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By Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli The current politburo standing committee members, all Xi loyalists, owe their rise to Xi and can bend to his tunes. Packing the highest decision-making bodies of China with the “Yes men” has the advantage of 'unified' thinking and an uninterrupted execution of decisions, yet such an exercise with unbridled powers with a few could land the country into many a pitfall. At the just-concluded 20th Communist Party Congress of China(CCP), Xi Jinping rejigged the entire political and military leadership structure. Xi’s rebooting of the leadership structure is aimed at internal balancing to buttress external balancing measures in light of his ambitions to make China “a great socialist modern country” by 2049 but more precisely, to replace the United States from the high pedestal. Xi’s ‘China-First’ Policy Needs Loyal Hands Xi’s dogged determination is reflected in his ruthless pursuit of power, tactical utilisation of other factional leaders’ services, accommodating his factional leaders at crucial party-state-army hierarchies, resorting to ancient stratagems of “feint in the east, attack in the west”, diverting negative forces on to the adversaries but skilfully absorbing positive energy and others. In a surprising move, Xi had opted for Li Qiang (63), serving currently as Shanghai party chief, as his second-in-command. Li served under Xi when the latter was the party chief of Zhejiang province. Both were also in touch when Li enrolled at the Central Party School at Beijing of which Xi was the President. Li implemented Xi’s harsh “dynamic zero covid” policy in the commercial capital of Shanghai, forcing its populace to their knees. Although Li has no experience at the central level and has not visited abroad extensively, he participated in the establishment of the first mega project of China International Import Expo at Shanghai in November 2018. He is also said to be instrumental in getting Tesla to Shanghai for making automobiles. His stint at Hong Kong Polytechnic University with executive business management subjects could provide an edge for him in addressing the emerging economic problems of the country. Can the Xi-Li Equation Push China to Global Forefront? However, what perhaps endeared Li to Xi is that he had, since the beginning of his career in Zhejiang province, focused on rural poverty, disaster relief, sociology, management, engineering and other subjects. This mix of big business and rural poverty experience could come handy for Li when he eventually takes over as the Premier next March. However, Li’s main drawback is his lack of strategic economic foresight to leapfrog China into number one economy in the world. If the 20th CCP message is to make China numero uno, then Li needs to alter the inherited economic structure. Much of the Chinese model is based on 20th-century heavy industry, housing sector, infrastructure, and growth in private sector. However, despite efforts at “dual circulation”, domestic consumption and 'Made in China 2025' campaign, the futuristic knowledge economy is still in its infancy. Major thrust areas of Li will be in this direction although heavy party control, scuttling of foreign tech companies and “common prosperity” campaign imperatives will test this resolve. Who All Make Xi’s Dream Team? The third-in-command is Zhao Leji who was renominated for the politburo standing committee and in-charge of discipline inspection commission that keeps a tab on party cadres. Zhao is likely to head the country’s parliament next March. Zhao is an Xi loyalist and kept Xi’s home province Shaanxi trouble-free. Also, Zhao headed an alternative bureaucratic decision-making body, the “comprehensively deepening reform” that Xi floated to overcome the traditional “central small leading groups”. Zhao also pushed Xi’s party “supervisory” roles across the state institutions – as a measure towards absolute control. The fourth important member of Xi’s loyalists is 67-year-old Wang Huning. Wang surprised every one for his endurance capacity serving Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and currently Xi as their script writer, ideologue and for prescribing “neo-authoritarianism” and party supremacy. Wang is also associated with “three represents”, “harmonious world” and currently “China Dream”, “China rejuvenation” and other trendy slogans that captivated the country’s political discourse. As a workaholic, Wang is likely to further nudge Xi taking the path of ideological confrontation with the west and democracies in general and by exporting the authoritarian “China model” on to the world stage. In tune with Xi, Wang advocates self-reliance, decoupling with the west, building China-specific soft power and others. Wang also served in Xi’s “comprehensively deepening reform” committees notably on internet controls. The fifth ranking leader, Cai Qi (67) is also a close associate of Xi, going back to the latter’s stint as party chief of Fujian province in the 1990s and Zhejiang province in the 2000s. Like Xi, Cai was also affected by the Cultural Revolution when he was rusticated in early 1970s, and hence both share empathies. In 2012, Cai visited Taiwan as a member of a delegation from Zhejiang Province. With the current hard-line on Taiwan, Cai’s advice must be invaluable to Xi. Cai served at the National Security Commission and as party chief of the country’s capital. What the Rejig Suggests of Xi’s Factional Politics On the closing day of the 20th CCP, global media attention was on how former leader Hu Jintao was unceremoniously jettisoned out of the venue of the congress. The person forcibly pushing out Hu was Kong Shaoxun, the trusted lieutenant of Ding Xuexiang (60) who is now the 6th ranking leader of China. Ding is in charge of the CCP’s Central Committee General Office, the centre of all liaison with the party-state-army apparatuses. Ding is associated throughout with the “Shanghai gang” where Xi also worked briefly. The 7th ranking politburo standing committee member is Li Xi (66) who had served in Xi’s home province of Shaanxi and specifically at Yan’an, the revolutionary base of the CCP in the 1930s and 40s. No wonder, Xi took the entire top leadership to Yanan soon after the party congress. Li undertook several major provincial assignments including Shanghai, Guangdong and the rust-belt Liaoning province. All the above six are Xi loyalists, ruling out any policy dissonances. Unlike acute differences between Xi’s statist policies and Premier Li Keqiang’s “street hawker” economic approach, the current politburo standing committee members owe their rise to Xi and hence can bend to his tunes. While provides harmony to the policy evolution and implementation, the lack of Plan B will stare at Xi in the coming years, possibly putting the country’s interests at risk. #China #USA #XiJinping Originally published: Open, October 29, 2022. https://www.thequint.com/voices/opinion/will-xi-jinpings-a-team-fulfil-his-vision-of-making-china-a-world-leader-chinese-president-chinese-communist-party-united-states-of-america#read-more Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli is Dean of School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University.

Paradip port has enormous potential to emerge as a significant player to expand India’s EXIM activities and build economic and cultural synergies with South Asian partners and neighbours. Paradip port, which is located in the Jagatsinghpur district of coastal Odisha, is poised to play a significant role in India’s maritime connectivity with South East Asia cementing the space for trans-regional free trade architecture. In this ambitious corridor, as part of the Sagarmala project (Garlands of the sea), the Government of India intends to augment port-led industrialisation by linking the Kalinga coastal zone with a host of industrial and maritime clusters. As a result, Paradip port on the east coast undergoes massive structural and logistical revamping. India’s aspirational $5 trillion economy benchmark necessitates shifting attention to the domain of the blue economy as well. The Indian peninsula constituting a 7,500 km coastline and 14, 500 km of navigable waterways presents the opportunity for India to capitalise on the sea space to forge trade ties with the neighbouring countries and beyond. This venture does not embody any novelty as the history of maritime commerce narrates India’s decisive visibility, but the difference it makes is that of the neo-classical approach that India has adopted to bring energy to its economy through the mediation of the sea. The major ports on the east coast include Haldia and Kolkata in West Bengal, Paradip in Odisha, Visakhapatnam in Andhra Pradesh, Tuticorin, Chennai and Ennore in Tamil Nadu, and Port Blair in Andaman & Nicobar Island. They facilitate synergies with the Indian hinterland, South East Asia and the partners in the Indo-Pacific. Their export-import profile covers petrochemical products, fertilizers, food products, salt, iron, iron ore, aluminium, automobiles, cement, etc. Shifting the gravity of attention to Paradip, it is placed in the middle between Kolkata port (210 nautical miles) and Visakhapatnam port (260 nautical miles). Capacity expansion and hinterland connectivity through railroad and highway are the important areas that have been taken up to inaugurate the port-led development. The Kalinga Coastal Economic Zone links Paradip with Dhamra port covering the coastal districts such as Puri, Jagatsinghpur, Cuttack, Kendrapara, Jajpur, and Bhadrak to build industrial clusters and smart cities. These localised linkages are further connected with the industrial corridors in West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, and Tamil Nadu to transform the east coast commercial, manufacturing, and Export-Import (EXIM) strength. In addition, the vast hinterland, including Odisha, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and West Bengal may get effectively connected to the Paradip port through railroad and highways and further coordination may be built by inter-port connectivity. Coastal circuit formation and cruise tourism are some of the potential areas which are planned to be developed to give a fillip to coastal tourism. This appears very ambitious and efforts have been made in the right direction to achieve the goal. If these developments are successful in the coming years, the Indian focus would essentially be on South East Asia to conduct more export-import-related activities. Self-reliant India with its focus on the manufacturing sector may emerge as a significant competitor in the South East Asian markets. This may initiate competition and may significantly reduce the Chinese monopoly there. Its unrestricted BRI expansionism will experience significant deterrence. Therefore, Paradip port has enormous potential to emerge as a significant player to expand India’s EXIM activities and build economic and cultural synergies with South Asian partners and neighbours. The indications are very positive and are quite expressive of the fact of India taking up a leadership role in the years to come. Its democratic credential will aid its emergence as a reliable partner and a leader. The global supply-chain disruption with the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic and China’s shrewd monopoly in the sector and its alleged involvement in abetting the pandemic and data secrecy and its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) interventionism through corridor formation have invited a dent in its global image. There is no quick fix to alter this perception. This allows India to emerge as an impactful leader in the supply-chain sector. In this connection, building port connectivity with South East Asia requires essentially Myanmar’s partnership. The latter’s political instability, militancy, military rule, and Chinese interventionism in its internal politics create a bottleneck in committing durable maritime ties with it. The Kolkata Port and Sittwe Port (Myanmar) connectivity are a few diplomatic and logistics clearances away to function effectively. The progress experienced uncertainty with Sui Kyi’s arrest by Myanmar’s military junta. But, if India devises some form of tactical diplomacy, there is always a way out to secure some optimism to reinforce stronger ties. However, ups and downs are recurrent in any international relationship. China apparently is the impediment, not Myanmar. But, India’s aspirations of reaching out to the South Asian neighbours require Myanmar’s deep partnership and its decoupling from China’s tutelage. India-South East Asia Maritime Space Moving ahead, inter-port connectivity between the Kolkata Port and Paradip port may serve the purpose of reaching the Sittwe port and thereafter to Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, and also to India’s Northeastern region involving multimodal operations. Moreover, to reduce the burden on the Kolkata port, the connectivity linkages may be directly developed between the Paradip port and Myanmar’s Kyaukpyu, Thandwe, and Pathein ports. China has already funded the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (KPSEZ) and India ought to expand its depth in Myanmar apart from its investment in the Sittwe port project. The great game of competition has already begun between India and China. It is, therefore, the time to unleash the potential of the Paradip port to express India’s clear intent to forge enduring ties with the South East Asian neighbours and partners. Highlighting the strength of the Paradip port, it currently handles numerous cargos covering crude oil, Petroleum, Oils and Lubricants (POL) products, iron ore, thermal coal, chrome ore, coking coal, manganese ore, charge chrome, ferro chrome, ferro manganese, limestone, hard coke, ingots and moulds, billets, finished steel, scrap, fertiliser, fertiliser raw material, clinker, gypsum, project cargo, and containers. Its proximity to the mining states such as Odisha, Jharkhand, and Chhattisgarh makes it all the more important to conduct import-export activities. In the event of the development of coastal industrial clusters and manufacturing hubs, Indian exports including automobiles, electronics, pharmaceuticals, fertilisers, food-processing, etc., will be transported to the South East Asian countries through the Paradip port directly or through the inter-port connectivity and interdependence. The Sagarmala project is rightly on track to maximise India’s depth on the east coast and its effective integration with the South East Asian nations. Needless to say, China is a major obstacle to India’s east coast enterprise and trade depth. Beijing’s arbitrariness in the region requires the presence of a competitor to introduce freedom of choice. India ought to upgrade its diplomacy and logistics to inaugurate the era of competitiveness in the Bay of Bengal and the Indo-Pacific region. For this incredible enterprise, the port logistics must be revitalized and the Paradip port’s strategic and economic depth must be capitalised. #Paradip #India #Odisha #MaritimeConnectivity Originally published: Open, October 22, 2022. https://www.news18.com/news/opinion/opinion-how-paradip-port-is-set-for-significant-role-in-indias-maritime-connectivity-6223117.html Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Dr Jajati K Pattnaik is an Associate Professor at the Centre for West Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Dr Chandan K Panda is an Assistant Professor at Rajiv Gandhi University, Itanagar, Arunachal Pradesh.

By Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli The ‘Chairman of Everything’ has demolished all factions, ruthlessly sidelined senior leaders, and placed loyalists in key posts The 20th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress will go down in history for consecrating unprecedented centralisation of powers in the hands of Xi Jinping, demolishing several political factions within the CCP to make way for Xi’s spectacular consolidation which provides no clear identification of the sixth generation of leadership. While the emergent picture provides much elbow room for Xi to pursue his goals, the CCP also enters an unchartered course. At the just concluded 20th CCP Congress in Beijing, two significant issues emerged. Firstly, the party congress constitution has been amended giving Xi a major place in the party history; and secondly, the new Chinese pantheon has been unveiled, one that will rule the next five years and beyond. First, the constitutional changes. Every national congress of the CCP has seen constitutional amendments reflecting the new power base of the times. At the 20th CCP, the constitutional changes primarily accommodate Xi’s ‘core’ status in the party and the political legitimacy that this entails among the rank and file. These were mentioned under “two establishes” and “two safeguards”. At the November 2021 “third historical resolution”, “two establishes” were promulgated to include Xi at the “core” of the leadership of the CCP and his “thought” as the “guiding” role for the rank and file. This was mentioned for the first time in early 2018 but did not come into circulation till late 2021. Further elevating the status of Xi were the “two safeguards” promulgated by the sixth plenary session of the 19th CCP in November 2021 that mentioned safeguarding the “core” status of Xi and his centralised authority. These two provide unprecedented powers to Xi in the party-state-army hierarchy. Deng’s Safeguards Previously, to avoid any excesses committed by party leaders, Deng Xiaoping ushered in several checks and balances. The “gang of four”, led by Mao Zedong’s wife Jiang Qing, exercised extra-judicial powers in the 1970s that led to enormous troubles for party leaders. Deng brought in the principle of “collective leadership” to avoid the pitfalls of a personality cult and a single leader amassing and abusing powers. With Xi attempting to centralise powers in the last decade, the impact of the emerging personality cult surrounding him will need to be assessed in the coming years. The second and most visible change at the 20th CCP is the emergence of a new political pantheon, though marred by the almost forceful eviction of former General Secretary Hu Jintao from the venue of the Congress. The new leadership includes, in the order of importance, Xi Jinping (69) for a third term, Li Qiang (63), Zhao Leji (65), Wang Huning (67), Cai Qi (67), Ding Xuexiang (60) and Li Xi (66). In the military, the leadership order includes Xi Jinping continuing as chairman of the all-powerful Central Military Commission, Zhang Youxia (72), He Weidong (65) as vice chairmen and Li Shangfu (64), Liu Zhenli (58), Miao Hua (67) and Zhang Shengmin (64) as members. By this selection, Xi eliminated any dissent or alternative viewpoint in the party and the army. All Xi’s men A brief profile of the standing committee members suggests that Xi has packed it with loyalists and leaders of his faction. The second-ranked Li Qiang belonged to the “new Zhijiang Army”—those who were associated with Xi during his term in Zhejiang in the early 2000s. Li served as Shanghai party secretary. Despite criticism of his handling of the Covid pandemic in Shanghai for the past several months, Li is promoted now and likely to become premier next March. The third-ranking member Zhao Leji belongs to the traditional Tibet area of Amdo, now called Qinghai, but served in Xi’s home province Shaanxi. Zhao is said to have kept the Shaanxi province safe for Xi. He headed the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, a post once occupied by Deng Xiaoping. The fourth-ranking member Wang Huning, the architect of “neo-authoritarian” policies, has been retained. Wang had written critically about US democracy and is said to be the scriptwriter for the last three generations of leaders in China. Wang is known to have brought in unprecedented curbs on information-sharing and internet security. Cai Qi belonged to the “new Zhijiang Army” and served as party secretary of Beijing as well as in the National Security Commission. Ding Xuexiang belongs to the Shanghai faction and served at the General Office of the Central Committee. Li Xi belonged to the Shanghai gang as well as Xi Jinping’s home province Shaanxi and served at Yanán—the communist base area of the 1930s after the Long March. Surprising omissions from these top posts were Xi’s loyalist Chen Min’er, the current party secretary of the largest city in China, Chongqing. Also, Communist Youth League leaders Hu Chunhua, Wang Yang, and Li Keqiang could not be accommodated even as their leader Hu Jintao was humiliated. As for the military leadership, Xi retained fellow “taizi” (princeling) Gen Zhang Youxia to continue as vice chairman of the CMC. Both also belong to the same Shaanxi province. Gen He served in the Western Theatre Command coinciding with the Doklam faceoff. Li Shangfu served in the space programme and was an asset to Xi in the PLA Strategic Support Force. Liu Zhenli is a Vietnam War veteran and is currently the Ground Forces chief. Miao Hua served earlier at Lanzhou Military Region and as naval chief. Zhang Shengmin also belonged to Xi’s home province Shaanxi and served at the rocket forces and discipline inspection commission. Thus, all CMC members are loyal to Xi and his policy coordination efforts are expected to be smooth. Age and term limits broken The above selection process suggests a few significant departures from the recent past. These include the norms on term and age limits, “collective leadership”, pluralism, space for moderate opinions, and a consensus approach on significant party positions that have been jettisoned. This means that either the CCP becomes more focused under Xi on achieving his goals, or could also lead to troubles for the party if the experiment runs into problems. To curb gerontocracy and promote younger leaders, Deng Xiaoping proposed 68 as the age limit for members of the highest decision-making body, the Politburo Standing Committee. This norm has been implemented since the 1980s. Also, to curb abuse of power and encourage talent, no more than two terms for these high offices were formulated in August 2006. These norms and rules have been thrown to the wind. The oldest in Xi’s team is Gen Zhang Youxia at 72 and that, too, as a member of the armed forces decision-making body. Most other members are also either in the mid or late-60s suggesting they will either retire after this term or, if the disregard for the age limit continues, remain for a life term—reducing the scope for young blood to enter the mainstream. The most significant issue is that no sixth-generation leader was identified at the end of the party congress. In the last three decades, there was a political consensus in the CCP on reform orientation and other fundamental issues. This is now broken with the Communist Youth League (CYL) almost demolished in the current selection process for the high posts. None of the bigwigs of the CYL like Li Keqiang, Wang Yang, Hu Chunhua, and others could make it. Jiang Zemin’s faction fared no better. On the other hand, Xi’s loyalists like Ding Xuexiang, Li Qiang, Cai Qi, Ding Xuexiang, Li Xi, and others could gatecrash easily into top positions. Thus, the momentous changes ushered by the 20th CCP both in its structural and personnel frameworks have long-term implications for the domestic body politic of China, and for the rest of the world. Overcentralisation of decision-making could possibly lead to quick results for Xi in his drive to replace the US from the high pedestal. The changes also bring no good news for India. Yet, increasing victimisation of other marginalised factional leaders could attract a backlash and bottlenecks in implementing national goals, leading to unanticipated setbacks for China. #China #ChineseCommunistParty #DengXiaoping #Geopolitics #XiJinping #ZhangShengmin Originally published: Open, October 24, 2022. https://openthemagazine.com/columns/chinas-new-pantheon-cast-xi-jinpings-image/ Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli is Dean of the School of International Studies and Professor in Chinese Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University. Views are personal.

Amitabh Mattoo and Joseph S. Nye outline some of the key misconceptions about strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific and the US–China relationship Few topics in international relations draw the level of in-depth discussion and debate, or matter as much for the future of international order, as China’s rise and its implications for international politics. In this blogpost we asked Amitabh Mattoo and Joseph S. Nye, Jr about the key misconceptions in current debates and what the future of strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific might look like. What are the biggest misconceptions about China in international politics? Joseph S. Nye, Jr: Different people have different misconceptions, but one that is widely shared is the view that China will become the dominant power in world politics by the centenary of Communist Party rule in 2049. This view is reinforced by China’s impressive record of economic growth that has made it the second largest economy in the world. But linear extrapolation from past events is always dangerous, and the trend line may change. China is in demographic decline. Its labour force peaked in 2015, and the population profile shows fewer productive younger people having to support older generations. While it has made impressive progress on some technologies that can replace labour, its total factor productivity (labour and capital) has been declining, and it is far from clear that tightening party and state control of the private sector will help solve this problem. Amitabh Mattoo: One of the biggest misconceptions about China is the belief that Beijing was ‘socialized’ into accepting the rules and the norms of a post-Cold War international system dominated by the West. There was also a myth, perpetuated by Sinologists for centuries, that Chinese strategic culture was inward-looking and not prone to expansionism. We are witnessing the end of these misconceptions. Rather than behaving like a status quo power, China is acting like any other rising power that seeks to challenge the prevailing order, through the use of force if necessary. China’s belligerence is heightened by its repressive system of government and its totalitarian leader, Xi Jinping, probably the most powerful since Mao. The Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s ‘24-character strategy’ of maintaining a low profile and biding time is now forgotten! There is no evidence that China’s strategic culture is moderating its offensive-realist policies across the region. China is deploying all the instruments propounded by the ancient Indian philosopher and political strategist Kautilya (with Chinese characteristics): saam, dam, dand, bhed (persuade or purchase or punish or exploit a weakness) to dominate is neighbourhood and beyond. What dynamics will shape the future international politics in the Indo-Pacific? Amitabh Mattoo: There will be an interplay of four factors that will shape the future of the Indo-Pacific. First, is the direction of China’s rise over the next decade. On present evidence, Beijing’s ambitions are to be the ‘hegemonic’ power in the Indo-Pacific. In this scenario, China will be increasingly belligerent, willing to use its ‘wolf warrior diplomacy’ to challenge the ‘rules-based order’ put into place by the West and weaponize its multilateral presence. If, however, China’s economy slows, as it has recently, and it faces increasing dissent, China could become more cautious and risk averse in its foreign policy. The latter is less likely. Second, much depends on how committed the United States is to the region, especially given its current weak leadership and its new focus on the European theatre in the wake of the war in Ukraine. If the promise of AUKUS and the Quad translates into reality, we may witness a stronger bulwark against Chinese designs than is the case today. Third, countries like India — rising in power, status and influence — facing the brunt of Chinese revisionism, and the choices they make will also be a critical factor in the shaping of the future of the region. Finally, unpredictable, high-impact Black Swan events could have an overarching impact on the region. A pandemic, environmental catastrophe or the use of a weapon of mass destruction could undermine traditional sources of power and security. Joseph S. Nye, Jr: The rise of China has created a situation where most countries want to maintain economic access to its large market, but also do not want to be politically dominated by China. Thus, many countries want an American presence in the region for security purposes, but do not want to alienate China. India will soon become the world’s most populous country and is a growing economy. Japan, the third largest national economy, has a military alliance with the US. In principle, this balance of power could be a formula for stability in the region but it could be disrupted by American withdrawal; a worsening of the India — China border conflict; a war over Taiwan; a North Korean nuclear event; or other low probability but high impact events. Are balancing against or cooperating with China the only options that exist for China’s neighbouring states? Amitabh Mattoo: While the western study of international relations focuses on balancing, cooperating or hedging, non-western IR offers other more nuanced perspectives. This is particularly true of civilizational states like India whose thinking on war, peace, order, justice and morality is captured in many of its classical texts. For instance, Dharma is a key concept in Indian thinking on war and peace. What, then, does Dharma mean strategically? First, Dharma means upholding the larger righteous interest, the welfare of humanity, in both its mundane and its transcendental sense. Second, Dharma means action, not passivity — acting without material incentives, and without regard for the narrowly defined gains from that action. It means acting decisively while recognizing that the fight to uphold Dharma will almost necessarily cause collateral damage both in terms of a strict adherence to principle, as well as in terms of violence. Finally, the fight for Dharma requires acting independently, without attachment, without fear and without external pressure. Dharma can only be sustained through the doctrine of strategic autonomy. It brings into harmony flexibility in diplomacy (even duplicity when needed) and purposeful violence when required. True statecraft and strategic autonomy become inseparable, bringing about a fusion of thought and action for the higher purposes of statecraft. In sum, Dharma offers a path beyond the choice of balancing or cooperation within a framework that combines national-interest, realpolitik and righteousness. How should policymakers understand the future relationship between the two powers? Joseph S. Nye, Jr: As I argued in my article, policy-makers in both countries should avoid demonizing each other and realize that the relationship is not like the Cold War. There is much more economic, social and ecological interdependence between the US and China than ever existed between the US and the Soviet Union. Instead, policy-makers should see the relationship as a ‘cooperative rivalry’ or ’competitive coexistence’ with equal attention to both parts of the description. As former Australian prime minister Kevin Rudd has argued, the objective for great power competition between China and the US is not defeat or total victory over an existential threat, but a ‘managed competition’. If China changes for the better in the long term, that is simply an unexpected bonus for a strategy that aims for successful management of a great power relationship in a time of traditional as well as economic and ecological interdependence. Amitabh Mattoo is Professor at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and Honorary Professorial Fellow at the University of Melbourne. His article, ‘How not to deal with a rising China: a perspective from south Asia’ was published in the September 2022 issue of International Affairs. Joseph S. Nye, Jr is the University Distinguished Service Professor, Emeritus and former Dean of the Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. His article, ‘How not to deal with a rising China: a US perspective’ was published in the September 2022 issue of International Affairs. #China #InternationalPolitics #India #US Originally published: Medium.com, October 26, 2022. https://medium.com/international-affairs-blog/how-not-to-deal-with-a-rising-china-8dfcede032e8 Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of Prof. Amitabh Mattoo.

By Prof. Gulshan Sachdeva Rishi Sunak’s top priority will be to get the UK’s economy back on track, and unite a badly-divided Conservative Party We did not have a UK-India FTA on Diwali, as hoped by the then visiting British Prime Minister Boris Johnson earlier this year. But we do have an Indian-origin Prime Minister in 10 Downing Street now. Rishi Sunak’s ascent to power has generated a lot of interest in India. The UK’s youngest Prime Minister in 200 years is a practicing Hindu who earlier took oath on the Bhagwad Gita. Despite being relatively new to British politics, he has played his cards well. Within a few years of becoming Member of Parliament, he was first appointed Chancellor of Exchequer, and now Prime Minister. This despite the fact that he is non-white and descendant of immigrants from India and East Africa. Although the recent political turmoil within the Conservative Party, and economic difficulties have provided an opportunity for him to become British Prime Minister, this is certainly a huge achievement for British democracy. This does not mean racism is finished in Britain, or suddenly the United Kingdom has become a successful multicultural society. Still, this indicates further maturity in British politics, attitudes, and its democracy. This is not a small achievement. It also shows that merit and competence get rewarded in a free British society. In his first speech as Prime Minister he highlighted that the country is “facing a profound economic crisis”. Further, the “aftermath of Covid still lingers” and "Putin's war in Ukraine has destabilised energy markets and supply chains the world over”. Without specifying details, he asserted that through “integrity, professionalism and accountability” he would bring “economic stability”, and fix some mistakes made by his predecessor. Sunak is a technocrat, and showed his competence as a Chancellor of Exchequer during the pandemic. This is perhaps the reason he is chosen by his party. But the real challenge for him is political. As a leader he has to unite a badly-divided Conservative Party. Many members of the Boris Johnson Cabinet are back. Since Tories are in no mood to go for elections now, he has more than two years to provide economic stability, unite the party, and lead Tories in the next general elections. His appointments may bring some calm in financial markets. But his political leadership to implement “hard economic decisions” to control inflation, and inject growth still needs to be demonstrated. Despite some euphoria in India, Sunak’s impact on India-UK ties will be marginal at best. The bilateral ties are already on an upward trajectory. This momentum will continue. The comprehensive strategic partnership, Roadmap 2030, and British tilt towards the Indo-Pacific have already brought the two countries closer. The most important deliverable expected is a bilateral FTA. Apart from agreements on many chapters, mobility of skilled Indians to the UK could be a sticky point. Another Indian-origin MP, Suella Braverman has been re-appointed as Home Secretary. She earlier branded Indians as the largest group of migrants who overstayed in the UK. Sunak has also been an early backer of Brexit, wants more controls of its borders, and favours deporting of asylum seekers to Rwanda. So tough negotiations on mobility issue are expected under the Sunak administration. Although the UK’s economic conditions are not very favourable towards a new trade agreement, both sides feel that early FTA will help trade and investment in the coming years. Internationally, Sunak will continue to follow the UK's role and responsibilities at the UNSC, NATO, G7, and G20. With his international exposure and background, he will have little difficulty in adjusting to this role. No change is expected in Britain’s prominent role in support of Ukraine. At this point in history, Sunak has got an opportunity to prove his capability in stabilising the British economy. The markets would expect a detailed and credible tax rise, expenditure cut, and defence spending plan of action. The accumulated economic problems are the result of Brexit shocks, the pandemic, and the Ukraine war. Some of the issues can be tackled through domestic responses, but many issues need wider co-ordination within Europe and beyond. Still, a limited economic stability can strengthen him politically within the Conservative Party’s rank and file. Tories are fast losing popularity. Sunak’s main job at the moment is to keep the party united so that it can avoid a general election which could prove disastrous for the Conservatives. The Brexit is done. But the Brexiters are now reluctant to go to electorates. #India #UK #India-UKTies #Politics #RishiSunak Originally published: Money Control, October 26, 2022. https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/opinion/india-uk-ties-despite-euphoria-rishi-sunaks-impact-will-be-marginal-at-best-9392531.html Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Gulshan Sachdeva is Professor at the Centre for European Studies and Coordinator, Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, Jawaharlal Nehru University.

By Prof. Swaran Singh In his speech at the opening session of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on Sunday, CPC Central Committee General Secretary Xi Jinping highlighted China's achievements and future development and strategic trajectories. One example among these that carry inevitable implications for post-pandemic global resilience is Xi's enunciation of the Chinese path to modernization with its clearly defined benchmarks and timelines. A careful reading of Xi's speech shows economic growth is but only a part of his prescribed indexes in his modernization philosophy. A tentative count of its pillars include upholding the overall leadership of the Party and socialism with Chinese characteristics, developing whole-process people's democracy, enriching the Chinese people's cultural lives and achieving common prosperity, promoting harmony between humankind and nature and a new form of human advancement, and building a community with a shared future for mankind. As the world's second-largest economy — and possibly the world's largest economy by 2030 — Chinese modernization trajectories remain deeply intertwined with those of the rest of the world. As the world's largest trading nation with huge foreign exchange reserves and nearly 30 percent share of global manufacturing — and home to emerging global brands thanks to innovations and cutting-edge research — China has also increasingly become part of global governance structures and processes. In 2016, the World Bank recognized China as an upper-middle income country. Given all this, Xi's underlying vision behind China's continued pursuit of modernization portends critical system-shaping possibilities. And, at its core, Xi's vision aims to present an alternative to war, violence and market competition-driven conventional Western models of national development. The first distinction that calls for the world to take notice is Xi's continued stress on making the Chinese path to modernization peaceful and to strive for shared prosperity for all. This may appear idealistic. But China's successful eradication of absolute poverty makes Xi's contentions worth a careful scrutiny. Second, the new era under Xi's leadership has also seen China playing a more prominent role in global governance structures and processes. One yardstick of this recognition is the US' National Security Strategy reports of February 2015, December 2017 and October 2022 mentioning China 12, 33 and 54 times respectively. Third, many developing nations may also find the Chinese development model enticing. After all, China remains a developing country and its economic miracle is just more than four decades old. Being on a similar curve, emerging economies, too, will find China's development model engaging. In particular, the COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted the global industry and supply chains and slowed down the economic development of most countries, prompting them to seek serious course correction and explore alternative choices to revitalize their industry and supply chains and boost their economic growth. The new era has already seen Xi launch global development alternatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative and propose to build a community with a shared future for mankind — and more recently put forward alternative development and security-safeguard paradigms like the Global Development Initiative and the Global Security Initiative. All these remain closely connected with Xi's modernization drive that aims to realize common prosperity by improving income distribution. In his speech, Xi also talked about ensuring a "more work, more pay" system to enable people to work hard and achieve greater prosperity. Having eradicated extreme poverty, China now seeks to focus on eliminating relative poverty by ensuring equality of opportunity and taking measures to raise the incomes of low-income earners. This will further expand the size of China's middle-income earners which already adds up to 500 million. Conversely, this calls for keeping tabs on accumulation of wealth and ensuring wealth distribution is well regulated. Way back in December 2012, Xi introduced the idea of a "Chinese Dream" and the Chinese modernization drive marks the next step toward achieving that goal. The Chinese Dream is not to be confused with the proverbial "American Dream "that focuses on unleashing individual energy for personal prosperity. Indeed, this commitment remains enshrined in the United States Constitution that grants citizens the fundamental right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness. The Chinese Dream, besides people's well-being, also visualizes national rejuvenation and cultural rejuvenation of the nation. Taken together with Xi's Global Development Initiative, his modernization paradigm seeks to present a "new choice" for humankind where education, science and technology and human resources are to be the foundational and strategic pillars for developing China into a modern socialist country by creating an open, globally competitive innovation-driven ecosystem. This is bound to make the Chinese modernization all the more closely intertwined with the rest of the world. And with the world's second-largest population and fifth-largest economy, India will have to pay closer attention to China's development trajectories and the vision behind it. #China #CPC #Modernization #XiJinping Originally published: China Daily, October 21, 2022. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202210/21/WS6351ce83a310fd2b29e7da90.html?fbclid=IwAR1ERmwJwI_ZmPpBlzQpcT2Z2EoSYqssA0uPYtJATKW-1Ud3i4mhIwrjt6s Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Swaran Singh is a professor of diplomacy and disarmament at Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Delhi) and a visiting professor at the University of British Columbia (Vancouver, Canada).

By Prof. Swaran Singh This week India hosted its 12th DefExpo in Gandhinagar in the western province of Gujarat. With its theme of “Path to Pride” – and guided by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s “Make in India” and “Self-Reliant India” campaigns – it not only showcased India’s state-of-the-art defense technologies but seemed to unleash its so-called “animal spirit” in forging partnerships among Indians as well as with other global manufacturers. As this biannual exhibition comes to a close on Saturday, the DefExpo can boast of the presence of 1,340 companies from the Indian defense industry, including 100 startups, plus others from 75 participating nations, resulting in the signing of at least 450 memoranda of understanding. Inaugurating it on Tuesday, Modi spoke of India’s defense exports having increased by eight times in last eight years and India now exporting defense materials and equipment to more than 75 countries, leading him to set the target of US$5 billion worth of such exports annually by 2025. In fact, inaugurating the Aero India 2021 airshow at Yelahanka Air Force Station near Bangalore last year, Defense Minister Rajnath Singh had already announced targets of taking domestic defense production to $25 billion and exports to $5 billion by 2025. Yet another report talked of defense exports having risen by 334% in last five years, claiming the defense sector was on the “cusp of a revolution.” On cusp of revolution This mood and momentum in India’s defense exports were surmised in Modi’s inaugural address to the DefExpo, where he said: “This is the very same country that once released pigeons; today it has reached a stage where it is releasing cheetahs.” He was referring to pigeons being the symbols of peace and to himself releasing on his birthday last month eight Namibian cheetahs into Kuno National Park in central India. In fact many sectors in India have lately begun talking of being on the “cusp of a revolution,” promising transformative early harvests of impressive outcomes. As for the defense sector, last year witnessed major restructuring in the Department of Defense Production (DDP). Seven new defense companies were carved out of its erstwhile Ordnance Factory Board. DefExpo 2022 saw them making their debut presence. Second, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) database has for years shown India as world’s largest importer of arms. So, as part of course correction by encouraging indigenous production, DefExpo 2022 saw the DPP release its fourth Positive Indigenization List (PIL) of 101 items – taking the total to 411 defense items – that will be procured only from domestic production. The first three PILs were issued in quick succession on August 21, 2020, May 31, 2021, and April 7, 2022, underlining the DPP’s commitment to fast-forward this transformation. Third, in exploring its competitive edge beyond Southeast Asia, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean littoral, India has begun to focus on Africa. On the opening day of DefExpo 2022, 53 African countries joined the second India-Africa Defense Dialogue (IADD). Delegates included 13 ministers, four deputy ministers and other African senior defense officials. The inaugural IADD was held in Lucknow in 2020 with an objective of turning India into a potential competitive arms supplier for Africa. Leap of faith It is important, however, to underline the formidable emotional and structural challenges that lie in the way of this newfound excitement. Being the land of the Buddha and Mahatma Gandhi – and known for having achieved its independence through a piecemeal transfer of power, largely through non-violent means – India for long was uncomfortable with either joining military alliances or exporting weapons. The first jolt to India’s low priority to defense came in the war with China in 1962. This saw defense expenditure being doubled, though as a percentage of gross domestic product, it remains lower than the global average and especially lower compared with its countries of concern, Pakistan and China. Successive governments did try to modernize their inherited gargantuan colonial defense establishment, but resources remained limited and changes sporadic. Serious change began from the early 1990s; with the improved growth rates of India’s economy, budgets saw greater resource allocations for arms procurement, modernization and indigenization. With increasing defense budgets, India became conscious of spending enormous amounts of precious foreign exchange on arms imports that were subsidizing research and development in supplier nations. India also learned lessons of its limitations in ensuring quick and assured supplies in times of urgent need, such as during the 1999 Kargil War. More recently, Russian military operations in Ukraine may push India into reducing reliance on Russia. In fact, experts compare imported defense equipment to crutches. By this logic, excessive reliance on defense imports can diminish the military muscle of a nation in the long run. It can make the importing nation captive to dictates by suppliers and vulnerable to greedy and opportunistic middlemen trying to capitalize in times of crisis for the recipient nation. Indigenization drive Arms exports therefore have to be understood as a byproduct of India’s drive for indigenization. License production with Russia has moved to joint research and development. Their BrahMos cruise missiles joint venture has made India a sought-after exporter. But the Department of Defense Production now showcases bigger achievements like India’s first indigenous aircraft carrier INS Vikrant, the “Prachand” advanced light combat helicopter, and laser-guided anti-tank guided missiles. At DefExpo 2022, Modi unveiled India’s latest HTT-40 trainer aircraft designed by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. Second, it is important to note that India remains primarily focused in promoting non-lethal defense exports. India’s export brochures list a whole range of solutions from bulletproof vests and vehicle armor to anti-drone systems, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), mine-protected vehicles and so on. This makes the United States the largest market for India’s defense exports, followed by Israel, Armenia and, more recently, the Philippines and other Southeast Asian and Middle East nations. India is now exploring opportunities in South America. Third, the credibility of India’s exports is backed by proven battlefield capabilities of the country’s armed forces and by the acceptance of indigenously produced weapons systems. Another interesting fact is that India’s defense production, which in the past was totally state-owned, has over the years encouraged public-private-partnership (PPP) and opened up several sectors for even 100% investment. As a result, more than 50 Indian companies in the private sector are known for contributing to India’s defense exports. Speaking at DefExpo 2022, Defense Minister Rajnath Singh said India had already signed contracts for defense exports worth $1 billion in first six months of this year and since 2014 India had made defense exports worth more than $4 billion. Another report quoted India’s Defense Ministry claiming a sixfold increase in defense exports since 2014 reaching a total of $1.6 billion for financial year 2021-22. Reflecting this fervor, and backed by additional orders from the Philippines as well as progress made in its negotiations with Vietnam, Malaysia and few other nations, Atul D Rane, the chairman of India’s flagship BrahMos Aerospace, claims its BrahMos cruise missiles alone will be able to achieve the set export target of $5 billion by 2025. Long way to go However, notwithstanding this enthusiasm, India has a long way to go in making its presence felt in the global arms market. According to SIPRI, for the period 2017-2021, India was listed at 23rd out of the 25 largest exporters, accounting for a 0.2% share. This leaves India far behind the big five – the US, Russia, France, China and Germany – that together account for 77% of all arms exports. This, however, can also be seen as reflecting enormous space to maneuver. The ongoing Ukraine war could not only negatively impact Russia’s defense exports but present India as an ideal candidate to take that space as well. A potential scenario of India reaching even a single-digit percentage share of the global market could make a great difference for its future course. Making that first dent should be possible for India given its track record and visible global presence. But India will have to continue with reforms at home. Currently, India’s defense production revolves around 16 defense public sector undertakings (DPSUs) and 41 ordnance factories, and yet it is India’s foreign joint ventures and private companies that have led this recent upsurge in defense exports. This is in spite of its state DPSUs having the great advantage of availing India’s defense and other lines of credit extended to various recipient nations, availing preferential trade agreements and services of defense attachés in Indian missions abroad. Both the need and the opportunity for defense exports seem to be staring India in the face to cross that “cusp” and revolutionize India’s defense sector. It will be equally interesting to explore its spin-offs for various civilian sectors. #ArmsExports #DefExpo #IndianMilitary Originally published: Asia Times, October 21, 2022. https://asiatimes.com/2022/10/are-indias-arms-exports-on-cusp-of-a-revolution/?fbclid=IwAR2t2t5v4vVYPROEhK-2Wxxbq-_w6l4N7Qjd_4h2lETEREFPV9NzEXSwTE8 Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Swaran Singh is visiting professor at the University of British Columbia and professor of diplomacy and disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He is president of the Association of Asia Scholars; adjunct senior fellow at the Charhar Institute, Beijing; senior fellow, Institute for National Security Studies Sri Lanka, Colombo; and visiting professor, Research Institute for Indian Ocean Economies, Kunming.

By Prof. Amitabh Mattoo As High Commissioner to India and Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, he believed the two nations can resolve their issues if India has a larger heart and Pakistan develops more thoughtful head In the passing away of Humayun Khan, former foreign secretary of Pakistan and Islamabad’s envoy to New Delhi, the Indian Subcontinent has lost a wise, almost sagely soul, who was also a “formidable diplomat, a thinker of high calibre and a genuine humanist,” as former Pakistani Senator (and current leader of the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement), Afrasaib Khattak, described him. Khan was a Pashtun in the mould of the “frontier” Gandhi, Badshah Khan, rather than the usurpers of Pashtunwali, the dreadful Taliban. He was, above all, a passionate believer in India-Pakistan dosti. Khan understood that long-term realism in South Asia demands moving beyond the tactical and looking forward towards a common and secure future. In the last decades of his full and varied life, he devoted himself to his two passions — the cause of India-Pakistan peace and rural development, especially to ensure the sustainable development of the people of his beloved Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. For Humayun “Lalla”, the essence of the problematique of India-Pakistan relations was simple: India must have a larger heart and Pakistan must develop a more thoughtful head. If an expansive heart of India met the sensitive spirit of Pakistan, no problem would be too difficult to resolve. Unfortunately, he did not live long enough to see this dream translate into reality. Even his formidable adversaries within the Indian establishment spoke of his generosity, in thought and action. The former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan, Gopalaswamy Parthasarthy, often seen as a hardliner, happily admitted to me that Khan “was a class apart”. Parthasarthy and Khan had co-authored a book, Diplomatic Divide, reminiscing about their lives in Islamabad and New Delhi, respectively. Khan belonged to a distinguished Pashtun family of Peshawar and had his early education as a boarder at Bishop Cotton School, Shimla, and then went to earn a tripos from Trinity at Cambridge. Subsequently, he joined the Civil Service of Pakistan and served primarily in the Northwest Frontier (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) including as Political Agent in Malakand and North Waziristan and then as Home Secretary for the Province. In the 1970s was Khan first seconded to and then permanently absorbed in the Pakistan foreign service serving as its High Commissioner in Bangladesh and then India before being promoted and superannuating as Foreign Secretary. In the early 1990s, he served as Pakistan’s High Commissioner to the United Kingdom. TCA Raghavan, India’s High Commissioner to Islamabad from 2013-2015, described Khan as a “mentor and friend”. The high point of Humayun Khan’s tenure was his four-year stint as High Commissioner to India, from 1984-1988 and as Foreign Secretary for less than a year thereafter. As High Commissioner, he arrived in New Delhi in the last months of Indira Gandhi’s tenure as Prime Minister and stayed through the initial bonhomie of the Rajiv Gandhi-Benazir Bhutto diplomatic honeymoon and presided over the twists and turns during that intriguing period in bilateral relations. When Khan called on Mrs Gandhi, he found that, not surprisingly, she did not like General Zia-ul Haq but she reserved real animosity for Zulifiqar Ali Bhutto. This was because the bitterness that she still nursed about the betrayal at Shimla. As is well known, ZAB had agreed at Shimla to converting the Line of Control into the international border but wanted time to “prepare his people” before signing a formal agreement. In Mrs Gandhi’s view, ZAB did a complete U-turn once he returned to Pakistan from Shimla. One of the most enduring bilateral agreements between India and Pakistan, “The Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack Against Nuclear Installations and Facilities – the Non-Attack Agreement”) was signed by Khan and his Indian counterpart, K P S Menon, on December 31, 1988. A notable failure during Khan’s tenure as Foreign Secretary was the inability to arrive at an agreement and disengage at the Siachen glacier. Both Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto, seeking a major foreign policy success (Rajiv Gandhi particularly after the fiasco in Sri Lanka and Nepal) had apparently personally intervened to give “political clearance” to a plan to demilitarise Siachen but the agreement fell apart after meeting strong opposition from the Indian armed forces, unwilling to move out of the dominating heights of the Saltro ridge. My personal relationship with Humayun “Lalla” evolved while chairing for a decade the only meaningful Track 2 dialogue with the blessings of the top leadership on both sides. His was a voice of reason, of restraint, of moderation and nuance and he brought with him the highest drafting skills when demanded. I hosted him as Vice Chancellor at Jammu, and I remember him talking about izzat as being at the heart of Pashtunwali. “All of us in South Asia are driven by our honour. The izzat you have conferred on me today, Amitabh, has overwhelmed me – there is very little I will not do for you! Imagine the consequences if our beloved countries can just learn to respect each other.” #India #Pakistan #HumayunKhan Originally published: The Indian Express, September 29, 2022. https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/humayun-khan-india-pakistan-dosti-8168396/ Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Amitabh Mattoo is Professor at CIPOD, JNU and an Honorary Professor at the University of Melbourne, founded and co-chaired the now disbanded Chaophraya dialogue for over a decade.

Eurasian Insights: Strengthening Indo-Pacific Studies in Europe (EISPIS) is an international project focused on increasing knowledge and awareness of the Indo-Pacific region. It is co-funded by European Union under Cooperation for innovation and the exchange of good practices Erasmus+ KA203 - Strategic Partnerships for higher education (project number: 2019-1-PL01-KA203-065644, http://eisips.eu/). The main objective of EISIPS is to strengthen Indo-Pacific studies. As the broad region of Indo-Pacific is getting more and more attention both from policy-makers and scholars, there is a growing demand for better understanding of the region which is provided by the growing research area of Indo-Pacific studies. For the purpose of the project Indo-Pacific studies are defined as a multidisciplinary research area focusing on the political, economic and social developments in the Indo-Pacific region. Project is coordinated by Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, University of Warsaw (Poland) by dr. Barbra Kratiuk. Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University is one of the partners in the project. Other partners in the project are: Adam Mickiewicz University (Poland), La Sapienza University Rome (Italy), University of St Andrews (UK), Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University (Japan). It is also worth to mention associate partners: The National Maritime Foundation (India), International Christian University (Japan) and South Asia Democratic Forum (Belgium). EISIPS is directed to teachers, students, and experts working on Indo-Pacific Studies (IPS) both from and beyond the EU. To address the needs of these target groups and improve the quality of IPS in Europe, the project is in line with the following EU priorities for higher education: Open education and innovative practices in a digital era Developing skills – developing curricula relevant to the labor market and societal needs Supporting the transfer of latest research back into education The objectives of the project range from creating didactic materials, recommendations and organizing events, and their common aim is to improve the quality of teaching IPS by offering a comprehensive set of innovative didactic tools in an Open Access manner as well with tips and guidelines on how to use them. EISIPS will work toward strengthening the global position of IPS education in the European Union. The project’s main objectives are: 1. Open Access New Handbook A multidisciplinary, state-of-the-art, Handbook of Indo-Pacific Studies, covering historical and contemporary issues of politics, security, economics, culture, society and other aspects of IPS in a comprehensive way. Handbook will be available in open access (free to download) till end of 2022. 2. Free Online podcasts A series of supporting online podcasts presenting handbook topics in an accessible way for learners and teachers. These can serve as e-learning materials for the handbook or as an introduction to the topic for anyone interested. You can listen to podcast for free: https://open.spotify.com/show/084dGSmUq254J7JAX15lga 3. Teaching Guidelines A user-guide on how to implement innovative teaching techniques and assessment methods in Indo-Pacific Studies, which were tailor-made for teachers planning to use the handbook and other didactic materials. For students and other end-users there will be specific guidelines and tips for self-study. 4. Curriculum Design Another goal of EISIPS is to make recommendations for institutions that teach IPS to improve existing IPS curricula in higher education by altering or complementing course offers and making the content more relevant to the contemporary labor market. On 22nd and 23rd of September 2022 under EISPIS project workshop was held in the Centre for European Studies, School Of International Studies. Workshops were organized by prof. Gulshan Sachdeva who is the team leader of the project at JNU. Prof. Baswati Sarkar, prof. Shankari Sundararaman, prof. Jayati Srivastava and prof. Jitendra Uttam from JNU are also involved in EISPS project. Over 30 students of JNU were guests during lectures. Inaugural Address was given by prof. Santishree Dhulipudi Pandit, Vice Chancellor, JNU. Keynote speech during the first day of the workshop was delivered by Prof. Adam Burakowski, Ambassador of the Republic of Poland to India. One of the session was opened by Prof Srikanth Kondapalli, Dean, School of International Studies, JNU. Lectures were held by EISIPS team members from Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, University of Warsaw: · dr. Barbara Kratiuk, Strategic Alliances and Alignments in the Indo-Pacific · dr. Aleksandra Jaskólska, Cultural Issues in the Indo-Pacific · Ambassador Tomasz Łukaszuk, Maritime Governance in Indo-Pacific · dr. Karina Jędrzejowska, Development Issues in the Indo-Pacific · dr. Anna Wróbel, Trade Integration in the Indo-Pacific and by EISIPS team members from Adam Mickiewicz University: · prof. Przemysław Osiewicz, International Conflicts in the Indo-Pacific · dr. Rafał Wiśniewski, Military Competition in the Indo-Pacific We encourage you to join EISIPS Team on 15 and 16 December at the Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, University of Warsaw for international conference and workshops: “Indo-Pacific and the shape of international relations”. How to join? You just need to visit EISIPS website and submit the application: http://eisips.eu/events/conference.html. We would like to propose the following questions for debate: · Is the concept of Indo-Pacific truly necessary for understanding modern IR? · How and why are states outside of the region engaging with it? · What are the perceptions of Indo-Pacific in and outside of the region? · How does Indo-Pacific impact the security and stability of the international system? Keynote Speakers during the conference: · Kate Sullivan de Estada, University of Oxford · Jagannath Panda, Stockholm Center for South Asian and Indo-Pacific Affairs. Workshop registration: http://eisips.eu/events/workshop.html. Students during the workshop will have the opportunity to discuss their research in small groups with dedicated researchers and gain valuable feedback. We would like to especially encourage early PhD scholars and students who are working on their Master’s thesis in international relations, that deal with topics related to Indo-Pacific. In case you would like to stay up to date on the activities of the project, our friends and the research conducted on the topic, we also encourage you to join our Facebook page: https://pl-pl.facebook.com/eisips/ Dr. Barbara Kratiuk and Dr. Aleksandra Jaskólska teach at Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, University of Warsaw, Poland.

By Prof. Bharat H Desai The right to live healthy life with basic human dignity is sine qua non for measuring the real wealth of nations. Hence, persistence of poverty anywhere in any form is a violation of the fundamental human rights The 30th anniversary of the International Day for the Eradication of Poverty was overserved on October 17 amidst predictions of deepening of global poverty, hunger, malnourishment and misery. The day was designated in 1992 by the UN General Assembly (resolution 47/196). The day also witnessed release of the Multidimensional Poverty Index (2022). It has estimated that 1.2 billion people in 111 developing countries live in acute multidimensional poverty. The largest number of poor people live in Sub-Saharan Africa (579 million) and South Asia (385 million). Out of this, 84 per cent live in the rural areas. It is double the number of people who are considered poor on the basis of criteria of living on less than $1.90 per day. Notwithstanding the pall of gloom, there are positive indications in the MPI. In a remarkable poverty alleviation initiative, in a span of 15 years, India alone has lifted some 415 million people out of multidimensional poverty. It comprises 140 million since 2015/2016. It vouches for working of a lot of targeted poverty alleviation schemes. India matters in the global poverty eradication drive, since it still has a sizeable number of poor people. Out of nearly 229 million poor, nearly 90 percent (205 million) live in rural areas. Basic household requirements such as electricity, clean cooking fuel, nutrition, sanitation and housing haunt most of the people falling under the poverty line. Moreover, the armed conflicts perennially afflicting many countries around the world have taken pushed millions into poverty and misery. The key lies in defining the magical threshold of poverty. Poverty as a Violation of Human Rights The right to live healthy life with basic human dignity is sine qua non for measuring the real wealth of nations. Hence, persistence of poverty anywhere in any form is a violation of the fundamental human rights. In 2021 alone, the Covid-19 pandemic pushed between 143 and 163 million people into poverty. Ominously, out of these projected new poor, almost half are in South Asia. Poverty quotient draws upon indicators of deprivation that include nutritious food, cooking fuel, sanitation and housing. Extremely poor do not have access to productive resources, basic health, education, social protection services and basic infrastructure. They remain highly susceptible to the impacts of natural disasters and the adverse effects of climate change. In this vicious spiral, it is the rural women and girls who remain more vulnerable and suffer chronic hunger, malnutrition and sexual violence. The 2022 projections indicate that between 75 million and 95 million people have been added to 659 million people who lived in extreme poverty in 2018. The Ukraine conflict since early 2022 has compounded the global poverty challenge. On September 8, 2022 UNDP released its annual dataset, 2022 Human Development Report. It shows that 2020-2022 pandemic has proved devastating for billions of people. For the first time, the human development has declined for 9 out of 10 countries. In this wake, the 2022 World Hunger Index has added to the grim scenario by confirming that “progress in tackling hunger has largely halted". Similarly, the 2022 State of Food Security and Nutrition showed that the number of undernourished people worldwide, as an indicator of chronic hunger, has shot up to 828 million. It has taken its toll in every part of the world. In an ominous sign, out of the world population of 7.9 billion (2022), a multi-agency report (FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO) has showed that nearly “2.37 billion people did not have access to adequate food”. Global Response As a primary forum to address the concerns of deprived peoples and nations, the UN General Assembly has consistently employed its principal tool – resolutions – during 2021 (76/219), 2020 (75/232), 2019 (74/237) and 2018 (73/244). As a continuation, on October 13, a draft resolution for 2022, mooted by Group of 77 and China, has been circulated to the UN member states. Though frowned upon by the skeptics, these resolutions reflect the common concerns of humankind. On December 20, 2017 (72/233), the UNGA considered the theme of the Third United Nations Decade for the Eradication of Poverty (2018–2027) for accelerating global actions for a poverty-free world. There are several entities of the UN system such as Food and Agriculture Organization, International Fund for Agricultural Development, the International Labor Organization, United Nations Development Program and World Food Program that play vital roles in the global efforts to reduce poverty, hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition. The UNSG’s 2021 report on the Decade of Action on Nutrition (2016–2025), highlighted the underlying drivers of all forms of malnutrition. It called upon the states to act with urgency for elimination of “all forms of malnutrition and achieving the SDGs by 2030”. The Geneva based Human Rights Council (HRC), a subsidiary organ of the UNGA, has five special rapporteurs with mandates that impinge upon different facets of global poverty. They collate the data from grassroots and provide vital signals to the HRC to address chronic poverty as a violation of human rights of “we, the peoples” in whose name the UN Charter was adopted on June 26, 1945. The UN Security Council (UNSC) has also contributed by its periodic conflict related food insecurity ministerial level open debate on May 19, 2022. In the wake of the spiraling global food shortage, high prices and hunger, the UNSG’s good offices did lead to the Black Sea Grain Deal on July 22, 2022 to allow shipments of wheat from both parties to the conflict (Russia and Ukraine). Thus, the UN does matter most in the eradication of global poverty. Taking International Law Seriously Notwithstanding the UNGA ordained soft normativity, reflected in resolutions adopted without vote, the persistence of chronic poverty calls for robust international legal instruments to provide a legal basis for the poverty eradication. Most of the former colonial countries still remain unaccountable for the past plundering of wealth of subjugated nations even as funds through bilateral aid and donor agencies remain a trickle and development banks work as mere banks. It presents an ideational challenge for the system of International Law and the conscientious scholars to devise ways and means to institutionalize a robust global cooperative framework for the eradication of poverty in the foreseeable future, if not by the end of current cycle of SDGs 2030 (GA resolution 70/1 of 25 Sept 2015). With 1.3 billion population and largest share of the global poor, India holds the key in leading from the front in making a decisive dent on the global poverty cauldron, as already shown in the recent years. #Poverty #HumanRights #InternationalLaw Professor Dr. Bharat H. Desai is Jawaharlal Nehru Chair and Professor of International Law at the Centre for International Legal Studies of SIS, JNU. He served as a member of the official Indian Delegations to various multilateral negotiations (2002-2008) as well as coordinated the Making SIS Visible initiative (2008-2013) and Inter-University Consortium: JNU; Jammu; Kashmir; Sikkim (2012-2020). He is the Editor-in-Chief of Environmental Policy and Law (IOS Press: Amsterdam).

By Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli Xi reiterated in work report to safeguard China’s dignity and core interests which has major implications for India Intense nationalist rhetoric, aggressive posturing both at the domestic and external front, muscle-flexing on Taiwan and disputed areas, new-found defiance of the existing order from which China benefited in the first place and grandiose plans for 'rejuvenation' amidst the spread of the pandemic as well as the Ukraine crisis characterised Xi Jinping’s address to the 20th Communist Party Congress (CCP) on 16 October at Beijing. Xi read out a nearly two-hour long speech giving a clarion call to the Chinese people to sacrifice further for the growth of the CCP and fulfil its aspirations and “founding mission”. He demanded that they serve the party and the state to observe the coming centennial of the armed forces in 2027 and of the People’s Republic in 2049. Xi also directed that the country should be prepared to “effectively respond to grave, intricate international developments and a series of immense risks and challenges." Many of these are of course, the making of China itself, including the origin and spread of the Covid-19 pandemic and regional assertiveness, even though recent Russian invasion of Ukraine triggered crises in food, fuel and fertilisers besides destruction and rise of a new order. Xi’s Nationalistic Agendas at the CCP Xi expressed his satisfaction to the turnaround in Hong Kong after the passing and implementation of the new security law last year that aimed at curbing any dissent. His tone on Taiwan, after the recent Chinese military exercises post US leader Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taipei, was reminiscent of his previous congress’s “six nos” and the CCP centennial speech of “breaking heads" last July. Xi called for “a strategic initiative for China's complete reunification” without ruling out the use of force. Interestingly, he suggests that “China's issues must be dealt with by Chinese people in the light of the Chinese context.” This is in contrast to the Taiwan President Dr Tsai Ing-wen’s position that issues of Taiwan should be decided by the Taiwanese. Xi painted a bleak external picture, a seizure mentality, by stating to “external attempts to blackmail, contain, blockade, and exert maximum pressure on China.” This is at a time when the recent official assessments suggest to a weakening of the US influence, China’s bourgeoning trade and investments with the US and other countries, despite the recent tariff wars and semiconductor ban. China's Crisis Resolution Plans Such an assessment also hides China’s assertive posturing towards Senkaku islands, South China Sea disputes and aggressiveness on the India-China border areas. Significantly, in an assertive stance, Xi suggested to evolving “mechanisms for countering foreign sanctions, interference, and long-arm jurisdiction will be strengthened.” Another significant takeaway from Xi’s speech is on building a “peaceful China” through the support of the country’s armed forces and the national security establishment. Xi’s most pungent attack was surprisingly on the domestic political factional rivals within the CCP. Many of them he demolished through the sectarian and relentless anti-corruption campaign unleashed on the 1.5 million "tigers," "flies," and "foxes," while protecting his flock. Xi Questions Internal Leadership Xi castigated some “vested interests” among CCP members as “sliding toward weak, hollow and watered-down Party leadership in practice”. Xi lambasted: “Despite repeated warnings, pointless formalities, bureaucratism, hedonism, and extravagance persisted in some localities and departments. Privilege-seeking mindsets and practices posed a serious problem, and some deeply shocking cases of corruption had been uncovered.” Xi also was scathing on those party members who are with “misguided patterns of thinking such as money worship, hedonism, egocentricity, and historical nihilism were common, and online discourse was rife with disorder.” In general, to reduce the influence of previous leaders like Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, Xi has to denigrate them in order to prop his own “New Zhijiang Army” followers since his provincial sting nearly two decades ago. Xi alludes to a “people run the country” approach However, no clear institutionalised structures nor procedures were mentioned and thus remains rhetorical in nature. There were village level elections conducted for the past few years but the CCP organisational structure is above that level – at the county. Currently, the 20th CCP is being held by 2,296 deputies who were selected by 96 million cadres and not by 1.47 billion people. India-China Equations at the CCP While India was not mentioned in the work report presented by Xi, five broad areas could be noticed. Firstly, Xi's assertion that "momentous changes of a like not seen in a century are accelerating across the world" and that "significant shift is taking place in the international balance of power, presenting China with strategic opportunities" suggest to two possibilities for India – one of tentative collaboration with India and other states in multipolarity phenomena such as in the BRICS, SCO and other platforms, specifically in renminbi internationalisation process and opposing the US or the risk of intensifying conflict on the borders and in the Indian Ocean region. Secondly, related to the above, Xi reiterated in the work report to the PLA modernisation and to "safeguard China’s dignity and core interests”. This has major implications for India as with other countries. Xi's speech had an estimated mention of 73 times of security and protecting national security. This indicates to the unrelenting focus on use of force, threat of use of force and enhancing deterrence capabilities. Conventional deterrence capabilities were displayed by China in Galwan incident in June 2020 even though it promised previously to abide by the confidence-building measures and border stability. Galwan Border Conflict in the Spotlight Thirdly, the circulation of Galwan-related videos in mainstream media in China in addition to the attendance of Galwan skirmish participant Qi Fabao at the 20th CCP Congress, suggest that the embers of 2020 border conflict have not only not dowsed but kept alive for future contingencies. Fourthly, Xi's assertion that "dynamic zero Covid" policy of “people’s war” is correct in putting the “people and their lives above all else” meant that border controls will not be relaxed anytime soon- leading to hardships to thousands of Indian students and businesses. China could relax these selectively for its benefit but the situation is not conducive for expanding bilateral relations. Lastly, Xi's plan to focus on S&T and innovation could pose competition with the US, India and other countries. Already with the 'Made in China 2025', China had put the US on watch, while its 14th five year plan has ambitions of becoming superpower in eleven items such as trade, hi-tech manufacturing, digitalisation, cyberspace, sports, culture, and other fields. Ironically, much of these inputs were received from the US and other advanced countries. #China #CCP #Politics #XiJinping Originally published: The Quint, October 18, 2022. https://www.thequint.com/voices/opinion/from-taiwan-to-galwan-what-chinas-expansionist-policies-imply-for-the-world-galwan-clash-india-china-border-crisis#read-more#read-more Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli is Dean of the School of International Studies and Professor in Chinese Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University. Views are personal.

By Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli Such a lack of transparency is a Soviet legacy and is followed by Communist parties across the globe As the 20th Communist Party of China congress unfolds October 16-22, there’ll be global scrutiny of the official reports, political gestures and statements made there. Much of this process is shrouded in mystery and intrigue, but it has consequences for the world. For one, thousands of MNCs have invested trillions of dollars in China. ‘Risk analysis’ reports will be much sought-after, especially as President Xi Jinping pursues his “Made in China 2025” and “dual circulation” strategies to reduce economic and technological dependence on the West, while the US seeks to ‘decouple’ from the Chinese economy, too. In the main, three things will happen at the 20th CCP congress: the current General Secretary of the Communist Party – Xi Jinping – will read out his work report on achievements in the past five years and the “guiding principles” for the next five; changes to the CCP constitution, with speculation rife that Xi will be anointed ‘party chairman’; and the report of the party’s Central Committee’s discipline inspection commission (which maintains dossiers on 96 million party cadres!) will be presented. On October 23, the Chinese people and the world at large will be provided a glimpse of a parade of the seven most powerful party leaders selected to rule over the country’s 1.47 billion people for the next five years. The whole process of this selection of the Top 7 leaders of the apex Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) and 25 Politburo members is an opaque process. Last week’s 7th Plenary Session of the 19th CCP provided no discernible clues on who the new Top 7 of China will be. The formal process is that 2,296 ‘delegates’ to the congress, elected from the provinces, elect 200-odd members to the Central Committee of the CCP, who in turn elect the 25 Politburo and 7 PSC members. However, the actual process is informal selection -- with party elders and current leaders retreating to Beidaihe, a sea-side resort, and choosing the new leaders and signalling to the delegates whom they need to ‘elect’. Such a lack of transparency is a Soviet legacy and is followed by Communist parties across the globe. To divine Soviet political developments correctly, which was crucial during the Cold War, Western scholars developed the esoteric discipline of Kremlinology to read the tea leaves from extremely limited official handouts and information on possible changes in leadership and power. Reading Chinese developments (Pekinology) is equally difficult and inexact, as many seasoned reporters and scholars have found out after each CCP congress. It’s unlikely that we will fare any better this time. All the same, analysts will intensely scrutinise particular documents or the presence or absence of leaders in a meeting to figure out who is rising and who is falling in the CCP power structure. Frequently employed analytical tools in Pekinology include looking at factional leaders’ guanxi (political connections), relative appearances in official media or visits abroad or domestically, prominent “speech acts” of specific leaders, promotions to prominent party secretary positions in provinces or central government posts, or their removal and purges, or prominence given to or downgrading of significant “political lines” associated with leaders. This is a tedious task even for highly qualified professionals. China’s official media put out in public the profiles, educational qualifications, gender and professional status of the 2,296 delegates. The tone and tenor of this display is to let the world know how young and gender-conscious the Communist Party is. Xinhua, for instance, stated that the delegates are “highly qualified ideologically and politically…are competent in discussing State affairs…” It stated that the average age of the delegates is 52.2 years and that women constitute 26% and ethnic minorities 11% of the delegates. #China #CCP #Politics Originally published: Deccan Herald, October 16, 2022. https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/let-s-do-some-pekinology-1153967.html Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli is Dean of the School of International Studies and Professor in Chinese Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University. Views are personal.