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By Prof. Gulshan Sachdeva French President Emmanuel Macron’s intention of making the EU a third pole in global affairs along with the US and China through strategic autonomy and European sovereignty may be right but timing and messaging seems incorrect French president Emmanuel Macron is facing protests against his pension reforms and criticism of his recent China visit and Taiwan remarks. In the midst of all this, he has once again elaborated his plans for the future of Europe during his visit to the Netherlands. The plan was originally presented by him in 2017 at the Sorbonne University. The idea was to reboot the slow and inefficient European Union (EU) under Franco-German partnership. With Britain moving out of the EU and Angela Merkel retiring as a de facto leader of Europe, young Macron was then expected to take over European leadership. Macron’s Vision And Realities Since then much has changed in Europe. Apart from the pandemic, the European security architecture has been fundamentally changed by the war in Ukraine. In 2019, Macron described NATO as “brain dead”. But the alliance is alive and kicking. With Finland and Sweden joining NATO, the organisation's ambitions are growing. The usefulness of the transatlantic alliance is strongly felt in Europe today. This differs significantly compared to the difficult years under the Trump presidency in the United States. At The Hague, Macron talked about a new era of ‘European sovereignty’, which he asserted is not just a French idea. His vision contains five pillars: competitiveness, industrial policy, protectionism, reciprocity and cooperation. Many of these ideas are contrary to traditional free market principles, which is the basis for most common EU policies. Throughout his speech, the focus was how to make the European economy competitive to the United States and China. To him, “European sovereignty” means that Europe must be able to choose its own partners and shape its own destiny, rather than “a mere witness of the dramatic evolution of this world”. He further stressed that Europeans “must strive to be rule-makers rather than rule-takers”. This is interesting as many in the world including in India believe that Europeans are in fact over-represented in most institutions of global governance. On trade agreements currently being negotiated by the EU, he argued that sustainability must be an integral part of all of them. While tough green laws are being implemented for the EU industry, Europe must not seal agreements with countries where sustainability laws are less rigorous. He found the EU-New Zealand FTA as the gold standard for sustainability. Eurocentrism’s Limits Despite setbacks and drastically changed circumstances in Europe, he is continuing pursuing his theme of “strategic autonomy” of Europe. He feels that in an emerging geopolitical competition between the United States and China, Europe must pursue its strategic autonomy, possibly under French leadership. Even during his recent China trip, both President Macron and the European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen emphasised on “de-risking” rather than “de-coupling” as encouraged by the United States. In a recent interview, Macron mentioned that the major risk which Europe faces is that it “gets caught up in crises that are not ours, which prevents it from building its strategic autonomy”. The part of the interview which has generated a lot of controversy is where he asserted that “the question Europeans need to answer … is it in our interest to accelerate [a crisis] on Taiwan? No. The worse thing would be to think that we Europeans must become followers on this topic and take our cue from the US agenda and a Chinese overreaction”. This is exactly the kind of approach about which the Indian External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar had pointed out earlier that “Europe has to grow out of the mindset that Europe's problems are the world's problems but the world's problems are not Europe's problems”. US Makes A Comeback President Macron might have noble intentions of making the EU a third pole along with Washington and Beijing in the coming decades through his narratives of strategic autonomy and European sovereignty. The Franco-German alliance has also been a main force behind the European integration project. In the recent past, however, many EU nations have been critical of Franco-German dealings with both Russia and China. They are also aware that without the serious US involvement, Ukraine could not have resisted the Russian aggression. In these circumstances, president Macron’s autonomy and sovereignty agenda for an assertive Europe seems ill-timed. Some major West European countries are sympathetic with the idea but uncomfortable with the language and timing due to the war in Ukraine and Chinese military exercises around Taiwan. The European Council president Charles Michel has confirmed that quite a few European leaders think like Macron though “wouldn't say things the same way”. But still most countries in the Baltics, Nordics and Central and Eastern Europe see the United States crucial to their security. And they have become very assertive in recent years. #Marcon #EuropeanSovereignty #USSinoRivalry #EUThirdPole Originally published : Money Control, on 14th April, 2023 https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/opinion/emmanuel-macrons-ill-timed-move-to-assert-europes-autonomy-10412431.html Posted in SIS Blog with the authorisation of the Author. Prof. Dr. Gulshan Sachdeva is Professor at the Centre for European Studies and Coordinator, Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, Jawaharlal Nehru University.

By Prof. Bharat H. Desai On March 29, 2023, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted a resolution titled “The role of diamonds in fuelling conflict: breaking the link between the illicit transaction of rough diamonds and armed conflict as a contribution to prevention and settlement of conflicts”. The draft resolution of March 27, 2023 (A/77/L.61) was mooted by Botswana. It recognized that the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) helps in ensuring the implementation of Security Council resolutions such as 1643 (2005), 1579 (2004), 1521 (2003) containing sanctions on the trade in conflict diamonds. The UNGA had taken the lead through resolution 55/56 of December 1, 2000 for “breaking the link between the illicit transaction of rough diamonds and armed conflict” and called for an international certification scheme for rough diamonds. That paved the way for the initiative by a select Southern African countries for the Kimberley Process. Since then the UNGA has provided strong support for the KPCS including through resolution 75/261 (March 03, 2021). The Kimberly Process Certification Scheme Bereft of the status of a legally binding international treaty, the KPCS is a unique inter-governmental initiative brought into being on November 05, 2002 through the Interlaken Declaration on the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds. It came into effect on January 01, 2003. The UNGA acknowledged the KPCS through its resolution 56/263 of March 13, 2002. The KPCS came into effect on January 01, 2003. It aims at eliminating the use of rough diamonds to finance armed conflicts. Hence, they are termed ‘conflict diamonds’ or ‘rough diamonds’ that are sold by rebel groups or their allies to fund conflicts against legitimate governments. The KPCS focuses on what has been dubbed as ‘blood diamonds’ as they emanate from areas that are mineral rich and armed groups engaged in the extraction process indulge in violence and brutality that take a heavy toll of wildlife, forests and people. It has fueled insurgencies as environment becomes a ‘cannon fodder’ in conflict zones of the world. The National Geographic film Diamonds of War: Africa’s Blood Diamonds (2007), by journalist Dominic Cunningham-Reid, provides a peep into the mysterious world of diamonds that have almost become a curse for the people. India chaired the KPCS in 2019 that comprises 59 participants from 82 countries including the European Union (with 27-member states). The KPCS has been given effect through respective domestic legislations. KPCS accounts for 99.8% of the global production of rough diamonds. It has defined ‘conflict diamonds’ as “rough diamonds used to finance wars against governments”. The trade in rough diamonds (HS Code 7102.10, .21 or .31) is permitted between KPCS participants on the basis of authentic KP certificates. It is an umbrella entity that brings together participating governments, diamond industry and civil society. The World Diamond Council (WDC) is the diamond industry’s representative in the KP that has designed a ‘system of warranties’ (SOW). It requires professional buyers and sellers of rough diamonds, polished diamonds and jewelry sets with diamonds to include a warranty statement on B2B invoices and memos each time a diamond changes hand. It ensures the next buyer that diamond originated from sources in compliance with KPCS. An upgraded SOW launched in 2021 requires compliance with the guidelines of the WDC as well as the KPCS. In fact, the SOWs, endorsed by the KPCS participants, all buyers and sellers of both rough and polished diamonds must make the following affirmative statement on all invoices: “The diamonds herein invoiced have been purchased from legitimate sources not involved in funding conflict and in compliance with United Nations resolutions. The seller hereby guarantees that these diamonds are conflict free, based on personal knowledge and/or written guarantees provided by the supplier of these diamonds.” The KPCS process works on the basis of inter-governmental “conflict-free" certification that provide legitimacy to the shipments of rough diamonds. It is estimated that trade in diamonds worth $13.88 billion was facilitated in 2015 through the KP. With such high stakes, what constitutes “conflict-free” remains a moot question. Most of the African continent is dependent on proceeds from diamond sales. The diamonds represent an industry worth over $81.4 billion per year. More than 50 per cent of global diamond production is sourced from Africa alone. Diamond–Conflict Nexus: Role of the UN Security Council In view of direct links with the source of origin of diamonds from the conflict regions, the UN Security Council (UNSC) gave its stamp of approval to the KPCS through the resolution 1459 of January 28, 2003 and recalled previous resolutions: 1408 (2002), 1385 (2001), 1343 (2001), 1306 (2000) and 1173 (1998). In taking enforcement actions in situations of Côte d’Ivoire (resolution 1643 of December 15, 2005) the UNSC recognized "the linkage between the illegal exploitation of natural resources such as diamonds, illicit trade in such resources, and the proliferation and trafficking of arms and the recruitment and use of mercenaries as one of the sources of fuelling and exacerbating conflicts”. Similarly, in case of Liberia (resolution 1579 of December 21, 2004), the UNSC sought to “establish an effective Certificate of Origin regime for trade in rough diamonds that is transparent and internationally verifiable” to be vouched by the Kimberley Process. The UNSC has repeatedly expressed grave concern as regards the “linkage between the illicit trade in rough diamonds from certain regions of the world and the fueling of armed conflicts that affect international peace and security”. As indicated above, the UNSC has acted at various times under enforcement Chapter VII of the Charter to address threats to international peace and security posed by conflicts linked to diamonds. Through these actions, it has prohibited all states from exporting weapons to countries affected by conflicts in countries such as Sierra Leone and Liberia. The 2022 KPCS Botswana Meeting and Beyond The KPCS provides an arrangement wherein the participating countries give effect to the consensual decisions through their respective domestic regulatory processes. For instance, the sub-committee on trade of the US Congress held ‘conflict diamonds’ hearings on October 10, 2001. It was followed by the enactment of a special legislation Clean Diamond Trade Act 2003 - . It authorizes (Section 4) the US President to “prohibit the importation into, or exportation from, the United States of any rough diamond, from whatever source, that has not been controlled through the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme”. The 2002 Interlaken Declaration calls upon KPCS participants to implement the scheme through their “respective laws and internal systems of control meeting the standards established in the Document (KPCS)”. The KPCS for rough diamonds need to be compliant with international trade rules. It also needs to spell out the definition of ‘conflict diamond’. The 2022 Botswana intersessional meeting indicated readiness of the KPCS members to work on this crucial aspect around which the entire scheme revolves. Moreover, it needs to further build upon the 2021 Moscow Declaration on Principles to promote best practices in the diamond sector. As a corollary, after a hiatus of 20 years, it is time for the KPCS to place the 2002 Interlaken Declaration on a firmer legal footing of a multilateral treaty. The task is cut out in 2023 for the KP Chair Zimbabwe. #KPCS #UNGA #UNSC #UNSG #WDC Dr. Bharat H. Desai is Jawaharlal Nehru Chair and Professor of International Law at the Centre for International Legal Studies (SIS, JNU), contributes as the Editor-in-Chief of Environmental Policy and Law (IOS Press: Amsterdam) and served as a member of the official Indian Delegations to various multilateral negotiations (2002-2008) as well as coordinated the initiatives for Making SIS Visible (2008-2013) and the Inter-University Consortium: JNU; Jammu; Kashmir; Sikkim (2012-2020)

By Akhand Pratap Rai and Nirbhay Phusate Introduction The International Criminal Court (ICC) recently issued arrest warrants against Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, President of Russian federation and Ms Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova, Commissioner for Children Rights in the Office of President of the Russian Federation. The press release of 17th March 2023 mentioned that Mr Putin and Ms Lvova-Belova “is allegedly responsible for the war crime of unlawful deportation of population (children) and that of unlawful transfer of population (children) from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation (under articles 8(2)(a)(vii) and 8(2)(b)(viii) of the Rome Statute)”. The press release further mentioned that Mr Putin liable under Article 28(b) of the Rome Statute for “his failure to exercise control properly over civilian and military subordinates who committed the acts, or allowed for their commission, and who were under his effective authority and control, pursuant to superior responsibility”. The Court again made Mr Putin and Ms Lvova-Belova liable under Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute under individual criminal responsibility “for having committed the acts directly, jointly with others and/or through others”. The International Criminal Court The ICC came into existence in the year 2002 and it is governed by Rome Statue which was adopted in July 1998. The Article 11 (1) of the Rome Statute, states that the Court doesn’t have retroactive jurisdiction over crimes that occur before entry into force of Rome Statue on July 1, 2002. Article 5 of the Rome Statue grants the ICC jurisdiction over for main crime i.e. (i) the crime of genocide (ii) crime against humanity (iii) war crime (iv) crime of aggression. The ICC works on the Principle of Complementarity i.e. it prosecutes cases only when states are unwilling or unable to do so genuinely. The hypocricy of International criminal Justice System The Russian ‘military action’ against Ukraine was condemned by several western leaders citing UN Charter and International Law. But this is not the first time that powerful states violate the rules governing the use of force under the UN Charter. The world is full of hypocritical leaders who change their stands on a case to case basis on similar grounds. There is a famous Bollywood movie Deewaar (1975) acted by Shashi Kapoor and Amitabh Bacchan. In a scene of Deewar movie, Shashi Kapoor who acted as a Police Personnel said to Amitabh Bacchan who acted as a criminal that “Doosro ke paap ginane se tumhare apne paap kam nahi ho sakte” [Your own sins cannot be reduced by counting the sins of others]. This dialogue is the benchmark of the western world leaders when you ask them for their obligation under international law and UN charter. The western world leader are making hue and cry over the Russian ‘military action’ against Ukraine but at the same time they keep silent over their own crime against humanity. They are using International Institutions for their own national interest. Prof B S Chimini in his article International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making mentioned that the “leaders and armed personnel of northern states would ever be dragged before the ICC” (pp.13). The world has witnessed the blatant violation of International Law by western countries and their leaders in every nook and corner of the world. In the name of ‘war on terror’ US and its allies bombarded and destroyed several nations. The world has witnessed the violation of international law directly and indirectly by western countries in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, Libya, Syria and Palestine. Many war crimes have been committed in these nations, resulting in the deaths of thousands, if not millions of people; nonetheless, there have never been any significant appeals for the ICC to bring the offenders to justice. The torture camp at Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq, Bombing at Kunduz Hospital in Afghanistan, detention camp at Guantanamo Bay Prison , blocking of several UN resolutions in United Nations against Israel, are the best example of human rights violation and international law by United States. The world has witness the role of Belgium and France in Rwanda Genocide lead to death of 80,000 persons. In 2021, Emanuel Macron, the President of France, accepted the role of France in Rwanda Genocide and also President Macron seeks forgiveness over Rwanda Genocide. In 2018, the former US National Security Advisor John Bolton threatened the ICC and called the Court “illegitimate”. Bolton further said that “We will not cooperate with the ICC. We will provide no assistance to the ICC. We will not join the ICC. We will let the ICC die on its own. After all, for all intents and purposes, the ICC is already dead to us”. The US passed a law called American Service Protection Act, 2002 (known as The Hague Invasion Act). This law allows the President of the US to use military force to liberate any American or citizen of a US-allied country being held by the ICC and, as the court resides in The Hague in the Netherlands. Among other things, it prevents the US Government from supporting the ICC, collaborating with its requests, or giving military aid to any state that is a party to the ICC. Ironically, the US President Joe Biden welcomed the ICC issuing of arrest warrant against President Putin. The way forward The International Law is a circus and the western countries are the ‘ringmaster’ of the Circus. International institutions such as the United Nations and ICC should not work as a “spoke-person” of western countries. The ‘pick and choose’ of cases in the name of ‘International Justice’ will only harm the reputation and legitimacy of international institutions. The ICC should stands against the western leader for “justice” with the same intent as it stands against President Putin for alleged ‘war crimes’. #ArrestWarrant, #ICC, #UNCharter, #Putin Akhand Pratap Rai and Nirbhay Phusate are Doctoral Candidates at the Centre for International Legal Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi

Prof. Bharat H. Desai In 2022, the world witnessed the 50 years of the global environmental movement at the Stockholm+50 Conference (June 2-3) and UNEP@50 as well as 30 years of the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (June 4) and 40 years of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (December 10). Two mega Conference of Parties meetings of the universal conventions on climate change (COP27: November 6-20, 2022) and on biodiversity (COP15: December 7-19, 2022) were also held without any major splash. Both the conventions, adopted at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, are yet to make critical difference with respect to attaining their primary objectives. These events and largely ‘framework convention’ processes with their in-built law-making mechanisms have shown the limits of the global conferencing techniques. In his June 02, 2022 address at the Stockholm+50 Moment, the UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres warned that we have not kept our promises on the environment since our consumption is “at the rate of 1.7 planets a year” that has placed “global well-being is in jeopardy”. The gathering storms indicate the planetary level environmental crisis. The coming events cast their shadows before. The humankind seems to be sleepwalking into an existential “triple planetary crisis”. It may be akin to the events of 1914 that led to the catastrophic World War – I. The UN-led World Order Built on the ashes of the League of Nations (1920-1945) after World War – I, the advent of the 1945 United Nations Charter has stood the test of time for 77 long years. Notwithstanding its limits, as the members driven international organization in a State-centric global order, the UN matters most for the humanity’s survival on the Earth. The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) has played a crucial role in institutionalizing law-making as well as institution-building processes [Bharat H Desai (2004), Institutionalizing International Environmental Law. New York: Transnational Publishers]. At each of the momentous occasions, through the instrumentality of its resolutions (UN Charter, Chapter IV), the UNGA took crucial decisions across wide canvass of its functions and powers that include convening of the major global conferences (1972, 1992, 2002, 2012 and 2022), established international environmental governance structures (UNEP, CSD, HLPF), took initiatives for launching inter-governmental negotiations (such as the three Rio Conventions: climate change, biodiversity, desertification) and provided mandates on several occasions for high-level informal consultations (such as the Global Pact for the Environment; UNGA resolution 73/733 of August 30, 2019). As the plenary organ with all the UN member states, the Assembly has played its vanguard role to address the world environmental problematique with varied levels of successes. The fact that the UNGA provides a springboard to the UN member States for an institutionalized cooperation, records the needs, aspirations and concerns of the time and comes out with consensual outcome of resolutions (recommendatory) with some normative legal significance (Asamoah, 1966) itself needs to be considered a blessing for the humankind. There is no other global forum at our disposal commanding such a universal reach, trust, competence and legitimacy. Our only abode, planet Earth is in the Balance The Stockholm Moments: 1972 and 2022 The 1972 Stockholm Moment was an outcome of the “Swedish initiative” that took the form of the UNGA resolution [2398 (XXIII), December 03, 1968: The problems of the human environment] and the resultant outcome, though under the UN auspices, had a strong Stockholm imprint. In contrast, as underscored by this author in his preface “The Stockholm Moment” [EPL 52 (3-4) 2022], the Stockholm+50 Conference was enabled by the UNGA through resolution 75/280 of May 24, 2021 (“Sweden to host and assume the cost” and “with the support of Kenya”) as well as mandated by resolution 75/326 of September 10, 2021 (“Sweden to host and assume the cost”; “with the support of Kenya”; “two Presidents, one from Sweden and one from Kenya”). These resolutions explicitly made the Swedish Government share the credits with the Kenyan Government. It was also expected that the “international meeting should be mutually reinforcing with UNEP@50, avoiding overlap and duplication”. In fact, the UNGA required “the United Nations Environment Program to serve as the focal point for providing support to the organization of the international meeting” and suggested to the Secretary-General “to appoint the Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Program as the Secretary-General of the international meeting”. It was also curious that commemoration of the 2022 Stockholm+50 Moment was parceled into two parts for a mere two-day event across two far-away continents: (i) UNEP@50 in Nairobi, March 3-4, 2022 and (ii) Stockholm+50 in Stockholm, June 2-3, 2022. Cumulatively, in essence, the stage set was inherently robbed off the luster as regards the historical significance of the 2022 Stockhom+50 Moment. Possibly, keeping in mind the ground reality of the much-divided world, it showed that the effort was to be ‘politically correct’ rather than seize the Stockholm+50 Moment to ordain a rigorous revitalization of the existing international environmental legal instruments as well as the international environmental governance (IEG) architecture including structure, performance and location of UNEP. The organizing of the three leadership dialogues as well as Stockholm+50 Report (August 01, 2022) spelled out the five interconnected pathways (Figure 1) to provide altruist goals to weave together various global and regional processes for the healthy planet. At the ‘act of origin’ (1972 Stockholm Moment), the deliberations were spread over June 5-16 whereas only two days (June 2-3, 2022) were given for the 50-year commemorative event (2022 Stockholm+50). Hence, nothing concrete could be expected except ritualistic sermons and inspirational statements. The UNSG’s repeated laments at Stockholm+50 and the UNGA speaks volumes about the lack of sensitivity and seriousness of the member States to grapple with the planetary crisis staring at the humankind and the Earth. Yet the sheer presence of the feisty UNSG has been a silver lining, almost akin to the plight of the lonely House Sparrow who ran from the pillar to the post by sprinkling little drops of water when her own forest was on fire! The UNGA Needs to Take the Charge It now appears, in the aftermath of the outcome of the 2022 Stockholm+50 Moment and in view of the gravity of the planetary crisis, the UNGA needs to rise to the occasion to take charge of the situation. The UNGA has already set the stage for Summit of the Future (UNGA resolution 76/307 of 8 September 2022) to be held in New York during September 22-23, 2024. As a corollary, the Assembly needs to chart the future roadmap to institutionalize the review, establish synergy and inter-linkages as well as determine the trajectory of some of the principal MEAs (with universal membership, such as UNFCCC, UNCCD and CBD) as well as determine the design of the futuristic IEG architecture that is warranted to address the planetary level environmental challenges of the 21st century. #IPCC #UN #UNSG #UNEP #MEA #PMOIndia Dr. Bharat H. Desai is Jawaharlal Nehru Chair and Professor of International Law at the Centre for International Legal Studies (SIS, JNU), contributes as the Editor-in-Chief of Environmental Policy and Law (IOS Press: Amsterdam) and served as a member of the official Indian Delegations to various multilateral negotiations (2002-2008) as well as coordinated the initiatives for Making SIS Visible (2008-2013) and the Inter-University Consortium: JNU; Jammu; Kashmir; Sikkim (2012-2020)

By Prof. Swaran Singh China’s claim to fame as the world’s new peacemaker is seeing serious contenders Last month saw China staging a diplomatic coup by brokering a peace deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia — two arch rivals in the tension-ridden Middle East, where the United States has been an uncontested arbiter of all regional dynamics. This historic breakthrough by China was followed by its former foreign minister and now State Counsellor, Wang Yi, at the Munich Security Conference last month, presenting a 12-point peace proposal for ending the Ukraine crisis. While the United States reluctantly recognised China facilitating the Saudi-Iran peace deal, it credited its regional allies Iraq and Oman for hosting several rounds of talks for two years before Beijing could host this finale on March 10. In comparison, Wang Yi’s peace proposal was dismissed by most of Ukraine’s western allies citing China’s suspect credentials as the most powerful backer of President Putin. However, on obtaining his unprecedented third term in office, President Xi has now staked his personal prestige on this initiative. Earlier this week, not only did Xi make this a top priority of his Moscow visit, his actions saw President Putin accepting and endorsing it. So much so that even though Xi’s Moscow visit was followed by Russia relaunching another barrage of attacks, Xi's peace proposal has since engendered multiple counterintuitive responses, triggering debates on China emerging as the new peacemaker and and what it means for the future of American global leadership. As Xi’s interlocutors began to work on his follow-up dialogue with President Zelenksy — who has welcomed Xi’s intervention asking that his words must be followed by sincere deeds — this Thursday witnessed an interesting Spanish twist. And, as time passes, this Spanish twist appears to be in line with what was widely suspected, given China’s deep and expanding outreach with European countries. Though Ukraine has been critical of soft Russia policies of NATO members like Hungary and Germany, the end of Xi’s visit saw Spanish Prime Minister, Pedro Sánchez, surprising his European and American friends by announcing his China visit next week. He has offered to discuss Xi’s peace framework, transmit the message to Ukraine and help establish the conditions for their talks. Spain is Ukraine’s strongest supporter, supplying Kyiv with military equipment and planning to send main battle tanks in its fight against President Putin. But Spain now wants to work with Xi in resolving the Ukrainian crisis. Most importantly, Spain is due, in July, to take over the European Union’s presidency, thus obtaining Pedro Sanchez a bigger platform to pursue this peace perspective. Should this be seen as a wake-up call for the West to begin exploring serious counter-strategies instead of pooh-poohing China’s credentials and denouncing its refrain for a ceasefire as nothing more than seeking “effectively the ratification of Russian conquest” calling it “a classic part of China’s playbook”? Does it make sense to continue dismissing Xi’s peace initiative as nothing but a smokescreen for China’s ever-increasing support for President Putin? So far, American agencies have continued to publicise their assessments that China is still considering supplying weapons to Russia and their confirmation that Chinese munitions are being used by Russian forces. In light of such Western rhetoric, can the Saudi-Iran peace deal provide any clues about Ukraine’s likely trajectories? Saudi-Iran deal To put things in perspective, China’s Saudi-Iran peace deal has rather limited lessons for the Ukraine crisis. It can neither be a stepping stone nor a model template for easy replication though China has sought to project it as setting the stage and adding an aura to Xi’s Ukraine initiative. The Saudi-Iran deal could be brokered by Beijing as it is easier for it to maintain some sort of equidistance from these two countries. This is not possible when it comes to China’s ties with Moscow and Kyiv. Especially in China’s long-drawn contest with the United States, Putin remains Xi’s most important ally. Second, given the volatile history of the Middle East, it will be easy to blame any future failure on the contracting parties, not Beijing. Like most such agreements, this peace deal too remains vague and vulnerable to contradictory interpretations from both sides. It makes no mention of resolving their bloody proxy war in Yemen. Also, the failure of this peace deal will have limited implications for Beijing’s power and prestige. Its damage will be restricted to the Middle East. The Ukraine crisis has already resulted in shortages and price hikes in food, fuel, fertilisers and even finance capital worldwide. These have seen Russia brandishing nuclear weapons and commentators calling it 'World War III in the making'. Ukrainian exceptionalism What holds promise for Xi is that Ukraine’s approach to his peace proposal has been far too subtle and pragmatic; even at strong variance from its western allies. This makes Zelensky's direct talk with Xi a strong possibility. For Zelenksky, if nothing else, his engagement with Xi will ensure China will stay closer to its professed neutrality and feel restrained from supplying weapons or any other material support to President Putin. Moreover, before this war began, China was Ukraine’s largest trading partner and a major destination for its barley and corn. Ukraine had often abstained from a UN vote condemning China’s prosecution of its Uyghur Muslims. So, in spite of Ukrainian discomfort about China’s increased oil imports from Russia funding President Putin’s war machine and China's peace proposal making no mention of the withdrawal of Russian forces, its specific points like the stress on reducing nuclear risks are finding unanimous approval from the Ukrainian political elite. President Zelensky — who last March, told his western benefactors to send him weapons to fight and not a ride for an exile — has shown the grit and grace needed for his office. He knows how Western tough-talking and sanctions have had limited impact on Moscow and are even less likely to work with Beijing, were it to supply weapons to President Putin. Zelensky must be watching parts of the Biden administration showing signs of course correction or fatigue that he must reckon with in choosing his options. Perhaps indirectly endorsing China's peace proposal, the US National Security Advisor, Jake Sullivan, for example, urged Xi to directly engage Zelensky rather than relying exclusively on Russian narratives. Future trajectories For China, this peace proposal marks another stepping stone in its global aspirations. But it may also end up revealing Xi’s inability to persuade Russia to meet Ukraine even halfway, leave alone accepting Ukraine’s precondition of withdrawing its forces. This will further accentuate China’s core challenge of managing perceptions of its credentials as a peacemaker. Second, China is not the only one staking claim to mediating in the Ukraine war. President Erdogan of Turkey has been the only one so far to achieve concrete success, though it was short-lived. India presents the other major example with several nations now publicly expressing hope for its G20 presidency to deliver a breakthrough in the Ukraine war. Prime Minister Modi’s ‘this era is not era of war’ comment has become the mantra amongst world leaders. The G20 Foreign Ministers meeting earlier this month was able to usher in a breakthrough by facilitating a bilateral between Blinken and Lavrov — their first meeting since the beginning of the Ukraine war. India now hopes to bring President Putin and the rest of the world leaders together at its G20 Summit coming September. China’s claim to fame as the world’s new peacemaker is seeing serious contenders. It is also important to ask if India will continue to fight shy and just stand by the side as China presses ahead, projecting itself as the new peacemaker. Xi’s pursuit of peace in Ukraine has to be understood in the context of its brinkmanship with the US, which makes it pregnant with systemic implications for world order. Closer to home as well, it has serious implications. China’s neighbours remain on the receiving end of its increasingly assertive behaviour. No doubt, apart from major power contestations, China’s muscle-flexing in its immediate periphery has been a drain on its credibility. Here, India — being both the largest among China’s neighbours and also a major power — must take cognisance of these developments and take some bold initiatives of its own in order to avoid being pushed into taking sides and playing second fiddle. #China #IranSaudiDeal #SinoUSRivalry #MiddleEast #WestAsia Originally published: Deccan Herald, March 25, 2023. https://www.deccanherald.com/specials/chinas-strategy-has-a-new-arbiter-entered-the-ring-1203528.html Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Swaran Singh is visiting professor at the University of British Columbia, fellow of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute in Calgary, Alberta, and professor of diplomacy and disarmament at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India l

By Prof. Bharat H. Desai In order to set in motion a concerted global response to the impending planetary crisis, the UNGA could at the minimum, invoke three ideas, processes and instrumentalities of international law that would be the least-cost, pragmatic and not require any de novo international legal and institutional structures as follows: (a) Climate Change as a Planetary Concern Since 1988, the UNGA has been the principal conductor of the grand climate-change orchestra, invoking the normativity of ‘common concern’ (UNGA resolution 43/53 of December 8, 1988) which brought into being the UNEP-WMO joint mechanism of IPCC (resolution 43/53, paragraph 5) and triggered the process for negotiations (1990-1992) of the UNFCCC. Therefore, it is high time for the UNGA to rise to the occasion and elevate that common concern to the higher pedestal of a planetary concern. The IPCC AR6 Synthesis Report (Interlaken; March 13-19, 2023), has unequivocally confirmed widespread and rapid “human-caused climate change” occurred in the “atmosphere, ocean, cryosphere and biosphere…in every region across the globe”. Hence, the UNGA needs to take charge by adopting an appropriate normative resolution during the 77th session and beyond to provide future directions to the 1992 UNFCCC and 2015 Paris Agreement processes. Even though COP27 (2022) adopted the decision on ‘loss and damage’ funding for those vulnerable countries hit hardest by climate disasters, it will take years to flesh out the mechanism and ensure the requisite funding would be provided by the concerned countries. However, the previous experiences of such climate funding commitments do not augur well. As we look ahead, the future trajectory of the climate change regulatory process remains uncertain. The climatic crisis presents an ideational challenge for the international law scholars, the UN General Assembly and the UNFCCC regulatory process. After 30 years, as argued by this author (Environmental Policy and Law 52 (5-6) 2022), it earnestly calls for elevating the normative ambit of climate change regulation from a common concern to a planetary concern (2023; 2022). (b) Upgrading UNEP into a ‘Specialized Agency’ – UNEPO A product of the 1972 Stockholm Moment, UNEP has been working as an environmental subsidiary organ of the UNGA. There has been much discussion among the scholars and the decision-makers to elevate the current programmatic format of UNEP. Since the 1998 Klaus Toepfer Task Report on Environment and Human Settlements, several exercises have been undertaken to boost its institutional status within the UN system. This author, in an invited January 15, 1999 talk at Legal Department of the World Bank, called for UNEP’s upgradation as UNEPO: UN Environment Protection Organization (2014; 2012; 2006; 2000). Notwithstanding change in nomenclature as UNEA [Bharat H. Desai, ASIL Insight, 19 (2) 2015] in place of the Governing Council and the universal membership, UNEP remains trapped in the quagmire of a program and its Nairobi location has often posed many practical challenges. Since, UNEP is still not a full-fledged international organization, it is high time to finally confer it with the status of a UN ‘specialized agency’ (vide Articles 57 and 63 of the UN Charter). Instead of the current ‘program’, such a treaty-based international environmental organization (UNEPO), would be an effective instrumentality to address the planetary level environmental challenges of the 21st century, contribute to new forms of regulatory approaches, processes and institutionalized forms of international environment cooperation, avail membership based UN scale of funding assessment as well as bring other institutional actors and stakeholders on board. After full 50 years, the UN system need to have a full-fledged ‘specialized agency’ (UNEPO) for the global environment. (c) The Repurposed UN Trusteeship Council Along with the UNEP, there is a need to revive and repurpose (2023; 2022; 2022; 2021; 2018; 2014; 2000) the UNTC to look after the need and actions of the present and future generations for the conservation and protection of the global environment and the global commons. In 2021 Our Common Agenda report, the UNSG Antonio Guterres has now acknowledged that the UNTC needs to be repurposed as a deliberative forum on behalf of succeeding generations. The UNSG report has provided a fresh impetus to this author’s long pending proposal for revival and repurpose (2023; 2022; 2022; 2021; 2018; 2014; 2000) of the UNTC (Articles 86-88, Chapter XIII of the UN Charter). It came at a time when the world was getting ready for the 2022 Stockholm+50 Moment. As explained at length in this author’s above-mentioned proposal, the UNTC could be entrusted with the task of supervising the scattered legal regimes for some of the universal environmental conventions as well as the global commons. In fact, it could share the tasks of the other two overburdened principal UN organs — the UNGA and the ECOSOC. As a corollary, the repurposed UNTC would serve as the UN system’s in-house global supervisory organ for environment, global commons and sustainable development. It will also obviate the need for new funding demands and creation of any de novo institutional structure. Notwithstanding all the pious declarations, international instruments and institutional maze, the global environmental conditions have reached a perilous state. On June 02, 2022, the UN Secretary-General António Guterres described the triple planetary crisis as “our number one existential threat” that needs “an urgent, all-out effort to turn things around.” Similarly, Inger Andersen, UNEP executive director and the Secretary-General of Stockholm+50, underscored that “If we do not change, the triple planetary crisis of climate change, nature and biodiversity loss, and pollution and waste will only accelerate." The President of the 76th General Assembly, Abdulla Shahid, also reminded at 2022 Stockholm+50 Moment that the policies we implement today “will shape the world we live in tomorrow”. Towards 2024 Summit of the Future The 2022 Stockholm+50, as a missed opportunity, still provides vital lessons for the scholars of international law and international relations to think aloud and ahead for our better common environmental future. In order to save the humankind and the planet from an impending planetary crisis, we will need cutting-edge ideational solutions. In the realm of such possibilities, it was a humbling experience for this author to reach out during the most difficult Covid-19 pandemic period (2020-2022) to the outstanding thought leaders from around the world. The harvesting of the creative ideas yielded rich corpus of 55 ideational research papers, all curated by this author and published by the IOS Press (Amsterdam, Berlin, Washington DC) in three books [International Climate Change Law, 2023 (forthcoming); 2022; 2021]. It amply underscores that at a time of such a planetary crisis, it is possible for the conscientious and forward-looking scholars to seed ideational solutions to save the humankind from the brink. There are ‘limits to growth’ but no limits to human ingenuity in times of existential crisis. On the road to the 2024 Summit of the Future (UNGA resolution 76/307 of September 8, 2022) there would still be room for terrain mapping so as to engage in greater scholarly churning for invoking instrumentalities of international law. The onus remains on the decision-makers of the sovereign States, the UN system, multilateral treaty frameworks and other international institutions to translate some of these cutting-edge scholarly ideas into action to save the humankind from a planetary crisis [Bharat H. Desai, EPL 53 (1) 2023 3-18]. The humankind awaits a world leader to invoke International Law instrumentalities for translating the idea of trusteeship of the planet into action. Who shall seize the initiative? Time is the answer. #IPCC #UN #UNSG #UNEP #MEA #PMOIndia Dr. Bharat H. Desai is Jawaharlal Nehru Chair and Professor of International Law at the Centre for International Legal Studies (SIS, JNU), contributes as the Editor-in-Chief of Environmental Policy and Law (IOS Press: Amsterdam) and served as a member of the official Indian Delegations to various multilateral negotiations (2002-2008) as well as coordinated the initiatives for Making SIS Visible (2008-2013) and the Inter-University Consortium: JNU; Jammu; Kashmir; Sikkim (2012-2020)

By Prof. Swaran Singh The two countries’ convergence on the Indo-Pacific region could make this summit an inflection point in their bilateral relations US President Joe Biden arrives in Ottawa on Thursday for an inordinately delayed visit. Conventionally, Canada has generally been the first country to host foreign visits of newly elected American presidents. However, both Donald Trump and Biden have deviated from that norm, of course for very different reasons. Unlike Biden, who last visited Ottawa as Barack Obama’s vice-president in December 2016, stressing at the state diner how the US needed Canada “very very badly,” there was no love lost between Trump and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. In his typical abrasive style, Trump publicly called the Canadian leader “two-faced … dishonest and weak.” Other than attending the June 2018 Group of Seven summit in La Malbaie, Quebec, Trump never visited Canada in his four years as president. But in the case of President Joe Biden, it was the Covid-19 pandemic that intervened to cause this delay. Biden, though, has held several phone calls and online meetings and has sat in on other multilateral fora with Prime Minister Trudeau. Indeed, Biden twice earlier planned this visit to Canada, first in February 2021 and then last summer. But both times these plans were scuttled, first by the pandemic and then when he himself tested positive for the respiratory ailment, not once but twice. Indo-Pacific reconnect But this visit finally taking place has brought to light the unique nature of Canada-US relations, which are often called “best friends, whether we like it or not.” But what is going to distinguish this summit as the two sides routinely sign several memoranda of understanding (MoUs) and agreements or enunciating new initiatives? Especially for the world outside, this summit takes place against the backdrop of Canada having released its long-awaited, resource-driven Indo-Pacific strategy. The two countries’ convergence on the Indo-Pacific region, therefore, could make this summit an inflection point in their bilateral relations with implications far and wide. This is because for the last two decades – as global focus shifted from the North Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific region – Canada missed the bus in connecting with this evolving narrative. Indeed, Canada, a founding member of the ASEAN Regional Forum, has to date not joined the East Asia Summit that was set up in 2005. Especially noticeable has been Canada’s absence from US-led Indo-Pacific initiatives. These include the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) security mechanism of September 2021 and more recently the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework of May 2022. Even Trump did not exclude Canada from his revival of the Five Eyes alliance. Canada has also remained outside the US-led Quadrilateral Security Framework, which has since co-opted New Zealand, South Korea, Vietnam into its new “Quad Plus” formulation. Post-Brexit “global Britain” – which strictly speaking is not a Pacific nation like Canada – is seen becoming a more acceptable US partner in the region. Accordingly, Ottawa’s newfound enthusiasm for going an extra mile to conform to President Biden’s Indo-Pacific Strategy of February 2021 was visible in its own Indo-Pacific Strategy released last November. Among other replications from Biden’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, the Canadian version calls China a disruptive power and India a critical partner for achieving its regional objectives. Against that backdrop, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s impending US visit in June and then Trudeau and Biden both visiting New Delhi in September to join India’s Group of Twenty Summit may see Canada’s reconnect with the Indo-Pacific littoral getting further traction and elucidation. Only last week, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida in New Delhi underlined India as a critical parter in Japan’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. Shared China challenge All these aforementioned leaders feel increasingly connected by a shared China challenge even though their public articulations continue to shy away from saying so clearly. Indeed, world leaders’ denials often reveal more than they hide as they remain intentionally circuitous in their allusions to China. Against the backdrop of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin this week, officials in the US and Canada have been discussing their continued support for Ukraine. For example, answering a question on China on Wednesday, Trudeau said, “Of course, we’ll be talking about China, but the center of our conversations will be about jobs and growth, critical minerals and fighting climate change, and continuing to build an economy across the continent that works for all of our citizens.” It is important to remember that this Biden-Trudeau summit takes place in the midst of growing anti-China sentiment that, last month, witnessed the shooting down of a Chinese weather balloon and three other unidentified small flying objects. In Ottawa, these incidents have sparked simmering debates on China’s alleged interference in Canada’s two preceding federal elections. Not only does this China factor promise the two leaders revisiting their Indo-Pacific strategies, but as a build-up to Biden’s visit, his half a dozen rather friendly meetings with Trudeau during various multilateral fora over last two years have quite synergized their personal chemistry. Their January meeting in Mexico City saw them at perfect ease talking about their unlimited economic potential, their emergence as clean-energy powerhouses and leading the global transition to net zero emissions, recasting supply chains especially for critical materials to withstand together any pressure from China and so on. NORAD and other issues The most critical umbilical cord that requires their urgent attention is their aging jointly led continental defense system, the North American Aerospace Defense (NORAD) Command. Since last month, NORAD has come under heavy scrutiny for its inability to identify three tiny flying objects and yet calling these threats to national security to justify its use of modern and expensive missile systems to shoot these objects down. Canada has pledged to continue to support NORAD financially. But the need to strengthen NORAD has since been further accentuated by Russia’s recent use of hypersonic missiles. As well, amid the Ukraine war, President Xi this week reasserted China sustaining its “no limit” partnership with President Putin. Various US agencies believe Beijing is set to begin supplying Russia with weapons as well. So as part of Biden’s “America is back” formulation, he and Trudeau are likely to give top priority to accelerating their ongoing upgrades to the NORAD but also look beyond for developing a wider spectrum of responses. For instance, other than revamping NORAD, this requires building joint partnerships to cut down their dependence on China by redesigning and on-shoring and friend-shoring their supply chains to rationalize their dependence on imports from China. Remember, in some critical sectors like green energy, China controls 55% of the global market for the chemical lithium required for batteries for electric vehicles. The same is true of photovoltaic products such as polysilicon wafers and cells for solar power generation critical for global climate change mitigation. Other issues for discussion will include the instability in Haiti, supply-chain resilience and the opioid epidemic in both their nations. There are also other irritants in their bilateral travel, trade and migration rules, and the impending onset of inflationary and recessionary trends could add to the complications. Conclusion Finally, upon landing in Ottawa on Thursday, Biden’s recollection of his last visit could be instructive to prioritizing his planned outcomes from his series of meetings over the next two days. Biden last visited Canada in December 2016 when the world was bracing for the inauguration of president Donald Trump. This saw then-vice-president Biden underlining Canada’s critical role in the maintenance of the “liberal world order.” A more interesting comparison perhaps is the last presidential visit from the US, by president Barack Obama in June 2016. By then, candidate Trump had already emerged as a force to reckon with. Once again, US presidential election primaries are building momentum. And not only do large numbers of Republicans continue to rally around Trump, but the mid-term elections made them believe it will be easy for him to defeat Biden. It will be interesting to see how Biden, who in 2016 saw Canada as a critical partner for saving the liberal order, projects partnership with Canada for multivariate challenges facing our post-pandemic world but also his presidency facing detractors both inside and outside the US. Where does Canada stand in his cost-benefit analyses? #USCanada #IndoPacific #ChinaFactor #SinoRussia #NORAD #Biden #Trudeau Originally published: Asia Times, March 23, 2023. https://asiatimes.com/2023/03/biden-visit-to-strengthen-canadas-pacific-nation-credentials/ Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Swaran Singh is visiting professor at the University of British Columbia, fellow of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute in Calgary, Alberta, and professor of diplomacy and disarmament at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India

By Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli Despite expectations that Xi would come out with an action plan on peace in Ukraine, there was no concrete statement in this regard, except to reiterate their respective known positions. Beginning his three-day state visit to Moscow on March 20, China’s President Xi Jinping stated that relations with Russia are based on “no-alliance, no-confrontation and not targeting any third party”, even though “in a world of volatility and transformation, China will continue to work with Russia to safeguard the international system”. The joint statement issued after talks stated that bilateral relations have “reached the highest level in history”. President Vladimir Putin and President Xi have met 40 times so far. Two contrasting narratives were generated on the eve of Xi’s Moscow visit. One, that in the backdrop of foreign policy Czar Wang Yi’s European tour recently about a peace plan for the war on Ukraine that seemed to be never ending since its launch on February 24 last year. China had also come out with a 12-point position paper on the Ukraine conflict which emphasised on negotiations, protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity but also opposing the “Cold War mentality”. The last one – that of opposing cold war mentality- is a code word for the Sino-Russian joint opposition to the western policies and has been cobbled up sinceJuly 2001 in strategic partnership that became recently a “comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination in a new era”. It manifested in a joint stance at the United Nations Security Council, emphasis on global governance rather than rule of law, opposing the United States and the NATO, G20, BRICS, SCO, on North Korean nuclear programme, Afghanistan, merger of China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Eurasian Economic Union and others. At the bilateral level, such coordination is reflected on counter-terrorism, cyber security, energy, outer space cooperation, defence cooperation and on joint military exercises. In reality, this aspect of furthering such coordination is the basis for Xi’ visit to Moscow. Indeed, despite expectations that Xi would come out with an action plan on peace in Ukraine, there was no concrete statement in this regard, except to reiterate their respective known positions. For instance, the joint statement referred to “legitimate security concerns of all countries must be respected” and that a “responsible dialogue” should be carried forward. On the other hand, both expressed “firm support in safeguarding their respective core interests”. It is not clear how China’s support to Russia will manifest but consensus emerged between both to embark and strengthen their united front against the western countries. Both reiterated their opposition to the NATO expansion, the Indo-Pacific strategy, AUKUS and other initiatives recently and termed these as “small circles targeting specific countries”. Both reiterated to work for a multipolar world. Xi’s statement at the October 2022 20th party congress and the recent plenary session earlier this month critical of the United States were well-timed for the current Moscow visit. The focus of the visit was also on 14 agreements and memoranda of understanding on various bilateral issues like enhancing economic ties to over $200 billion in trade, and other fields. However, the issues mentioned here make for no big-ticket items, but incremental rather than quantum jump in the bilateral relations. As Russia is deeply entrenched in the Ukrainian conflict, China saw this as an opportunity and its Ministry of Natural Resources renamed Russian Far Eastern places like Vladivostok and Sakhalin into Haishenwai and Kuyedao respectively. As China is engineering demographic changes in Siberia, Russia’s Nelson Eye to such actions will be detrimental to its hold over the region. Earlier, China provoked India by changing the names in Arunachal Pradesh and began constructing 624 “well-off society villages”. Even though such measures are hollow in nature, these Chinese acts reflect irredentist claims. Significantly, Xi appeared to be leaving the resolution of the Ukraine issue to Russia, despite donning “peace negotiator” clothes, while seeking Moscow’s blessings to invade Taiwan. Given the watered-down version of Xi’s Ukraine-related agenda, it is likely that a quid pro quo has emerged between Beijing and Moscow on these “core interests”. However, China’s assiduously built narrative on sovereignty stands exposed. China’s position on Ukraine that the sovereignty of nations should not be violated only evokes its double standards. For instance, for decades China stated that the western sector of the border with India is a “disputed territory”, but changed its position in 2020 to claim “sovereignty” over the Galwan region that resulted in violence, blood and death of soldiers. Again, China mentioned in the joint statement with Russia that “dialogue rather than confrontation” should be practiced. However, even after 17 rounds of Corps Commanders level meetings and 26 rounds of Working Mechanism for Consultation & Coordination on India-China Border Affairs, no resolution in the border crises is visible. China and Russia coming together has negative connotations for India. The joint statement mentions both as “priority cooperative partners”. While both have significant differences and even went to border clashes in 1969, China’s successful ability to exploit current Russian complications is likely to increase Russian dependence on China. Russia playing second fiddle to a rising China could restrict the strategic space for India in the coming years, including in cutting-edge arms transfers. #SinoRussia #UkraineCrisis #XiJinping #XiMoscowVisit #Beijing #China #Russia Originally published : Financial Express, March, 23, 2023. https://www.financialexpress.com/defence/pursuing-united-front-against-the-west-xi-jinpings-visit-to-moscow/3019658/ Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli is Dean of School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University.

By Prof. Swaran Singh The summit is witness to how much can Modi and Kishida harmonise their positions to achieve better outcomes from their hosting of G7 and G20 summits for both their nations Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida arrived in New Delhi on Monday for his 27-hour visit for an annual summit with Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Given their rapidly growing proximity during the last two decades, the two leaders as expected witnessed signing of multiple MoUs and agreements, enunciate a few new initiatives, explored some novel avenues to further strengthen their partnerships and, most of all, further fine-tune their regional and global perspectives. At the top of their priorities were building better synergies for their respective hosting of the Group of Seven (G7) and Groups of Twenty (G20) summits in May and September in Hiroshima and New Delhi respectively. Both India and Japan currently hold these presidencies of G7 and G20 that have the similar mandate of managing global macroeconomic challenges. Indeed, global governance is expected to gradually shift from G7 to G20 which provides better representation and promising effective outcomes. However, given major powers geopolitical contestations has put hurdles in this transition and two leaders will need to explore how to rekindle that agreed evolution from G7 to G20? Amongst various great power geopolitical contestations, the Ukraine war has come to be the most recent trigger to bring this transition from G7 to G20 to a virtual grind with no easy resolution in sight for bridging their growing divergence. The Ukraine war has seen G7 drifting away, becoming a platform for major powers anti-Russia platform. At least few of the G7 members have become singularly focused on condemning Russia instead of addressing various economic challenges of the post-pandemic world. In spite of India’s good relations with the G7 this myopic politics on using all forums to condemn Russia has cost G20 its opportunity to address the real challenges of post-pandemic global redemption. As has been the case of Ukraine war debates at most United Nations organs, this has seen Russia, and even China, vetoing final statements of recent G20 Finance and Foreign Ministers meetings. The same divide now threatens to seal the fate of India’s G20 summit producing an agreed final communique. In this backdrop, as host of the coming G7 summit, Prime Minister Kishida can best appreciate India’s worries about this constant distracting of G20 meetings from its core agenda. But can Prime Minister Kishida provide any relief, or set in the tone for bridging that gulf between G20 and G7? Can this summit set the stage for Prime Minister Modi’s coming US visit rekindling hope of a consensus as India hosts 2023 G20 summit in September? Reading between the lines The answer to the above-mentioned questions lies in reading between the fine lines of this growing divide between G20 and G7 and in Japan’s ability to manoeuvre its position in India’s favour. To begin with, this snap dash by Japanese prime minister has triggered a few insinuations that must be first scrutinised. First is question that if Prime Minister Kishida had visited New Delhi last March for his first bilateral summit — which was incidentally also the first post-pandemic in-person India-Japan summit — with Prime Minister Modi, wasn’t it now latter’s turn to undertake a reciprocal visit to Tokyo? This brings to light the air of informality that undergirds India-Japan interactions. It is important to note that since their last summit in New Delhi, Prime Minister Modi had visited Tokyo twice: for the Quad summit in last May and at former prime minister Shinzo Abe’s funeral last September. Both times Prime Minister Modi had held bilateral sit-ins with Prime Minister Kishida. Now, Prime Minister Modi is again due to visit Japan this May as special guest for the 49th G7 summit being held at Hiroshima. Second, apart from these three visits of Prime Modi to Japan, Prime Minister Kishida remains committed to replicating the spirit of fabled Modi-Abe friendship. Understandably, he would not wish to see any protocols coming in the way of holding the India-Japan annual summit in time. This is especially so when Prime Minister Kishida is all set to take Japan’s defence expenditure not just beyond its self-imposed limit of 1 per cent of its GDP but to the new NATO limit of 2 per cent of GDP that promises to make Japan a major military power in the Indo-Pacific which has seen India and Japan converging so effectively together. Speculations also allude to this being a compensation visit. This is because, earlier this month, Japan’s Foreign Minister Hayashi Yoshimasa had missed attending the G20 Foreign Ministers meet. Sceptics point to Hayashi arriving New Delhi but the very next day of G20 Foreign Ministers meet to participate in the Quad Foreign Ministers’ meeting instead. This was explained by Japan in terms of their convention that all cabinet ministers must be present to face the Japanese Diet’s budget committee meeting. But this can also be read as Japan’s effort to avoid associating itself with aggressive anti-Russia line taken by the United State and its close allies at the G20 Foreign Ministers meeting. After all, Japan does stand at variance from some of these G7 members. For instance, when last May, the G7 had decided to ban imports of Russia crude oil and American multinational ExxonMobil — which held 35 per cent stake in Russia’s Sakhalin-1 project — had walked out of that project, Japan owned the other 30 per cent and India owning 20 per cent had decided to stay on with the project. This may be one example of Japan’s variance from US-led sanctions campaign and condemnation of Russia’s war in Ukraine yet makes India posture on Ukraine closer to that of Japan compared to few other G7 members. Ukraine today, Asia tomorrow The most glaring difference is that both Japan and India not just share disputed borders with rising China but have experienced violent stand-offs with China as well. All other G7 members seem closer to Russia and more focused on the European security situation. The important lesson for Japan and India has been that coming years will see the United States and its European allies entangled in the Ukraine war and later in the reconstruction of Ukraine and European security architecture. Japan meanwhile continues to wait to become a ‘normal’ nation. The Ukraine war has seen Prime Minister Kishida build his campaign on ‘Ukraine today and East Asia tomorrow’ which was reinforced last August by an accelerated pace of Sino-American brinkmanship during former US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. This saw China unleashing its largest-ever military exercise in Taiwan Strait. This is bound to make Japan look for alternative partners. And, for India’s ideal strategic position in the Indian Ocean and for being the world’s largest democracy, Kishida sees India as the aptest and an also most acceptable partner for asserting Japan’s strategic autonomy through its major Indo-Pacific initiatives. Referring to China’s aggressive military posturing in East China and South China Seas and Taiwan Strait in his Shangri La Dialogue speech last June, Prime Minister Kishida had promised to lay out his Free and Open Indo-Pacific for Peace plan by next spring. He is expected to announce this plan in New Delhi today which may see him underline the centrality of the India-Japan partnership and to India’s increasingly significant role in the Indo-Pacific region. This initiative could entail Japan and India working together to further improve maritime warning and surveillance capabilities and developing ports and other infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific littoral. India is already part of the recently launched Indo-Pacific Economic Forum and Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness Initiative. But this does not mean that two prime ministers will find it easy to bridge this gap between G20 and G7. There remain palpable differences when it comes to the Ukraine war. Japan continues to push for more sanctions against Russia while India has refused to condemn Russia; follows a stance of proactive neutrality and seeks to prevent the G20 from becoming a forum for major powers’ geopolitics. The summit is witness to how much can Modi and Kishida harmonise their positions to achieve better outcomes from their hosting of G7 and G20 summits for both their nations. #ModiKishida #IndoJapan #G7 #G20 #FOIP #IndoPacific #UkraineTodayAsiaTomorrow #GreatPowerContestations Originally published: FirstPost, March 21, 2023. https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/can-india-japan-summit-help-in-bridging-the-gap-between-g20-and-g7-12324542.html Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Swaran Singh is visiting professor at the University of British Columbia, fellow of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute in Calgary, Alberta, and professor of diplomacy and disarmament at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India

By Prof. Swaran Singh Exactly 20 years ago Russia and China both condemned the US invasion of Iraq, but their positions on Ukraine are more complex Monday marks the 20th anniversary of the United States’ ground invasion of Iraq in 2003. So on Monday afternoon when Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping sit down in Moscow for an informal lunch and one-on-one talks that will be followed by a formal delegation-level dialogue the next morning, they will surely be reminded of their countries’ strong track record of close proximity that is once again being tested in the midst of the Ukraine crisis. Both Russia and China called the 2003 US invasion of Iraq as “illegal,” showcasing their convergence on “restraining … [American] monopoly and domination in world affairs,” and their experience since, and now in the Ukraine war, should only further cement their “no limits” partnership. However, this piece of great-power geopolitics offers little respite, if any, from the unending stream of death, destruction and disruptions reverberating from its epicenter in Ukraine to the far corners of the international community. Sino-Russian convictions meanwhile stand reinforced by what major-powers geopolitics can deliver. The US-led Second Gulf War of 2003 that ended 30 years of rule by Saddam Hussein ushered in an unending era of conflict and chaos, making Iraq home for Hamas, al-Qaeda, Islamic State, and and no one shedding any tears for the God-forsaken Iraqis. So much so that an Axios-Ipsos survey held this month found as many as 61% of Americans did not believe the US invasion of Iraq was the right decision. Given such knotted history and the multilayered puzzle of the Ukraine crisis, what can one expect from this week’s Putin-Xi summit? Who seems to be setting their agenda, and what could be the motivations guiding their perspectives? Can this summit prove to be an inflection point? At the most visible level, since the Munich Security Conference of February 17-19, China has been working on its 12-point peace proposal on the Ukraine crisis. And seeking peace in Ukraine has come to define President Xi’s Moscow visit. Putin driving the agenda To begin with, it is Putin who seems to be driving the agenda of this summit. After his December 30 videoconference and formal invitation to Xi to visit Moscow in the spring, Putin called their ties “a model of cooperation between major powers in the 21st century.” The Chinese readout of that meeting, on the other hand, was relatively muted and made no mention of a visit promising to take a “objective and fair” position on Ukraine crisis. But it is not that China has not reciprocated. The Chinese perhaps believe in doing rather than talking. For instance, in the midst of Western sanctions, Sino-Russian bilateral trade showed an impressive 32% upswing for 2022 and Chinese companies have stepped in to fill the vacuum created by the exodus of foreign firms, resulting in 11 of 14 car brands in the Russian market today being Chinese. And now Xi arrives in Moscow on the back of having brokered a peace deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia, thereby forcefully inching to the center stage of global diplomacy. However, Putin is not making Xi’s challenge easy. After a visit by Chinese State Councilor Wang Yi, Putin was the first to announce Xi’s Moscow visit, declaring that Sino-Russian ties were “reaching new frontiers.” And now, Putin has moved the global focus on this summit taking place in the backdrop of the ninth anniversary of Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea. This weekend, Putin undertook a surprise trip to Crimea and Mariupol, marking the occasion to claim Russia’s legitimate incorporation of these territories. This is bound to color Western imaginations of the Putin-Xi summit as well as putting added pressure on President Xi exploring peace possibilities. Western media have criticized this as Putin’s defiance by a display of bravado following an arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court for war crimes. He was shown driving a car and walking around Mariupol, where he visited several districts before returning to Moscow. Indeed, on eve of the Putin-Xi summit, US National Security Council spokesman John Kirby told Fox News that “some sort of call for a ceasefire” coming out of the summit would be “unacceptable, because all that’s going to do is to ratify Russia’s conquest to date.” He accused Beijing and Moscow of trying “to rewrite the rules of the game globally.” Secretary of State Antony Blinken had earlier explained China’s peace initiatives as and attempt to distract the world away from its support of Putin. China’s peace initiative With US President Joe Biden having put together a coalition of 50 nations committed to supporting Ukraine defending itself against Russian threats and Putin showing no sign of relenting, the chances of the Chinese peace proposal making any headway in this week’s summit remain bleak. Both sides remain committed to escalating. Western countries have begun supplying Ukraine with main battle tanks and fighter jets, which could take the war across to Russian territories, increasing unpredictability about its trajectories. But Xi has also put his personal intervention at stake, promising to “play a constructive role in promoting talks” and planning even to speak with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky after his meeting with Putin. This would be Xi’s first contact with Zelensky, and it would not be easy to convince the Ukrainian leader of China’s neutrality and strike a balance between Moscow and Kiev. Xi’s peace mission is also his first foreign trip after securing an unprecedented third term in office, with all his domestic constituencies watching. Today, the world, including Ukraine, sees Sino-Russia ties through the prism of the Xi-Putin joint statement of February 2022 announcing their “no limit” partnership. But it is important to note that the Ukraine war has seen China becoming cautious in its support to Putin and displaying its desire to put an early end to the Ukraine crisis. The Russian readout on Putin-Xi bilateral talks on the sidelines of the Samarkand SCO summit last September, for instance, acknowledged China’s “questions and concerns” while appreciating Beijing’s “balanced position” (not support) on the Ukraine crisis. Most important, China has avoided supplying any weapons, or even material support, for Russia’s war efforts, though the Americans suspect Beijing of preparing to do so. China has also increasingly sought to portray itself as “an honest broker between Moscow and Kiev” and last month enunciated a detailed 12-point peace proposal, though it received only a lukewarm, even skeptical response from most Western countries. But Russia, with an economy of about one-tenth the size of China’s, has become increasingly dependent on Beijing, thus expanding China’s sway over the Russian power elite. But access to Russian energy, and even defense technologies, remains Moscow’s strong bargaining point with Beijing. Also, in the long run, China will need Russia for its ongoing confrontation with the United States and its friends and allies. This will see Xi walking the tightrope of not harming his interests in Russian friendship while being fully aware of how Western countries are interpreting his words and deeds on an everyday basis. Summit’s limited remit Recent weeks have seen China publicizing its limited remit on the Ukraine crisis, thereby lowering expectations from this week’s much-hyped Putin-Xu summit. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin recently summarized China’s position on the Ukraine crisis in a single sentence as one where China aims to “urge peace and promote talks.” This may be driven partially by the recent reports of some US agencies having confirmed that rounds of Chinese ammunition were used in battlefields in Ukraine and suspicions they were fired by Russian forces. US officials even claim to possess intelligence indicating that Beijing is considering sending arms and ammunition to Russia. But the presence of Chinese ammunition cannot be conclusive evidence. Even before the Ukraine war began, the world saw China and Russia standing together to oppose the United States and its allies both inside and outside the United Nations. The world has seen them set up the world’s largest parallel regional forum, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) that covers 40% of the global population and 30% of global GDP, with several other nations trying to join them as members, observers, dialogue partners, special invitees etc. Russia has its 10-member Collective Security Treaty Organization of former Soviet republics. All this means the world remains divided, with a large number of nations staying neutral or disinterested. Most of them have no leverage other than voting in the UN General Assembly, which also stands divided. But the United States feels on the back foot after China’s recent diplomatic coup in facilitating a peace agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the main arch-rivals of the Middle East, where Washington enjoys unquestioned leadership. This explains why President Xi plans to speak with Zelensky knowing well the cost it may have for Sino-Russian friendship. As for ending the Ukraine war, modern wars have no easy closure. This is especially so when they are driven by major-power geopolitics and have no regard whatsoever for their actual victims. So it makes sense to keep expectations pragmatic, and the Putin-Xi summit will at best give them a chance to reaffirm their friendship and assert their leadership, with little respite to the Ukraine crisis. #PutinXiSummit #UkraineCrisis #SinoRussia #GreatPowerPolitics Originally published: AsiaTimes, March 20, 2023. https://asiatimes.com/2023/03/putin-xi-summit-has-only-limited-chance-to-resolve-ukraine-crisis/ Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Swaran Singh is visiting professor at the University of British Columbia, fellow of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute in Calgary, Alberta, and professor of diplomacy and disarmament at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India

By Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli China is sending a clear message: Either India is with it or with the US – there’s no third way possible Apart from the expected third term for President Xi Jinping and the installation of his protégé Li Qiang as Premier of the State Council, the ongoing ‘two sessions’ signals an intensification of China’s “decoupling” process with the United States, the strengthening of the Communist Party’s domination of the State, especially its finance and S&T establishments, and a boost to China’s armed forces with a rising defence allocation despite a slowing economy. China began its annual ‘two sessions’ on March 4 with its advisory body, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), and parliament, the National People’s Congress (NPC) meeting at Beijing. This is the first full-fledged session of these two bodies after Covid lockdowns were lifted in December. The previous sessions were truncated due to the Covid restrictions since its outbreak three years ago. At the 2018 session of the NPC, following the 19th Communist Party Congress the previous year, the two-term limit was lifted to pave the way for Xi to stay on for another term at the current session. Deng Xiaoping had suggested and implemented two-term limits so as to promote youngsters in the party as well as curb excesses as witnessed during the Gang of Four rule in the 1970s. Xi has thus jettisoned Deng’s reform. Also, soon after the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, the Communist Party vowed to strengthen its control over all walks of life in China. As a result, the Company Law of 1993 ordered all companies – both domestic and foreign – to allow Communist Party cells to operate within them. As the “leading” organ of the party-state, the Communist Party gradually began not only to penetrate the enterprises but also into various State organs. With the intensification of reforms and China becoming the second largest economy, mainly reflected by its burgeoning exports, Xi began sensing that the party’s influence over tech companies was decreasing. Alibaba chief Jack Ma’s October 2020 criticism of the country’s banking system deepened Xi’s suspicion of his political faction’s diminishing control over the society and economy. Thus, to strengthen the party’s control, on March 8, the State Council released an “institutional reform plan” of various ministries, bureaus and commissions and in “science and technology, financial supervision, data management, rural revitalisation, intellectual property rights, and elderly care.” Such reforms have been implemented before. One of the major reforms was the one instituted by then-Premier Zhu Rongji in the late 1990s, which slashed several bureaucratic structures. However, the aim of that structural reform was to strengthen the market economy and enhance productivity. The 2018 reform mainly aimed at slashing the bureaucracy. However, the March 8 reform measure is to reinstate and expand Xi’s factional leaders in the bureaucracy and remove Communist Youth League and other factions. Previously, Xi began the “comprehensively deepening reforms” committees, but their effectiveness for his political control remained doubtful. Among the current measures, apart from slashing about 5 per cent of the bureaucracy, two new commissions would be proposed for finance and science and technology sectors, as these are seen as growth sectors, but also as crucial for the future economic growth of China. The stakes for political control of these two rising sectors is obvious, given the increasing geopolitical differences with the United States and as a domestic balancing measure. On the military (PLA) front, the outgoing Premier announced an increase of 7.2 per cent in defence allocations for 2023, over and above the national economic growth target “of around 5 per cent”. Last year, China failed to reach the set target of 5.5 per cent GDP growth (it hit less than 3 per cent) but the growth in defence budget continued at 7.1 per cent. The increase in allocations is said to strengthen the move to build the PLA into a “world-class military” and strengthen its ability to regain “lost territories.” Most significantly, on March 6, Xi took direct aim at the United States. In an unusual statement, Xi said that in the past five years, which he described as an “extremely unusual and extraordinary” period, “Western countries led by the United States have contained and suppressed us in an all-round way, which has brought unprecedented severe challenges to our development”. Such a combative posture, which began after President Trump initiated “tariff wars” in view of trillions of dollars in trade deficits in favour of China, is expected to be the defining characteristic of Xi’s third term. With such a confrontational messaging, the outcome of the ‘two sessions’ will also impact India, which is facing China’s ire since the Galwan clashes in June 2020 when 20 Indian soldiers died at the hands of the Chinese. China is sending a clear message: Either India is with it or with the US – there’s no third way possible! (The author, a JNU Prof, has been Peking behind the Bamboo Curtain for 30 years. @SrikanthKondap8) #Xi #ThirdTerm #China #TwoSessions #SinoUsRivalry #India Originally published : Deccan Herald on March, 12, 2023. https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/xi-has-set-tone-for-third-term-with-a-message-for-us-and-for-india-1199405.html Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli is Dean of School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University.

By Prof. Swaran Singh Anthony Albanese this week makes his first trip to India since becoming prime minister After German Chancellor Olaf Sholz on February 25-26 and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni on March 2-3, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese is to arrive in India on Wednesday for a four-day visit. This will see his large delegation – comprising senior ministers, officials and 27 business leaders of higher education, finance, mining, aviation, health, energy, defense and architecture – traveling to Ahmedabad and Mumbai and returning home after the India-Australia prime ministers’ summit in New Delhi. As if to preset the mood and momentum of the visit, last week saw Australian Home Affairs Minister Clare O’Neil, Education Minister Jason Clare and Foreign Minister Penny Wong in New Delhi rubbing shoulders with their counterparts. While the education ministers discussed clearing of pending education visas and signed an agreement for mutual recognition of qualifications and for Australian universities to open campuses in India, Foreign Minister Wong attended a Group of Twenty meeting, a Quad meeting, a few bilateral meetings, and New Delhi’s Raisina Dialogue, where she called India a “critical great power.” Mood and momentum Keeping in line with this foreshadowing, Prime Minister Albanese arrives on Holi, India’s festival of colors, for fun and frolic followed by an evening of lighting bonfires signifying the victory of good over evil. On this first day, he and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi will take some time out from their ceremonial, festive and official engagement to watch the fourth match of the ongoing India-Australia men’s test series of cricket at the world’s largest stadium, which has a seating capacity of 132,000 and is named after Modi. Thursday will see the large Australian delegation visiting Mumbai, the financial capital of India. Led by Trade and Tourism Minister Don Farrell and the minister of resources and Northern Australia, Madeleine King, these delegations, among others, will participate in an Australia-India CEO Forum to negotiate business-to-business deals under the framework of the Australia-India Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement that was signed last April. India as of now is the sixth-largest trading partner of Australia and in 19th position in the list of the 20 top investors in that country. But this means there remains enormous space to cover. On Friday, New Delhi will host the annual summit under the India-Australia Strategic Partnership that was upgraded to Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in June 2020, reflecting the recent upswing in bilateral relations. This has been further bolstered since the 2017 revival of the Quadrilateral Security Framework that is committed to ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific region, where their shared China challenge has brought India and Australia even closer. But it is also true that their forward momentum has faced headwinds in the form of disruptions and disjunctions triggered by the Covid-19 pandemic and the Ukraine war. For example, this will be the first India visit by an Australian prime minister since 2017 and the first visit ever by Anthony Albanese as prime minister. Does this mean that both sides must keep their expectations pragmatic and stay ready for more hiccups in coming times? For example, Adani Group, India’s largest investor in Australia, has recently come under rough weather. What outcomes and trajectories then can be expected? Shared China challenge Before his departure from Sydney, Albanese underlined that his India visit aimed at “deepening and diversifying our international investments and trade links,” which clearly referenced Australia’s strained relations with China, a country that has been Australia’s largest trading partner since 2007 and its largest export destination since 2009. But since 2020 China and Australia have been at loggerheads and, in spite of their recent diplomatic thaw, their trade war shows little sign of relenting, pushing Canberra to explore alternative partners. Indeed, both Australia and India have had China as their largest trading partner but both have also experienced increased tensions with Beijing. This has coincided with, and perhaps contributed to, both becoming increasingly committed to ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific, which has further reinforced their sense of a shared China challenge. The two countries coming together in the Quadrilateral Security Framework has seen them working closer together in several critical sectors, including joint naval exercises that saw India finally agreeing to Australia joining the Malabar event. The two are now talking of security and defense cooperation. Energy is now seen as another critical connect in the making, though India has been a major investor in Australian coal mines. Given Australia’s ambitions to emerge as renewable energy superpower by 2030 and India projected to see an exponential growth in its energy consumption, this portends both exploring new partnerships. This again makes China their major point of convergence. China is reported to have the world’s fourth-largest lithium reserves after Bolivia, Argentina and Australia, but China, with its major investments at home and in Argentina, has come to be world’s third-largest lithium exporter; and it owns 55% of the world market in the chemical lithium required for electric-vehicle batteries. China’s designs to invest in and control various rare-earth minerals outside its borders has added to the sense of complementarity between New Delhi and Canberra. This makes Australia critical for India’s goals of achieving 50% renewable energy and 30% electric vehicles by 2030. Only last week Canberra blocked the China-linked Yuxiao Fund’s proposal to increase its stake in one of Australia’s strategic rare-earths producers. And back in 2018, Canberra banned China’s Huawei from participating in its fifth-generation (5G) telecom networks. Conversely, among several other memoranda of understanding (MoUs) and agreements to be signed during Albanese’s visit, India’s Khanij Bidesh India Ltd is set to announce a “significant investment” in Australia’s critical minerals. Persistent irritants It is true that India-Australia bonhomie has become robust and visible and a large number of people of Indian origin in Australia have reached senior positions in Australian companies and institutions. It is also true that in 2021 the expat community overtook the Chinese to become Australia’s fastest-growing major diaspora. Nevertheless, issues of discrimination, even racism, have occasionally come to the surface as a simmering irritant for both sides. Newly assertive India has to find innovative ways to redress avoidable friction points that threaten to dwarf their potential for working together. Recent months, for example, witnessed vandalization of Hindu temples in Melbourne and Brisbane, suspected to be the doing of supporters of the Khalistan movement. Led by Sikhs For Justice (SFJ), which is banned in India, this group has sought to hold Khalistan referenda in Australia, Canada, Italy, Switzerland and elsewhere. In July 2019, India banned the SFJ on grounds of secessionism, but it has lately issued threats to disrupt India’s international events like G20 meetings, and parts of Punjab have lately begun witnessing increased visibility of what are being called the Khalistan 2.0 sympathizers. In anticipation that these irritants will come up for discussion by the two prime ministers, Australian High Commissioner in New Delhi Barry O’Farrell on Monday sought to douse the fire by underlining his country’s “unwavering” respect for India’s sovereignty, saying that in Australia, the right to freedom of speech “does not cover those engaging in hate speech, vandalism or violence.” Earlier as well, India has conveyed to Australia its concerns, asking for “suitable action” against vandalism and anti-India propaganda. And, if India’s recent interactions with world leaders is any indication, a firm mention of India’s expectations will be perfectly on the expected lines during this week’s visit. O’Farrell’s strong condemnation of such acts in Australia and his energetic defense of his country’s commitment to India on the eve of Albanese’s visit lays the ground for addressing the irritants beyond their closed-door parleys. But whether Albanese will strongly condemn such actions in Australia while he is on Indian soil remains to be seen. #IndiaAustraliaPMSummit #Trade #QUAD #NewDelhi #FOIP #China Originally published: AisaTimes, March 07, 2023. https://asiatimes.com/2023/03/what-to-watch-for-during-oz-pms-visit-to-india/?fbclid=IwAR1uVyRohxusFfMrhsjM7ONaWJr_pW3l6_Ml6ZSKU4v3oZ8Xh5dknjsEQ9o Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Prof. Swaran Singh is is visiting professor at the University of British Columbia, fellow of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute in Calgary, Alberta, and professor of diplomacy and disarmament at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India