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By Prof. Swaran Singh The tone of Beijing’s latest White Paper on Taiwan differs markedly from those issued before the Xi Jinping era China this week closed its largest ever military drills in the Taiwan Strait with a series of important statements, including the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council issuing its third White Paper, the title of which reveals the “new normal” of its Taiwan policy. The title of this third White Paper on Taiwan reads: “The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era.” The paper contains content quite distinct in tone and tenor from the two earlier White Papers on Taiwan. In a nutshell, the White Paper asserts that reunification is not only the Communist Party of China’s “historic mission” but is also “indispensable for the realization of China’s rejuvenation.” It claims the party has adopted, under President Xi Jinping’s leadership, “new and innovative measures in relation to Taiwan.” This “new starting point for reunification” is referred to as the “new normal” of China’s Taiwan policy. Clearly, in the case of all civilizational states, especially those with imperial impulses and system-shaping capabilities, understanding the symbolism of semantics is significant in interpreting their likely trajectories, with implications far and wide. And given this prognosis, the “new normal” of China-Taiwan ties has become the subject of media commentaries. Shifting saliences To begin with, the title of the White Paper issued this week – the first one under President Xi Jinping – marks a significant change in stance from the earlier two, which were titled “The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue” (February 2000) and “The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China” (August 1993). That change is the inclusion of “New Era” in the title, which is defined by Xi as distancing China from Deng Xiaoping’s “hide your strengthens and bide your time” thesis. Especially now, in the run-up to the 20th Party Congress, where Xi will be seeking an unprecedented third term in office, this radicalization has been there for all to see. Second, the title of this paper also involves an interesting twist of words, from “reunification of China” to “China’s reunification,” which alludes to an assertion toward a more China-driven reunification. This reminds of a similar earlier twist from Chairman Mao Zedong’s “liberation” of Taiwan to Deng’s “integration of Taiwan,” saying the same thing while using different semantics. The third distinction is more operative and much too “in the face” to be missed even by cursory China watchers. Here, compared with the White Papers of August 1993 and February 2000, it has expunged their earlier commitment that “any matter can be negotiated” as long as Taiwan accepts that there is only one China and does not pursue separatist policies. This again reinforces Beijing’s growing conviction in effecting this reunification on its own terms. Fourth, unlike the earlier two, this third White Paper showcases relatively stronger allusion toward use of military power in effecting reunification. It elucidates how in the “new era,” “with significant growth in its political, economic, cultural, technological, and military strength, there is no likelihood that China will allow Taiwan to be separated again.” This assertion, of course, is explained in terms of military advancements of Taiwan and other foreign powers seeking to split China, implying United States and its friends and allies. Fifth, the release of the White Paper this week was accompanied by other statements to reiterate China’s non-renunciation of use of its military. This element was, for example, elucidated on Wednesday in a formal statement issued by the State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office. Announcing the successful completion of military drills in Taiwan Strait, it said, “But we will not renounce the use of force, and reserve the option of taking all necessary measures. This is to guard against external interference and all separatist activities.” All this is now being called the “new normal” of China’s Taiwan policy and China-US ties, where extensive military drills are expected to become more regular to effect blockage of sea routes and the airspace of Taiwan, thereby circumventing its ever growing economic partnerships and further reducing the number of nations that continue to recognize Taipei as a sovereign nation-state. This ratcheting up in cross-Strait relations, however, has implications way beyond China-US-Taiwan triangular ties. Strategic implications The fact that Chinese state media reporting on military drills has been seen as alluding to transgressions across the Taiwan Strait’s median line becoming a “regular” exercise has already had a visible impact on regional supply lines, with companies assessing short-term and long-term costs and strategies. At the least, these military drills have demonstrated Beijing’s capacity to inflict an enormous yet uncontested disruption to regional trade flows as and when it chooses. In the midst of post-pandemic resilience initiatives, these disruptions are bound to trigger panic. Even a cursory glance at these trade flows shows how, for the first half of this year, about half of the world’s container fleet and nearly 90% of its largest vessels by tonnage passed through the Taiwan Strait connecting East Asia to markets worldwide. It is well understood that any tension in the Taiwan Strait will imply trade routes becoming extended, increasing transit times and pushing up freight rates, with goods and services reaching consumers much later and at a much higher price. But would not such disruptions be equally counterproductive for China’s own whopping foreign trade, especially its commerce from its eastern ports of Shanghai, Shenzhen, Ningbo and Guangzhou, the four largest ports facing the Taiwan Strait? The answer to this is obviously negative. China may be world’s largest trading nation, but the world has witnessed President Xi’s sustained willingness to sacrifice economics for his politics; see for example his “zero Covid” strategy that continues to shut down large parts of the country, greatly slowing down its economy. However, what brings relief is the broad consensus around how China remains strongly circumscribed in its tactics. Unleashing a direct military strike seems as yet completely unaffordable among its policy choices. So instead of an incessant amphibious attack, China is likely to choose a strategy of verbose “warrior diplomacy” accompanied by intermittent unannounced and unacknowledged naval and aerial blockades of Taiwan, and make this routine the “new normal” of its time-tested “gray-zone operations,” which will make the American response indecisive. When elephants fight … As the saying goes, when elephants fight it is the grass that suffers. All this “new normal” does not augur well for Taipei. For instance, at end of its recent military drills, the People’s Liberation Army’s East Theater Command said in a statement: “Theater forces will keep an eye on the changes in the situation in the Taiwan Strait, continue to carry out training and preparation for combat, organize regular combat readiness patrols in the direction of the Taiwan Strait, and resolutely defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity.” On Wednesday, this was corroborated by Taiwan’s Defense Ministry reporting that a total of 17 Chinese fighter jets flew across the median line of the Taiwan Strait. China claims that it is the United States that is trying to change the status quo by strengthening and upgrading its relations with Taiwan, which Beijing claims as its territory. So, Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu told China Central Television (CCTV) on Tuesday, “China has no choice but to fight back and defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity.” But while China persists in the view that its relations with Taiwan are an internal matter and that it reserves the right to bring the island under its control, by force if necessary, Taiwan rejects China’s claims, saying that only the island’s people can decide their future. The United States, meanwhile, continues to claim that visits to the island like the recent one by the Speaker of its House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, are routine and that China is using them as pretexts to ratchet up its force posture against Taipei. Then there are internal disjunctions of Taiwan’s democracy, which have witnessed the cyclical nature of the Kuomintang (KMT or Nationalist Party) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) sharing power on a two-term basis. This logic forecasts the KMT, seen as relatively much cozier with Beijing, coming back to power in 2024. Some of this was demonstrated in how, even before China’s military drills had ended, Andrew Hsia, deputy chairman of the KMT, flew to China for what his party said was a prearranged visit to meet the Taiwanese business community. Understandably, President Tsai Ing-wen, leader of the currently ruling DPP, called this “disappointing to our people,” even though Hsia’s China visit involved no official meetings or even a visit to Beijing. China’s neighbors meanwhile are taking notice of this power posturing, though their responses remain disjointed. Whereas newly elected South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol was the only regional leader to give Pelosi the slip even when he was in same city, India is planning high-altitude joint military exercises with the United States less 100 kilometers from the tension-ridden China-India ceasefire line, and its timing in October will coincide with China’s 20th Party Congress in Beijing. All this does not augur well for regional peace and security. #China #Taiwan #US Originally published: Asia Times, August 12, 2022 https://asiatimes.com/2022/08/decoding-chinas-new-normal-taiwan-policy/?fbclid=IwAR1yWI2Gb4Rk71JilrhGZBBYRdXE_xxfsTlUnY3yNFH1y5oahOW8Z-MBuI0&fs=e&s=cl Posted here with the authorization of the author. Swaran Singh is visiting professor at the University of British Columbia and professor of diplomacy and disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He is president of the Association of Asia Scholars; adjunct senior fellow at the Charhar Institute, Beijing; senior fellow, Institute for National Security Studies Sri Lanka, Colombo; and visiting professor, Research Institute for Indian Ocean Economies, Kunming.

By Prof. Bharat H. Desai The first week of August 2022 brought vivid memories of the lethal capacity of the nuclear bombs that were dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima (6 August) and Nagasaki (9 August). It showed the destructive human streak for nuclear annihilation. The United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) Antonio Guterres became the second UN chief to personally go to the Hiroshima bombsite in 2022 to share the collective grief of the Japanese people. The UNSG alerted the world about risk of nuclear miscalculation or misunderstanding. "Nuclear weapons are nonsense. They guarantee no safety - only death and destruction. Three quarters of a century later, we must ask what we've learned from the mushroom cloud that swelled above this city in 1945", the UNSG said on 6 August in exasperation. Hiroshima-Nagasaki as a Metaphor The world was stunned by the atomic bombs dropped by the US bombers on Hiroshima (Little Boy) and Nagasaki (Fat Boy) on 6 August and 9 August 1945, respectively. They instantly killed between 129,000 and 226,000 people and destroyed the infrastructure of both cities. Left with no choice, Japan surrendered on 15 August 1945 and brought to end the World War II. It seems, propelled by the prospects of the Russian advances that would have forced the Japanese to surrender to them, the US President Truman ordered dropping of nuclear bombs. “Japan was already defeated…dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary”, President Dwight Eisenhower said years later. Even Nobel Laurate Albert Einstein spoke out against the nuclear strikes on Japan that were “unjustified and motivated by US−Soviet politicking”. Einstein regretted for urging, in August 1939, President Roosevelt for an atomic weapons program. After 71 years, on 27 May 2016, Barack Obama became the first sitting US President to appear at the Hiroshima bombsite. “We stand here in the middle of this city and force ourselves to imagine the moment the bomb fell...we listen to a silent cry…demonstrated that mankind possessed the means to destroy itself”, Obama spoke for the posterity, while laying wreath at Hiroshima Peace Memorial and bowed head in silence to pay homage to the departed souls. Obama did what people do when a place of horrific incident overwhelms. Quest for Elimination of Nuclear Weapons Over the last 77 years, global efforts have sought to realize the dream of nuclear weapons free world. The 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), with 192 parties, has been an important pillar. Now the Tenth Review Conference on the NPT (New York; 1-26 August 2022) is underway. On 1 August 2022, the UNSG’s address to the NPT review conference expressed grave concern that the “humanity is just one misunderstanding, one miscalculation away from nuclear annihilation”. “Almost 13,000 nuclear weapons are now being held in arsenals around the world”, Guterres said in inaugural address at the NPT Tenth Review. On 4 August, the US Ambassador Scheinman assured that “the United States will continue the long work toward eventual nuclear disarmament”. The Tenth NPT Review is taking place after the 3 January 2022 Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States (China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA) for Preventing Nuclear War and avoiding Arms Races. “We affirm that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. As nuclear use would have far-reaching consequences, we also affirm that nuclear weapons—for as long as they continue to exist—should serve defensive purposes, deter aggression, and prevent war”, the joint statement proclaimed. They reiterated their commitment (NPT article VI) “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament”. Delegitimizing Use of Nuclear Weapons In June 2022, ahead of the NPT review, the International Campaign against Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) carried out legal analysis that shows nuclear arsenals of nuclear weapons states have only grown considerably. Did they pursue negotiations in good faith (NPT article VI obligation) to end the nuclear arms race? In the aftermath of the 24 February 2022 Russian special military operation in Ukraine to protect people “facing humiliation and genocide perpetrated in the Kiev regime”. In the wake of sanctions and NATO inching closer, the Russian drawing of ‘red lines’ on the use of nuclear weapons did cause global consternation. There is a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) adopted vide the General Assembly resolution 50/245 on 10 September 1996. It requires ratification by “all States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty”. The basic obligation under CTBT would be “not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion”. As on 1 August 2022, 174 states have ratified CTBT. Still, seven are left (US; China; India; Pakistan; Israel; Iran; North Korea), out of 44 states (Annex 2, Article XIV) whose ratification is essential for CTBT to come into force. Interestingly, all the states swear by the ultimate objective of elimination of nuclear weapons. Upon request of the UN General Assembly, the International Court of Justice gave an advisory opinion (8 July 1996) on Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons that echoed (paragraph 105 (2) E) Yudhishthira’s ambivalence (अश्वथाम हतः नरो वा कुञ्जरोवा) in the Mahabharata war, by taking a strange view that “in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake”. Contrary to the view of many International Law scholars that the ICJ declared a non-liquet (no law), this author argued in a seminal work (1997 IJIL 37 (2) 218) that the Court could not do so since such an interpretation “would be contrary to the law of the Charter and other corpus juris on the matter and, indeed to the totality of international law”. It drew signed letters (in pre-internet days) from at least six ICJ judges (on file with the author). In the case of India, even after the emphatic position before the ICJ (20 June 1995) that “the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance…is illegal or unlawful under international law”, notwithstanding going nuclear in 11-13 May 1998 (ISQ 58 (3). 342-362. 2021) and pronouncing a no-first use doctrine on 4 January 2003, it still swears by the “commitment to the goal of a nuclear weapon free world, through global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament”. Ironically, a plenty of technical barriers still remain in the operationalization of the existing international legal instruments for the elimination nuclear weapons. These arise from the basic human insecurity and the streak of nuclear weapon states to dominate non-nuclear states. Time shall have to bring sanity among those who ‘swear by the sword’ of nuclear weapons by delegitimizing their use for survival of life on our only one earth. Part - I: Blog Special Series-I: Use of Food as a Weapon of War: A Challenge for International Law (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com) Part - II: Blog Special Series-II: Use of Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War: A Challenge for International Law (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com) Part - III: Abused Ammunition as a Weapon of War in the DR Congo: A Challenge for International Law (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com) #NuclearWeapons #War #HiroshimaNagasaki #InternationalLaw Professor Dr. Bharat H. Desai is Jawaharlal Nehru Chair and Professor of International Law at the Centre for International Legal Studies of SIS, JNU. He coordinated the Making SIS Visible initiative (2008-2013) as well as Inter-University Consortium: JNU; Jammu; Kashmir; Sikkim (2012-2020) and is the Editor-in-Chief of Environmental Policy and Law (IOS Press: Amsterdam)

By Prof. Santishree Dhulipudi Pandit We need to rediscover and reinvent our civilisational journey The journey of India at 75 to India at 100 makes me think of many things. But there are two things in particular that capture my imagination: Making higher education more Indo-centric and reducing the gender gap at the top. Even after 75 years of Independence, women have a long way to go. The journey towards equality and equity with inclusion is still long and tedious and appears to be a pipe dream. Women’s leadership in higher education and education-related decision-making bodies at the government level is largely absent as these remain boys’ clubs. Only seven of India’s 54 central universities have women vice-chancellors. This is despite girls outnumbering boys in higher education admissions and women constituting more than 50 per cent of the entry-level university teaching positions. The situation is even worse if one is from the reserved categories. There are several reasons for this: Women need to multitask; marriage and family are still considered women’s responsibilities; despite being qualified, women continue to be hobbled by the ruthless, identity-based politics that plague our higher education institutions. In addition, women must fight entrenched patriarchy and male hegemony. It takes a lot of courage, time and energy to fight these social ills and many women just do not want to, as the fight can get dirty and time-consuming. The few who dare to fight are maligned. A woman’s assertiveness is seen as aggressiveness. These inequalities are further confirmed by the 2022 World Economic Forum’s Gender Gap Index. India’s overall score has improved from 0.625 (in 2021) to 0.629, its seventh-highest score in the last 16 years. It will now take 132 years to reach gender parity, with the gap reducing only by four years since 2021. This is a dim prospect for a civilisation state that boasts of the elevation of the feminine. We need to rediscover and reinvent our civilisational journey. The emancipation and empowerment of the Indian mind is the first step. We are disconnected and colonised in our thinking and scholarship. In the last 75 years, we have moved between self-hatred and self-loathing and just imitating the West without any understanding of ourselves. It is time that we start this intellectual journey towards the creation of knowledge that is original and goes back to our roots. This journey is a must for every Indian who wants India to be a Vishwa Guru. This is my vision for India at 100. Technology and other means are important but they are just instruments and cannot replace the quality of the human mind. Just take the sad plight that we are in with regard to the status of women, although the present government is doing its best to break the various glass ceilings. For me, the glass ceiling to be broken is the intellectual slavery of the Indian mind where all that is Western is good and anything Indian is seen as being regressive and therefore bad. All events need to be secularised and the invaders humanised. In history, we often tend to sing of the valour of men who conquered cities with violence and forget the women’s side of the story. Even though women generously populate our civilisational stories, there has hardly been any retelling of these stories from a feminine perspective till recently. We are a civilisation which has always elevated the feminine and celebrated the harmony of the masculine and the feminine in the image of the Ardhanarishwar. Goddesses represent the humanisation of various abstract values. In the concept of the Tridevi, Parvati represents power, Lakshmi represents fortune and Saraswati represents knowledge. And unlike Parvati, who is the epitome of motherhood, Saraswati is pretty firm that she doesn’t believe in marriage and love. She is trying to say that it is more important to love yourself as an individual and love your own work; unless you do that, you won’t be a positive asset for society and the people around you. Women characters are misinterpreted. Take Savitri, who outwitted Yama with her determination and argument. Another politically strong person is Tara, Bali and Sugriva’s wife, who is the reason why the vanaras become part of Rama’s army. If one looks at all these women, it is clear that they have been misinterpreted because of social pressure and ignorance. Pativratas are women who broke the rules. Which other tradition has this progressive, even revolutionary, narrative? In one of the earliest recorded protests against a male-dominated world and society, Draupadi’s fight against injustice reflects one of the first acts of feminism — a fight for one’s rights. In this case, it was the right to avenge the wrongs inflicted on her. She is exemplified as one of the earliest feminists, be it in terms of polyandry — regarded as a matter of censure by society, then and now — or in terms of her thirst for revenge. Why can’t Sita be seen as the first single mother? Unless and until India becomes a norm-builder we will go nowhere. We will just be imitating the other while losing all that is our own. Institutions of higher education must open themselves up to multiple Indic narratives because they represent the space where true liberation can begin in the mind. The emancipation and empowerment of women need to be fought for first at the level of ideas and narratives. It is at the level of the mind and intellect where the real battle for us lies, from now to India in 2047. India is a civilisational state that rests on the shoulders of women such as Sita, Draupadi, Kannagi and Manimekalai. They were unconventional, intelligent, strong-willed and capable of taking independent decisions and exercising their autonomy. India at 100 will be where women will be able to reclaim and reconstruct such a strong civilisational heritage by leading the state from the front as leaders across all fields. #India #India@75 #IndependenceDay #WomenLeadership #IndianCivilisation Originally published: The Indian Express, August 15, 2022 https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/india-of-sita-draupadi-kannagi-india-75-independence-day-8090434/ Posted here with the authorization of Dean,SIS. Prof. Santishree Dhulipudi Pandit is the Vice-Chancellor, Jawaharlal Nehru University.

By Srijan Sharma The world order has witnessed three strategic shocks- first is the COVID-19 pandemic; second US unceremonious exit from Afghanistan leading to Talibanization of Afghanistan; and third is the Russia Ukraine War. However, when we look around India, we find that India is in tight position in battling and strategically balancing in these strategic shocks. The situation gets more complicated when India faced a new strategic shock of managing disordered affairs of her neighbors in the South Asian region and therefore, a discussion on India’s strategic environment deserves merit. Internal Strategic Environment Since last two years, India’s internal strategic environment has witnessed spinning changes. The two years went in battling and reviving from the devastating COVID waves. The aftermath of the waves knocked the doors of economic pressure affecting India’s internal environment. Apart from non-traditional threats, the traditional threats have vigorously evolved. Since past few decades while computing India’s internal strategic environment only traditional threats were considered as sole component, but in recent times civil society has assumed a special mention in India’s internal strategic environment. COVID Pandemic First the COVID claimed thousands of lives, made people homeless and jobless. Second the economic pressure- India witnessed inflation pressure and price pressures during COVID times. Though India is recalibrating and at least able to ensure a steady mark for its economy. Thus, putting civil society under pressure due to COVID and economic factor. Civil Society Chanakya stressed on four dangers to national security – one external abetment of external origin and internal abetment of internal origin. Based on this there is consistent threat on the societal cohesiveness of the Indian state. Due to variety of reasons and external abetments of external origin that have exploited the societal fault lines. India witnessed some controversial events which disturbed India’s internal environment- Farmers Agitation, CAA riots etc. This opened a new box of emerging threat to India’s internal strategic environment i.e., psychological warfare where hostile subverted actors try to target and destabilize Indian civil society. Perhaps, that’s why last year the National Security Advisor (NSA) in passing out parade of IPS probationers has said that “Civil Society is New Theater of Warfare". In totality one cannot shut eyes from the fact after 2019 India’s internal strategic environment has been bulldozed with intertwining of traditional and non-traditional threats involving the civil society factor which is going to complicate India’s internal strategic environment. External Strategic Environment As mentioned above that three strategic shocks and the fourth one sums up the present external strategic environment for India where on one hand geopolitical uncertainty is increasing and on the other hand India is navigating in troubled waters of geopolitical realignment using its strategic autonomy focused on maximizing and protecting her interests. However, one may argue that the strategic autonomy comes under a strong pressure when we see adversarial maneuvering of hostile neighbors- China’s charm offensive through CPEC and BRI in South Asia embracing Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar complimented by growing Pakistan-China axis where Pakistan is assuming the role of China’s second tool of deterrence against India. Therefore, in the present tight situation India’s aspirations of strategic rise are guided by strategic autonomy. Apart from challenges, India sees brewing opportunities in Eurasia and Indo Pacific besides, seeing them reeling under strategic uncertainty. The limited interests West and Russia in Central Asia after Afghanistan episode had given regional power a considerable space to weigh options in the region. However, with Russia-Ukraine episode it has been argued that Russia is coming back in its neighborhood using regional power as springboard to fill the strategic vacuum. For India it is needles to mention that India has vast interests in the resource rich region as postulated by Heartland theory and in the pursuance of the same India has been carving out strategies through Iran by sharing room in regional initiative backed up by nurturing close ties with Central Asian countries- NSA level meet In November 2021 and choosing Central Asian Presidents as Republic Day chief guest are also steps in making India and Central Asian connect closer and stronger. However, a counter perspective is that India’s connect central Asian policy with Russia is currently facing a limitation due to heavy sanctions on Russia but operationalization of International North South Transport Corridor has revived some hopes for India’s connect central Asian policy. On the other hand, Iran is under pressure from India’s key strategic partners Israel and US on its nuclear issue and therefore in such scenario India-Iran relations would be tested. But what remains a Eurasian challenge for India is the Strategic alignment of China Russia-Iran and Turkey-Pakistan. Deft diplomacy in blocking Islamic bloc of Turkey-Pakistan and calculatedly managing relations with Iran Russia to keep Chinese influence at bay are some options. India must realize that the geopolitics of trade and connectivity would form the competition base for India’s connect Central Asia policy in coming years. Therefore, India must keep paddling between Iran and Central Asian leaders to gain an all-exclusive access to Central Asian region and further reduce dependence on Russia. Down to Pacific, India is assuming significant importance in the Indo Pacific region both military and diplomatically. It has been argued that US sees India as strategic balancer in the region in countering Chinese hegemonic rise in the region. Further the status of strategic balancer would provide India plethora of opportunities in maximizing sphere of influence in maritime domain. However, a counter argument comes in when Indo Pacific region gets referred as strategic competitive region. With Sino-Russia axis coming into play and Taiwan coming under threat would eventually put India under intense pressure of managing Indo Pacific affairs and countering China. Though Australia is an option for US but Australian Naval architecture still needs improvement. Considering this India has been in center for which India needs to vector the concert of other key Indo Pacific players and middle level powers for ensuring stability in the region. #India #Strategic #CivilSociety #ForeignPolicy Srijan Sharma is working as an Research Analyst at India's oldest and prestigious national security and strategic Think Tank United Service Institution Of India (USI). Views are personal.

By Prof. Swaran Singh and Prof. Yves Tiberghien, UBC There is plenty of blame to go around for the apparent fourth Taiwan Straits crisis of August 2022. Intensely partisan US politics have taken the liberal international order for a dangerous ride. Increasingly nationalistic politics in China have produced assertive foreign policy behaviour and in the age of social media, emotions across the Pacific are boiling over. The delicate diplomatic compromise of constructive ambiguity over Taiwan’s status initiated by former US national security advisor Henry Kissinger and Chinese premier Zhou Enlai in 1972 is fraying beyond repair. We are witnessing a ratcheting up of the struggle between ideational commitments to the rival principles of democracy and national sovereignty. The compromise around a general ‘One China’ policy, coupled with the deterrence inscribed by the 1979 US Taiwan Relations Act and other reassurances which were last reinforced in 1998, have been the foundation of diplomatic relations between China and Western nations. Should this delicate equilibrium break, the global order will be undermined, resulting in heightened tensions to the point of possible conflict. The region is rattled in the wake of US House of Representatives Speaker, Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan and China’s response in the form of massive military exercises and diplomatic bluster. The Chinese navy and air force have entered Taiwan’s territorial waters for the first time. Missiles have landed near the island and in Japan’s exclusive economic zone. China has also severed most diplomatic channels with the United States and walked out of the ASEAN summit, not once but twice. India expressed its concern with a loud silence, Southeast Asia with an urgent call for tension de-escalation and South Korea with the surprising snub of Pelosi during her visit to Seoul. Japan joined the G7 communique supporting Pelosi’s visit and condemned China’s dangerous military response. This enraged China and caused the last-minute cancellation of a planned meeting between China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Japan’s Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi. It is worrisome that the world’s two economic and military superpowers keep escalating their tit-for-tat interactions without a visible endpoint or any institutionalised guardrails. The current fulcrum of domestic politics in each country appears to reward a bottom-line mentality, normative grand standing and mutual discounting. Such a high-risk situation is a flashback to the politics of summer 1914 or the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. The domestic mood in each country discounts the misery that one wrong move could create, especially for the people of Taiwan. There is no incentive to pursue stabilisation through restraint or accommodation or willingness to show any appearance of weakness. Pelosi’s Asia tour was totally overshadowed by speculation about her Taiwan visit. Despite reassurances by the US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, that Washington’s commitment to the ‘One China’ policy remains unchanged, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi called the visit ‘manic, irresponsible and irrational’. As pre-warned by Chinese President Xi Jinping, China used the visit to undertake high-calibre live fire drills —effectively enforcing a four-day blockade of Taiwan and disrupting shipping and flights into Taipei. The visit was preceded by secrecy and press leaks. The initial statement issued by Pelosi’s office made no mention of Taiwan, stating that her ‘visits to Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea and Japan’ aimed to establish ‘mutual security, economic partnership and democratic governance in the Indo-Pacific region’. Amid growing media leaks from Taiwan, Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong reaffirmed ‘the importance of stable US–China relations for regional peace and stability’. For all the talk of a last-minute stop, Taiwan pulled off a carnival-like welcome with a livestream of her arrival and a massive greeting on the Taipei 101 building. Both supporters and protestors showed up in streets. At the Legislative Yuan, Pelosi delivered a strong expression of support for Taiwan’s fight for freedom and democracy. The shockwaves made by Pelosi’s Taiwan visit were felt during her stopover in Seoul. Sensing the mood in Beijing, South Korean President Yoon Suk-Yeol chose not to meet with her because he was reportedly on vacation, making him the only leader not to meet with Pelosi on her Asia tour. President Yoon made this move in spite of his pro-United States leanings, his near historic low approval ratings and Pelosi’s visit to the ‘truce village’ of Panmunjom in the Korean DMZ. No senior officials or legislators welcomed Pelosi upon her landing in Seoul. China was quick to reward South Korea by inviting Foreign Minister Park Jin to Beijing. The reverberations from Taipei were still palpable when she met with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and House Speaker Kiroyuki Hosoda. The meeting came soon after China’s missiles landed in Japan’s exclusive economic zone and Wang Yi’s meeting with Yoshimasa Hayashi was cancelled. In the end, this crisis has offered Nancy Pelosi the chance to establish her legacy of toughness on China and support for democracy ahead of the US mid-term elections. It has also given China an opportunity to test its growing military hardware in Taiwanese waters and demonstrate its commitment to sovereignty ahead of the Fall Party Congress. But the trip as could have been foretold has unleashed a new cycle of mistrust, nationalist escalation and an arms race in the Pacific. The United States and China must urgently establish more robust communication channels, updated arms control mechanisms and bring some stability and peace back to the Taiwan compromise. #China #Taiwan #US #NancyPelosi Originally published: East Asia Forum, August 8, 2022 https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/08/08/pelosis-visit-could-derail-us-china-compromise-over-taiwan/?fbclid=IwAR2nVAAO0Bg3IwyMbCO6a7rmALc6mAkgIGHSUreryEUCOF6Zaf5GJMQuy7g Posted here with the authorization of Prof. Swaran Singh. Swaran Singh is Professor in the School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and President of the Association of Asia Scholars. He is Visiting Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of British Columbia. Yves Tiberghien is Professor of Political Science and Director Emeritus of the Institute of Asian Research at the University of British Columbia. He is also a Distinguished Fellow at the Asia-Pacific Foundation of Canada.

By Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli Nancy Pelosi’s defiant, but unannounced, visit comes in the wake of China’s uncalled for, politically disastrous and military indefensible, escalation for the past few years Nancy Pelosi, the Speaker of the United States Representatives, called off China’s bluff on “playing with fire” by visiting Taiwan on 3 August, amidst the latter’s coercive diplomatic pressures. Nancy Pelosi’s defiant, but unannounced, visit comes in the wake of China’s uncalled for, politically disastrous and military indefensible, escalation for the past few years. Pelosi praised Taiwan’s bubbling democracy and called the beleaguered island a friend and defended it in her speeches during her whirlwind less than a day visit. Even though China threatened to retaliate to the visit, Pelosi continued her visit nonchalantly making China to blink first in this round. The political fallout of Pelosi’s visit on China’s domestic politics is higher than on Taiwan or the US. President Xi Jinping since his ascension in 2012 has been making caustic comments on Taiwan, with the 2017 19th Communist Party Congress stating that “We will never allow anyone, any organisation, or any political party, at any time or in any form, to separate any part of Chinese territory from China!” Further at the communist party’s centennial in July 2021, Xi even threatened to “break the heads” of those who interfere with Taiwan. As China now could not stop Pelosi’s visit, the 20th communist party congress this November, where Xi is seeking a third term, could become decisive. Naturally the upcoming Beidaihe meeting of high-level party leaders and elders could be stormy. The timing of Pelosi’s visit could not be worse for Xi. Rival political factional leaders like Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and others are up in arms with Xi for many reasons but the Taiwan fiasco could provide them with enough reasons to counter Xi. With massive restrictions due to “zero Covid” policies, several millions of Chinese are in partial or complete lockdown with hardships. The economic growth is declining due to these policies and due to the on-going tariff wars with the US. While Xi banked on nationalism and anti-corruption drive to protect himself so far, the escalation on Taiwan could prove to be costly. Also, Pelosi’s aircraft landed in Taiwan with the US Air Force flight escort, thus puncturing one of China’s original “three nos” — that Taiwan should not become independent, no foreign troops in Taiwan soil and no to Taiwan’s nuclear weapon programme. With such military aircraft landing in Taiwan, China’s inability to stop such landing not only exposed China’s weakness but also for possible defiance by other countries in future of such red lines by China. Pelosi was also signalling that China’s recent forays in Asia will be checkmated. In May 2014, addressing the summit meeting of Conference on Interactions in Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) at Shanghai, Xi Jinping suggested that “outside” powers should withdraw from Asia for the eventual imposition of Chinese hegemony. Since then, China’s aggressiveness on South China Sea islands disputes, over Senkaku islands with Japan and on land borders with India knew no bounds. Pelosi not only indirectly questioned China’s ability but also its credentials for the claims. In the aftermath of Pelosi’s visit, China had deployed naval and air forces in six maritime regions close to Taiwan as an intimidating tactic. There are also reports of Chinese cyber-attacks on Taiwan’s foreign ministry, banks and certain market stores, besides banning certain food products. With or with the US tacit support, Taiwan could weather off this challenge. For Taiwan, Pelosi’s visit could be a major turning point in its strategic direction, both at the domestic and external affairs. At the domestic political level, the majority “status quo” public opinion in the political spectrum could change towards an active assertion of Taiwan’s identity far away from China. More the Chinese coercion, more would be the critical responses of the Taiwanese in the near future. At the foreign policy level, the US ambiguous policies could change towards more clarity and purpose in defending Taiwan and its democratic system. Taiwan’s joining of the emerging Indo-Pacific could also be fructified in this milieu. Thus, “internationalisation” of Taiwan issue is likely to pick up pace, as 300,000 who watched Pelosi’s flight path in anticipation indicated. If Taiwan had to go through seven decades of uncertainty, Pelosi’s visit nudged this process for more clear outcomes in the near future. During the Russian invasion of Ukraine, many analysts suggested an imminent Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Pelosi’s visit not only questions this assumption by politically providing American support to Taiwan but provides Taiwan with an opportunity to explore friends and allies in the international system. This could also further intensify the ongoing New Southbound policy’s outreach soon. #China #Taiwan #US #NancyPelosi Originally published: News18, August 07, 2022. https://www.news18.com/news/opinion/nancy-pelosis-visit-to-taiwan-need-to-stand-up-to-china-and-call-its-bluff-5704915.html Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli is Professor in Chinese Studies and Dean of School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University.

By Prof. Swaran Singh ASEAN has too many serious issues at hand to address instead of being distracted by great-power politics Media focus has begun to shift from Taipei to Phnom Penh, which is hosting three days of multiple ASEAN-centric meetings involving in-person meetings of dozens of foreign ministers from all the major stakeholders of the Indo-Pacific region. Starting with the 55th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, these also include the ASEAN+3 Ministerial Meeting and the East Asia Summit Foreign Ministers Meeting, as well as individual dialogue partner nations’ meetings with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations – all culminating on Friday with the 29th Ministerial Meeting of the 27-member ASEAN Region Forum (ARF). In the midst of the four-month-old Ukraine crisis and more recently Nancy Pelosi’s Taiwan visit and the worsening of US relations with both Moscow and Beijing, dozens of bilateral meetings among middle powers in Phnom Penh are expected to bring up some interesting new prognoses. At the least, these are likely to reinforce the impact of ASEAN “centrality” as the key to stability and peace in the Indo-Pacific region, which is currently becoming vulnerable to contested equations among major powers resulting in increased volatility in the region. However, how enduring this unanimous refrain for ASEAN “centrality” in Phnom Penh will prove in building consensus remains to be seen. In fact, ASEAN cementing its equations among European and other emerging economies perhaps most aptly showcases this drift toward strengthening of middle powers’ synergies. For instance, these meetings in Phnom Penh also include celebrations of 45 years of EU-ASEAN partnership and hosting of the annual EU-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. Among others, that meeting is expected to adopt a Plan of Action for 2023-2027 and finalize details of a Commemorative Summit involving all 27 European Union members to be held in Brussels in December. Only last year the EU upgraded its Mission to ASEAN as a full-fledged EU Delegation and issued the “EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific” last September, both underlining the “centrality” of ASEAN. Indeed, ASEAN centrality has come to be the refrain that conjoins this region’s friends and foes alike and can be seen in various strategy reports issued by these countries. India this year is celebrating 30 years of dialogue partnership with ASEAN with a series of events including the foreign ministers’ meeting that was held in June and a summit meeting scheduled for October. India has also maintained that ASEAN-driven efforts in the Indo-Pacific region should focus on local issues and avoid getting distracted into great-power geopolitics. The initial reflection of this shift toward strengthening ASEAN centrality can be seen in regional issues gaining traction over major powers’ geopolitics. While each of these meetings in Phnom Penh will see participants pushing their own priorities, collectively these parleys are expected to seek ASEAN-driven consensus on specific issues, as was underlined during the preparatory Senior Officials Meeting last week, where they tried building consensus on challenges flowing from the Covid-19 pandemic, and situations in Myanmar, the Korean Peninsula and the South China Sea. Power politics persists In reality, however, all of these regional issues remain entangled with major powers’ contestations, making norm-building a rather difficult enterprise. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s visit to Myanmar, for instance, has made headlines emphasizing how he described the military junta as Russia’s “friendly and long-standing partner” underlining no change in Moscow’s Myanmar policy even as the military has used Russian Yak-130 aircraft in attacks on its civilian population. Reports about Pyongyang’s next nuclear test have also triggered scary scenarios in media. No doubt, the ARF has been the only forum in which North Korea has always participated since 2000. It was at the Bangkok ARF of that year that then-US secretary of state Madeleine Albright first met with North Korean representative Paek Nam Sun. That was the first such meeting since the Korean War of 1950-53 and was soon followed by her historic visit to Pyongyang. But even though ARF meetings in the past may have facilitated talks between the US and North Korea, there are no expectations this time of any such encounter in Phnom Penh leading to a revival of dialogue between the Kim Jong Un regime and US President Joe Biden’s administration. In any case, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken only last month met with China’s Wang Yi at the Group of Twenty Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Bali. Likewise, Blinken had this year’s first phone conversation with Lavrov only last week. The recent Biden-Xi Jinping online conversation likewise was no more than verbose posturing. Nevertheless, instead of focusing on ASEAN-driven outcomes, speculations continue to engage in juicy scenarios of a “potentially awkward encounter” that Lavrov or Wang Yi may have with Blinken and what could transpire in such meetings. This, in spite of the fact that Chinese experts already see “no need for Wang Yi to meet and talk with Blinken any more,” underlining the dangerous implications of Nancy Pelosi’s Taiwan visit. Even scheduled meetings between Blinken and host Prime Minister Hun Sen and his foreign minister are being read in the light of US security concerns about Cambodia’s gradual drift toward Beijing. Prioritizing Myanmar ASEAN has too many serious issues at hand to address instead of being distracted by great-power politics. To begin with, intensifying efforts to put a stop to escalating violence in Myanmar remains the most immediate priority for the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. After all, Myanmar has openly rebelled against accepting the ASEAN consensus, which has serious implications for the association’s credibility. In February last year, Myanmar’s military junta ousted the popularly elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi, and all the torchbearers of democracy have failed to stave off the visible drift toward a civil war. Already, the military junta’s heavy-handed policies have resulted in some 2,100 deaths, while 15,000 others have been imprisoned and tens of thousands have fled to neighboring countries. This must be a top priority for ASEAN and its friends and allies who have stakes in an ASEAN-led Indo-Pacific region. So far in dealings with Myanmar, all the efforts of ASEAN have failed to fructify. In April 2021, it asked the military leaders in Myanmar to stop sending representatives to ASEAN meetings until it has complied with the bloc’s Five-Point Consensus for Peace. ASEAN also appointed Cambodia’s Kung Phoak as the ASEAN Chair’s special envoy for Myanmar to ensure that the junta complied with benchmarks set by ASEAN. But the junta has shown little interest in complying and last week resumed judicial executions by hanging four political prisoners. It has retaliated by announcing its refusal to send representatives to ASEAN meetings and refused access to the ASEAN special envoy to Myanmar, creating a stalemate of a kind. Before addressing other equally urgent issues, this continued defiance by the Myanmar junta remains the weakest link for ASEAN reclaiming its centrality in the Indo-Pacific region. For other stakeholders as well, this remains the critical prerequisite for all ASEAN-led initiatives for regional stability and peace. #ASEAN #Cambodia #IndoPacific #ARF #Myanmar Originally published: Asia Times, August 4, 2022 https://asiatimes.com/2022/08/redeeming-asean-centrality-in-indo-pacific-region/?fbclid=IwAR3Bf4tLBqVybGtq5whNMvXkRooEHe5N0Y8VXrQn23FhdJy-kLNXAX9qJcs Posted here with the authorization of the author. Prof. Swaran Singh is visiting professor at the University of British Columbia and professor of diplomacy and disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He is president of the Association of Asia Scholars; adjunct senior fellow at the Charhar Institute, Beijing; senior fellow, Institute for National Security Studies Sri Lanka, Colombo; and visiting professor, Research Institute for Indian Ocean Economies, Kunming.

By Prof. Bharat H. Desai The troubling reality is that the abundance of our natural resources – gold, coltan, cobalt and other strategic minerals – is the root cause of war, extreme violence and abject poverty On 03 August 2022, the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres unveiled a new sculpture – Abused Ammunition – at the UN headquarters in New York to commemorate the sacrifice of the two human rights experts who were on a mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the second largest country on the African continent (after Algeria). Designed by the Swedish artist, Thommy Bremberg, Abused Ammunition is a glass sculpture of a golden bullet. It conveys a powerful message on the use and abuse of weapons of war that have become a curse for the DRC. Killing of the UN Experts on Mission The UN experts, Zaida Catalán (Sweden) and Michael Sharp (USA), on mission as the UNSC resolution 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee’s Group of Experts, were abducted on 12 March 2017 during their investigation of mass atrocities in the troubled Kasai region in the aftermath of brutal clash between armed militia and the Congolese government forces. The search by the UN peacekeepers found their bodies after two weeks. The Board of Inquiry set up by the UNSG noted in its report of 16 August 2017 that the “Congolese interpreter and the three motorcycle drivers [accompanying Catalán and Sharp] were also killed, but their bodies have not been found to date.” Reporting took place under the UNSC resolutions that gave mandate to the Group of Experts (2360 of 21 June. 2017) Group of Experts (2478 of 26 June 2019). These UNSC resolutions have been taken under ‘enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter after arriving at an explicit determination that the “situation in the DRC continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region”. The UNSC took a comprehensive review of the situation in the DRC vide resolution 2641 on 30 June 2022. This came in the wake of long line of the UNSC’s 33 extensive briefings and consultations, between 10 July 2017 to 30 June 2022. It speaks volumes about the deep-rooted malaise, gravity of the ground situation in the DRC and UN’s own engagement in the quagmire of the DRC. Secretary-General António Guterres (left) and Ann Christin Linde, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, attends the inaugural ceremony of the Abused Ammunition Sculpture on 03 August 2022 at the UNHQ in New York, NY. Tragedy of the DR Congo With 110 million population, being 11th largest country in the world and extremely rich natural resources, the DRC in the sub-Saharan Africa remains one of the poorest and most unstable. Variously known during different phases as the Belgian Congo, Congo-Kinshasha, the Congo, Zaire and the DR Congo (different from the Republic of Congo-Brazzaville), the prosperity in resources seems to have become such a curse that its helpless people are condemned to remain at 175 out of 189 countries listed in the ‘low’ Human Development Index. The crux of the appalling condition in the DRC was graphically narrated in spine-chilling address of the Congolese gynaecologist Denis Mukewege in his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech on 10 December 2018 at the Oslo City Hall. “The human cost of this perverted, organized chaos has been hundreds of thousands of women raped, over 4 million people displaced within the country and the loss of 6 million human lives. Imagine, the equivalent of the entire population of Denmark decimated. United Nations peacekeepers and experts have not been spared, either. Several of them have been killed on duty”, Denis Mukewege said. The power of the upfront talk by of Denis Mukwege, brought tears in the eyes of the elite Oslo audience: “I come from one of the richest countries on the planet. Yet the people of my country are among the poorest of the world. The troubling reality is that the abundance of our natural resources – gold, coltan, cobalt and other strategic minerals – is the root cause of war, extreme violence and abject poverty”. Three years down the line, the situation in DRC remains as explosive as narrated in the Nobel Prize acceptance speech. Upon attaining independence from Belgium on 30 June 1960, the DRC saw numerous twists and turns with leaders propped up by outside powers such as: Patrice Lumumba; Joseph Mobutu; Laurent Kabila; Joseph Kabila; Félix Tshisekedi. The cocktail of chaos, ethnic strife and civil wars have taken a deadly toll on the DRC. It is the complexity this crisis in DRC that has entangled the UN therein. In fact, it the DRC conflict that led the feisty UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, to personally go to check the ongoing negotiations of a cease-fire. His death in 18 September 1961 plane crash, on UN mission, remains mysterious. Predicament of the UN The abduction and killing of the two members of the UN Group of Experts is the latest flashpoint in the UN’s engagement in the DRC. On 04 August 2022, the head of UN Peacekeeping, Jean-Pierre Lacroix, following his following his 28-29 July visit to Kinshasa, briefed a closed-door session of the UNSC. It came a day after Congolese authorities expelled the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) spokesperson following some deadly protests in the eastern part. The UNSC resolutions 2641 (2022), 2612 (2021), 2582 (2021) and 2556 (2020) have sought a general and immediate cessation of hostilities and the UNSG’s 21 March 2022 report amply shows no signs of resolving the DRC’s complex tangle, the questions arise about this ‘bottomless-barrel’ situation. It poses grave risks for the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC that includes an Indian contingent. The gravity of the situation can be gauged from the fact that on 25-26 July 2022, anti-UN protestors looted and damaged UN facilities across North Kivu province. They were angered by the UN’s inability to curb violence by armed groups. Three UN peacekeepers (two from India and one from Morocco) were killed. The Road Ahead The UNSC resolution 2612 of 20 December 2021 explicitly asked the President Tshisekedi towards ensuring that the DRC Government protects and respects human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as combats impunity in all areas. It remains to be seen how the DRC national transitional justice (TJ) strategy leads towards truth and reconciliation while ensuring accountability for past crimes, reparation for victims and safeguards against the recurrence of gross human rights violations. The UNSC needs to make the DRC Government to comply with these commitments. The UNSC’s 04 August 2022 consultations were expected to address the crisis and explore a way out. Possibly, the UNSC shall have to soon follow the TJ model adopted for the Rwandan genocide wherein the UNSC resolution 955 (1994), acting under Chapter VII, set up the International Tribunal for Rwanda. The UN needs to find a way and means to rein the warring factions responsible for the spiral of violence in the DRC. The quagmire of the vicious conflict in the DRC necessitates a concrete calibrated application of the International Humanitarian Law, International Criminal Law and the innovative TJ mechanisms to stop the endless nightmare of the Congolese people. It presents an ideational challenge for all. PART - I: Blog Special Series-I: Use of Food as a Weapon of War: A Challenge for International Law (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com) PART - II: Blog Special Series-II: Use of Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War: A Challenge for International Law (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com) #UN #UNSC #DRCongo #InternationalLaw #WeaponsOfWar Professor Dr. Bharat H. Desai is Jawaharlal Nehru Chair and Professor of International Law at the Centre for International Legal Studies of SIS, JNU. He coordinated the Making SIS Visible initiative (2008-2013) as well as Inter-University Consortium: JNU; Jammu; Kashmir; Sikkim (2012-2020) and is the Editor-in-Chief of Environmental Policy and Law (IOS Press: Amsterdam).

By Prof. Swaran Singh Much more should be expected of seasoned leaders like Joe Biden and Xi Jinping than they have shown during their presidencies On Thursday, the presidents of the United States and China held their fifth bilateral online conversation since Joe Biden took office in the White House in January 2021. However, these frequent summits have not helped the two leaders achieve anything substantive. These conversations usually rely on semantics and last for several hours, and the two presidents often appear distracted or stuck in ritualistic text reading. Indeed, these two world leaders have not as yet had a single offline interaction. For his part, President Xi has not traveled outside China for the last two-plus years of the Covid-19 pandemic and is not likely to do so any time soon. For the rest of the world, the enduring uncertainties and anxieties between the leaders of the two most powerful countries have implications far and wide. And thanks to their persisting domestic challenges – where one faces historically low popularity ratings and is widely expected not to run for a second term in office, while the other faces factional infighting over his intention to take an unprecedented third term in office – this stalemate is not going to disappear in a hurry. Add to this the larger enduring narratives of the rise of China coinciding with America’s relative decline and, more recently, tensions triggered by the pandemic and the Ukraine crisis further confirming a cold war in the making, and there begins to unravel a scary prognosis where bonhomie between these two leaders becomes a prerequisite for global peace and prosperity. Premium on personalities With so much premium (read glamour) attached the US and Chinese presidencies, Donald Trump of course is often excused for being new to politics and condoned for having rattled both American domestic politics and its foreign policy. This also explains the inordinate hope that was placed on Biden, who came into the White House to redeem the American slide from global leadership. Unlike Trump, Biden had decades of experience at the forefront of US politics. The same is true of the long tenure of Xi Jinping. But if anything, their track record of bilateral equations should have inspired caution against putting too much hope in their building strong synergies. As vice-presidents, the two had multiple long face-to-face interactions. But in the 18 months since Biden took office on the promise of “America is back,” he has so far failed even to climb down from Tump’s trade and technology wars against the world’s second-largest economy. Instead, Biden’s engagements, one after another, have begun betraying fatigue on undoing its Trump legacy. Fissures in US alliance relationships abroad and raging inflation, price rises and slow growth at home increase the likelihood of Donald Trump contesting the next presidential election and perhaps even returning to office to continue with what, his followers believe, he left unfinished. Meanwhile the rest of the world remains dependent on the personal power of leaders like Biden and Xi, who seem far too deeply entangled with their day-to-day crisis of ensuring personal popularity, falling increasingly short on statesmanlike qualities and clueless on cultivating an enduring partnership. It is a no-brainer that a stable US-China relationship is not a matter of choice and has implications beyond their bilateral ties. Lost opportunities The truth is that much more is expected from political sagacity of seasoned leaders like Biden and Xi. Beginning from China’s rise and former US president Barack Obama’s “pivot” to the Asia-Pacific, China has come to be the most important country for American leaders. Once it was clear that vice-president Xi was in line to become the next Chinese leader and yet was largely a mystery, vice-president Biden “was assigned the task of getting to know him.” So as vice-president, Biden would often travel with Xi during his inter-city flights during his US visits and often hold long meetings. Even when Xi became president of China, vice-president Biden’s December 2013 visit to China saw them having another five-hour high-level interaction that made media headlines. Likewise, when President Xi made his first state visit to the US in September 2015, the welcome dinner was hosted by vice-president Biden. All this should have given an impression of deep bonhomie for bold initiatives. Prima facie, it remains unclear if these long meetings and travels together created any personal warmth and chemistry capable of overcoming mutual irritations and challenges. If anything, it is their short-term personal gains that seem to guide their zigzag tightrope-walking. For instance, Biden, as a presidential candidate in 2020 contesting against the temperamental Trump, sought to emphasize being tough on Xi, thus attacking him with epithets like a “thug” who “doesn’t have a democratic, with a small D, bone in his body.” That sort of thing is fine if it reveals any sustained predictable trajectory, but Biden has lacked consistency in his China policy. And this lack of consistency has resulted in a gradual buildup of brinkmanship with Beijing, particularly over Taiwa. Strategic ambiguity Meanwhile all sides continue to hide behind semantics like hedging and strategic ambiguity. The most recent example is weeks of reports and reactions on the alleged plans for a visit by US House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan, which she has neither confirmed nor denied at this writing. But President Biden has gone public urging her to avoid it and also saying that the US military is also against such a visit, with Pelosi adding further fuel to the fire by asking whether the military expected her plane to be attacked by the Chinese. Such subterfuge defies logic. The fact that the third in line to the US presidency could be planning a visit to Taiwan – which is known to be such a sensitive issue for Beijing – and that, given constitutional checks and balances, the president has no authority to stop her has resulted in China’s Ministry of Defense issuing warnings of strong military action if such a visit materializes. The fact that such unconfirmed media reports could consume the Thursday online summit of Biden and Xi shows how subterfuge and semantics can sideline the substantive. How could that be when Biden is often described as someone who has stood for engaging China even at cost of negating genuine aspirations of Taiwanese? After entering the US Senate in 1973 and witnessing tectonic changes under president Richard Nixon’s China policy, and then being one of the 90 senators to vote for the Taiwan Relations Act, Biden developed a strong “engaging China” policy that saw him oppose the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act in 1999 and in 2001 explicitly warn Taiwan’s newly elected president Chen Shui-bian against declaring independence unilaterally, “because we are not willing to go to war” over such an act. But politics triumphs, and the politics of the weak triumphs most unabashedly. In the face of contesting an election against a whimsical Donald Trump, who as president-designate had made history by making a direct phone call to Taiwanese president-elect Tsai Ing-wen, Joe Biden was to become the first Democratic presidential candidate to make a similar phone call to her on her election to a second term on office. Short-term gains often dictate strategies of being active without being productive. That is what Thursday’s summit achieved. In the end, marking one more round of rituals, Chinese media reports claimed that Xi told Biden “if you play with fire you get burned,” while the US readout was equally bland and sketchy, saying the “United States strongly opposes efforts to change the status quo or undermine peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait,” which says nothing. #US #China #JoeBiden #XiJinping Originally published: Asia Times, July 29, 2022 https://asiatimes.com/2022/07/biden-xi-talks-semantics-sideline-the-substantive/ Posted here with the authorization of the author. Prof. Swaran Singh is visiting professor at the University of British Columbia and professor of diplomacy and disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He is president of the Association of Asia Scholars; adjunct senior fellow at the Charhar Institute, Beijing; senior fellow, Institute for National Security Studies Sri Lanka, Colombo; and visiting professor, Research Institute for Indian Ocean Economies, Kunming.

By Prof. Bharat H. Desai The use of food as a weapon to starve people presents a global challenge. Such aggressive methods of warfare have been prohibited under the four 1949 Geneva Conventions as well as the 1977 Additional Protocols thereto. On 22 July 2022, in an unprecedented thaw, the Black Sea Grain Initiative was signed in Istanbul (Turkey) by the Russian and Ukrainian ministers in the presence of the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres and the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The grain initiative, brokered by the UN Secretary-General with the assistance of Türkiye, shows that if negotiations (Article 33, Chapter VI, UN Charter) are given a chance, any contentious global issue including an armed conflict, can be resolved. The invisible seeds for this were sown by the UNSG’s April 2022 visit to Russia and Ukraine, who has been “working every day since". It underscores unique role of the good offices of the UNSG for the peaceful settlement of international disputes among the UN member states. It also provides a pathway for finding an amicable compromise on the Russia-Ukraine standoff arising from the “special military operation” in Ukraine. The Russian action, “in accordance with Article 51 (chapter VII) of the Charter”, has now completed full five months (February 24 - July 24). The UNSG has aptly described the Black Sea agreement as the “agreement for the world” since it paves the way for food exports from the three key Ukrainian ports in the Black Sea – Odessa, Chernomorsk and Yuzhny. The agreement offers prospects for a new window of peace monitored through the Joint Coordination Centre in Istanbul that would comprise representatives of Ukraine, Russia and Türkiye. The Black Sea agreement as expected to immediately ease the global food prices and help in reducing global hunger. The shipments of food and fertilizers reaching the markets will control spiraling food prices and stave off global famine affecting millions of people. “Today, there is a beacon on the Black Sea…a beacon of hope, a beacon of possibility – a beacon of relief - in a world that needs it more than ever”, the UN secretary-general optimistically said. There has been unprecedented rise in food and fuel prices, as well as supply chain issues as the mountains of grain stocks remained stuck in silos. It shows the enormous cost of allowing the conflict to rage on, supplying arms to Ukraine as well as using the sanctions stick to beat and isolate Russia, a permanent member of the UN Security Council. As the rival egos held the centerstage and crippling sanctions and geopolitics took priority in place of peace, the world has paid a heavy price for allowing the conflict to rage on. For the last four centuries, Russia has remained central for the European peace and stability. “Failure to restart negotiations with Russia and the further alienation of the Kremlin would have dire long-term consequences for stability in Europe”, Henry Kissinger (99), former US secretary of state, warned in his 23 May 2022 iconoclastic video address to the World Economic Forum in Davos. Russia, a Eurasian nuclear and space power, has a 20% share (2020) in the global wheat exports. Ukraine also accounts for 8% of the wheat supply. It annually supplies 45 million tons of wheat and some 20 million tons are already stuck in Ukrainian warehouses and containers. It is no less significant that some 50 countries around the world import 30 % of their wheat requirements from Russia and Ukraine. Ukraine also exports 16% corn (fourth largest) and grows 46% of sunflower-seed and sunflower oil (world’s largest). World Hunger In was no coincidence that early on 06 July 2022 report on the state of world hunger and nutrition was released at an online event. It has been a multi-agency laborious task coordinated by five UN agencies: Food and Agriculture Organization, International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), UN Children Emergency Relief Fund (UNICEF), World Food Program (WFP) and World Health Organization (WHO). Similarly, the UN Security Council (UNSC) held an unprecedented ministerial level open debate on 19 May 2022 on conflict and food security. It took place amidst reports that conflicts have been the primary driver of hunger for 139 million people in 24 countries and territories. It grew from 99 million in 2020. The situation is expected to worsen in 2022 due the conflict in Ukraine. “A sharp increase in global food insecurity threatens to destabilize fragile societies and exacerbate armed conflicts and regional instability”, the concept notes by the US Presidency of the UNSC (May 2022) stated. On April 12, 2021, the UNSG reported to the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on Implementation of the United Nations Decade of Action on Nutrition (2016–2025). The report, highlighted the underlying drivers of all forms of malnutrition. It called upon the states to act with urgency for elimination of “all forms of malnutrition and achieving the SDGs by 2030”. In the 2021 report the five UN agencies graphically noted that in 2020 “between 720 and 811 million people in the world faced hunger” and nearly “2.37 billion people did not have access to adequate food”. The Food Challenge The large part of the problematique on hunger, inadequacy of food and nutrition has been contributed by various kinds of armed conflicts that rage across the world. They place a large part of the 7.9 billion (2022) global population to live in misery. According to FAO, vicious cycle of hunger is largely fueled by extreme climatic events, economic slowdowns and the Covid-19 pandemic. With the world population expected to reach the staggering figure of 10 billion in 2050, it presents a monumental challenge to sustainably feed the growing population on Earth. The 2021 Global Hunger Index forecast shows 47 countries with alarming levels of hunger and 47 others will fail to reach ‘zero hunger’ by 2030. The use of food as a weapon to starve people presents a global challenge. Such aggressive methods of warfare have been prohibited under the four 1949 Geneva Conventions as well as the 1977 Additional Protocols thereto. Still, there is a beacon of hope amidst conflicts, arrogance of power, rival games played on the global geopolitical chessboard and the resultant human misery. “These destructive forces are not invincible”, the ICRC President, Peter Maurer, shared his optimism in conversation with this author. Hence, we need to stamp out the use of food as a weapon of war in the 21st century world. It presents a global ideational challenge to connoisseurs of International Law and International Relations. #BlackSeaGrainAgreement #UN #Turkey #Food #Hunger Originally published: The Tribune, July 28, 2022. https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/black-sea-deal-to-ease-global-food-challenge-416250 Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Professor Dr. Bharat H. Desai is Jawaharlal Nehru Chair and Professor of International Law at the Centre for International Legal Studies of SIS, JNU. He coordinated the Making SIS Visible initiative (2008-2013) as well as Inter-University Consortium: JNU; Jammu; Kashmir; Sikkim (2012-2020) and is the Editor-in-Chief of Environmental Policy and Law (IOS Press: Amsterdam).

By Prof. Bharat H. Desai In view of constraints of the SIS Blog space, this article will appear in Part – I and Part – II. On 15 July 2022, IOS Press published an ideational proposal of this author entitled: “The Repurposed UN Trusteeship Council for the Future”, Environmental Policy and Law 52 (2022) 223-235. It also forms part of the book curated by the author on Envisioning Our Environmental Future: Stockholm+50 and Beyond (IOS Press: Amsterdam, 2022). The said ideational proposal holds significance in view of a flurry of initiatives taken by the United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) António Guterres. In April 2022, the UNSG formed the High-Level Advisory Board (HLAB) for Effective Multilateralism as a sequel to his 2021 report Our Common Agenda as well as the statement to the 75th session of the UN General Assembly (September 2021). It is a prelude to the UNSG’s proposals for the Special Envoy on the Future Generations and the Summit of the Future 2023. The UNSG has suggested that the UN Trusteeship Council (UNTC) be repurposed “to enhance the governance of the global commons…invite States to consider making the Council available as a multi-stakeholder body to tackle emerging challenges and, especially, to serve as a deliberative forum to act on behalf of succeeding generations”. The suggestion of the UNSG was endorsed in another report Our Common Agenda and the Road to 2023 in order to “improve governance of the global commons, including the high seas, Antarctica, the atmosphere, and outer space”. The UNTC Idea on the Global Radar The UNSG’s suggestion reflects the inherent powers of his office as the chief executive officer of the 193-member political organization of the sovereign states. It also shows that change is the law of life. The time seems to have finally come for the UNTC to “arise, awake and listen to the boons” (उत्तिष्ठत जाग्रत प्राप्य वरान्निबोधत - Katha Upanishad, 1.3.14 chapter) after a hiatus of 28 years. The UNSG report has provided a fresh impetus to this author’s long standing scholarly idea (2022; 2021; 2014; 2000) for revival and repurpose of the UNTC, originally mooted in a special talk of 15 January 1999 at the World Bank in Washington DC. The relevance of the idea also came to the fore in the author’s interaction at the Expert Consultation of 22 June 2022 with members of the UN-HLAB who sought concrete ideas for the future. It took place quick on the heels of the Stockholm+50 Conference (2-3 June 2022). How can the UNTC be repurposed with a new mandate in the new context? In the wake of this author’s one-one-one meeting with the Prime Minister Narendra Modi, a detailed proposal contained in the book International Environmental Governance (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2014), released at the UN General Assembly Building (UNHQ, New York; 12 December 2014), was provided both to the Prime Minister Office (PMO) as well as the External Affairs Minister. In a letter of 12 March 2019 to the author, the UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres termed idea of the UNTC revival as “common concern” and referred to “different initiatives related to the protection of the environment and the conservation and sustainable use of its resources”. Reflecting on the growing convergence of thoughts on the UNTC revival, in a letter dated 28 January 2019 to the author, the President of the 73rd UN General Assembly, Maria Fernanda Espinosa Garces, shared her sentiment that “preserving and caring for our planet and protecting the environment are among the most pressing challenges we face globally”. She further added: “As you rightly point out, a new mandate for the UN Trusteeship Council would necessitate consensus among the UN membership and an amendment to the Charter in accordance with its article 108”. Responses from some of the Heads of Government have also been promising. On behalf of the Russian President Vladimir Putin, Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ letter of 31 July 2019 said: “We view it as a unique approach to tackle environmental challenges and we agree with you on its potential…We will surely take into consideration your proposal in our future deliberations”. Scott Morrison, Prime Minister of Australia, in a letter of 6 September 2019, reposed trust in the UN processes and observed: “Australia strongly supports the United Nations (UN) reforms…that UN oversight processes can work effectively, and that the UNSG takes his responsibilities serisouly”. Going beyond diplomatese, Winston Peters, Deputy PM of New Zealand, on behalf of Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern, on 12 September 2019 specially compared the idea of ‘trusteeship’ with the local Māori tradition and said: “The value of kaitiakitanga (guardianship and conservation) resonates strongly with the New Zealand Government, and aligns with the understanding that we have been entrusted with our environment, and have a duty of care for it”. It is in the abovementioned global context as well as following a communication from the PMO, the former SIS colleagues Ajay Patnaik (Dean) and Chintamani Mahapatra (Rector) quickly moved to specially organize this author’s SIS Public Talk (10 April 2019): “On the Revival of the UN Trusteeship Council with a New Mandate for the Environment and the Global Commons”. In Sacred Trust As the things stand, the UNTC still remains one of the six “principal organs” of the UN (Article 7). It has remained dormant since suspending operations on 10 November 1994 after independence of the last trust territory of Palau. On the basis of the UNTC resolution 2199 (LXI) of 25 May 1994, the UNSC adopted resolution S/RES/956 (1994) to this effect. The tasks of the UNTC were to supervise the dependent territories. The concept of sacred trust remained the cardinal principle of the UNTC for the exercise of hand-holding and care for the entrusted 11 trust territories (during 1945-1994). As per Article 86 (Chapter XIII) of the UN Charter, the UNTC was to administer the trust territories. The TC comprised the five permenant members (Article 23) of the Security Council. As a corollary, under the authority of the UNGA, the UNTC was to “consider reports submitted by the administering authority” (Article 87) and “make an annual report to the General Assembly” (Article 88). In view of completion of its mandated task, the UNTC amended its rules of procedure by a resolution on 25 May 1994, to drop the obligation to meet annually. It has agreed to meet as occasion required. It could be by its decision or the decision of its President, or at the request of a majority of its members or the General Assembly or the Security Council. As a reflection of continuity, the 73nd session (7 December 2021) of the UNTC elected Nathalie Broadhurst Estival of France as its President and James Kariuki of the United Kingdom as its Vice-President. The Trusteeship Council is expected to meet again in December 2023. As the UN practice shows, any proposal for an amendment of the Charter is generally treated cautiously. There has been much effort to push for the expansion of the UNSC’s membership and to review the veto power itself. That has not yet materialized. It is feared that it would open up a Pandora’s box for review of the whole Charter as many member states strongly feel that the UNSC is not representative and the UN Charter does not reflect the realities of the 21st century world. Any such UN restructuring would need to be reflective of the aspirations of the ‘peoples’ in whose name the Charter came into existence on 26 June 1945. If there is a consensus on the utility of the UNTC in this new context, an appropriate mandate would need to constitute “trusteeship of the planet”. It has also been identified that the governance of the global commons forms a significant part of the larger architecture of International Environmental Governance. In view of the global environmental challenges, it is now high time to entrust the UNTC with the overall supervision of the global commons and the global environmental protection. How can the UNTC be repurposed in with a new mandate in the new context? PART – II: The Repurposed UN Trusteeship Council for the Future PART – II: A New Mandate in the New Context (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com) #UN #UNTC #UNSG #India #GlobalCommons #EnvironmentalGovernance Professor Dr. Bharat H. Desai is Jawaharlal Nehru Chair and Professor of International Law at the Centre for International Legal Studies of SIS, JNU. He coordinated the Making SIS Visible initiative (2008-2013) as well as Inter-University Consortium: JNU; Jammu; Kashmir; Sikkim (2012-2020) and is the Editor-in-Chief of Environmental Policy and Law (IOS Press: Amsterdam).

By Prof. Bharat H. Desai In view of the global environmental challenges in the Anthropocene epoch, the revived and repurposed UN Trusteeship Council (UNTC) needs to be entrusted with the task of the overall supervision of global environmental protection (especially universal MEAs such as UNFCCC; UNCCD; CBD) as well as the global commons (the Area under UNCLOS; Atmosphere; Antarctica; Outer Space). In a futuristic scenario, wherein consensus emerges among the states to repurpose the UNTC with a new mandate, it will necessitate an amendment under Article 108 of the UN Charter. Any possibility of amendment of the UN Charter, generally, though difficult, is quite plausible and a necessity. An amendment would require approval by a two-thirds of the UNGA members as well as concurrence of all five permanent members of the UNSC. A review conference (Article 109) can be convened theoretically by a two-thirds vote in the UNGA and a vote of any nine members in the UNSC. However, any alteration of the Charter proposed at a review conference cannot take effect without the consent of all five of the permanent members of the UNSC. In a repurposed UNTC, the composition (Article 86), could range from 15 members, at the minimum, to 54, at the maximum. The UNGA would elect members for a period of three years, with one-third of the members retiring every three years. The allocation of seats would be on the basis of an equitable geographical distribution. Unlike the earlier incarnation of the UNTC, no trust areas would be assigned to it. No member of the revived TC would be assigned any special role or conferred with any veto or special or privileged voting rights. The function of the TC would be democratic on the basis of the one-state–one-vote principle (same as the UNGA; Article 18). If retained in its present form, UN Environment (UNEP), or its possible future upgrade into a UN ‘specialized agency’ that may be called UN Environment Protection Organization (UNEPO), would have to work out a special ‘relationship agreement’ with the ECOSOC. If this were to happen, UNEPO, as a specialized agency, would report directly to the UNTC and, through it, to the UNGA. The UNTC would of course be able to avail assistance of the ECOSOC and other UN specialized agencies in regard to matters with which they are respectively concerned (Article 91). The new mandate for the revived UNTC could be repurposed as follows: Article 87: The General Assembly and, under its authority, the Trusteeship Council, in carrying out their functions, may: a. examine progress in reversing global environmental deterioration in consultation with the UN Environment or (its future upgrade into a UN specialized agency) United Nations Environment Protection Organization (UNEPO; or known by any other nomenclature); b. consider reports submitted by the UN Environment or UNEPO as well as relevant multilateral environmental agreements (preferably climate change, biological diversity, desertification, which have universal membership and were crystallized through the UNGA mandated law-making processes) duly sanctioned by their respective Conferences of Parties on the basis of relationship agreements with the Trusteeship Council; c. review the status of each of the designated global commons keeping in view the overall interest of all the inhabitants of the planet earth, in consultation with decision-making organs of their respective regulatory regimes through relationship agreements and provide a mandate for further law-making processes as deemed most appropriate; d. adopt appropriate decisions and other actions, as deemed proper, from time to time, consistent with the respective international agreements, arrangements and mechanisms. Article 88: The Trusteeship Council shall prepare the form and modalities for submission of periodic reports by each of the regulatory regime of multilateral environment agreement as well as the global commons areas placed under its supervision. The decision-making organs of the respective regimes shall provide an annual report to the Trusteeship Council and, through it, to the General Assembly. Trusteeship of the Planet Through the abovementioned mandate, the UNTC, shall reflect a genuine trusteeship, with a responsibility of the planetary trust for the present and the future generations. Its duty will shift from territory to the rights and welfare of the ‘peoples’ (opening line of Preamble to the UN Charter). It will essentially serve as a guardian of the global ‘common concerns’ as well as of the ‘common heritage of mankind.’ Thus, its primary mandate would constitute the global environment and the global commons. Thus, in essence, the UNTC would be entrusted with responsibility as the principal instrumentality for the “trusteeship of the planet”. The evolution of the idea of a trust in the global domain underscores that there are places, territories, and areas that require special and careful nurturing. Hence, the practice has been to place them under the tutelage of a sovereign state or an international institution that can supervise their well-being. At this juncture, the global supervision for the environmental protection and the global commons assumes significance since they hold special value for the present and future generations on the planet Earth. In this context the call given by the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi (September 2020), in his address at the 75th anniversary virtual meet of the UNGA, became relevant for the comprehensive UN reforms since “we cannot fight today’s challenges with outdated structures”. In a similar vein, an explicit reference made by the Prime Minister Modi for “trusteeship of the planet” in an address to the G-20 Riyadh virtual summit (November 2020) provides the future pathway. As a logical corollary, a repurposed UNTC, with a new mandate for the environment and the global commons, would serve as the principal instrumentality for the said trusteeship of the planet. Who shall get the credit (यश) for donning the mantle for this futuristic change of the UNTC whose time has come? The answer lies in the womb of Time. PART – I: The Repurposed UN Trusteeship Council for the Future PART – I: The Context and the Idea (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com) #UNGA #UNTC #UNSG #India #GlobalCommons #EnvironmentalGovernance Professor Dr. Bharat H. Desai is Jawaharlal Nehru Chair and Professor of International Law at the Centre for International Legal Studies of SIS, JNU. He coordinated the Making SIS Visible initiative (2008-2013) as well as Inter-University Consortium: JNU; Jammu; Kashmir; Sikkim (2012-2020) and is the Editor-in-Chief of Environmental Policy and Law (IOS Press: Amsterdam).