By Prof. Dr. Bharat H. Desai
On September 9, 2024, the United Nations (UN) Security Council (SC), under Slovenia Presidency, held an open debate on the “peacekeeping operations”. The primary strength and support of these operations is drawn from the contributions of the UN member states. “As geopolitical tensions have mounted, including here in this Council, and amid shifting global and regional dynamics, peacekeeping operations are increasingly unable to rely on Member States to act in a strong, unified manner to support peacekeeping efforts they are mandated to support,” Jean-Pierre Lacroix, Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations told the 15-member UNSC.
UNSC Open Debate
The concept note (August 27, 2024) prepared and circulated in advance by the Slovenian Presidency emphasized that “the United Nations peace operations must continue to adapt to new realities and ensure their own effectiveness and ability to implement their mandated task, including the protection of civilians. This cannot be achieved without the full, equal and meaningful participation of women and a gender responsive approach at all stages of peacekeeping”.
Following were the guiding questions for the UNSC open debate:
(1) What can the Security Council do to make United Nations peace operations more fit for purpose?
(2) How can the Security Council engage Member States, including host countries, neighbouring countries and troop- and police-contributing countries, more effectively and systematically rally behind United Nations peacekeeping and the political solutions that they are designed to support? What can the role of the regional organizations be in helping ensure a conducive political environment for peace operations?
(3) What concrete steps can be taken to foster greater political unity within the Security Council as the basis for consistent political support for peace operations?
(4) Recognizing the progress made thus far, how can the Security Council do more to define strategic objectives and to prioritize and sequence peacekeeping mission mandates?
(5) In devising peacekeeping mandates, how can we reach an optimal balance between upholding the Council’s prerogatives under the Charter while appropriately considering both the views of the host countries and the expectations of the civilian population?
(6) How can it become more people-centred and ensure that it continues to support inclusive peace and political processes, with the participation of women and youth?
Instrumentality of Peacekeeping
As of April 2024, some 77, 650 peacekeepers were stationed in conflict zones and seek to protect the civilian population as well as fight battles, among others, against armed groups, mercenaries, rogue elements, transnational organized gangs, illegal resource plunder (poaching, trafficking, smuggling), proliferation of weapons, disinformation campaigns. There are 11 UN peacekeeping operations that carry different nomenclatures, areas of operation, mandates and composition. They comprise: Western Sahara (MINURSO); Golan (UNDOF); Abyie (UNISFA); India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP); Central African Republic (MINUSCA); Cyprus (UNFICYP); Kosovo (UNMIK); Middle East (UNTSO); DR of the Congo (MONUSCO); Lebanon (UNIFIL) and South Sudan (UNMISS). The UN peacekeepers are engaged in fire-fighting operations in various conflict zones that essentially require political solutions. The approved budget for UN Peacekeeping operations stood at US$6.38 billion for the fiscal year 2021 - 2022 (A/C.5/75/25). UNMOGIP, as the UN’s oldest mission (1949) seems to have outlived its utility in view of fundamental change of circumstances. After the Shimla Agreement (1972) and the Lahore Declaration (1999), “all outstanding issues with Pakistan are discussed only bilaterally”. Moreover, after the last UNSC resolution 307 (1971), the Council has remained silent on the “India-Pakistan Question (IPQ)". It underscores that the subsequent developments have overtaken the legal dynamics of the original issue. Therefore, it seems high time to remove IPQ from the UNSC’s “seized items” (Bharat Desai, SIS Blog Special, May 10, 2022) list and close the UNMOGIP after a passage of 75 years (1949-2024).
The 2021-2022 budget represented an average of 2.1% decrease on the approved budget (US $6.57 billion) for 2020-2021. This finance covers 9 of the 11 UN peacekeeping missions. The remaining two are the oldest missions (UNTSO, 1948; UNMOGIP, 1949) and funded through the regular UN budget. By way of comparison, the expenses incurred on UN peacekeeping operations constitute less than one-half per cent (0.5%) of world military expenditures (estimated at $1, 981 billion in 2020). For the year 2020-2021, the top 10 contributing countries for the peacekeeping operations were as follows: United States (27.89%); China (15.21%); Japan (8.56%); Germany (6.09%); United Kingdom (5.79%); France (5.61%); Italy (3.30%); Russian Federation (3.04%); Canada (2.73%); Republic of Korea (2.26%). Out of total 77, 650 peacekeepers deployed in 11 missions, none of the permanent member (P5) of the UNSC has provided any troop (or police) contribution except very small number of experts provided by the Russian Federation (MINURSO and UNIFICYP) and China (UNTSO). Each of the peacekeeping mission has witnessed casualties that show the grave peril faced by them. So far 1374 peacekeepers have died on UN peacekeeping missions. “There is only so much that peacekeeping can do on its own,” Lacroix modestly underscored as he urged the UNSC and the UN Member States to provide unified backing for missions.
The most of the UN peacekeepers (68, 950) are deployed in just four missions: MINUSCA (22, 523); MONUSCO (17, 761); UNMISS (18, 125) and UNIFIL (10, 541). The mandates of these four major operations are as follows: (1) Under MONUSCO, the peacekeepers have been entrusted with protection of more than 100,000 displaced civilians at the Drodro camp in Ituri Province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo; (2) The UNIFIL personnel face daily threats in Southern Lebanon from cross-border violence but serve as the crucial communication channel preventing further escalation; (3) The UNMISS works to advance political solutions in South Sudan by engaging local and national stakeholders, building confidence for long-term peace; and (4) The UNISFA mediates peace agreements in Abyei Province in Sudan between herders and farmers competing over scarce natural resources, preventing conflict during cattle migration seasons by collaborating with local and international partners.
The current Indian contribution to the UN peacekeeping comprises 4653 troops primarily in these four peacekeeping missions: UNMISS (2402); MONUSCO (1817+139); UNIFIL (895) and UNDOF (200). Traditionally, India has been one of the biggest providers of military and police personnel to UN missions, including the first all-women UN police contingent in 2007 posted to the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). The mission successfully ended its mandate on March 30, 2018. Moreover, in 2023, India provided a contingent of 25 women soldiers from the Corps of Military Police (CMP) and the Assam Rifles. Since the peacekeeping operations began in 1948, more than 200,000 Indian men and women had served in 49 peacekeeping missions. Most of the peacekeeping forces are run with the help of troops contributions provided by the Global South countries such as Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Nepal and Pakistan.
Apart from the troops, the UN also deploys police personnel in mission countries where normal law and order has broken down. The UN Police personnel complement and work in conjunction with the UN peacekeeping troops. From it first deployment in 1960, to its current presence in DR Congo, tens of thousands of police officers from over 130 countries have worked to protect populations, strengthen the rule of law, and build the foundations for effective and accountable policing that serve host-State populations. Policing is as much preventive as it is responsive, and it is central to efforts to avert, mitigate and resolve violent conflict. For this reason, the United Nations and its police components must prioritize conflict prevention in peace efforts, as well as in response to violence in support of the achievement of peace and security. With a current authorized strength of 10,000 serving on the frontlines in UN peace operations globally, they occupy a unique role among the world’s police forces. The UN policing serves and protects people where ‘blue helmets’ are stationed, beginning with Action for Peacekeeping, particularly in the areas prioritized within what the UN has designated as A4P+. The UN Police helps in adherence to rule of law and International Human Rights Law (UNSG Report, December 31, 2018).
Legal Basis for UN Peacekeeping
The idea and the practice of peacekeeping is premised upon inter-related and mutually reinforcing three basic principles: (i) consent of the parties (ii) impartiality and (iii) non-use of force except in self-defense and in upholding the mandate. Each peacekeeping operation is designed differently since situations arising from conflicts and post-conflicts present different challenges. The UNSC could invoke its powers especially from the UN Charter (Chapters VI, VII and VIII). In general, while adopting a resolution authorizing a peace operation, the UNSC does not need to refer to any specific Chapter or provision. However, the UNSC does so whenever it undertakes to give effect to its ‘enforcement powers’ under Chapter VII.
The Charter provides for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes under Chapter VI (Articles 33-38). UN peace operations have traditionally been associated with this Chapter. However, the UNSC while giving a mandate for specific UN peacekeeping operation has not invoked Chapter VI. Chapter VII (Articles 39-51) contains provisions related to “Action with Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression’. It entails progressively tougher actions as warranted by situation on the ground. In order to trigger peace enforcement operations, the Council needs to make an explicit reference to Chapter VII. In recent years, the Council has adopted the practice of invoking Chapter VII of the Charter while authorizing deployment of the UN peace operations especially in the aftermath of breakdown of rule of law, peace and order and exercise of normal state functions. In doing so, the Council first arrives at a determination (Article 39) as regards the “existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.” Thereafter, the Council invokes its inherent power for maintenance of international peace and security and emphatically states that it is “acting under Chapter VII” (see UNSC Reso. 2738 (June 27, 2024 on the DRC). Then it further “decides” specific course of action for addressing the parties to the conflict. Since the UNSC’s powers under Chapter VII lead to legally binding consequences, the language also remains emphatic as the Council literally issues ‘orders’ as a reflection of the collective resolve of the 15-members including P5. As compared to Chapters VI and VII, in enabling action under Chapter VIII (Articles 52-54), the Charter broadens the basis by involving regional arrangements and agencies in the maintenance of international peace and security. However, any such action must be in consonance with the purposes and principles outlined in Chapter I of the Charter.
Now in its 77th year as an instrumentality for peace, “peacekeeping” per se does not find an explicit mention in the UN Charter. Since 1948, there been 71 UN peacekeeping operations. As of April 2024, 11 missions were active. However, the primary leitmotif (leitmotiv in German) of the UN’s peacekeeping remains maintenance of international peace and security [UN Charter, Article 1(1)]. As the global military expenditure reached a new high of US$ 2.24 trillion (2022), conflict related deaths reached 28 year high (2022), conflicts have become a major factor for global displacement of people. Notwithstanding the UN Charter ‘blueprint’ [Article 2 (4) and Article 51] for prohibition of “threat or use of force”, some 2 billion people (one-fourth of global population of 8 billion) live in world’s conflict zones. It presents daunting challenges for the UN and its peacekeepers. Instead of managing conflicts as the UNSC mostly ends up doing, the primary focus needs to be on prevention of conflicts as well as timely resolution of the roots causes of such global conflicts. The security forces can try to contain harm caused by the warring groups. However, ultimate solution must be through political means.
Limits of Peacekeeping
The role of the UN, primarily driven by the UNSC, do not necessarily result in solutions in all conflicts wherein the peacekeepers are stationed. There are limits to the peacekeeping operations in view of competing interests of the UNSC members. Therefore, the language of the legally binding resolutions could be unclear, ambiguous or open-ended as they emanate from political compromises of 15-member UNSC. As a result, mandates of many peacekeeping operations do not yield results even as the peacekeepers face risks on missions (1374 UN personnel have died in 11 ongoing missions). It leads to conflicts festering for years causing death and destruction as can be seen from peacekeeping operations in Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, South Sudan and Lebanon.
In this respect, the report of the Brahimi Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (August 17, 2000) observed: “There are many tasks which United Nations peacekeeping forces should not be asked to undertake and many places they should not go. But when the United Nations does send its forces to uphold the peace, they must be prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and violence, with the ability and determination to defeat them”. Therefore, any UN peacekeeping operation needs to be carefully designed considering situation on the ground, responsible factors (such as tug-of-war for control over natural resources) for the conflict, disruptive capacity of the rival armed groups, political will of the P5 and availability of required financial and manpower requirements for the operation. The crucial balancing calls for deciding on how to do peacekeeping and how not to do peacekeeping. The size and capacity of the peacekeeping contingent would need to be assessed on the basis of their capacity to deter the rebel groups. Notwithstanding this, as seen in some cases, the anguish of the local populations sometimes turns against the peacekeepers due to sheer survival issues (abject poverty) or frustration arising from years-long insecurity and instability. For instance, the UN experts, Zaida Catalán (Sweden) and Michael Sharp (USA) were on mission as mandated by the UNSC resolution 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee’s Group of Experts. They were abducted on March 12, 2017 during their investigation of mass atrocities in the troubled Kasai region in the aftermath of brutal clash between armed militia and the Congolese government forces. The search by the UN peacekeepers found their bodies after two weeks. Similarly, on August 04, 2022, the Congolese authorities also expelled spokespersons of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) following some deadly protests in the eastern part.
The Board of Inquiry set up by the UNSG noted in its report of August 16, 2017 that the “Congolese interpreter and the three motorcycle drivers [accompanying Catalán and Sharp] were also killed, but their bodies have not been found to date.” Reporting took place under the UNSC resolutions that have given mandate to the Group of Experts (starting from resolution 1533 March 12, 2004 to resolution 2738 of June 27, 2024). These UNSC resolutions were adopted under ‘enforcement’ powers of Chapter VII of the UN Charter after arriving at an explicit determination that the “situation in the DRC continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region” (resolution 2738 of June 27, 2024). The UNSC took a comprehensive review of the situation in the DRC vide resolution 2641 of June 30, 2022. This came in the wake of long line of the UNSC’s 33 extensive briefings and consultations (between July 10, 2017 to June 30, 2022). It speaks volumes about the laborious task involved, deep-rooted malaise, gravity of the situation in the DRC and UN’s own engagement in the quagmire of the DRC.
Tragedy of Peacekeeping in the DR Congo
With third largest contingent of the UN peacekeeping contingent of 17, 761 (MONUSCO, February 2024), 110 million population, 11th largest country (geographical area) in the world and extremely rich natural resources, the DRC in the sub-Saharan Africa has remained one of the poorest and most unstable regions in the world. Variously known during different phases as the Belgian Congo, Congo-Kinshasha, the Congo, Zaire and the DR Congo (different from the Republic of Congo-Brazzaville), the prosperity in resources seems to have become such a curse that its helpless people are condemned to remain at 175 out of 189 countries listed in the ‘low’ Human Development Index.
The crux of the appalling condition in the DRC was graphically narrated in spine-chilling address of the Congolese gynaecologist Denis Mukewege in his 2018 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech (December 10) at the Oslo City Hall. “The human cost of this perverted, organized chaos has been hundreds of thousands of women raped, over 4 million people displaced within the country and the loss of 6 million human lives. Imagine, the equivalent of the entire population of Denmark decimated. United Nations peacekeepers and experts have not been spared, either. Several of them have been killed on duty”, Denis Mukewege said. Even after passage of six years (2024), the situation in DRC remains as explosive as narrated in Mukewege’s Nobel Prize acceptance speech. The UN has been badly entangled in the quagmire of the DR of Congo. It is worth recalling that it was the DRC conflict that led the feisty UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, to personally go to check the ongoing negotiations of a cease-fire. His death in September 18, 1961 plane crash, on UN mission, still remains a mystery.
The UNSC resolutions 2738 (2024), 2688 (2023), 2641 (2022), 2612 (2021), 2582 (2021) and 2556 (2020) have sought a general and immediate cessation of hostilities and the UNSG’s March 21, 2022 report amply showed no signs of resolving the complex tangle of the DRC, the questions arise about this ‘bottomless-barrel’ situation. It poses grave risks for the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC that includes an Indian contingent. The UNSC resolution 2612 of December 20, 2021 explicitly asked the President Tshisekedi towards ensuring that the DRC Government protects and respects human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as combats impunity in all areas. The gravity of the situation can be gauged from the fact that on July 25-26, 2022, anti-UN protestors looted and damaged UN facilities across North Kivu province. They were angered by the UN’s inability to curb violence by armed groups. Three UN peacekeepers (two from India and one from Morocco) were also killed.
Road Ahead: Beyond Peacekeeping
The quagmire of the vicious global conflicts have forced the UN’s engagements in various peacekeeping missions. It underscores the graphic reality that the dramatis personae in respective regions have been driven by vested interests in perpetuating conflicts rather than resolving them. The UN peacekeeping can only help in managing the conflicts pending final resolution through settlement between the parties. Therefore, every operation calls for very careful calibration that finally yields a treaty for durable peace between the conflicting groups. It necessitates peace brokered by ace international lawyers and diplomats as the peacekeepers keep a hawk eye. Thus, the roadmap, after the UN peacekeepers leave, would require an application of the International Humanitarian Law, International Criminal Law and the innovative TJ mechanisms to usher into era of peace with justice for all the stakeholders. The Pact of the Future to be adopted at the UN Summit of the Future (September 22-23, 2024) acknowledges the need to "respect and protect humanitarian personnel and UN and associated personnel" in global arms conflict. However, it is a tall order and would need to be give effect to in relative international legal instruments. This presents an ideational challenge for International Law scholars, peace negotiators and the decision-makers.
This Article is an Original Contribution to the SIS Blog.
It is 11th article by the author in the Blog Special Series: Use of Weapons of War.
1) 20 August 2024: BLOG SPECIAL – X: The Geneva Conventions @75: Use of Weapons of War and Audacity for Humanizing Warfare (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com)
(2) 27 January 2024: Blog Special – IX: The Odious Scourge of Genocide and the Use of Weapons of War: Making International Law Work (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com);
3) 13 April 2023: Blog Special – VIII: The Conflict Diamonds and the Weapons of War: A Challenge for International Law (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com)
4) 11 March 2023: Blog Special – VII: Rape under Orders as a Weapon of War: A Challenge for International Law (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com)
5) 22 September 2022: Blog Special –VI: Use of Weapons of War and Violence Against Children: A Challenge for International Law (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com)
6) 23 August 2022: Blog Special –V: Use of Weapons of War and the Role of Humanitarians: (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com)
7) 11 August 2022: Blog Special –IV: Use of Nuclear Weapons in War (Hiroshima-Nagasaki Day): A Challenge (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com)
8) 06 August 2022: Blog Special - III: Abused Ammunition as a Weapon of War in the DR Congo: A Challenge for International Law (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com)
9) 22 June 2022: Blog Special-II: Use of Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War: A Challenge for International Law (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com)
10) 28 May 2022: Blog Special-I: Use of Food as a Weapon of War: A Challenge for International Law (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com)
Prof. (Dr.) Bharat H. Desai is (former) Chairperson and Professor of International Law at the Centre for International Legal Studies (SIS, JNU), who served as a member of the Official Indian Delegations to various multilateral negotiations (2002-2008), coordinated the futuristic knowledge initiatives for the SIS Faculty Wall of Honor (2023-24), the Inter-University Consortium: JNU; Jammu; Kashmir; Sikkim (2012-2020) and the Making SIS Visible (2008-2013) as well as contributes as the Editor-in-Chief of Environmental Policy and Law (IOS Press: Amsterdam).
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