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By Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli When Xi visited Samarkand on September 16, what surprised many analysts was that he made no major headline-grabbing speech nor attended the official dinner. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s first foreign visit since the outbreak of the Covid pandemic – to Samarkand for the SCO summit – seems to have proved largely counter-productive. China and Russia helped form the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in 2001, building on its earlier avatar ‘Shanghai Five’ of 1996. Today, the SCO has eight members and several observers, dialogue partners and partner multilateral institutions. It has made some progress in counter-terrorism -- through ‘Peace Mission’, ‘Pabbi’ and ‘Solidarity’ exercises -- and energy cooperation and multipolarity. Except for China and India, the SCO is still weak in market economy. When Xi visited Samarkand on September 16, what surprised many analysts was that he made no major headline-grabbing speech nor attended the official dinner. His anodyne address to the summit meeting on “sunny and rainy days” alternating only led to speculation on the domestic and global situation. No significant reports of his bilateral meetings were mentioned, except for that with Russian President Vladimir Putin, which apparently did not go well. The expected meeting at Samarkand between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi did not take place despite the partial disengagement of troops on September 8 at Gogra Heights and Hot Springs in Ladakh. There are at least six more “friction points” where disengagement and de-escalation need to be carried out. The SCO ‘spirit’ is to build mutual trust. However, China’s military aggression against India, a fellow SCO member, has punctured such claims. Also, the Samarkand Declaration emphasised on fighting terrorism, even as China was putting on hold, once again, sanctions on Pakistan-based terrorists. While Beijing has been bailing out terrorists like Masood Azhar, Zakir-ul-Rehman, Makki and others since 2009, blocking action to proscribe them in the UN Security Council-mandated 1267 Committee, the trend has intensified recently – contrary to the SCO’s spirit and agenda. The Samarkand Declaration stated that the “global situation is deteriorating alarmingly”. This is in reference to the Ukrainian situation, energy and food crises, supply chain disruptions due to the spread of the pandemic, and others. Xi is also under tremendous pressure due to the persistence of Covid-19 across China, despite his ‘zero covid’ policies, and the resultant relative decline in economic growth rates and social unrest. However, the undercurrent at Samarkand was the uncertainty brought about by Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. The supposedly mighty Russian military has been unable to bring Ukraine under its boot even after seven months of fighting. Nor has Putin been able to achieve his stated goals of forcing Ukraine to remain neutral and preventing NATO expansion. The recent withdrawal of Russian troops from Kharkiv further raised doubts in China about Russian superiority. In early February, a Xi-Putin joint statement had proclaimed their partnership to be “limitless”. Just months later, stark differences have come to the fore between them, including on how far China would go to support Russia against western sanctions. Not just that, Chinese migration to Siberia is changing the demographic profile in Khabarovsk, Krai, Primorovsky and other regions in the Russian Far East. Then there are, of course, issues like Chinese smuggling, IPR theft , espionage for defence technologies, fisheries’ restrictions, etc. It was reported that at the Xi-Putin meeting in Samarkand, Xi had reiterated his readiness “to work with Russia in extending strong support to each other on issues concerning their respective core interests”. Putin, on the other hand, said he understood China’s “questions and concerns”. A week before the Xi-Putin meeting, Li Zhanshu, the No 3 Politburo Standing Committee member, visited Russia and reportedly assured China’s support for Russia. Thus, while China-Russia equations on Ukraine, Taiwan and other issues are still shrouded in secrecy, it appears that China is feeling the heat from the NATO countries – together, China’s largest trading partners, with nearly $2 trillion in trade that is heavily beneficial to Beijing. With the Ukraine war dragging on for more than seven months now, China is under tremendous pressure from all quarters. Initially, China justified the Russian invasion, blaming NATO expansion for it. This view is now relatively subdued in Chinese statements. Increasingly, China is under pressure domestically and internationally for its ties with Russia. Domestically, as China is witnessing relative economic decline, it increasingly needs the support of western countries to resurrect Chinese fortunes. With the 20th Communist Party Congress due on October 16 this year, Xi is under growing pressure from different factions in the Communist Party. Meanwhile, China’s tacit support to Russian military actions is increasingly alienating Beijing from the western countries. With the Ukrainian conflict at the cusp of the changing regional and international order, Xi must be a worried man. China dreamt of rising to the top to supplant a declining United States. Xi’s apple cart has been upset – the global and regional strategic situation has become more complex. #SCO #China #XiJinping #Russia Originally published: Deccan Herald, September 25, 2022. https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/xi-might-want-to-quickly-forget-his-samarkand-outing-1148055.html Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli is Dean of the School of International Studies and Professor in Chinese Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University. Views are personal.

By Prof. Bharat H Desai The Maldivian diplomat Abdulla Shahid, President of the 76th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), symbolically handed over gavel on 12 September 2022, at the end of his ‘Presidency of Hope’, to the Hungarian diplomat Csaba Kőrösi, the President of the 77th session. “We owe it to ourselves, to our peers, to our children, to our grandchildren, to humanity, to choose hope”, Shahid said. It is exactly that hope that lie in tatters even as millions of children worldwide face unprecedented challenges at birth, in growth, treatment on gendered lines and in violent conflicts that rage around the world. This sordid saga seriously impinges upon our future. Still, it remains mostly under wraps as jetsetter diplomats engage in glitzy state affairs, scholars quibble over geopolitics, spheres of influence, territorial disputes, bilateral photo-ops and others relish in finding faults with the UN and International Law. Global Violence Against Children A landmark 2006 UN study on violence against children emphatically asserted that “No violence against children is justifiable; all violence against children is preventable”. Globally, children now face growing violence such as bullying, including cyberbullying, sexual harassment including peer-to-peer and conscription by armed groups engaged in warfare and terrorism. Girls in particular are exposed to heightened risks of negative social norms, gender stereotypes, gender-based discrimination and sexual and gender-based violence. According to the Global Humanitarian Overview 2022, an estimated 16 million people pushed into food crises in 15 countries has exacerbated violence against women and children. In conflict zones, recurrent attacks take place on schools and hospitals and children get abducted. Protection of Children: Existing Legal Framework The global armed conflicts result in gross violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights law (IHRL). The political organs of the UN have responded to the challenge through the resolutions of the UNGA and the UNSC for protection of the rights of the children against violence including in armed conflicts. The UNGA resolution 76/147 of 16 December 2021 called upon UNSG’s SR for Children and Armed Conflict to carry out her mandate for the protection of children in situations of armed conflict. She has been mandated to pro-actively engage with relevant UN entities, Member States, regional organizations and non-State armed groups. Now world’s 25% children (aged 0-14 years) population, out of 7.95 billion (2022), face a grim future. The UNGA adopted the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) vide resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989. It acknowledges that the Convention and the Optional Protocols thereto contain a comprehensive set of international legal standards for the protection and well-being of children. The nature and gravity of the challenges faced by world’s children can be gauged from the concerted works of the Special Representatives (SR) of the UNSG on Violence against Children as well as for Children and Armed Conflict, the Special Rapporteurs (SRs) of the Human Rights Council and the Committee on the Rights of the Child. The 2021 annual report of the UNSG’s SR (Najat Maalla M’jid) on violence against children (A/HRC/49/57) highlighted how violence against children has sharply risen. It was followed by the UNSG’s own 2022 report of the UNSG on children and armed conflict that provides graphic details of the violations against children. It holds parties to the conflict responsible for “recruitment and use of children, the killing and maiming of children, rape and other forms of sexual violence against children, attacks on schools, hospitals and protected persons”. The report has enlisted 23,982 verified grave violations that have affected 19,165 children (13,633 boys, 5,242 girls, 290 sex unknown). The highest numbers of violations comprised the killing (2,515) and maiming (5,555) of 8,070 children and the recruitment of 6,310 children. In this respect, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Somalia, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen top the chart. The UNSG’s report (S/2022/272 of 29 March 2022) on conflict related sexual violence surmises that most of the cases of sexual violence continued to be vastly underreported, owing to stigmatization, the fear of reprisals, harmful social norms, the absence of services, impunity, the lack of humanitarian access and safety concerns. Any recruitment or use of children in armed conflicts is a violation of the IHL. In fact, IHL prohibits any indiscriminate attacks against civilians, including children, and they shall not be the object of attack, including by way of reprisal or excessive use of force. The role of various armed groups, as distinct from the armed forces of a State, have become a global concern as regards the recruitment and training of children in hostilities. In view of growing conscription of children in armed conflict, the Optional Protocol (25 May 2000) to the CRC, has called for raising the minimum age for voluntary recruitment of persons into the national armed forces from that set out in article 38 (3) of the CRC. The Optional Protocol (Article 2) explicitly requires that the State Parties “shall ensure that persons who have not attained the age of 18 years are not compulsorily recruited into their armed forces”. Under the CRC too, persons under 18 years of age are entitled to special protection, and to adopt safeguards to ensure that such recruitment is not forced or coerced. As a corollary to these instruments, there has been other efforts at ‘taming the beast’ in armed conflicts such as the Cape Town Principles (1997) and the Paris Principles and Commitments on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups (2007). Striving for Children’s Better Future In view of the above, as the authoritarian regimes, toxicity laden societies and violent conflicts pose grave risks to the 25% of global population (children), the UN member states need to urgently address the challenge. The road map can comprise convening of a special UN conference on the rights and protection of children including special focus at the Summit of the Future (22-23 September 2024), decided vide UNGA modalities resolution of 76/307 of 08 September 2022, to craft a concrete time bound action plan for the elimination of all forms of violence against children especially in conflict zones to ensure a better future for the world’s children. ****** Part - I: Blog Special Series-I: Use of Food as a Weapon of War: A Challenge for International Law (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com) Part - II: Blog Special Series-II: Use of Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War: A Challenge for International Law (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com) Part - III: Abused Ammunition as a Weapon of War in the DR Congo: A Challenge for International Law (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com) Part – IV: Use of Nuclear Weapons in War (Hiroshima-Nagasaki Day): A Challenge for International Law (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com) Part – V: Use of Weapons of War and the Role of Humanitarians: A Challenge for International Law (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com) #War #Children #InternationalLaw Professor Dr. Bharat H. Desai is Jawaharlal Nehru Chair and Professor of International Law at the Centre for International Legal Studies of SIS, JNU. He coordinated the Making SIS Visible initiative (2008-2013) as well as Inter-University Consortium: JNU; Jammu; Kashmir; Sikkim (2012-2020) and is the Editor-in-Chief of Environmental Policy and Law (IOS Press: Amsterdam).

प्रोफेसर श्रीकांत कोंडापल्ली शंघाई सहयोग संगठन की मौजूदा बैठक भारत के लिए काफी अहम साबित होने जा रही है। बेशक, चर्चा का यही मुख्य विषय है कि क्या चीन के राष्ट्रपति शी जिनपिंग और भारतीय प्रधानमंत्री नरेंद्र मोदी एक साथ बैठेंगे?... शंघाई सहयोग संगठन की मौजूदा बैठक भारत के लिए काफी अहम साबित होने जा रही है। बेशक, चर्चा का यही मुख्य विषय है कि क्या चीन के राष्ट्रपति शी जिनपिंग और भारतीय प्रधानमंत्री नरेंद्र मोदी एक साथ बैठेंगे? मगर कई अन्य मसले भी हैं, जिन पर चर्चा हमारे लिए मायने रखती है। प्रधानमंत्री मोदी ने ऐसे कई विषयों को अपने संबोधन में समेटा। उन्होंने विनिर्माण कार्य तेज करने, कोविड-संक्रमण काल से उबरने, आपूर्ति शृंखला को निर्बाध गति देने और विकास दर को आगे बढ़ाने पर उचित ही जोर दिया। उन्होंने खाद्यान्न की कीमतों की भी चर्चा की, क्योंकि रूस-यूक्रेन युद्ध से गेहूं का वैश्विक निर्यात प्रभावित हुआ है। वैश्विक महंगाई भी एक अहम मुद्दा था, जिसकी चर्चा प्रधानमंत्री मोदी ने की। ऊर्जा संरक्षण पर भी उन्होंने जोर दिया, क्योंकि कोविड-काल में अंतरराष्ट्रीय बाजार में कच्चे तेल के दाम घटकर शून्य के करीब हो गए थे, जो अब बढ़कर फिर 100 डॉलर प्रति बैरल पहुंच गए हैं। भारत और चीन के शासनाध्यक्षों की मुलाकात को लेकर शायद ही आधिकारिक तौर पर कुछ कहा जाए, लेकिन दोनों नेता आखिरी वक्त में मिल भी सकते हैं। सीमा पर तनातनी खत्म करने की जो पहल पिछले दिनों हुई थी, उसका यही मतलब निकलता है। कूटनीतिज्ञ जानते हैं कि बिना किसी खास प्रयोजन के ऐसा नहीं किया जाता। विश्व की दूसरी सबसे बड़ी अर्थव्यवस्था यानी चीन और पांचवीं आर्थिक ताकत यानी भारत जरूर बात करेंगे, बेशक इससे संबंधों को कोई खास गति न मिले। अच्छी बात यह है कि अगले साल शंघाई सहयोग संगठन का नेतृत्व भारत करेगा। इस पर सभी सदस्य देश राजी हैं। यह प्रधानमंत्री मोदी की यात्रा की एक बड़ी उपलब्धि होगी, क्योंकि अगली बैठक की सफलता बतौर मेजबान हमारा कद ऊंचा करेगी, और हमारी क्षमता बढ़ाएगी। यही कारण है कि अपने संबोधन में प्रधानमंत्री मोदी ने किसी विवादित मुद्दे की बात नहीं की, बल्कि कोविड से कारण सुस्त पड़ी आर्थिक गति को तेज करने का खाका खींचा। इस संगठन का हमें कई तरह से फायदा हो सकता है। पहला, आतंकवाद के खिलाफ यह हमारे काम आ सकता है। ‘रीजनल एंटी-टेररिस्ट स्ट्रक्चर’ (आरएटीएस) इस संगठन का स्थायी अंग है। यह आतंकवाद के खिलाफ अभ्यास-कार्य करता रहता है, जिससे हमारे सैनिकों को सुरक्षा की नई रणनीति बनाने का अनुभव मिलता है। फिर, जब हम ‘काउंटर-टेररिज्म’ की बात कहते हैं, तो वह ‘क्रॉस-बॉर्डर टेररिज्म’ होता है, यानी सीमा पार से संचालित आतंकी गतिविधि। इसमें स्वाभाविक तौर पर पाकिस्तान घिरता है। यह संगठन हमें मौका देता है कि हम न सिर्फ चीन और रूस, बल्कि ईरान को भी पाकिस्तान का असली चेहरा दिखा सकते हैं। आतंकवाद का विरोध करने के कारण संगठन के सदस्य देश पाकिस्तान-परस्त आतंकवाद पर बहुत दिनों तक आंखें मूंदे नहीं रह सकते। ऊर्जा सहयोग के लिहाज से भी यह संगठन काफी फायदेमंद है। 2008 की आर्थिक मंदी के समय जब कच्चे तेल की कीमत बढ़कर 140 डॉलर प्रति बैरल हो गई थी, तब हमारा बजट पूरी तरह से गड़बड़ा गया था। मध्य एशिया हमारी ऊर्जा जरूरतें काफी हद तक पूरी कर सकता है। रूस भी साल के कुछ महीने में सऊदी अरब से अधिक तेल उत्पादन करता है। इसका मतलब है कि यदि रूस और मध्य एशिया से हमारे रिश्ते सही रहे, तो हमें सस्ती दरों पर तेल मिल सकता है। पिछले दिनों रूस ने हमें करीब 35 फीसदी छूट के साथ तेल दिया था। व्यापारिक रिश्ते को गति देने में भी यह कारगर है। ‘इंटरनेशनल नॉर्थ-साउथ ट्रांसपोर्ट कॉरिडोर’ भारत को यूरोप से जोड़ेगा। हम इसके माध्यम से पाकिस्तान को किनारे करके चाबहार (अफगानिस्तान) के रास्ते रूस तक जा सकते हैं। जरांज-डेलाराम रोड भी हमारे लिए फायदेमंद है। अफगानिस्तान से निकटता लिथियम बैटरी जैसी हमारी जरूरतों को दूर कर सकती है। अच्छी बात है कि ऊर्जा, व्यापार और आर्थिकी से जुड़े कुछ द्विपक्षीय समझौते भी हुए हैं। चीन को छोड़कर शंघाई सहयोग संगठन के तमाम देशों से अभी हम 30-40 अरब डॉलर का कारोबार करते हैं। नए समझौते आपसी कारोबार बढ़ा सकते हैं, जो हमारे लिए लाभ का सौदा होगा। मूल रूप से प्रकाशित: हिंदुस्तान, 16.09.2022 https://www.livehindustan.com/blog/nazariya/story-hindustan-nazariya-column-17-september-2022-7092437.amp.html प्रोफेसर श्रीकांत कोंडापल्ली डीन, स्कूल ऑफ इंटरनेशनल स्टडीज, जेएनयू

By Prof. Swaran Singh Instead of transforming diminishing post-war institutions, the U.S. and its allies remain focused on strengthening them despite waning relevance and remit. The GSI, on the other hand, promises to address increasingly complex global security challenges with Chinese solutions rooted in the ancient wisdom of Chinese traditions. After a decade of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Chinese President Xi Jinping launched two spin-offs, the Global Development Initiative (GDI) and the Global Security Initiative (GSI), in September 2021 and April 2022, respectively. The trio of programs has its proponents, partners, fence sitters and detractors, and over time, their ideas have all gained traction and attention worldwide. As United Nations (UN) Secretary-General António Guterres prepares his ambitious 2023 Summit of the Future in September, which is expected to bring a “New Agenda for Peace,” the debate is shifting from specific conflicts to crafting a transformative overarching global security governance architecture for the future that provides interesting space for the GSI to engage in global narratives. The last time UN Secretary General issued such a proposal was in 1992, when Boutros-Boutros Ghali presented “An Agenda for Peace” that resulted in transforming the UN peacekeeping operations. This makes the GSI a significant turning point and a catalyst for making critical value additions to this evolving discussion around a new global security architecture blueprint. Various commentators have already described the GSI as one potent non-Western alternative that represents the aspirations of the combined Global South. However, to make a permanent mark on the emerging debate, China needs to convince nations of the Global North as well. They represent the architects and advocates of the existing post-World War II global security architecture. In August, as the rotating president of the UN Security Council, China convened a special session dedicated to “Promoting Common Security through Dialogue and Cooperation,” wherein China’s permanent representative to the UN Zhang Jun presented details of the GSI and expressed the country’s readiness to work with the international community to evolve consensus around the GSI in building a balanced, effective, and sustainable international security architecture together. President Xi first proposed the GSI vision to provide security for all in a short keynote address at the opening ceremony of the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference 2022 this April. As outlined in President Xi’s speech, the GSI is underpinned by “six commitments” as its pillar principles. These include: Vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security; Respecting sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries; Abiding by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter; Taking the legitimate security concerns of all countries seriously; Peacefully resolving differences and disputes between countries through dialogue and consultation; and Maintaining security in both traditional and non-traditional domains. Like the BRI and the GDI, in which various individual projects preexisted before President Xi released official blueprints for transforming global infrastructure, at first glance, the principles of the GSI have also been the mainstay of China’s foreign policy. What was novel here was that President Xi also urged all countries to uphold the principle of indivisible security and build a balanced, effective, and sustainable security architecture. The GSI’s recalibration of these principles in the new era changes central connotations, especially in terms of the addition of the principle of indivisibility of global security. As the saying goes, any system always contains more than the total sum of its parts. Also, parts often preexist before they are recalibrated in a new innovative design to maximize their collective outcome. Likewise, individual principles of the GSI can be traced back as far as the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, or the Panchasheel, originating in talks between China and India in the 1950s. In the same vein, the fact that the GSI now seeks to connect them with the noble principle of indivisible nature of global security enhances its critical contribution. The GSI must be read in tandem with the BRI and the GDI, as the trio of programs form part of China’s overarching vision and strategy of creating public goods to build a community with a shared future for humanity. These initiatives aim to eliminate the global deficit in material infrastructure, development, and peace. The central axiom of the GSI is that one nation’s security cannot be built at the cost of other nations. By proposing the GSI, China aims to emerge as a leading alternative provider of global security. No doubt, Western powers have looked at China’s GSI apprehensively and seen it delegitimizing the Cold War mindset of power politics and hegemony, thereby diminishing much of the outdated global governance architecture which no longer reflects the new realities of the 21st century. Addressing such suspicions will be an uphill task that must be done to earn credibility. After a decade of similar suspicion of the BRI, experience has paved a path to overcoming challenges, and today the many participating nations include many allies of the U.S. The progress of China’s GDI showcases the speed with which Beijing seeks to operationalize the GSI even more. The announcement of the GDI in September 2021 was followed by President Xi expounding it on the eve of 14th BRICS Summit in June 2022 as he chaired the High-level Dialogue on Global Development. This meeting was attended by BRICS leaders plus a dozen other invited national leaders from around the world. They agreed to work together and harness China’s GDI as an accelerator for realizing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The effort helped identify broad guiding principles for joint efforts while identifying eight areas for cooperation and setting up 32 specific mechanisms for collaboration towards well-defined deliverable outcomes. Just like the BRI and the GDI, the GSI has been especially agreeable to a number of African countries. Two sessions of the China-Africa Peace and Security Forum involving about 50 African states have been held. By practicing the GSI, China and Africa are expected to move towards a promising vision of jointly building a security community. Alongside building consensus on broad conceptualizations with these African nations, the GSI more specifically details help from China in areas of strategic communication, equipment and technology cooperation, joint maritime training exercises, exchange in professional fields, and other technical and financial assistance to counter terrorism and other threats in Africa. Along with serving as a development provider in Africa, China is also emerging as a security defender across many of the African nations. This trend became noticeable when some of Africa’s traditional security providers wound down their military engagement with African countries. As part of UN peacekeeping operations, thousands of Chinese peacekeepers are currently deployed to some of Africa’s most dangerous locations in Congo, Liberia, Mali, and Sudan. Under the BRI, many of these countries have already received assistance in building highways, ports, power stations, dams, and railways. Now, China is seeking to provide African countries with comprehensive support on matters such as piracy and counter-terrorism. The drive includes providing technology, equipment, personnel, and strategic advice that form the conflict prevention core of China’s GSI. The Gulf of Aden has already seen China emerge as an active player in counter-piracy operations. In addition to its coordinated naval patrols and rescue operations, China has provided naval assets, equipment, and financial assistance to local anti-piracy networks. But like the BRI and the GDI, the GSI is also expected to develop both conceptual and operational outreach far beyond Africa and this will have its challenges. Most importantly, GSI presents an alternate vision of global security governance that has implications for the existing post-World War II architecture that props up U.S. world leadership. Embroiled in pandemic-driven resource deficit and domestic instability, the Biden administration has increasingly depended on its friends and allies, many of whom now show varying trajectories in their engagement with Beijing. The ongoing Ukraine crisis has made the issue even more public as the U.S. has sought to build consensus for imposing severe economic sanctions on Russia. These internal issues affecting both the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization also shine light on the urgent need for reformation of global security architecture. However, the U.S. and its allies remain focused on strengthening internally instead of transforming post-World War II institutions that are revealing their fast-diminishing relevance and remit. Consequently, the GSI has this space to ignite a new debate on the optimal method to address the world’s increasingly complex security challenges. It, of course, seeks to do so by providing Chinese solutions rooted in the ancient wisdom of unique Chinese traditions. #GSI #BRI #GDI #China Originally published: China Daily, September 19, 2022 http://chinaindiadialogue.com/global-security-initiative-off-to-a-promising-start-but-an-uphill-task Posted here with the authorization of the author. Swaran Singh is a Professor of International Relations at Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Delhi) and currently visiting professor at the University of British Columbia (Vancouver, Canada).

By Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli While the nation’s attention is drawn acutely to the western sector of the border between India and China in the wake of the bloody fisticuffs on the night of June 15, 2020, and the aftermath, developments in the Indian eastern flank are no less alarming. Indeed, China’s revival of irredentist claims, strategic border domination efforts, the creation of pinpricks or even waging psychological warfare against India. These are, of course, stoutly countered by India by matching, if not overpowering, build-up of capabilities, plans, strategic alignments, and diplomatic manoeuvres. When China occupied Tibet in 1951, its main focus was on the Aksai Chin region for transporting and sustaining its troops. China’s attention hardly elicited Arunachal Pradesh’s (at that time, North East Frontier Agency) region. Indeed, in 1960, China’s Premier Zhou Enlai even suggested a “swap deal” of accepting south of the 1914 McMahon Line (the current day Arunachal Pradesh) as a part of India provided the latter recognised Aksai Chin as a part of China. The offer was repeated by Deng Xiaoping in 1980 but was not accepted by India due to China’s tentative and dubious claims, even for Aksai Chin. The territorial dispute across 1,126 kilometres of border between India and China in the eastern sector is actually in six areas, including Longju, Asaphila, Migyitun, Namka Chu, Samdurong Chu, and Chantze. Frequent transgressions by China’s troops are reported in these areas, specifically in Kameng, Fish Tails, and other areas. Recently, border transgressions by China were reported at Hundred Hill at Kaho, Andrella Valley at Dibang, Maja in Upper Subansiri and other areas. However, since the mid-1980s, China has begun eyeing Arunachal Pradesh for its strategic location, boundless natural resources, and historical and religious affiliations of Tibet to this region and to balance or contain India. Samdurong Chu incident in 1986 was the first pointer in this direction when about 200 Chinese soldiers crossed the Kameng sector at an increasing rate of transgressions that year. Earlier, in 1975, the Tulung la incident resulted in four Assam Rifles soldiers being ambushed. India doubled down by organising the spectacular Operation Checkerboard with air-land battle scenarios. The Chinese were rattled with the resulting kill ratio – that is estimated at ten Chinese casualties for every one Indian soldier dead in the simulations, according to Chinese military sources. As a result, Deng Xiaoping began diverting attention to “Asian century” debates. At the 8th border talks to resolve the territorial dispute in November 1987, a flustered China also proposed creating a demilitarised zone in the eastern sector. Again, at the 4th Joint Working Group (JWG) meeting in February 1992, China proposed that the local military personnel should meet at Bumla to sort out border frictions. Later, in August 1995, at the 8th JWG meeting, China also agreed to withdraw troops from four forward military posts in the Wangdong area. At the next 9th JWG meeting in October 1996, China also agreed to open an annual military meeting point at Dichu in the eastern sector at the level of a major general. Thus, even though China realised it could not force India into the eastern sector, it, however, raised unsettling irredentist claims in the region by equating Arunachal Pradesh to “southern Tibet” (zangnan). Since the mid-1980s, China began arguing that since the 5th Dalai Lama hailed from the Tawang monastery, it should belong to communist China now! Even though China’s foreign minister, Li Zhaoxing wrote a book lampooning the 5th Dalai Lama, China began assuming “ownership” over him and the monastery. Today, with President Xi Jinping proclaiming the “China Dream” of eyeing “lost territories” historically, full normalisation of relations with India has become problematic for decades to come. The then China’s ambassador to India Sun Yuxi went further, just before the visit of President Hu Jintao to Delhi in November 2006, by declaring to a tv channel that the whole of Arunachal Pradesh is a disputed territory between the two countries—thus moving farther than Zhou or Deng’s “swap” deal offer. In early 2007 China also denied a visa to an IAS officer from Arunachal Pradesh, which led India to cancel the whole visit by 107 officers to China. Several sportspersons, defence personnel, and others who were domiciled to Arunachal Pradesh, likewise were denied visas by China. China also began diverting river waters from Yarlung Zangpo in Tibet to its northern areas under the South-North River Diversion Program. As Yarlung Zangpo enters Arunachal Pradesh at Namchabarua, an estimated 62 billion cubic metres of water is discharged at this point. With accumulations from the Siang River and others downstream, the Brahmaputra River gains strength, and when it reaches Bangladesh through Meghalaya, it discharges an estimated 220 billion cubic metres of water. However, with the river diversion projects upstream – with about 26 medium to large dams planned by China and some three times bigger than the existing Three Gorges Dam – the lower riparian states such as India and Bangladesh are concerned about water shortages or China using this as a “water bomb”. In October last year, when Kameng river water became dark due to turbidity, speculations were rife about China’s antics and concerns about biodiversity in the region. A more concerted effort was made by China to dominate the region by first constructing dual-use infrastructure projects and later brazenly creating “well-off society” villages or even military installations across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with Arunachal Pradesh. China began constructing 624 “well-off society” villages in 2017, and 200 of these were constructed in the LAC areas with India or on the borders with Bhutan and Nepal. At Tsari Chu village at Migyitun on the border with Arunachal Pradesh, two military outposts of China have also come up, while at Longju in Arunachal Pradesh, construction activity with road and forest clearance has been reported recently. These efforts were matched with the large-scale deployment of military assets to the region opposite to Arunachal Pradesh. Over a period of time, China has built eight airfields opposite India in the eastern sector, including Gonggar, Hoping, Pangta and Linzhi, besides other airfields deeper inside at Chengdu, Kunming and Chongqing in the recently refurbished Western Theatre Command. Reports in August 2022 indicated that China began building a helipad closer to Chaglagam closer to Anjaw district in Arunachal Pradesh. Its road construction projects in Tibet have also been expanded to over 1,20,000 kilometres, while after the 2006 inauguration of the Gormud to Lhasa railway, China began constructing railways from Chengdu and Kunming, passing through Nyingqi prefecture opposite Arunachal Pradesh. For instance, due to this infrastructure development, the military outposts across the LAC are well connected in Tibet – almost about 8 kilometres near the LAC compared to 20 or even 120 kilometres where the Indian troops are connected on many areas of the Indian side of the LAC. Also, as psychological warfare, China renamed six places in Arunachal Pradesh in 2017 and another 15 in late 2021. India brushed off Beijing’s such antics. Earlier in June 2009, China blocked an Indian loan request from Asian Development Bank for flood control, sanitation and water management projects in Arunachal Pradesh. Frequent reports also indicate the intimidation or even kidnapping of youths across the Upper Siang district, such as the incident on January 18 this year. The legitimacy for such brazen activities of China in border areas with Arunachal Pradesh was provided by the highest political leadership. President Xi Jinping visited Tibet from July 21 to 23 last year. He visited Nyingchi which is a few kilometres north of Arunachal Pradesh, to inspect the railway line under construction. Earlier, he wrote a letter on October 28, 2017, to Drolkar and Yangzom, the Yume village herders located 30 kilometres north of Asaphila in Arunachal Pradesh. This came soon after the Dokhlam imbroglio on the Sino-Bhutan border. In the letter, Xi stated, “Without peace in the territory, there will be no peaceful lives for millions of families. [I] hope you will motivate more herders to set down roots in the border area like galsang flowers, and become guardians of the Chinese territory and constructors of a happy hometown”. Such efforts of China were stoutly opposed by India. While agreeing that China’s military deployments and infrastructure projects pose concern for India, the Indian Army’s Eastern Command chief Lt. Gen Pratap Singh Kalita stated at the press conference on May 16 this year that there have been no border transgressions by China since the 1959 Longju incident in the region. India’s response to China’s efforts is swift and decisive. At the infrastructure level, India began the strategic road construction connecting border areas. The Border Area Development Programme witnessed a massive hike in allocations in Arunachal Pradesh recently. Eight-foot tracks measuring around 600 kilometres are being laid down in Arunachal Pradesh. Arunachal Pradesh has a formidable array of troops and weapon systems – an estimated 1,70,000 troops, an additional two Divisions since June 2009, a Brahmos cruise missile regiment, two squadrons of Su-30 MKI fighter aircraft since July 2008 and bases at Hashimara, Chabua and Tezpur for deep penetration strikes into China. Since 2009, India also announced strategic nuclear weapons deployments to the Northeast as a deterrent against China. The Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) raised 34 additional battalions to Arunachal Pradesh for front-line defence against China. The ITBP created 47 new border outposts along the border with China, in addition to 12 staging camps. To bridge the civil and military aviation infrastructure gaps in the region, India began revamping the advanced landing zones in the eastern regions of Arunachal Pradesh. Also, in April this year, Alliance Air made its maiden visit to Pasighat from Dibrugarh with Union Ministers Jyotiraditya Scindia and Kiren Rijiju onboard. Soon, air services are expected to connect Tezu, Mechuka, Ziro and Tuting. At the political level, India began sending high political functionaries to Arunachal Pradesh such as President, Vice President, and Prime Ministers, periodically. Last October, for instance, Vice President Naidu visited Arunachal Pradesh. Also, the Dalai Lama made frequent visits to the region, specifically to the religious Tawang Monastery. In November last year, the Dalai Lama visited the region, with the previous visits in 1986, 1996, 1997, twice in 2003, 2006 and in 2017. These elicited sharp reactions from China but in vain. Thus, while China had undertaken a multipronged approach to counter India in Arunachal Pradesh, these remain ineffective and counter-productive. Arunachal Pradesh today is a formidable bulwark against the Chinese juggernaut at religious, cultural, political, economic, military, and democratic levels. While China has been pumping enormous economic resources, specifically into infrastructure projects and the military in Tibet, these are devoid of legitimacy and popular support. As a thriving democracy and with increasing economic growth rates and inclusive development, India is more than a match for China. Hence, when the new German Ambassador to India, Philip Ackerman on August 30 this year termed China’s claims on Arunachal Pradesh as “outrageous” and the periodic border transgressions as a “violation of the international order”, China is increasingly losing its face in the international community to its aggressive policies. Also, since the 1962 border clashes, the United States recognised McMahon Line as the border between the two countries. Japan’s Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso, as well supported India on Arunachal Pradesh. The writing on the wall for China is thus increasingly becoming clear both at the bilateral and international levels. #India #China #ArunachalPradesh #LAC Originally published: THE BORDERLENS, September 13, 2022. https://www.borderlens.com/features/china-storming-arunachal-bastion-in-vain/ Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli is Dean of the School of International Studies and Professor in Chinese Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University. Views are personal.

By Prof. Gulshan Sachdeva Staying away from a key IPEF pillar negotiations is not good optics for a confident nation, and a key Indo-Pacific player At the recently-held ministerial meeting of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), India decided to join its three pillars related to supply chains, tax and anti-corruption, and clean energy. However, due to possible binding commitments on labour, environment, and digital trade, New Delhi opted out of its trade pillar. The United States-led IPEF was launched in May. Currently, it consists of 14 Indo-Pacific nations viz. Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, Vietnam, and the US. The grouping represents 40 percent of the global GDP, and 28 percent of global trade in goods and services. Many view the establishment of the IPEF as a move to counter China’s growing economic influence in the Indo-Pacific. Although growing in economic significance, the region is recognised by all major players, and its economic architecture is still evolving. Both the US and India are out of the Indo-Pacific megadeals. They are not members of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) or the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). So, the IPEF has the potential to provide a solid platform to both of them in framing economic rules in an economically-dynamic Indo-Pacific region. Two years ago, India moved out of the China-dominated RCEP. The 15 nations RCEP now consists of 10 ASEAN nations as well as China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. Similarly, the CPTPP is an FTA between remaining 11 members of the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) when the Donald Trump administration withdrew from it in 2017. The membership now includes Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, New Zealand, Singapore, and Vietnam. The United Kingdom, China, Taiwan, and Ecuador have also applied for its membership. The key provisions of the CPTPP includes goods tariff, digital trade, procurement, IPR, investment, services etc. Unlike the CPTPP, the RCEP does not include labour and environmental issues or support to State-owned enterprises. But it encourages deep supply chain integration among members. Some countries such as Japan, Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Vietnam, and Brunei are members of all three groupings viz. CPTPP, the RCEP and the IPEF. Some of them have close strategic ties with the US. But all of them are also integrated with China-centred value chains. For them, the IPEF is one additional layer of integration in the Indo-Pacific under US patronage. It is also good for rebalancing increasing Chinese economic dominance. Through the IPEF, the US along with its allies and partners wants to enhance its economic engagement in Asia, and the Indo Pacific. Being a large, fastest-growing economy, and an important part of the QUAD, India also has an ambition to play a crucial part in the Indo-Pacific security, and economic architectures. It also wants to emerge as an alternative to companies relocating their value chains from China. Since we are absent both from the CPTPP and the RCEP, the IPEF is an opportunity to build multilateral economic linkages in the Indo-Pacific. As trade and supply chains are deeply integrated with each other, all the IPEF members except India have agreed to take part in negotiations in all four pillars of the IPEF. The labour issue has been cited as one of the major concerns for not joining the IPEF trade pillar. But even in the supply chain pillar, it is clearly mentioned that partner countries “will seek to ensure that the work promotes the labour standards that underpin fair, sustainable, and resilient supply chains”. India’s reluctance to participate in the trade pillar of the IPEF indicates a lack of confidence in its competitiveness. Recent trade agreements with Australia and the United Arab Emirates and fast track negotiations with the UK showed the world that India is changing its cautious approach towards trade pacts. It is not just bilateral deals, India is also hopeful of trade and investment agreements with the 27-member European Union (EU) soon. The agenda with the EU also includes labour and sustainability issues. Today, India’s foreign policy discourse is dominated by the Indo-Pacific. This narrative has to be synchronised with the confident external economic arrangements in the region. A short-term transactional approach may not be helpful in making India a crucial Indo-Pacific player. Staying away even for negotiations in a key IPEF pillar is not good optics for a confident nation. #India #IndoPacific #IPEF Originally published: Money Control, September 14, 2022 https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/opinion/what-message-does-india-send-by-opting-out-of-ipef-trade-policy-pillar-9175611.html Posted here with the authorization of the author. Gulshan Sachdeva is Professor at the Centre for European Studies and Coordinator, Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, Jawaharlal Nehru University. Views are personal.

By Prof. Amita Batra India's ability to successfully conclude its FTAs with the EU and Australia, according to schedule, will signal to the world its readiness and capability to play the role envisioned of it in the IPEF The US is hosting the first in-person ministerial meeting of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) on September 8-9 in Los Angeles. Earlier discussions with trade ministers, in which India participated as an “observer”, were held at the end of July in Singapore. No joint statement was issued after the July discussions but it is envisioned that the participating countries will declare the formal launch of rule-setting at the end of the September meeting. It may be useful to note some relevant considerations in developing India’s negotiating strategy in the IPEF trade pillar. It is important to emphasise that while the IPEF has a trade pillar, it is not a trade agreement and, therefore, should not be considered as an alternative to the mega regionals in Asia, namely, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). More specifically, the TPP, of which the CPTPP is a subset, both in terms of provisions and membership, was an economic instrument at the heart of the US’s pivot to Asia strategy aimed at containment of China. By instituting WTO++ provisions, especially with respect to state-owned enterprises, intellectual property rights (IPRs) and investor-state dispute settlement, the idea was to establish a rules-based trade order that China would have either found difficult to abide by and/or incur substantial costs in terms of difficult domestic reforms. The CPTPP, in comparison, is a watered-down version of the TPP, especially with respect to provisions relating to investment and labour and environment standards. Most importantly, the IPR provisions have been substantively altered, thus making it easier for China to seek membership of the agreement. China applied for the CPTPP in September 2021. While it has been argued that the actual membership for China may take a long time given some member countries’ (e.g. Japan, Australia and Canada) discomfort with the Chinese membership, it is also a fact that Australia and Japan are both members of the other mega-regional in Asia, the RCEP, which is inclusive of China and was signed in the midst of the pandemic when sentiments against China were running high. Given its centrality in regional supply chains and trade, membership of both the regional agreements, CPTPP and the RCEP, will give China a dominant position in setting the trade rules in the region. The IPEF, which excludes China and is promoted by the US, acquires salience in this context. For India, which is not a member of either of the mega-regional trade agreements, the IPEF, with nine members from East Asia (seven of which are Asean member economies) and two of its four pillars focused on trade connectivity and supply chains resilience, offers another opportunity to integrate with the dynamic East Asian value chain hub. Post-pandemic and in the wake of the Ukraine crisis, the regional economies are most likely to emerge as the preferred, secure alternative in the large corporations’ “China plus one” relocation strategy. Also, as evident in its post-pandemic comprehensive recovery framework, Asean is looking for supply chain resilience through diversification beyond the region (and beyond the RCEP) through its bilateral free-trade agreements (FTAs). The flexible format of the IPEF could be an opportunity, especially under its trade facilitation component, for India to seek remedial action against the non-tariff barriers that it has long complained about in the context of Asean-India FTA. The opportunity, however, comes with challenges. The IPEF does not include tariff preferences and hence, the scope for enhanced market access. Non-inclusion of tariffs has been attributed to domestic political constraints in the US. An additional consideration may have been the already low (0-5 per cent) global average most-favoured nation tariffs in the manufacturing sector achieved through both unilateral trade liberalisation policies of the developed and many developing countries and preferential trade agreements. The IPEF may have therefore been deliberately designed to focus on more modern-day provisions like digital trade, regulatory policies, trade facilitation and sustainable social development provisions relating to labour and environmental standards. Led by the US, the IPEF is likely to reflect its revealed position in the US-Mexico Canada Agreement (USMCA), which has forward-looking labour standards, including a mechanism to ensure minimum wages through the innovatively-defined rules of origin that could become a template for the IPEF. The provisions pertaining to digital trade and environmental standards in the USMCA are considered to be even more stringent than those under the CPTPP. The trade facilitation component in the IPEF may likely draw from the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) rules. Other than India, all members of the IPEF are also members of the APEC. Countries like Vietnam, which is a member of RCEP, CPTPP and APEC, have, in the past, used their membership of FTAs as a means to lock in necessary domestic reforms. A majority of Vietnam’s FTAs are with the APEC member economies. Interestingly, the consensus towards taking forward the high grade, WTO++, CPTPP (post-US withdrawal from the TPP) was achieved at the APEC 2017 summit when Vietnam was the chair. India, therefore, will need to overcome its handicap of non-membership of mega-regional trade agreements, RCEP and CPTPP as well as the regional cooperation forum, the APEC. The fact that India is in the midst of advanced negotiations with the EU and is aiming at accomplishing the CECA with Australia in the next few months could prove propitious in this context. The EU leads the way, globally, in negotiating and concluding modern-day FTAs with emphasis, in particular, on labour and environment-related commitments. Australia is a founding and leading member of the APEC, which, even with its soft regulations and non-binding/ voluntary mechanisms, has been acknowledged for its contribution to trade and investment facilitation and establishing regulatory ease for cross-border supply chains. India’s ability to conclude successfully, according to the schedule, its FTAs with these countries will not just help to prepare the ground by undertaking necessary domestic policy and tariff reforms but could also, very significantly, be a signalling mechanism to the world, of India’s readiness and capability to play the role envisioned of it in the IPEF. Thus, India’s stance in the next round of FTA negotiations with the EU, expected to be held next month, should provide evidence of whether it has stepped up its FTA game and its willingness for necessary domestic policy and tariff reforms. #IPEF #RCEP #FTA #CPTPP #APEC #US #India Originally published: Business Standard, September 09, 2022 https://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/indo-pacific-economic-framework-opportunity-and-challenge-122090801390_1.html?code=RElORERUeGMweGp6R2svc2UyclhtbmlQcXZKMi9rSHd1Y3MyZTQra29FTT0=#.YxrLVfb2Z9Y.gmail Posted here with the authorization of the author. Amita Batra is Professor of Economics, SIS, JNU. The views are personal.

By Prof. Swaran Singh BRICS expansion is inevitable in light of developed countries' unwillingness to give developing countries greater say in global governance, but will take efforts. Although BRICS has engaged several other nations under the rubric of "BRICS Plus "and "BRICS Outreach" summits, the group has remained cautious about adding new members. Lately, however, expanding its membership has become a subject of discussion at the BRICS summits, especially those of 2013, 2017 and 2022 when China was the chair, as it is noticeably in favor of additional members. Russia and South Africa have also become increasingly agreeable though they believe no single nation should be allowed to decide on the new entrants. Brazil and India, on the other hand, are still cautious. Nevertheless the die has been cast and expansion is bound to happen sooner rather than later. The Beijing Declaration from their 2022 summit, for instance, agreed on "promoting discussions … on the expansion process … to clarify the guiding principles, standards, criteria and procedures" in order to expand cooperation with other emerging markets and developing countries. This sentiment for expansion was also visible in their 2021"terms of reference" for their Sherpas. Five new nations could be joining BRICS in 2023 during the presidency of South Africa, which joined the original group of four BRIC countries in 2010.Applications from Iran and Argentina are already under consideration while Saudi Arabia, Turkiye and Egypt have begun the process of applying for membership. Turkiye, in particular, is keen on fast forwarding the application process. In addition, Algeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sudan, Syria, the United Arab Emirates and Venezuela have also expressed interest in joining. Several of them participated in the May 2022 "BRICS Plus" foreign ministers' meeting convened by China. Among the arguments in favor of expansion, BRICS remains under-represented in global financial governance. Collectively the five members account for more than 50 percent of global growth, 40 percent of global currency reserves, 25 percent of global GDP and 16 percent of world trade, and yet, they hold no more than 15 percent of the voting rights in both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. BRICS' advocating for free, fair and equitable global commerce has made it the flag bearer of the aspirations of the Global South that believes its interests are not adequately protected under the existing global financial governance system. The BRICS' GDP is set to surpass the G7 economies' GDP by 2032 if not earlier. However, the criteria for expansion may not be GDP or market size. The inclusion of South Africa was based on it being the gateway of BRIC into Africa, the next center of growth, and the inclusion of a country from the African continent would make BRICS global. Today the criteria for inclusion may include geographical, civilizational and religious representation or resources. Indonesia, Iran, Egypt and Saudi Arabia could represent the Muslim countries, each one with its unique strengths. Saudi Arabia may also stand out as the world's largest oil exporting nation. Consensus on expansion will also be constrained by intra-BRICS relations. The equation between the largest and second largest BRICS economies－China and India－is an apt example. Applications from Argentina or Pakistan may face serious trust deficit from Brazil and India. The original logic of BRICS as "emerging economies" might be a problem for its current formation. Brazil, Russia and South Africa are not just smaller but face economic disruptions. During the pandemic years, even China and India saw periods of negative growth and a general slowdown. But the Russia-Ukraine conflict and resultant volatility in food and fuel prices and shortages have provided a boost to BRICS expansion. The resultant rise in Russia's trade with other BRICS nations－especially with China and India－has revived their efforts at reducing their dependence on the US dollar through ruble-rupee and rubble-renminbi transactions. The abrasive policies of the Donald Trump administration had already accelerated demands for BRICS to raise its voice on the international stage. The pandemic has further amplified those calls, exposing the West's "vaccine apartheid".Now, the Ukraine crisis has revealed the West's failure to stand united even in imposing economic sanctions. Indeed, new revelations about food and energy leverages of several aspirant emerging economies over G7 nations have strengthened the conviction of BRICS to expand. Also, faced with Western sanctions, Russia is far more agreeable to expanding its circle of friends. But instead of heralding another Cold War, the expansion of BRICS is aimed at obtaining a greater say for the developing countries in global decision-making. As post-pandemic resilience brings BRICS an opportunity to redefine global financial governance, BRICS has begun expanding beyond the time-tested "BRICS Plus" and "BRICS Outreach" summits to include new members. But an expanded BRICS will have neither the desire nor potential to become a counterweight to the G7 or the G20, or to disrupt financial institutions led by Western nations. BRICS expansion is making Western nations rethink their reluctance to make space for emerging economies, only further strengthening their realization that making space for emerging economies remains a prerequisite for making global financial governance inclusive, representative and effective. #BRICS #China #India Originally published: China Daily, September 07, 2022 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202209/07/WS6317d97ea310fd2b29e76537.html Posted here with the authorization of the author. Swaran Singh is a Professor of International Relations at Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Delhi) and currently visiting professor at the University of British Columbia (Vancouver, Canada).

By Prof. Swaran Singh As part of the hyperactive senior official- and minister-level talks launched during US President Joe Biden's visit to Japan in May, the United States is hosting the first in-person ministerial meeting of "Indo-Pacific Economic Framework" signatory states on Thursday and Friday. Led by the US Trade Representative Katherine Tai and Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo, the last three months have seen several such online and hybrid meetings aimed at "scoping" the "arrangements" for the four IPEF pillars — trade rules, clean energy, supply chains and tax and anti-corruption. Notwithstanding the speed, the IPEF remains a work-in-progress and no joint statements have so far made clear what it has achieved. The US, on the other hand, wants to finalize the basic tenets of the IPEF before it hosts the APEC Leaders' Meeting in November 2023. But the 18 months between May 2022 and November 2023 is not its only challenge. To begin with, India has already emerged as a country of concern, igniting speculations on its possible exit from the IPEF. India's refusal to denounce Russia's "special military operation" in Ukraine and increased imports of Russian oil during the past six months have exposed growing disjunctions that could come in the way of India becoming a permanent member of the grouping. SHI YU/CHINA DAILY India's case has also brought to light similar palpable disjunctions between the US and other IPEF signatory states. In fact, India's last-minute decision to walk out of the world's largest free trade agreement — the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership agreement — in 2019 reinforces concerns about India choosing to do the same with the IPEF. And the fact that India joined the IPEF's trade negotiations only as an "observer" in August adds more credence to such speculations. Also, India has recently gone on a trade deal signing spree. It has signed trade deals with Australia and the United Arab Emirates, and it’s taking negotiations fast forward with Canada, Israel, the European Union and the United Kingdom. Yet Indo-US free trade agreement remains in suspended animation with implications for India permanently joining the US-led IPEF. The flexibility of the IPEF outlined in Tokyo may have made New Delhi align with it. The IPEF was presented as a framework to "advance resilience, sustainability, inclusiveness, economic growth, fairness and competitiveness" by creating flexible arrangements where member states are free to join or not to join initiatives under any of the stipulated pillars, and both pillars and members could be expanded beyond the original four and 14. Like the RCEP, the IPEF is not expected to be another free trade agreement involving tariff reductions, greater market access or dispute-settlement mechanisms. But now that, after moving from sublime vision to mundane reality, it considers creating a regulatory mechanism, building alternative supply chains and fighting corruption as necessary, India could face some of the old challenges of the RCEP. Besides, the consciousness about the infrastructure and connectivity deficit among the "Indo-Pacific" countries have exacerbated, especially because of the formation of the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership during the Barack Obama administration and the way it was abandoned by previous US president Donald Trump in 2017. Meanwhile, the last five years have witnessed several of these countries aligning with the China-proposed Belt and Road Initiative. That makes the vision of IPEF too China-centric, which will make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for member states to choose sides if push comes to shove. China has not just helped establish the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which now has 105 economies as its members and become the new flag bearer of economic globalization and technically the "leader" of world's largest FTA, the RECP, it has also applied to join the TPP's reincarnation — the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement on Trans-Pacific Partnership. This is where India's parallel engagement with China and the US also complicates its negotiations in the IPEF. China remains a close competitor of the US and yet it is the largest trading partner of, and major investor in, India. This has prompted US interlocutors to see motives where none exist. For instance, in the wake of continued border standoffs with China, why has India refused to accept mediation from the US? Plus, India-US trade partnership has had its hiccups, with India insisting on data localization and the US expecting India to improve its environmental and labor standards. All this may circumscribe the IPEF from accommodating New Delhi's concerns. Finally, many members of the IPEF are also members of the RCEP. India remains sensitive to negative trade deficits, to protecting its small and medium-sized industries and exploring opportunities for its skilled manpower. But more than the RCEP, the IPEF has added knots to be untied: Washington wishes to explore avenues for cheap manufacturing for its high-end designs and yet has not been able to trust recipients with its advanced technology. The US is a master at building old style political alignments with an eye on capturing global markets for its goods and services and for exporting its weapons. This explains its recent announcements of opening new embassies in Kiribati and Tonga and holding an ASEAN-US special summit. But economic multilateralism involving complex coexistence with, and coordinating and accommodating contrarian impulses may stretch the US to the seams and push India into making difficult choices it wants to avoid. #China #IPEF #US #India Originally published: China Daily, September 07, 2022 https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202209/07/WS63184cfba310fd2b29e767aa.html Posted here with the authorization of the author. Swaran Singh is a Professor of International Relations at Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Delhi) and currently visiting professor at the University of British Columbia (Vancouver, Canada).

By Prof. Gulshan Sachdeva Though new British Prime Minister Liz Truss’ initial focus will be on domestic economic agenda, and the war in Ukraine, the momentum in India-UK relations is likely to be maintained British Prime Minister Liz Truss is not new to India-UK ties. Earlier as an International Trade Secretary, and later as a Secretary of State in the Boris Johnson government, she had many virtual interactions with Indian policy-makers. She also visited India a few times in the recent past. India-UK ties have already been elevated to a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’, and an ambitious ‘Roadmap 2030’ have been adopted. Fast track negotiations on bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA), and the British ‘Indo-Pacific tilt’ have provided new impetus to relations. As trade minister, Truss saw India as a “big, major opportunity” and “UK and India in a sweet spot of the trade dynamics”. She launched the India-UK Enhanced Trade Partnership (ETP) in early 2021, and believed that “working with India will help enhance the UK’s position as a global hub for digital and services”. While interacting with the Conservative Friends of India during her campaign, Truss asserted that she is “very, very committed to the UK-India relationship”. As the fourth British Prime Minister in six years, she is taking over at a time when the UK is facing serious economic, political, and foreign policy challenges. The Conservative Party is badly divided. The post-Brexit disruptions are still being felt. The post-pandemic recovery is rocked by the war in Ukraine, higher energy prices, and unprecedented inflation. So, managing different factions within the party, and announcing a new growth and energy strategy will be on top of her agenda. During the campaign, she asserted that her plan for growth is to “built on Conservative ideas: tax cuts, supply-side reform and deregulation”. Now she wants to “transform Britain into an aspiration nation” with the priorities on economy, energy, and National Health Service (NHS). In the coming days, her government has to roll out specific details of these plans. Apart from broader convergence of Britain’s post-Brexit ambitions, and India’s economic and strategic priorities, a major deliverable expected is a bilateral FTA. During Johnson’s India visit early this year, a deadline of an agreement by Diwali was fixed. As 19 out of 26 chapters are already closed, Indian policy-makers are confident that an agreement by the deadline is within reach. Even if we are able to see an agreement by the end of 2022, it will be quite an achievement as negotiations started only in January. An India-UK FTA also has the potential to provide a broader template to India’s other trade negotiations including with the European Union. However, if negotiations are prolonged, it will impact momentum created by the newly-signed FTA’s with Australia and the United Arab Emirates. Normally, countries sign trade agreements when economic conditions are more favourable. The conditions in the UK are clearly not encouraging when inflation is at a 40-year-high, and the economy is heading towards recession. Although Indian policy-makers are making positive statements, economic difficulties along with change in leadership in the UK may delay the conclusion of negotiations. Although the UK's Indo-Pacific tilt has been discussed widely, at the moment, London is focused more on war in Ukraine. This is an area where Indian and British perceptions differ. In March when Truss visited India as part of Britain’s ‘wider diplomatic push’ on war in Ukraine, she hoped that Indian views in Russia would change. Her trip to India had also coincided with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s visit to New Delhi at the same time. On sanctions against Russia, sharp exchanges were witnessed between Truss and Indian Foreign Minister S Jaishankar. As she is quite hawkish on Russia at the moment, convergence on many foreign policy issues may not happen automatically. This may impact slowly developing India-UK defence and security cooperation. Domestic economic priorities, and evolving geopolitical developments including the rise of assertive China have helped boost India-UK ties. Many of the new initiatives were facilitated by Johnson’s close bond with Prime Minister Narendra Modi. As Truss has been part of this process, it will be easy for her to continue with the same agenda. At the moment she may be occupied with domestic economic issues, and Russia. But the broad direction of India-UK ties has already been set. This will be further strengthened by the bilateral FTA whenever it is signed. #LizTruss #UK #India #IndiaUK Originally published: Money Control, September 07, 2022 https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/opinion/india-uk-ties-prime-minister-liz-truss-will-further-boost-bilateral-relations-9142151.html Posted here with the authorization of the author. Gulshan Sachdeva is Professor at the Centre for European Studies and Coordinator, Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, Jawaharlal Nehru University. Views are personal.

By Srijan Sharma “You Do One More Mumbai And You Will Loose Balochistan”- The National Security Advisor of India, Ajit Doval’s dramatic explanation in describing the roadmap of India’s shift in India’s National security strategy back in early 2014 has now become a reality. The Doval doctrine has given a significant push to India’s national security makeover and departures from old silent watch and play strategies. This doctrine not only has become a tool of powerful deterrence but also helped India showcasing its iron will in international arena which was earlier wrinkled by anxieties and doubts. A Silent Watch and Play Game: An Asymmetrical Approach and Strategic Restraint Earlier, India’s approach towards National Security Strategy was defensive. India adopted strategic restraint and moved forward for the fulfillment of strategic/tactical national security which proved to be non-effective towards defeating cross-border terrorism and handling Pakistan’s misadventures. A classic example of a defensive approach can be decoded from the response to the 26/11 attacks. The response was defensive- seeking diplomatic solutions instead of initiating a counterattack and taking retaliatory measures against Pakistan. The reason for adoption of such strategy can be attributed to doubtfulness and unwillingness of exercising of force with a failed attempt to understand security and strategic environment of neighborhood and world politics. The defensive strategy also showed a passive attitude in India’s national security strategy which was later projected as a weakness of India’s softness. In the real sense, India was on an approach that was diametrically opposite or asymmetrical from Pakistan’s Doctrine in short, India was on the defensive whereas Pakistan was already taken an offensive approach towards India through capitalizing its unconventional warfare spectrum, the asymmetry had zeroed the effectiveness of India’s national security strategy towards Pakistan. This undue strategic restraint has committed a grave error in India’s national security calculations which was later leveraged by our hostile neighbors. Understanding the Doctrine: Defensive Offensive and Offensive Defensive At one hand back to back terror strikes before 26/11 and post that, targeting India’s key cities- Pune, Hyderabad, Varanasi, Delhi and Bangalore and on the other hand, continued failure of India’s diplomatic efforts under the garb of exercising strategic restraint strategy has called for serious attention to India’s national security strategy. There was urgent need to add realist dimension to India’s national security strategy because in detail, if we see India was failing at both the ends of securing security- neither able to prevent attacks nor able to able deploy effective retaliatory response mechanism involving detection and prevention and mitigation. Therefore India needed an urgent course correction in its national security trajectory. The course correction came in 2014 when Ajit Doval became National Security Advisor of India. Doval’s arrival introduced strategic doctrine which goes by his name: Doval Doctrine or double squeeze strategy which addressed the errors in India’s national security calculus and inserted a realist factor by bringing the hawkish outlook in India’s National Security strategy. This doctrine primarily has two dimensions- Offensive Defensive and Defensive Offensive. Offensive Defensive- Offensive defense is pre-emptive way of carrying out offensive with defensive purpose. Here, the defensive purpose is to carry out offensive to force the larger foe on the back-foot at the outset by seizing the initiative is logic behind this dimension. India’s commitment towards carrying out pre-emptive strikes involving surgical strikes, Air strikes against terror safe havens in Pakistan occupied Kashmir indicates towards offensive defensive posture. Defensive Offensive- Defensive Offensive posture is more focused towards countering the adversary in exploiting its internal conflicts and sharp efforts at international level including sanctions and international isolation. Defensive offensive also means carrying out deterrence through offensive means (offensive deterrence) India’s Air Strikes in Balakot In February 2019 and Uri Strikes In 2016. The Nuclear Factor The Nuclear factor becomes a key constraint for the both the countries to go on a full offensive. During Kargil War In 1999 the nuclear factor did play a role. The New Delhi centric Pakistan nuclear policy with first strike capability is something to watchout during an event of tight conflict between both the countries. However, the Doval doctrine keeps the check on the Nuclear threshold and affirms in delivering the solid response to Pakistan in striking the terror networks. In any case punishing and denying Pakistan room for their nasty terror designs is one of the prime focus of India’s national security strategy in keeping India safe from state sponsored terrorism. A Strategic Doctrine of Deterrence and Comprehensive Response The Doval’s doctrine includes the right amount of deterrence- through denial and punishment and a comprehensive response including detection, prevention and mitigation. With this doctrine in force Pakistan was taken a back from carrying out terror strikes to attaining strategic depth through viz-a viz Afghanistan and West Asia. The Doval doctrine kept a check on every front of the adversary and transformed our national security craft. The Doval doctrine has also contributed substantially in India’s image makeover in security domain internationally. India is now being showcased as major and competitive firepower among key global players. As far as questions of China and emerging threats are considered, this strategic doctrine can reckon with the China factor but the doctrine is required to be backed up with more strong and modern security and military apparatus for countering Chinese hegemonic rise and future threats. There can be no denying that Doval doctrine made India assertive in security and strategic domain and due to which India is able to sail and realize its aspirations of strategic rise in the global power. #AjitDoval #NationalSecurity Srijan Sharma is working as a Research Analyst at India's oldest and prestigious national security and strategic Think Tank United Service Institution Of India (USI). He has served as Defence editor for a journal and authored articles on matters of strategic affairs for national daily like The Telegraph and journals.

By Prof. Swaran Singh Sheikh Hasina plans a four-day visit next week to further already strong bilateral ties World leaders have begun to hold what are now called “offline” meetings to return to the “normal” ways of conducting diplomatic relations where personal chemistry remains the key to success. So after the whirlwind six-hour visit by President Vladimir Putin on December 6, New Delhi will be hosting next week (September 5-8) a four-day visit by Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. She will be accompanied by a high-powered delegation consisting of a number of ministers, advisers, officials and business leaders who will be traveling beyond New Delhi as well. A press briefing by India’s Ministry of External Affairs said the visit aims to reiterate unique historical and cultural linkages that undergird the two countries’ innovative ways to enhance their multifaceted cooperation in such crucial sectors as bilateral trade, investment, energy, defense, connectivity, and above all the sharing of water. Also marking their strong cultural and societal linkages, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina will visit the city of Ajmer in India’s northwest to offer prayers at the historic shrine of Sufi saint Moinuddin Chishti. In New Delhi, other than meeting top leaders, her engagements will include awarding Mujib Scholarships to the descendants of 200 Indian Armed Forces personnel who were martyred or suffered critical injuries during Bangladesh’s Liberation War of 1971. Golden chapter To begin with, the positive message of this visit for the larger South Asian region cannot go unnoticed. It comes in the face of continuing economic and political instability in Sri lanka, Afghanistan and Pakistan and to some degree in Nepal and even Mauritius and Seychelles. In addition to domestic fissures in these countries, a persistent pandemic and six months of the Ukraine crisis have triggered further economic, social and political disruptions. At the least, therefore, this visit is expected to bring respite from the stresses and strains in South Asia. Indeed, recent years of India-Bangladesh relations have been described by some observers as their shonali adhyay (golden chapter). This is because of their economic successes. On the one hand, international observers have been talking of the “Bangladesh model” of development and recognizing Bangladesh as the economic miracle of South Asia. On the other, India has been the the fastest-growing major economy of the last two years. Indeed, creating some concerns of “overheating” and going way beyond World Bank projections of achieving 7-8% growth for this year, India’s gross domestic product hit an astonishing level of 13.5% growth for the first quarter of financial year 2022-23. It is against this backdrop that India and Bangladesh will now begin formal negotiations for signing a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, or CEPA. India’s northeastern region has lately become a special driver of the Act East policy and especially of its increasing engagement with BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation), which has its secretariat in Dhaka. While India has lately been hyperactive in negotiating free-trade deals, this will be the first FTA for Bangladesh, which has granted this privilege to India while others such as China and Japan have been requesting similar negotiations with Dhaka. Bilateral trade between India and Bangladesh has grown substantially in the last five years, expanding from US$9 billion for 2018 to $16 billion last year, making Bangladesh the fastest-growing destination for India’s exports. But this has also made their bilateral trade increasingly one-sided. For instance, Bangladesh’s $12 billon trade deficit in favor of India has be rectified to make quick further progress. Water sharing remains their other major challenge. Water sharing Among a slew of agreements and memoranda of understanding (MoUs) to be signed in New Delhi next week, the two nations will also be signing an agreement on the sharing of Kushiyara River waters. Only last week the 38th ministerial meeting of the India-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Comission (JRC) held in New Delhi on August 25 had India and Bangladesh finalize the text of this interim agreement. The JRC meeting of course also highlighted the urgency of resolving other bilateral water-sharing issues, including the need to begin working on the upcoming renewal of their Ganga (Ganges) Water Treaty. But the fact that this was the JRC’s first meeting since 2010 shows the changed milieu for making bold decisions. Teesta River water sharing has been their most difficult knot where Bangladesh has sought equitable distribution of water from India. The Teesta deal was all set to be signed during Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bangladesh visit of September 2011 but was postponed and has still not yet been signed. The Ganges treaty was signed in 1996 and is due for renewal in 2026, and work on its renewal has already begun. Inspired by the Indus Water Treaty between India and Pakistan, India and newly liberated Bangladesh set up the JRC in 1972 as their bilateral mechanism for evolving shared understanding on common rivers. But more than India and Pakistan, India and Bangladesh share 54 rivers, big and small, of which seven have been identified for developing an earlier framework for negotiation water-sharing agreements. But sustained warmth of leadership from both sides and now a return to post-pandemic interactions give hope of another upswing in India-Bangladesh relations with lessons for rest of the region. Strategic upswing The recent past has seen overall strategic ties between India and Bangladesh on an upswing. In March last year, even in the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic, Modi made an exception to travel restrictions and went to Dhaka to attend events celebrating 50 years of liberation of Bangladesh from Pakistan and the birth centenary of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Indeed, marking India’s unique connection to the liberation of Bangladesh, New Delhi also hosted several events to celebrate the surrender of Pakistani forces in Dhaka to the India Army and “Mukti Bahini” on December 16, 1971. This was also a unique example of 93,000 Pakistani troops being taken as prisoners of war by India and then safely repatriated at great cost and effort, setting a unique example for the world. There are other examples of India-Bangladesh cooperation, including demarcation of their land and maritime borders. This has greatly facilitated their developmental partnership. Dhaka now allows transit of Indian goods to India’s northeast, has approved the Agartala-Dhaka-Kolkata Maitri bus service, and imports electrical power from India. These examples of the changing nature of their bilateral relations have lessons and implications for the larger region. #India #Bangladesh Originally published: Asian Times, September 02, 2022 https://asiatimes.com/2022/09/bangladeshi-pms-india-visit-to-provide-a-positive-spin-for-s-asia/?fbclid=IwAR3xxhvJKJhfLkM8hJl5EMkRCXj2f3133_Hb6WGE8a4H6HbeRfbKT7Dv9eg Posted here with the authorization of the author. Swaran Singh is visiting professor at the University of British Columbia and professor of diplomacy and disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He is president of the Association of Asia Scholars; adjunct senior fellow at the Charhar Institute, Beijing; senior fellow, Institute for National Security Studies Sri Lanka, Colombo; and visiting professor, Research Institute for Indian Ocean Economies, Kunming.