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By Prof. Bharat H Desai Apart from the claim of India and others, the question of veto remains the bone of contention. Will the P5 allow the future inductees the privileged of wielding a veto? In all probability, the question of sharing this privilege would remain non-negotiable for P5. The high-level segment of the 77th session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) concluded on September 26, addressed by 190 speakers included 76 Heads of State, 50 Heads of Government and 48 Ministers. They resorted to posturing and airing their grievances against the global order, the UN system, global flashpoints and other states. Interestingly, the US President Joe Biden’s September 21 address brought the spotlight back on the long pending discourse for expansion of the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the Indian claim for a permanent seat therein. “I also believe the time has come for this institution to become more inclusive so that it can better respond to the needs of today’s world. That is also why the United States supports increasing the number of both permanent and non-permanent representatives of the Council”, Biden said. Biden did not spell out the countries that the US would support in both the categories. The Indian External Affairs Minister, Dr. S. Jaishankar while attending a flurry of meetings in New York, addressed the UNGA plenary session on September 25 (A Watershed Moment: Transformative Solutions to Interlocking Challenges), contributed to the 32 countries’ joint statement of September 23 for comprehensive reforms for a “legitimate Security Council” and held a meeting of G4 countries on September 22 – Brazil, India, Germany and Japan – jointly seeking a permanent seat. Each one has challengers to their claims in respective regions. Veto and Inequality The advent of the UN, on the ashes of the League of Nations, was an audacious project to “to save the succeeding generations from the scourge of war” (Preamble, UN Charter). In his address on adoption of the UN Charter on June 26, 1945, the US President Harry Truman prophesized that “If we had had this Charter a few years ago-and above all, the will to use it--millions now dead would be alive. If we should falter in the future in our will to use it, millions now living will surely die”. The special provision for the “concurring votes of the permanent members” (Article 27), known as veto, proved most contentious at the outset since many of the original 51 founding members expressed reservations about making the P5 countries – China, France, USSR, UK and USA (Article 23) – more equal than the others. However, with the collapse of the League, the war-ravaged world was left with no option but to accept the imperfect general political organization that the victorious powers pushed down their throat. It was taking it or leave it situation. That legacy continued even after expansion of the non-permanent membership from 11 to 15 by a December 17, 1963 amendment to Article 23. Since then, the world has been greatly transformed in the last six decades including the UN membership of 193 states. The UN has been a human construct and not a perfect solution for the outlawry of war. It was not “to take mankind to paradise, but rather to save humanity from hell”, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said on September 24. As a corollary, the instrument of veto was not inserted “in a fit of absent-mindedness”. It was a “deliberate decision to render the Security council incapable of undertaking enforcement action against, or against the will of, any of the Big Five” [Inis Claude, Jr., International Conciliation 532 (1961) 329]. On numerous occasions, the P5 have proved this prophecy correct. The Indian Bid The Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi gave a call for “comprehensive UN reforms” in his address of September 25, 2021 at the 76th UNGA. “We cannot fight today’s challenges with outdated structures”, the Prime Minster said. His priority list included climate change, poverty alleviation, situation in Afghanistan and the Security Council reforms. Apart from the claim of India and others, the question of veto remains the bone of contention. Will the P5 allow the future inductees the privileged of wielding a veto? In all probability, the question of sharing this privilege would remain non-negotiable for P5. Hence, the prospective bidders shall have to take a realistic position. Some improvisions are now discernible from President Biden’s when he suggested that the P5 need to “refrain from the use of the veto, except in rare, extraordinary situations”. Similarly, in the use of Russian veto in the aftermath of the ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine, the UNGA adopted an unprecedented resolution 76/262 on April 26, 2022 for a “standing mandate for a General Assembly debate when a veto is cast in the Security Council”. It has suggested that “President of the General Assembly shall convene a formal meeting of the General Assembly within 10 working days of the casting of a veto by one or more permanent members of the Security Council, to hold a debate on the situation as to which the veto was cast.” This extraordinary step shows the future pathway to blunt the edges of use of veto by P5. In turn, it may render veto less attractive for the future expansion of the UNSC. That would open the doors for the third category of permanent membership without veto. It would be a pragmatic pathway for India and G4 to avail a permanent seat on the UNSC’s horse-shoe table. Time as the Answer It is feared that the UNSC expansion would open up a Pandora’s box since the whole Charter may be subject to review. Many member states strongly feel that the UN Charter does not reflect realities of the 21st century world. In a futuristic scenario, if consensus would emerge among the states, it will necessitate an amendment of the Charter under Article 108. It would require approval by a two-thirds of the UNGA members as well as concurrence of P5 of the UNSC. A review conference under Article 109 can be convened by a two-thirds vote in the UNGA and a vote of any nine UNSC members. Any alteration of the Charter proposed at a review conference cannot take effect without the consent of the P5. If the UNSC expansion comes up on the agenda, can the revival and repurpose of the UN Trusteeship Council (UNTC), lying dormant since November 10, 1994, be far behind? This author has suggested (The Tribune, December 2, 2020) for the repurposed UNTC (EPL 52 (2022) 223–235) to exercise trusteeship of the planet through global supervision of environment and the commons. The idea for “trusteeship of the planet” was flagged in Prime Minister Modi’s address of November 21, 2020 to the G20 Riyadh Summit. In order to earn a rightful place on the high-table of the UNSC and become a global solution provider, India needs to have cutting-edge futuristic ideas by timely investment in the study of international affairs by institutionalizing knowledge-driven architecture in the mainstream university sector. This author has earnestly envisioned the role of a ‘think tank’ for his alma mater, through Making SIS Visible initiative (2008-2013), for the pioneering School of International Studies. Cumulatively, the solution oriented scholarly works of global relevance would pave the way for the UNSC seat to follow India rather than vice versa. When will that materialize? Time is the answer. #India #UNSC #ForeignPolicy Professor Dr. Bharat H. Desai is Jawaharlal Nehru Chair and Professor of International Law at the Centre for International Legal Studies of SIS, JNU. He served as a member of the official Indian Delegations to various multilateral negotiations (2002-2008) as well as coordinated the Making SIS Visible initiative (2008-2013) and Inter-University Consortium: JNU; Jammu; Kashmir; Sikkim (2012-2020). He is the Editor-in-Chief of Environmental Policy and Law (IOS Press: Amsterdam).

By Prof. Swaran Singh Interactions at the Pacific Islands Summit this week revealed some of the deeper fears that explain perennial tensions in the region The United States hosted its first ever Pacific Islands Summit in Washington this week. It was attended by heads of state or government of the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, French Polynesia, New Caledonia, Palau, Papua New Guinea, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Tuvalu, while the Republic of Nauru and Vanuatu were represented respectively by their local chargé d’affaires and ambassador in Washington. No doubt, the summit finally managed to issue a detailed 2,375-word Declaration on US-Pacific Partnership, and the United States separately released its first ever Pacific Islands strategy titled Pacific Partnership Strategy. Yet interactions at the summit revealed some of the deeper fears that explain their perennial tensions. While China remained the elephant in the room, it also brought to light some deeper explanations. On the eve of the summit, for example, the United States’ negotiations to renew its Compact of Free Association – the key US arrangement with its most trusted allies in the region, namely the Marshall Islands, Micronesia and Palau – had broken off in Majuro, with local leaders citing their perennial grievances about the lingering impact of US nuclear testing of 1946-1958 in the region on Islanders’ health, environment and economy. Heightened geopolitics Other than these legacies of Cold War geopolitics, the summit proceedings also saw both sides sharing a sense of increasingly becoming victims to the emerging great powers’ geopolitics in the making. Needless to say, China’s unprecedented economic rise and expanding presence in the Pacific Islands have lately begun to change regional equations. But the two sides seemed to present opposing explanations on what this implied, as well as presenting opposing strategies to redress the matter. For instance, the United States’ just-released Pacific Partnership Strategy cites the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent of the Pacific Islands Forum expressing concerns about “heightened geopolitical competition” impacting their lives. But in the very next sentence it blames “economic coercion by the People’s Republic of China, which risks undermining the peace, prosperity, and security of the region, and by extension, of the United States.” Likewise, China also accuses the United States and its allies of “organizing smearing” what it sees as growing acceptability in the region. Especially after the special security agreement that China signed with Solomon Islands this March, the United States’ regional allies Australia and New Zealand have been vocal about their China-driven anxieties, leading Pacific Islanders to read hyperactive re-engagement US President Joe Biden’s administration as driven by its desire to counter China. This was witnessed on Thursday at the summit, for instance, when Biden announced that the US was reopening its embassy in Solomon Islands that was closed in 1993, or announced plans to open more embassies including in Tonga and Kiribati and to recognize the Cook Islands and Niue as sovereign states. All of these Island nations have seen expanding presence of China and their growing friendship with Beijing. Hectic re-engagement The last five years have witnessed the United States’ hyper-engagement with this region. It began with former vice-president Mike Pence attending the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in Papua New Guinea in 2018. This was followed by then-president Donald Trump hosting a summit with the Freely Associated States – the Republic of Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Island and the Federated States of Micronesia, with the last one hosting then-secretary of state Mike Pompeo, which was the first such high-level US visit to that nation. After the long interlude caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, this February saw Secretary of State Antony Blinken visiting Fiji – the first such visit in three decades. This was followed by the assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific affairs, Daniel Kritenbrink, and National Security Council Indo-Pacific coordinator Kurt Campbell visiting Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands, from where they went to join Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry, who was co-hosting the Our Ocean Conference in Palau in April. July saw Vice-President Kamala Harris virtually addressing the Pacific Islands Forum, where she confessed that “the Pacific Islands may not have received the diplomatic attention and support that you deserve” and announced plans for greater US engagement with the region, including opening of new embassies, the return of the Peace Corps and an increase in funding for the Forum Fisheries Agency. In August, Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman and Ambassador to Australis Caroline Kennedy traveled to Solomon islands to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the Guadalcanal Campaign of World War II. Not all of this may have been driven by China’s expanding engagement and influence. Indeed, both China and the United States have reasons for engaging Pacific Islands other than simply undercutting each other. To that extent, their contestation may be seen as a byproduct rather than the sole driver of their increasing engagement with these Island nations. Underlying factors It is important, for example, to underline that the United States’ interests in the Pacific Islands region predate the US-China competition of recent times. The United States has sovereign territories – including its State of Hawaii, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana islands and Guam – that explain its concerns about China’s expanding outreach across the Pacific in general. Second, the United States formerly administered the “Trust Territories” that now form the Freely Associated States of Palau, the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia. This special relationship entails expectations and responsibilities that again explain the United States’ wariness about China’s expanding footprint in this region. Third, it is equally important to underline how several Pacific Islands leaders have expressed discomfort with the United States engaging them to counter China, thus constraining the Biden administration to underplay geopolitics and focus on specifics of local livelihoods, education, training, overfishing and other pandemic- and climate-related existential challenges. This explains why Biden’s Indo-Pacific Strategy released in February also indicated deeper engagement with Pacific Islands, underlining commitment to make the United States “an indispensable partner to Pacific Island Nations.” Finally, the Pacific Islands – an “ocean continent” spanning 15% of the Earth’s surface – form an important subregion of the Indo-Pacific region. Likewise, China needs these 14 Pacific Island nations to expand its support base at international forums, to find new partners for its Belt and Road Initiative as well as its newly launched Global Development and Global Security Initiatives. Most of all, China needs them to constrain Taiwan’s diplomatic space further. After all, four of the 14 nations that recognize Taiwan as the Republic of China are the Marshall Islands, Tuvalu, Palau and Nauru. China’s growing presence among the Pacific Islands has directly resulted in Kiribati and Solomon Islands in 2019 switching diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. Even India has created a Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation and held two summits with national leaders of the 14 Pacific Islands, in Suva, Fiji, and Jaipur, India, in 2014 and 2015 respectively, and hosted an India-Pacific Islands Sustainable Development Conference in New Delhi in May 2017. Fiji, the second-largest of the Pacific Islands and with 38% of its population being Indo-Fijians, has had close bonds with India. But sensational speculations can often provide convincing outlines. India has lately not been the most active player in the region, yet geopolitics-driven speculations can cause commentators to see the Indian foreign minister meeting last week in Washington with his counterpart from Papua New Guinea – the largest of the Pacific Islands – as India joining the US in reviving its engagement with the Islands to counter China. How much of that is true will remain an enigma. #PacificIslandsSummit #US #China Originally published: Asia Times, September 30, 2022 https://asiatimes.com/2022/09/us-pacific-islands-strategy-what-lies-beyond/?fbclid=IwAR09cjB-hATEOTwJ4rom8kvg6HKlb7iUS3r_rUYEpHxbXA4Kc6prwDIJNBw Posted here with the authorization of the author. Swaran Singh is Professor of Diplomacy and Disarmament at Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Delhi) and currently visiting professor with University of British Columbia (Vancouver, Canada).

By Prof. Swaran Singh India's policy of multi-alignment has been on full display throughout the past several weeks. In addition to India's prime minister attending a whole range of summit meetings, last week saw India's foreign minister Dr S Jaishankar attend dozens of meetings involving BRICS, as well as several other quadrilaterals, triangular and bilateral foreign ministers' meets on the sidelines of the 77th session of the UN General Assembly. In this gradual shift of India's foreign policy — from traditional non-alignment towards multi-alignment involving building partnerships in across many sectors with as many countries as possible — the ongoing Ukraine crisis has been an acid test for India's efforts to carefully craft this complex balance between its engagement with Russia, China and other Eurasian nations on the one hand, while building close proximity with the United States. This method of "spreading thin," of course, has been criticized by some as a "hunting with hounds and running with hares" strategy yet what has sustained it is the fact that it represents India's essential civilizational character of seeking "unity in diversity" as acceptance grows of this genre of India's foreign policy. This, of course, has had its costs, and benefits. This shift, however, has been in the making for some time with domestic dynamics having begun to a play larger role compared to exogenous structural factors and forces. Even if not yet a system shaping power like China, an emerging India aspires to be able to influence global dynamics using forums that enhance its ever growing leverage. The current leadership had come to power in 2014 on the slogan that India has been "punching way below its weight." This has since seen them repeatedly underline India's demographic and economic size in explaining this novel experiment at synergizing India's pursuit for protecting core national interests by utilizing India's ever expanding economic leverage. The Indian economy grew by 13.5 percent for the first quarter of this financial year (April-June 2022) and reminded experts of China's exponential growth rates in the early 1990s. Whilst India is not able to completely follow China's growth trajectories in face of pandemic-driven global disruption and deceleration, India's emerging economy can nonetheless maximize outcomes by joining the correct forums. This is what makes India's engagement with groupings like BRICS, G20 and the SCO critical for its peaceful rise, though it remains equally engaged with the US-led Quad in the Indo-Pacific, or the Middle East. Even within these primarily development-focused groupings, the US-led G20 has become increasingly vulnerable to divisive geopolitics, while both BRICS and SCO have been debating on expansion to co-opt new aspirant countries which promises to increase their writ and relevance. The fact that India will chair next year's SCO should help it balance its growing tilt towards the United States and its friends and allies' strategic initiatives. What also makes India's participation in BRICS and the SCO so unique is that India is the only member that is also member of the US-led Quad and is regularly invited to G7 summits. This is where India aspires to bring to bear its sobering impact through bridge building of their overlaps and work to ensure that these two sets of groupings do not become preoccupied with mutual skepticism and counterproductive rivalries. Some of that promise can also be seen in how, in spite of their bilateral differences on some of these issues, BRICS and SCO members have displayed consensus building capacity on a whole range of issues way beyond economic cooperation and financial restructuring. The media statement issued from New York foreign ministers BRICS meet last week for instance covers areas spanning multilateralism, terrorism, climate change, corruption and human rights. Indeed, it also saw foreign ministers of China and India both advocating need for reforming extant multilateralism which has become dated. Indeed, what often gets overlooked is how India has steered clear from US-led regional security mechanisms like AUKUS and 5-Eyes, whilst has also begun distancing itself from IPEF, all whilst it has sustained its engagement with SCO and BRICS groupings where China stands tall as an inordinately large economy. In spite of border tensions, India's trade with China has remained ahead of its trade with the United States. In the midst of the past seven months of the Ukraine crisis, India's presence in BRICS and the SCO has provided India an opportunity to assert its autonomy in toeing either the American or Russian line, while at the same time contribute to bringing moderation to their contrarian impulses. No doubt, India has refused to denounce Russian military action in Ukraine and also increased imports of Russian oil and other commodities,but India even today buys more oil from the United States and India-US trade stands much larger than that of India-Russia trade. What then explains Western anxieties on India's engagement with Russia and China? Emerging internal disjunctions of liberal order that undergirds the United States global leaders may perhaps reveal some answers. #India #Multi-Alignment #BRICS #SCO #G20 Originally published: Global Times, September 27, 2022 https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202209/1276207.shtml Posted here with the authorization of the author. Swaran Singh is Professor of Diplomacy and Disarmament at Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Delhi) and currently visiting professor with University of British Columbia (Vancouver, Canada).

By Dr. Aprajita Kashyap CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States), is a unique regional bloc that brings together all Latin America and Caribbean countries. It epitomises accurately a regional integration program based on principles of egalitarianism between states, decision-making based on consensus. The objective is to formulate policies that endorse social, political and economic cooperation. As a conglomerate, CELAC is the third largest economy in the world with a GDP of around $ 7 trillion dollars, the largest food producer in the world and the third largest producer of electricity. The convergence of India and CELAC as partners is a derivative of the common principles behind which both India and CELAC stand firm grounds viz., respect for international law, peaceful resolution of differences or conflicts, promotion and protection of human rights, advancement of sustainable development and consolidation of a multi-polar and balanced world order. Abhorrence of colonialism and the commitment to strengthening the South-South Cooperation could be other factors of attraction towards each other. CELAC is in news due to the meeting of EAM of India Dr. S. Jaishankar with the CELAC Quartet (represented by the Foreign Ministers of Argentina, Santiago Cafiero; Guatemala, Mario Adolfo Bucaro Flores; Trinidad and Tobago, Dr. Amery Browne, and the Deputy Minister for Multilateral Affairs of Colombia, Laura Gil Savastano) at New York on September 19, 2022. Gains for India For India, the advantages of cooperation are that through this grouping entire Latin America and the Caribbean region can be within reach. This would imply doing away with barriers that hamper trade with individual countries or signing bilateral commercial agreements and investment policies. The other advantage is that it could become a member of the Inter-American Developmental Bank, thus gaining access to greater credit facilities for Indian investors in Latin America. Partnership with CELAC can become a game-changer and be more sustainable due to large number of partners and varied agenda, which is not the case with smaller groupings with specific objectives. The social aspect may lead to the strengthening of diasporic ties with the Caribbean. The political, economic and social relations can be augmented using the multi-pronged reach of this one platform. Benefits for CELAC CELAC had carefully chosen India as the first dialogue partner due to its size, similar political positions and affinity toward developing countries. India is amongst Latin America’s top export markets for renewable sources of energy, soybean and precious minerals. The size of the Indian market is colossal and that augurs well for routing their primary products and semi-processed goods. India has emerged as an important partner in goods, services and investment. The Indian service industry especially the IT sector has made a valuable contribution as technological endowment in many countries. The soft power elements of India are moderately visible in the region in the form of cuisine, crafts, dance, music and yoga. Cementing the Cooperation Soon after the formation of CELAC in 2011, the then Foreign Minister, SM Krishna, had held a dialogue with this grouping in 2012. The intention to expand and diversify trade and boost investments was endorsed by the India-CELAC Joint Statement that had proposed to set up a Business Council, a CEO Forum, an Energy Forum, a Science Forum and an Agricultural Experts group. Besides, climate change and terrorism were recognised as the most potent global challenges. However, the intent was not backed by prioritization of the commitment and, therefore, a period of lull followed. What to expect? Coupled with the earlier visit to Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, this trip lends a renewed focus on South America by the EAM. It could become a counter-force to the China-CELAC forum. Despite the sizeable presence of Chinese investment India has been seen as a benevolent partner with similar aspirations. The meeting endorses the spirit of the Argentine Foreign Affairs Minister Santiago Cafiero (Argentina holds the pro tempore Presidency of CELAC), who had earlier announced that during his tenure he will promote dialogue with the European Union (EU) and countries such as China, Russia and India. This CELAC-India meeting is an accomplishment of this aspiration. The leaders at the helm were upbeat about their cooperation in UN and other multilateral fora. Several prospective areas of cooperation have been identified which importantly include endeavours towards post-pandemic economic recovery; revitalising trade relations; collaborating in areas of healthcare and vaccine production; venturing into space cooperation; and providing food security through partnering in agricultural sector. UN reforms and climate change tackling could become other areas of association. Taking it forward In the present context, CELAC acquires a central relevance since the region can speak with a single voice and this would simplify the multiplicity of efforts to sustain India-LAC ties. CELAC can help in dispelling the dilemma of India to collaborate with a plethora of regional groupings in the LAC region and rather concentrate on a few. Moreover, partnership with CELAC coupled with bilateral links through embassies in more than 20 LAC countries can deepen the relations further. Vital stands in this regard could be instituting commitments within established timelines, initiation of direct connectivity, facilitating issuance of visas and enabling trade through incentives and simplification of tariffs. Additional areas of cooperation can be identified especially in defence and space technology. #CELAC #India #LatinAmerica #CaribbeanStates Originally published: Financial Express, September 20, 2022 https://www.financialexpress.com/defence/india-and-celac-meeting-making-headway-towards-improved-relations/2677599/ Posted here with the authorization of the author. Dr Aprajita Kashyap is Faculty in Latin American Division, CCUS&LAS, SIS, JNU, New Delhi. Email: aprajitakash@gmail.com

By Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli When Xi visited Samarkand on September 16, what surprised many analysts was that he made no major headline-grabbing speech nor attended the official dinner. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s first foreign visit since the outbreak of the Covid pandemic – to Samarkand for the SCO summit – seems to have proved largely counter-productive. China and Russia helped form the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in 2001, building on its earlier avatar ‘Shanghai Five’ of 1996. Today, the SCO has eight members and several observers, dialogue partners and partner multilateral institutions. It has made some progress in counter-terrorism -- through ‘Peace Mission’, ‘Pabbi’ and ‘Solidarity’ exercises -- and energy cooperation and multipolarity. Except for China and India, the SCO is still weak in market economy. When Xi visited Samarkand on September 16, what surprised many analysts was that he made no major headline-grabbing speech nor attended the official dinner. His anodyne address to the summit meeting on “sunny and rainy days” alternating only led to speculation on the domestic and global situation. No significant reports of his bilateral meetings were mentioned, except for that with Russian President Vladimir Putin, which apparently did not go well. The expected meeting at Samarkand between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi did not take place despite the partial disengagement of troops on September 8 at Gogra Heights and Hot Springs in Ladakh. There are at least six more “friction points” where disengagement and de-escalation need to be carried out. The SCO ‘spirit’ is to build mutual trust. However, China’s military aggression against India, a fellow SCO member, has punctured such claims. Also, the Samarkand Declaration emphasised on fighting terrorism, even as China was putting on hold, once again, sanctions on Pakistan-based terrorists. While Beijing has been bailing out terrorists like Masood Azhar, Zakir-ul-Rehman, Makki and others since 2009, blocking action to proscribe them in the UN Security Council-mandated 1267 Committee, the trend has intensified recently – contrary to the SCO’s spirit and agenda. The Samarkand Declaration stated that the “global situation is deteriorating alarmingly”. This is in reference to the Ukrainian situation, energy and food crises, supply chain disruptions due to the spread of the pandemic, and others. Xi is also under tremendous pressure due to the persistence of Covid-19 across China, despite his ‘zero covid’ policies, and the resultant relative decline in economic growth rates and social unrest. However, the undercurrent at Samarkand was the uncertainty brought about by Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. The supposedly mighty Russian military has been unable to bring Ukraine under its boot even after seven months of fighting. Nor has Putin been able to achieve his stated goals of forcing Ukraine to remain neutral and preventing NATO expansion. The recent withdrawal of Russian troops from Kharkiv further raised doubts in China about Russian superiority. In early February, a Xi-Putin joint statement had proclaimed their partnership to be “limitless”. Just months later, stark differences have come to the fore between them, including on how far China would go to support Russia against western sanctions. Not just that, Chinese migration to Siberia is changing the demographic profile in Khabarovsk, Krai, Primorovsky and other regions in the Russian Far East. Then there are, of course, issues like Chinese smuggling, IPR theft , espionage for defence technologies, fisheries’ restrictions, etc. It was reported that at the Xi-Putin meeting in Samarkand, Xi had reiterated his readiness “to work with Russia in extending strong support to each other on issues concerning their respective core interests”. Putin, on the other hand, said he understood China’s “questions and concerns”. A week before the Xi-Putin meeting, Li Zhanshu, the No 3 Politburo Standing Committee member, visited Russia and reportedly assured China’s support for Russia. Thus, while China-Russia equations on Ukraine, Taiwan and other issues are still shrouded in secrecy, it appears that China is feeling the heat from the NATO countries – together, China’s largest trading partners, with nearly $2 trillion in trade that is heavily beneficial to Beijing. With the Ukraine war dragging on for more than seven months now, China is under tremendous pressure from all quarters. Initially, China justified the Russian invasion, blaming NATO expansion for it. This view is now relatively subdued in Chinese statements. Increasingly, China is under pressure domestically and internationally for its ties with Russia. Domestically, as China is witnessing relative economic decline, it increasingly needs the support of western countries to resurrect Chinese fortunes. With the 20th Communist Party Congress due on October 16 this year, Xi is under growing pressure from different factions in the Communist Party. Meanwhile, China’s tacit support to Russian military actions is increasingly alienating Beijing from the western countries. With the Ukrainian conflict at the cusp of the changing regional and international order, Xi must be a worried man. China dreamt of rising to the top to supplant a declining United States. Xi’s apple cart has been upset – the global and regional strategic situation has become more complex. #SCO #China #XiJinping #Russia Originally published: Deccan Herald, September 25, 2022. https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/xi-might-want-to-quickly-forget-his-samarkand-outing-1148055.html Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli is Dean of the School of International Studies and Professor in Chinese Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University. Views are personal.

By Prof. Bharat H Desai The Maldivian diplomat Abdulla Shahid, President of the 76th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), symbolically handed over gavel on 12 September 2022, at the end of his ‘Presidency of Hope’, to the Hungarian diplomat Csaba Kőrösi, the President of the 77th session. “We owe it to ourselves, to our peers, to our children, to our grandchildren, to humanity, to choose hope”, Shahid said. It is exactly that hope that lie in tatters even as millions of children worldwide face unprecedented challenges at birth, in growth, treatment on gendered lines and in violent conflicts that rage around the world. This sordid saga seriously impinges upon our future. Still, it remains mostly under wraps as jetsetter diplomats engage in glitzy state affairs, scholars quibble over geopolitics, spheres of influence, territorial disputes, bilateral photo-ops and others relish in finding faults with the UN and International Law. Global Violence Against Children A landmark 2006 UN study on violence against children emphatically asserted that “No violence against children is justifiable; all violence against children is preventable”. Globally, children now face growing violence such as bullying, including cyberbullying, sexual harassment including peer-to-peer and conscription by armed groups engaged in warfare and terrorism. Girls in particular are exposed to heightened risks of negative social norms, gender stereotypes, gender-based discrimination and sexual and gender-based violence. According to the Global Humanitarian Overview 2022, an estimated 16 million people pushed into food crises in 15 countries has exacerbated violence against women and children. In conflict zones, recurrent attacks take place on schools and hospitals and children get abducted. Protection of Children: Existing Legal Framework The global armed conflicts result in gross violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights law (IHRL). The political organs of the UN have responded to the challenge through the resolutions of the UNGA and the UNSC for protection of the rights of the children against violence including in armed conflicts. The UNGA resolution 76/147 of 16 December 2021 called upon UNSG’s SR for Children and Armed Conflict to carry out her mandate for the protection of children in situations of armed conflict. She has been mandated to pro-actively engage with relevant UN entities, Member States, regional organizations and non-State armed groups. Now world’s 25% children (aged 0-14 years) population, out of 7.95 billion (2022), face a grim future. The UNGA adopted the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) vide resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989. It acknowledges that the Convention and the Optional Protocols thereto contain a comprehensive set of international legal standards for the protection and well-being of children. The nature and gravity of the challenges faced by world’s children can be gauged from the concerted works of the Special Representatives (SR) of the UNSG on Violence against Children as well as for Children and Armed Conflict, the Special Rapporteurs (SRs) of the Human Rights Council and the Committee on the Rights of the Child. The 2021 annual report of the UNSG’s SR (Najat Maalla M’jid) on violence against children (A/HRC/49/57) highlighted how violence against children has sharply risen. It was followed by the UNSG’s own 2022 report of the UNSG on children and armed conflict that provides graphic details of the violations against children. It holds parties to the conflict responsible for “recruitment and use of children, the killing and maiming of children, rape and other forms of sexual violence against children, attacks on schools, hospitals and protected persons”. The report has enlisted 23,982 verified grave violations that have affected 19,165 children (13,633 boys, 5,242 girls, 290 sex unknown). The highest numbers of violations comprised the killing (2,515) and maiming (5,555) of 8,070 children and the recruitment of 6,310 children. In this respect, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Somalia, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen top the chart. The UNSG’s report (S/2022/272 of 29 March 2022) on conflict related sexual violence surmises that most of the cases of sexual violence continued to be vastly underreported, owing to stigmatization, the fear of reprisals, harmful social norms, the absence of services, impunity, the lack of humanitarian access and safety concerns. Any recruitment or use of children in armed conflicts is a violation of the IHL. In fact, IHL prohibits any indiscriminate attacks against civilians, including children, and they shall not be the object of attack, including by way of reprisal or excessive use of force. The role of various armed groups, as distinct from the armed forces of a State, have become a global concern as regards the recruitment and training of children in hostilities. In view of growing conscription of children in armed conflict, the Optional Protocol (25 May 2000) to the CRC, has called for raising the minimum age for voluntary recruitment of persons into the national armed forces from that set out in article 38 (3) of the CRC. The Optional Protocol (Article 2) explicitly requires that the State Parties “shall ensure that persons who have not attained the age of 18 years are not compulsorily recruited into their armed forces”. Under the CRC too, persons under 18 years of age are entitled to special protection, and to adopt safeguards to ensure that such recruitment is not forced or coerced. As a corollary to these instruments, there has been other efforts at ‘taming the beast’ in armed conflicts such as the Cape Town Principles (1997) and the Paris Principles and Commitments on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups (2007). Striving for Children’s Better Future In view of the above, as the authoritarian regimes, toxicity laden societies and violent conflicts pose grave risks to the 25% of global population (children), the UN member states need to urgently address the challenge. The road map can comprise convening of a special UN conference on the rights and protection of children including special focus at the Summit of the Future (22-23 September 2024), decided vide UNGA modalities resolution of 76/307 of 08 September 2022, to craft a concrete time bound action plan for the elimination of all forms of violence against children especially in conflict zones to ensure a better future for the world’s children. ****** Part - I: Blog Special Series-I: Use of Food as a Weapon of War: A Challenge for International Law (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com) Part - II: Blog Special Series-II: Use of Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War: A Challenge for International Law (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com) Part - III: Abused Ammunition as a Weapon of War in the DR Congo: A Challenge for International Law (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com) Part – IV: Use of Nuclear Weapons in War (Hiroshima-Nagasaki Day): A Challenge for International Law (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com) Part – V: Use of Weapons of War and the Role of Humanitarians: A Challenge for International Law (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com) #War #Children #InternationalLaw Professor Dr. Bharat H. Desai is Jawaharlal Nehru Chair and Professor of International Law at the Centre for International Legal Studies of SIS, JNU. He coordinated the Making SIS Visible initiative (2008-2013) as well as Inter-University Consortium: JNU; Jammu; Kashmir; Sikkim (2012-2020) and is the Editor-in-Chief of Environmental Policy and Law (IOS Press: Amsterdam).

प्रोफेसर श्रीकांत कोंडापल्ली शंघाई सहयोग संगठन की मौजूदा बैठक भारत के लिए काफी अहम साबित होने जा रही है। बेशक, चर्चा का यही मुख्य विषय है कि क्या चीन के राष्ट्रपति शी जिनपिंग और भारतीय प्रधानमंत्री नरेंद्र मोदी एक साथ बैठेंगे?... शंघाई सहयोग संगठन की मौजूदा बैठक भारत के लिए काफी अहम साबित होने जा रही है। बेशक, चर्चा का यही मुख्य विषय है कि क्या चीन के राष्ट्रपति शी जिनपिंग और भारतीय प्रधानमंत्री नरेंद्र मोदी एक साथ बैठेंगे? मगर कई अन्य मसले भी हैं, जिन पर चर्चा हमारे लिए मायने रखती है। प्रधानमंत्री मोदी ने ऐसे कई विषयों को अपने संबोधन में समेटा। उन्होंने विनिर्माण कार्य तेज करने, कोविड-संक्रमण काल से उबरने, आपूर्ति शृंखला को निर्बाध गति देने और विकास दर को आगे बढ़ाने पर उचित ही जोर दिया। उन्होंने खाद्यान्न की कीमतों की भी चर्चा की, क्योंकि रूस-यूक्रेन युद्ध से गेहूं का वैश्विक निर्यात प्रभावित हुआ है। वैश्विक महंगाई भी एक अहम मुद्दा था, जिसकी चर्चा प्रधानमंत्री मोदी ने की। ऊर्जा संरक्षण पर भी उन्होंने जोर दिया, क्योंकि कोविड-काल में अंतरराष्ट्रीय बाजार में कच्चे तेल के दाम घटकर शून्य के करीब हो गए थे, जो अब बढ़कर फिर 100 डॉलर प्रति बैरल पहुंच गए हैं। भारत और चीन के शासनाध्यक्षों की मुलाकात को लेकर शायद ही आधिकारिक तौर पर कुछ कहा जाए, लेकिन दोनों नेता आखिरी वक्त में मिल भी सकते हैं। सीमा पर तनातनी खत्म करने की जो पहल पिछले दिनों हुई थी, उसका यही मतलब निकलता है। कूटनीतिज्ञ जानते हैं कि बिना किसी खास प्रयोजन के ऐसा नहीं किया जाता। विश्व की दूसरी सबसे बड़ी अर्थव्यवस्था यानी चीन और पांचवीं आर्थिक ताकत यानी भारत जरूर बात करेंगे, बेशक इससे संबंधों को कोई खास गति न मिले। अच्छी बात यह है कि अगले साल शंघाई सहयोग संगठन का नेतृत्व भारत करेगा। इस पर सभी सदस्य देश राजी हैं। यह प्रधानमंत्री मोदी की यात्रा की एक बड़ी उपलब्धि होगी, क्योंकि अगली बैठक की सफलता बतौर मेजबान हमारा कद ऊंचा करेगी, और हमारी क्षमता बढ़ाएगी। यही कारण है कि अपने संबोधन में प्रधानमंत्री मोदी ने किसी विवादित मुद्दे की बात नहीं की, बल्कि कोविड से कारण सुस्त पड़ी आर्थिक गति को तेज करने का खाका खींचा। इस संगठन का हमें कई तरह से फायदा हो सकता है। पहला, आतंकवाद के खिलाफ यह हमारे काम आ सकता है। ‘रीजनल एंटी-टेररिस्ट स्ट्रक्चर’ (आरएटीएस) इस संगठन का स्थायी अंग है। यह आतंकवाद के खिलाफ अभ्यास-कार्य करता रहता है, जिससे हमारे सैनिकों को सुरक्षा की नई रणनीति बनाने का अनुभव मिलता है। फिर, जब हम ‘काउंटर-टेररिज्म’ की बात कहते हैं, तो वह ‘क्रॉस-बॉर्डर टेररिज्म’ होता है, यानी सीमा पार से संचालित आतंकी गतिविधि। इसमें स्वाभाविक तौर पर पाकिस्तान घिरता है। यह संगठन हमें मौका देता है कि हम न सिर्फ चीन और रूस, बल्कि ईरान को भी पाकिस्तान का असली चेहरा दिखा सकते हैं। आतंकवाद का विरोध करने के कारण संगठन के सदस्य देश पाकिस्तान-परस्त आतंकवाद पर बहुत दिनों तक आंखें मूंदे नहीं रह सकते। ऊर्जा सहयोग के लिहाज से भी यह संगठन काफी फायदेमंद है। 2008 की आर्थिक मंदी के समय जब कच्चे तेल की कीमत बढ़कर 140 डॉलर प्रति बैरल हो गई थी, तब हमारा बजट पूरी तरह से गड़बड़ा गया था। मध्य एशिया हमारी ऊर्जा जरूरतें काफी हद तक पूरी कर सकता है। रूस भी साल के कुछ महीने में सऊदी अरब से अधिक तेल उत्पादन करता है। इसका मतलब है कि यदि रूस और मध्य एशिया से हमारे रिश्ते सही रहे, तो हमें सस्ती दरों पर तेल मिल सकता है। पिछले दिनों रूस ने हमें करीब 35 फीसदी छूट के साथ तेल दिया था। व्यापारिक रिश्ते को गति देने में भी यह कारगर है। ‘इंटरनेशनल नॉर्थ-साउथ ट्रांसपोर्ट कॉरिडोर’ भारत को यूरोप से जोड़ेगा। हम इसके माध्यम से पाकिस्तान को किनारे करके चाबहार (अफगानिस्तान) के रास्ते रूस तक जा सकते हैं। जरांज-डेलाराम रोड भी हमारे लिए फायदेमंद है। अफगानिस्तान से निकटता लिथियम बैटरी जैसी हमारी जरूरतों को दूर कर सकती है। अच्छी बात है कि ऊर्जा, व्यापार और आर्थिकी से जुड़े कुछ द्विपक्षीय समझौते भी हुए हैं। चीन को छोड़कर शंघाई सहयोग संगठन के तमाम देशों से अभी हम 30-40 अरब डॉलर का कारोबार करते हैं। नए समझौते आपसी कारोबार बढ़ा सकते हैं, जो हमारे लिए लाभ का सौदा होगा। मूल रूप से प्रकाशित: हिंदुस्तान, 16.09.2022 https://www.livehindustan.com/blog/nazariya/story-hindustan-nazariya-column-17-september-2022-7092437.amp.html प्रोफेसर श्रीकांत कोंडापल्ली डीन, स्कूल ऑफ इंटरनेशनल स्टडीज, जेएनयू

By Prof. Swaran Singh Instead of transforming diminishing post-war institutions, the U.S. and its allies remain focused on strengthening them despite waning relevance and remit. The GSI, on the other hand, promises to address increasingly complex global security challenges with Chinese solutions rooted in the ancient wisdom of Chinese traditions. After a decade of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Chinese President Xi Jinping launched two spin-offs, the Global Development Initiative (GDI) and the Global Security Initiative (GSI), in September 2021 and April 2022, respectively. The trio of programs has its proponents, partners, fence sitters and detractors, and over time, their ideas have all gained traction and attention worldwide. As United Nations (UN) Secretary-General António Guterres prepares his ambitious 2023 Summit of the Future in September, which is expected to bring a “New Agenda for Peace,” the debate is shifting from specific conflicts to crafting a transformative overarching global security governance architecture for the future that provides interesting space for the GSI to engage in global narratives. The last time UN Secretary General issued such a proposal was in 1992, when Boutros-Boutros Ghali presented “An Agenda for Peace” that resulted in transforming the UN peacekeeping operations. This makes the GSI a significant turning point and a catalyst for making critical value additions to this evolving discussion around a new global security architecture blueprint. Various commentators have already described the GSI as one potent non-Western alternative that represents the aspirations of the combined Global South. However, to make a permanent mark on the emerging debate, China needs to convince nations of the Global North as well. They represent the architects and advocates of the existing post-World War II global security architecture. In August, as the rotating president of the UN Security Council, China convened a special session dedicated to “Promoting Common Security through Dialogue and Cooperation,” wherein China’s permanent representative to the UN Zhang Jun presented details of the GSI and expressed the country’s readiness to work with the international community to evolve consensus around the GSI in building a balanced, effective, and sustainable international security architecture together. President Xi first proposed the GSI vision to provide security for all in a short keynote address at the opening ceremony of the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference 2022 this April. As outlined in President Xi’s speech, the GSI is underpinned by “six commitments” as its pillar principles. These include: Vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security; Respecting sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries; Abiding by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter; Taking the legitimate security concerns of all countries seriously; Peacefully resolving differences and disputes between countries through dialogue and consultation; and Maintaining security in both traditional and non-traditional domains. Like the BRI and the GDI, in which various individual projects preexisted before President Xi released official blueprints for transforming global infrastructure, at first glance, the principles of the GSI have also been the mainstay of China’s foreign policy. What was novel here was that President Xi also urged all countries to uphold the principle of indivisible security and build a balanced, effective, and sustainable security architecture. The GSI’s recalibration of these principles in the new era changes central connotations, especially in terms of the addition of the principle of indivisibility of global security. As the saying goes, any system always contains more than the total sum of its parts. Also, parts often preexist before they are recalibrated in a new innovative design to maximize their collective outcome. Likewise, individual principles of the GSI can be traced back as far as the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, or the Panchasheel, originating in talks between China and India in the 1950s. In the same vein, the fact that the GSI now seeks to connect them with the noble principle of indivisible nature of global security enhances its critical contribution. The GSI must be read in tandem with the BRI and the GDI, as the trio of programs form part of China’s overarching vision and strategy of creating public goods to build a community with a shared future for humanity. These initiatives aim to eliminate the global deficit in material infrastructure, development, and peace. The central axiom of the GSI is that one nation’s security cannot be built at the cost of other nations. By proposing the GSI, China aims to emerge as a leading alternative provider of global security. No doubt, Western powers have looked at China’s GSI apprehensively and seen it delegitimizing the Cold War mindset of power politics and hegemony, thereby diminishing much of the outdated global governance architecture which no longer reflects the new realities of the 21st century. Addressing such suspicions will be an uphill task that must be done to earn credibility. After a decade of similar suspicion of the BRI, experience has paved a path to overcoming challenges, and today the many participating nations include many allies of the U.S. The progress of China’s GDI showcases the speed with which Beijing seeks to operationalize the GSI even more. The announcement of the GDI in September 2021 was followed by President Xi expounding it on the eve of 14th BRICS Summit in June 2022 as he chaired the High-level Dialogue on Global Development. This meeting was attended by BRICS leaders plus a dozen other invited national leaders from around the world. They agreed to work together and harness China’s GDI as an accelerator for realizing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The effort helped identify broad guiding principles for joint efforts while identifying eight areas for cooperation and setting up 32 specific mechanisms for collaboration towards well-defined deliverable outcomes. Just like the BRI and the GDI, the GSI has been especially agreeable to a number of African countries. Two sessions of the China-Africa Peace and Security Forum involving about 50 African states have been held. By practicing the GSI, China and Africa are expected to move towards a promising vision of jointly building a security community. Alongside building consensus on broad conceptualizations with these African nations, the GSI more specifically details help from China in areas of strategic communication, equipment and technology cooperation, joint maritime training exercises, exchange in professional fields, and other technical and financial assistance to counter terrorism and other threats in Africa. Along with serving as a development provider in Africa, China is also emerging as a security defender across many of the African nations. This trend became noticeable when some of Africa’s traditional security providers wound down their military engagement with African countries. As part of UN peacekeeping operations, thousands of Chinese peacekeepers are currently deployed to some of Africa’s most dangerous locations in Congo, Liberia, Mali, and Sudan. Under the BRI, many of these countries have already received assistance in building highways, ports, power stations, dams, and railways. Now, China is seeking to provide African countries with comprehensive support on matters such as piracy and counter-terrorism. The drive includes providing technology, equipment, personnel, and strategic advice that form the conflict prevention core of China’s GSI. The Gulf of Aden has already seen China emerge as an active player in counter-piracy operations. In addition to its coordinated naval patrols and rescue operations, China has provided naval assets, equipment, and financial assistance to local anti-piracy networks. But like the BRI and the GDI, the GSI is also expected to develop both conceptual and operational outreach far beyond Africa and this will have its challenges. Most importantly, GSI presents an alternate vision of global security governance that has implications for the existing post-World War II architecture that props up U.S. world leadership. Embroiled in pandemic-driven resource deficit and domestic instability, the Biden administration has increasingly depended on its friends and allies, many of whom now show varying trajectories in their engagement with Beijing. The ongoing Ukraine crisis has made the issue even more public as the U.S. has sought to build consensus for imposing severe economic sanctions on Russia. These internal issues affecting both the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization also shine light on the urgent need for reformation of global security architecture. However, the U.S. and its allies remain focused on strengthening internally instead of transforming post-World War II institutions that are revealing their fast-diminishing relevance and remit. Consequently, the GSI has this space to ignite a new debate on the optimal method to address the world’s increasingly complex security challenges. It, of course, seeks to do so by providing Chinese solutions rooted in the ancient wisdom of unique Chinese traditions. #GSI #BRI #GDI #China Originally published: China Daily, September 19, 2022 http://chinaindiadialogue.com/global-security-initiative-off-to-a-promising-start-but-an-uphill-task Posted here with the authorization of the author. Swaran Singh is a Professor of International Relations at Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Delhi) and currently visiting professor at the University of British Columbia (Vancouver, Canada).

By Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli While the nation’s attention is drawn acutely to the western sector of the border between India and China in the wake of the bloody fisticuffs on the night of June 15, 2020, and the aftermath, developments in the Indian eastern flank are no less alarming. Indeed, China’s revival of irredentist claims, strategic border domination efforts, the creation of pinpricks or even waging psychological warfare against India. These are, of course, stoutly countered by India by matching, if not overpowering, build-up of capabilities, plans, strategic alignments, and diplomatic manoeuvres. When China occupied Tibet in 1951, its main focus was on the Aksai Chin region for transporting and sustaining its troops. China’s attention hardly elicited Arunachal Pradesh’s (at that time, North East Frontier Agency) region. Indeed, in 1960, China’s Premier Zhou Enlai even suggested a “swap deal” of accepting south of the 1914 McMahon Line (the current day Arunachal Pradesh) as a part of India provided the latter recognised Aksai Chin as a part of China. The offer was repeated by Deng Xiaoping in 1980 but was not accepted by India due to China’s tentative and dubious claims, even for Aksai Chin. The territorial dispute across 1,126 kilometres of border between India and China in the eastern sector is actually in six areas, including Longju, Asaphila, Migyitun, Namka Chu, Samdurong Chu, and Chantze. Frequent transgressions by China’s troops are reported in these areas, specifically in Kameng, Fish Tails, and other areas. Recently, border transgressions by China were reported at Hundred Hill at Kaho, Andrella Valley at Dibang, Maja in Upper Subansiri and other areas. However, since the mid-1980s, China has begun eyeing Arunachal Pradesh for its strategic location, boundless natural resources, and historical and religious affiliations of Tibet to this region and to balance or contain India. Samdurong Chu incident in 1986 was the first pointer in this direction when about 200 Chinese soldiers crossed the Kameng sector at an increasing rate of transgressions that year. Earlier, in 1975, the Tulung la incident resulted in four Assam Rifles soldiers being ambushed. India doubled down by organising the spectacular Operation Checkerboard with air-land battle scenarios. The Chinese were rattled with the resulting kill ratio – that is estimated at ten Chinese casualties for every one Indian soldier dead in the simulations, according to Chinese military sources. As a result, Deng Xiaoping began diverting attention to “Asian century” debates. At the 8th border talks to resolve the territorial dispute in November 1987, a flustered China also proposed creating a demilitarised zone in the eastern sector. Again, at the 4th Joint Working Group (JWG) meeting in February 1992, China proposed that the local military personnel should meet at Bumla to sort out border frictions. Later, in August 1995, at the 8th JWG meeting, China also agreed to withdraw troops from four forward military posts in the Wangdong area. At the next 9th JWG meeting in October 1996, China also agreed to open an annual military meeting point at Dichu in the eastern sector at the level of a major general. Thus, even though China realised it could not force India into the eastern sector, it, however, raised unsettling irredentist claims in the region by equating Arunachal Pradesh to “southern Tibet” (zangnan). Since the mid-1980s, China began arguing that since the 5th Dalai Lama hailed from the Tawang monastery, it should belong to communist China now! Even though China’s foreign minister, Li Zhaoxing wrote a book lampooning the 5th Dalai Lama, China began assuming “ownership” over him and the monastery. Today, with President Xi Jinping proclaiming the “China Dream” of eyeing “lost territories” historically, full normalisation of relations with India has become problematic for decades to come. The then China’s ambassador to India Sun Yuxi went further, just before the visit of President Hu Jintao to Delhi in November 2006, by declaring to a tv channel that the whole of Arunachal Pradesh is a disputed territory between the two countries—thus moving farther than Zhou or Deng’s “swap” deal offer. In early 2007 China also denied a visa to an IAS officer from Arunachal Pradesh, which led India to cancel the whole visit by 107 officers to China. Several sportspersons, defence personnel, and others who were domiciled to Arunachal Pradesh, likewise were denied visas by China. China also began diverting river waters from Yarlung Zangpo in Tibet to its northern areas under the South-North River Diversion Program. As Yarlung Zangpo enters Arunachal Pradesh at Namchabarua, an estimated 62 billion cubic metres of water is discharged at this point. With accumulations from the Siang River and others downstream, the Brahmaputra River gains strength, and when it reaches Bangladesh through Meghalaya, it discharges an estimated 220 billion cubic metres of water. However, with the river diversion projects upstream – with about 26 medium to large dams planned by China and some three times bigger than the existing Three Gorges Dam – the lower riparian states such as India and Bangladesh are concerned about water shortages or China using this as a “water bomb”. In October last year, when Kameng river water became dark due to turbidity, speculations were rife about China’s antics and concerns about biodiversity in the region. A more concerted effort was made by China to dominate the region by first constructing dual-use infrastructure projects and later brazenly creating “well-off society” villages or even military installations across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with Arunachal Pradesh. China began constructing 624 “well-off society” villages in 2017, and 200 of these were constructed in the LAC areas with India or on the borders with Bhutan and Nepal. At Tsari Chu village at Migyitun on the border with Arunachal Pradesh, two military outposts of China have also come up, while at Longju in Arunachal Pradesh, construction activity with road and forest clearance has been reported recently. These efforts were matched with the large-scale deployment of military assets to the region opposite to Arunachal Pradesh. Over a period of time, China has built eight airfields opposite India in the eastern sector, including Gonggar, Hoping, Pangta and Linzhi, besides other airfields deeper inside at Chengdu, Kunming and Chongqing in the recently refurbished Western Theatre Command. Reports in August 2022 indicated that China began building a helipad closer to Chaglagam closer to Anjaw district in Arunachal Pradesh. Its road construction projects in Tibet have also been expanded to over 1,20,000 kilometres, while after the 2006 inauguration of the Gormud to Lhasa railway, China began constructing railways from Chengdu and Kunming, passing through Nyingqi prefecture opposite Arunachal Pradesh. For instance, due to this infrastructure development, the military outposts across the LAC are well connected in Tibet – almost about 8 kilometres near the LAC compared to 20 or even 120 kilometres where the Indian troops are connected on many areas of the Indian side of the LAC. Also, as psychological warfare, China renamed six places in Arunachal Pradesh in 2017 and another 15 in late 2021. India brushed off Beijing’s such antics. Earlier in June 2009, China blocked an Indian loan request from Asian Development Bank for flood control, sanitation and water management projects in Arunachal Pradesh. Frequent reports also indicate the intimidation or even kidnapping of youths across the Upper Siang district, such as the incident on January 18 this year. The legitimacy for such brazen activities of China in border areas with Arunachal Pradesh was provided by the highest political leadership. President Xi Jinping visited Tibet from July 21 to 23 last year. He visited Nyingchi which is a few kilometres north of Arunachal Pradesh, to inspect the railway line under construction. Earlier, he wrote a letter on October 28, 2017, to Drolkar and Yangzom, the Yume village herders located 30 kilometres north of Asaphila in Arunachal Pradesh. This came soon after the Dokhlam imbroglio on the Sino-Bhutan border. In the letter, Xi stated, “Without peace in the territory, there will be no peaceful lives for millions of families. [I] hope you will motivate more herders to set down roots in the border area like galsang flowers, and become guardians of the Chinese territory and constructors of a happy hometown”. Such efforts of China were stoutly opposed by India. While agreeing that China’s military deployments and infrastructure projects pose concern for India, the Indian Army’s Eastern Command chief Lt. Gen Pratap Singh Kalita stated at the press conference on May 16 this year that there have been no border transgressions by China since the 1959 Longju incident in the region. India’s response to China’s efforts is swift and decisive. At the infrastructure level, India began the strategic road construction connecting border areas. The Border Area Development Programme witnessed a massive hike in allocations in Arunachal Pradesh recently. Eight-foot tracks measuring around 600 kilometres are being laid down in Arunachal Pradesh. Arunachal Pradesh has a formidable array of troops and weapon systems – an estimated 1,70,000 troops, an additional two Divisions since June 2009, a Brahmos cruise missile regiment, two squadrons of Su-30 MKI fighter aircraft since July 2008 and bases at Hashimara, Chabua and Tezpur for deep penetration strikes into China. Since 2009, India also announced strategic nuclear weapons deployments to the Northeast as a deterrent against China. The Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) raised 34 additional battalions to Arunachal Pradesh for front-line defence against China. The ITBP created 47 new border outposts along the border with China, in addition to 12 staging camps. To bridge the civil and military aviation infrastructure gaps in the region, India began revamping the advanced landing zones in the eastern regions of Arunachal Pradesh. Also, in April this year, Alliance Air made its maiden visit to Pasighat from Dibrugarh with Union Ministers Jyotiraditya Scindia and Kiren Rijiju onboard. Soon, air services are expected to connect Tezu, Mechuka, Ziro and Tuting. At the political level, India began sending high political functionaries to Arunachal Pradesh such as President, Vice President, and Prime Ministers, periodically. Last October, for instance, Vice President Naidu visited Arunachal Pradesh. Also, the Dalai Lama made frequent visits to the region, specifically to the religious Tawang Monastery. In November last year, the Dalai Lama visited the region, with the previous visits in 1986, 1996, 1997, twice in 2003, 2006 and in 2017. These elicited sharp reactions from China but in vain. Thus, while China had undertaken a multipronged approach to counter India in Arunachal Pradesh, these remain ineffective and counter-productive. Arunachal Pradesh today is a formidable bulwark against the Chinese juggernaut at religious, cultural, political, economic, military, and democratic levels. While China has been pumping enormous economic resources, specifically into infrastructure projects and the military in Tibet, these are devoid of legitimacy and popular support. As a thriving democracy and with increasing economic growth rates and inclusive development, India is more than a match for China. Hence, when the new German Ambassador to India, Philip Ackerman on August 30 this year termed China’s claims on Arunachal Pradesh as “outrageous” and the periodic border transgressions as a “violation of the international order”, China is increasingly losing its face in the international community to its aggressive policies. Also, since the 1962 border clashes, the United States recognised McMahon Line as the border between the two countries. Japan’s Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso, as well supported India on Arunachal Pradesh. The writing on the wall for China is thus increasingly becoming clear both at the bilateral and international levels. #India #China #ArunachalPradesh #LAC Originally published: THE BORDERLENS, September 13, 2022. https://www.borderlens.com/features/china-storming-arunachal-bastion-in-vain/ Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli is Dean of the School of International Studies and Professor in Chinese Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University. Views are personal.

By Prof. Gulshan Sachdeva Staying away from a key IPEF pillar negotiations is not good optics for a confident nation, and a key Indo-Pacific player At the recently-held ministerial meeting of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), India decided to join its three pillars related to supply chains, tax and anti-corruption, and clean energy. However, due to possible binding commitments on labour, environment, and digital trade, New Delhi opted out of its trade pillar. The United States-led IPEF was launched in May. Currently, it consists of 14 Indo-Pacific nations viz. Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, Vietnam, and the US. The grouping represents 40 percent of the global GDP, and 28 percent of global trade in goods and services. Many view the establishment of the IPEF as a move to counter China’s growing economic influence in the Indo-Pacific. Although growing in economic significance, the region is recognised by all major players, and its economic architecture is still evolving. Both the US and India are out of the Indo-Pacific megadeals. They are not members of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) or the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). So, the IPEF has the potential to provide a solid platform to both of them in framing economic rules in an economically-dynamic Indo-Pacific region. Two years ago, India moved out of the China-dominated RCEP. The 15 nations RCEP now consists of 10 ASEAN nations as well as China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. Similarly, the CPTPP is an FTA between remaining 11 members of the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) when the Donald Trump administration withdrew from it in 2017. The membership now includes Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, New Zealand, Singapore, and Vietnam. The United Kingdom, China, Taiwan, and Ecuador have also applied for its membership. The key provisions of the CPTPP includes goods tariff, digital trade, procurement, IPR, investment, services etc. Unlike the CPTPP, the RCEP does not include labour and environmental issues or support to State-owned enterprises. But it encourages deep supply chain integration among members. Some countries such as Japan, Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Vietnam, and Brunei are members of all three groupings viz. CPTPP, the RCEP and the IPEF. Some of them have close strategic ties with the US. But all of them are also integrated with China-centred value chains. For them, the IPEF is one additional layer of integration in the Indo-Pacific under US patronage. It is also good for rebalancing increasing Chinese economic dominance. Through the IPEF, the US along with its allies and partners wants to enhance its economic engagement in Asia, and the Indo Pacific. Being a large, fastest-growing economy, and an important part of the QUAD, India also has an ambition to play a crucial part in the Indo-Pacific security, and economic architectures. It also wants to emerge as an alternative to companies relocating their value chains from China. Since we are absent both from the CPTPP and the RCEP, the IPEF is an opportunity to build multilateral economic linkages in the Indo-Pacific. As trade and supply chains are deeply integrated with each other, all the IPEF members except India have agreed to take part in negotiations in all four pillars of the IPEF. The labour issue has been cited as one of the major concerns for not joining the IPEF trade pillar. But even in the supply chain pillar, it is clearly mentioned that partner countries “will seek to ensure that the work promotes the labour standards that underpin fair, sustainable, and resilient supply chains”. India’s reluctance to participate in the trade pillar of the IPEF indicates a lack of confidence in its competitiveness. Recent trade agreements with Australia and the United Arab Emirates and fast track negotiations with the UK showed the world that India is changing its cautious approach towards trade pacts. It is not just bilateral deals, India is also hopeful of trade and investment agreements with the 27-member European Union (EU) soon. The agenda with the EU also includes labour and sustainability issues. Today, India’s foreign policy discourse is dominated by the Indo-Pacific. This narrative has to be synchronised with the confident external economic arrangements in the region. A short-term transactional approach may not be helpful in making India a crucial Indo-Pacific player. Staying away even for negotiations in a key IPEF pillar is not good optics for a confident nation. #India #IndoPacific #IPEF Originally published: Money Control, September 14, 2022 https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/opinion/what-message-does-india-send-by-opting-out-of-ipef-trade-policy-pillar-9175611.html Posted here with the authorization of the author. Gulshan Sachdeva is Professor at the Centre for European Studies and Coordinator, Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, Jawaharlal Nehru University. Views are personal.

By Prof. Amita Batra India's ability to successfully conclude its FTAs with the EU and Australia, according to schedule, will signal to the world its readiness and capability to play the role envisioned of it in the IPEF The US is hosting the first in-person ministerial meeting of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) on September 8-9 in Los Angeles. Earlier discussions with trade ministers, in which India participated as an “observer”, were held at the end of July in Singapore. No joint statement was issued after the July discussions but it is envisioned that the participating countries will declare the formal launch of rule-setting at the end of the September meeting. It may be useful to note some relevant considerations in developing India’s negotiating strategy in the IPEF trade pillar. It is important to emphasise that while the IPEF has a trade pillar, it is not a trade agreement and, therefore, should not be considered as an alternative to the mega regionals in Asia, namely, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). More specifically, the TPP, of which the CPTPP is a subset, both in terms of provisions and membership, was an economic instrument at the heart of the US’s pivot to Asia strategy aimed at containment of China. By instituting WTO++ provisions, especially with respect to state-owned enterprises, intellectual property rights (IPRs) and investor-state dispute settlement, the idea was to establish a rules-based trade order that China would have either found difficult to abide by and/or incur substantial costs in terms of difficult domestic reforms. The CPTPP, in comparison, is a watered-down version of the TPP, especially with respect to provisions relating to investment and labour and environment standards. Most importantly, the IPR provisions have been substantively altered, thus making it easier for China to seek membership of the agreement. China applied for the CPTPP in September 2021. While it has been argued that the actual membership for China may take a long time given some member countries’ (e.g. Japan, Australia and Canada) discomfort with the Chinese membership, it is also a fact that Australia and Japan are both members of the other mega-regional in Asia, the RCEP, which is inclusive of China and was signed in the midst of the pandemic when sentiments against China were running high. Given its centrality in regional supply chains and trade, membership of both the regional agreements, CPTPP and the RCEP, will give China a dominant position in setting the trade rules in the region. The IPEF, which excludes China and is promoted by the US, acquires salience in this context. For India, which is not a member of either of the mega-regional trade agreements, the IPEF, with nine members from East Asia (seven of which are Asean member economies) and two of its four pillars focused on trade connectivity and supply chains resilience, offers another opportunity to integrate with the dynamic East Asian value chain hub. Post-pandemic and in the wake of the Ukraine crisis, the regional economies are most likely to emerge as the preferred, secure alternative in the large corporations’ “China plus one” relocation strategy. Also, as evident in its post-pandemic comprehensive recovery framework, Asean is looking for supply chain resilience through diversification beyond the region (and beyond the RCEP) through its bilateral free-trade agreements (FTAs). The flexible format of the IPEF could be an opportunity, especially under its trade facilitation component, for India to seek remedial action against the non-tariff barriers that it has long complained about in the context of Asean-India FTA. The opportunity, however, comes with challenges. The IPEF does not include tariff preferences and hence, the scope for enhanced market access. Non-inclusion of tariffs has been attributed to domestic political constraints in the US. An additional consideration may have been the already low (0-5 per cent) global average most-favoured nation tariffs in the manufacturing sector achieved through both unilateral trade liberalisation policies of the developed and many developing countries and preferential trade agreements. The IPEF may have therefore been deliberately designed to focus on more modern-day provisions like digital trade, regulatory policies, trade facilitation and sustainable social development provisions relating to labour and environmental standards. Led by the US, the IPEF is likely to reflect its revealed position in the US-Mexico Canada Agreement (USMCA), which has forward-looking labour standards, including a mechanism to ensure minimum wages through the innovatively-defined rules of origin that could become a template for the IPEF. The provisions pertaining to digital trade and environmental standards in the USMCA are considered to be even more stringent than those under the CPTPP. The trade facilitation component in the IPEF may likely draw from the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) rules. Other than India, all members of the IPEF are also members of the APEC. Countries like Vietnam, which is a member of RCEP, CPTPP and APEC, have, in the past, used their membership of FTAs as a means to lock in necessary domestic reforms. A majority of Vietnam’s FTAs are with the APEC member economies. Interestingly, the consensus towards taking forward the high grade, WTO++, CPTPP (post-US withdrawal from the TPP) was achieved at the APEC 2017 summit when Vietnam was the chair. India, therefore, will need to overcome its handicap of non-membership of mega-regional trade agreements, RCEP and CPTPP as well as the regional cooperation forum, the APEC. The fact that India is in the midst of advanced negotiations with the EU and is aiming at accomplishing the CECA with Australia in the next few months could prove propitious in this context. The EU leads the way, globally, in negotiating and concluding modern-day FTAs with emphasis, in particular, on labour and environment-related commitments. Australia is a founding and leading member of the APEC, which, even with its soft regulations and non-binding/ voluntary mechanisms, has been acknowledged for its contribution to trade and investment facilitation and establishing regulatory ease for cross-border supply chains. India’s ability to conclude successfully, according to the schedule, its FTAs with these countries will not just help to prepare the ground by undertaking necessary domestic policy and tariff reforms but could also, very significantly, be a signalling mechanism to the world, of India’s readiness and capability to play the role envisioned of it in the IPEF. Thus, India’s stance in the next round of FTA negotiations with the EU, expected to be held next month, should provide evidence of whether it has stepped up its FTA game and its willingness for necessary domestic policy and tariff reforms. #IPEF #RCEP #FTA #CPTPP #APEC #US #India Originally published: Business Standard, September 09, 2022 https://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/indo-pacific-economic-framework-opportunity-and-challenge-122090801390_1.html?code=RElORERUeGMweGp6R2svc2UyclhtbmlQcXZKMi9rSHd1Y3MyZTQra29FTT0=#.YxrLVfb2Z9Y.gmail Posted here with the authorization of the author. Amita Batra is Professor of Economics, SIS, JNU. The views are personal.

By Prof. Swaran Singh BRICS expansion is inevitable in light of developed countries' unwillingness to give developing countries greater say in global governance, but will take efforts. Although BRICS has engaged several other nations under the rubric of "BRICS Plus "and "BRICS Outreach" summits, the group has remained cautious about adding new members. Lately, however, expanding its membership has become a subject of discussion at the BRICS summits, especially those of 2013, 2017 and 2022 when China was the chair, as it is noticeably in favor of additional members. Russia and South Africa have also become increasingly agreeable though they believe no single nation should be allowed to decide on the new entrants. Brazil and India, on the other hand, are still cautious. Nevertheless the die has been cast and expansion is bound to happen sooner rather than later. The Beijing Declaration from their 2022 summit, for instance, agreed on "promoting discussions … on the expansion process … to clarify the guiding principles, standards, criteria and procedures" in order to expand cooperation with other emerging markets and developing countries. This sentiment for expansion was also visible in their 2021"terms of reference" for their Sherpas. Five new nations could be joining BRICS in 2023 during the presidency of South Africa, which joined the original group of four BRIC countries in 2010.Applications from Iran and Argentina are already under consideration while Saudi Arabia, Turkiye and Egypt have begun the process of applying for membership. Turkiye, in particular, is keen on fast forwarding the application process. In addition, Algeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sudan, Syria, the United Arab Emirates and Venezuela have also expressed interest in joining. Several of them participated in the May 2022 "BRICS Plus" foreign ministers' meeting convened by China. Among the arguments in favor of expansion, BRICS remains under-represented in global financial governance. Collectively the five members account for more than 50 percent of global growth, 40 percent of global currency reserves, 25 percent of global GDP and 16 percent of world trade, and yet, they hold no more than 15 percent of the voting rights in both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. BRICS' advocating for free, fair and equitable global commerce has made it the flag bearer of the aspirations of the Global South that believes its interests are not adequately protected under the existing global financial governance system. The BRICS' GDP is set to surpass the G7 economies' GDP by 2032 if not earlier. However, the criteria for expansion may not be GDP or market size. The inclusion of South Africa was based on it being the gateway of BRIC into Africa, the next center of growth, and the inclusion of a country from the African continent would make BRICS global. Today the criteria for inclusion may include geographical, civilizational and religious representation or resources. Indonesia, Iran, Egypt and Saudi Arabia could represent the Muslim countries, each one with its unique strengths. Saudi Arabia may also stand out as the world's largest oil exporting nation. Consensus on expansion will also be constrained by intra-BRICS relations. The equation between the largest and second largest BRICS economies－China and India－is an apt example. Applications from Argentina or Pakistan may face serious trust deficit from Brazil and India. The original logic of BRICS as "emerging economies" might be a problem for its current formation. Brazil, Russia and South Africa are not just smaller but face economic disruptions. During the pandemic years, even China and India saw periods of negative growth and a general slowdown. But the Russia-Ukraine conflict and resultant volatility in food and fuel prices and shortages have provided a boost to BRICS expansion. The resultant rise in Russia's trade with other BRICS nations－especially with China and India－has revived their efforts at reducing their dependence on the US dollar through ruble-rupee and rubble-renminbi transactions. The abrasive policies of the Donald Trump administration had already accelerated demands for BRICS to raise its voice on the international stage. The pandemic has further amplified those calls, exposing the West's "vaccine apartheid".Now, the Ukraine crisis has revealed the West's failure to stand united even in imposing economic sanctions. Indeed, new revelations about food and energy leverages of several aspirant emerging economies over G7 nations have strengthened the conviction of BRICS to expand. Also, faced with Western sanctions, Russia is far more agreeable to expanding its circle of friends. But instead of heralding another Cold War, the expansion of BRICS is aimed at obtaining a greater say for the developing countries in global decision-making. As post-pandemic resilience brings BRICS an opportunity to redefine global financial governance, BRICS has begun expanding beyond the time-tested "BRICS Plus" and "BRICS Outreach" summits to include new members. But an expanded BRICS will have neither the desire nor potential to become a counterweight to the G7 or the G20, or to disrupt financial institutions led by Western nations. BRICS expansion is making Western nations rethink their reluctance to make space for emerging economies, only further strengthening their realization that making space for emerging economies remains a prerequisite for making global financial governance inclusive, representative and effective. #BRICS #China #India Originally published: China Daily, September 07, 2022 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202209/07/WS6317d97ea310fd2b29e76537.html Posted here with the authorization of the author. Swaran Singh is a Professor of International Relations at Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Delhi) and currently visiting professor at the University of British Columbia (Vancouver, Canada).