertainty, Pelosi’s visit nudged this process for more clear outcomes in the near future. During the Russian invasion of Ukraine, many analysts suggested an imminent Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Pelosi’s visit not only questions this assumption by politically providing American support to Taiwan but provides Taiwan with an opportunity to explore friends and allies in the international system. This could also further intensify the ongoing New Southbound policy’s outreach soon. #China #Taiwan #US #NancyPelosi Originally published: News18, August 07, 2022. https://www.news18.com/news/opinion/nancy-pelosis-visit-to-taiwan-need-to-stand-up-to-china-and-call-its-bluff-5704915.html Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli is Professor in Chinese Studies and Dean of School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University.

By Prof. Swaran Singh ASEAN has too many serious issues at hand to address instead of being distracted by great-power politics Media focus has begun to shift from Taipei to Phnom Penh, which is hosting three days of multiple ASEAN-centric meetings involving in-person meetings of dozens of foreign ministers from all the major stakeholders of the Indo-Pacific region. Starting with the 55th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, these also include the ASEAN+3 Ministerial Meeting and the East Asia Summit Foreign Ministers Meeting, as well as individual dialogue partner nations’ meetings with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations – all culminating on Friday with the 29th Ministerial Meeting of the 27-member ASEAN Region Forum (ARF). In the midst of the four-month-old Ukraine crisis and more recently Nancy Pelosi’s Taiwan visit and the worsening of US relations with both Moscow and Beijing, dozens of bilateral meetings among middle powers in Phnom Penh are expected to bring up some interesting new prognoses. At the least, these are likely to reinforce the impact of ASEAN “centrality” as the key to stability and peace in the Indo-Pacific region, which is currently becoming vulnerable to contested equations among major powers resulting in increased volatility in the region. However, how enduring this unanimous refrain for ASEAN “centrality” in Phnom Penh will prove in building consensus remains to be seen. In fact, ASEAN cementing its equations among European and other emerging economies perhaps most aptly showcases this drift toward strengthening of middle powers’ synergies. For instance, these meetings in Phnom Penh also include celebrations of 45 years of EU-ASEAN partnership and hosting of the annual EU-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. Among others, that meeting is expected to adopt a Plan of Action for 2023-2027 and finalize details of a Commemorative Summit involving all 27 European Union members to be held in Brussels in December. Only last year the EU upgraded its Mission to ASEAN as a full-fledged EU Delegation and issued the “EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific” last September, both underlining the “centrality” of ASEAN. Indeed, ASEAN centrality has come to be the refrain that conjoins this region’s friends and foes alike and can be seen in various strategy reports issued by these countries. India this year is celebrating 30 years of dialogue partnership with ASEAN with a series of events including the foreign ministers’ meeting that was held in June and a summit meeting scheduled for October. India has also maintained that ASEAN-driven efforts in the Indo-Pacific region should focus on local issues and avoid getting distracted into great-power geopolitics. The initial reflection of this shift toward strengthening ASEAN centrality can be seen in regional issues gaining traction over major powers’ geopolitics. While each of these meetings in Phnom Penh will see participants pushing their own priorities, collectively these parleys are expected to seek ASEAN-driven consensus on specific issues, as was underlined during the preparatory Senior Officials Meeting last week, where they tried building consensus on challenges flowing from the Covid-19 pandemic, and situations in Myanmar, the Korean Peninsula and the South China Sea. Power politics persists In reality, however, all of these regional issues remain entangled with major powers’ contestations, making norm-building a rather difficult enterprise. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s visit to Myanmar, for instance, has made headlines emphasizing how he described the military junta as Russia’s “friendly and long-standing partner” underlining no change in Moscow’s Myanmar policy even as the military has used Russian Yak-130 aircraft in attacks on its civilian population. Reports about Pyongyang’s next nuclear test have also triggered scary scenarios in media. No doubt, the ARF has been the only forum in which North Korea has always participated since 2000. It was at the Bangkok ARF of that year that then-US secretary of state Madeleine Albright first met with North Korean representative Paek Nam Sun. That was the first such meeting since the Korean War of 1950-53 and was soon followed by her historic visit to Pyongyang. But even though ARF meetings in the past may have facilitated talks between the US and North Korea, there are no expectations this time of any such encounter in Phnom Penh leading to a revival of dialogue between the Kim Jong Un regime and US President Joe Biden’s administration. In any case, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken only last month met with China’s Wang Yi at the Group of Twenty Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Bali. Likewise, Blinken had this year’s first phone conversation with Lavrov only last week. The recent Biden-Xi Jinping online conversation likewise was no more than verbose posturing. Nevertheless, instead of focusing on ASEAN-driven outcomes, speculations continue to engage in juicy scenarios of a “potentially awkward encounter” that Lavrov or Wang Yi may have with Blinken and what could transpire in such meetings. This, in spite of the fact that Chinese experts already see “no need for Wang Yi to meet and talk with Blinken any more,” underlining the dangerous implications of Nancy Pelosi’s Taiwan visit. Even scheduled meetings between Blinken and host Prime Minister Hun Sen and his foreign minister are being read in the light of US security concerns about Cambodia’s gradual drift toward Beijing. Prioritizing Myanmar ASEAN has too many serious issues at hand to address instead of being distracted by great-power politics. To begin with, intensifying efforts to put a stop to escalating violence in Myanmar remains the most immediate priority for the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. After all, Myanmar has openly rebelled against accepting the ASEAN consensus, which has serious implications for the association’s credibility. In February last year, Myanmar’s military junta ousted the popularly elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi, and all the torchbearers of democracy have failed to stave off the visible drift toward a civil war. Already, the military junta’s heavy-handed policies have resulted in some 2,100 deaths, while 15,000 others have been imprisoned and tens of thousands have fled to neighboring countries. This must be a top priority for ASEAN and its friends and allies who have stakes in an ASEAN-led Indo-Pacific region. So far in dealings with Myanmar, all the efforts of ASEAN have failed to fructify. In April 2021, it asked the military leaders in Myanmar to stop sending representatives to ASEAN meetings until it has complied with the bloc’s Five-Point Consensus for Peace. ASEAN also appointed Cambodia’s Kung Phoak as the ASEAN Chair’s special envoy for Myanmar to ensure that the junta complied with benchmarks set by ASEAN. But the junta has shown little interest in complying and last week resumed judicial executions by hanging four political prisoners. It has retaliated by announcing its refusal to send representatives to ASEAN meetings and refused access to the ASEAN special envoy to Myanmar, creating a stalemate of a kind. Before addressing other equally urgent issues, this continued defiance by the Myanmar junta remains the weakest link for ASEAN reclaiming its centrality in the Indo-Pacific region. For other stakeholders as well, this remains the critical prerequisite for all ASEAN-led initiatives for regional stability and peace. #ASEAN #Cambodia #IndoPacific #ARF #Myanmar Originally published: Asia Times, August 4, 2022 https://asiatimes.com/2022/08/redeeming-asean-centrality-in-indo-pacific-region/?fbclid=IwAR3Bf4tLBqVybGtq5whNMvXkRooEHe5N0Y8VXrQn23FhdJy-kLNXAX9qJcs Posted here with the authorization of the author. Prof. Swaran Singh is visiting professor at the University of British Columbia and professor of diplomacy and disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He is president of the Association of Asia Scholars; adjunct senior fellow at the Charhar Institute, Beijing; senior fellow, Institute for National Security Studies Sri Lanka, Colombo; and visiting professor, Research Institute for Indian Ocean Economies, Kunming.

By Prof. Bharat H. Desai The troubling reality is that the abundance of our natural resources – gold, coltan, cobalt and other strategic minerals – is the root cause of war, extreme violence and abject poverty On 03 August 2022, the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres unveiled a new sculpture – Abused Ammunition – at the UN headquarters in New York to commemorate the sacrifice of the two human rights experts who were on a mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the second largest country on the African continent (after Algeria). Designed by the Swedish artist, Thommy Bremberg, Abused Ammunition is a glass sculpture of a golden bullet. It conveys a powerful message on the use and abuse of weapons of war that have become a curse for the DRC. Killing of the UN Experts on Mission The UN experts, Zaida Catalán (Sweden) and Michael Sharp (USA), on mission as the UNSC resolution 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee’s Group of Experts, were abducted on 12 March 2017 during their investigation of mass atrocities in the troubled Kasai region in the aftermath of brutal clash between armed militia and the Congolese government forces. The search by the UN peacekeepers found their bodies after two weeks. The Board of Inquiry set up by the UNSG noted in its report of 16 August 2017 that the “Congolese interpreter and the three motorcycle drivers [accompanying Catalán and Sharp] were also killed, but their bodies have not been found to date.” Reporting took place under the UNSC resolutions that gave mandate to the Group of Experts (2360 of 21 June. 2017) Group of Experts (2478 of 26 June 2019). These UNSC resolutions have been taken under ‘enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter after arriving at an explicit determination that the “situation in the DRC continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region”. The UNSC took a comprehensive review of the situation in the DRC vide resolution 2641 on 30 June 2022. This came in the wake of long line of the UNSC’s 33 extensive briefings and consultations, between 10 July 2017 to 30 June 2022. It speaks volumes about the deep-rooted malaise, gravity of the ground situation in the DRC and UN’s own engagement in the quagmire of the DRC. Secretary-General António Guterres (left) and Ann Christin Linde, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, attends the inaugural ceremony of the Abused Ammunition Sculpture on 03 August 2022 at the UNHQ in New York, NY. Tragedy of the DR Congo With 110 million population, being 11th largest country in the world and extremely rich natural resources, the DRC in the sub-Saharan Africa remains one of the poorest and most unstable. Variously known during different phases as the Belgian Congo, Congo-Kinshasha, the Congo, Zaire and the DR Congo (different from the Republic of Congo-Brazzaville), the prosperity in resources seems to have become such a curse that its helpless people are condemned to remain at 175 out of 189 countries listed in the ‘low’ Human Development Index. The crux of the appalling condition in the DRC was graphically narrated in spine-chilling address of the Congolese gynaecologist Denis Mukewege in his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech on 10 December 2018 at the Oslo City Hall. “The human cost of this perverted, organized chaos has been hundreds of thousands of women raped, over 4 million people displaced within the country and the loss of 6 million human lives. Imagine, the equivalent of the entire population of Denmark decimated. United Nations peacekeepers and experts have not been spared, either. Several of them have been killed on duty”, Denis Mukewege said. The power of the upfront talk by of Denis Mukwege, brought tears in the eyes of the elite Oslo audience: “I come from one of the richest countries on the planet. Yet the people of my country are among the poorest of the world. The troubling reality is that the abundance of our natural resources – gold, coltan, cobalt and other strategic minerals – is the root cause of war, extreme violence and abject poverty”. Three years down the line, the situation in DRC remains as explosive as narrated in the Nobel Prize acceptance speech. Upon attaining independence from Belgium on 30 June 1960, the DRC saw numerous twists and turns with leaders propped up by outside powers such as: Patrice Lumumba; Joseph Mobutu; Laurent Kabila; Joseph Kabila; Félix Tshisekedi. The cocktail of chaos, ethnic strife and civil wars have taken a deadly toll on the DRC. It is the complexity this crisis in DRC that has entangled the UN therein. In fact, it the DRC conflict that led the feisty UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, to personally go to check the ongoing negotiations of a cease-fire. His death in 18 September 1961 plane crash, on UN mission, remains mysterious. Predicament of the UN The abduction and killing of the two members of the UN Group of Experts is the latest flashpoint in the UN’s engagement in the DRC. On 04 August 2022, the head of UN Peacekeeping, Jean-Pierre Lacroix, following his following his 28-29 July visit to Kinshasa, briefed a closed-door session of the UNSC. It came a day after Congolese authorities expelled the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) spokesperson following some deadly protests in the eastern part. The UNSC resolutions 2641 (2022), 2612 (2021), 2582 (2021) and 2556 (2020) have sought a general and immediate cessation of hostilities and the UNSG’s 21 March 2022 report amply shows no signs of resolving the DRC’s complex tangle, the questions arise about this ‘bottomless-barrel’ situation. It poses grave risks for the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC that includes an Indian contingent. The gravity of the situation can be gauged from the fact that on 25-26 July 2022, anti-UN protestors looted and damaged UN facilities across North Kivu province. They were angered by the UN’s inability to curb violence by armed groups. Three UN peacekeepers (two from India and one from Morocco) were killed. The Road Ahead The UNSC resolution 2612 of 20 December 2021 explicitly asked the President Tshisekedi towards ensuring that the DRC Government protects and respects human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as combats impunity in all areas. It remains to be seen how the DRC national transitional justice (TJ) strategy leads towards truth and reconciliation while ensuring accountability for past crimes, reparation for victims and safeguards against the recurrence of gross human rights violations. The UNSC needs to make the DRC Government to comply with these commitments. The UNSC’s 04 August 2022 consultations were expected to address the crisis and explore a way out. Possibly, the UNSC shall have to soon follow the TJ model adopted for the Rwandan genocide wherein the UNSC resolution 955 (1994), acting under Chapter VII, set up the International Tribunal for Rwanda. The UN needs to find a way and means to rein the warring factions responsible for the spiral of violence in the DRC. The quagmire of the vicious conflict in the DRC necessitates a concrete calibrated application of the International Humanitarian Law, International Criminal Law and the innovative TJ mechanisms to stop the endless nightmare of the Congolese people. It presents an ideational challenge for all. PART - I: Blog Special Series-I: Use of Food as a Weapon of War: A Challenge for International Law (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com) PART - II: Blog Special Series-II: Use of Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War: A Challenge for International Law (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com) #UN #UNSC #DRCongo #InternationalLaw #WeaponsOfWar Professor Dr. Bharat H. Desai is Jawaharlal Nehru Chair and Professor of International Law at the Centre for International Legal Studies of SIS, JNU. He coordinated the Making SIS Visible initiative (2008-2013) as well as Inter-University Consortium: JNU; Jammu; Kashmir; Sikkim (2012-2020) and is the Editor-in-Chief of Environmental Policy and Law (IOS Press: Amsterdam).

By Prof. Swaran Singh Much more should be expected of seasoned leaders like Joe Biden and Xi Jinping than they have shown during their presidencies On Thursday, the presidents of the United States and China held their fifth bilateral online conversation since Joe Biden took office in the White House in January 2021. However, these frequent summits have not helped the two leaders achieve anything substantive. These conversations usually rely on semantics and last for several hours, and the two presidents often appear distracted or stuck in ritualistic text reading. Indeed, these two world leaders have not as yet had a single offline interaction. For his part, President Xi has not traveled outside China for the last two-plus years of the Covid-19 pandemic and is not likely to do so any time soon. For the rest of the world, the enduring uncertainties and anxieties between the leaders of the two most powerful countries have implications far and wide. And thanks to their persisting domestic challenges – where one faces historically low popularity ratings and is widely expected not to run for a second term in office, while the other faces factional infighting over his intention to take an unprecedented third term in office – this stalemate is not going to disappear in a hurry. Add to this the larger enduring narratives of the rise of China coinciding with America’s relative decline and, more recently, tensions triggered by the pandemic and the Ukraine crisis further confirming a cold war in the making, and there begins to unravel a scary prognosis where bonhomie between these two leaders becomes a prerequisite for global peace and prosperity. Premium on personalities With so much premium (read glamour) attached the US and Chinese presidencies, Donald Trump of course is often excused for being new to politics and condoned for having rattled both American domestic politics and its foreign policy. This also explains the inordinate hope that was placed on Biden, who came into the White House to redeem the American slide from global leadership. Unlike Trump, Biden had decades of experience at the forefront of US politics. The same is true of the long tenure of Xi Jinping. But if anything, their track record of bilateral equations should have inspired caution against putting too much hope in their building strong synergies. As vice-presidents, the two had multiple long face-to-face interactions. But in the 18 months since Biden took office on the promise of “America is back,” he has so far failed even to climb down from Tump’s trade and technology wars against the world’s second-largest economy. Instead, Biden’s engagements, one after another, have begun betraying fatigue on undoing its Trump legacy. Fissures in US alliance relationships abroad and raging inflation, price rises and slow growth at home increase the likelihood of Donald Trump contesting the next presidential election and perhaps even returning to office to continue with what, his followers believe, he left unfinished. Meanwhile the rest of the world remains dependent on the personal power of leaders like Biden and Xi, who seem far too deeply entangled with their day-to-day crisis of ensuring personal popularity, falling increasingly short on statesmanlike qualities and clueless on cultivating an enduring partnership. It is a no-brainer that a stable US-China relationship is not a matter of choice and has implications beyond their bilateral ties. Lost opportunities The truth is that much more is expected from political sagacity of seasoned leaders like Biden and Xi. Beginning from China’s rise and former US president Barack Obama’s “pivot” to the Asia-Pacific, China has come to be the most important country for American leaders. Once it was clear that vice-president Xi was in line to become the next Chinese leader and yet was largely a mystery, vice-president Biden “was assigned the task of getting to know him.” So as vice-president, Biden would often travel with Xi during his inter-city flights during his US visits and often hold long meetings. Even when Xi became president of China, vice-president Biden’s December 2013 visit to China saw them having another five-hour high-level interaction that made media headlines. Likewise, when President Xi made his first state visit to the US in September 2015, the welcome dinner was hosted by vice-president Biden. All this should have given an impression of deep bonhomie for bold initiatives. Prima facie, it remains unclear if these long meetings and travels together created any personal warmth and chemistry capable of overcoming mutual irritations and challenges. If anything, it is their short-term personal gains that seem to guide their zigzag tightrope-walking. For instance, Biden, as a presidential candidate in 2020 contesting against the temperamental Trump, sought to emphasize being tough on Xi, thus attacking him with epithets like a “thug” who “doesn’t have a democratic, with a small D, bone in his body.” That sort of thing is fine if it reveals any sustained predictable trajectory, but Biden has lacked consistency in his China policy. And this lack of consistency has resulted in a gradual buildup of brinkmanship with Beijing, particularly over Taiwa. Strategic ambiguity Meanwhile all sides continue to hide behind semantics like hedging and strategic ambiguity. The most recent example is weeks of reports and reactions on the alleged plans for a visit by US House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan, which she has neither confirmed nor denied at this writing. But President Biden has gone public urging her to avoid it and also saying that the US military is also against such a visit, with Pelosi adding further fuel to the fire by asking whether the military expected her plane to be attacked by the Chinese. Such subterfuge defies logic. The fact that the third in line to the US presidency could be planning a visit to Taiwan – which is known to be such a sensitive issue for Beijing – and that, given constitutional checks and balances, the president has no authority to stop her has resulted in China’s Ministry of Defense issuing warnings of strong military action if such a visit materializes. The fact that such unconfirmed media reports could consume the Thursday online summit of Biden and Xi shows how subterfuge and semantics can sideline the substantive. How could that be when Biden is often described as someone who has stood for engaging China even at cost of negating genuine aspirations of Taiwanese? After entering the US Senate in 1973 and witnessing tectonic changes under president Richard Nixon’s China policy, and then being one of the 90 senators to vote for the Taiwan Relations Act, Biden developed a strong “engaging China” policy that saw him oppose the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act in 1999 and in 2001 explicitly warn Taiwan’s newly elected president Chen Shui-bian against declaring independence unilaterally, “because we are not willing to go to war” over such an act. But politics triumphs, and the politics of the weak triumphs most unabashedly. In the face of contesting an election against a whimsical Donald Trump, who as president-designate had made history by making a direct phone call to Taiwanese president-elect Tsai Ing-wen, Joe Biden was to become the first Democratic presidential candidate to make a similar phone call to her on her election to a second term on office. Short-term gains often dictate strategies of being active without being productive. That is what Thursday’s summit achieved. In the end, marking one more round of rituals, Chinese media reports claimed that Xi told Biden “if you play with fire you get burned,” while the US readout was equally bland and sketchy, saying the “United States strongly opposes efforts to change the status quo or undermine peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait,” which says nothing. #US #China #JoeBiden #XiJinping Originally published: Asia Times, July 29, 2022 https://asiatimes.com/2022/07/biden-xi-talks-semantics-sideline-the-substantive/ Posted here with the authorization of the author. Prof. Swaran Singh is visiting professor at the University of British Columbia and professor of diplomacy and disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He is president of the Association of Asia Scholars; adjunct senior fellow at the Charhar Institute, Beijing; senior fellow, Institute for National Security Studies Sri Lanka, Colombo; and visiting professor, Research Institute for Indian Ocean Economies, Kunming.

By Prof. Bharat H. Desai The use of food as a weapon to starve people presents a global challenge. Such aggressive methods of warfare have been prohibited under the four 1949 Geneva Conventions as well as the 1977 Additional Protocols thereto. On 22 July 2022, in an unprecedented thaw, the Black Sea Grain Initiative was signed in Istanbul (Turkey) by the Russian and Ukrainian ministers in the presence of the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres and the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The grain initiative, brokered by the UN Secretary-General with the assistance of Türkiye, shows that if negotiations (Article 33, Chapter VI, UN Charter) are given a chance, any contentious global issue including an armed conflict, can be resolved. The invisible seeds for this were sown by the UNSG’s April 2022 visit to Russia and Ukraine, who has been “working every day since". It underscores unique role of the good offices of the UNSG for the peaceful settlement of international disputes among the UN member states. It also provides a pathway for finding an amicable compromise on the Russia-Ukraine standoff arising from the “special military operation” in Ukraine. The Russian action, “in accordance with Article 51 (chapter VII) of the Charter”, has now completed full five months (February 24 - July 24). The UNSG has aptly described the Black Sea agreement as the “agreement for the world” since it paves the way for food exports from the three key Ukrainian ports in the Black Sea – Odessa, Chernomorsk and Yuzhny. The agreement offers prospects for a new window of peace monitored through the Joint Coordination Centre in Istanbul that would comprise representatives of Ukraine, Russia and Türkiye. The Black Sea agreement as expected to immediately ease the global food prices and help in reducing global hunger. The shipments of food and fertilizers reaching the markets will control spiraling food prices and stave off global famine affecting millions of people. “Today, there is a beacon on the Black Sea…a beacon of hope, a beacon of possibility – a beacon of relief - in a world that needs it more than ever”, the UN secretary-general optimistically said. There has been unprecedented rise in food and fuel prices, as well as supply chain issues as the mountains of grain stocks remained stuck in silos. It shows the enormous cost of allowing the conflict to rage on, supplying arms to Ukraine as well as using the sanctions stick to beat and isolate Russia, a permanent member of the UN Security Council. As the rival egos held the centerstage and crippling sanctions and geopolitics took priority in place of peace, the world has paid a heavy price for allowing the conflict to rage on. For the last four centuries, Russia has remained central for the European peace and stability. “Failure to restart negotiations with Russia and the further alienation of the Kremlin would have dire long-term consequences for stability in Europe”, Henry Kissinger (99), former US secretary of state, warned in his 23 May 2022 iconoclastic video address to the World Economic Forum in Davos. Russia, a Eurasian nuclear and space power, has a 20% share (2020) in the global wheat exports. Ukraine also accounts for 8% of the wheat supply. It annually supplies 45 million tons of wheat and some 20 million tons are already stuck in Ukrainian warehouses and containers. It is no less significant that some 50 countries around the world import 30 % of their wheat requirements from Russia and Ukraine. Ukraine also exports 16% corn (fourth largest) and grows 46% of sunflower-seed and sunflower oil (world’s largest). World Hunger In was no coincidence that early on 06 July 2022 report on the state of world hunger and nutrition was released at an online event. It has been a multi-agency laborious task coordinated by five UN agencies: Food and Agriculture Organization, International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), UN Children Emergency Relief Fund (UNICEF), World Food Program (WFP) and World Health Organization (WHO). Similarly, the UN Security Council (UNSC) held an unprecedented ministerial level open debate on 19 May 2022 on conflict and food security. It took place amidst reports that conflicts have been the primary driver of hunger for 139 million people in 24 countries and territories. It grew from 99 million in 2020. The situation is expected to worsen in 2022 due the conflict in Ukraine. “A sharp increase in global food insecurity threatens to destabilize fragile societies and exacerbate armed conflicts and regional instability”, the concept notes by the US Presidency of the UNSC (May 2022) stated. On April 12, 2021, the UNSG reported to the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on Implementation of the United Nations Decade of Action on Nutrition (2016–2025). The report, highlighted the underlying drivers of all forms of malnutrition. It called upon the states to act with urgency for elimination of “all forms of malnutrition and achieving the SDGs by 2030”. In the 2021 report the five UN agencies graphically noted that in 2020 “between 720 and 811 million people in the world faced hunger” and nearly “2.37 billion people did not have access to adequate food”. The Food Challenge The large part of the problematique on hunger, inadequacy of food and nutrition has been contributed by various kinds of armed conflicts that rage across the world. They place a large part of the 7.9 billion (2022) global population to live in misery. According to FAO, vicious cycle of hunger is largely fueled by extreme climatic events, economic slowdowns and the Covid-19 pandemic. With the world population expected to reach the staggering figure of 10 billion in 2050, it presents a monumental challenge to sustainably feed the growing population on Earth. The 2021 Global Hunger Index forecast shows 47 countries with alarming levels of hunger and 47 others will fail to reach ‘zero hunger’ by 2030. The use of food as a weapon to starve people presents a global challenge. Such aggressive methods of warfare have been prohibited under the four 1949 Geneva Conventions as well as the 1977 Additional Protocols thereto. Still, there is a beacon of hope amidst conflicts, arrogance of power, rival games played on the global geopolitical chessboard and the resultant human misery. “These destructive forces are not invincible”, the ICRC President, Peter Maurer, shared his optimism in conversation with this author. Hence, we need to stamp out the use of food as a weapon of war in the 21st century world. It presents a global ideational challenge to connoisseurs of International Law and International Relations. #BlackSeaGrainAgreement #UN #Turkey #Food #Hunger Originally published: The Tribune, July 28, 2022. https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/black-sea-deal-to-ease-global-food-challenge-416250 Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Professor Dr. Bharat H. Desai is Jawaharlal Nehru Chair and Professor of International Law at the Centre for International Legal Studies of SIS, JNU. He coordinated the Making SIS Visible initiative (2008-2013) as well as Inter-University Consortium: JNU; Jammu; Kashmir; Sikkim (2012-2020) and is the Editor-in-Chief of Environmental Policy and Law (IOS Press: Amsterdam).

By Prof. Bharat H. Desai In view of constraints of the SIS Blog space, this article will appear in Part – I and Part – II. On 15 July 2022, IOS Press published an ideational proposal of this author entitled: “The Repurposed UN Trusteeship Council for the Future”, Environmental Policy and Law 52 (2022) 223-235. It also forms part of the book curated by the author on Envisioning Our Environmental Future: Stockholm+50 and Beyond (IOS Press: Amsterdam, 2022). The said ideational proposal holds significance in view of a flurry of initiatives taken by the United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) António Guterres. In April 2022, the UNSG formed the High-Level Advisory Board (HLAB) for Effective Multilateralism as a sequel to his 2021 report Our Common Agenda as well as the statement to the 75th session of the UN General Assembly (September 2021). It is a prelude to the UNSG’s proposals for the Special Envoy on the Future Generations and the Summit of the Future 2023. The UNSG has suggested that the UN Trusteeship Council (UNTC) be repurposed “to enhance the governance of the global commons…invite States to consider making the Council available as a multi-stakeholder body to tackle emerging challenges and, especially, to serve as a deliberative forum to act on behalf of succeeding generations”. The suggestion of the UNSG was endorsed in another report Our Common Agenda and the Road to 2023 in order to “improve governance of the global commons, including the high seas, Antarctica, the atmosphere, and outer space”. The UNTC Idea on the Global Radar The UNSG’s suggestion reflects the inherent powers of his office as the chief executive officer of the 193-member political organization of the sovereign states. It also shows that change is the law of life. The time seems to have finally come for the UNTC to “arise, awake and listen to the boons” (उत्तिष्ठत जाग्रत प्राप्य वरान्निबोधत - Katha Upanishad, 1.3.14 chapter) after a hiatus of 28 years. The UNSG report has provided a fresh impetus to this author’s long standing scholarly idea (2022; 2021; 2014; 2000) for revival and repurpose of the UNTC, originally mooted in a special talk of 15 January 1999 at the World Bank in Washington DC. The relevance of the idea also came to the fore in the author’s interaction at the Expert Consultation of 22 June 2022 with members of the UN-HLAB who sought concrete ideas for the future. It took place quick on the heels of the Stockholm+50 Conference (2-3 June 2022). How can the UNTC be repurposed with a new mandate in the new context? In the wake of this author’s one-one-one meeting with the Prime Minister Narendra Modi, a detailed proposal contained in the book International Environmental Governance (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2014), released at the UN General Assembly Building (UNHQ, New York; 12 December 2014), was provided both to the Prime Minister Office (PMO) as well as the External Affairs Minister. In a letter of 12 March 2019 to the author, the UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres termed idea of the UNTC revival as “common concern” and referred to “different initiatives related to the protection of the environment and the conservation and sustainable use of its resources”. Reflecting on the growing convergence of thoughts on the UNTC revival, in a letter dated 28 January 2019 to the author, the President of the 73rd UN General Assembly, Maria Fernanda Espinosa Garces, shared her sentiment that “preserving and caring for our planet and protecting the environment are among the most pressing challenges we face globally”. She further added: “As you rightly point out, a new mandate for the UN Trusteeship Council would necessitate consensus among the UN membership and an amendment to the Charter in accordance with its article 108”. Responses from some of the Heads of Government have also been promising. On behalf of the Russian President Vladimir Putin, Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ letter of 31 July 2019 said: “We view it as a unique approach to tackle environmental challenges and we agree with you on its potential…We will surely take into consideration your proposal in our future deliberations”. Scott Morrison, Prime Minister of Australia, in a letter of 6 September 2019, reposed trust in the UN processes and observed: “Australia strongly supports the United Nations (UN) reforms…that UN oversight processes can work effectively, and that the UNSG takes his responsibilities serisouly”. Going beyond diplomatese, Winston Peters, Deputy PM of New Zealand, on behalf of Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern, on 12 September 2019 specially compared the idea of ‘trusteeship’ with the local Māori tradition and said: “The value of kaitiakitanga (guardianship and conservation) resonates strongly with the New Zealand Government, and aligns with the understanding that we have been entrusted with our environment, and have a duty of care for it”. It is in the abovementioned global context as well as following a communication from the PMO, the former SIS colleagues Ajay Patnaik (Dean) and Chintamani Mahapatra (Rector) quickly moved to specially organize this author’s SIS Public Talk (10 April 2019): “On the Revival of the UN Trusteeship Council with a New Mandate for the Environment and the Global Commons”. In Sacred Trust As the things stand, the UNTC still remains one of the six “principal organs” of the UN (Article 7). It has remained dormant since suspending operations on 10 November 1994 after independence of the last trust territory of Palau. On the basis of the UNTC resolution 2199 (LXI) of 25 May 1994, the UNSC adopted resolution S/RES/956 (1994) to this effect. The tasks of the UNTC were to supervise the dependent territories. The concept of sacred trust remained the cardinal principle of the UNTC for the exercise of hand-holding and care for the entrusted 11 trust territories (during 1945-1994). As per Article 86 (Chapter XIII) of the UN Charter, the UNTC was to administer the trust territories. The TC comprised the five permenant members (Article 23) of the Security Council. As a corollary, under the authority of the UNGA, the UNTC was to “consider reports submitted by the administering authority” (Article 87) and “make an annual report to the General Assembly” (Article 88). In view of completion of its mandated task, the UNTC amended its rules of procedure by a resolution on 25 May 1994, to drop the obligation to meet annually. It has agreed to meet as occasion required. It could be by its decision or the decision of its President, or at the request of a majority of its members or the General Assembly or the Security Council. As a reflection of continuity, the 73nd session (7 December 2021) of the UNTC elected Nathalie Broadhurst Estival of France as its President and James Kariuki of the United Kingdom as its Vice-President. The Trusteeship Council is expected to meet again in December 2023. As the UN practice shows, any proposal for an amendment of the Charter is generally treated cautiously. There has been much effort to push for the expansion of the UNSC’s membership and to review the veto power itself. That has not yet materialized. It is feared that it would open up a Pandora’s box for review of the whole Charter as many member states strongly feel that the UNSC is not representative and the UN Charter does not reflect the realities of the 21st century world. Any such UN restructuring would need to be reflective of the aspirations of the ‘peoples’ in whose name the Charter came into existence on 26 June 1945. If there is a consensus on the utility of the UNTC in this new context, an appropriate mandate would need to constitute “trusteeship of the planet”. It has also been identified that the governance of the global commons forms a significant part of the larger architecture of International Environmental Governance. In view of the global environmental challenges, it is now high time to entrust the UNTC with the overall supervision of the global commons and the global environmental protection. How can the UNTC be repurposed in with a new mandate in the new context? PART – II: The Repurposed UN Trusteeship Council for the Future PART – II: A New Mandate in the New Context (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com) #UN #UNTC #UNSG #India #GlobalCommons #EnvironmentalGovernance Professor Dr. Bharat H. Desai is Jawaharlal Nehru Chair and Professor of International Law at the Centre for International Legal Studies of SIS, JNU. He coordinated the Making SIS Visible initiative (2008-2013) as well as Inter-University Consortium: JNU; Jammu; Kashmir; Sikkim (2012-2020) and is the Editor-in-Chief of Environmental Policy and Law (IOS Press: Amsterdam).

By Prof. Bharat H. Desai In view of the global environmental challenges in the Anthropocene epoch, the revived and repurposed UN Trusteeship Council (UNTC) needs to be entrusted with the task of the overall supervision of global environmental protection (especially universal MEAs such as UNFCCC; UNCCD; CBD) as well as the global commons (the Area under UNCLOS; Atmosphere; Antarctica; Outer Space). In a futuristic scenario, wherein consensus emerges among the states to repurpose the UNTC with a new mandate, it will necessitate an amendment under Article 108 of the UN Charter. Any possibility of amendment of the UN Charter, generally, though difficult, is quite plausible and a necessity. An amendment would require approval by a two-thirds of the UNGA members as well as concurrence of all five permanent members of the UNSC. A review conference (Article 109) can be convened theoretically by a two-thirds vote in the UNGA and a vote of any nine members in the UNSC. However, any alteration of the Charter proposed at a review conference cannot take effect without the consent of all five of the permanent members of the UNSC. In a repurposed UNTC, the composition (Article 86), could range from 15 members, at the minimum, to 54, at the maximum. The UNGA would elect members for a period of three years, with one-third of the members retiring every three years. The allocation of seats would be on the basis of an equitable geographical distribution. Unlike the earlier incarnation of the UNTC, no trust areas would be assigned to it. No member of the revived TC would be assigned any special role or conferred with any veto or special or privileged voting rights. The function of the TC would be democratic on the basis of the one-state–one-vote principle (same as the UNGA; Article 18). If retained in its present form, UN Environment (UNEP), or its possible future upgrade into a UN ‘specialized agency’ that may be called UN Environment Protection Organization (UNEPO), would have to work out a special ‘relationship agreement’ with the ECOSOC. If this were to happen, UNEPO, as a specialized agency, would report directly to the UNTC and, through it, to the UNGA. The UNTC would of course be able to avail assistance of the ECOSOC and other UN specialized agencies in regard to matters with which they are respectively concerned (Article 91). The new mandate for the revived UNTC could be repurposed as follows: Article 87: The General Assembly and, under its authority, the Trusteeship Council, in carrying out their functions, may: a. examine progress in reversing global environmental deterioration in consultation with the UN Environment or (its future upgrade into a UN specialized agency) United Nations Environment Protection Organization (UNEPO; or known by any other nomenclature); b. consider reports submitted by the UN Environment or UNEPO as well as relevant multilateral environmental agreements (preferably climate change, biological diversity, desertification, which have universal membership and were crystallized through the UNGA mandated law-making processes) duly sanctioned by their respective Conferences of Parties on the basis of relationship agreements with the Trusteeship Council; c. review the status of each of the designated global commons keeping in view the overall interest of all the inhabitants of the planet earth, in consultation with decision-making organs of their respective regulatory regimes through relationship agreements and provide a mandate for further law-making processes as deemed most appropriate; d. adopt appropriate decisions and other actions, as deemed proper, from time to time, consistent with the respective international agreements, arrangements and mechanisms. Article 88: The Trusteeship Council shall prepare the form and modalities for submission of periodic reports by each of the regulatory regime of multilateral environment agreement as well as the global commons areas placed under its supervision. The decision-making organs of the respective regimes shall provide an annual report to the Trusteeship Council and, through it, to the General Assembly. Trusteeship of the Planet Through the abovementioned mandate, the UNTC, shall reflect a genuine trusteeship, with a responsibility of the planetary trust for the present and the future generations. Its duty will shift from territory to the rights and welfare of the ‘peoples’ (opening line of Preamble to the UN Charter). It will essentially serve as a guardian of the global ‘common concerns’ as well as of the ‘common heritage of mankind.’ Thus, its primary mandate would constitute the global environment and the global commons. Thus, in essence, the UNTC would be entrusted with responsibility as the principal instrumentality for the “trusteeship of the planet”. The evolution of the idea of a trust in the global domain underscores that there are places, territories, and areas that require special and careful nurturing. Hence, the practice has been to place them under the tutelage of a sovereign state or an international institution that can supervise their well-being. At this juncture, the global supervision for the environmental protection and the global commons assumes significance since they hold special value for the present and future generations on the planet Earth. In this context the call given by the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi (September 2020), in his address at the 75th anniversary virtual meet of the UNGA, became relevant for the comprehensive UN reforms since “we cannot fight today’s challenges with outdated structures”. In a similar vein, an explicit reference made by the Prime Minister Modi for “trusteeship of the planet” in an address to the G-20 Riyadh virtual summit (November 2020) provides the future pathway. As a logical corollary, a repurposed UNTC, with a new mandate for the environment and the global commons, would serve as the principal instrumentality for the said trusteeship of the planet. Who shall get the credit (यश) for donning the mantle for this futuristic change of the UNTC whose time has come? The answer lies in the womb of Time. PART – I: The Repurposed UN Trusteeship Council for the Future PART – I: The Context and the Idea (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com) #UNGA #UNTC #UNSG #India #GlobalCommons #EnvironmentalGovernance Professor Dr. Bharat H. Desai is Jawaharlal Nehru Chair and Professor of International Law at the Centre for International Legal Studies of SIS, JNU. He coordinated the Making SIS Visible initiative (2008-2013) as well as Inter-University Consortium: JNU; Jammu; Kashmir; Sikkim (2012-2020) and is the Editor-in-Chief of Environmental Policy and Law (IOS Press: Amsterdam).

By Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli Recent actions against Chinese companies, in India and elsewhere, are impacting economic ties with China. Are they also having an impact on China's internal dynamics? Chinese companies operating in various countries including India have come under the scanner recently. Several of them made huge profits due to the backing of the Communist party-state in terms of subsidies, diplomatic support, managerial skills, mass production, cost advantage and other factors. However, this 'win-win' strategy of China is running out of steam. The United States government targeted China’s companies on espionage cases, unfair trade practices, intellectual property thefts, growing trade deficits, lack of market economy and the consequent discrimination of American companies in the China market. Europe also rolled back Huawei 5G telecom networks. In the backdrop of the Ukraine conflict, NATO’s move to target Russia and China has dwindled China’s business prospects. India also recently began tightening the screws after the June 2020 Galwan incident. As Foreign Minister S Jaishankar repeatedly reminded the Chinese leadership, unless and until peace prevails on the borders, bilateral relations — including trade and economic relations — cannot improve. As a result, India initially banned over 200 Chinese IT apps, restricted Chinese investment in infrastructure projects and closed several Confucius classrooms. In the last few months, as a part of 'decoupling strategy', India began exerting pressure on China in trade and economic relations.This was in the backdropof no progress on the 'de-escalation and disengagement' process in the border areas,despite 16 rounds of corps commanders’ meetings. Clearly, the political messaging to China is that after the Galwan incident, it cannot be business as usual, and economic relations come under political control as well. Trade with India (about $120 billion last year) is only a minuscule one percent of the overall trade of China (estimated at over $6 trillion a year). Yet, Beijing was able to earn a whopping $1.2 trillion through trade deficits with India in the past decade. With such revenues, China could easily subsidise the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (worth $62 billion), in addition to infrastructure projects in Tibet, Xinjiang or Sri Lanka and Nepal. After the Galwan incident, India consciously began to diversify from the China market and reduce dependence on an estimated 4,400 items of Chinese merchandise. However, due to the pandemic, bilateral trade ballooned to over $120 billion last year, despite the protests of the Indian Consul General in Hong Kong on inflated prices of oxygen concentrators. India also began looking at the operations of Chinese companies. Many Chinese firms – specifically in the telecom sector such as Xiaomi, Vivo, Oppo, Zhongxing (ZTE), Huawei and others, have dominated the retail sector in India. Several of these have been investigated on money laundering charges. For instance, the Enforcement Directorate’s raid on Xiaomi this May yielded nearly $700 million in money laundering and tax evasion charges. A July raid on Vivo yielded over $3 billion in 'remittances' to China. Many Chinese business leaders fled the country. Backdoor entry Another critical area is the backdoor entry of China’s capital into the Indian market, even as the total Chinese direct investment is only $8.2 billion for a $17 trillion economy. The portfolio investments of the People's Bank of China in startups, and its investment of over one percent in Housing Development Finance Corporation had raised eyebrows in India on the pervasive financial influence that China is intending to build up. By April, India’s Ministry of Home Affairs curbed the automatic route for investors from countries bordering India. Indian actions thus concern not only telecom security but also financial security. However, while China’s official position reiterated the 'law of the land' principle, there is also a veiled criticism of India, implying that these raids would affect future business prospects. China’s foreign ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian said in a recent statement that India should “provide a fair, just and non-discriminatory business environment for Chinese enterprises to invest and operate within their borders”. However, there was no mention about China’s discriminatory practices towards Indian pharmaceuticals and IT companies in the Chinese market. Further, on July 5, the spokesperson of China’s embassy in New Delhi, Wang Xiaojian said that such investigations “impede the improvement of business environment in India and chills (sic) the confidence and willingness of market entities from other countries, including Chinese enterprises to invest and operate in India.” The Communist party’s influence on all walks of life, in China and abroad, is pervasive. Under China’s law, all enterprises which have more than seven employees —private or state-owned companies — should establish Communist party cells that report directly to the central committee. Also, by the 2015 national intelligence law, all individuals or institutions are required to cooperate with the country’s agencies on all matters of concern to the party-state. This has alerted many countries to the pitfalls of doing business with China. In this global business environment that has grown generally restrictive for Chinese companies, and in the backdrop of relative economic decline — an estimated 4% this year, China’s Communist party is concerned about the blowback effect on domestic politics. With the 20th Community party Congress scheduled to happen this November, political jockeying has intensified for the 6th generation of political leadership. It is natural that the economic aspects also come into the limelight. Through the anti-corruption drive since 2012, and the 'common prosperity' campaign since last year, Xi Jinping was able to make a major dent in the money power of Jiang Zemin’s faction in the communist party. State-business connection Many of Jiang’s cronies in the party-state and businesses have been netted. However, Jiang’s faction is said to have deep pockets in China. Jiang, who served as the Shanghai party secretary before 1989, has been identified as a part of the 'Shanghai gang'. It would be no exaggeration to say that reformist China was mostly guided by this 'Shanghai gang'. Last year, China’s major fintech company Alibaba’s Ant Group stock listing was cancelled, affecting several shareholders, including Jiang Zemin’s grandson. Also, a Hangzhou city official was put in dock ostensibly for his connections to the Alibaba company. Restrictions on Tencent, Meituan and other companies and the free fall of real-estate tycoons had sent shivers across Xi’s opposing factions. However, Xi also needed funds to prop up his vision and his factional leaders at various levels. It is well-known that at the village level direct elections, the moneyed class of leaders are emerging in large numbers. Money and muscle power are also playing a big role in the Communist party selection process for national congress at the county, prefecture, province and centre levels. Significantly, in the provincial people’s congress selection process, a significant percentage of members belong to the nouveau riche. All of these political activities in the run-up to the 20th Communist party congress need money bags, which can only be delivered by party-state 'loyal' Chinese companies. However, these companies have come under increasing scrutiny abroad recently, thus impacting the political dynamics back in China. It is thus a tricky political issue in China. #China #India #Market #Economy #Business Originally published: Deccan Herald, July 24, 2022. https://www.deccanherald.com/amp/specials/chinese-business-giants-lose-steam-1129408.html Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli is Professor in Chinese Studies and Dean of School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University.

By Prof. Swaran Singh As we enter the fifth month of the Ukraine war and resultant food and fuel shortages worldwide, parties to the conflict have begun showing crisis fatigue. They increasingly appear to be reconciling to this mutually hurtful stalemate with no end to the violence yet in sight. Russia of course was the first to tone down its lofty objectives of seeking written security guarantees against NATO's eastward expansion, limiting its goals to consolidating its positions in bordering territories inside Ukraine. Now Western nations have as well begun to reveal a similar dwindling of resolve, unleashing their internal catharsis, with systemic implications worldwide. Meanwhile, all sides continue to claim victories as they gradually begin to drift into myopic and self-centric policy choices, thus thinning their facade of being guided by sublime objectives of seeking regional or global welfare and peace. Their diplomatic doublespeak continues to thrive as they attempt to explain the circumstances restraining their options, as the hapless Ukrainians continue to die or flee for their lives and while consumers worldwide continue to be pulverized by soaring prices of essential commodities. As of now, it is Europe's growing panic about impending energy shortages in the coming winter that may be casting a reset in their equations with Russian President Vladimir Putin, yet the microcosm of Sri Lanka's political vacuum and financial ruin reveals what could replicate in other vulnerable countries. A firm Ukraine supporter The case of Canada presents the most apt example of Western circumspection that defies logic. Canada has been an example of a NATO country with a strong normative foreign policy. This has seen it employing a humanitarian discourse to undergird its inordinate indulgence with Ukraine and standing tall with President Volodymyr Zelensky. Canada has been a leading advocate of Ukraine joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and proactive in its military support of Ukraine since its 2014 backing of the ouster of pro-Moscow president Viktor Yanukovych, and since 2015, Canada has trained more than 30,000 Ukrainian soldiers. This indulgence is partly guided by Canada's Ukrainian diaspora, which numbered a whopping 1.36 million at the last count in 2016. So on February 25, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau was among the first to“condemn” Russia and slap sanctions on 58 Russian people and entities. The last four months have seen Canada sending soldiers, volunteers, weapons and relief materials and supporting Ukraine in international forums. Canada has not only welcomed Ukrainian refugees but has waived multiple immigration rules of eligibility and provided them with a monthly financial stipend on arrival under the Canada-Ukraine Authorization for Emergency Travel . The federal government website on Canada's response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine presents impressively user-friendly handholding in offering safe passage and shelter to those wishing leave their war-torn country. Defying logic But this past Monday, in the face of opposition from its Ukrainian diaspora at home and the Ukrainian leadership in Kiev, Canada delivered by plane the first of six Russian turbines being repaired by the German energy firm Siemens in Montreal. It arrived at Russian's Portovaya compressor station, which is a crucial element of Moscow's Nord Stream 1 gas pipeline to Germany and the most powerful instrument in its arm-twisting of European countries. While the US State Department, the European Union and Germany have expressed support for this Canadian decision, Ukrainians have been vocal in their opposition. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba called it a“mistake,” saying“this solution will not address the problems” and will instead“put Russia in a winning position.” On Tuesday, Canada's own former chief of Defence Staff, General Rick Hillier , described it as signaling a“relenting of pressure from NATO [and] from the West in general.” No doubt, both uncertainties and shortages of Russian gas supplies have pushed up both panic and prices across Canada's European allies, yet this decision varies widely from, for example, Australia's standard line on the Ukraine crisis. Likewise, confusion among Europeans has also continued to flourish. Most European nations have already taken emergency measures, and yet next Tuesday will see the European Commission debating a proposal to ask member states to ensure a 15% cut in their gas consumption, which needs a difficult-to-achieve two-thirds majority for approval. No easy choices Gazprom, which stands in the midst of these shifting tides, owns majority stakes in Nord Stream 1, and has been under Canadian sanctions since March. Last week, Gazprom linked its decision to reduce Nord Stream 1 gas supplies by 60% of its capacity to the continuing delays in repair of its turbines at Siemens' facility in Montreal. That apparently was the last straw pushing Trudeau to make the difficult choice of allowing repair of six Russian turbines in Canada for a period of years, though he defended his decision by saying it was designed to spare European allies the pain from sanctions meant to target the Russia regime. Putin, however, shows little sign of relenting on using energy to browbeat Canada's European allies. For months, the Russian president has been threatening to cut back supplies, thereby weakening already shaky resolve among several vulnerable European countries, including Germany, which relies heavily on Russian gas supplies. Of the European Union's total import of 140 billion cubic meters (bcm) from Russia's pipelines last year, the biggest share came from Nord Stream 1, which annually transports 55bcm of gas, but it has been shut down for annual maintenance since July 11. That repair period had been scheduled for 10 days, thus ending on July 21, but some suspect Putin will not return the pipeline to 100% capacity. That prospect threatens to throw European plans to store gas for winter into disarray while they grope between emergency measures and imposing punishing price increases. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg this week pressured the European Parliament to“stop complaining” and help Ukraine, alluding to his fears of Europe's changing trajectories. Shifting tides Realizing that the Ukraine stalemate is bound to become a painful long haul with no meeting ground between Russia and the US and its European allies yet in sight, third countries like Turkey have become proactive in finding exit strategies for Moscow and Kiev. This is where the logic-defying Canadian concession to Gazprom could help strengthen such positive vibes. The last four months have already witnessed both Russia and Ukraine diminishing the intensity of their violence. Moscow and Kiev have also been engaged in more than a dozen direct talks with various interlocutors of repute. Now, with facilitation provided by Turkey – often an irritant for the US – Russia and Ukraine were to sign on Friday a UN-brokered deal to allow Ukraine to resume its food exports from its ports on the Black Sea. The deal entails Russia enforcing a truce while Ukrainian naval vessels escort grain shipments through heavily mined coastal waters, while Turkey – supported by the UN – ensures that the Ukrainian ships are not misused for weapon smuggling. While experts remain skeptical whether such gestures will make any dent in Putin's policies, after the arrival of the first turbine from Canada, Moscow on Thursday resumed Nord Stream 1 gas supplies, albeit as yet at only 40% of its capacity. At the same time, even after this unusual gesture from Ottawa, Putin on Wednesday accused Canada of sabotaging Gazprom's ability to continue with its full supplies. He went a step further to allege that Canada had sinister motives, saying“Canada did it because it produces oil and gas itself and plans to enter the European market,” which of course carries a mixture of both myth and reality. At the very least, this concession to Gazprom brings Canada back into the global spotlight, for it has long been missing from most other US-led global initiatives. #Canada #Russia #Ukraine #Gazprom #Trudeau Originally published: MENAFN-Asia Times, July 22, 2022 at https://menafn.com/1104574692/Canadas-Gazprom-Move-May-Be-Part-Of-Western-War-Fatigue Posted here with the authorization of the author. Prof. Swaran Singh is visiting professor at the University of British Columbia and professor of diplomacy and disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He is president of the Association of Asia Scholars; adjunct senior fellow at the Charhar Institute, Beijing; senior fellow, Institute for National Security Studies Sri Lanka, Colombo; and visiting professor, Research Institute for Indian Ocean Economies, Kunming.

By Udbhav Sharma The declaration of financial emergency, the change of PM seat from Mahinda Rajapaksha to Ranil Wickramsinghe did little to satisfy the public. Gotabaya should have quit long back by taking the moral responsibility. On 9th of July, images from Sri Lankan President’s House were going rounds on all the networking platforms. The world witnessed a historic seizure of power by the already troubled Sri Lankan public. This seizure was a hard-hitting response of the masses towards the wrongly managed economic policies of the government in power, it was a message to the world that perverted regimes can always be challenged and overthrown if the greatest stakeholder, the general public forms a chain strong enough. The saturation point of the hardships faced by people in the last three years and particularly in the preceding span of 6 months resulted in what we have been witnessing on the streets of Colombo. Things are now looking even more worrisome with the proclamation of indefinite emergency, reluctance of the military man Gotabaya to step down making the crowds on the roads of Colombo go haywire. There are different theories as explanations for the economic crisis seen in Sri Lanka. Some point towards the debt diplomacy of China, few others curse the pandemic for reduced tourism revenue as a factor. Along with these two, there are significant structural policy flaws from the government side which has been the major reason of the present situation in Sri Lanka. The Rajapaksha brothers returned back to power through the 2019 general election. The new government lead by Gotabaya Rajapaksha set out to fulfill its proposed promises like tax cuts, decision of organic farming. The idea of tax-free household, Decision of huge reduction in VAT tax and a significant reduction in cooperative tax lead to severe downfall in government revenue and an obvious budget deficit. To cover this, Central Bank began printing money after which the IMF warned about a possibility of economic explosion. Gotabaya further went on to ban fertilizers import which he believed would significantly lower imports and save foreign reserves. This backfired as the nation was not ready for the transition to organic farming thereby leading to shortages of food creating a problematic price rise. As a result, Sri Lanka had to now import basic food crops. Further, the recent Russian ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine disturbed imports of tea by Russia. Aggravating all this, the Easter bombings lead to a reduction in tourists and the pandemic further gave a severe crush to the tourism sector which is said to have accounted as high as 12% of the country GDP. Sri Lankan beaches are today completely empty in a season which usually is a peak time for hospitality sector. A fall in remittance, debt trap and Russia-Ukraine confrontation are some ancillary reasons for the same. The declaration of financial emergency, the change of PM seat from Mahinda Rajapaksha to Ranil Wickramsinghe did little to satisfy the public. Gotabaya should have quit long back by taking the moral responsibility. Instead, he chose to deflect the blame on his ministers and did the most to irritate the masses. Even today, he is not in a mood to accept the very fact that his royal mansion was raided by angry mob and how he had to manage the great escape. Governments policy blunders lead to people waiting for hours to get cooking gas cylinders get refilled, huge power cuts, schools and other institutions getting closed to save Oil and electricity, unprecedented inflation leading to almost everything getting costly. The series of events above mentioned made the plot of Public coup and the seizure of Presidential Palace, the PM’s house ‘Temple Tress’ getting occupied by angry protestors and the large scale demonstrations across the country. This angry mob diving in the President’s Pool has clearly stated that the Palace won’t be emptied until both the PM and the President resigns from office. What is worth understanding is not just this attractive seizure but what the way ahead is for the pearl of Indian Ocean whose shine has got diminished in the last few months. It is worth understanding that the Seizure of Presidential Palace and the viral images might look attractive but does little to improve the economic crisis. It has more of a symbolic role to warn the coming regime to be indebted to public interest failing which can result into similar or possibly even bigger revolution. A mere regime change would just mollify the masses for the time being. What is indeed needed is a proper shift of power within constitutional bounds, without the public coup turning out into a military coup and through a well structured mechanism. Given that the country is already lacking resources monetarily and also otherwise, fresh elections are not a prudent step. Possibly, the Speaker can takeover rather than giving seat, though constitutionally, to a person whom the public finds not less guilty of the present hardships. He should ensure that the parliament chooses new occupants at the earliest so that a constitutionally legitimized government can go on to IMF, the western powers and other allies for a bailout package and do all other steps to bring the Lankan Lion back to normalcy. Such a transition will instill public trust and confidence, something which looks the most shattered at present. If the occupancy of two prominent seats of power remains vacant for long, this would lead to power vacuum leading to a possible civil unrest in the country. The tourism sector cannot boost until a fixed and powerful regime is established and inflation is brought down. A revised tourism policy can be formulated keeping in view the significance of tourism sector in lowering the budget deficit. Once the foreign debt percentage falls from the present 119% of GDP, essential goods supply chain is normalized, reformulated and decisive monetary and fiscal policies are installed, the country can move on for a fresh election. The nation needs to prioritize the present situation leaving aside old confrontations on racial and religious lines. To curb unemployment rates and for strategic purposes, it should also focus to diversify its investment projects by shifting from the Dragon to other nations in Europe and South East Asia. The opposition parties have to set aside ideological and ethnic differences and together try to build the Lankan republic from scratch. The political elite of Sri Lanka should keep their self interests aside and those guilty in the eyes of the public should step down soon. They need to understand that unless the angry crowds on streets don’t go back to their home, leave the fancy presidential palace; no reformation process can take place. Afterall, crowds cannot negotiate with the IMF. Sri Lankan public is just not ready to accept the Rajpaksha family and their supporters at the moment. With army keeping their guns down at some protest sites in support of the public should be a simple indication for the top office how far has the Sri Lankan public reached in capturing state institutions. All in all, the small island nation in the Indian Ocean needs to back itself; the political leadership has to be smart enough in negotiating over the bailout package along with instilling the confidence in masses of a better Sri Lanka in the times to come. It needs to understand from the model of Indonesia who was once stuck in a similar economic crisis but smart and swift economic model has ensured its entry into the powerful G-20 club today. The July 9 protests and the later developments on the streets of Colombo are a clear testimony to the potential of a collective mass mobilization. It is an alarming situation for similar economies that have been facing economic crisis as a result of miscalculated policies by their representatives in power. The public coup thus need not be seen as the end of it rather has to be acknowledged with a hope of a fresh start towards a new era in the island’s history. #SriLanka #Coup #China #Rajapaksha Udbhav Sharma is doing his Masters in Politics and International Relations at the School of International studies, Jawaharlal University, New Delhi.

By Srijan Sharma The concept of contingent sovereignty which says that sovereign rights and immunities are not absolute. They depend on the observance of fundamental state obligations. The Russian Ukraine War is going to complete 6 months and has raised full throttle discussions over it. The International Court of Justice has condemned Russia’s actions and ordered an immediate withdrawal of troops from Ukraine. Therefore, the question of legality of Russian actions deserves merit to be discussed. What UN Charter Says? United Nations Charter of 1945, in article 2(4), prohibited “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”. The United Nation straightway prohibits war; however, UN does not fully close the doors for aggression or presses for prohibition rather United Nations under the charter have established due procedure to respond to aggression through armed measures. UN is empowered under article 39 to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. It may make recommendations or decide what measures (including the use of armed force) shall be taken. The decision rests upon the UNSC. Applicability of Article 51 of UN Charter The Article 51 of UN Charter reads Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Article 51 grants states the right to exercise self-defence. In such cases States have resorted to defend and protect their sovereignty, security from terrorists and have taken armed measures against non-military targets and hence Self Defence is convincingly justified; but is it justified in the present scenario? The answer is straight no because there are territorial and strategic interests of Russia (Donbas Region). It is a well settled fact that Article 51 cannot be used for territorial gains rather for securing and responding to an attack by a state or violent non-state actors against a state. In this regard Security Council resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001) have formally endorsed the view that self-defence is available to avert terrorist attacks such as in the case of the 9/11 attacks. Even if Russia argues that use of force is done in the response of genocide then it makes the case of humanitarian intervention for which UNSC nod is required. Though critics argue that such an act of unilateralism was exercised by the United States in the past, Libya Kosovo etc. Looking Through ICJ Lenses ICJ prima facie did not decide on question of genocide, the court did raise its eyebrows on the fact that whether a country can unilaterally use force against another country for preventing an alleged act of genocide. This indicates that Russia’s use of force is difficult to justify under the Genocide Convention. However, there is no strict and effective measure to enforce ICJ decisions, it has to go through UNSC in which Russia is the permanent member. The question still remains - Is there legality to war? Or does even full prohibition of war exists? Even if it partially exists no mechanism or institution is able to even control that partial fraction of war. No Full Prohibition of War: Russia Seeking Refuge in Interpretations There is no full prohibition to war there are certain legal escape routes that can circumvent the UN Charters, ICJ Rulings etc. That is the Principle of Military Necessity Under International Humanitarian Law. This principle permits the legal use of force to achieve military objectives. Further, principles of military necessity are only implemented as a last resort when all agreed political and diplomatic channels collapse. The following is the explanation on merits which justifies Russian actions under the umbrella of interpretations. 1- Russia says meaningful dialogue cannot be initiated now through diplomatic and political means because over the years the agreements have failed. Russia’s apprehensions of Ukraine waging a genocide in Donbstek makes the situation appear a military necessity. The speech of Head of Main Operations Directorate of General Staff of Armed Forces of the Russian Federation Colonel General Segi Rudskoy deals with the issue. 2- Russia says that It has launched a special military operation to target military and strategic installations of Ukraine Government and Military and nowhere says that the operation is aimed against people of Ukraine. 3- The case of collateral damages fits in the present case. Russia has no intent to harm or directly target the people of Ukraine. Damages and loss of life direct result of unintentional damage which has been inflicted upon by Air Strikes/ Artillery fire. 4- The concept of contingent sovereignty which says that sovereign rights and immunities are not absolute. They depend on the observance of fundamental state obligations. These include the responsibility to protect the citizens of the state. When a regime makes war on its people or cannot prevent atrocities against them, it loses its claim to non-intervention. In such a situation, the responsibility to protect may fall on the international community. #Russia #Ukraine #UNSC #ICJ Srijan Sharma is working as an Research Analyst at India's oldest and prestigious national security and strategic Think Tank United Service Institution Of India (USI).