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By Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli The ‘you are on your own now’ policy came following nationwide protests in late November against Xi’s oppressive ‘Zero Covid’ policies After nearly three years of the world’s strictest Covid restrictions, snap lockdowns, border controls, repeated PCR tests at one’s own cost and strict quarantine procedures, China abruptly announced on December 7 the lifting of all restrictions in the pandemic-hit country. It is typically Mao style ‘leadership’, by China’s ‘new Mao’, Xi Jinping – swinging a country of 1.4 billion suffering Chinese from one extreme to the other – from ‘Zero Covid’ to ‘zero control’, marked by a ‘if you protest against my policies, go fend for yourself’ message from the Great Leader. If that were not enough, China’s National Health Commission has now even stopped providing reliable data on the nationwide spread of infections and death toll even as reports from other sources suggest that millions are infected, and thousands are dying every day. In the past nearly three years, China has claimed that its death toll is only about 6,000 and there were only 1.6 million infections in the world’s most populous country. This, at a time when the US reported more than a million dead and India, half that number. On December 24, China’s NHC reported about 4,000 infections -- and no deaths! -- across the country, despite all the evidence to the contrary. Simulation studies conducted by Airfinity estimate, given the low immunity levels in the Chinese population, that between 167 million to 279 million infections could erupt across the nation over the next few months, which could lead to between 1.3 million and 2.1 million deaths, mostly of the elderly. The ‘you are on your own now’ policy came following nationwide protests in late November against Xi’s oppressive ‘Zero Covid’ policies, which led not to the containment of the pandemic, as the Chinese government had claimed all along, but to police brutality in enforcing restrictions, a rapacious pharmaceutical lobby that was raking in the moolah, costly but ineffective home-based Sinopharm and Sinovac vaccines, a false sense of “vaccine nationalism”, and increasing unemployment. In June 2020, China’s ‘white paper’ on its Covid policies had boasted of its “open, transparent and effective” policies. This year, it was still showcasing how it was building hospitals rapidly, transferring medical professionals to infected areas, vaccinating most of its people, its quarantine procedures and how it was helping the Chinese people. As late as October, the 20th Communist Party Congress, where Xi secured a third term for himself, reiterated his ‘Dynamic Zero Covid’ policies. China’s sharp U-turn reflects its authoritarian nature, which in the past claimed millions of lives during the Great Leap Forward and other political pogroms. The cynical political leadership hardly had a Plan B to put in place, no checks and balances, nor did it consider any alternative proposals. Mao once famously remarked that if there was a nuclear war with the US, 300 million Chinese would die, but the other 300 million would pounce on the adversary! The attitude of Xi’s China remains the same. It was China’s lax approach in the months from October 2019 to January 2020 that caused the pandemic across the globe, with over 5 million Chinese fanning out domestically and overseas in the months prior to the Wuhan lockdown. This resulted in international demands for China to take responsibility, compensate victims globally, and apologise to the world. A similar spectre is rising with hundreds of millions of infections in China itself now. Several countries have begun curbing travel flows to and from China. China would do better to jettison its ‘vaccine nationalism’, pursue transparent policies, shut down any destructive genetic modification programmes, align with global research and policies on healthcare, import life-saving drugs, increase hospital beds and health professionals, and most importantly, give accurate data on the numbers infected and dying to its own people and to the world. Given the change in weather, the spread of flu this season and the expected travel of hundreds of millions of Chinese for the Spring Festival, the sharp shift in policy without any preparation is likely to worsen an already horrible situation. Instead of seeking to distract domestic and international attention from the ongoing catastrophe by militarily threatening Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines and India, Xi must focus on helping his own people. India needs to constantly review the China situation. While strengthening our own border controls, New Delhi should also extend medical support to the people of China in their hour of grave need, something its own government is unable or unwilling to do. #China #XiJinping #Covid19 Originally published: Open, January 01, 2023. https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/xi-s-revenge-1176837.html Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli is Dean of School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University.

By Prof. Sangeeta Thapliyal New government has been formed in Nepal after much anticipation with Prachanda as the Prime Minister. Leading 170 members in 275 member House of Representatives, his party Nepal Communist Party (Maoist Centre) [NCP(MC)] has allied with KP Sharma Oli led Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist Leninist) [CPN(UML)] and four others; Rashtriya Swatantra Party (RSP), Rashtriya Prajatantra Party (RPP), Janata Samajbadi Party (JSP), Janamat Party (JP), Nagrik Unmukti Party (NUP) and four independents. The colorful Nepali politics has astounding plots and subplots. Prachanda had a pre-poll alliance with Nepali Congress (NC) led by Sher Bahadur Deuba, Madhav Nepal led CPN (Unified Socialist), Loktantrik Samajbadi Party (LSP) led by Mahanta Thakur and Chitra Bahadur KC’s Rashtriya Janmorcha. It is said that some in the Nepali Congress wanted the party to go for polls without alliance with the Maoists. However, Prachanda and Madhav Nepal had supported Deuba to form a government after breaking away from Nepal Communist Party when Oli government was removed on Supreme Court’s order. The alliance continued till the 2022 election. It is alleged that there was a pre- poll understanding that in case the alliance won then Prime Minister’s position would be shared between Deuba and Prachanda. Elections were held for the federal parliament and seven provinces on 20 November. In the 275 members federal parliament, the House of Representatives (lower house) has two kinds of votes: First Past The Post (FPTP) for 165 seats and Proportional Representation (PR) for 110. Overall NC has secured 89 seats followed by CPN (UML) with 78 and CPN(MC) with 32. The NC and CPN (MC) alliance had secured 136 seats in the parliament and required two more to form the government. Interestingly in the provinces also the alliance had a majority in all. However, there was a huge twist in the story. There was internal wrangling for the coveted post of the PM. Prachanda wanted the PM position in the first term of two and half years which was not allegedly acceptable to Deuba and his inner party circle advisors. In the meantime, UML was talking to NC and also to the Maoists. President Bidya Devi Bhandari finally invoked article 76 (2) of the constitution and gave an ultimatum to form a government within a week by 5 pm on 25 December 2022. Under article 76 (2) the President can call parties to show majority with the support of two or more parties, if no single party secures a clear majority. On December 25, Oli and Prachanda gave a surprise Christmas gift to the country by aligning to form the government. It cost NC not only the federal government but also in the provinces. The known monarchists RPP had pre-poll alliance with the CPN(UML). It has given support to the government but has not joined it. Some of their key positioning has been to restore monarchy, directly elected executive prime minister and a Hindu state. It’s a political contradiction that RPP is giving support to the government led by Prachanda who was responsible for giving a strong voice to republican Nepal and ending monarchy. The election has sprung some surprising results. A new party Rashtriya Swantantra Party (RSP) led by media person Rabi Lamichhane has emerged in the political scene. It secured 7 seats in the FPTP and 13 in PR. The party had not contested in all the federal constituencies and no candidate in the provinces. One of the major characteristics of the party was that it had fielded young professionals. Toshima Karki, 32 years of age, doctor by profession defeated Pampha Bhusal of CPN (MC) from Lalitpur 3 constituency. Party Leader Rabi Lamichhane, 48 years old, had defeated Umesh Shreshtha of NC in Chitwan-2. It is said that in his Television programmes like Sidha Kura (Straight Talk) Lamichhane discussed social and economic issues affecting common lives. These programmes were popular amongst the Nepalis working abroad too. People could relate to him. The party has made claims that it supports directly elected PM and Chief Ministers. It wants to do away with the provincial assemblies and replace them with provincial councils elected by the local level assemblies. RSP has not only given support to the government but also bagged the post of Deputy Prime Minister for Lamichhane. Interestingly this has raised many eyebrows because there is a writ petition in the Supreme Court of Nepal on the issue of his citizenship. CK Raut, 45 years old, the only elected leader from JP defeated political stalwart Upendra Yadav in Saptari-2. His party has bagged 5 seats through PR. In the recent past, Raut had led the Madhesi movement and was arrested and charged with sedition but joined mainstream politics after signing an agreement with KP Oli. JP has joined the government and Abdul Khan from the party is one of the four ministers picked up by Prachanda. NUP led by Ranjeeta Shreshtha has secured 4 seats in the parliament from West Madhes. It has not joined the government but nevertheless has given support to it. The PR system has harmed the interests of some established leaders and their parties. Madhav Nepal’s CPN(US) secured 10 seats and Mahanta Thakur’s LSP won 4 seats in FPTP but could not get 3% of votes in the PR which cost them recognition as national parties. Many have highlighted that the young leaders are a ray of hope in the Nepali politics. They will bring new vigour, energy and ideas. People have shown faith and confidence in young politicians. Every year new voters get enrolled in the voters list. The voting pattern shows that voters are not in awe of the traditional parties or older leaders and want those who can deliver. However, the younger politicians are inexperienced and not tested. Only time will tell how they will perform. If this trend is any indication, then the other major parties should take notice of the people’s mandate. They should start giving space to younger people within the party. If ignored this may lead to intra party tensions and splits. In the next five years some leaders may become too old to be active in party politics, but they can definitely play a constructive role in identifying their successors and guide the party with their foresight and political acumen. The election results show that coalition politics is here to stay in Nepal. Except in 1991 when Nepali Congress had secured a majority in the parliament, no one party has gained enough support to form government on its own. All these parties have political stalwarts who have been either PM or Deputy PM and even when in alliance they compete with each other for that coveted post or for important positions to their party men in government. Even though there is huge dissatisfaction against political instability, the present election signals towards that. The coalition partners have diverse standings, and they will find it difficult to implement most of their promises. Their personal interest is the only glue that has brought them together and any breach in it may fracture the alliance. The biggest challenge would be to provide a stable government by keeping the coalition partners together. Yet another challenge for the government would be to balance relations with its two neighbours. Some international media have named the present PM as `ex maoist rebel leader’ or 'fierce guerrilla leader’. Many from Indian media have described the present government as `anti-India’, or `pro-China’. It will be a hard task for the government in Nepal to rise above such perceptions and deliver goods. Much of this perception stems from the past experience of strains during Oli’s regime and his nationalistic postures targeting India. However, in Nepal no government is permanently pro or anti any country. Their posturing changes based on their own personal and party interests based on context, time, and place. The present governing alliance is much to the liking of China. The election results show that NC has made inroads in the northern districts bordering Tibet where left parties had domination. Presumably the shift is due to China’s territorial encroachments in the border areas of Nepal. The previous regime of Oli was silent on the issue. China had developed good working relations with Oli and had signed a number of infrastructures related projects. They were however concerned by the Deuba government and its allies ratifying the $500 Millennium Challenge Corporation with the US. Before the elections China tried for a left party alliance. They have shown their positive response by opening a border point in Rasuwagarhi on the very next day of the government formation. A team from China Railway 1st Survey and Design Institute Group from China has also arrived in Nepal to discuss the trans-Himalayan railway project. India has been focusing on trade and infrastructure related projects in Nepal. The government has facilitated involvement of the private sector in power trade. Presently Nepal is selling power to India to the tune of $56 million. There are efforts to have transmission grids at sub-regional level. No government in Nepal can ignore such an approach. #NepalElections2022 #Prachanda #Oli #China Originally published: VIF, 30 December 2022. https://www.vifindia.org/article/2022/december/30/making-sense-of-nepal-elections%20 Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Prof. Sangeeta Thapliyal is the Chairperson, Centre for Inner Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University.

Ms. Sweta Basak is pursuing integrated PhD program from Centre for West Asian Studies, School of International Studies. Recently she was invited as a panelist in the 'Next Generation Expert Segment' of Moscow Nonproliferation Conference 2022. The conference was jointly organized by Centre for Energy and Security Studies and Primakov Centre for International Corporation, Moscow. She presented her views on 'Future of Nuclear Energy: Next Generation Nuclear Technologies and global decarbonisation goals'.Twelve students from eight countries around the world participated in the conference with full scholarship. In her paper she reflected about the impact of Ukrainian crisis on European energy security and the prospects to shift to Nuclear power in Europe. In addition to it that she also highlighted about the role of east Asian economies on the same, specifically China and South Korea's policy on Nuclear technology and energy export. The paper was well received by scholars. Posted here with authorization of the Dean, SIS.

By Prof. Gulshan Sachdeva India’s G20 presidency still has to come out with a specific long-term agenda for the Global South While speaking at the G20 University Connect programme, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar asserted that during India’s G20 presidency “we must become the voice of the Global South that is otherwise under-represented in such forums”. Now India has a big opportunity to make a lasting impact on the G20 narrative, particularly from the perspectives of the developing countries. The establishment of the G20 itself was a reflection of the realisation that economic power has started shifting towards Asia, and emerging markets. Since then it has become clear that only Western countries can no longer provide solutions to many of the global economic problems. In fact, many recent economic and financial troubles in the world economy have their origin within the G7. The current geopolitical tensions and related economic difficulties are also due to Russian action in Ukraine and subsequent economic sanctions by the West. From the very beginning, New Delhi has been voicing concerns for the larger developing world. At the peak of the 2008 economic crisis when leaders met for the first G20 summit in Washington, then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh articulated that emerging markets and developing countries “were not the cause of this crisis, but they are amongst the worst affected victims”. The Seoul summit (2010) was the first meeting held in an Asian country. South Korea with its own development experience pushed the G20 beyond monetary and macroeconomic issues, and brought development to the main agenda. Since then, the ‘development track’ has become an important part of the discussions. This later now coincided with the Agenda 2030, and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In the last few years, food security, boosting infrastructure, enhancing burden sharing, as well as energy and environmental sustainability have become important action points within the G20. At the Hamburg summit in 2017, Prime Minister Narender Modi argued that “G20 nations must walk the talk to facilitate technical and financial infusion in Africa”. While taking over G20 presidency, Prime Minister Narendra Modi asserted that our “priorities will be shaped in consultation with not just our G20 partners, but also our fellow-travellers in the Global South”. In addition, he argued that “we shall present India’s experiences, learnings and models as possible templates for others, particularly the developing world”. Apart from broad references concerning immediate energy, food, and debt issues, India’s G20 presidency still has to come out with a specific long-term agenda for the Global South. As South Korea earlier changed the G20 narrative through ‘development track’, we still have not heard any big ideas concerning Global South from India’s policy makers. It seems most of the Indian G20 documents either talk of broad generalisations like “one earth, one family, one future”, or concentrate on the strengths of the Indian economy and Indian initiatives. This may be important for immediate discussions or for the Indian audience, but these narratives will not last beyond Indian presidency. For the post-pandemic, post-Ukraine war world, India must take a lead in articulating Global South’s priorities through one big narrative. This narrative must include some of the elements of the SDGs, green transition, global inequality, and reforms in global economic governance. It could also present a framework of co-operation between OECD-led global development architecture and South-South co-operation. These points could be clubbed together under one heading, and presented as a big Indian G20 idea. Some of the ideas mentioned earlier under the South Korean development track’s multi-year action plan are still valid. These include food security, infrastructure, financial inclusion, human resource development, responsible private sector, domestic resource mobilisation, and knowledge sharing. However, since then we have seen adoption of the 2030 agenda; competing infrastructure strategies following the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative; and disruptions created by the pandemic and various conflicts. We have also seen huge development in green technologies and adoption of more ambitious climate action plans. In the current challenging environment, India is well placed to present an entirely new development track within G20, which can take care of requirements of the developing countries in the next decade. If agreed by others, this will be a real contribution by New Delhi which has the ambition to lead an “inclusive, ambitious, action-oriented, and decisive” G20 presidency. #G20 #India #G20Presidency Originally published: Money Control, December 22, 2022. https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/opinion/g20-presidency-a-big-narrative-articulating-global-souths-priorities-is-crucial-9649671.html Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Gulshan Sachdeva is Professor at the Centre for European Studies and Coordinator, Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, Jawaharlal Nehru University.

By Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli From COVID to Economy, China is witnessing its strongest resistance since the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. In an unprecedented development since the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, China is witnessing a series of pitched battles across the country between the commoners and the authorities on the debilitating restrictions imposed on people for the past three years in the name of controlling the pandemic. At the last count, the protests have spread to over 25 cities and over 80 universities, totalling over 50 since the last week of November when nearly a dozen residents were charred to death at Urumqi in Xinjiang in a locked-down high-rise building that caught fire. The spread of such protests geographically is for the first time in China since the Tiananmen Square incident, although the 1989 movement attracted more protestors. COVID Protests Echo Tiananmen Square Movement Moreover, the communist party was split vertically between pro-student leaders like Zhao Ziyang and hardliners like Li Peng. Today, while political tensions exist between rival factions in the communist party such as the “New Zhijiang Army” of Xi Jinping and the Communist Youth League of Hu Jintao and Li Keqiang, the protests have not divided the crucial party centre yet. China witnessed “mass incidents” periodically after the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. According to official estimates, over 5500 such incidents were reported in 1991, rising continuously to over 87,000 in 2005 and to 1,80,000 in 2010. However, China’s Premier has discontinued providing such statistics anymore. The protests continued as the economic growth rates declined in the past decade from nearly 10 percent to an estimated 3 percent for this year. The crisis of confidence in the party-state is also that while it promised to maintain economic growth rates if students do not question the party’s legitimacy, such high growth rates have vanished in thin air. While a majority of the “mass incidents” were against the grievances related to the withdrawal of subsidies and the retrenchment of the party-state duties, the current protests are against the excessive political control exercised by the authorities in the name of pandemic control for the past three years. Pandemic Control or Political Crackdown? Given the nature of the surveillance state in China and other repressive mechanisms like the “social credit” system, it would be hard to think of scores of people joining any protest in China today. However, the fact that many people ranging from students to workers, ethnic minorities to Han Chinese were participating in large numbers not only indicated that COVID control mechanisms have enraged a large section of the population but also the ability to express openly their dissent to the top powers. Also, despite the domination over the cyber domain and curbs on social networking sites in China, many have utilised such channels to assemble and organise protests across the country. Even though such protests remained decentralised and devoid of backing, funding, and nationwide networks, the fact that they were able to spread like wildfire indicates the growing political dissent in China and the limitations of the authoritarian regime. The COVID prevention efforts provided a chance to furthering the intrusive policies of the party-state and controlling people with arbitrary procedures, unpredictable lockdowns of whole localities and cities without providing for basic provisions of food and sanitary facilities. For the newly anointed Xi Jinping with a third term at the 20th party congress this October, the widespread political protests across the country are challenging if not unnerving. While Xi enjoys an absolute majority in the crucial party hierarchies, the protests tend to undermine his political authority and in the medium term, his legitimacy. What Is Xi’s Strategy To Retain His Term? Even though there is no imminent threat to Xi’s political leadership, despite some slogans in this regard by the protestors, he is expected to broad-base his appeal to the public for any meaningful solution to the problem at hand. Xi had earlier jettisoned rival factional leaders like Li Keqiang, Wang Yang, Hu Chunhua, and others from gaining a foothold in the politburo standing committee. Now, he needs coalition partners to douse the protests across the country. Xi also faces the dilemma of the intensity of the crackdown on the protestors and could easily stamp out dissent, given the overwhelming internal security build-up in China for the past several decades. In fact, today, China has more internal security budgetary allocations than on the defence sector. The nature of surveillance has also been sharpened. However, the more the repression, more is the intensity of protests likely in the current context, thus, creating regime security anxieties. In such a scenario, rethinking the “dynamic zero-COVID” policies earlier reiterated at the 20th party congress in October, might be Xi government's best bet. #China #XiJinping #TiananmenSquare #ChinaEconomy Originally published: Open, December 05, 2022. https://www.thequint.com/voices/opinion/china-churning-can-xi-jinping-retain-premiership-amid-protests-party-crisis-anti-covid-economy-protests-chinese-communist-party#read-more#read-more Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli is Dean of School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University.

By Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli More than nine decades ago, on January 5, 1930, Mao Zedong wrote a letter titled “A single spark can start a prairie fire” offering an optimistic view of the communist movement that eventually spread across the country, seizing state power in 1949. On the reverse, years of mishandling the country’s affairs — specifically imposing a relentlessly draconian policy of “dynamic zero Covid” — created conditions for the spreading of such a fire across the country recently. China witnessed unprecedented protests last month, a first since the massive protests at Tiananmen Square in 1989. The current upsurge — against the excessive intrusion of the party-state in the lives of hundreds of millions of people who are subjected to arbitrary lockdowns, strict border controls, food shortages, unemployment, debilitating quarantine procedures, intensive surveillance, misuse of authority and enormous hardships — is spontaneous, rapid and inclusive. Stringent Covid policies benefited certain business interests of the pharmaceutical and health industry at the cost of the social sector. Even though nearly 90 per cent of the people are said to be vaccinated, the number of infections is rising substantially to nearly 30,000 infections a day, suggesting the ineffectiveness of the China-developed vaccines. In fact, Brazilians found to their chagrin that the effectiveness of Chinese vaccines was just over 56 per cent. Even then, China refuses to procure advanced vaccines from abroad. China bragged about how “open, transparent and efficient” it was in its “victorious” war against the pandemic in the last three years and how its centralised political leadership responded concertedly in controlling infections. It also threw mud on several democratic countries in an all-out ideological campaign. China’s Communist Party organs even practised “vulture diplomacy” when infections increased in India and other countries last year. The protests found resonances in far-flung western areas of Xinjiang when a locked-down apartment caught fire on November 24, killing nearly a dozen according to official figures. It found echoes from nooks and corners of China with “Urumqi Road” placards becoming iconic symbols. Urumqi protests spread to Korla and Hotan cities, usually hotbeds of Uighur insurgency. Major cities in China, including Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Wuhan, Chongqing, Chengdu, Xian, Taiyuan, Jinan and Hangzhou, were engulfed in the fast-spreading prairie fire. These are unprecedented pitched battles of affected people with the police and clearly indicate a loss of political legitimacy of the powers that be. That the protests happened soon after the 20th Communist Party congress has surprised many despite Xi Jinping’s bulldozing of the party leadership with his factional leaders’ domination and demolishment of rival political groups. Political triggers In the political landscape of China, the death of a major political leader provides an opportunity to rally public opinion. The first Premier Zhou Enlai’s death in 1976 led to protests at Tiananmen Square in favour of the “people’s Premier”. Chinese Communist Party leader Hu Yaobang’s death on April 15, 1989 resulted in a cascading effect, leading to massive protests in the next couple of months. However, Jiang Zemin’s claim to power that year was based on clamping down on protests in Shanghai. Unlike the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, where anti-corruption and ushering of democracy were the main slogans raised by students and others, the current round of spontaneous protests in China are overwhelmingly related to the stringent Covid protocols across the country. Also, unlike the 1989 massacre of students, when the Army was brought in and the police forces remained relatively dormant, in the current protests, the police and paramilitary forces are taking the lead in countering protestors. The police were seen verifying even the mobile phones of commuters to find if they have accessed or were transmitting protest-related information. The official narrative considered these to be “grey rhino” phenomena with “ulterior motives”, short of calling the protestors “counter-revolutionaries” such as in 1989. That economic hardship is one of the main problems of extensive lockdowns is reflected in the removal of metal barriers in Guangzhou and a rampage in the Foxconn factory at Zhengzhou for employment retention benefit issues and others. Pitched battles were also seen elsewhere based on economic demands. Social media Unlike in 1989, the current protests rapidly dominated the imagination of hundreds of millions of people across the country, given the widespread use of social networking sites such as WeChat, Weibo, Douyin, Douban and others, despite the presence of “wumao” cyber police across the spectrum. Much like the “guerrillas” that Mao spoke about in 1930, the Chinese netizens were waging a high-tech “guerrilla” warfare against the party-state. While diversity marks the nature of the protests across the country, minimal demands include allowing public vigils and mourning, ending lockdowns, release of protestors and protecting civil rights. Another innovative protest method is public display of blank white papers – alluding to “coloured revolutions” that battered Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Egypt, Myanmar and other countries. Of course, there was also the message for Shanghai metro commuters on December 1, calling for the resignation of Xi Jinping. That at least some have targeted the highest leadership for the current pandemic debacle suggests two things — the loss of political legitimacy of Xi’s Covid policies which could be amended with relative relaxation under popular resistance and the possible intensification of popular struggle and further clamping down by authorities. Already, on November 20, the National Health Commission announced 20 measures that could be seen as removing stringent rules to counter the pandemic, including lifting the mandatory PCR tests, access to provision stores, travel and others. On November 30, Covid pandemic in-charge, Vice Premier Sun Chunlan, announced measures that indicated possible stepping down from high alert to medium levels with implications for a relaxation in current policies. Sun alluded to the Omicron variant becoming less lethal, in addition to vaccination drives and prevention control experience. These amendments, of course, must be vetted through the politburo meeting due this month. However, questioning the centre of power by the protestors soon after Xi began acquiring absolute leadership at the just concluded 20th party congress surprised many. For the party congress was amended to include “two establishes,” — Xi as the “core” of the leadership of the party and his “thought” as having the “guiding” role for the rank and file. Further, the amendments also included “two safeguards” — that of safeguarding the “core” status of Xi and his centralised authority. The popular protests depleted these newly enshrined tenets in the party constitution. It contests the recent phrase of “the party leads everything.” Given the overwhelming support in the political establishment, control of all levers of coercive state apparatuses, it is likely that the prairie fire raging across the country could be doused in the coming months. However, despite such crushing strength of the party-state apparatuses, the protests spread to over 20 cities, indicating the possible resurgence of the movement in the coming years in different forms, even after lifting pandemic-related curbs. #China #Covid #Protest Originally published: Open, December 04, 2022. https://www.deccanherald.com/amp/specials/prairie-fires-rage-across-china-1168212.html Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli is Dean of School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University.

By Aishwarya Pathak There was a headline on the Hindu on September 26, 2022 that read “Apple starts production of iPhone 14 at Foxconn’s plant near Chennai”, yet again, a September 30, 2022 headline stated “State’s second iPhone manufacturing facility opens at Chengalpattu” which said Taiwanese firm Pegatron will make iPhones at the Mahindra World City, Chengalpattu, near Chennai. I will attempt to explain these events through the lens of liberalism. Liberals are in favour of free flow of trade, finance, capital and people across borders. They also argue that markets through the interaction of demand and supply will find an equilibrium and that there should be no or minimum interreference by the state. Liberalism also considers Multi-National Corporations as a catalyst for globalization that have positive effect in terms of employment generation, growth and development of a country. One such MNC is Apple. As we all know, it is the one of the biggest companies in the world in terms of its market capitalization. Although, three contract manufacturers of Apple (Foxconn, Wistron and Pegatron) were already manufacturing low end models of iPhone in India, but in a first, newer models of iPhone like iPhone 14 will be produced almost simultaneously and close to the device’s launch world-wide in India along with China. The decision of Apple to diversify its supply chain is due to the US-China trade tensions and the covid zero policy of the Chinese government which disrupted its supply chain. The above two factors are in direct contrast to liberalism that condemns the use of protectionist instruments such as tariffs ,which were seen being imposed by the US on commodities imported from China along with other non-trade barriers. Besides this, restrictions put by the Chinese government during the pandemic such as the covid zero policy is frowned upon by the liberals who want minimum state intervention. Furthermore, liberals who favour democracy which has individuals interests at the core believe that China could sustain the covid zero policy due to its undemocratic government. In addition, due to the hostile relations between, U.S and China, many companies including apple is apprehensive of US imposing higher import taxes on goods imported from China. Moreover, protection of intellectual property has been a focus for U.S. companies, which Apple and other big brands have had some concern about in China due to continuous disregard of international norms set by international organizations such as the UNCLOS, undermining the tenet of "global cooperation" as put forward by the liberals. Meanwhile, India has become an attractive manufacturer for Apple due to a skilled labour endowment and lower labour costs than China where these labour-intensive industries see demographic dividend diminishing due to the rising labour costs. The competitive labour cost gives India a comparative advantage. Other than that favourable government policies to attract FDI such as "make in India" and production linked incentive scheme that aims to give company incentives on incremental sales from products manufactured in domestic units. It has an objective to make domestic manufacturing competitive and efficient, create economies of scale, make India part of global supply chain, attract investment in core manufacturing and cutting-edge technology to ultimately increase exports. All of the three Taiwanese Apple suppliers making iPhones in India are under the PLI scheme. Moreover, this scheme adheres to the principles of liberalism and has been carefully constructed to adhere to World Trade Organization (WTO) rules unlike the Merchandise Exports from India Scheme (MEIS). By its very construct, the PLI scheme does not link the eligibility or quantum of its subsidy to exports and local value addition, thus making it WTO-compliant. The shifting of Apple’s supply chain to India might not be immediately beneficial to the consumers in terms of lower price as the new iPhones will only be assembled in the country; hardly any of its components are locally sourced and Apple has to pay import duty on them. Hence, the cost of production is expected to remain the same. But in the long term there should be some benefit accruing out of the incentives being offered by the government and it will definitely help in the availability of apple products in the Indian market which in the previous year’s saw a shortage in supply. Apple’s supply chain that is dominated by China is seen diversifying into India not just because of its huge demand and market but also the liberalist policies undertaken by the government in line with the international norms of trade that focuses on a free market economy. In addition, the skilled and cheap labour force in India gives it a comparative advantage. A recent report by JP Morgan on `Apple Supply Chain relocation' predicted that Apple is likely to move about 5 per cent of iPhone 14 production to India from late 2022 and reach 25 per cent by 2025. This move of Apple could boost India’s reputation as a manufacturing destination and encourage other manufacturers to come to India. Building up of India’s manufacturing sector will help reduce the dependence of people on agriculture, giving them an avenue to be absorbed by the manufacturing sector. Having a competitive manufacturing ecosystem, India can specialize in the production stage, making it a competitive supplier internationally, leading to job creation, growth and development of India, leading to being an economic power as is seen in the case of China. Although the onus lies on the government to make sure that this comparative advantage doesn’t lead to disadvantage for the workers by strengthening the labour regulations and its enforcement so that the benefits of an open market percolate to every worker in India. #InternationalPoliticalEconomy #iPhone #Liberalism #China #India #SupplyChain Aishwarya Pathak is a Student of MA (International Relations and Area Studies) at School of International Studies, JNU.

By Pratik Mall Hungary, a country in Eastern Europe, has come full circle from autocracy during the Cold War period to democracy in the post-communist world post the fall of the USSR and the end of the Cold War again back to autocracy under its current president, Victor Orban. At a broader level, Hungary is not a stand-alone case of this process of democratic backsliding. Still, it represents a more significant trend currently at play in different world geographies and more so in post-communist space. Hungary's democratic erosion has generated heated debates within the EU parliament. A recent non-binding but highly symbolic report branded Hungary as a "hybrid regime of electoral autocracy" which could no longer be considered a fully functional democracy. Hungary's transition from a once full-fledged and flourishing democracy which led to its inclusion into the European Union, to a currently flawed and fragile status is telling of a much broader and fundamental structural phenomenon at play. The Covid pandemic has only intensified the capture of the already pliable and weak democratic institutions. It has exposed the pitfalls of western liberal hegemony, so triumphantly claimed by Francis Fukuyama as the "most credible game in town" in the backdrop of the end of the Cold War. Theoretical Frameworks The degeneration of Hungary's liberal democratic credentials, which reached its peak at the turn of the 21st century, into an illiberal authoritarian and populist regime sparked significant concerns about democratic regression. Noted Political Scientist Samuel P Huntington's conceptual framework of the ebb and flow of democracies, which he explained so eloquently through his waves of democracies followed by reverse waves, serves as a critical theoretical tool to make sense of the more extensive process at work. One of the vital indicators of the decline pointed out by the EU parliament has been the regular and timely conduct of multiparty elections but with a simultaneous subversion of democratic norms and standards to unfairly benefit the ruling party. In essence, the conduct of elections could be called reasonably free but not at all fair. Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, in their seminal book "How democracies die", have tried to explain the phenomenon of subversion of democracy by elected leaders after coming to power through tactics like constitutional hardball and legal court-packing schemes to cement their power. By employing these critical theoretical concepts, one can better grasp the gravity of the process at play undermining democracy irreparably in Hungary. The method of democratic backsliding in Hungary is so slow and subtle that it is difficult to pinpoint one particular event or period when it all began. It has been an incremental process rather than a revolutionary one. Ozan Varol's concept of "stealth authoritarianism" is essential to deciphering the modus operandi of Hungary's authoritarian leader and party. They have used all the legitimate legal means to achieve anti-democratic ends by camouflaging anti-democratic practices under the garb of law. The Personality Factor Of all the other factors, the personality factor stands out as the most important in testing the resilience of democratic experiments in Hungary. The decline of democracy in Hungary began to unfold after the great economic meltdown post the global financial collapse of 2008. It gained even more steam with the victory of the Fidesz party and the installation of its leader Viktor Orban as Hungary's Prime Minister. The undermining of democracy began with a deliberate and systemic assault on democratic institutions, democratic practices, norms and standards. Forbearance, or the concept of self-restraint, is considered an essential pillar of democracy. Viktor Orban's administration, since its onset, has epitomized the complete disregard for political forbearance in its conduct. The constitution has been manipulated, and its various components were rewritten in a concerted attempt to amass unbridled power for himself and the party. Orban has packed the courts with his loyalist and has gerrymandered the parliamentary districts to break up the anti-Fidesz vote to retain his hegemonic position. This has been done as a classic example of stealth authoritarianism and through constitutional hardball to avoid questioning on purely legal grounds. The unprecedented Covid crisis gave the Orban government a golden opportunity to further tighten the stranglehold over government machinery. The covid law empowered him with unfettered powers to rule the country indefinitely by decree even as the government gagged the media, increased the propaganda campaigns against feminism, withdrew financial resources from local administrations and placed state companies under partial military rule. The gross misuse of a law penalizing fake news against political opponents speaks volumes about the lack of mutual tolerance, which lies at the heart of a genuinely democratic regime. Notwithstanding the above trends, however, the main point of contestation in Hungarian politics remains that of identity politics. Assault on free media has been another glaring example of Hungary's slow but quite pervasive strangulation of democracy. Since 2017, over 90 per cent of media outlets in Hungary have been owned by Fidesz or Fidesz allies. This brazen attempt has obscured the line between party, government and the state. Orban administration has misused media as a critical tool to silence opposition and advance its propaganda. The creation of fake political parties by the party has been yet another tactic adopted to destroy democracy in Hungary. These parties have been created solely to break up the electorates. In addition, the voter tourism law passage is yet another example of how the game rules have been distorted, and Hungary has slipped into a one-person one-party rule. Hungary has become a textbook example of how a democratically elected leader has misused the legal provisions to subvert and hijack democracy. The downgrading of Hungary to a "partly free country" in the freedom house report noted that Hungary was the first hybrid regime in Europe and could no longer be considered a functional democracy. Debates Within The EU Much debate and discussion have ensued regarding membership of Hungary within the EU. EU parliament members have discussed the degradation of the status of Hungary, primarily since the freedom house report, which served as an eye-opener. A host of draconian laws that curtailed citizen's fundamental civic liberties, including the freedom of expression and media freedom, coupled with anti-immigrants, asylum seekers and anti-LQBTQI policies, has led to significant furore about Hungary's continuing as an EU member. There has been a proposal to invoke article 7 of the Lisbon treaty since Hungary has breached the EU'S fundamental values of freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law. However, according to experts, Article 7 is toothless since it requires the unanimous support of all members to come into effect to deprive Hungary of its voting rights in the parliament. In this case, it is guaranteed that Poland will back Hungary. Interestingly, it is not the first time that democracy in Hungary has been questioned under Viktor Orban's populist authoritarian regime. Earlier in 2018, a majority of EU parliament members had voted to determine that Hungary was at risk of breaching the foundational values of the EU enshrined in article 2 of the Lisbon treaty. The 2022 resolutions assume even greater significance in the wake of Russia Ukraine war as Hungary has openly supported Russia, and prime minister Orban is an ally of Vladimir Putin. Regarding the EU voluntarily lowering natural gas usage by 15%, Hungary was one of the only two countries, along with Poland, that opposed this move. Members of the EP made three key recommendations to the EU commission. Firstly, it asked the European Commission to make the approval of Hungary's recovery and resilience recovery programme contingent upon its compliance with the relevant European semester recommendations and implementations of all relevant judgements of the EU court of justice and EU court of human rights. secondly, recommended for a more rigorous application of the Common Provisions Regulation and the Financial Regulation to contain the misuse of EU funds for political motives. Thirdly, it recommended excluding the cohesion programmes since it contributes to the abuse of funds. Conclusion The phenomenon of democratic backsliding in Hungary and the ensuing debate in the EU is but a single case study to understand the more extensive process of democratic fragility of immature democracies in Eastern Europe. The turn towards illiberal democracy could be attributed to two key factors: lack of a robust process of strong institution building and a natural process of democratization of society and polity. Thus, it makes eminent sense to heed Samuel P Huntington's advice and carefully recognize, analyze and arrest the trends of reverse waves of democracy. #Hungary #Obran #Europe #EU Pratik Mall is a Postgraduate student of Politics with a Specialization in International Studies at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi

By Dr. Priti Singh The slim win for president-elect Lula points to a deeply divided country supporting two diametrically opposite views and a defeat that has not been easily conceded by Bolsonaro and his supporters in the months leading up to it. Luiz InácioLula da Silva, the co-founder of the Workers’ Party (PT), has won the October 30 presidential elections in Brazil by a very small margin. His promises in the election campaign included defense of the Amazon, democracy and justice for all. His supporters come from the socially and the economically weaker sections—especially from the Northeast region but also include those in power who were not very happy with the authoritarian approach of the incumbent president Jair Bolsonaro. The slim win for president-elect Lula points to a deeply divided country supporting two diametrically opposite views and a defeat that has not been easily conceded by Bolsonaro and his supporters in the months leading up to it. Discussion on Brazil’s elections for the last few months has been on false news and misinformation on social media, social and economic policies, corruption and the pandemic. There were reports that the highway police were involved in voter suppression by blocking roads in areas that were in support of Lula such as the Northeast. This has been a very difficult win. Lula had been arrested in 2018 on charges of bribery thus preventing him from participating in the elections that year buthe was released the next year and charges levelled against him were dropped by 2021. Ever since then, he has been slowly making his way back to the top. What does all this mean for Brazil? Will Lula, who has been supportive of taxing the rich, attempt to redistribute wealth or maintain stability in fiscal policies as per his electoral mandate? Coming from a far-right agenda, Bolsonaro’s emphasis has been on deregulation and privatization. Lula, on the other hand, has focused on poverty, food and housing. Brazil has been struggling to recover from a deep recession which started in 2014 along with the major corruption controversy known as ‘Operation Car Wash’ which led to political turmoil and was followed by the pandemic. Even during his first two terms, Lula introduced social welfare schemes such as the Bolsa Familia which used the concept of conditional cash transfer to link welfare payments to education of children. These innovative programmes had helped Brazil lessen its poverty figures. The Lula years had seen a rise in Gross Domestic Product by 7.5 percent in 2010 (World Bank). Scholars writing on Brazil have argued over the reasons for Brazil’s enormous growth in the first decade of the twenty-first century. While many pointed to Brazil’s profits due to the sale of primary commodities mainly attributed to the demand from China, others argued that economic stability, a result of Lula’s welfare policies, had also contributed to this growth (O’Neil, Lapper et al, 2012). Whatever the reason, the economy was doing well, and Brazil was politically stable. Thus, Lula’s approval ratings even at the end of his second term were very high. This had allowed Dilma Rousseff to succeed him as president once his term was over as the Brazilian Constitution does not allow a consecutive third term for a president. The economic and political decline for Brazil had already set in by then with the economy stumbling and the corruption allegations reaching its height during Rousseff’s term, resulting in her impeachment. Ultra-conservative Bolsonaro’s election as president in 2018 has often been claimed as the result of a backlash or reaction of the people and their disappointment with the previous administrations. Described as a result of the “anger vote” and an economic recession that hit Brazil with high unemployment rates, the people chose to vote for a far-right populist, a former army captain and a firm supporter of Trump. Nicknamed as the ‘Trump of the Tropics’, Bolsonaro had appointed Paulo Guedes, a Chicago University economist as his economy minister. His term, however, was beset with problems. The uproar over Bolsonaro’s stance on the Amazon and deforestation with his foreign minister Ernesto Araujo having claimed that the climate change assertion was part of a conspiracy by “cultural Marxists” is just one such example. While Bolsonaro’s Environment Minister Joaquim Leite announced programmes for sustainable development and conservation of forests in 2021, it was not very well received by the international community as they believed that it lacked credibility and did not confront head on the problem of deforestation. Bolsonaro’s open disdain for masks during the pandemic and his inability to handle the situation effectively also instigated a lot of criticism. This is not to say that Lula has always been revered as a leader. The corruption scandal had really hit both Lula and his political party very hard. This partly explains the very thin margin by which Lula has won this election. In his first speech on Sunday evening, Lula was perhaps attempting to garner more support by assuring the people that he would broaden his outlook beyond his party by including centrists and right of centre views in his approach. This is a natural extension of any balanced and pragmatic politician. Lula is known for his international activism and his contribution to multilateralism, which falls in line with the present US president Biden’s approach. He has in the past shown his inclination for market-friendly policies that support private sector growth and foreign investments. Lula’s global outreach included India and relations between the two countries had grown in leaps and bounds during his time. He visited India thrice during his tenure in 2004, 2007 and 2008. This is also the time that the BRICS forum along with IBSA and BASIC was given form. India signed a defence cooperation agreement with Brazil in 2003 in R&D, military training and planned joint maneuvers. So much so, Brazil opened a Defence wing in its embassy in New Delhi by 2009. A proponent of Mercosur and Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), Lula’s win has raised hopes globally for environmental and indigenous rights activists as well as for advocates of South American integration. For Lula, it will be a long domestic struggle to secure his position by balancing his passion and pragmatism. #Brazil #Politics #Election Originally published: Financial Express, November 03, 2022. https://www.financialexpress.com/world-news/lulas-victory-a-win-win-for-all/2772872/ Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Dr. Priti Singh is the Chairperson, Centre for Canadian, US & Latin American Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

By Dr. Aprajita Kashyap Brazil, endowed with the Amazon Rainforest and dubbed as the ‘lungs of the earth’, is one of the countries from the Global South whose stand has often been under scrutiny by the world The 27th Conference of Parties (COP 27 is a meeting of 197 countries that have ratified the UNFCCC) (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) that begins in Egypt from 07 November 2022 will witness deliberations by several heads of states or their representatives, businessmen, scientists, indigenous community members and activists on how to keep the commitment to the 2015 Paris Agreement intact. The attainment of the assurances could be gauged through the implementation of recommendations of the earlier COPs and honouring the nationally determined contributions (NDC) towards achieving the goals of curtailing carbon emissions. One area that will attract the focus of the developing countries, especially India, would be the definition of climate finance and the extent of its flows for climate action. Brazil, endowed with the Amazon Rainforest and dubbed as the ‘lungs of the earth’, is one of the countries from the Global South whose stand has often been under scrutiny by the world. Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva’s during his two previous Presidential stints had put Brazil on a firm economic footing while ensuring a responsible environmental policy, the latter being hailed as being among the most progressive in the world. Lula’s success in declaring bold targets for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and reducing the rates of deforestation in the Amazon had put him at or near the top of the list when it came to eco-conscious world leaders. Dilma Rousseff, though a protégé of Lula, during her Presidency digressed and gave sweeping amnesty for those who had illegally deforested, outraging environmentalists and scientists. On analyzing her programmes, there were two kinds of outcomes – the skeptics’ views revolved around the key assertion that Dilma had continued to consider the environment “an obstacle to development” as she had said during the Copenhagen climate change summit while the believers opined she had emerged as a more consensus-oriented politician being convinced by arguments from the environmentalists and had continued Brazil’s positive trend of curbing deforestation. Nevertheless, the rate and extent of deforestation have always remained a debatable issue in Brazil under successive governments. Even before taking over as President, Jair Bolsonaro had decided to back out of Brazil’s offer to host the COP 25. On assumption of Presidential office, two departments of the Ministry of Environment that dealt with climate change and mitigation policies were nixed, the decision to end the environmental fine was firmed up and the selection of Cabinet members hostile to the fight against global warming was made. But then, after two years of downplaying the Amazon crisis and dismissing calls for action, the Bolsonaro administration changed the tone of its public statements in 2021 at the climate summit, where he pledged for the first time to curb deforestation and increase resources for environmental law enforcement. Lula, a pro-environmentalist, in his first and second stints had chosen to surround himself with a Cabinet made up of equally fervent Ministers- Dilma as the Minister of Energy and Marina Silva who is a staunch environmentalist, as the Minister of Environment. Despite these efforts, at the end of his term, Lula rode a great wave of popularity for his measured yet progressive approach towards development while he netted disappointment among the environmentalists for not making the preservation of nature his highest priority. Leaving aside the criticisms, Lula’s success lay in declaring bold targets for the reduction of greenhouse gases and reducing the rates of deforestation in the Amazon. In the present context, the President-elect will participate as the head of his political party and not as the President since he takes over only in January, in the COP 27 at Sharm El-Sheikh in Egypt. The environmentalists have immense expectations from Lula as the major plank of his campaign were the promises to protect the Amazon rainforest and restore Brazilian leadership on climate change. Lula’s attending the conference of parties is more of a signal to the world that Brazil is ready to take a proactive position towards halting climate change. The expectations of the world can be fathomed from several news items- the Times published under the headline: “Lungs of the Earth breathe sigh of relief at Lula’s election victory” and the New York Times’ write up quoted Lula’s victory speech -“Let’s fight for zero deforestation”. For Lula it would be a mammoth challenge, given the adverse impact of the policies under Bolsonaro on the environment and the blockade his efforts may receive due to a right-wing dominated Congress. Delving deeper into the Brazilian context, it is apparent that there are certain areas that have continued to evoke concerns regardless of the ideology of the incumbent government: deforestation as a source of greenhouse gas emissions; the role of the farmers and indigenous people; changing weather patterns; and implementation of national policies and international agreements and regime. Even though Lula’s selection shows he evinces measurable popularity among Brazilians for his positions on environmental policies, the dilemma remains- should the priority be development or the environment? Clearly, development remains important as is corroborated by the fact that Brazil needs to maintain its ranking as the twelfth largest economy in the world (World Bank 2021), yet the clout that it has acquired at the multilateral environmental fora necessitates that it must tread the path of sustainable development carefully. #Brazil #COP27 #UNFCCC Originally published: Financial Express, November 06, 2022. https://www.financialexpress.com/opinion/will-lulas-brazil-be-a-game-changer-at-cop27/2776943/ Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Dr. Aprajita Kashyap is Faculty in Latin American Studies Programme, CCUS & LAS, SIS, JNU, New Delhi. Email: aprajitakash@gmail.com; aprajita@mail.jnu.ac.in

By Prof. Swaran Singh This month, Asia is hosting back-to-back four world summits: November 6-18 Climate summit at Sharm el-Sheikh in Egypt; November 10-13 East Asia Summit at Phnom Penh in Cambodia; November 15-16 G20 summit in Bali (Indonesia); and then, November 16-19 APEC summit in Bangkok (Thailand). What is new is that after nearly three years of pandemic-driven disruptions and online meetings, these summits see world leaders and their delegations travelling to these cities and deliberating in person. On the flip side, however, this return to normal also reveals how in spite of all the talk about decoupling and recasting, the world continues to face an industrialized West who still sets the tone, tenor and agenda at all summit meetings. These summits across Asia, for instance, are bound to remain preoccupied with global shortages and price hikes for food, fuel, fertilizer and now finance - all triggered by the Ukraine crisis. Finance is the latest fourth "F" now added in face of a widely anticipated global recession reinforcing protectionist policies of Western nations. The actual deliberations of these summits are widely suspected to be hijacked by the visible US-Russia confrontation, although Russian President Vladimir Putin is expected to join only the G20 online. But the opportunity costs of Russia delegations being harangued in these summits remain incalculable. All this not only complicates challenges for host nations but threatens to distract attention away from real issues. Photo: Global Times Deeper questions to ask are why has West failed to bring an early end to the Ukraine war? Why has the resultant spree for weapons procurements been allowed to divert precious resources from healthcare or climate mitigation? Why energy shortages are being allowed as the new excuse for global revert to fossil fuels or for West defying their climate finance commitments? What explains this path-dependency on Western powers? To begin with, the very institution of summits has their origins in Europe. This fashion of holding peacetime leader summits originated in 19th century Europe. The 1648 Peace Treaty of Westphalia had finally put an end to European history of religious wars and later their mercantile and industrial revolutions enabled their colonial expansions around the world. This had drifted their mutual hatred to far away territories of their hapless colonized societies. European nations were now able to unleash destruction on these faraway lands and bargain these territories while sitting the exquisite settings of Vienna, Berlin, Paris, and London that were now the chosen venues for European summits. At least the cutlery, courtesies and conversations of summits have remained the same. Nothing changed even when they hosted anti-colonial leaders of their colonies at the same summit venues in Europe. British India's Round Table Conferences in London were British way of socializing India into so-called civilization. Even anti-colonial gatherings were initially held in Europe. In 1927, German communist Willi Munzenberg, with support from Comintern, had initiated a League against Imperialism and Colonial Oppression by convening a meeting in Brussels that was attended by leaders of the American left plus 175 leaders, 107 out of which came from 37 colonized nations. The two World Wars and the Great Depression of 1920 were to accelerate the wave of decolonization and transform these master-slave equations. The two decades following World War II saw emergence of a large number of new nations across Asia, Africa and Latin America. One matrix to measure this change was the membership of the United Nations that rose from 51 to 99 in its first 15 years of its existence. Asia was to see the arrival of world's largest new nations like India, China and Indonesia. The global ramifications of this transformation were reflected in the Asian Relations Conference held in New Delhi on March-April 1947. They agreed to set up an Asian Relations Organization (ARO) and to hold two follow-up events: First, its Southeast Asian Section was to draft an ARO Convention by April 1948 and the second Asian Relations Conference was to be hosted in 1949 in China. Only India's violent partition, first war with Pakistan, and China and Indonesia being in the last stages of their liberation struggles disrupted this momentum for Asian summitry by several years. Wars in Korea and Vietnam saw the US attempting to take over regional leadership through brute force and military alliances and "divide and rule" policy of European imperial powers. While the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) Security Treaty survived in Europe and Australasia, Southeast Asia Treaty (SEATO) and Baghdad Pact of Central Treaty Organization (CTO) remained dysfunctional. These were replaced by US "hub-and-spokes" military alignments with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Singapore. The indigenous Asian summitry was revived in April 1955 Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian nations and their five points of Bandung Spirit were to later produce world's largest ever Non-aligned Movement (NAM). Though the NAM for long remained a third pillar to reckon with, yet the Cold War succeeded in dividing Asian nations into opposite camps. It was not until the collapse of the Soviet Union which coincided with unprecedented economic rise of China that focus shifted to the emerging economies bringing Asia back to the centre. These four summits in Asia represent that historic recognition of Asian wisdom. Asia having since emerged as the locomotive of global growth and development explains why G7 had happily co-opted six Asian nations or 12 nations of Global South in its novel G20 summits from 2008. This also explains centrality of China and India to climate change and other deliberations of global governance. Of world top five economies today, China, Japan and India respectively occupy second, third and fifth positions. Among these India remains the fastest growing economy with promising potential. Asia together accounts for 40 percent of global manufacturing and East Asia alone accounts for over 75 percent of world's semiconductors production - a technology that has become the benchmark of technological progression. But like old times, divisions within Asia have not disappeared altogether. These have allowed the industrialized West to continue to master over their present and future. Having done wonders in economic parameters, this calls for putting Asia's political equations in order. If Asia has to take the lead in realizing the Asian dream of what Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi calls "no first world or third world but only one world" then Asian nations must begin by addressing their distracting mutual disputes and differences. Originally published: Global Times, November 13, 2022. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202211/1279367.shtml?fbclid=IwAR3ei4Dfm8UT2PjlvbU93gpnnP-bVXUD22aDi8ymL7MTh9KEgG5My1NTm34 Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Swaran Singh is a visiting professor at the University of British Columbia (Vancouver) and professor for diplomacy and disarmament, Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Delhi).

By Prof. Gulshan Sachdeva The real challenge is migration and mobility. Still, a ‘thin interim deal’ is possible in the coming months In the context of the upward trajectory of India-United Kingdom relations one constant reference has been the possibility of a bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA). During the then UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s India visit, a Diwali (end October) deadline to conclude negotiations was fixed. In the meanwhile, political and economic crises in the UK deepened. As a result of political turmoil within the Conservative Party, Rishi Sunak is now the third Tory Prime Minister in 2022. At 10.1 percent, inflation is at a 40-year high. The Bank of England predicts that the country would be in recession for the whole of 2023. The soaring energy bills may lead to winter of strikes. Given this, the environment is not conducive for an aggressive trade deal. Sunak’s ascent to power has naturally generated interest, and excitement in India. But his Home Secretary pick Suella Braverman, another Indian-origin leader, asserts that the UK’s current asylum system was "broken" and "out of control”. Besides, the country is facing an "invasion" of migrants. She earlier branded Indians as the largest group of migrants who overstayed in the UK. Although policy-makers from both the countries are issuing positive statements, prospectus for an early conclusion of an FTA needs to be analysed within broader British political and economic developments. No new deadline has been proposed by either side. The British High Commissioner said that both countries are set up for the ‘final ascent’ on signing the trade agreement in the next few months. Some Indian sources indicate that now it will take some time before negotiations are finalised. Although India-UK talks started only this year, both have been negotiating for a trade deal since 2007, earlier under India-EU negotiations. Some of the difficult issues are well known for years. As Indian average tariffs are higher compared to the UK, the British side will definitely benefit more from coming down of tariff walls. The immediate beneficiaries will be in companies in the food and drinks sector in both the countries. About 90 percent of UK exports to India are Scotch whisky in this sector, which attracts 150 percent tariffs. Many in India would like to believe that some loss in the goods sector could compensated through more exports in the services sector. However, the UK is also very competitive in the financial and legal services, and would expect major gains. Earlier it was reported that 16 out of 26 chapters are closed. But sometimes just a few issues can take very long, particularly when there is no new deadline. As there is a strong political will from both sides to conclude negotiations, issues concerning trade in goods and services could still be resolved without any serious difficulty. However, due to past experience of Vodafone and Cairn Energy, the UK will go for tough negotiations in the investment sector. India has terminated most of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) including with the UK. To bring British companies under specific protection, the UK would like to add a comprehensive investment chapter. Since the UK is also a major destination of Indian companies for investment, India may not be averse to this, but serious negotiations may take some time. Some issues concerning digital trade and data protection as well as stringent patent rules as indicated by the leaked text could be problematic. However, solutions could be found as enough homework has already been done to deal with such issues. The real challenge will be in the area of migration and mobility. Unless there are serious gains for India in this sector, negotiations may not conclude. The current political leadership and economic difficulties in the UK may not be very supportive in this area. At the moment, unemployment in the UK is at historic low. But it is expected to rise from next year. A bilateral deal on migration and mobility was signed last year. As per the deal India can send 3,000 young professionals annually to the UK in exchange for taking back undocumented migrants. Both sides have already raised issues on the implementation of the deal. While the UK feels that co-operation on illegal migration has not “worked very well”, India feels there is lack of “demonstrable progress” on mobility protocol. While looking at the political economy environment in the UK and India’s ambitions from the deal, conclusion of a comprehensive pact covering trade, investment, migration, data protection, procurement, and development issues may take some time. But this could also be a template for India-EU negotiations. However, if policy-makers wants to demonstrate progress, a ‘thin interim deal’ is very much possible in the next few months. #India-UKTies #Politics #Migration #NarendraModi #RishiSunak Originally published: Money Control, November 07, 2022. https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/opinion/india-uk-fta-without-migration-a-comprehensive-deal-is-unlikely-9461691.html Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Gulshan Sachdeva is Professor at the Centre for European Studies and Coordinator, Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, Jawaharlal Nehru University.