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By Prof. Swaran Singh This month, Asia is hosting back-to-back four world summits: November 6-18 Climate summit at Sharm el-Sheikh in Egypt; November 10-13 East Asia Summit at Phnom Penh in Cambodia; November 15-16 G20 summit in Bali (Indonesia); and then, November 16-19 APEC summit in Bangkok (Thailand). What is new is that after nearly three years of pandemic-driven disruptions and online meetings, these summits see world leaders and their delegations travelling to these cities and deliberating in person. On the flip side, however, this return to normal also reveals how in spite of all the talk about decoupling and recasting, the world continues to face an industrialized West who still sets the tone, tenor and agenda at all summit meetings. These summits across Asia, for instance, are bound to remain preoccupied with global shortages and price hikes for food, fuel, fertilizer and now finance - all triggered by the Ukraine crisis. Finance is the latest fourth "F" now added in face of a widely anticipated global recession reinforcing protectionist policies of Western nations. The actual deliberations of these summits are widely suspected to be hijacked by the visible US-Russia confrontation, although Russian President Vladimir Putin is expected to join only the G20 online. But the opportunity costs of Russia delegations being harangued in these summits remain incalculable. All this not only complicates challenges for host nations but threatens to distract attention away from real issues. Photo: Global Times Deeper questions to ask are why has West failed to bring an early end to the Ukraine war? Why has the resultant spree for weapons procurements been allowed to divert precious resources from healthcare or climate mitigation? Why energy shortages are being allowed as the new excuse for global revert to fossil fuels or for West defying their climate finance commitments? What explains this path-dependency on Western powers? To begin with, the very institution of summits has their origins in Europe. This fashion of holding peacetime leader summits originated in 19th century Europe. The 1648 Peace Treaty of Westphalia had finally put an end to European history of religious wars and later their mercantile and industrial revolutions enabled their colonial expansions around the world. This had drifted their mutual hatred to far away territories of their hapless colonized societies. European nations were now able to unleash destruction on these faraway lands and bargain these territories while sitting the exquisite settings of Vienna, Berlin, Paris, and London that were now the chosen venues for European summits. At least the cutlery, courtesies and conversations of summits have remained the same. Nothing changed even when they hosted anti-colonial leaders of their colonies at the same summit venues in Europe. British India's Round Table Conferences in London were British way of socializing India into so-called civilization. Even anti-colonial gatherings were initially held in Europe. In 1927, German communist Willi Munzenberg, with support from Comintern, had initiated a League against Imperialism and Colonial Oppression by convening a meeting in Brussels that was attended by leaders of the American left plus 175 leaders, 107 out of which came from 37 colonized nations. The two World Wars and the Great Depression of 1920 were to accelerate the wave of decolonization and transform these master-slave equations. The two decades following World War II saw emergence of a large number of new nations across Asia, Africa and Latin America. One matrix to measure this change was the membership of the United Nations that rose from 51 to 99 in its first 15 years of its existence. Asia was to see the arrival of world's largest new nations like India, China and Indonesia. The global ramifications of this transformation were reflected in the Asian Relations Conference held in New Delhi on March-April 1947. They agreed to set up an Asian Relations Organization (ARO) and to hold two follow-up events: First, its Southeast Asian Section was to draft an ARO Convention by April 1948 and the second Asian Relations Conference was to be hosted in 1949 in China. Only India's violent partition, first war with Pakistan, and China and Indonesia being in the last stages of their liberation struggles disrupted this momentum for Asian summitry by several years. Wars in Korea and Vietnam saw the US attempting to take over regional leadership through brute force and military alliances and "divide and rule" policy of European imperial powers. While the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) Security Treaty survived in Europe and Australasia, Southeast Asia Treaty (SEATO) and Baghdad Pact of Central Treaty Organization (CTO) remained dysfunctional. These were replaced by US "hub-and-spokes" military alignments with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Singapore. The indigenous Asian summitry was revived in April 1955 Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian nations and their five points of Bandung Spirit were to later produce world's largest ever Non-aligned Movement (NAM). Though the NAM for long remained a third pillar to reckon with, yet the Cold War succeeded in dividing Asian nations into opposite camps. It was not until the collapse of the Soviet Union which coincided with unprecedented economic rise of China that focus shifted to the emerging economies bringing Asia back to the centre. These four summits in Asia represent that historic recognition of Asian wisdom. Asia having since emerged as the locomotive of global growth and development explains why G7 had happily co-opted six Asian nations or 12 nations of Global South in its novel G20 summits from 2008. This also explains centrality of China and India to climate change and other deliberations of global governance. Of world top five economies today, China, Japan and India respectively occupy second, third and fifth positions. Among these India remains the fastest growing economy with promising potential. Asia together accounts for 40 percent of global manufacturing and East Asia alone accounts for over 75 percent of world's semiconductors production - a technology that has become the benchmark of technological progression. But like old times, divisions within Asia have not disappeared altogether. These have allowed the industrialized West to continue to master over their present and future. Having done wonders in economic parameters, this calls for putting Asia's political equations in order. If Asia has to take the lead in realizing the Asian dream of what Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi calls "no first world or third world but only one world" then Asian nations must begin by addressing their distracting mutual disputes and differences. Originally published: Global Times, November 13, 2022. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202211/1279367.shtml?fbclid=IwAR3ei4Dfm8UT2PjlvbU93gpnnP-bVXUD22aDi8ymL7MTh9KEgG5My1NTm34 Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Swaran Singh is a visiting professor at the University of British Columbia (Vancouver) and professor for diplomacy and disarmament, Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Delhi).

By Prof. Gulshan Sachdeva The real challenge is migration and mobility. Still, a ‘thin interim deal’ is possible in the coming months In the context of the upward trajectory of India-United Kingdom relations one constant reference has been the possibility of a bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA). During the then UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s India visit, a Diwali (end October) deadline to conclude negotiations was fixed. In the meanwhile, political and economic crises in the UK deepened. As a result of political turmoil within the Conservative Party, Rishi Sunak is now the third Tory Prime Minister in 2022. At 10.1 percent, inflation is at a 40-year high. The Bank of England predicts that the country would be in recession for the whole of 2023. The soaring energy bills may lead to winter of strikes. Given this, the environment is not conducive for an aggressive trade deal. Sunak’s ascent to power has naturally generated interest, and excitement in India. But his Home Secretary pick Suella Braverman, another Indian-origin leader, asserts that the UK’s current asylum system was "broken" and "out of control”. Besides, the country is facing an "invasion" of migrants. She earlier branded Indians as the largest group of migrants who overstayed in the UK. Although policy-makers from both the countries are issuing positive statements, prospectus for an early conclusion of an FTA needs to be analysed within broader British political and economic developments. No new deadline has been proposed by either side. The British High Commissioner said that both countries are set up for the ‘final ascent’ on signing the trade agreement in the next few months. Some Indian sources indicate that now it will take some time before negotiations are finalised. Although India-UK talks started only this year, both have been negotiating for a trade deal since 2007, earlier under India-EU negotiations. Some of the difficult issues are well known for years. As Indian average tariffs are higher compared to the UK, the British side will definitely benefit more from coming down of tariff walls. The immediate beneficiaries will be in companies in the food and drinks sector in both the countries. About 90 percent of UK exports to India are Scotch whisky in this sector, which attracts 150 percent tariffs. Many in India would like to believe that some loss in the goods sector could compensated through more exports in the services sector. However, the UK is also very competitive in the financial and legal services, and would expect major gains. Earlier it was reported that 16 out of 26 chapters are closed. But sometimes just a few issues can take very long, particularly when there is no new deadline. As there is a strong political will from both sides to conclude negotiations, issues concerning trade in goods and services could still be resolved without any serious difficulty. However, due to past experience of Vodafone and Cairn Energy, the UK will go for tough negotiations in the investment sector. India has terminated most of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) including with the UK. To bring British companies under specific protection, the UK would like to add a comprehensive investment chapter. Since the UK is also a major destination of Indian companies for investment, India may not be averse to this, but serious negotiations may take some time. Some issues concerning digital trade and data protection as well as stringent patent rules as indicated by the leaked text could be problematic. However, solutions could be found as enough homework has already been done to deal with such issues. The real challenge will be in the area of migration and mobility. Unless there are serious gains for India in this sector, negotiations may not conclude. The current political leadership and economic difficulties in the UK may not be very supportive in this area. At the moment, unemployment in the UK is at historic low. But it is expected to rise from next year. A bilateral deal on migration and mobility was signed last year. As per the deal India can send 3,000 young professionals annually to the UK in exchange for taking back undocumented migrants. Both sides have already raised issues on the implementation of the deal. While the UK feels that co-operation on illegal migration has not “worked very well”, India feels there is lack of “demonstrable progress” on mobility protocol. While looking at the political economy environment in the UK and India’s ambitions from the deal, conclusion of a comprehensive pact covering trade, investment, migration, data protection, procurement, and development issues may take some time. But this could also be a template for India-EU negotiations. However, if policy-makers wants to demonstrate progress, a ‘thin interim deal’ is very much possible in the next few months. #India-UKTies #Politics #Migration #NarendraModi #RishiSunak Originally published: Money Control, November 07, 2022. https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/opinion/india-uk-fta-without-migration-a-comprehensive-deal-is-unlikely-9461691.html Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Gulshan Sachdeva is Professor at the Centre for European Studies and Coordinator, Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, Jawaharlal Nehru University.

By Dr. Vandana Mishra The most attention-grabbing section of the book are the chapters which deal with the planning and preparation for 26/11 attacks in India. If the authors would have been allowed to write the real-life stories without the pretense of “fiction”, the story of Lt Col Purohit and the attempts of creating a false narrative of “saffron terror” would have been a decisive nail in the coffin of the ISI-political party-media “nexus”. Uncomfortable truth about the 26/11 terrorist attacks in India, which killed 175 people and wounded around 300 and the seemingly manipulated arrest of Lt Col Purohit were dismissed and shelved for a politically correct narrative, the author claims. Since the same government got another term, the truth was imprisoned and tortured. The naming of political leaders, both of India and Pakistan; travel schedules of leaders and terrorists; details of LeT (Lashkar-e-Taiba) terrorist training modules in Pakistan; involvement of Pakistan’s army and ISI in attacks in India; etc., are enough to give cold shivers despite the fact that the author writes in the Introduction itself that the book is a “fiction, based on information”. The lucidity in narration by Col. Khatana, retired intelligence officer, is exemplary. The author in “The Game Behind Saffron Terror” appositely traces the sequence of events leading to the 26/11 attacks and a political party’s connivance with ISI in establishing it and several other terrorist attacks as acts of “saffron terrorism”, when nothing of the sort exists. The way the conspiracy to float the non-existent jargon “saffron terror” is concocted in the presence of some political leaders in 2006 induces the reader to question the allegiance of the party. The book goes beyond hinting and insinuating, and establishes the linkages between ISI and LeT by detailing the frequent visits of ISI officials to the LeT training camps; ISI role in selection and training of fidayeen terrorists; supply of arms and ammunition; etc. If one is to believe in the chain of events that the author has established, reasoning it to be based on information notwithstanding it being fictional, then there is hardly anything left in judging that not only the jargon “saffron terror” is lodged by ISI (who works with the aid and advise of the President of Pakistan), but the political party and some major media houses have participated and helped ISI in their malicious designs. Another interesting thread that is seamlessly weaved in the narration is that of internal politics in Pakistan. The extent of political control exercised by Army in Pakistan has been significantly highlighted by notating their role in enticing Benazir Bhutto to return to Pakistan and then getting her assassinated with the help of LeT. The detailed discussions between the head of ISI and Pakistan’s President suffice the need of terrorist activities in India to keep the Indo-Pak border volatile in order to bargain internationally in the interest of Pakistan. The most attention-grabbing section of the book are the chapters which deal with the planning and preparation for 26/11 attacks in India, painstaking selection and training of terrorists from LeT, their journey to India for executing the 26/11 attacks and the timeline of the final attack. On the one hand, the account speaks volumes about ISI’s commitment and eye for perfection in their task, and on the other, it is a tale of deceit, amorality, and scabbing by a major political party on the other side of the border. The chapters that describe the love life of Col Purohit fail to harmonize with the flow of the book but at the end their importance can be well accounted for as they successfully stir the reader’s emotiveness when the author elucidates the harsh realities of existence and continuation in real world politics. The saga of Col Purohit—his hard work, accomplishments, false accusations, misled and un-notified arrest, jail, torture, fabricated tagging as saffron terrorist—can bring jitters, albeit it being fictional based on information. Col Khatana claims that the arrest of Lt Col Purohit, and Pragya Thakur, and others in the Malegaon blast case was a well-planned move conceived in Pakistan and aided and supported by a political party and a few media houses to achieve two objectives. One, to establish the existence of “saffron terror”, and two, to raise questions about the honor and integrity of the Indian armed forces. The change of government in 2014; Pragya Thakur as MP; and release of Col Purohit have turned the tables and the narrative too. The book is a radical work for understanding the nuances of intelligence agencies and “behind the curtain” politics in domestic as well as international affairs. Col Khatana’s experience as an intelligence officer adds the much-required element of thorough detailing, which was a prerequisite for a book like this. Though it is a must read for scholars of South Asia and national security, but anyone with a minutest of interest in national politics will also find it valuable. This is not to say that “it is only for scholars”. The book has a fiction-novel like unfolding which can be of interest to any avid reader. Another book, titled “An Invisible Hand Behind Saffron Terrorism”, by Anup Sardesai also takes the reader on the same course of understanding the agenda and methodology of hidden forces in India who are continuously on the move to establish the non-existent “saffron terror” by detailing the incidents and events leading to Malegaon blast and the subsequent arrest of Pragya Thakur. Both works are of the same genre but Col Khatana’s detailing of events, travels, meetings happening in India, Pakistan, UAE, Britain and the audaciousness of taking “names” is what makes this book more chilling and unnerving. On a lighter side, for reasons known only to the author, the expression “poker faced” has been used a number of times and very aptly indeed. Originally published: Sunday Guardian Live, November 12, 2022. https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/news/fact-fiction-book-exposes-game-behind-saffron-terror Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the Dean, SIS. Dr Vandana Mishra is Assistant Professor, Centre for Comparative Politics and Political Theory, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University.

By Pratik Mall “Eminent geoeconomic, geopolitical and strategic rationale underpins China's repeated attempts to block Indian bids to proscribe specific individuals as global terrorists as part of its war on terror” On 19th October 2022, in yet another brazen and misused display of its veto power, China blocked a joint resolution backed by India and the United States to designate LET leader Shahid Mahmood as a global terrorist under UNSC 1267 AL Qaeda Sanctions Committee regime. This thwarting attempt is the fourth in a row this year. A broad realist theoretical framework highlights China's more comprehensive policy of pursuing its parochial, selfish national interests without paying heed to global sensitivities. Paying lip service to the Purity of means, the Chinese have epitomized the dictum of Purity of ends over Means in the past couple of decades. China has no scruples in deploying the utmost irrational, illogical and immoral rationale behind its moves to achieve its sacrosanct foreign policy goals. In the past five years, China has foiled India's bid to blacklist terrorists of already proscribed organizations on multiple occasions. In 2016, seven years after the dreadful Mumbai terror attacks, India proposed the designation of Masood Azhar, the head of already proscribed Lashkar e Taiba, as a global terrorist. This proposal, backed by three of the five P5 of the UNSC, the UK, France and the USA, was blocked by China, citing flimsy technical grounds. It was followed by the trio moving a proposal again in 2017, only to be blocked by China again. It was only in 2019, after severe backlash and criticism faced by China in the aftermath of the Pulwama attacks, that China lifted its technical hold, paving the way for putting Masood Azhar on the global terrorist list of the UNSC 1267 Sanctions Committee Regime. Interestingly India is also currently serving as chair of the UNSC Counter-Terrorism Committee for the year 2022. While India has called for a sustained and coordinated approach to fight the menace of global terrorism, China, on the other hand, has repeatedly blocked India's efforts in this direction. Firstly, in June 2022, China blocked a joint India US proposal for blacklisting LeT deputy chief Abdul Rahman Makki. This was followed quickly by the second attempt to block the designation of Sajid Mir, the mastermind of the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks. The third attempt was in August this year when China foiled an Indian bid to designate Abdul Rauf Ashgar, one of India's most wanted masterminds of the IC814 hijacking. The fourth and latest attempt was to block the designation of Hafiz Saeed's son Talha Saeed and LeT deputy chief Shahid Mahmood as a global terrorist on vague technical grounds. The Chinese Motive Eminent geoeconomic, geopolitical and strategic rationale underpins China's repeated attempts to block Indian bids to proscribe specific individuals as global terrorists as part of its war on terror. The all-weather and iron-brother friendship between China and Pakistan is an overarching thread that runs through all of these logics. Hailed as "higher than mountains, deeper than oceans, stronger than steel and sweeter than honey", this friendship has belied the famous dictum of "No permanent friends and foes in international relations". A sound economic logic informs China's repeated attempts to foil India's bid. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which forms part of President Xi Jinping's pet project, the Belt and Road initiative (BRI), is critical to the Chinese agenda of putting forward an alternative plan for infrastructure development and connectivity. In a larger sense, it holds the key to what China has triumphantly touted as a "Beijing Consensus" model as opposed to the US-dominated neoliberal "Washington Consensus". China has invested heavily in infrastructure development and connectivity projects to the tune of $62 US billion. The Gwadar port, which constitutes the heart of CPEC, holds a lot of economic and strategic significance for China and has been widely touted as a viable alternative to the Chinese "Malacca Dilemma" in the Indian Ocean region. Multiple reports have suggested that CPEC has run into trouble owing to protests by Baloch nationalist elements and attacks on crucial projects. The massive influx of the Chinese population has led to severe demographic alteration and reports of violence against Chinese nationals and workers. A palpable sense among many of these protesting sections has been that China has essentially turned Pakistan into a colony and is imposing a debilitating impact on it in terms of both resource crunch and no tangible economic benefits for Pakistan. Debt trap diplomacy of China, especially in the case of Hambantota in Sri Lanka and its financial collapse, has further alarmed the people of Pakistan of it also falling into a similar kind of debt trap in future. It has exposed the land-grabbing nature of China, leading to protests and attacks. Masood Azhar, whose blacklisting China blocked multiple times, has been a go-to man for them. China has been paying its organization and goons to protect Chinese economic interests in protest-hit regions. At the strategic level, competition with India has been a critical factor behind china's move. China which seeks to build hierarchical world order, wants India not only to play second fiddle but also to box in India in South Asia. At the broader level, Pakistan has been pursuing a policy of “bleeding India by thousand cuts” and invocation to “thousand years of war”, with India couched as a low-intensity covert war through militancy and infiltration. In the broader scheme of things and to put India down, China uses Pakistan as a strategic ally and exploits hostility against India, the raison d'etre for Pakistan. China has cultivated the vicious China-Pakistan nexus in India's neighbourhood to stoke extremism and terrorism on its eastern and western borders to keep them unstable, hampering India's growth prospects. China's logic to put a technical hold doesn't hold water as LeT and Jaish e Mohammad has already been proscribed under UNSC 1267 sanctions committee regime. China's attempts have been primarily to buy time by citing vague grounds such as that sufficient linkages do not exist between 1267, a specific clause dealing with Al Qaeda and Islamic State and these individual terrorists. At the political level, China has tried to build a narrative in its favour through institutions like SCO, which includes a Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) specifically dedicated to combating the menace of global terrorism. However, China's double standard and double-speak are quite evident given its track record at blocking Indian bids to sanction international terrorists. Another critical factor for China's non-recognition of threats of terrorism, which it actively abets and finances in its backyard, can be attributed to a lack of proper and complete understanding on the part of the Chinese Communist Party of the debilitating impacts of terrorism. CCP and China's leadership which has embraced Communism as the party ideology for the past seven decades, has always responded to religion-based terrorism in a knee-jerk manner. The immaturity of Chinese understanding is quite apparent, whether in the Falun Gong, Xinxiang Uighur Muslim issue, its attempts against the Christian church, and specific advisories against Indian cults. #India #China #Terrorism #GlobalTerrorist Pratik Mall is an M.A. (PISM), Batch 2021-2023 student of School of International Studies, JNU. Email ID: pratikmall.h@gmail.com

By Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli The 20th Communist Party Congress in China signalled a total centralisation of powers in the person of Xi Jinping, demolishing informal political processes in the party while retaining specific Xi-nurtured factions and sectarian networks, tearing away from established party-state norms, movement towards decoupling from the US, and keeping China’s sights firmly on preparations to seize regional and global power. Xi secured a third term, and perhaps tenure for life. There is a new narrative of Chinese assertiveness and resolve. Four specific outcomes are visible from the party congress. First, the resurrection of centralised authority. Under previous presidents since Deng Xiaoping, “collective leadership” had provided stability to the decision-making process in China. Xi has driven the party to return to the principle of “core” leadership, with himself embodying that core. This has been enforced through changes in the constitution of the Chinese Communist Party. For instance, the constitution has been amended to include “two establishes” -- to establish Xi as the “core” of the leadership of the CCP and his “thought” as having the “guiding” role for the rank and file; and “two safeguards” -- that of safeguarding the “core” status of Xi and that of his centralised authority. These amendments are binding on the CCP’s 96 million cadre across the country. Xi needed this figment of constitutional legitimacy to establish his iron hand, to overcome the decades-long party dynamics of intensive shadowboxing between various factions. Hu Jintao and his Communist Youth League were jettisoned visibly and symbolically, although it may still be hard to wipe out established factions or their political influence in the party. A second, and more substantial, way in which factional politics was sought to be obliterated was in the composition of the Politburo and the Politburo Standing Committee. Defying the predictions of China analysts the world over, it was the most surprising outcome of the 20th CCP. We will never know what actually transpired at the congress, partly due to the opaque political system of China but also because there is no Chinese Julian Assange or Edward Snowden around. However, the visual image of Hu Jintao’s dissatisfaction with the list of members in the hands of Xi Jinping, and the efforts of Li Zhanshu and Wang Huning to prevent Hu from taking a look at the list at the final session of the congress point to political friction emerging soon. Nevertheless, the current Politburo and its Standing Committee are packed with Xi loyalists, mainly those belonging to Fujian, Zhejiang and Shanghai, where he worked as party secretary in the 1990s and 2000s, or from his home province, Shaanxi. Shaanxi. They belong to “new Zhijiang Army”, “Shanghai Gang” and other factions. A third outcome that has both domestic and external implications is the excessive focus on national security at the 20th CCP, compared to the Deng Xiaoping-era obsession with “economics at the centre”. Xi declared that China will “pursue a holistic approach to national security and promote national security in all areas and stages of the work of the party and the country.” In its obsession to build a “fortified China,” the party congress resolved to make national security “the foundation for national rejuvenation.” Strikingly, there was no mention of the Jiang Zemin-Hu Jintao era “peace and development” in the work report. With this, we should expect a national security state to come to the fore in China, one that seeks solutions not in diplomacy or moderate policies but in coercive postures, if not outright military onslaught. A fourth potential outcome is the acceleration of decoupling from the United States, with its implications for globalisation and the rest of the world, including India. Though Xi made these intentions known through the 14th Five Year Plan, Made in China 2025, and other schemes to restructure China’s economy to become less dependent on exports and run on domestic consumption, the signal from the 20th CCP is one of heightened paranoia and jingoism, alluding to “external attempts to blackmail, contain, blockade, and exert maximum pressure on China”. While this is meant to counter recent setbacks in relations with the US, in the backdrop of the tariff wars, a ban on semiconductor sales, and the US resolve to “out-compete” China, the party congress sends an unambiguous signal of “effectively responding” to external challenges. More acrimony is to be expected then, not just on Taiwan, of which a specific mention was made in the amended party constitution, but also over the rest of the neighbourhood. New Delhi, take note. #China #CCP #XiJinping Originally published: Open, November 06, 2022. https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/xi-jinping-the-new-mao-1159781.html Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli is Dean of the School of International Studies and Professor in Chinese Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University. Views are personal.

By Prof. Swaran Singh After failing to facilitate an end to the war in Ukraine, the Security Council tackles the escalating crisis on the Korean Peninsula The United Nations Security Council was already facing tough questions on its credibility having been further eroded by its inability to deliver an early termination of the Ukraine crisis. It was to meet again on Friday to take stock of another cascading crisis: the rapidly rising tensions and possible nuclear escalation on the Korean Peninsula. The current tensions on the peninsula can be traced to the September 29 visit by US Vice-President Kamala Harris to the heavily fortified Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that divides North and South Korea. This was followed the next day by resumption of US-Japan-South Korea trilateral naval exercises that had been suspended since 2017 when then-US president Donald Trump reached out with an olive branch to Kim Jong Un’s regime. North Korea responded to the resumption of these naval exercises by launching ballistic missiles over Japan. Tokyo took the matter to the Security Council, which saw Russia and China insisting that it was the US-led military exercises in the Sea of Japan that had provoked North Korea, and the discussion ended in a deadlock. Obviously no lessons were learned, as this Monday saw the beginning of another five-day-long US-South Korea annual air exercise, Operation Vigilant Storm, which had also been suspended since 2017. Only this time around, the response from North Korea was more than anticipated, leading the US and South Korea to extend exercises beyond their scheduled closing date on Friday, further aggravating a rapidly rising crisis in the making. Rapid buildup Against this backdrop of mutual suspicions, the last four days were especially dramatic. The news of resumption of Vigilant Storm had already triggered angry responses from Pyongyang, calling them “aggressive and provocative” and requesting their suspension. But their initiation on Monday saw North Korea begin an unprecedented cascade of missile launches. On Wednesday, it launched nearly 30 missiles and more than a hundred artillery shells. To make things worse, for the first time since the 1948 bifurcation of the Korean Peninsula into North and South, three missiles on Wednesday landed 56 kilometers south of the Northern Limit Line off the east coast. And to complicate matters further, this was responded to by South Korea’s F-15K and KF-16 jets firing three guided surface-to-air missiles into the sea approximately same distance north of the Northern Limit Line. The South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff called it their “resolve to respond sternly to any provocations,” while Japanese Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada said North Korea’s actions were “absolutely unacceptable.” On Thursday morning, taking matters forward, Pyongyang launched a Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which reportedly failed after reaching an apogee of 750km and falling into the Sea of Japan. Anticipating it crossing over Japan, Tokyo had issued a warning to its northern prefectures. To recall, North Korea had carried out the first test of its Hwasong-17 ICBM on March 24 this year. But this again is believed by some to have failed, though others believed it reached an apogee of 6,000km and traveled a distance of 1,090km in 64 minutes. The Hwasong-17, also called the “Monster Missiles,” is the most potent symbol of North Korea’s nuclear deterrence against the United States. And to endorse this conviction in Pyongyang once again, within hours US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, during a meeting with his South Korean counterpart, issued a warning that any North Korean nuclear attack, including use of non-strategic nuclear weapons, against the United States or its allies would “result in the end of the Kim regime.” UNSC deadlocked Meanwhile, the United States – backed by Britain, France, Albania, Ireland and Norway – asked for the UN Security Council to meet publicly on Friday to take stock of the efficacy (read inefficacy) of all its bans on North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests. The result of this meeting, however, can be anybody’s guess. Only last month, Japan brought this issue of North Korean missiles to UNSC with no results whatsoever. This, if anything, has perhaps further emboldened Kim Jong Un. Friday’s meeting will not be the first time the Security Council has discussed North Korea. Since 1984, Pyongyang has carried out more than 200 missile launches and six nuclear tests, and half of these have been since 2016 under Kim Jong Un. Likewise, since 1950, the UNSC has passed 21 major resolutions (plus resolutions to extend or implement earlier resolutions) related to North Korea, with the majority of these since Kim Jong Un came to power in 2012. As well, in more than one way the current Ukraine crisis has only strengthened North Korean resolve. Without doubt, the Ukraine war has exposed the limitations of the veto-based system of the UN Security Council. But the war in Ukraine – a country that once held the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal, which it surrendered in 1994 in exchange for security guarantees by the veto-wielding UNSC Permanent Five members – has also reinforced the “currency of power” argument about nuclear weapons. In a bizarre way, this has also reinforced the resolve of nuclear-aspirant nations. Does this make non-proliferation a lost cause and the future far too uncertain? Back to the future North Korea, if anything, forms part of this deeper malaise of great-power contestations. Its departure from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, first in 1994 and then finally in 2003, saw the United States for the first time outsource the non-proliferation lead to China as convener of the Six Party Talks. Those talks took place from 2003 to 2009 and, after a lot of juggling, even clinched a joint statement on denuclearization. North Korea even dismantled its plutonium-producing reactor. The United Nations set up a monitoring committee under UNSC Resolution 1718 and a Panel of Experts created under UNSC Resolution 1874 of 2009. But great-power contestations intervened, especially since Donald Trump’s tumultuous “fire and fury” phase, which was followed by his two “falling in love” summits with Kim Jong Un, encouraging Pyongyang to find solace and faith in brute force. And once again, the ongoing escalation on the Korean Peninsula seems to be getting far too intertwined with exogenous factors that vary from domestic constituencies to global equations of major powers. Resumption of the air exercises this week, for example, has been linked to the war in Ukraine, where North Korea, along with Iran, has been provisioning Russian President Vladimir Putin’s military operations. US National Security Council spokesman John Kirby had only recently accused North Korea of providing “thousands” of artillery shells to aid Russia’s Ukraine war. And the United States also remains anxious about incessant reports of North Korean ICBM tests and its next nuclear test, which is seen as imminent given that both Russia and China are unlikely to support UN sanctions on Pyongyang. With attention quickly shifting to the coming climate and G20 summits, interlocutors on escalating Korean Peninsula tensions may find brief relief in a stalemate by focusing on style rather than substance. But remember, such hedging strategies may push dangers further away into future, but they make their outcomes potentially more catastrophic. #Hwasong-17 #KimJongUn #KoreanPeninsula #NorthKoreaMissileTests Originally published: China Daily, November 04, 2022. https://asiatimes.com/2022/11/after-ukraine-unsc-faces-another-acid-test-on-korea/ Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Swaran Singh is visiting professor at the University of British Columbia and professor of diplomacy and disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He is president of the Association of Asia Scholars; adjunct senior fellow at the Charhar Institute, Beijing; senior fellow, Institute for National Security Studies Sri Lanka, Colombo; and visiting professor, Research Institute for Indian Ocean Economies, Kunming.

By Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli The current politburo standing committee members, all Xi loyalists, owe their rise to Xi and can bend to his tunes. Packing the highest decision-making bodies of China with the “Yes men” has the advantage of 'unified' thinking and an uninterrupted execution of decisions, yet such an exercise with unbridled powers with a few could land the country into many a pitfall. At the just-concluded 20th Communist Party Congress of China(CCP), Xi Jinping rejigged the entire political and military leadership structure. Xi’s rebooting of the leadership structure is aimed at internal balancing to buttress external balancing measures in light of his ambitions to make China “a great socialist modern country” by 2049 but more precisely, to replace the United States from the high pedestal. Xi’s ‘China-First’ Policy Needs Loyal Hands Xi’s dogged determination is reflected in his ruthless pursuit of power, tactical utilisation of other factional leaders’ services, accommodating his factional leaders at crucial party-state-army hierarchies, resorting to ancient stratagems of “feint in the east, attack in the west”, diverting negative forces on to the adversaries but skilfully absorbing positive energy and others. In a surprising move, Xi had opted for Li Qiang (63), serving currently as Shanghai party chief, as his second-in-command. Li served under Xi when the latter was the party chief of Zhejiang province. Both were also in touch when Li enrolled at the Central Party School at Beijing of which Xi was the President. Li implemented Xi’s harsh “dynamic zero covid” policy in the commercial capital of Shanghai, forcing its populace to their knees. Although Li has no experience at the central level and has not visited abroad extensively, he participated in the establishment of the first mega project of China International Import Expo at Shanghai in November 2018. He is also said to be instrumental in getting Tesla to Shanghai for making automobiles. His stint at Hong Kong Polytechnic University with executive business management subjects could provide an edge for him in addressing the emerging economic problems of the country. Can the Xi-Li Equation Push China to Global Forefront? However, what perhaps endeared Li to Xi is that he had, since the beginning of his career in Zhejiang province, focused on rural poverty, disaster relief, sociology, management, engineering and other subjects. This mix of big business and rural poverty experience could come handy for Li when he eventually takes over as the Premier next March. However, Li’s main drawback is his lack of strategic economic foresight to leapfrog China into number one economy in the world. If the 20th CCP message is to make China numero uno, then Li needs to alter the inherited economic structure. Much of the Chinese model is based on 20th-century heavy industry, housing sector, infrastructure, and growth in private sector. However, despite efforts at “dual circulation”, domestic consumption and 'Made in China 2025' campaign, the futuristic knowledge economy is still in its infancy. Major thrust areas of Li will be in this direction although heavy party control, scuttling of foreign tech companies and “common prosperity” campaign imperatives will test this resolve. Who All Make Xi’s Dream Team? The third-in-command is Zhao Leji who was renominated for the politburo standing committee and in-charge of discipline inspection commission that keeps a tab on party cadres. Zhao is likely to head the country’s parliament next March. Zhao is an Xi loyalist and kept Xi’s home province Shaanxi trouble-free. Also, Zhao headed an alternative bureaucratic decision-making body, the “comprehensively deepening reform” that Xi floated to overcome the traditional “central small leading groups”. Zhao also pushed Xi’s party “supervisory” roles across the state institutions – as a measure towards absolute control. The fourth important member of Xi’s loyalists is 67-year-old Wang Huning. Wang surprised every one for his endurance capacity serving Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and currently Xi as their script writer, ideologue and for prescribing “neo-authoritarianism” and party supremacy. Wang is also associated with “three represents”, “harmonious world” and currently “China Dream”, “China rejuvenation” and other trendy slogans that captivated the country’s political discourse. As a workaholic, Wang is likely to further nudge Xi taking the path of ideological confrontation with the west and democracies in general and by exporting the authoritarian “China model” on to the world stage. In tune with Xi, Wang advocates self-reliance, decoupling with the west, building China-specific soft power and others. Wang also served in Xi’s “comprehensively deepening reform” committees notably on internet controls. The fifth ranking leader, Cai Qi (67) is also a close associate of Xi, going back to the latter’s stint as party chief of Fujian province in the 1990s and Zhejiang province in the 2000s. Like Xi, Cai was also affected by the Cultural Revolution when he was rusticated in early 1970s, and hence both share empathies. In 2012, Cai visited Taiwan as a member of a delegation from Zhejiang Province. With the current hard-line on Taiwan, Cai’s advice must be invaluable to Xi. Cai served at the National Security Commission and as party chief of the country’s capital. What the Rejig Suggests of Xi’s Factional Politics On the closing day of the 20th CCP, global media attention was on how former leader Hu Jintao was unceremoniously jettisoned out of the venue of the congress. The person forcibly pushing out Hu was Kong Shaoxun, the trusted lieutenant of Ding Xuexiang (60) who is now the 6th ranking leader of China. Ding is in charge of the CCP’s Central Committee General Office, the centre of all liaison with the party-state-army apparatuses. Ding is associated throughout with the “Shanghai gang” where Xi also worked briefly. The 7th ranking politburo standing committee member is Li Xi (66) who had served in Xi’s home province of Shaanxi and specifically at Yan’an, the revolutionary base of the CCP in the 1930s and 40s. No wonder, Xi took the entire top leadership to Yanan soon after the party congress. Li undertook several major provincial assignments including Shanghai, Guangdong and the rust-belt Liaoning province. All the above six are Xi loyalists, ruling out any policy dissonances. Unlike acute differences between Xi’s statist policies and Premier Li Keqiang’s “street hawker” economic approach, the current politburo standing committee members owe their rise to Xi and hence can bend to his tunes. While provides harmony to the policy evolution and implementation, the lack of Plan B will stare at Xi in the coming years, possibly putting the country’s interests at risk. #China #USA #XiJinping Originally published: Open, October 29, 2022. https://www.thequint.com/voices/opinion/will-xi-jinpings-a-team-fulfil-his-vision-of-making-china-a-world-leader-chinese-president-chinese-communist-party-united-states-of-america#read-more Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli is Dean of School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University.

Paradip port has enormous potential to emerge as a significant player to expand India’s EXIM activities and build economic and cultural synergies with South Asian partners and neighbours. Paradip port, which is located in the Jagatsinghpur district of coastal Odisha, is poised to play a significant role in India’s maritime connectivity with South East Asia cementing the space for trans-regional free trade architecture. In this ambitious corridor, as part of the Sagarmala project (Garlands of the sea), the Government of India intends to augment port-led industrialisation by linking the Kalinga coastal zone with a host of industrial and maritime clusters. As a result, Paradip port on the east coast undergoes massive structural and logistical revamping. India’s aspirational $5 trillion economy benchmark necessitates shifting attention to the domain of the blue economy as well. The Indian peninsula constituting a 7,500 km coastline and 14, 500 km of navigable waterways presents the opportunity for India to capitalise on the sea space to forge trade ties with the neighbouring countries and beyond. This venture does not embody any novelty as the history of maritime commerce narrates India’s decisive visibility, but the difference it makes is that of the neo-classical approach that India has adopted to bring energy to its economy through the mediation of the sea. The major ports on the east coast include Haldia and Kolkata in West Bengal, Paradip in Odisha, Visakhapatnam in Andhra Pradesh, Tuticorin, Chennai and Ennore in Tamil Nadu, and Port Blair in Andaman & Nicobar Island. They facilitate synergies with the Indian hinterland, South East Asia and the partners in the Indo-Pacific. Their export-import profile covers petrochemical products, fertilizers, food products, salt, iron, iron ore, aluminium, automobiles, cement, etc. Shifting the gravity of attention to Paradip, it is placed in the middle between Kolkata port (210 nautical miles) and Visakhapatnam port (260 nautical miles). Capacity expansion and hinterland connectivity through railroad and highway are the important areas that have been taken up to inaugurate the port-led development. The Kalinga Coastal Economic Zone links Paradip with Dhamra port covering the coastal districts such as Puri, Jagatsinghpur, Cuttack, Kendrapara, Jajpur, and Bhadrak to build industrial clusters and smart cities. These localised linkages are further connected with the industrial corridors in West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, and Tamil Nadu to transform the east coast commercial, manufacturing, and Export-Import (EXIM) strength. In addition, the vast hinterland, including Odisha, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and West Bengal may get effectively connected to the Paradip port through railroad and highways and further coordination may be built by inter-port connectivity. Coastal circuit formation and cruise tourism are some of the potential areas which are planned to be developed to give a fillip to coastal tourism. This appears very ambitious and efforts have been made in the right direction to achieve the goal. If these developments are successful in the coming years, the Indian focus would essentially be on South East Asia to conduct more export-import-related activities. Self-reliant India with its focus on the manufacturing sector may emerge as a significant competitor in the South East Asian markets. This may initiate competition and may significantly reduce the Chinese monopoly there. Its unrestricted BRI expansionism will experience significant deterrence. Therefore, Paradip port has enormous potential to emerge as a significant player to expand India’s EXIM activities and build economic and cultural synergies with South Asian partners and neighbours. The indications are very positive and are quite expressive of the fact of India taking up a leadership role in the years to come. Its democratic credential will aid its emergence as a reliable partner and a leader. The global supply-chain disruption with the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic and China’s shrewd monopoly in the sector and its alleged involvement in abetting the pandemic and data secrecy and its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) interventionism through corridor formation have invited a dent in its global image. There is no quick fix to alter this perception. This allows India to emerge as an impactful leader in the supply-chain sector. In this connection, building port connectivity with South East Asia requires essentially Myanmar’s partnership. The latter’s political instability, militancy, military rule, and Chinese interventionism in its internal politics create a bottleneck in committing durable maritime ties with it. The Kolkata Port and Sittwe Port (Myanmar) connectivity are a few diplomatic and logistics clearances away to function effectively. The progress experienced uncertainty with Sui Kyi’s arrest by Myanmar’s military junta. But, if India devises some form of tactical diplomacy, there is always a way out to secure some optimism to reinforce stronger ties. However, ups and downs are recurrent in any international relationship. China apparently is the impediment, not Myanmar. But, India’s aspirations of reaching out to the South Asian neighbours require Myanmar’s deep partnership and its decoupling from China’s tutelage. India-South East Asia Maritime Space Moving ahead, inter-port connectivity between the Kolkata Port and Paradip port may serve the purpose of reaching the Sittwe port and thereafter to Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, and also to India’s Northeastern region involving multimodal operations. Moreover, to reduce the burden on the Kolkata port, the connectivity linkages may be directly developed between the Paradip port and Myanmar’s Kyaukpyu, Thandwe, and Pathein ports. China has already funded the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (KPSEZ) and India ought to expand its depth in Myanmar apart from its investment in the Sittwe port project. The great game of competition has already begun between India and China. It is, therefore, the time to unleash the potential of the Paradip port to express India’s clear intent to forge enduring ties with the South East Asian neighbours and partners. Highlighting the strength of the Paradip port, it currently handles numerous cargos covering crude oil, Petroleum, Oils and Lubricants (POL) products, iron ore, thermal coal, chrome ore, coking coal, manganese ore, charge chrome, ferro chrome, ferro manganese, limestone, hard coke, ingots and moulds, billets, finished steel, scrap, fertiliser, fertiliser raw material, clinker, gypsum, project cargo, and containers. Its proximity to the mining states such as Odisha, Jharkhand, and Chhattisgarh makes it all the more important to conduct import-export activities. In the event of the development of coastal industrial clusters and manufacturing hubs, Indian exports including automobiles, electronics, pharmaceuticals, fertilisers, food-processing, etc., will be transported to the South East Asian countries through the Paradip port directly or through the inter-port connectivity and interdependence. The Sagarmala project is rightly on track to maximise India’s depth on the east coast and its effective integration with the South East Asian nations. Needless to say, China is a major obstacle to India’s east coast enterprise and trade depth. Beijing’s arbitrariness in the region requires the presence of a competitor to introduce freedom of choice. India ought to upgrade its diplomacy and logistics to inaugurate the era of competitiveness in the Bay of Bengal and the Indo-Pacific region. For this incredible enterprise, the port logistics must be revitalized and the Paradip port’s strategic and economic depth must be capitalised. #Paradip #India #Odisha #MaritimeConnectivity Originally published: Open, October 22, 2022. https://www.news18.com/news/opinion/opinion-how-paradip-port-is-set-for-significant-role-in-indias-maritime-connectivity-6223117.html Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Dr Jajati K Pattnaik is an Associate Professor at the Centre for West Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Dr Chandan K Panda is an Assistant Professor at Rajiv Gandhi University, Itanagar, Arunachal Pradesh.

By Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli The ‘Chairman of Everything’ has demolished all factions, ruthlessly sidelined senior leaders, and placed loyalists in key posts The 20th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress will go down in history for consecrating unprecedented centralisation of powers in the hands of Xi Jinping, demolishing several political factions within the CCP to make way for Xi’s spectacular consolidation which provides no clear identification of the sixth generation of leadership. While the emergent picture provides much elbow room for Xi to pursue his goals, the CCP also enters an unchartered course. At the just concluded 20th CCP Congress in Beijing, two significant issues emerged. Firstly, the party congress constitution has been amended giving Xi a major place in the party history; and secondly, the new Chinese pantheon has been unveiled, one that will rule the next five years and beyond. First, the constitutional changes. Every national congress of the CCP has seen constitutional amendments reflecting the new power base of the times. At the 20th CCP, the constitutional changes primarily accommodate Xi’s ‘core’ status in the party and the political legitimacy that this entails among the rank and file. These were mentioned under “two establishes” and “two safeguards”. At the November 2021 “third historical resolution”, “two establishes” were promulgated to include Xi at the “core” of the leadership of the CCP and his “thought” as the “guiding” role for the rank and file. This was mentioned for the first time in early 2018 but did not come into circulation till late 2021. Further elevating the status of Xi were the “two safeguards” promulgated by the sixth plenary session of the 19th CCP in November 2021 that mentioned safeguarding the “core” status of Xi and his centralised authority. These two provide unprecedented powers to Xi in the party-state-army hierarchy. Deng’s Safeguards Previously, to avoid any excesses committed by party leaders, Deng Xiaoping ushered in several checks and balances. The “gang of four”, led by Mao Zedong’s wife Jiang Qing, exercised extra-judicial powers in the 1970s that led to enormous troubles for party leaders. Deng brought in the principle of “collective leadership” to avoid the pitfalls of a personality cult and a single leader amassing and abusing powers. With Xi attempting to centralise powers in the last decade, the impact of the emerging personality cult surrounding him will need to be assessed in the coming years. The second and most visible change at the 20th CCP is the emergence of a new political pantheon, though marred by the almost forceful eviction of former General Secretary Hu Jintao from the venue of the Congress. The new leadership includes, in the order of importance, Xi Jinping (69) for a third term, Li Qiang (63), Zhao Leji (65), Wang Huning (67), Cai Qi (67), Ding Xuexiang (60) and Li Xi (66). In the military, the leadership order includes Xi Jinping continuing as chairman of the all-powerful Central Military Commission, Zhang Youxia (72), He Weidong (65) as vice chairmen and Li Shangfu (64), Liu Zhenli (58), Miao Hua (67) and Zhang Shengmin (64) as members. By this selection, Xi eliminated any dissent or alternative viewpoint in the party and the army. All Xi’s men A brief profile of the standing committee members suggests that Xi has packed it with loyalists and leaders of his faction. The second-ranked Li Qiang belonged to the “new Zhijiang Army”—those who were associated with Xi during his term in Zhejiang in the early 2000s. Li served as Shanghai party secretary. Despite criticism of his handling of the Covid pandemic in Shanghai for the past several months, Li is promoted now and likely to become premier next March. The third-ranking member Zhao Leji belongs to the traditional Tibet area of Amdo, now called Qinghai, but served in Xi’s home province Shaanxi. Zhao is said to have kept the Shaanxi province safe for Xi. He headed the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, a post once occupied by Deng Xiaoping. The fourth-ranking member Wang Huning, the architect of “neo-authoritarian” policies, has been retained. Wang had written critically about US democracy and is said to be the scriptwriter for the last three generations of leaders in China. Wang is known to have brought in unprecedented curbs on information-sharing and internet security. Cai Qi belonged to the “new Zhijiang Army” and served as party secretary of Beijing as well as in the National Security Commission. Ding Xuexiang belongs to the Shanghai faction and served at the General Office of the Central Committee. Li Xi belonged to the Shanghai gang as well as Xi Jinping’s home province Shaanxi and served at Yanán—the communist base area of the 1930s after the Long March. Surprising omissions from these top posts were Xi’s loyalist Chen Min’er, the current party secretary of the largest city in China, Chongqing. Also, Communist Youth League leaders Hu Chunhua, Wang Yang, and Li Keqiang could not be accommodated even as their leader Hu Jintao was humiliated. As for the military leadership, Xi retained fellow “taizi” (princeling) Gen Zhang Youxia to continue as vice chairman of the CMC. Both also belong to the same Shaanxi province. Gen He served in the Western Theatre Command coinciding with the Doklam faceoff. Li Shangfu served in the space programme and was an asset to Xi in the PLA Strategic Support Force. Liu Zhenli is a Vietnam War veteran and is currently the Ground Forces chief. Miao Hua served earlier at Lanzhou Military Region and as naval chief. Zhang Shengmin also belonged to Xi’s home province Shaanxi and served at the rocket forces and discipline inspection commission. Thus, all CMC members are loyal to Xi and his policy coordination efforts are expected to be smooth. Age and term limits broken The above selection process suggests a few significant departures from the recent past. These include the norms on term and age limits, “collective leadership”, pluralism, space for moderate opinions, and a consensus approach on significant party positions that have been jettisoned. This means that either the CCP becomes more focused under Xi on achieving his goals, or could also lead to troubles for the party if the experiment runs into problems. To curb gerontocracy and promote younger leaders, Deng Xiaoping proposed 68 as the age limit for members of the highest decision-making body, the Politburo Standing Committee. This norm has been implemented since the 1980s. Also, to curb abuse of power and encourage talent, no more than two terms for these high offices were formulated in August 2006. These norms and rules have been thrown to the wind. The oldest in Xi’s team is Gen Zhang Youxia at 72 and that, too, as a member of the armed forces decision-making body. Most other members are also either in the mid or late-60s suggesting they will either retire after this term or, if the disregard for the age limit continues, remain for a life term—reducing the scope for young blood to enter the mainstream. The most significant issue is that no sixth-generation leader was identified at the end of the party congress. In the last three decades, there was a political consensus in the CCP on reform orientation and other fundamental issues. This is now broken with the Communist Youth League (CYL) almost demolished in the current selection process for the high posts. None of the bigwigs of the CYL like Li Keqiang, Wang Yang, Hu Chunhua, and others could make it. Jiang Zemin’s faction fared no better. On the other hand, Xi’s loyalists like Ding Xuexiang, Li Qiang, Cai Qi, Ding Xuexiang, Li Xi, and others could gatecrash easily into top positions. Thus, the momentous changes ushered by the 20th CCP both in its structural and personnel frameworks have long-term implications for the domestic body politic of China, and for the rest of the world. Overcentralisation of decision-making could possibly lead to quick results for Xi in his drive to replace the US from the high pedestal. The changes also bring no good news for India. Yet, increasing victimisation of other marginalised factional leaders could attract a backlash and bottlenecks in implementing national goals, leading to unanticipated setbacks for China. #China #ChineseCommunistParty #DengXiaoping #Geopolitics #XiJinping #ZhangShengmin Originally published: Open, October 24, 2022. https://openthemagazine.com/columns/chinas-new-pantheon-cast-xi-jinpings-image/ Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli is Dean of the School of International Studies and Professor in Chinese Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University. Views are personal.

Amitabh Mattoo and Joseph S. Nye outline some of the key misconceptions about strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific and the US–China relationship Few topics in international relations draw the level of in-depth discussion and debate, or matter as much for the future of international order, as China’s rise and its implications for international politics. In this blogpost we asked Amitabh Mattoo and Joseph S. Nye, Jr about the key misconceptions in current debates and what the future of strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific might look like. What are the biggest misconceptions about China in international politics? Joseph S. Nye, Jr: Different people have different misconceptions, but one that is widely shared is the view that China will become the dominant power in world politics by the centenary of Communist Party rule in 2049. This view is reinforced by China’s impressive record of economic growth that has made it the second largest economy in the world. But linear extrapolation from past events is always dangerous, and the trend line may change. China is in demographic decline. Its labour force peaked in 2015, and the population profile shows fewer productive younger people having to support older generations. While it has made impressive progress on some technologies that can replace labour, its total factor productivity (labour and capital) has been declining, and it is far from clear that tightening party and state control of the private sector will help solve this problem. Amitabh Mattoo: One of the biggest misconceptions about China is the belief that Beijing was ‘socialized’ into accepting the rules and the norms of a post-Cold War international system dominated by the West. There was also a myth, perpetuated by Sinologists for centuries, that Chinese strategic culture was inward-looking and not prone to expansionism. We are witnessing the end of these misconceptions. Rather than behaving like a status quo power, China is acting like any other rising power that seeks to challenge the prevailing order, through the use of force if necessary. China’s belligerence is heightened by its repressive system of government and its totalitarian leader, Xi Jinping, probably the most powerful since Mao. The Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s ‘24-character strategy’ of maintaining a low profile and biding time is now forgotten! There is no evidence that China’s strategic culture is moderating its offensive-realist policies across the region. China is deploying all the instruments propounded by the ancient Indian philosopher and political strategist Kautilya (with Chinese characteristics): saam, dam, dand, bhed (persuade or purchase or punish or exploit a weakness) to dominate is neighbourhood and beyond. What dynamics will shape the future international politics in the Indo-Pacific? Amitabh Mattoo: There will be an interplay of four factors that will shape the future of the Indo-Pacific. First, is the direction of China’s rise over the next decade. On present evidence, Beijing’s ambitions are to be the ‘hegemonic’ power in the Indo-Pacific. In this scenario, China will be increasingly belligerent, willing to use its ‘wolf warrior diplomacy’ to challenge the ‘rules-based order’ put into place by the West and weaponize its multilateral presence. If, however, China’s economy slows, as it has recently, and it faces increasing dissent, China could become more cautious and risk averse in its foreign policy. The latter is less likely. Second, much depends on how committed the United States is to the region, especially given its current weak leadership and its new focus on the European theatre in the wake of the war in Ukraine. If the promise of AUKUS and the Quad translates into reality, we may witness a stronger bulwark against Chinese designs than is the case today. Third, countries like India — rising in power, status and influence — facing the brunt of Chinese revisionism, and the choices they make will also be a critical factor in the shaping of the future of the region. Finally, unpredictable, high-impact Black Swan events could have an overarching impact on the region. A pandemic, environmental catastrophe or the use of a weapon of mass destruction could undermine traditional sources of power and security. Joseph S. Nye, Jr: The rise of China has created a situation where most countries want to maintain economic access to its large market, but also do not want to be politically dominated by China. Thus, many countries want an American presence in the region for security purposes, but do not want to alienate China. India will soon become the world’s most populous country and is a growing economy. Japan, the third largest national economy, has a military alliance with the US. In principle, this balance of power could be a formula for stability in the region but it could be disrupted by American withdrawal; a worsening of the India — China border conflict; a war over Taiwan; a North Korean nuclear event; or other low probability but high impact events. Are balancing against or cooperating with China the only options that exist for China’s neighbouring states? Amitabh Mattoo: While the western study of international relations focuses on balancing, cooperating or hedging, non-western IR offers other more nuanced perspectives. This is particularly true of civilizational states like India whose thinking on war, peace, order, justice and morality is captured in many of its classical texts. For instance, Dharma is a key concept in Indian thinking on war and peace. What, then, does Dharma mean strategically? First, Dharma means upholding the larger righteous interest, the welfare of humanity, in both its mundane and its transcendental sense. Second, Dharma means action, not passivity — acting without material incentives, and without regard for the narrowly defined gains from that action. It means acting decisively while recognizing that the fight to uphold Dharma will almost necessarily cause collateral damage both in terms of a strict adherence to principle, as well as in terms of violence. Finally, the fight for Dharma requires acting independently, without attachment, without fear and without external pressure. Dharma can only be sustained through the doctrine of strategic autonomy. It brings into harmony flexibility in diplomacy (even duplicity when needed) and purposeful violence when required. True statecraft and strategic autonomy become inseparable, bringing about a fusion of thought and action for the higher purposes of statecraft. In sum, Dharma offers a path beyond the choice of balancing or cooperation within a framework that combines national-interest, realpolitik and righteousness. How should policymakers understand the future relationship between the two powers? Joseph S. Nye, Jr: As I argued in my article, policy-makers in both countries should avoid demonizing each other and realize that the relationship is not like the Cold War. There is much more economic, social and ecological interdependence between the US and China than ever existed between the US and the Soviet Union. Instead, policy-makers should see the relationship as a ‘cooperative rivalry’ or ’competitive coexistence’ with equal attention to both parts of the description. As former Australian prime minister Kevin Rudd has argued, the objective for great power competition between China and the US is not defeat or total victory over an existential threat, but a ‘managed competition’. If China changes for the better in the long term, that is simply an unexpected bonus for a strategy that aims for successful management of a great power relationship in a time of traditional as well as economic and ecological interdependence. Amitabh Mattoo is Professor at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and Honorary Professorial Fellow at the University of Melbourne. His article, ‘How not to deal with a rising China: a perspective from south Asia’ was published in the September 2022 issue of International Affairs. Joseph S. Nye, Jr is the University Distinguished Service Professor, Emeritus and former Dean of the Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. His article, ‘How not to deal with a rising China: a US perspective’ was published in the September 2022 issue of International Affairs. #China #InternationalPolitics #India #US Originally published: Medium.com, October 26, 2022. https://medium.com/international-affairs-blog/how-not-to-deal-with-a-rising-china-8dfcede032e8 Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of Prof. Amitabh Mattoo.

By Prof. Gulshan Sachdeva Rishi Sunak’s top priority will be to get the UK’s economy back on track, and unite a badly-divided Conservative Party We did not have a UK-India FTA on Diwali, as hoped by the then visiting British Prime Minister Boris Johnson earlier this year. But we do have an Indian-origin Prime Minister in 10 Downing Street now. Rishi Sunak’s ascent to power has generated a lot of interest in India. The UK’s youngest Prime Minister in 200 years is a practicing Hindu who earlier took oath on the Bhagwad Gita. Despite being relatively new to British politics, he has played his cards well. Within a few years of becoming Member of Parliament, he was first appointed Chancellor of Exchequer, and now Prime Minister. This despite the fact that he is non-white and descendant of immigrants from India and East Africa. Although the recent political turmoil within the Conservative Party, and economic difficulties have provided an opportunity for him to become British Prime Minister, this is certainly a huge achievement for British democracy. This does not mean racism is finished in Britain, or suddenly the United Kingdom has become a successful multicultural society. Still, this indicates further maturity in British politics, attitudes, and its democracy. This is not a small achievement. It also shows that merit and competence get rewarded in a free British society. In his first speech as Prime Minister he highlighted that the country is “facing a profound economic crisis”. Further, the “aftermath of Covid still lingers” and "Putin's war in Ukraine has destabilised energy markets and supply chains the world over”. Without specifying details, he asserted that through “integrity, professionalism and accountability” he would bring “economic stability”, and fix some mistakes made by his predecessor. Sunak is a technocrat, and showed his competence as a Chancellor of Exchequer during the pandemic. This is perhaps the reason he is chosen by his party. But the real challenge for him is political. As a leader he has to unite a badly-divided Conservative Party. Many members of the Boris Johnson Cabinet are back. Since Tories are in no mood to go for elections now, he has more than two years to provide economic stability, unite the party, and lead Tories in the next general elections. His appointments may bring some calm in financial markets. But his political leadership to implement “hard economic decisions” to control inflation, and inject growth still needs to be demonstrated. Despite some euphoria in India, Sunak’s impact on India-UK ties will be marginal at best. The bilateral ties are already on an upward trajectory. This momentum will continue. The comprehensive strategic partnership, Roadmap 2030, and British tilt towards the Indo-Pacific have already brought the two countries closer. The most important deliverable expected is a bilateral FTA. Apart from agreements on many chapters, mobility of skilled Indians to the UK could be a sticky point. Another Indian-origin MP, Suella Braverman has been re-appointed as Home Secretary. She earlier branded Indians as the largest group of migrants who overstayed in the UK. Sunak has also been an early backer of Brexit, wants more controls of its borders, and favours deporting of asylum seekers to Rwanda. So tough negotiations on mobility issue are expected under the Sunak administration. Although the UK’s economic conditions are not very favourable towards a new trade agreement, both sides feel that early FTA will help trade and investment in the coming years. Internationally, Sunak will continue to follow the UK's role and responsibilities at the UNSC, NATO, G7, and G20. With his international exposure and background, he will have little difficulty in adjusting to this role. No change is expected in Britain’s prominent role in support of Ukraine. At this point in history, Sunak has got an opportunity to prove his capability in stabilising the British economy. The markets would expect a detailed and credible tax rise, expenditure cut, and defence spending plan of action. The accumulated economic problems are the result of Brexit shocks, the pandemic, and the Ukraine war. Some of the issues can be tackled through domestic responses, but many issues need wider co-ordination within Europe and beyond. Still, a limited economic stability can strengthen him politically within the Conservative Party’s rank and file. Tories are fast losing popularity. Sunak’s main job at the moment is to keep the party united so that it can avoid a general election which could prove disastrous for the Conservatives. The Brexit is done. But the Brexiters are now reluctant to go to electorates. #India #UK #India-UKTies #Politics #RishiSunak Originally published: Money Control, October 26, 2022. https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/opinion/india-uk-ties-despite-euphoria-rishi-sunaks-impact-will-be-marginal-at-best-9392531.html Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Gulshan Sachdeva is Professor at the Centre for European Studies and Coordinator, Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, Jawaharlal Nehru University.

By Prof. Swaran Singh In his speech at the opening session of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on Sunday, CPC Central Committee General Secretary Xi Jinping highlighted China's achievements and future development and strategic trajectories. One example among these that carry inevitable implications for post-pandemic global resilience is Xi's enunciation of the Chinese path to modernization with its clearly defined benchmarks and timelines. A careful reading of Xi's speech shows economic growth is but only a part of his prescribed indexes in his modernization philosophy. A tentative count of its pillars include upholding the overall leadership of the Party and socialism with Chinese characteristics, developing whole-process people's democracy, enriching the Chinese people's cultural lives and achieving common prosperity, promoting harmony between humankind and nature and a new form of human advancement, and building a community with a shared future for mankind. As the world's second-largest economy — and possibly the world's largest economy by 2030 — Chinese modernization trajectories remain deeply intertwined with those of the rest of the world. As the world's largest trading nation with huge foreign exchange reserves and nearly 30 percent share of global manufacturing — and home to emerging global brands thanks to innovations and cutting-edge research — China has also increasingly become part of global governance structures and processes. In 2016, the World Bank recognized China as an upper-middle income country. Given all this, Xi's underlying vision behind China's continued pursuit of modernization portends critical system-shaping possibilities. And, at its core, Xi's vision aims to present an alternative to war, violence and market competition-driven conventional Western models of national development. The first distinction that calls for the world to take notice is Xi's continued stress on making the Chinese path to modernization peaceful and to strive for shared prosperity for all. This may appear idealistic. But China's successful eradication of absolute poverty makes Xi's contentions worth a careful scrutiny. Second, the new era under Xi's leadership has also seen China playing a more prominent role in global governance structures and processes. One yardstick of this recognition is the US' National Security Strategy reports of February 2015, December 2017 and October 2022 mentioning China 12, 33 and 54 times respectively. Third, many developing nations may also find the Chinese development model enticing. After all, China remains a developing country and its economic miracle is just more than four decades old. Being on a similar curve, emerging economies, too, will find China's development model engaging. In particular, the COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted the global industry and supply chains and slowed down the economic development of most countries, prompting them to seek serious course correction and explore alternative choices to revitalize their industry and supply chains and boost their economic growth. The new era has already seen Xi launch global development alternatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative and propose to build a community with a shared future for mankind — and more recently put forward alternative development and security-safeguard paradigms like the Global Development Initiative and the Global Security Initiative. All these remain closely connected with Xi's modernization drive that aims to realize common prosperity by improving income distribution. In his speech, Xi also talked about ensuring a "more work, more pay" system to enable people to work hard and achieve greater prosperity. Having eradicated extreme poverty, China now seeks to focus on eliminating relative poverty by ensuring equality of opportunity and taking measures to raise the incomes of low-income earners. This will further expand the size of China's middle-income earners which already adds up to 500 million. Conversely, this calls for keeping tabs on accumulation of wealth and ensuring wealth distribution is well regulated. Way back in December 2012, Xi introduced the idea of a "Chinese Dream" and the Chinese modernization drive marks the next step toward achieving that goal. The Chinese Dream is not to be confused with the proverbial "American Dream "that focuses on unleashing individual energy for personal prosperity. Indeed, this commitment remains enshrined in the United States Constitution that grants citizens the fundamental right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness. The Chinese Dream, besides people's well-being, also visualizes national rejuvenation and cultural rejuvenation of the nation. Taken together with Xi's Global Development Initiative, his modernization paradigm seeks to present a "new choice" for humankind where education, science and technology and human resources are to be the foundational and strategic pillars for developing China into a modern socialist country by creating an open, globally competitive innovation-driven ecosystem. This is bound to make the Chinese modernization all the more closely intertwined with the rest of the world. And with the world's second-largest population and fifth-largest economy, India will have to pay closer attention to China's development trajectories and the vision behind it. #China #CPC #Modernization #XiJinping Originally published: China Daily, October 21, 2022. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202210/21/WS6351ce83a310fd2b29e7da90.html?fbclid=IwAR1ERmwJwI_ZmPpBlzQpcT2Z2EoSYqssA0uPYtJATKW-1Ud3i4mhIwrjt6s Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Swaran Singh is a professor of diplomacy and disarmament at Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Delhi) and a visiting professor at the University of British Columbia (Vancouver, Canada).