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By Kuldeep Ojha Donald Trump’s re-election in 2024 marks the beginning of a potentially transformative era for U.S.-Latin America relations. Trump promises to promote his ‘America First’ policy, based on a combination of neo-conservative thought, and the Monroe Doctrine's principles of “American dominance” in the Americas, given that Republicans dominate the Senate and House . If the first Trump presidency and his campaign rhetoric are any indication of things to come, his policy approach on trade, border security, immigration, and energy transition are likely to shape Latin America’s own policy choices. President Trump’s affinity with right-wing nationalist leaders in the region might also play a role in shaping bilateral ties. However, Trump’s transactional and personalistic approach would translate into uncertainty and even policy reversals. Within this scenario of an ‘America First’ presidency that will withdraw from the leadership role, Latin American countries are likely to resort to bilateral diplomacy to wrest concession and avoid conflagrations.   The Protectionist Disruption Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy, evident during his first term, treats international relations as a series of deals prioritizing the US economic interests. By withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)  and renegotiating the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) into the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA ), Trump clarified that multilateral arrangements would take a back seat to bilateral deals designed to boost the US influence. Since most Latin American countries rely significantly on commercial activity with the United States, this position could pose serious difficulties. For example, Trump's proposed 10% import tariff could severely impact Latin American economies, which are heavily dependent on exports to the U.S. market. While Mexico is particularly prone to tariff-induced disruption, Brazil and Argentina’s already troubled economies may face a double whammy . On one hand, Trump’s proposed tariffs would negate their excess to the lucrative US market. At the same time, sapping demand from China might deprive them of an alternative destination. In kind, the protectionism used by Trump may have reciprocal measures such as tariffs and devaluations of currencies. This may lead to the collapse of mutually trading system with smaller countries, that will ensure the weaker economies become volatile and unstable. Concretely, Trump’s policies may affect Latin American Agrarian and Industrial products that define the continent’s export baskets. Especially Brazilian soybeans and Argentine beef are imported to a large extent into the United States and would particularly be harmed by a high tax on agriculture imports. Moreover, it seems that Trump’s bolder ways of achieving the economy through reduction of corporate taxes and increased spending in the US may lead to the larger fiscal deficit and cause inflation to increase the unadjusted interest rates. This may, in turn, lead to the Latin American currencies decline by even a larger extent; thus, negatively affecting the region’s economy growth rate. According to the Pew Research, Latin American gross domestic product may have difficulty breaking the 3% growth mark in the following years. The unpredictable and skeptic decision making, that defines Trump policies around the region, could prompt regional leaders to continue applying a persuasive leadership principle to secure political favor or trade export permits for certain key sectors. However, in the long-run, the most potent way of countering protectionism and policy risks that are evident in the American inward turning strategy, is to build relationships with Asian, European and African markets. After Trump withdrew from the TPP, the redesigning of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), negotiated by Japan, shows the potential of such an approach.     Crackdown on Illegal Immigration Trump 1.0 took a zero-tolerance stance on non-traditional security issues emanating from Latin America, including drug trafficking, gang violence, and illegal immigration. It is reasonable to expect a continuation of the hard-line approach in his second term, including stricter border control and potential military action against the Mexican drug cartels. More recently, Trump’s Vice President-elect J.D. Vance has sought consent to let the US president launch strikes against cartel compounds in Mexico. This could distort the relationship between Mexico and the US. The effects of these policies would be felt most acutely in countries like Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, where poverty and violence drive thousands to seek refuge in the US. Trump’s strict immigration stance has translated into policies of family separations and deportations, with significant impacts on the economies of Central American countries. However, illegal immigration was a hot political issue in the recent presidential campaign, in which the Republican candidate associated the issue with its impact on economy and ethno- cultural identity. In this case, Trump’s immigration policies will be harmful to immigrants and Latin American economy particularly because of issues of deportation and construction of Camps.  For example, nearly 5 million Mexicans and 2 million Central Americans reside illegally in the United States.  Remittances sent by migrants from the US, contribute substantially to these economies, particularly in Guatemala and Honduras. If deportations go through and the erstwhile illegal residents are forced to return to their home countries, it will add to the pressure on the Latin American governments to generate suitable opportunities for the influx of returnee population. The failure to meet the economic aspirations of deported people would cause social and political discontent. Therefore, massive deportations or restrictions in remittances may further destabilize these economies. This situation may lead Latin American countries to increased unemployment, poverty, and, in essence, pressures towards more human movements.   The Green Transition Setback Trump's re-election also means that he shall continue to have the same policy on climate that he has laid in his first presidency, which is pro-fossil fuels. He has continuously supported such measures to bring back coal and oil industries . This could help oil rich countries in Latin America such as Guyana, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago get more US investments in fossil fuel. Nevertheless, for the countries such as Brazil and Colombia, the members of the rainforest, Trump’s attitude towards climate action might be costly. For instance, Brazil, which will be hosting the COP 30 climate conference in 2025 , has cited the Lula presidency to its readiness to gain a place among world powers in the preservation of the environment. Nevertheless, Trump’s support of fossil energy and his previous exit from the Partnership with Paris Agreement may alienate the better cooperation with Brazil regarding climatic conservation programs. Additionally, Trump’s policies could strain biodiversity in Latin America’s tropical rainforests, crucial for absorbing global carbon emissions.  Trump’s disregard for climate action may not sit well with the environmentally conscious Latin American leaders like Lula. The green transition sceptics constituency that Trump represents would cause harm to the American reputation for leadership on climate change in the eyes of Latin America. Trump’s disregard for green energy transition may also dash hopes for a Marshall Plan-like endeavour on the part of the US to enable technology transfer to the Global South. Ironically enough, the void created by the US in this domain shall allow China to step in with its ‘green transition diplomacy’. Since clean energy is increasingly going to dominate economic activity, China’s aid and technology transfer to enable this economic transformation in Latin America will provide it with economic gains in terms of market access and diplomatic support in terms of favourable bilateral relationship China’s green energy leadership in the US backyard then will amount to a strategic setback for the US. While Latin American countries may partially hitch their wagon to Chinese tech and services, they would do well to find alternatives to reduce the risks of excessive dependency. Such a diversification bid may also involve cooperating with the US by engaging with the private sector, civil society experts, and provincial governors more attuned to the climate risk.   Diplomatic Shifts and Future Relations Trump’s re-election has galvanized right-wing leaders across Latin America, including Argentina’s Javier Milei and El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele, who share with Trump an affinity for “tough” policies and nationalist rhetoric. Central American countries such as Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Panama, as well as South American countries such as Paraguay, Chile, and Uruguay, that are in synergy with the US economic and security agenda are likely to benefit from this Trump regime. Trump support for conservative right- wing governments in these countries could foster enhanced economic and security cooperation mainly in the fight against drug cartels, and management of economic risks. However, Trump’s re-election could create diplomatic hurdles for left-leaning governments, such as those in Mexico, Chile, and Brazil, which will find it hard to deal with his militaristic, unilateralist approach to foreign policy with a disregard for diplomatic norms. He proposed an aggressive approach to so-called anti-American states, including Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, which he calls, the “ Troika of Tyranny ”. His aggressive policy could only deepen the measures to impose more sanctions and a more profound isolation of these countries. For instance, Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela could get even heavier sanctions that will imply limitation or even total banning of the export of petroleum, which is the main exportable commodity of Venezuela, and could exacerbate a present scarcity of foodstuffs and drugs. Furthermore, Trump's focus on alleviating China's clout in Latin America adds another dimension of geopolitical rivalry.  Under The America Crece  initiative, the US seeks to promote private investments in Latin American infrastructure sector. If done rightly, this initiative could counter China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and help revitalize the Latin American economy. However, during the COVID-19 pandemic, China’s ‘ mask diplomacy ’ helped it gain a foothold in Latin American markets, where public sentiment towards China has become increasingly favourable. Pew Research Centre further reveals that most of the Latin Americans view China as an economic- ally and, at some point, even as a geopolitical ally. Conclusion Trump’s second term is set to redefine the US-Latin American relations through a transactional lens, where bilateral treaties, strict immigration reforms, and strategic anti-China measures take precedence. For Latin America, where the pace of growth is still low, estimated at 1.8%, Trump can increase existing economic and social problems, and some can turn to other partners and cooperate with China or Russia. While Latin America struggles with how to cope with the aftermath of the downturns, its leaders will have no choice but to be business-like in relation to Trump while relying on diplomacy to obtain the best possible conditions for their countries. Trump’s neo-conservative policy and, in addition, the absolute adherence to an ‘America First’ doctrine may catalyze a new phase of Latin American diplomacy in front of a binary choice: cooperation or divergence. Sustainable foundations for this new bilateral the US-Latin America relationship will be predicated on how the two regions will maneuver around the swirl of economic relations, security, and environmental concerns caused by evolving power realignments This Article is an Original Contribution to the SIS Blog Kuldeep Ojha is a PhD scholar in Latin American Studies at SIS, JNU. His research focuses on environmental governance in Central America, and his interests extend to the Latin American region and its geopolitics.

By Prof. (Dr.) Bharat H. Desai I. Views of the States   On the whole, all the presentations (written and oral) made by the States and IOs brought a variety of legal arguments that constituted the mosaic of different approaches in addressing the challenge of global climate change. For instance, Brazil  ( Written Statement, March 21, 2024 ; Oral Presentation, December 03, 2024 ) highlighted its commitment to ambitious emissions reductions, stressing that despite being a developing country, it faces significant challenges like poverty eradication and extreme climate impacts. The Brazilian envoy underscored the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”. China ( Written Statement, March 22, 2024 ; Oral Presentation, December 03, 2024 ) urged the ICJ to avoid creating new legal obligations and focus on existing frameworks and underscored the developed countries’ historical responsibility.   The Indian approach has been reflected in the Written Statement of March 21, 2024 ; Oral Presentation, December 05, 2024 . Since this author prepared the initial draft of the Indian Written Statement, it is worth spelling out the stance emphasizing that the “Court may exercise due caution to avoid devising new or additional obligations beyond what is already agreed under the existing climate change regime”. [ Indian Written Statement, March 21, 2024; conclusion, page 39, paragraph 106 (iii) ]. However, the two leading players on the climate chessboard, European Union (EU) and the United States took different positions. The EU ( Written Statement, March 22, 2024 ; Oral Presentation, December 13, 2024 ) emphasized cooperation and stressed the non-adversarial nature of the advisory proceedings and pointed to the importance of existing treaties in addressing climate change but stopped short of calling for enforcement mechanisms. On the other hand, the United States ( Written Statement, March 22, 2024 ; Oral Presentation, December 04, 2024 ) acknowledged the severity of the climate crisis but rejected by the notion that “common but differentiated responsibilities” is a fundamental principle of international law.   Picture Source : UNICEF/ Lasse Bak Mejlvang: Small Island nations, such as Tuvalu face greater risk from sea level rise arising from extreme climatic changes. II. What Would the World Court Do? Upon perusal of the Written Statements and hearing the Oral Presentations ( December 13, 2024 ), some ICJ judges asked the States and IOs specific questions and sought responses by December 20, 2024 ( ENB , December 16, 2024 ) It did elicite good clarifications from 60 States and 5 IOs, till December 20, 2024 .  The Court is expected to deliver its considered Advisory Opinion, hopefully, in the first half of 2025. After the ICJ renders an opinion, the ball would revert back to the UNGA who could further decide on the course correction.   Since there are indications of floundering of the UNFCCC process, as seen in the outcomes of last three successive COP meetings at Baku ( COP29, November 11-24, 2024 ), Dubai ( COP28, November 30-December 12, 2023 ) and Sharm-al-Sheikh ( COP27, November 6-18, 2022 ), it could possibly yield critical space to the ICJ to illuminate upon some seminal aspects for affixing obligations of the states within and beyond the three principal international legal instruments on climate change ( 1992 UNFCCC , 1997 Kyoto Protocol ; 2015 Paris Agreement ) .   It presents an ideational challenge for International Law and Relations scholars, the UNGA and the UNFCCC process. As argued in one of this author’s ideational papers ( Environmental Policy and Law  52 (5-6) 2022, 331-347 ),  the climate crisis calls for earnestly elevating the normative ambit of climate change regulation from a common concern to a planetary concern ( here , EPL , 54 (1) 2024, 3-14 ; here, EPL Blog , January 5, 2023 ; here , EPL , 52 (5-6) 2022, 331-347 ). The UNGA could take the charge by adopting a normative resolution at the 80th session (after the ICJ renders its Opinion in 2025) to provide future directions to the global regulatory approach on climate change. The ICJ would need to find answers to the specific questions in the UNGA request (March 29, 2023 ) . W hat would the World Court do to nudge the UNGA and the States to squarely address the global climate riddle? Picture Source: ICJ: Oral Presentations Venue: The Great Hall of Justice, Peace Palace: December 02-13, 2024 III. Making International Law Work In view of the above legal stratagems and crafting of tools and techniques to stabilize GHG emissions enshrined in the three legal instruments ( 1992 UNFCCC , 1997 Kyoto Protocol  and 2015 Paris Agreement ) , the regulatory approach appears to be stagnating. It has brought in fatigue effect, proliferation of national climate change litigations and the UNGA request . Ironically, the Baku COP29 (November 11-24, 2024   resulted in literal abandonment of the multilateral climate negotiations by some States and lukewarm attitudes of others. The Baku COP29 decision ( CMA.6: New collective quantified goal on climate finance, paragraph 8 ; Press Release, November 24, 2024 ) “to set a goal, in extension of the goal referred to in paragraph 53 of decision 1/CP.21, with developed country Parties taking the lead, of at least USD 300 billion per year by 2035 for developing country Parties for climate action” requires cautious optimism in view of the previous experience of such climate funding commitments remaining on paper. The outcomes of the three back-to-back global events, Summit of the Future ( New York; September 22-23, 2024 ), Sustainable Development Goals  ( New York; September 18-19, 2023 ) and Stockholm+50 Conference  ( Stockholm; June 2-3, 2022 ) have dampened prospects for squarely addressing the climate emergency. As we look ahead, it is high time for the States Parties to the climate change regime ( 1992 UNFCCC , 1997 Kyoto Protocol  and 2015 Paris Agreement ) to engage in a major course correction, as preliminarily spelled out above. It calls for audacity of hope for wiser counsels to prevail. As an immediate goal, the State Parties need to elevate the normative ambit as a planetary concern . Thus, the forthcoming Advisory Opinion of the World Court can provide a nudge and a robust basis to locate “obligations of the states” within the realm of the said larger planetary concern.   In this respect, some of this author’s ideational works ( here , EPL , 54 (1) 2024, 3-14 ; here, EPL Blog , January 5, 2023 ; here , EPL , 52 (5-6) 2022, 331-347 ), done on his home turf of SIS, modestly provide some solutions to the problematique . IV. Conclusion It is in the above-mentioned larger context, in designing an Opinion expected in the first half of 2025, the ICJ has sufficient room for ‘widening the horizons’ through the instrumentality of interpretation on “obligations of states” in International Law. It remains to be seen as to how far the ICJ draws upon its past practices, precedents and processes. The content and futuristic trajectory of the Opinion would depend upon current composition of the Court wherein the judges with academically strong backgrounds could venture to innovate and extrapolate by reading within the fine texts of the three climate change instruments. It may yield “decisive course correction”, as suggested in this author’s recent ideational works ( here , EPL , 54 (1) 2024, 3-14 ; here, EPL Blog , January 5, 2023 ; here , EPL , 52 (5-6) 2022, 331-347 ). After the Court delivers an Opinion, the UNGA would consider it and give shape to the views of the UN Member States through an appropriate resolution, possibly at the 80th session of the UNGA. It could suggest the road ahead for addressing the planetary level climate emergency. As of now, for deciphering obligations of states in respect of climate change  under international Law, we need to trust the wisdom of the ICJ judges who represent the principal legal systems of the world. This Article is an Original Contribution to the SIS Blog. The Article is a sequel to the article Planetary Climate Emergency Part -I Prof. (Dr.) Bharat H. Desai is the former Chairperson and Professor of International Law at the Centre for International Legal Studies (SIS, JNU), who served as a member of the Official Indian Delegations to various multilateral negotiations (2002-2008), initiated and coordinated the futuristic knowledge initiatives for the SIS Faculty Wall of Honor (2023-24) , the Inter-University Consortium: JNU; Jammu; Kashmir; Sikkim (2012-2020)  and the Making SIS Visible (2008-2013)  as well as contributes as the Editor-in-Chief  of Environmental Policy and Law (IOS Press: Amsterdam) .

By Prof. (Dr.) Bharat H. Desai I.  The Context: 2024: Year of the Planetary Future   The year 2024 became the “Year of the Planetary Future” [ Author: EPL 54 (1) 2024 ] with the United Nations hosting a high-profile Summit of the Future  ( New York; September 22-23, 2024 ) in succession to 2023 and 2022 that witnessed summits on the  Sustainable Development Goals  ( New York; September 18-19, 2023 ) and the Stockholm+50 Conference  ( Stockholm; June 2-3, 2022 ). The outcomes of these global conferences of 2024 , 2023  and 2022  showed the gravity of the smoldering planetary level crisis ( here, 2024 ;   here, 2024 , here, 2023 ;   here, 2023 ). The 2024 Summit of the Future was mandated by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution 76/307 of September 8, 2022 (Modalities Resolution) . Thus, the year 2024 will be cast in stone as the Year of the   Planetary Future . ( Author: EPL 54 (1) 2024 ).   II.  Evidence of the Actual Working of International Law  The year also witnessed unfolding of an unprecedented saga of the International Law@Work in the International Court of Justice (ICJ; World Court), principal judicial organ of the UN. Over the years, International Law@Work has been the running theme, comprising a brief pictorial presentation or screening of an audio or video clip, to hammer on the actual working of International Law  by this author at the beginning of each class in two School level celebrated MA (PISM) courses: (i) International Law of Peace (Monsoon Semester); and (ii) Legal Controls of International Conflicts (Winter Semester). Therefore, a flurry of cases (contentious and advisory) coming to the ICJ underscores one of the facets of the actual working of International Law . Apart from the Advisory Opinion 2022-2024 proceedings ( vide UNGA resolution 77/247 of December 30, 2022 ) on Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem ( July 19, 2024 ), the Court has been saddled with another Advisory Opinion sought by the UNGA ( vide resolution 77/276 of March 29, 2023 ) : Obligations of States in Relation to Climate Change . The marathon proceedings in the case witnessed Written Statements ( 91 States and IOs, till April 12, 2024 ), comments on the Written Statements   ( 62 States and IOs, till August 15, 2024 ), Oral Presentations ( 96 States and 11 IOs, till December 13, 2024 ) and replies to specific questions put by the ICJ judges to the States and IOs ( 60 States and 5 IOs, till December 20, 2024 ). The UNGA request to the ICJ came in the backdrop of growing scientific predictions that e ven if greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions hit zero tomorrow, the climate chaos is likely to cost estimated $38 trillion (likely range of 19-59 trillion dollars) a year by 2050 . The UNSG Guterres has described ( June 02, 2022 ) climate change as one of the drivers of “triple planetary crises”.   Picture Source: ICJ : Fifteen ICJ Judges who will render the much-awaited Advisory Opinion III.  UNGA Request for an Advisory Opinion   Significantly, the Advisory Opinion sought by the UNGA (sent by the UNSG to the ICJ President; April 12, 2023 ) was an indication of the crisis at work. The ICJ has been requested to clarify on two specific legal questions ( vide   UNGA resolution 77/276 of March 29, 2023 ):   “(a) What are the obligations of States under international law to ensure the protection of the climate system and other parts of the environment from anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases for States and for present and future generations; (b) What are the legal consequences under these obligations for States where they, by their acts and omissions, have caused significant harm to the climate system and other parts of the environment…”   The above-mentioned two questions provide general framework for mapping the ‘obligations of states’. Still, as the history of ICJ Advisory Opinions shows, the Court can go beyond it to come out with an interpretation that was not originally contended before it. For instance, the finding of a caveat “very survival of a State would be at stake” in “extreme circumstance of self-defense” ( Opinion, page 43, paragraph 105 (2) E ) by the Court in its July 08, 1996  Advisory Opinion in the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons  is a case in point. However, as this author contended in an analysis of the 1996 Opinion ( IJIL 37 (2) 1997 at 218 ), invocation of any unwarranted miasma “would be contrary to the law of the Charter and other corpus juris  on the matter and, indeed to the totality of international law”.   Notwithstanding, existence of the three legal instruments ( 1992 UNFCCC , 1997 Kyoto Protocol ; 2015 Paris Agreement ) for global regulation of climate change and the annual Conference of Parties (COP) meetings (last one held in Baku COP29, November 11-24, 2024 ), most of the States and IOs have been looking for an authoritative exposition on the illusive “obligations of States”  from the World Court. Having prepared the initial draft of the Written Statement for the Republic of India ( Written Statement, March 21, 2024 ), this author is cognizant of the general view and desire of the sovereign states to stay with the chosen course that “obligations of States with respect to climate change are under the 1992 UNFCCC, and its instruments - the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, and the 2015 Paris Agreement.” Hence, most of the States expect the ICJ to “avoid devising new or additional obligations beyond what is already agreed under the existing climate change regime” [see: Indian Written Statement, March 21, 2024; conclusion, page 39, paragraph 106 (iii) ].   Picture Source : UN Photo : Seat of the ICJ, Peace Palace, The Hague, The Netherlands IV.  Marathon Written and Oral Proceedings   Article 65 (1) of the Statute of the ICJ  enjoins upon the principal judicial organ of the UN to “to give an advisory opinion on any legal question”. This article needs to be read in the context of the main provision -- Article 96 (1) of the UN Charter  – that provides: “The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question”. There is no obligation per se to give an opinion since the article contains the word “may give an advisory opinion”. In the Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change , the Court undertook an unprecedented process of consultations (see above) including a sitting ( November 26, 2024 ) with scientists of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) “to enhance the Court’s understanding of the key scientific findings which the IPCC (set up vide  the UNGA resolution 43/53 of December 08, 1988, paragraph 5 ) has delivered through its periodic assessment reports”. As per the practice before International Courts and Tribunals ( Author: “ICTs as New Environmental Sentinels”, EPL 51 (1-2) 2021, 121-134 ), eminent International Law scholars mostly based at leading Universities are chosen by the States in their cases before the ICJ. In all such cases, it is the person preparing the Written Statement also makes Oral Presentation as a member of the State Delegation. This author was specially requested by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) to prepare the Written Statement in consonance with the official Indian position on climate change. Accordingly, after due consultations and internal vetting, the Indian Written Statement was filed on March 21, 2024  by the Indian Ambassador (Reenat Sandhu) to The Netherlands. This Article is an Original Contribution to the SIS Blog. Prof. (Dr.) Bharat H. Desai is the former Chairperson and Professor of International Law at the Centre for International Legal Studies (SIS, JNU), who served as a member of the Official Indian Delegations to various multilateral negotiations (2002-2008), initiated and coordinated the futuristic knowledge initiatives for the SIS Faculty Wall of Honor (2023-24) , the Inter-University Consortium: JNU; Jammu; Kashmir; Sikkim (2012-2020)  and the Making SIS Visible (2008-2013)  as well as contributes as the Editor-in-Chief  of Environmental Policy and Law (IOS Press: Amsterdam) .

By Prof. (Dr.) Bharat H. Desai On December 05, 2024, celebrated Mexican activist Norma Andrade, was at the UN Office in Geneva to raise awareness about femicide. She knew what it exactly means since her own daughter, Lilia Alejandra, was murdered in that same city in 2001. Her words “we are worth a peanut…a woman is just disposable,” pithily reflect the new global scourge – femicide – that has afflicted societies. As per the available figures, some 2526 women were murdered and hundreds disappeared in Mexico’s Ciudad Juarez during 1993 to 2023 . Andrade, raised her voice against organized femicide against women in Mexico. “In Mexico, the growing number of disappearances is real, but this boom in organized crime and drug trafficking has erased what is happening to women, not that it stopped happening, but it is becoming invisible”, Andrade said. Femicide as a New Scourge The term “femicide” is used to refer to all types of gender-related killings of women and girls as described in the “Statistical framework for measuring the gender-related killing of women and girls (also referred to as “femicide/ feminicide”)”. It is developed by UN Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) and UN Women and approved by the United Nations Statistical Commission in March 2022 . In the emerging scenario, vast majority of male homicides take place outside the domestic sphere. However, home has become the “most dangerous place for women and girls”. As per the 2024 report published by the UNODC , the contrast is stark: as compared to 11.8% killings of male, 60.2% women were killed in 2023 by their intimate partners (45%) or other family members (55%).   Picture Source : UNODC and UN Women, Femicides in 2023: Global Estimates of Intimate Partner/Family Member Femicides  ( United Nations, 2024 ). The number of killings by family members and intimate partners – the most common manifestation of femicide – remains at staggering levels globally. The UNODC report, on the basis of studies carried out  in 2023  show that some 51,100 (as compared to 48, 800 in 2022 ) women and girls were killed at home, out of 85,000 ( 89, 000 in 2022 ) women and girls killed intentionally by their intimate partners or other family members. Thus, femicides account for 60 per cent of all female killings globally. In other words, an average of 140 women and girls worldwide lost their lives every day at the hands of their partner or a close relative. In many of the cases, the victims had previously reported violence. Hence, their killings could have been prevented. Gender based violence is a global challenge ( Author: The Tribune, November 02, 2021 ). However, the gender related killings of women are reflection of deeply entrenched hatred and sadistic mindsets that assume “most brutal and extreme manifestation of violence against women and girls” ( UN Women; November 25, 2024 ). Femicide differs from other forms of homicides or murders wherein there is an explicit mens rea  (intention) to kill a female solely on the basis of her gender. In order to eliminate the root cause of femicide, the regulatory processes could trace the genesis and symptoms at home, in workplaces, schools or public spaces, including intimate partner violence, sexual harassment and other forms of sexual violence, harmful practices and trafficking. Picture Source : UNODC and UN Women, Femicides in 2023: Global Estimates of Intimate Partner/Family Member Femicides  ( United Nations, 2024 ). As a new global menace, femicide transcends borders, socio-economic status and cultures, but its severity varies from region to region and country to country. For instance, Africa recorded the highest rates of intimate partner and family-related femicides, with 21,700 women killed in 2023, followed by Asia (18,500), Americas (8,300) and Europe (2,300) and Oceania (300). In Europe, 64 per cent of victims were killed by their intimate partners; in the Americas, it was 58 per cent. In contrast, women in Africa and Asia were more likely to be killed by family members than by their partners. This is a graphic reality of the alarming rise in new global scourge witnessed around the world. The challenge remains as to how to end violence against women and girls and achieve justice for every victim. It calls for an end to the culture of impunity and holding the perpetrators accountable amidst challenges of non-reporting of killings, societal cultures and weak justice delivery mechanisms. The organs of the UN such as UNODC and UN Women face heavy odds in their efforts to collate statistics and spread of awareness.    The Normative Framework The genesis of the social-patriarchal construct of uneven position and treatment of women goes back to time immemorial. However, there has been organized efforts, struggles and processes as well as crafting of instruments and structures to attain the truism in various spheres of life that a woman is as much human as man. In the post- UN Charter (1945 )  era, the first breakthrough was brought about by the pioneering magna carta  (International Bill of Human Rights) – Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) through its resolution 217 (III)  of December 10, 1948 . A feisty Indian woman delegate, Hansa Mehta, is widely credited for bringing about sanity and balance in the drafting process to replace the word ‘men’ by ‘human beings’. Hence the UDHR emphatically declares: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights” ( Article 1 ). It became a historic milestone of normative equality between men and women. However, it took 30 more years to address the simmering issue of discrimination against women when the UNGA again took the initiative to adopt Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women ( CEDAW ) through the instrumentality of its resolution 34/180 of December 18, 1979 . In defining the discrimination against women”, CEDAW has identified “ any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex” (Article 1).  The primary thrust of CEDAW comprises elimination of discrimination and restoring equality in three spheres: (i) c ivil rights and the legal status of women (ii) dimensions of human reproduction and (iii) impact of cultural or traditional factors on gender relations . Yet CEDAW refrained from addressing the crucial challenge of violence faced by women around the world. Therefore, 1979 CEDAW’s thrust on “elimination” was sought to supplemented by the UNGA through a special resolution 48/104 of December 20, 1993 . It brought into being Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women . In defining the phrase "violence against women", the Declaration brought into vogue a new global parlance of “any act of gender-based violence” ( Article 1 ). As a corollary, the 1993 UNGA Declaration sought to establish an umbilical link with 1997 CEDAW in these words: “effective implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women would contribute to the elimination of violence against women and that the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, set forth in the present resolution, will strengthen and complement that process”. It aimed to fill up the gap on violence left out in CEDAW. Though adopted through a recommendatory UNGA resolution, the 1993 Declaration can be said to have higher normative value as it is the only global instrument that squarely addresses the endemic scourge of violence against women. It enshrined the broad contours of violence against women ( Article 2 ) to include the following: (a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, including battering, sexual abuse of female children in the household, dowry-related violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation and other traditional practices harmful to women, non-spousal violence and violence related to exploitation; (b) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring within the general community, including rape, sexual abuse, sexual harassment and intimidation at work, in educational institutions and elsewhere, trafficking in women and forced prostitution; (c) Physical, sexual and psychological violence perpetrated or condoned by the State, wherever it occurs.          It is significant that the Declaration places onus on the States in taking violence against women seriously and enjoins upon them to “condemn violence against women and should not invoke any custom, tradition or religious consideration to avoid their obligations with respect to its elimination.” The call to adopt “all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating violence against women” can be construed as leaving primary thrust of action to the domestic policies, legislations and enforcement organs for elimination of all forms of violence against women. As a result, it places the 1993 Declaration in the same league as the 1997 Convention (CEDAW). It came as a logical corollary for the UNGA, in view of the global trend of violence against women and girls, to take further initiative through resolution 54/134 of December 17, 1999  to designate November 25  every year as the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women . The UNGA recognized the graphic global reality of inequality, discrimination and violence against women and sought to bring together the UN system-wide efforts in conjunction with the efforts by the sovereign states and civil society and NGOs. It was on the recognition of the concrete premise that “violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men and women, which have led to domination over and discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of their full advancement, and that violence against women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced into subordinate positions, compared with men” ( Preamble, paragraph 6 ). This forms the basis for continuation of a process to take step-by-step concerted measures, in view of the ground realities in different countries, for the elimination of all forms of violence against women. Picture Source : UNIC Mexico. Eloísa Farrera. Mural (Sowing memory, reaping justice) At the regional level, only directly applicable instrument remains the 1994 Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women. The Convention was adopted at Belem Do Para (Brazil) on September 06, 1994 by 34 States  at the 24th regular session of the General Assembly to the Organization of American States (OAS). It entered into force on May 03, 1995. The OAS Convention, adopted after the 1993 UNGA Declaration, has defined violence against women as “any act or conduct based on gender that causes death or physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, whether in the public or the private sphere” ( Article 1 ). Significantly, in outlining the scope of the Convention, it has imbibed the spirit of the 1993 UNGA Declaration ( Article 2 ). In laying down the duties of the States Parties, the Convention has created Inter-American Commission of Women to which the Parties will provide national reports on “measures adopted to prevent and prohibit violence against women, and to assist women affected by violence, as well as on any difficulties they observe in applying those measures, and the factors that contribute to violence against women” ( Article 10 ). Notwithstanding this OAS Convention, its efficacy has come under question in view of rising tide of femicide in Americas as reflected in 8, 300 killings of women and girls (2023) . The consistently higher rate of intimate partner/family member femicide is more worrisome in Central America than in the other parts of the region.                  A Challenge for International Law Femicide requires multifaceted approaches to attain the aspirational goal of “elimination” of violence against women and girls. The  prevalence of such violence against women and girls in the third decade of the 21st century presents a challenge for International Law, international institutions and the global scholarly community. As underscored in this author’s treatise Sexual and Gender Based Violence in International Law  (Springer: English 2022 ; German 2023 ) “the control over female sexuality remains central to the social, cultural, and State-driven global normative systems”. It appears to be an important contributing factor in the rising global scourge of femicide prevalent in all the societies. The above scholarly work has alluded to working out processes for de-legitimization of SGBV. It would also help as an important approach to ensure elimination of femicide in the foreseeable future.  As explained in the discussion on “normative framework”, it is the UNGA that has put into place resolutions and declarations that have propounded fundamental human rights of women and girls in general and inequality, discrimination and violence against them in particular. The only UNGA mandated global instrument (1997 CEDAW) per se does not address any form of violence against women even though all forms of discrimination against women constitute a major factor that contribute to brutal violence (femicide) against women and girls. Therefore, it is high time that the UNGA, as a plenary organ of the UN, sets in motion a negotiating process at the earliest for a special global Convention on the Elimination of Sexual and Gender Based Violence Against Women that can be adopted as annexure to a special resolution thereon. #Femicide #UNGA #UNSC #UNWomen #UNWomenIndia                         This is an Original Contribution to the SIS Blog. Prof. (Dr.) Bharat H. Desai is (former) Chairperson and Professor of International Law at the Centre for International Legal Studies (SIS, JNU), who served as a member of the Official Indian Delegations to various multilateral negotiations (2002-2008), initiated and coordinated the futuristic knowledge initiatives for the SIS Faculty Wall of Honor (2023-24) , the Inter-University Consortium: JNU; Jammu; Kashmir; Sikkim (2012-2020)  and the Making SIS Visible (2008-2013)  as well as contributes as the Editor-in-Chief  of Environmental Policy and Law (IOS Press: Amsterdam) .

By Shibankita Pradhan The month of November unfurled itself interweaving the pride of a cherished past and the vision of a promising future. As the celebration lights of Cuttack’s Balijatra dimmed with the conclusion of the annual festival, the spotlight was shifted to the capital where the stage was set for India to make its pathway toward the aspiration of becoming an oceanic superpower, by hosting the inaugural edition of Sagarmanthan 2024: the great oceanic dialogue , organised by the amalgamated efforts of the Union Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways and the Observers Research Foundation.   Owing to its vast coastline of 7,500 kilometres, the ancient mariners of the land successfully created not only trade links but also cultural connectivity with the Southeast Asian region, which has shaped the dynamics of India’s soft power capabilities today. The architectural wonders  like Java's Borobudur and Prambanan temple and Tanah Lot temple in Bali, today stand as the timeless witness of India's ancient glory and seafaring endeavors. The annual festival of Balijatra ("voyage to Bali") in Odisha, keeps this treasured legacy alive by commemorating the farsightedness of the mariners of the land. This age-old tradition somewhere prepared the foundational ground for setting up India’s current vision of becoming a global maritime superpower by reviving its past potential. This aspiration got a kick-start by the inaugural edition of Sagarmanthan Dialogue 2024, which aimed to forge strategic cooperation in the key areas of Global Supply Chains, Climate change Maritime Logistics, and Sustainable Growth, thereby positioning India in the epicenter of global maritime governance.   Described as “the platform of churning” by the president of the ORF, Mr. Samir Saran in his opening remarks, the two-day Sagarmanthan dialogue brought together delegates, policymakers, and thinkers of across 60 nations to formulate a well-planned, sustainable, and mutually shared strategy  to address the challenges and opportunity in the field of ocean governance and blue economy. Looking at the picture through the geostrategic lenses, the Dialogue succeeded in finding plausible solutions to the China factor. It can be contemplated that the core goal of discussions was to present India as a reliable alternative to China so that the Chinese dominance over global maritime trade can be countered. During the sessions, experts and policymakers concluded that India, with its geographical position coupled with rapidly developing infrastructure is a more reliable player in reforming the world's supply chains as opposed to China, whose unethical practices related to the Belt and Road Initiative were subjected to criticism across the globe. The Sagarmala initiative, a key Indian infrastructure project, caters to this by focusing on increasing global connectivity in the sea trade routes and reducing the reliance of those routes on China. The dialogue has further underlined India's approach towards building geopolitical partnerships, mainly in the Indo-Pacific region. Opportunities for the future can be created by aligning with the Quad nations and by promoting regional collaborations through initiatives like SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region). Moreover, the concept of democracies "ruling the waves" can particularly gain momentum in this respect as they are guided by the principles of equitable and sustainable global order. Democracies are more likely to promote the notion of freedom of navigation and free trade routes as emphasized in the United Nations Convention on Laws Of Sea. Unlike China's unilaterally imposed approach on the South China Sea, India's approach revolves around the notions of "Viswamaitri" and “Vasudhaiwa Kutumbakam” with promises of inclusivity and cooperation between likeminded nations in order to achieve a balanced maritime governance.   The Sagarmanthan dialogue marked an iconic milestone as it drew global attention to its position as the most influential maritime thought leadership platform in South Asia. It brought a plethora of valuable insights for Indian policymakers to realize that the vision put forward through the Sagarmanthan needs a constant and rigorous plan of action. This takes the Indian maritime journey to a crossroads now. This is a nation with an ancient oceanic trading legacy and the distinction of having an ocean name after it, yet, it does not seem to have found its position among the contemporary maritime leaderships. The country’s economy accounts for 8 percent of the global GDP, but is starkly contrasted with only a paltry 1.2 percent of share in global shipping capacity and has to rely heavily on foreign vessels to transport 95 percent of nation’s traded merchandise . However, India inherits all the potential and expertise to transform the current scenario. From building nuclear submarines to aircraft carriers, it has all the capabilities to bridge this gap. The country's brimming young population can be a valuable asset in shipbuilding foremanship. Almost 20% of the Indian youth are following their profession in sailing activities. Along with that, the current government is committed to policy reforms by granting ship infrastructure status for long-term financing and amending the SARFAESI Act to allow ships as collateral. Increased research around oceans, enhanced commercial shipping capacity, and a strong naval power, are the three focus areas that can act as catalysts for India's march toward being an oceanic powerhouse.   Towards the end of the dialogue , Sanjeev Sanyal, a member of Economic Advisory Council to the Prime Minister of India , drawing inspirations from Balijatra, linked India's ancient maritime power with its modern potential. "If we once dominated the oceans through commerce and culture, there is no reason we cannot do so again,"  Sanyal remarked. The echoes of Balijatra, symbolizing centuries of maritime excellence, resonated deeply throughout the Sagarmanthan. It was a powerful reminder that the strength of India lies in fusing its legacy with the ambition of its future. The tradition of toy boat sailing on Boita Bandana on the day of Kartika Purnima carries aspirations for a future where the maritime spirit of India will lead the world, sailing through the challenges, and uniting tradition and ambition to steer mankind toward a brighter, more sustainable horizon.   This is an Original Contribution to the SIS Blog.   Shibankita Pradhan is a postgraduate student of Politics with specialization in International Relations (PISM) at the School of International Studies, JNU. Her academic pursuits are centered around research and writing on pressing political issues and global dynamics and transitions.

By Prof .Emeritus S. D. Muni Ideologically, the United States is a self-proclaimed promoter and protector of democracy in the world. Its democracy policy has gradually evolved over the past century. The US fought the Second World War to defend democracy against fascism and waged a three-decades-long struggle during the Cold War against communism. Soon after the Cold War, U.S. President George Bush Senior proposed a ‘New World Order’ based on “freedom, peace and democracy” His successor, President Bill Clinton, said at the United Nations on September 27, 1993, that the ‘overriding purpose’ of American foreign policy is to “expand and strengthen the world’s community of market-based democracies.” In order to advance this purpose, Clinton’s Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, took the initiative of establishing a Community of Democracies (CoD). At the first meeting of the CoD in Warsaw in 2000, 106 countries promised to advance democratic norms and institutions [1] .  The U.N. endorsed this intergovernmental organization and later raised a “U.N. Fund for Democracy,” with contributions from members. In recent years, President Joe Biden has convened the ‘Summit of Democracy.’ The first such summit was convened in a virtual form in Washington on December 9-10, 2021. Its objectives were “defending against authoritarianism, addressing and fighting corruption and advancing respect for human rights.” The second summit was hosted by the U.S. in collaboration with Costa Rica, Zambia, Netherlands and South Korea in March 2023, and the third summit was hosted by South Korea in March 2024, in a hybrid, in-person, and virtual form. The second summit was prompted by the feeling that there was “autocratic assertion and an ongoing democratic recession.” The U.S. strategic community (official and unofficial) has identified Russia and China as the two powerful states pursuing “autocratic” assertions, thus integrating its ideological stance on democracy with the foreign policy goals of containing Russia and China. At the second summit, Biden promised to work with the U.S. Congress to “commit $9.5bn across all over efforts to advance democracy around the world.” In a critical assessment of Biden’s approach, the Carnegie Endowment for Peace said that “Biden’s democracy policy…actions belie the administration’s soaring rhetorics about standing for democracy against autocracy.” [2]  The declared policy’s inconsistencies and its contradictions with the actions, however, are not limited to the Biden-Harris administration alone, but to the U.S. approach as a whole. Recall President Clinton’s campaign speeches in 1992, when he had criticized his predecessor, Bush Senior, for aligning American interests with a variety of dictatorial regimes while highlighting the values of democracy and freedom. Democracy in South Asia Let us look closely at these inconsistencies in U.S. democracy policy in South Asia over the years. South Asia as a region occupies a strategically important place in U.S. foreign policy as it accounts for a third of the world’s population, closely neighbours China and turbulent West Asia, is a potentially attractive economic market, and its countries are jostling with diverse and fluid forms of democratic governance. On the ideological plane, the U.S. State Department brings out two reports every year to monitor human rights and religious freedoms all over the world. These reports cover in detail various aspects that underline democratic processes and governance, like violations of human rights and personal freedoms, political freedoms, the role of the judiciary, media censorship and prosecutions of journalists, government corruption, discriminatory nationalism, the status of ethnic and religious minorities, gender justice, etc. These reports serve an important role in U.S. domestic politics to show how committed the government of the day is to the cause of democracy. In these reports, policy recommendations are also made to the government in its approach to specific countries, depending on their positive or negative record on various aspects. Measures like sanctions, denial of economic assistance and visas, and trade and other restrictions on those who violate norms, including individuals, leaders, business houses, managers of democratic institutions, and the like, are implemented to get the faults corrected. In these reports, South Asian countries have been found wanting on many of the human rights and religious freedom parameters of democratic functioning. For instance, the Report of the U.S. Commission for International Religious Freedoms (USCIRF) for 2024-25 listed four South Asian countries, namely India, Pakistan, Myanmar and Afghanistan, as “countries of concern.” Sri Lanka was put on the list of countries under “special watch”, while Pakistan was pulled up for its discriminatory and harsh blasphemy laws. India was described as a country where “religious freedom conditions continued to deteriorate,” which “reinforced discriminatory nationalist policies” and also failed to “address communal violence…against Muslims and their places of religious worship.” The U.S. Ambassador in India endorsed this report. Earlier, President Obama had sounded caution to India in a public speech in New Delhi during his state visit in 2015. In Sri Lanka, too, according to the latest report, “religious freedom continued to decline,”, pointing out that lands belonging to Hindu and Muslim minorities were being acquired for the construction of Buddhist places of worship. Similarly, detailed country reports on the state of human rights, annually prepared by the U.S. Department of State since 1977, also show South Asian countries in poor light. Most of them have been censured for restraining freedom of expression, violence and discrimination against minorities, life-threatening conditions in prisons, gender violence and injustice, persecution of political opponents, and related issues. Besides Department of State monitoring, there are think tanks and advocacy institutions engaged in regular studies and analysis of the democracy situation in the world. In its latest “Freedom in the World” report, Freedom House categorises all the South Asian countries as “partially free,” and India’s Kashmir as “not free.” On India, it says that “separate incidents of violence resulted in damage to mosques, Muslim-owned businesses and Christian churches.” South Asian countries have rejected such categorization. South Asian governments have dismissed the U.S. reports as biased and distortions of reality. Reacting to the 2024-25 USCIRF report, India’s Minister for External Affairs, S. Jaishankar, described it as uncalled-for “interference.” He said: “It cannot be that one democracy has a right to comment on another, and that’s part of promoting democracy globally. But when others do that, it becomes foreign interference. Foreign interference is foreign interference, irrespective of who does it and where it is done.” Describing the USCIRF as a “biased organisation with a political agenda,” Randhir Jaiswal, spokesperson of India’s Ministry of External Affairs, said, “We reject this malicious report, which only serves to discredit USCIRF further.” [3]  Similarly, the Pakistani Foreign Office spokesperson Mumtaz Zahara Baloch, reacting to the 2023 report on religious freedom, said: “Such ill-informed reporting exercises about internal affairs of sovereign states are pointless, irresponsible and counterproductive.” [4]  India has not been issuing visas to USCIRF representatives for over a decade. Cold War Policy Inconsistencies and Contradictions U.S. agencies make various policy recommendations for the government, which include sanctions (including financial), visa restrictions and other diplomatic measures to be imposed on countries and entities violating the rights of their citizens. The U.S. government has only selectively accepted such recommendations depending upon its perceived strategic, economic and other interests. This is evident in U.S. policies towards South Asian countries. During the Second World War, U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt wrote to Gandhi, the leader of India’s freedom struggle, to cooperate with the British war efforts, saying: “Our common interest in democracy and righteousness will enable your countrymen and mine to make common cause against a common enemy.” Gandhi and India’s freedom fighters refused the request and asked for the grant of Indian independence first. After independence, India denounced military alliances and emerged as a leader of the non-aligned movement. India’s non-alignment and its cordial relations with the then Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the People’s Republic of China – the perceived bastions of Communism and adversaries of the U.S. – so annoyed policy-makers in Washington that they decided to contain India within South Asia. For instance, during the Cold War, the U.S. preferred military regimes of Pakistan against a democratic India. The reason was that India refused to follow the U.S. vision of the world, and Pakistan was more than willing to do the U.S. bidding in return for American military, economic and diplomatic support against India. India’s push for democratization of the Himalayan Kingdoms of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim was only selectively welcomed by the U.S. In Nepal, the U.S.’ preferred option remained the Monarchy from the rise of King Mahendra in 1955 until the elimination of the Monarchy under King Gyanendra in 2008. The democratization of Sikkim (1975) and Bhutan (2008) were accepted in Washington. India’s support for the emergence of an independent and sovereign Bangladesh in 1971 was militarily resisted by the U.S. Subsequently, the U.S. was seen in New Delhi as being actively involved in the Pakistan and China-engineered military coup in Bangladesh in 1975 that overthrew a democratic regime, brutally killing its popular Prime Minister Mujibur Rahman and his entire family. [5]   During the 1970s and 1980s, the U.S. even allied with China to isolate the USSR and force it to retreat from Afghanistan. This proved the consistent Indian assumption that the Cold War was being waged not to fight Communism ideologically but to contain the USSR to consolidate U.S. power and supremacy in the world. The broader strategic irritation and indifference towards India in U.S. policies was punctuated by periodic and limited economic and military support (after the Chinese aggression in 1962). There were also U.S. Presidents like Eisenhower, Kennedy and Reagan who appreciated India’s democratic credentials and wanted to improve bilateral relations but strategic interests worked out by the Departments of State and Defense did not let the White House’s ideological preferences translate into concrete policies. The real shift in U.S. approach towards India has been evident only in the context of India’s declared nuclear weapons power status in 1998, its growing economy since the early 1990s, and the rising challenge posed by China to U.S. supremacy and India’s territorial integrity in the Indo-Pacific region. The U.S. sees India as a credible force in the Indian Ocean to balance Chinese expansion and assertion, and India looks towards the U.S. for military, technological, economic and diplomatic support to match China’s phenomenal rise. In pursuance of this strategic convergence, the U.S. is soft-peddling its response to India’s democratic deviation, and India is willing to absorb minor ideological shocks from the U.S. [6]  To accommodate India’s unhappiness, the U.S Department of State has distanced itself from the latest USCIRF report.     U.S. support for Pakistan started with the firming up of the Cold War against the Communist powers Russia and China. Explaining this support, a senior State Department official observed in 1951: “We do however have a great incentive to help Pakistan for the reason that Pakistan is very co-operative with us and the western countries. Pakistan has a very forthright attitude with respect to the basic cold war issues. Pakistan…has in other ways demonstrated her willingness to participate with us.” [7] Several studies hold U.S. support for Pakistan responsible for the erosion of its democracy and the rise of its military as a domestic power center. The sudden death of its founder, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, followed by the mysterious assassination of its popular Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, broke the back of democratic evolution in Pakistan. The U.S. Central Investigation Agency is suspected of having played a role in Liaquat Ali’s assassination. [8] In his biography, “ Friends, Not Masters (Oxford University Press, 1967), Pakistan’s first military dictator, General Ayub, wrote that American support for his army gave it strength and confidence between 1952 and 1958. This encouraged the army to take control of the Pakistani State in 1958. By then Pakistan had become a military ally of the U.S. Pakistan’s military has consistently received U.S. military, political and economic support (estimated to be $67 bn between 1951 and 2011). After the Cold War, the U.S. needed Pakistan to fight its post-9/11 war on terrorism in Afghanistan. Even after realizing that Pakistan was a part of the ISIS and Al-Qaida terror networks and its strategic proximity was growing with China, the U.S. continued to support Pakistan and its military’s dominance in its polity. The latest example of support for the Pakistani military was evident in the ouster of popular Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan through a parliamentary conspiracy in April 2022. [9]  Pakistan’s nuclear weapons power status, its identity as the largest Islamic State, its proximity to the turbulent Islamic world, and its location on the Persian Gulf and in the neighbourhood of China cannot be ignored by Washington’s strategists. Recent Democratic Upheavals in South Asia   Three South Asian countries have undergone democratic upheavals in the past two decades. Nepal saw the democratic mainstreaming of a decade-old Maoist insurrection in 2006 and the elimination of its Monarchy in 2008 for an “inclusive, federal, republican democratic” order. The Maoist leadership had promised to create a “New Nepal” through systemic transformation. During March-July 2022, a popular uprising in Sri Lanka, called Janatha Aragalaya  (people’s struggle) forced its democratically elected President Gotabaya Rajapaksa to flee the country. The Rajapaksa clan was known to be authoritarian, corrupt and strategically leaning towards China. In the presidential elections in September 2024, Anura Kumara Dissanayake of a radical, leftist outfit, the Janatha Vimukti Peramuna (JVP) known for its violent rebellions in 1971 and 1989, has emerged victorious. Dissanayake has promised to bring about systemic changes in the Sri Lankan polity. In Bangladesh, a massive student uprising defied violent suppression and forced Shiekh Hasina, its prime minister of 15 years, to resign and flee the country. An interim political setup that includes student leaders and led by Noble Laureate and activist Mohammad Yunus has assumed power. The new administration promises to reform Bangladesh’s political dynamics radically. The U.S. reacted differently to these transformations. In Nepal, it strongly opposed the Maoist insurrection and, while pleading for a peaceful resolution of the turmoil and condemning human rights violations both by the Maoists and the ruling monarchy, offered military and financial assistance to the latter to crush the former. The U.S. support, along with support from China, had emboldened the autocratic Monarchy to avoid reaching a peaceful compromise with mainstream democratic parties and the Maoists. These two anti-monarchy forces joined hands and, blessed by India, eventually forced the King to surrender his executive power in April 2006. Mainstreamed into politics, the Maoists with support from other Nepali democratic parties ended Monarchy through a popularly elected Constituent Assembly in 2008. The U.S. accepted this change and has since been pursuing cordial relations with Nepal, including under Maoist-led governments. Indeed, Biden invited Pushpa Kamal Dahal, the former Maoist guerrilla leader who was the then Nepali prime minister, to attend the second Democracy Summit in 2023.   In Sri Lanka, when an inefficient and autocratic presidency of Gotabaya Rajapaksa triggered a huge popular uprising, the U.S. stood by the people. The Department of State opposed Gotabaya’s imposition of emergency and violent police action to deal with the uprising in 2022. It extended support for the protesters. The U.S. Ambassador in Colombo Julie Chung was in direct contact with the protest leaders and had reportedly financially backed them. In a post on X, formerly Twitter, on May 04, 2022, she said: “The freedom to engage in peaceful protest without fear of arrest is fundamental to democracy. The US urges restraint on all sides and reiterates our support for the rights of peaceful protest.” Whispers in Colombo’s political circles pointed to the U.S. embassy’s efforts, while supporting the protests, in helping President Gotabaya (a dual U.S./Sri Lanka citizen) escape without being personally harmed. A U.S.-friendly successor to him in Ranil Wickremasinghe was ensured. There were also reports of Ambassador Chung subsequently visiting the JVP office, supporting JVP leader Dissanayake’s bid for the presidency in the September 2024 elections and sponsoring his U.S. visit to mobilize diaspora support before the election. [10]  This underlined, in view of the Nepali example, that the U.S. is willing to engage and support radical South Asian forces that had engaged in armed rebellion when such forces join democratic politics. In the case of Bangladesh, the U.S. has been consistently unhappy with the Awami League (AL) since the elections of 2009, as its sympathies lay generally with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) established by post-1975 military dictator Gen. Zia-Ur-Rahman and led after his death by his wife Begum Khalida Zia. The U.S. found it difficult to accept the legitimacy of the Hasina-led AL’s electoral victory as elections were not conducted under an ‘independent’ interim administration, a provision made under the BNP government but amended by the AL government in 2011. Since 2021, the U.S. was openly pressuring Prime Minister Hasina to ensure “free and fair elections”, under an interim arrangement. In December 2021, it imposed sanctions on Bangladesh’s Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), a para-military force meant for counter-terrorism, anti-drug action and emergency use. This force was allegedly being politically abused for carrying out extra-judicial killings, abductions and election fund-raising through extortions. The U.S. Department of State imposed visa restrictions in May 2023, reiterating them in September 2023, ahead of the January 2024 elections, on “Bangladeshi individuals responsible for, or complicit in, undermining the democratic election process… The United States is committed to supporting free and fair elections in Bangladesh that are carried out in a peaceful manner.” The U.S. viewed the January 2024 elections as unfair and rigged. After the elections, it lent support to the anti-government students’ uprising (June-August), condemning the Hasina government for atrocities against the protesters, who were demanding her resignation and ‘restoration of democracy.’ Hasina’s contention was that by using the shield of the students’ movement, the U.S. worked to overthrow her regime because she had refused to toe the U.S. strategy for the Indo-Pacific region. Apparently, Bangladesh had refused to sign two U.S.-proposed defence agreements—the “General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA)” and the “Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA). She publicly accused the U.S. of forcing her to let the U.S. build a military base on Saint Martine’s Island. [11]  Yunus, who heads the post-Hasina interim government, has been a known friend and supporter of the U.S. since the Clinton presidency. There are media reports that the U.S. has been quietly mobilizing and training students for the anti-government uprising. [12]  These reports quote Yunus introducing the protesting students’ leader to former President Clinton, lauding these leaders’ careful planning and execution of the Hasina government’s ouster. The groundwork for this operation, spread over months through funding the movement and training the leaders, was reportedly done by the International Republican Institute (IRI), a subsidiary of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), and under information to the Department of State. [13] India has generally been uncomfortable with any major external, including from the U.S., move or intervention in its immediate neighborhood. However, the years of recent democratic upheavals in South Asia have also been the years of growing strategic proximity between India and the U.S. Both have a common objective of containing China’s assertive and expansionist stance in the Indo-Pacific region, though their pursuance of this objective has mutual nuances and deviations. India was unhappy with the U.S. in its support of the Nepali Monarchy’s military approach to the Maoists while repressing democratic institutions and parties. After the mainstreaming of the Maoists, the U.S. has accepted the primacy of India’s strategic interests in the Himalayan state and the two countries are coordinating their approaches to Nepal. In Sri Lanka’s case, India and the U.S. converged on supporting popular resentment against the Rajapaksa ruling clan that has been unduly leaning towards China. Both also found Wickremasinghe to be eminently acceptable as a successor of Gotabaya, and are generally working in harmony to ensure that newly elected President Dissanayake builds an inclusive and stable democratic order. India has felt seriously disturbed by the U.S. support for regime change in Bangladesh. India had built a strong economic and security relationship with the Hasina regime, based on respect for mutual sensitivities and core interests. The forces opposed to Hasina, like the BNP and radical Islamists of the Jamaat-e-Islami, are traditionally close to Pakistan and inimical to India’s interests. The rise of these forces and the prevailing instability, including attacks on the Hindu minority and the fragility of the Yunus-led arrangement, are a matter of deep concern to India. Through quiet diplomatic channels, India has brought U.S. attention to it. It may be hoped that in the larger regional interest of both partners, the U.S. would be responsive to India to see that these forces do not gain ground in the evolving political dynamics of Bangladesh. In this respect, India’s loss will only be the gain for Pakistan and China. In a recent interview, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell admitted that the U.S. role in Bangladesh has “raised some anxieties in India…but we have sought very much to communicate directly of our strong desire that India’s interests are noted and acted on.” [14]  If the discordance between the American and Indian approaches to Bangladesh is not bridged, the interests of both will suffer and Bangladesh will not be able to stabilize itself. Summing Up: The ideological passion for supporting democracy in the world is clearly evident in U.S. foreign policy. However, in translating this ideological commitment into concrete policy measures, strategic and economic interests have always been accorded priority. The cause of democracy has been subordinated to U.S. geostrategic concerns. Balancing ideology with core strategic interests has been all the more challenging for the U.S. in relation to South Asia, where the countries of the region are democratic commitments, but they carry no insignificant value in the U.S. strategic calculations. The U.S., however, is not alone in this mismatch between ideological values and strategic core interests. All other major countries, including India, confront from this dilemma all the time [15]. ------------------- [1] For the text of the declaration see “Warsaw Declaration: A roadmap to democracy”. June 27, 2000. https://community-democracies.org/app/uploads/2019/04/WD-brochure-large.pdf . [2] Thomas Carothers and Francis Brown, “Democracy Policy under Biden”, Carnegie Endowment for Peace, Washington DC, February 06, 2024. [3] The Hindustan Times (Delhi), October 04, 2024. [4] The Dawn (Karachi), May 19,2023. https://www.dawn.com/news/1754289 . [5]  Lawrence Lifshultz,  Bangladesh: The Unfinished Revolution , Part1 and 2, Zed Books Ltd, 1979. [6] For an interesting over view of values and strategic conflict between India and the US, see Daniel Markey, “India As It Is: Washington and New Delhi Share Interests, Not Values”, Foreign Affairs  July/August 2023, Vol. 102, No. 4. Pp. 128-141. [7] As cited in Baldev Raj Nayar, American Geopolitics and India, Manohar Publication, new Delhi, 1976. [8] M.S. Venkataramani, The American Role in Pakistan , New Delhi 1982. Also see, Akhtar Baloch, “The Mystery that shrouds Liaquat Ali Khan’s murder”, The Dawn (Karachi), October 16, 2015. [9] “Imran Khan Claimed He was threatened by the US” The Guardian (London), March 31, 2022. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/31/imran-khan-address-pakistan-faces-no-confidence-vote . [10] Sena Thoradeniya, “Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s (AKD’s) Tryst In America And Julie Chung’s Apologists”, Lankaweb, November 1st, 2023. https://www.lankaweb.com/news/items/2023/11/01/anura-kumaras-akds-tryst-in-america-and-julie-chungs-apologists/ . [11] The Times of India (New Delhi), August 11, 2024. [12]  ibid. [13] Kit Kilarenberg and Wyatt Reed, “Leaked file expose covert US government plot to destabilize Bangladesh’s politics”. The GRAYZONE , September 30, 2024. https://thegrayzone.com/2024/09/30/us-plot-destabilize-bangladesh/ . [14] The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), October 06, 2024. [15] S.D. Muni, India’s Foreign Policy: The Democratic Dimension , Cambridge University Press, 2009, New Delhi. An edited version of this article was published in The Diplomat magazine (No.120, November 2024) Views expressed are personal and do not reflect the official position of SIS. Prof. S.D. Muni is Professor Emeritus, Jawaharlal Nehru University and Former Ambassador and Special Envoy, Government of India

By Pankaj Phanase Clausewitz famously stated , “War is nothing but a duel on a larger scale. It is a physical contest between people where each side uses force to oblige enemy to do things at their will.” Since his time, the nature, purpose, and course of war have transformed dramatically. Gone are the days when war represented the final act of the struggle for existence. Today, it has become a complex task of multidimensional activity with multiple tactics. The rise of asymmetric warfare, the formation of alliances and counter-alliances, and the limited nature of modern conflicts have taken the scope of war far beyond just survival. One need not mobilise an entire resource and yield maximum efficiency when the dominant side really has the power to dictate the entire course of a conflict for the winner. Such a luxury enables the dominant parties to go beyond political objectives to economic objectives in the wars. When such a party is technologically superior, the course of war reaches the war platform, turning into platforms for testing new technologies and strategies, effectively transforming battlefields into experimental labs. The limited wars of the 21st century, such as the Russia-Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas conflict, need to be assessed through this perspective. When the war was escalated by Putin in 2022, it was thought of as a matter of time before the fall of Ukraine. But, Ukraine captivated its allies and observers alike with its remarkable technological capacity to counter Russia’s aggression. The use of smart phones  by both the combatants and noncombatants has brought transformation in command, control, communications, computing, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) on the battlefield. The monitoring capability of Ukrainian software bugs can easily penetrate Russian computers, tablets and phones, which make them GPS guides  for Zelensky’s army.  is followed by small, plastic drones, buzzing quietly overhead, dropping grenades and other ordnance on Russian troops. 3D printers  are able to manufacture spare parts in such a way that maintenance of heavy equipment could be done in the war field itself. Further, ordinary pickup trucks are transformed into the mobile missile launchers  by the engineers. Beyond testing new technologies, Ukraine has shown that even existing technologies can be pushed to their limits to determine their effectiveness. For example, the U.S. and its allies have been keenly observing how well their weapons perform under the stresses of combat and analysing the types of ammunition each side employs. One prominent example is the effectiveness of Russia's use of inexpensive drones  supplied by Iran, which have proven effective in targeting Ukraine’s electrical grid. Western military observers have noted how Ukrainian success has largely been attributed to the American-made HIMARS  (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System), which has played a decisive role in stalling Russian advances. However, some high-profile systems provided to the Ukrainians, such as the Switchblade 300 drone , have not performed as well as expected, teaching valuable lessons about their durability and maintenance requirements in high-intensity warfare. The innovation definitely entered a new phase when it came to the Israel-Hamas war, which escalated after the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023. Israel has shown tremendous superiority over its adversary in three ways. First, unconventional methods of intelligence gathering and targeted killings have revolutionised its warfare. The extensive use of Artificial Intelligence (AI)  has become a game-changer. The Israeli military, using an AI system known as “Lavender”,identified tens of thousands of “human targets” for assassination based on their suspected affiliation with Hamas or the Palestinian Islamic terrorist groups. Once these targets were selected, another AI-based system called “ Where’s Daddy? ” was employed to track them, often resulting in the killing of entire families and nearby neighbours. Another AI system, “ Habsora ”, has been used to identify and destroy buildings and facilities that are purportedly used for military purposes. The second is manufacturing and deployment of ultramodern weapons. The army only used unguided missiles, sometimes referred to as "dumb" bombs  (as opposed to “smart” precision bombs), which have the ability to destroy entire buildings, causing a lot of casualties, when it came to targeting the alleged junior militants identified by ‘Lavender’. This exercise is the outcome of the logic of cost-cutting in warfare, which has reduced human lives to mere numbers, leading to the deaths of hundreds of women and children in Gaza. Third, the transformation of the conventional artillery to unconventional levels. The 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons prohibits the use of lethal weapons on civilian populations. Hence, Israel has developed weapons that appear less lethal on the surface, but cause significant harm. The new precision-guided 120mm mortar bomb called the  Iron Sting  is a powerful weapon in urban warfare because it can pierce double-reinforced concrete. The Palestinian people have suffered severe injuries as a result of the Israeli army’s testing of rubber bullets, robotic guns with artificial intelligence, and various crowd dispersal techniques. The nature of the wounds disguises the lethality of these bullets. Surgeons noticed  that the limbs after the wound appear intact, but it is difficult to distinguish between bone and soft tissues. Hence, superficial wounds reveal severe internal damage, making these weapons exceptionally dangerous. Finally, the IDF’s ability to expand the war beyond borders to initiate manipulation of information. Images from the Israel-Hamas conflict have painfully and graphically demonstrated AI’s ability to be used as a propaganda tool to produce realistic depictions  of bloodshed. Since the beginning of the war, social media has been circulating digitally manipulated photographs that have been used to mislead people about atrocities that never happened or to create false reports of casualties. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu posted a set of pictures on X during the early stages of the conflict, describing them as “horrifying photos of babies murdered and burned”  by Hamas. Ben Shapiro, a conservative commentator, came under fire for allegedly disseminating artificial intelligence-generated content after he enlarged one of the images on X. On the battlefield itself, IDF has deployed drones making sounds of babies crying, which forced the civil population to come out during the night, resulting in enhanced and target identification programmed in ‘Lavender’. The  superiority of the Israeli technicians has deceived AI checking tools.   Wars after the 2020s have introduced novel weapons, frontiers, and techniques, pushing the boundaries of battlefield innovation and allowing for the real-time deployment and testing of these advancements in combat. In the Syrian conflict, Russia used the space  to demonstrate its weapons and access the global arms market. Now Ukraine and Israel replicating this manoeuvre to advanced levels. The limited and deceived lethality of the weapons combined with psychological techniques makes it hard to bring these innovations under radar. China is definitely taking notes  for its potential technological spectacle in Taiwan or elsewhere in the neighbourhood. Thus, modern battlefields are no longer just theatres of conflict— they have become testing grounds where new technologies are forged, pushing the boundaries of warfare and redefining the rules of engagement for future generations. #Digital #War #Competition #Geopolitics This Article is an Original Contribution to the SIS Blog Pankaj Fanase is a Doctoral Candidate at the Centre for International Politics, Organisation, and Disarmament (CIPOD) at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. His thesis focuses on the impact of digital competition on great power politics and their strategic thinking.

By Rahul Pandey The India-China border dispute originates from colonial-era agreements  and post-independence territorial claims . The Sino-Indian War of 1962 significantly exacerbated tensions, resulting in a military standoff between both armed forces. The standoff resulted in the Chinese occupation of Aksai Chin ( China occupied 42,735 sq km ), an Indian territory (part of Ladakh). The conflict was primarily fueled by differing perceptions of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and unresolved territorial claims, which have persisted for decades.   Over the years, numerous talks have been held to address the border issues, yet a lasting solution still needs to be discovered. Tensions escalated in the late 1980s and early 1990s, particularly during the political unrest in Tibet and border incursions. The distrust and competitive nature of regional politics, fueled by the desire for regional influence, resulted in the signing of numerous peace treaties, such as the Peace and Tranquillity  Agreement and the Confidence-building Measures  Agreement, which aimed to foster peace and Development.   However, diplomatic engagements, such as agreements on maintaining peace along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), temporarily eased tensions. The situation turned dramatically with the Doklam standoff  in 2017. The Indian and Chinese troops faced off near the tri-junction of India, Bhutan, and China. However, the Indian Express reported in 2020 that the number of Chinese transgressions across the disputed border had increased from 428 in 2015 to 663 in 2019. Some of these transgressions eventually escalated into standoffs between the two armies. The most notable examples occurred near Chumar and Demchok in eastern Ladakh in 2014 and at Burtse in northern Ladakh in 2015. The Doklam standoff was triggered by China’s attempt to extend a road in a disputed area claimed by Bhutan. India intervened, leading to a 73-day standoff that ended without significant military engagement but underscored the fragility of Sino-Indian relations.   Galwan’s bloody hand-to-hand battle  in June 2020 (June 15/16, 2020) marked a significant deterioration in relations, resulting in the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers and an undisclosed number of Chinese casualties (Officially 4, Xinhua ). This violent confrontation was unprecedented since the 1962 as multiple agreements signed from the early 1990s to early 2010s, such as the Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement, 1993, Agreement on Confidence Building Measures, 1996, Protocol for the Implementation of Military Confidence Building Measures, 2005 and the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs, 2012 - limited the scope of violence. In the aftermath of the Galwan clash, both countries engaged in extensive military and diplomatic discussions to de-escalate the situation. Over the following months, military commanders and diplomatic officials met multiple times to negotiate disengagement ( 31 rounds of diplomatic meetings and 21 rounds of military talks ) at various friction points along the LAC. The key focus areas included the Galwan Valley, the banks of Pangong Tso Lake, and the Gogra-Hot Springs region.   The process was complex and challenging, as both sides sought to protect their territorial claims while avoiding further conflict. Initial agreements led to the establishment of buffer zones to reduce the risk of clashes. Local commanders have been encouraged to meet regularly to foster understanding and mitigate the risk of skirmishes. Implementing buffer zones has led to conflict resolution, but issues in the Depsang Plains and Demchok persist.   On October 21, 2024, Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri announced a breakthrough in the negotiation. He stated that significant progress had been made in resolving issues regarding patrolling arrangements along the LAC. This marked an important step toward normalising the situation, which had remained tense for over four years.  As part of the recent negotiations, both sides recognised the need for a mutual understanding of patrolling rights and troop deployments.   The discussions emphasised a return to pre-April 2020 positions, where normal patrolling was conducted without obstruction. On 12 September 2024, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, the External Affairs Minister , during his conversation with Amb Jean-David Levitte at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, confirmed that about 75% of the disengagement issues had been resolved. However, problems regarding the militarization of the border persisted.   Intense diplomatic efforts marked the process leading to the latest disengagement agreement. Meetings between high-ranking officials, including National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi , in September 2024 at the sidelines of BRICS summit meeting played a crucial role in bridging gaps and facilitating dialogue. These diplomatic channels were complemented by military discussions, which focused on practical measures to reduce tensions on the ground.   The continuous engagement at both levels demonstrates the importance of sustained communication in conflict resolution. Despite the historical mistrust and complexities involved, both nations have recognised the necessity of dialogue to prevent escalation and ensure stability along their shared border. The recent agreement on patrolling arrangements and the disengagement process  is critical to normalising relations. Continued vigilance and diplomatic efforts will be necessary to address the underlying issues and prevent future conflicts.   Implications of Disengagement: Among numerous short-and-medium-term implications, there are four broader implications of this disengagement process: border stability—the agreement could reduce tensions in disputed areas, enhance security along the LAC, and foster stability in border regions; further strengthening confidence-building measures—by creating a formal process of dialogue and crisis management mechanisms, the agreement could pave the way for greater diplomatic trust, potentially easing long-standing regional rivalries; trade and economic exchanges—it can improve trade relations that could benefit both countries and open up more investment opportunities; and people-to-people connectivity will also be restored, particularly among students who wish to pursue higher education in both countries. For instance, the well-known Chinese language fellowship supported by the Ministry of Education of China and the Ministry of Human Resource Department of India (now the Ministry of Education) has been suspended since the Doklam issue. This was a significant language fellowship for Indian students pursuing language training in Chinese universities. With the opening of dialogue, these issues can be resolved.   Challenges and Opportunities: Interpreting past agreements is the most significant challenge between the border issues of both countries. Several factors complicate the situation beyond differing interpretations of the Line of Actual Control (LAC). One of the most entrenched issues is the historical basis of each country’s territorial claims, which are deeply intertwined with national pride and identity. From the Chinese perspective, these claims stem from their political opportunism, rooted in the extension of their past empires.   Another significant challenge is the strategic importance of the contested areas. India and China have developed extensive military infrastructure in these regions, including roads, bases, and supply lines, which has led to a substantial military presence on both sides. This militarisation complicates disengagement because each side is reluctant to pull back, fearing that it could weaken its defensive position or allow the other side to gain strategic advantage. The result is a situation where even minor skirmishes or misunderstandings carry the potential for escalation, as neither side wants to appear weak in the eyes of the other.   What are the ways forward? The path to peace and tranquillity lies in maintaining continuous diplomatic dialogue, supported by back-channel diplomacy, at all levels: government, academia, business, and people-to-people. The territorial disputes between the Chinese and Indian states in the Eastern and Western sectors can be resolved peacefully by addressing the border issue and establishing boundaries at suitable locations along the long border between the two countries. To sum up, the India-China border dispute remains one of Asia's most complex geopolitical challenges. While significant progress has been made in recent months toward disengagement and dialogue, both countries' historical context and entrenched positions mean that a comprehensive resolution will require sustained effort and commitment. As both nations navigate their path forward, they must focus on building trust and cooperation to ensure lasting peace along the LAC. #IndiaChina #MilitaryDisengagement, #IndiaChina #BorderIssues, #DoklamStandoff, #GalwanIncident This is an Original Contribution to the SIS Blog. Rahul Pandey is a PhD candidate at the Chinese Centre of the Centre for East Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. He regularly contributes to domestic and global media on China-related issues, offering insights into Chinese politics, governance, and international relations

By Sanjay Turi Instead of pursuing truth or justice, Canada holds on to politically driven accusations, designed to distract from its own failures. The current diplomatic tensions between India and Canada following India's alleged involvement in the assassination of Hardeep Singh Nijjar- a notorious Khalistani terrorist - highlight how the phenomenon of migration and ethnic diasporas are increasingly determining the foreign policies of host countries. The contemporary scenario is marked with acclaimed migration as one of the topmost highly-debated political issues around the globe. People of liberal states are sharply divided among themselves in their ideologies over the issue of migration. The proponents tilt towards the idea of providing refuge to them for humanitarian considerations and global equality awareness. In contrast, the opponents argue against the same by claiming that the influx of migrants poses a serious threat to the job opportunities and survival of native groups. The current scenario in Canada, where the Sikh diaspora has exerted tremendous influence on foreign policy, highlights this tension in the context of global migrations. The mere fact that the Sikh community has played a significant role in shaping Canada’s internal and external policies, especially with respect to its ties with India, is again bringing this conflict into focus regarding whether migration among the countries should be encouraged or not. Currently, Canada is under a coalition government , where the Liberal Party of Canada (LPC), led by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau governs along with the New Democratic Party ( NDP ) led by Jagmeet Singh. That role is particularly important for Canada-India relations as the transborder migration of the Sikh community has continued to shape the foreign policy of the host country. The Sikh presence in Canada dates back to the late 19th century. Today, they have prospered and emerged as one of the most important minority groups in the country, known for their active participation in politics and economic success. The Canadian Sikh diaspora, today with more than 700,000  Sikhs is one of the largest Sikh populations outside India, with strong concentrations in provinces such as British Columbia, Ontario and Alberta. There are stages of Sikh migration to Canada, but a large number of Sikhs in Canada primarily came from families who immigrated during times of political turmoil in India, especially in the 1980s when tensions between the Indian government and Sikh separatist movements were at their height. Though Sikh diaspora makes up a prominent part of Canadian political life, with leaders like Jagmeet Singh, chief of the New Democratic Party, and many other Sikh members of Canadian parliament as well as cabinet ministers. This has, in turn, influenced Canadian politicians to address the Sikh community’s concerns, related to human rights and religious liberty as well as India’s internal politics, which in turn continues to affect Canada’s foreign policy stance toward India   While the Khalistan movement has decreased significantly in India, it still holds significant support among certain radical Sikh groups within Canada. Khalistani activists in Canada, where they have been able to hold referendums and protests among other events in support of the separatist movement that India sees as a serious threat to its sovereignty, territorial integrity and national security. The Indian government is continuously expressing concerns about the pro-Khalistani groups being active in Canada, accusing the so-called " liberal " Canadian government of supporting extremism and terrorism. It has been urged time and again by the Government of India to crack down on such groups, but Ottawa under domestic political pressure is quite ignorant and soft on them. This attitude of the Canadian government continues to fuel the diplomatic row between India and Canada in recent times. Canada, for its part, defends these activities on the grounds of freedom of speech and expression, enshrined in its constitution. Prime Minister Trudeau has repeatedly emphasised that Canada does not agree with the Khalistan movement, but strongly believes in allowing its citizens to express their political views peacefully. That view of the Trudeau government is interpreted by many as a bid to win the support of Canada's Sikh community – more than 2.1%  of its population and thus a sizable voting bloc. Therefore, even if Prime Minister Trudeau wishes to strengthen relations with India and respect its territorial integrity by cracking down on Sikh separatists living in Canada, he(Trudeau) would face substantial domestic pressure from the Sikh population, resulting in a significant decline in his electoral performance.   Trudeau’s reliance on the NDP, which has a very strong Sikh base, further complicates matters. Having recently survived two no-confidence motions , Trudeau cannot afford to alienate his coalition partner, Jagmeet Singh, or risk losing Sikh support ahead of the general election expected to be held next year in October.  This is exacerbated by the fact that Trudeau's government highly depends on the New Democratic Party(NDP) — a party with strong Sikh support, probably playing the role of King-Maker.   The recent diplomatic tension between Canada and India is a microcosm of a wider trend in global politics — where migration and diaspora politics are shaping home-grown policy more than ever before. Across the European continent, concerns about immigration—often framed in terms of national security, cultural preservation, and economic impact—are unilaterally driving political discourse in society. The negative impact of the Sikh Diaspora within Canada which impacts its foreign policy is perhaps a warning or wake-up call for multicultural societies such as European states. This seems to be possibly fuelling a further backlash against immigration. This may potentially lead to stricter policies on immigration and deportation of migrants globally, disproportionately affecting African and Asian communities who often come from disadvantaged backgrounds in search of better lives.   Mr Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary-General,  was a strong supporter of state sovereignty , once said in his speech that interfering in another country's internal affairs has the potential to undermine international cooperation and peace. He also said that supporting separatist groups for political benefits, generally results in "an endless cycle of retaliation" that harms the existing global multilateral cooperations for the greater good and undermines the idea of diplomacy in International Relations. Therefore, to promote the idea of Vashudaiv Kutumbakam  and prevent any such confrontations, countries, today, must follow the directions provided by the former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. #Canada #Diaspora #India This is an Original Contribution to the SIS Blog Sanjay Turi is a Doctoral Candidate at the Centre for West Asian Studies (CWAS), School of International Studies(SIS), Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

By Madhulika, Snehil Shukla, Sayantan Bandyopadhyay, Nadeem Iquebal, Chandan Kamath, Vijaylaxmi Pal At the heart of Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), Ganga Dhaba stands humbly as a buzzing hub of ideas and debate, where conversations flow as freely as the chai and debates echo into the cool evening air. Small in structure but immense in significance, Ganga Dhaba serves as a gathering ground for students, faculty, research scholars, and visitors alike, drawn in by its affordable tea and snacks, priced to be accessible to all. More than just a spot for late-night refreshments, it has become an enduring symbol of JNU's ethos of intellectual freedom, critical dialogue, and democratic spirit.   Originally established in the 1980s by Bharat Tomar as a humble tea stall, Ganga Dhaba swiftly evolved into a central hub for the university community, where students engage in passionate debates on subjects ranging from Marxism and feminism to caste politics and foreign policy, often continuing late into the night. “Despite its modest size, Ganga Dhaba has preserved its affordability, with a cup of chai costing just Rs. 10 and an aloo paratha also at Rs. 10, ensuring it remains accessible to students from all walks of life,” shared Harish, the current shop manager.   This unassuming eatery has been frequented by some of India’s most influential intellectuals and politicians during their formative years in JNU, many of whom credit their political awakening to the late-night discussions at Ganga Dhaba. Figures like Sitaram Yechury, Nirmala Sitharaman, and S. Jaishankar, have all spent evenings immersed in debate here, surrounded by fellow students as eager to discuss the intricacies of global affairs as they were to unpack domestic issues. For those who sat on these stone benches with steaming cups of chai, Ganga Dhaba was nothing less than an open classroom where ideas could be tested, arguments refined, and perspectives broadened. More than a place for debates, Ganga Dhaba is a sanctuary for dissent and activism, integral to JNU’s culture of social and political engagement. When the university administration threatened to close it for nonpayment of dues, modernization, and hygiene reasons, students rallied to preserve it. To them, the Dhaba was more than a food joint—it was the heart of campus life, embodying camaraderie, learning, and resilience.   With the U.S. presidential elections taking centre stage, Ganga Dhaba has become a hub for lively discussions. On the night of November 5th, doctoral scholars gathered at the Dhaba, sipping chai and munching on samosas, as they debated how the election’s outcome might impact India's future. Nikhil Biswas from the Centre for African Studies, School of International Studies, sipped his coffee while passionately endorsing Trump. He argued that Trump’s approach, particularly on Syria, favoured stability by leaving it to Russia, and he dismissed the possibility of the U.S. embracing a female president anytime soon. Nearby sat Dhirendra Kumar of the Centre for South Asian Studies, who countered Nikhil’s view with his support for Kamala Harris. He appreciated her inclusive policies and her Indian heritage, which he believed could foster stronger ties with India. Dhirendra highlighted what he saw as Trump’s patriarchal stance, restrictive immigration policies, and the hurdles he posed for Indians pursuing education and work in the U.S. The debate intensified as Nikhil defended Trump’s appeal to everyday Americans facing high living costs and job crises.   Nitish Kumar, a Ph.D. scholar from the Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies, then chimed in, drawing attention to the potential disruptions in trade policy under another Trump presidency. He explained that Trump has previously labelled India a “Tariff King” and a “very big abuser” in trade, pointing out that India’s average tariff rate of 17% far exceeds those of Japan, the U.S., and the EU. Alok, who stood beside him sipping a bottle of Lahori Zeera, added that Trump’s “America First” policy had already led to tariffs on Indian steel and aluminium in his previous term. “That’s why I’m hoping for Kamala’s win,” he remarked.   As the discussion unfolded, some students from Jamia Millia Islamia, waiting for friends nearby, joined in. Their perspective added a sobering dimension to the conversation. One Jamia student remarked, “It doesn’t matter whether Kamala wins or Trump; the ongoing genocide in Gaza is likely to continue.” Another added, “I’m not interested in the U.S. election at all. It’s not going to do any good for the people of Palestine.” The debate took a more reflective turn when an alumnus from the Centre for the Study of Social Systems joined, cautioning that renewed U.S.-China tensions could negatively impact India. He suggested that Trump’s relationship with American voters might see him through, even as he doubted Harris’s call for “a new generation of leaders” would resonate. As the night grew colder, Sankhar Da, the owner of the neighbouring saloon, strolled by, musing, “It doesn’t matter who wins as long as there’s a peaceful transition of power.” His words brought a calm end to the conversation, underscoring the Dhaba’s role as a democratic space where diverse opinions clash yet ultimately converge around a shared commitment to India’s future in a complex global order. In this spirited corner of JNU, students blend the personal with the political as they refine their perspectives on international relations, blending the personal with the political. #JNU #GangaDhabha #USElections This is an Original Contribution to the SIS Blog. Sayantan Bandyopadhyay, Madhulika, Nadeem Iquebal, Snehil Shukla, Vijaylaxmi Pal, and Chandan Kamath are Doctoral Research Scholars at the School of International Studies, JNU.

By Kuldeep Ojha The Chilean Foreign Minister His Excellency Mr. Alberto Van Klaveren’s visit to India during the last week of August 2024 marked a significant touchpoint in the Indo-Chile bilateral ties. As the first such visit in the past decade, it facilitated progress on trade, investment, environment and technological cooperation between the two Global South actors. On India’s part, the renewed momentum in ties with the Latin American state demonstrates its diplomatic commitment to engaging with the Global South on win-win terms. In an uncertain geopolitical environment, both India and Chile are prudently diversifying into new set of diplomatic ties beyond their traditional concerns to hedge their bets and achieve their foreign policy goals through new avenues. The foreign minister’s visit also included a sojourn to India’s premier international relations institution, the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU). A key element of his address included the promotion of education and knowledge exchange between the two countries. Welcomed by Professor Amitabh Mattoo, the Dean of the School of International Studies, the Minister addressed Chile’s role in world geopolitics and the potential for bilateral cooperation in the fields of trade, diplomacy, education and business. In this article, based on the Minister’s remarks at JNU, this article analyzes the current state of India-Chile  bilateral relationship and future avenue for cooperation. Economic Cooperation: Expanding Trade and Investment Ties India and Chile are strengthening trade cooperation, particularly in the areas of agriculture, pharmaceuticals and staple foods. The Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) , signed between the two countries in 2006, has played a significant role in reducing customs duties on over 1,000 products. The trade composition majorly consists of India’s imports of Chilean fruits and wines and its export of agricultural products and medicines. The key focus of the Chilean foreign minister’s visit included the discussion on the introduction of a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) between the two countries. During the bilateral talks with the Commerce Minister of India, Mr. Piyush Goyal, both parties stressed the need for the development of economic cooperation through the framework of market access and cooperation in a new and promising field for Chile and India, namely, critical minerals. The Chile-India Business (Agriculture) Summit in Mumbai  also proved its ability to bring back the agricultural trade between the two countries. Efforts have also been made to address the longstanding concerns regarding sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures, a move deemed crucial to spur fresh supplies of commodities including basmati rice, rose and kidney beans among others. Chile on its part wants to secure the portion of the Indian market share of wines and nuts.    Critical Minerals: Promoting Green Energy Collaboration Out of all the sectors for collaboration that was under discussion during the visit, one of the most crucial one included critical mineral. As the global leader in the lithium ore segment and the second largest producer of copper, Chile holds an important position in the global supply chain of renewable energy sources. India’s growing appetite for electric vehicle (EV) and renewable energy has created an immediate need for these minerals, most importantly lithium which is used for battery production. Moreover, China’s remarkable domination of the EV market and critical mineral supply chain provide an additional incentive on part of India to collaborate with Chile. The obvious rationale, when it comes to the strategic thinking of cutting the risks of economic over-dependence, could not be clearer in New Delhi’s equations. On the Chilean side, such political importance of economic interdependence and the need to diversify its markets could be the reasons that explain the keen interest to court a rising India. The Chilean Foreign Minister’s invitation to Indian firms to invest in lithium mining in Chile is a geopolitical chance for India to secure the supply of the mineral crucial to green transition. The gaining of technical know-how and a foothold in the lithium supply chain are to be counted as the long-term benefits for the Indian business sector. The collaboration further has the potential to result in technological exchange and joint partnerships around sustainable mining operations for economic and environmental benefits. Aligning Interests and Values in the Strategic Partnership India and Chile share a common ground in their commitment to democracy, human rights, and sustainable development. These shared values have the potential to serve as the bedrock of the growing bilateral relation. Both India and Chile support the use of diplomacy and peaceful means to resolve global problems and are committed to the rules-based international order. India’s EAM S Jaishankar has already expressed his appreciation for Chile’s support to India’s bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. The Chilean minister’s speech at JNU touched upon the synergy between the two nations on international order, especially the agenda of reforming multilateral institutions. Consequently, in future, Indian diplomacy may do well to coordinate its position with Chile in international forums on matters of global importance.  The strategic dimension of the bilateral relationship has also attracted quite a lot of diplomatic interest because the conversation has been colored by the possibility of cooperation in the spheres of defense, technology and space. Leading private Indian defence sector actors, including BrahMos, Azista Industries and Goa Shipyard Limited, are involved in discussions with the Chilean Armed Forces to gain access to the lucrative market. MKU Limited has recently exhibited its latest products at FIDAE (International Air and Space Fair) 2024 , in turn consolidating the Indian footprint in Chile’s defence acquisitions market. The vast potential for the defence export on part of India remains untapped and the future performance of Indian firms deserve a close watch. As for the potential for deepening bilateral cooperation, another set of concerned activities include the current negotiations over the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA). While the full details are not available, the likely affected areas include cybersecurity, green energy, climate action, poverty reduction. The Chilean minister also paid much attention to regional integration in Latin America and Asia, where India and Chile can potentially take the leading part to address climate change, economic inequality, and global health issues. India’s prowess in generic medicines, expertise in the HADR missions, and promotion of the solar alliance can readily serve as the diplomatic blueprint to provide public goods in these regions.  Conclusion In conclusion, the momentum in the bilateral relationship warrants an optimistic outlook of the future trajectory, despite a rapidly developing Sino-Latin American relations, and substantial geographical and linguistic barriers between India-Latin America. The Chilean foreign minister’s visit to New Delhi and JNU serve to highlight the Latin American nation’s commitment to improve the relation with India by investing in people to people ties and scholarly exchanges. The visit also demonstrates India’s rising profile and its adroit diplomatic conduct, as well as the continued importance of JNU as the leading hub of IR scholarship in India. #IndiaChile This Article is an Original Contribution to the SIS Blog and is based on an open event not subject to the Chatham House Rules. Kuldeep Ojha is a PhD scholar in Latin American Studies at SIS, JNU. His research focuses on environmental governance in Central America, and his interests extend to the Latin American region and its geopolitics.

By Aarshiya Chowdhary “Standards are taking centre stage in global governance discussions. When countries gather in New Delhi for WTSA-24, they will have an opportunity to foster digital inclusion and trust — values that are more important than ever to ensure that innovation in fields like artificial intelligence, the metaverse, and quantum information technologies helps us create the future we want."  - Doreen Bogdan-Martin, ITU Secretary-General   Artificial Intelligence (AI) is no longer a Small Wonder !   From the first AI Beauty Pageant   winner, Kenza Leyli , the first AI-driven Humanoid citizen , Sophia,  the proliferation of AI-driven haptic devices  like smartwatches to the increasing role of non-state actors like Taylor   Swift's AI-synthesised deep fake  in influencing electoral politics. Moreover, from the world’s first AI regulation  by the European Union (EU), Open AI’s Strawberry model  (sequel to ChatGPT), the adoption of the Global Digital Compact , the Nobel Prize 2024 (Physics) , to the recent release of Ananya Pandey starring ‘CNTRL ’ , Artificial Intelligence (AI) is intensely encapsulating human lives at light’s speed.   In light of this, the Information Telecommunication Union (ITU), the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) are spearheading the first edition of the International AI Standards Summit  at the World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly ( WTSA-2024 ), being held from 14th October- 24th October 2024, in New Delhi, India. This year's World Standards Day theme is ‘Achieving Industry, Innovation, and Infrastructure through AI’ , signifying the instrumental role of AI in transforming the digital space and ensuring an AI-driven sustainable future for all. The Birth of AI: The Smart Machine   The term AI was coined by American computer scientist and mathematician John McCarthy after the creation of LISP (a computer programming language based on a recursive mathematical function applied to a data set) in 1958. This programming language became fundamental to the birth of AI by enabling machines to ‘learn’ and imparted machines with 'intelligence' over a relay of past 'learnings' or 'experiences’. Basically, an AI machine cannot be asked to ' Forget The Past!’   Further, Artificial Intelligence gained traction with Alan Turing’s famous ‘Imitation Game’, also known as the ‘Turing Test’. In his remarkable paper, ‘ Computing Machinery and Intelligence , 1950 ’, Turing demonstrated the ability of machines to ‘think’, based on repeated mimicking or copying of humans in experimental conditions. This became the foundation of what Zuboff (1988) calls 'smart machines', highlighting their socio-economic implications on the different equations of power, particularly with the expansion of Information Technology (IT).   The Need for Standardisation of the AI Landscape: The Pros and Cons of an AI-driven Society   AI has a plethora of benefits, for instance, automated mechanical or creative work with greater efficiency and productivity, personalised online user experience, disaster risk mitigation based on geoclimatic data of a region and security enhancement of digital borders by filtering illegal migrants and identifying UAVs in the age of grey warfare and more.   However, there are downsides. First, it perpetuates inherent racial bias and gender discrimination as an outcome of deep-rooted social stereotypes and prejudices that get embedded in the technical architecture of AI networks. Second, the occurrence of false positives in identification processes. Third, Gen AI technologies like ChatGPT create artworks based on originals that violate IPRs (Intellectual Property Rights). Fourth, AI-created deep fakes facilitate the spread of disinformation and synthetic data. Fifth, there is an increased threat to cyber-security via machine-based phishing, spoofing and DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) attacks. Sixth, training AI models have a heavy energy consumption footprint. Seventh, anonymity and pseudofication techniques with the support of AI augment cyber threats to a great extent. Eighth, AI can deeply erode an individual’s information privacy.   The challenges of an AI-based algorithmic society are exacerbated with the digital Brandt line , which undermines the efforts towards an equitable AI-driven society. The inequality in digital connectivity, access, and literacy results in the absence of fair representation of data from deprived regions, causing biases in AI training models. Also, the fragmentation of data protection laws, including the demand for data localisation by developing countries, inhibits data security and protection of digital rights, fuelling critical threats like profiling based on discrimination.   Standardising AI: The Global Efforts So Far   The first global-level move to advance a human-centric, trustworthy and responsible AI society saw the inception of the OECD-led Global Partnership for AI (GPAI) during the Covid (2020). This was followed by UNESCO’s Recommendation on the Ethics of AI  (2021). Of late, in March 2024, the UNGA adopted the landmark resolution on AI  and emphasised two essential priorities: bridging the digital divide and ensuring equal protection of the rights of individuals in the offline-online world, particularly throughout the life cycle of the AI systems. Further, the European Union pioneered the first AI Regulation Act, adopting a risk-based approach with a critical focus on personal data protection and AI literacy of all stakeholders in the AI ecosystem. Following the release of the Act, the Council of Europe has adopted the first-ever legally-binding AI treaty  to ensure global standardisation of AI with a strong intent to protect human rights, mitigate AI-based risks that undermine social cohesion and democracy, uphold the rule of law, and ensure a sustainable and inclusive AI-based global society. India: Voice of the Global South in the AI Landscape Notably, alongside the WTSA-2024, the world’s first International AI Standards Summit is being held in New Delhi, India, from the 14th-18th of October 2024. It is important to note that such an event is taking place in the Indo-Pacific for the first time. This reflects the Global South's growing multistakeholdership in setting of the global AI-standard regime and India's growing leadership role as the representative of the Global South in the backdrop of current domination of Global North in AI landscape.   Today, the Indo-Pacific construct is emerging as the Geotech heartland  of the digital international system as a consequence of accelerating digital development. Here, India is working towards expanding its foreign policy interests as well as mainstreaming the goals and aspirations of the Global South:   a)     India has strategically opted out of the ‘ Trade pillar ’ of the US-led IPEF, where digital trade fuelled by personal data, the new oil of the twenty-first century , is a crucial component.   b)    India hosted the third Voice of the Global South Summit  under the theme ‘ An Empowered Global South for a Sustainable Future ', with technology, digital transformation, IT, innovation and governance as key focus areas.   c)     India is a founding member of the OECD-led GPAI (Global Partnership Alliance for Artificial Intelligence), 2020, an initiative to enhance multi-stakeholder cooperation in global governance on AI rooted in three critical priorities- safe, secure and trustworthy AI. This pins India's proactive role in fostering cooperation in AI governance. At the GPAI 2024, the New Delhi declaration  called for collaborative efforts to pursue 'AI for the good of all’.   d)    India participated in the Outreach session on AI at the G7 Summit , pushing its values of 'AI for All'. Also, it is a member of the Quad Standards Sub-Group on AI  (2024) that aims to promote international cooperation and give impetus to coherent global AI governance through technical interoperability. Therefore, India has the potential of being a critical bridge between the West and the Global South in the digital domain.   e)     India is positioned 39th on the WIPO’s Global Innovation Index . It occupies the first position amongst lower middle-income economies. It has continued to emerge as an innovation outperformer for the 14th year in a row. Also, it is the world's third-largest start-up economy, with most start-ups being tech-led . Also, India ranks 10th  in private investment in AI development.   f)     India’s global success in digital public infrastructure (DPIs) , for example with the adoption of India’s UPI in Bhutan, Singapore and France , is a significant achievement and highlights its huge potential to be the backbone of a global AI ecosystem that is transparent, inclusive, diverse, accountable, open for cooperation, and a standards-based sustainable human-centric AI future.   g)    India is an emerging economy with an expanding data pool  of 120 crore mobile phone users and 95 crore internet users. A wide data pool paves its way to be a notable actor from the Global South in the AI regulatory landscape.   To conclude, Artificial Intelligence (AI) is transforming and reconceptualising many aspects of human lives. Technology, particularly emerging technologies like AI, is instrumental in profoundly impacting the international world order. The digital divide in the AI landscape compels the developing world to be a dormant actor in the global governance of critical issues like AI. However, in recent times, amid the ongoing Sino-US technology rivalry, emerging economies like India from the Global South have a unique position. They are making headways to promote an ethical, inclusive, diverse and sustainable AI future. The World Standards Summit 2024, including the first AI international standards summit, is an apt moment to ensure an 'AI for Good for All' and achieve the essence of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG 2030). #AI #WTSA2024 #INDIA This is an Original Contribution to the SIS Blog.     Aarshiya Chowdhary is a Doctoral Candidate at the Centre for European Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, India, with her focus of research work on Data Protection, Information Privacy, Digital Rights and Global Regulation of Technology.