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By Dr. Aprajita Kashyap In absence of a clear-cut win, the two candidates will face each other again in a runoff on 30 October 2022. The momentous General Elections in Brazil on 2 October 2022, will witness the contest for President, Vice President, Governors and members of Congress and state-level assemblies. In the first round of Presidential elections, a candidate must receive more than 50 percent of the vote in the first round to secure an outright victory. In absence of a clear-cut win, the two candidates will face each other again in a runoff on 30 October 2022. The number of voters is expected to be high since voting in Brazil is compulsory for people older than 18, but those who are 16 years old can choose to cast a ballot, too (the extent of voting in 2018 elections was nearly 80 percent). The main contenders are Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the two-term former president of the Partido dos Trabalhadores, the Workers’ Party (also represents a three-party federation dubbed as ‘Brazil of hope’), and Jair Messias Bolsonaro of the right-wing Partido Liberal, Liberal Party ( leads the alliance ‘for the good of Brazil’). High levels of polarisation and disinformation have contributed to the creation of extreme narratives, sporadic episodes of violence and expressions of apprehension of rigged elections. Sunday’s electoral process in Brazil, besides being the most ideologically polarised elections, is also being fought amongst certain economic constraints like high inflation, reeling poverty and gender inequality. Despite having a gender quota requiring women to constitute one-third of the total candidature in political parties, a lack of incentives and political will for engagement of women in politics, a high number of cases of violence against women in politics and structural imbalances, hinder the prospects for women’s participation. Issues in Electoral Campaigns The elections sometimes look evenly poised however the two contenders have differences in terms of being the favourites of certain constituencies. Lula has an advantage over Bolsonaro among the women voters as per the opinion polls, an indication of the abhorrence for the latter’s hyper-masculine bravado and ongoing attacks against female journalists. However, among Evangelical voters, it is an advantage for Bolsonaro, even though the Catholic voters still favour Lula. The poor Brazilians would perhaps vote for Lula in contrast to the conservative and wealthy Brazilians for whom Bolsonaro remains the preferred choice. Among the voters, those who prioritise social issues and economic well-being over other issues, are more likely to favour Lula. On the other hand, the voters who prioritise unfettered growth and centralisation will be seen voting for Bolsonaro. An additional interesting facet is that the young population and those in the middle age group under 45 are more likely to vote for Lula. Of the two candidates, Bolsonaro lays stress upon taking Brazil along the path of economic growth whereas Lula lays emphasis on sustainable development incorporating efforts towards the protection of the environment and indigenous people’s rights. By electing Lula, voters feel they would be ushering in the saviour of the Amazon and climate change, the architect of a new tax regime to allow high public spending and a planner who can end hunger and poverty in Brazil. Bolsonaro’s claims to winning elections are hinged upon limiting interstate taxes to reduce gasoline prices for consumers and approval of an increased social welfare program. His chances of getting elected are dimmed by the contentions of handling of COVID 19 pandemic, of feeding hate and rising poverty and inequality. Change in Brazilian gun laws and marked upturning of environmental protection laws through his clear support for agribusiness may visibly become the other deciding issues. Furthermore, there are apprehensions about taking the help of the military to filch the elections. The Internal and External Dynamics On the domestic front, the opinion polls show voting percentage in the range of 44-51 for Lula and 33-40 percent voters tilted towards electing Bolsonaro. A decisive factor that is likely to impact the outcome of the elections is his use of digital strategies to create fake news and false narratives. At the international level, the UN experts who are part of the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council entrusted with the task of the independent fact-finding and monitoring mechanisms in elections, have taken cognisance of threats and intimidation to women, indigenous peoples, Afro-descendants and LGBT persons. They have been urging the political parties in Brazil to ensure peaceful general elections. Going by the voting on Chile’s Constitutional referendum experience, opinion polls are mere indicators and may get totally falsified. The inflection point that the Brazilian elections face, alongside concern about what may transpire on D-day, is whether the outcomes can be seen as an opportunity to reinforce its institutions, recalibrate its democracy to meet domestic and global challenges and better it’s ranking in the EIU’s Democratic Index. Civil society and the media must play key roles in ensuring a healthy democratic polity and must not bear the negative consequences of their expected role. It is critical for the military and members of any state institutions to refrain from any interference in the elections. The tradition of allowing international electoral observation missions viz., the Organization of American States, Mercosur’s Parliament, and the Inter-American Union of Electoral Organizations, would ensure speedy verdicts on the freedom and fairness of the electoral process. #BrazilianElections2022 #Politics Originally published: Financial Express, October 02, 2022 https://www.financialexpress.com/world-news/brazilian-elections-2022-a-political-inflection-point/2698215/ Posted here with the authorization of the author. Dr. Aprajita Kashyap is Faculty in Latin American Studies Programme, CCUS&LAS, SIS, JNU, New Delhi.

By Sanchita Borah Costa Rica tried involving OAS in deciding Nicaragua’s encroachment in disputed territory in 2010, when the issue of Isla Calero island emerged. At the international level, ICJ was used as a mediator in this conflict resolution going by its mandate and competence in resolving many cases over disputes regarding territorial and maritime claims. The issue was resolved by ICJ in 2018. In today’s world, the water crisis is the most significant environmental issue and an emerging security challenge. As referred to this, transboundary water resources pose a significant challenge to security between nations. Conflicts around these resources worldwide emanate from numerous facets including population explosion, rapid industrialization, urbanization, hydrological, water scarcity, and environmental deterioration. These accelerate into water scarcity, steering a steady increase in international disputes over transboundary water resources. Water disputes have thus become a complex issue and an unanticipated threat to the international world order. Dispute resolution and agreement for transboundary water resources have confronted multiple challenges. One of the transboundary water disputes that have been aggravating in recent years is the India-China dispute over the River Brahmaputra. The present article aims to delve into a comparative analysis of the India-China case with Costa Rica’s transboundary water dispute with Nicaragua over the San Juan River and the way of its resolution. Both India and Costa Rica’s nature in maintaining a balance in the world order through peaceful means is noteworthy. However, India is facing difficulties in reaching any mutually agreed solutions with China in the Brahmaputra case. Costa Rica’s example can be used as a lesson that resolved the San Juan River dispute with Nicaragua recently manifesting as a torch-bearer nation for others engulfed in water disputes. The Mighty Brahmaputra: Race for Water Security The Brahmaputra River/Yarlung Tsangpo is the provenance of existence for more than 130 million people in China, India, and Bangladesh. However, this has turned out to be a source of contention between the two Asian giants, India and China. There are multiple causes of the Brahmaputra river dispute. Historically, the relationship between India and China has not been optimistic. The 1962 Sino-Indian War, the Chola War of 1967, and the Sino-Indian skirmishes in the year 1987 portray the nations’ growing mistrust of each other. The expansionist policy of China is a major concern for India’s Arunachal Pradesh over which China lays its claim. Moreover, the defamatory attacks on India by China’s controlled media and China-Pakistan’s close ties create a sense of leery for India. Under this scenario, a categorized and systematic hydro-power project and water diversion schemes in the Yarlung Tsangpo, along with an increasing threat to water security fosters a profound consequence in the foreign policies of both nations. Many analysts have claimed that China has been using the Yarlung Tsangpo as a political weapon. The hydroelectric dams and diversion projects have raised an impending water security threat for India. The construction of dams in the Yarlung Tsangpo river by China would limit the water flow downstream posing environmental hazards for the people of North-East India and also Bangladesh which largely depend on water for agriculture. Moreover, a major water diversion project has been proposed by China in the Yarlung Tsangpo/Brahmaputra river at the Great Bend. Another assumption suggests that the construction of a dam in the bend near Arunachal Pradesh would help China assert its claim over the state. Thus, India has been under perennial distress constituted by China. Until recent times, the aim of China in the Himalayan region was distinctly engaged in sustaining a balanced power relation with India and a defensive approach towards Tibet. However, China has initiated crucial plans like the West-East Electricity Transfer projects (Xi Dian Dong Song) and the Western China Development Strategy (Xibu Da Kaifi). The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is positioning Tibet as the trading pivot in the Himalayan Region. ‘Opening up of the West’s campaign of China for extracting natural resources from Tibet would help boost the economic motor of eastern China and also vitalize ‘backward’ Tibet forward. Nicaragua-Costa Rica’s San Juan River Dispute The border between the two Central American Countries namely Nicaragua and Costa Rica has been demarcated by the River San Juan. The Cañas Jerez Treaty of 1858 set the San Juan River as the permanent border between the two nations. However, the treaty became the point of contention, as the sovereign power of the river was vested upon Nicaragua and at the same time, Costa Rica was given the right to navigation for commercial purposes. The dispute is largely ascribed to nationalism lacking the analysis of historical, economic, social, and political factors involved. Nicaragua’s economic interest is portrayed since independence when it was keen on constructing a canal route to link the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans. The President of Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega has used the sovereignty dispute over the river San Juan and the claim for dominion over Isla Calero Island to foster nationalistic sentiments among the people. The northern frontier of Costa Rica has a scanty population, despite the fact of its difficult terrain and isolated location, Nicaraguan immigrants got easy access to Costa Rica through these frontiers to escape the instability of the state since the Nicaraguan Revolution in the 1970s. This is a social factor aggravating the dispute between the two nations. The dispute has been carefully nuanced, and the scholars claimed that it is between the governments rather than the people of the nations. Mitigating San Juan Dispute: Lessons from Costa Rica? A historic confrontation changed to cooperation in 2002 when at the regional level, the Central American Integration System (SICA) decided to take concrete steps toward resolving the dispute between Nicaragua-Costa Rica. However, the Nicaraguan President routinely skipped the SICA meeting hosted by Costa Rica due to the ongoing dispute over the San Juan River, and thus it lacked concretization. In 2007, the meeting between President Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua and President Oscar Arias of Costa Rica reopened bilateral communication on the issues of migration and border disagreements which symbolized an attempt to restore peace. 8th Binational Commission of Costa Rica and Nicaragua which was a special commission of inquiry was to be held in November 2010, could not be convened because Foreign Relations Minister José Enrique Castillo Barrantes of Costa Rica said that unless the Nicaraguan military forces leave the Isla Calero island there could be no dialogue. Many bilateral meetings were initiated by both countries but lacked concretization. The role of the Organization of American States (OAS) at the hemispheric level as a mediator is limited because looking at the overarching influence of the US within it, Nicaragua was keener to solve the San Juan River dispute by referring it to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). However, Costa Rica tried involving OAS in deciding Nicaragua’s encroachment in disputed territory in 2010, when the issue of Isla Calero island emerged. At the international level, ICJ was used as a mediator in this conflict resolution going by its mandate and competence in resolving many cases over disputes regarding territorial and maritime claims. The issue was resolved by ICJ in 2018. After scrutinizing the above, it can be seen that Costa Rica was more of a pacifier and a stabilizing mechanism in the dispute. There are substantial reasons which portray the nation being a stabilizer. First, Costa Rica abolished its military in 1949, which led the country in following principles of civility in its political life and maintaining stable foreign relations with its neighbors and the world. Second, Costa Rica and Nicaragua initiated seven years of diplomatic discussion to settle the issue. Third, when diplomatic meetings and the discussion remained unfruitful, Costa Rica approached the OAS and ultimately filed a case against Nicaragua in the ICJ in 2005. Fourth, Costa Rica accepted the ICJ’s rulings in 2009, 2015, and 2018. In the international scenario, India also can be portrayed as a pacifier, as it champions the policy of constructive engagement despite serious provocations. India believes that violent retaliation and encounters further embroil the situation. Moreover, the nation adheres to noble and benign policies of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. In a globalized world order, foreign policy affairs and foreign economic policy are intricately related. The construction of an external environment conducive to inclusive growth in the country is one of the constitutive elements of India’s foreign policy. Utilization of every diplomatic skill and political leverage to impress upon the partners in the region towards a joint exploration of natural resources culminates in a win-win situation. Moreover, since 1950, India has skillfully tackled its strategy of non-prescriptive development assistance as soft power. This shows how India and Costa Rica characterized by similar foreign policy affairs can lead toward resolving issues nurturing serendipity. Costa Rica is a small Central American country, with few natural resources, and relatively little strategic value has been admired by the international community because of its strategies of peace in handling human rights, human security, and foreign policy issues. Thus, India and countries of the world like Costa Rica facing transboundary water disputes can overcome the stagnancy with their constitutive elements and confidence-building measures toward a collaborative expedition of natural and transboundary resources. #India #CostaRica #OrganizationOfAmericanStates #WaterResources #Brahmaputra Originally published: Financial Express, October 03, 2022 https://www.financialexpress.com/defence/the-brahmaputra-river-as-a-transboundary-water-resource-lessons-from-costa-rica/2698751/?utm_source=defence_landing_page&utm_medium=article_listing_widget&utm_campaign=Tags Posted here with the authorization of the author. Sanchita Borah is a PhD Research Scholar at the Centre for Canadian, US & Latin American Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

By Pratik Mall The ongoing Ukraine crisis has fueled the raging and perennial debate about the relevance of the UN The Russia-Ukraine crisis, popularly dubbed the biggest ground war in Europe since World War II, has entered its eighth month without showing signs of ceasing. The cataclysmic turmoil has resulted in one of the fastest growing refugee crisis in Europe and the skyrocketing oil and gas prices, causing economic crises and energy security dilemmas around the globe. The notion of perpetual peace at the heart of the foundations of the United Nations formed with the principal objective of saving the succeeding generations from the scourge of war has brought to fore the perennial questions of the role of the United Nations and its efficacy vis-a-vis its role in the crises as mentioned above. Flagrant Violations of the UN Charter When confronted with similar questions, Dag Hammarskjold, second Secretary General of the United Nations, had once vivaciously remarked that the principle of the UN Charter continues to be relevant as long as the member states uphold these principles on the ground. The charter's principles remain, but we, the member states, fail these principles. The Ukraine standoff has once again tarnished the so-called sacrosanct nature of Art. 2(4) of the UN charter, which commits organizations and the member state to refrain in their international affairs from threatening or using force against any state's territorial integrity or political independence. The blatant violation also includes Article 2 (3) of the UN Charter articulating the settlement of disputes by peaceful means considered as part of the Jus Cogen, along with article 2 (4), from which no derogation is permitted. The only two notable exceptions to Article 2 (4) are Article 51, which entails the self-defence clause sanctioning the use of force, and Article 107, about using force against ex-enemy states. Vladamir Putin's legal justification for Russia's action seems untenable under the rubric of international law. The invocation of Article 51 by Russia is a vivid example of the perversion of international law to justify armed action in a very similar fashion as the west in general and the United States, in particular, has done in the recent past, be it in the case of Kosovo bombing of 1999 or Iraq invasion of 2003. Putin's recognition of the two breakaway factions of Donetsk and Luhansk as sovereign states and his claim that the genocide being committed in these regions by Ukraine's government warranted Russia's armed intervention on humanitarian grounds is not backed by abundant and compelling evidence. The right to collective self-defence exists only for states under international law. Merely recognition by Russia of these two regions does not bestow statehood upon them. On the face of it, Putin's invocation of Article 51 on the grounds of self-defence holds some merit, given imminent threats posed to Russia by NATO inching further closer and prospects of Ukraine joining it. However, this in itself does not constitute sufficient ground for the armed attack as an imminent threat is not a recognized ground under international law. Russia's insistence on the notions of remedial secession to recognize the secession of Donetsk and Luhansk does not hold water. The idea of remedial secession, as per Russian submission to ICJ in the Kosovo case, is limited to genuinely extreme circumstances involving an outright armed attack by the parent state threatening the very existence of the people in question. Putin's justification for the use of force on the ground that Ukraine was committing genocide against Russians in Donetsk and Luhansk also sounds implausible, as even if there was a genocide, neither the Genocide Convention of 1948 nor the UN Charter gives member states the license to use force to remedy acts of genocide or human rights abuses. Is the UN moribund? The ongoing Ukraine crisis has fueled the raging and perennial debate about the relevance of the UN. Article 1 of the UN charter mentions maintaining international peace and security as one of the primary purposes and, to that end, entrusts the UN as the torchbearer of the idea of multilateralism. Questions about the Ukraine crisis signaling the death knell of multilateralism and the dawn of a new global order have become grappling issues. Under the UN Charter, maintaining international peace and security is considered an exclusive mandate of the Security Council, which is equipped to be effective but has failed on multiple occasions, including the current one. The crisis has also brought to light Article 27, Paragraph 3, a provision that has become a dead letter. This clause is not only a source of the veto power of permanent members but also imposes a limitation on this through what has come to be known as the principle of obligatory abstentions. It spells out that a party to the dispute, again a vague term, should abstain from voting in decisions under Chapter VI and Paragraph 3 of Article 52. Thus, it disallows a member to simultaneously be a party, judge and jury. However, in reality, both permanent and non-permanent members have, for all practical purposes, consigned this provision to the dustbins of history, including in the current Russia-Ukraine crisis. The International Court of Justice, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, also suffers from a glaring inefficacy in the current crisis. While, on the one hand, the ICJ certainly has a limited jurisdictional reach under the Genocide Convention of 1948, to which both Russia and Ukraine are parties, on the other hand, it lacks an effective enforcement mechanism. In addition, the court's role is severely limited because a great power like Russia, with a super sovereign status, could conveniently ignore its judgement. UN Still Matters Notwithstanding the above scathing criticism of the UN, a body like the UN is not only indispensable, but the fact that it has become irrelevant highlights the parochial and ignorant analyses of this centerpiece of global governance. Even in the gloomiest situations, the UN was not entirely missing from action. The Black Sea Grain Agreement is a classic example of its eternal relevance for the greater good of humanity. The UN brokered the black sea grain initiative through the good offices of UNSG Antonio Guterres, who was present at the deal signing. Signed in Istanbul between Turkey, Ukraine, the Russian Federation and the UN in July 2022, the agreement since then has been a landmark success in bringing down the prices of essentials such as food grains, cereals and oil and has helped to stabilize the global food markets. The agreement has drawn attention to chapter VI of the UN Charter pertaining to the Pacific Settlement Of Disputes (Articles 33-38). Described by UNSG as a beacon of hope, a beacon of possibility and a beacon of relief, it bears a unique testimony to the fact that if talks are given a chance, they can yield the most fruitful outcomes regardless of the hostilities. Thus, it would be befitting to say that the UN has not become irrelevant; instead, the obligation is on us to make it work better. #Ukraine #Russia #UN #NATO #InternationalLaw Pratik Mall is a Postgraduate student of Politics With a Specialization In International Studies at the School Of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. His area of interest includes analysis of India's Foreign Policy, particularly concerning its immediate neighbourhood in South Asia and extended neighbourhoods of Central Asia and Southeast Asia and the impact of great power rivalry in shaping India's foreign policy.

By Prof. Gulshan Sachdeva With hardened western stance, India’s room for maneuvering is going to be much more limited in the new phase of the Ukraine conflict. In the meanwhile, India-Russia energy trade has become stronger. While signing the accord to annex four Ukrainian regions namely Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia, the Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that people living in these regions “have become our citizens, forever”. He further asserted that “we will defend our land with all the forces and resources we have”. To a large extent, it seems this is Russia’s response to its recent military setback at Kharkiv. The European Union has rejected what it calls ‘illegal’ referenda and annexation and said that it will “continue to provide strong economic, military, social and financial support to Ukraine”. Similarly, while condemning Russia’s attempts, the United States has announced that it “will continue to support Ukraine’s efforts to regain control of its territory by strengthening its hand militarily and diplomatically”. These new developments complicate an already difficult situation. It also indicates further escalation in the conflict. Already the nuclear issue has entered into the rhetoric. With the damage to Nord Stream pipelines, the conflict has also entered a new phase of hybrid war threatening European energy infrastructure. As the war enters into a new phase, India will again have to weigh its options. While Prime Minister Narendra Modi sharpened New Delhi’s response emphasizing that this is ‘not an era of war’, India’s fundamental position on Russia’s role and conflict has not changed much. This was clearly evident through another abstention at the recent UNSC vote on Ukraine. At the open UN briefing on Nord stream pipeline sabotage, India also called for an “independent and objective investigation” of the incident. At the UNSC vote, India was “deeply disturbed by the turn events in Ukraine” not clearly mentioning referendum and annexation. This could also mean that India is also disturbed by huge western military support to Ukraine, which has reduced chances of a political settlement. Indian dependence on Russian military hardware has always been mentioned as one of the factors responsible for New Delhi’s reluctance to condemn Moscow for its actions in Ukraine. In the meanwhile, energy trade has also become stronger. Thanks to discounted oil purchases in the last few months. India-Russia bilateral trade between April and July 2022 was about $14 billion. This is more than India’s trade with countries such as Singapore, Australia, Germany, Japan or Netherlands during this period. As a result, Russia has emerged as the seventh largest trading partner of India during this period. Last year, Russia was India’s twenty-fifth trading partner. Now to boost Indian exports to Russia, the State Bank of India has also agreed to facilitate Rupee trade transactions to Russia. Although this is a dynamic situation with increasing sanctions against Moscow, Russia may emerge as India’s top ten trading partners in the current financial year. Strategic and defense ties with Russia were always strong. It was the commercial pillar which both countries were not able to revitalize. Despite sanctions, Russia will continue to be a major energy producer and exporter. Now the European Union and most of its Member States have clearly decided to diversify their energy imports away from Russia. Moscow clearly needs new energy markets for its exports, mainly in Asia. Apart from China, India could emerge as another major buyer of Russian energy in the coming years. Because of trusted strategic partnership, there is a clear potential of working out bilateral payment mechanisms and required infrastructure linkages in the coming years. With stronger partnership with India, Russia can also balance its dependence on China. This is not a conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Major western powers and NATO are clearly involved in a major way. Ukraine has no chance of getting membership of the European Union and NATO in the coming years. Still the West will continue to support Kiev militarily and financially so long as it is able to fight. So basically, this is a war between major economic and military players. Both sides also have seats in the UNSC. The conflict has also revitalized NATO as well as the Trans-Atlantic alliance. Now the West is looking for a ‘strategic defeat’ of Russia and a possible regime change in Moscow. In these circumstances, ‘victory’ or compromise for any one side is not going to be easy. India has close strategic ties with both sides and good relations with Ukraine. Still, due to the current nature of the conflict, room for playing a mediatory role for New Delhi is limited. So far, India has managed well in taking a ‘neutral stance’ and protecting its interests. As the conflict is entering another phase, the room for maneuvering is going to be much more limited due to a hardened western stance. #India #Russia #Ukraine Originally published: Economic Times, October 03, 2022 https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/view-more-complications-for-india-in-new-phase-of-ukraine-conflict/articleshow/94625426.cms Posted here with the authorization of the author. Gulshan Sachdeva is Professor at the Centre for European Studies and Coordinator, Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, Jawaharlal Nehru University

By Prof. Bharat H Desai Apart from the claim of India and others, the question of veto remains the bone of contention. Will the P5 allow the future inductees the privileged of wielding a veto? In all probability, the question of sharing this privilege would remain non-negotiable for P5. The high-level segment of the 77th session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) concluded on September 26, addressed by 190 speakers included 76 Heads of State, 50 Heads of Government and 48 Ministers. They resorted to posturing and airing their grievances against the global order, the UN system, global flashpoints and other states. Interestingly, the US President Joe Biden’s September 21 address brought the spotlight back on the long pending discourse for expansion of the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the Indian claim for a permanent seat therein. “I also believe the time has come for this institution to become more inclusive so that it can better respond to the needs of today’s world. That is also why the United States supports increasing the number of both permanent and non-permanent representatives of the Council”, Biden said. Biden did not spell out the countries that the US would support in both the categories. The Indian External Affairs Minister, Dr. S. Jaishankar while attending a flurry of meetings in New York, addressed the UNGA plenary session on September 25 (A Watershed Moment: Transformative Solutions to Interlocking Challenges), contributed to the 32 countries’ joint statement of September 23 for comprehensive reforms for a “legitimate Security Council” and held a meeting of G4 countries on September 22 – Brazil, India, Germany and Japan – jointly seeking a permanent seat. Each one has challengers to their claims in respective regions. Veto and Inequality The advent of the UN, on the ashes of the League of Nations, was an audacious project to “to save the succeeding generations from the scourge of war” (Preamble, UN Charter). In his address on adoption of the UN Charter on June 26, 1945, the US President Harry Truman prophesized that “If we had had this Charter a few years ago-and above all, the will to use it--millions now dead would be alive. If we should falter in the future in our will to use it, millions now living will surely die”. The special provision for the “concurring votes of the permanent members” (Article 27), known as veto, proved most contentious at the outset since many of the original 51 founding members expressed reservations about making the P5 countries – China, France, USSR, UK and USA (Article 23) – more equal than the others. However, with the collapse of the League, the war-ravaged world was left with no option but to accept the imperfect general political organization that the victorious powers pushed down their throat. It was taking it or leave it situation. That legacy continued even after expansion of the non-permanent membership from 11 to 15 by a December 17, 1963 amendment to Article 23. Since then, the world has been greatly transformed in the last six decades including the UN membership of 193 states. The UN has been a human construct and not a perfect solution for the outlawry of war. It was not “to take mankind to paradise, but rather to save humanity from hell”, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said on September 24. As a corollary, the instrument of veto was not inserted “in a fit of absent-mindedness”. It was a “deliberate decision to render the Security council incapable of undertaking enforcement action against, or against the will of, any of the Big Five” [Inis Claude, Jr., International Conciliation 532 (1961) 329]. On numerous occasions, the P5 have proved this prophecy correct. The Indian Bid The Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi gave a call for “comprehensive UN reforms” in his address of September 25, 2021 at the 76th UNGA. “We cannot fight today’s challenges with outdated structures”, the Prime Minster said. His priority list included climate change, poverty alleviation, situation in Afghanistan and the Security Council reforms. Apart from the claim of India and others, the question of veto remains the bone of contention. Will the P5 allow the future inductees the privileged of wielding a veto? In all probability, the question of sharing this privilege would remain non-negotiable for P5. Hence, the prospective bidders shall have to take a realistic position. Some improvisions are now discernible from President Biden’s when he suggested that the P5 need to “refrain from the use of the veto, except in rare, extraordinary situations”. Similarly, in the use of Russian veto in the aftermath of the ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine, the UNGA adopted an unprecedented resolution 76/262 on April 26, 2022 for a “standing mandate for a General Assembly debate when a veto is cast in the Security Council”. It has suggested that “President of the General Assembly shall convene a formal meeting of the General Assembly within 10 working days of the casting of a veto by one or more permanent members of the Security Council, to hold a debate on the situation as to which the veto was cast.” This extraordinary step shows the future pathway to blunt the edges of use of veto by P5. In turn, it may render veto less attractive for the future expansion of the UNSC. That would open the doors for the third category of permanent membership without veto. It would be a pragmatic pathway for India and G4 to avail a permanent seat on the UNSC’s horse-shoe table. Time as the Answer It is feared that the UNSC expansion would open up a Pandora’s box since the whole Charter may be subject to review. Many member states strongly feel that the UN Charter does not reflect realities of the 21st century world. In a futuristic scenario, if consensus would emerge among the states, it will necessitate an amendment of the Charter under Article 108. It would require approval by a two-thirds of the UNGA members as well as concurrence of P5 of the UNSC. A review conference under Article 109 can be convened by a two-thirds vote in the UNGA and a vote of any nine UNSC members. Any alteration of the Charter proposed at a review conference cannot take effect without the consent of the P5. If the UNSC expansion comes up on the agenda, can the revival and repurpose of the UN Trusteeship Council (UNTC), lying dormant since November 10, 1994, be far behind? This author has suggested (The Tribune, December 2, 2020) for the repurposed UNTC (EPL 52 (2022) 223–235) to exercise trusteeship of the planet through global supervision of environment and the commons. The idea for “trusteeship of the planet” was flagged in Prime Minister Modi’s address of November 21, 2020 to the G20 Riyadh Summit. In order to earn a rightful place on the high-table of the UNSC and become a global solution provider, India needs to have cutting-edge futuristic ideas by timely investment in the study of international affairs by institutionalizing knowledge-driven architecture in the mainstream university sector. This author has earnestly envisioned the role of a ‘think tank’ for his alma mater, through Making SIS Visible initiative (2008-2013), for the pioneering School of International Studies. Cumulatively, the solution oriented scholarly works of global relevance would pave the way for the UNSC seat to follow India rather than vice versa. When will that materialize? Time is the answer. #India #UNSC #ForeignPolicy Professor Dr. Bharat H. Desai is Jawaharlal Nehru Chair and Professor of International Law at the Centre for International Legal Studies of SIS, JNU. He served as a member of the official Indian Delegations to various multilateral negotiations (2002-2008) as well as coordinated the Making SIS Visible initiative (2008-2013) and Inter-University Consortium: JNU; Jammu; Kashmir; Sikkim (2012-2020). He is the Editor-in-Chief of Environmental Policy and Law (IOS Press: Amsterdam).

By Prof. Swaran Singh Interactions at the Pacific Islands Summit this week revealed some of the deeper fears that explain perennial tensions in the region The United States hosted its first ever Pacific Islands Summit in Washington this week. It was attended by heads of state or government of the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, French Polynesia, New Caledonia, Palau, Papua New Guinea, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Tuvalu, while the Republic of Nauru and Vanuatu were represented respectively by their local chargé d’affaires and ambassador in Washington. No doubt, the summit finally managed to issue a detailed 2,375-word Declaration on US-Pacific Partnership, and the United States separately released its first ever Pacific Islands strategy titled Pacific Partnership Strategy. Yet interactions at the summit revealed some of the deeper fears that explain their perennial tensions. While China remained the elephant in the room, it also brought to light some deeper explanations. On the eve of the summit, for example, the United States’ negotiations to renew its Compact of Free Association – the key US arrangement with its most trusted allies in the region, namely the Marshall Islands, Micronesia and Palau – had broken off in Majuro, with local leaders citing their perennial grievances about the lingering impact of US nuclear testing of 1946-1958 in the region on Islanders’ health, environment and economy. Heightened geopolitics Other than these legacies of Cold War geopolitics, the summit proceedings also saw both sides sharing a sense of increasingly becoming victims to the emerging great powers’ geopolitics in the making. Needless to say, China’s unprecedented economic rise and expanding presence in the Pacific Islands have lately begun to change regional equations. But the two sides seemed to present opposing explanations on what this implied, as well as presenting opposing strategies to redress the matter. For instance, the United States’ just-released Pacific Partnership Strategy cites the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent of the Pacific Islands Forum expressing concerns about “heightened geopolitical competition” impacting their lives. But in the very next sentence it blames “economic coercion by the People’s Republic of China, which risks undermining the peace, prosperity, and security of the region, and by extension, of the United States.” Likewise, China also accuses the United States and its allies of “organizing smearing” what it sees as growing acceptability in the region. Especially after the special security agreement that China signed with Solomon Islands this March, the United States’ regional allies Australia and New Zealand have been vocal about their China-driven anxieties, leading Pacific Islanders to read hyperactive re-engagement US President Joe Biden’s administration as driven by its desire to counter China. This was witnessed on Thursday at the summit, for instance, when Biden announced that the US was reopening its embassy in Solomon Islands that was closed in 1993, or announced plans to open more embassies including in Tonga and Kiribati and to recognize the Cook Islands and Niue as sovereign states. All of these Island nations have seen expanding presence of China and their growing friendship with Beijing. Hectic re-engagement The last five years have witnessed the United States’ hyper-engagement with this region. It began with former vice-president Mike Pence attending the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in Papua New Guinea in 2018. This was followed by then-president Donald Trump hosting a summit with the Freely Associated States – the Republic of Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Island and the Federated States of Micronesia, with the last one hosting then-secretary of state Mike Pompeo, which was the first such high-level US visit to that nation. After the long interlude caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, this February saw Secretary of State Antony Blinken visiting Fiji – the first such visit in three decades. This was followed by the assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific affairs, Daniel Kritenbrink, and National Security Council Indo-Pacific coordinator Kurt Campbell visiting Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands, from where they went to join Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry, who was co-hosting the Our Ocean Conference in Palau in April. July saw Vice-President Kamala Harris virtually addressing the Pacific Islands Forum, where she confessed that “the Pacific Islands may not have received the diplomatic attention and support that you deserve” and announced plans for greater US engagement with the region, including opening of new embassies, the return of the Peace Corps and an increase in funding for the Forum Fisheries Agency. In August, Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman and Ambassador to Australis Caroline Kennedy traveled to Solomon islands to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the Guadalcanal Campaign of World War II. Not all of this may have been driven by China’s expanding engagement and influence. Indeed, both China and the United States have reasons for engaging Pacific Islands other than simply undercutting each other. To that extent, their contestation may be seen as a byproduct rather than the sole driver of their increasing engagement with these Island nations. Underlying factors It is important, for example, to underline that the United States’ interests in the Pacific Islands region predate the US-China competition of recent times. The United States has sovereign territories – including its State of Hawaii, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana islands and Guam – that explain its concerns about China’s expanding outreach across the Pacific in general. Second, the United States formerly administered the “Trust Territories” that now form the Freely Associated States of Palau, the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia. This special relationship entails expectations and responsibilities that again explain the United States’ wariness about China’s expanding footprint in this region. Third, it is equally important to underline how several Pacific Islands leaders have expressed discomfort with the United States engaging them to counter China, thus constraining the Biden administration to underplay geopolitics and focus on specifics of local livelihoods, education, training, overfishing and other pandemic- and climate-related existential challenges. This explains why Biden’s Indo-Pacific Strategy released in February also indicated deeper engagement with Pacific Islands, underlining commitment to make the United States “an indispensable partner to Pacific Island Nations.” Finally, the Pacific Islands – an “ocean continent” spanning 15% of the Earth’s surface – form an important subregion of the Indo-Pacific region. Likewise, China needs these 14 Pacific Island nations to expand its support base at international forums, to find new partners for its Belt and Road Initiative as well as its newly launched Global Development and Global Security Initiatives. Most of all, China needs them to constrain Taiwan’s diplomatic space further. After all, four of the 14 nations that recognize Taiwan as the Republic of China are the Marshall Islands, Tuvalu, Palau and Nauru. China’s growing presence among the Pacific Islands has directly resulted in Kiribati and Solomon Islands in 2019 switching diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. Even India has created a Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation and held two summits with national leaders of the 14 Pacific Islands, in Suva, Fiji, and Jaipur, India, in 2014 and 2015 respectively, and hosted an India-Pacific Islands Sustainable Development Conference in New Delhi in May 2017. Fiji, the second-largest of the Pacific Islands and with 38% of its population being Indo-Fijians, has had close bonds with India. But sensational speculations can often provide convincing outlines. India has lately not been the most active player in the region, yet geopolitics-driven speculations can cause commentators to see the Indian foreign minister meeting last week in Washington with his counterpart from Papua New Guinea – the largest of the Pacific Islands – as India joining the US in reviving its engagement with the Islands to counter China. How much of that is true will remain an enigma. #PacificIslandsSummit #US #China Originally published: Asia Times, September 30, 2022 https://asiatimes.com/2022/09/us-pacific-islands-strategy-what-lies-beyond/?fbclid=IwAR09cjB-hATEOTwJ4rom8kvg6HKlb7iUS3r_rUYEpHxbXA4Kc6prwDIJNBw Posted here with the authorization of the author. Swaran Singh is Professor of Diplomacy and Disarmament at Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Delhi) and currently visiting professor with University of British Columbia (Vancouver, Canada).

By Prof. Swaran Singh India's policy of multi-alignment has been on full display throughout the past several weeks. In addition to India's prime minister attending a whole range of summit meetings, last week saw India's foreign minister Dr S Jaishankar attend dozens of meetings involving BRICS, as well as several other quadrilaterals, triangular and bilateral foreign ministers' meets on the sidelines of the 77th session of the UN General Assembly. In this gradual shift of India's foreign policy — from traditional non-alignment towards multi-alignment involving building partnerships in across many sectors with as many countries as possible — the ongoing Ukraine crisis has been an acid test for India's efforts to carefully craft this complex balance between its engagement with Russia, China and other Eurasian nations on the one hand, while building close proximity with the United States. This method of "spreading thin," of course, has been criticized by some as a "hunting with hounds and running with hares" strategy yet what has sustained it is the fact that it represents India's essential civilizational character of seeking "unity in diversity" as acceptance grows of this genre of India's foreign policy. This, of course, has had its costs, and benefits. This shift, however, has been in the making for some time with domestic dynamics having begun to a play larger role compared to exogenous structural factors and forces. Even if not yet a system shaping power like China, an emerging India aspires to be able to influence global dynamics using forums that enhance its ever growing leverage. The current leadership had come to power in 2014 on the slogan that India has been "punching way below its weight." This has since seen them repeatedly underline India's demographic and economic size in explaining this novel experiment at synergizing India's pursuit for protecting core national interests by utilizing India's ever expanding economic leverage. The Indian economy grew by 13.5 percent for the first quarter of this financial year (April-June 2022) and reminded experts of China's exponential growth rates in the early 1990s. Whilst India is not able to completely follow China's growth trajectories in face of pandemic-driven global disruption and deceleration, India's emerging economy can nonetheless maximize outcomes by joining the correct forums. This is what makes India's engagement with groupings like BRICS, G20 and the SCO critical for its peaceful rise, though it remains equally engaged with the US-led Quad in the Indo-Pacific, or the Middle East. Even within these primarily development-focused groupings, the US-led G20 has become increasingly vulnerable to divisive geopolitics, while both BRICS and SCO have been debating on expansion to co-opt new aspirant countries which promises to increase their writ and relevance. The fact that India will chair next year's SCO should help it balance its growing tilt towards the United States and its friends and allies' strategic initiatives. What also makes India's participation in BRICS and the SCO so unique is that India is the only member that is also member of the US-led Quad and is regularly invited to G7 summits. This is where India aspires to bring to bear its sobering impact through bridge building of their overlaps and work to ensure that these two sets of groupings do not become preoccupied with mutual skepticism and counterproductive rivalries. Some of that promise can also be seen in how, in spite of their bilateral differences on some of these issues, BRICS and SCO members have displayed consensus building capacity on a whole range of issues way beyond economic cooperation and financial restructuring. The media statement issued from New York foreign ministers BRICS meet last week for instance covers areas spanning multilateralism, terrorism, climate change, corruption and human rights. Indeed, it also saw foreign ministers of China and India both advocating need for reforming extant multilateralism which has become dated. Indeed, what often gets overlooked is how India has steered clear from US-led regional security mechanisms like AUKUS and 5-Eyes, whilst has also begun distancing itself from IPEF, all whilst it has sustained its engagement with SCO and BRICS groupings where China stands tall as an inordinately large economy. In spite of border tensions, India's trade with China has remained ahead of its trade with the United States. In the midst of the past seven months of the Ukraine crisis, India's presence in BRICS and the SCO has provided India an opportunity to assert its autonomy in toeing either the American or Russian line, while at the same time contribute to bringing moderation to their contrarian impulses. No doubt, India has refused to denounce Russian military action in Ukraine and also increased imports of Russian oil and other commodities,but India even today buys more oil from the United States and India-US trade stands much larger than that of India-Russia trade. What then explains Western anxieties on India's engagement with Russia and China? Emerging internal disjunctions of liberal order that undergirds the United States global leaders may perhaps reveal some answers. #India #Multi-Alignment #BRICS #SCO #G20 Originally published: Global Times, September 27, 2022 https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202209/1276207.shtml Posted here with the authorization of the author. Swaran Singh is Professor of Diplomacy and Disarmament at Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Delhi) and currently visiting professor with University of British Columbia (Vancouver, Canada).

By Dr. Aprajita Kashyap CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States), is a unique regional bloc that brings together all Latin America and Caribbean countries. It epitomises accurately a regional integration program based on principles of egalitarianism between states, decision-making based on consensus. The objective is to formulate policies that endorse social, political and economic cooperation. As a conglomerate, CELAC is the third largest economy in the world with a GDP of around $ 7 trillion dollars, the largest food producer in the world and the third largest producer of electricity. The convergence of India and CELAC as partners is a derivative of the common principles behind which both India and CELAC stand firm grounds viz., respect for international law, peaceful resolution of differences or conflicts, promotion and protection of human rights, advancement of sustainable development and consolidation of a multi-polar and balanced world order. Abhorrence of colonialism and the commitment to strengthening the South-South Cooperation could be other factors of attraction towards each other. CELAC is in news due to the meeting of EAM of India Dr. S. Jaishankar with the CELAC Quartet (represented by the Foreign Ministers of Argentina, Santiago Cafiero; Guatemala, Mario Adolfo Bucaro Flores; Trinidad and Tobago, Dr. Amery Browne, and the Deputy Minister for Multilateral Affairs of Colombia, Laura Gil Savastano) at New York on September 19, 2022. Gains for India For India, the advantages of cooperation are that through this grouping entire Latin America and the Caribbean region can be within reach. This would imply doing away with barriers that hamper trade with individual countries or signing bilateral commercial agreements and investment policies. The other advantage is that it could become a member of the Inter-American Developmental Bank, thus gaining access to greater credit facilities for Indian investors in Latin America. Partnership with CELAC can become a game-changer and be more sustainable due to large number of partners and varied agenda, which is not the case with smaller groupings with specific objectives. The social aspect may lead to the strengthening of diasporic ties with the Caribbean. The political, economic and social relations can be augmented using the multi-pronged reach of this one platform. Benefits for CELAC CELAC had carefully chosen India as the first dialogue partner due to its size, similar political positions and affinity toward developing countries. India is amongst Latin America’s top export markets for renewable sources of energy, soybean and precious minerals. The size of the Indian market is colossal and that augurs well for routing their primary products and semi-processed goods. India has emerged as an important partner in goods, services and investment. The Indian service industry especially the IT sector has made a valuable contribution as technological endowment in many countries. The soft power elements of India are moderately visible in the region in the form of cuisine, crafts, dance, music and yoga. Cementing the Cooperation Soon after the formation of CELAC in 2011, the then Foreign Minister, SM Krishna, had held a dialogue with this grouping in 2012. The intention to expand and diversify trade and boost investments was endorsed by the India-CELAC Joint Statement that had proposed to set up a Business Council, a CEO Forum, an Energy Forum, a Science Forum and an Agricultural Experts group. Besides, climate change and terrorism were recognised as the most potent global challenges. However, the intent was not backed by prioritization of the commitment and, therefore, a period of lull followed. What to expect? Coupled with the earlier visit to Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, this trip lends a renewed focus on South America by the EAM. It could become a counter-force to the China-CELAC forum. Despite the sizeable presence of Chinese investment India has been seen as a benevolent partner with similar aspirations. The meeting endorses the spirit of the Argentine Foreign Affairs Minister Santiago Cafiero (Argentina holds the pro tempore Presidency of CELAC), who had earlier announced that during his tenure he will promote dialogue with the European Union (EU) and countries such as China, Russia and India. This CELAC-India meeting is an accomplishment of this aspiration. The leaders at the helm were upbeat about their cooperation in UN and other multilateral fora. Several prospective areas of cooperation have been identified which importantly include endeavours towards post-pandemic economic recovery; revitalising trade relations; collaborating in areas of healthcare and vaccine production; venturing into space cooperation; and providing food security through partnering in agricultural sector. UN reforms and climate change tackling could become other areas of association. Taking it forward In the present context, CELAC acquires a central relevance since the region can speak with a single voice and this would simplify the multiplicity of efforts to sustain India-LAC ties. CELAC can help in dispelling the dilemma of India to collaborate with a plethora of regional groupings in the LAC region and rather concentrate on a few. Moreover, partnership with CELAC coupled with bilateral links through embassies in more than 20 LAC countries can deepen the relations further. Vital stands in this regard could be instituting commitments within established timelines, initiation of direct connectivity, facilitating issuance of visas and enabling trade through incentives and simplification of tariffs. Additional areas of cooperation can be identified especially in defence and space technology. #CELAC #India #LatinAmerica #CaribbeanStates Originally published: Financial Express, September 20, 2022 https://www.financialexpress.com/defence/india-and-celac-meeting-making-headway-towards-improved-relations/2677599/ Posted here with the authorization of the author. Dr Aprajita Kashyap is Faculty in Latin American Division, CCUS&LAS, SIS, JNU, New Delhi. Email: aprajitakash@gmail.com

By Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli When Xi visited Samarkand on September 16, what surprised many analysts was that he made no major headline-grabbing speech nor attended the official dinner. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s first foreign visit since the outbreak of the Covid pandemic – to Samarkand for the SCO summit – seems to have proved largely counter-productive. China and Russia helped form the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in 2001, building on its earlier avatar ‘Shanghai Five’ of 1996. Today, the SCO has eight members and several observers, dialogue partners and partner multilateral institutions. It has made some progress in counter-terrorism -- through ‘Peace Mission’, ‘Pabbi’ and ‘Solidarity’ exercises -- and energy cooperation and multipolarity. Except for China and India, the SCO is still weak in market economy. When Xi visited Samarkand on September 16, what surprised many analysts was that he made no major headline-grabbing speech nor attended the official dinner. His anodyne address to the summit meeting on “sunny and rainy days” alternating only led to speculation on the domestic and global situation. No significant reports of his bilateral meetings were mentioned, except for that with Russian President Vladimir Putin, which apparently did not go well. The expected meeting at Samarkand between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi did not take place despite the partial disengagement of troops on September 8 at Gogra Heights and Hot Springs in Ladakh. There are at least six more “friction points” where disengagement and de-escalation need to be carried out. The SCO ‘spirit’ is to build mutual trust. However, China’s military aggression against India, a fellow SCO member, has punctured such claims. Also, the Samarkand Declaration emphasised on fighting terrorism, even as China was putting on hold, once again, sanctions on Pakistan-based terrorists. While Beijing has been bailing out terrorists like Masood Azhar, Zakir-ul-Rehman, Makki and others since 2009, blocking action to proscribe them in the UN Security Council-mandated 1267 Committee, the trend has intensified recently – contrary to the SCO’s spirit and agenda. The Samarkand Declaration stated that the “global situation is deteriorating alarmingly”. This is in reference to the Ukrainian situation, energy and food crises, supply chain disruptions due to the spread of the pandemic, and others. Xi is also under tremendous pressure due to the persistence of Covid-19 across China, despite his ‘zero covid’ policies, and the resultant relative decline in economic growth rates and social unrest. However, the undercurrent at Samarkand was the uncertainty brought about by Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. The supposedly mighty Russian military has been unable to bring Ukraine under its boot even after seven months of fighting. Nor has Putin been able to achieve his stated goals of forcing Ukraine to remain neutral and preventing NATO expansion. The recent withdrawal of Russian troops from Kharkiv further raised doubts in China about Russian superiority. In early February, a Xi-Putin joint statement had proclaimed their partnership to be “limitless”. Just months later, stark differences have come to the fore between them, including on how far China would go to support Russia against western sanctions. Not just that, Chinese migration to Siberia is changing the demographic profile in Khabarovsk, Krai, Primorovsky and other regions in the Russian Far East. Then there are, of course, issues like Chinese smuggling, IPR theft , espionage for defence technologies, fisheries’ restrictions, etc. It was reported that at the Xi-Putin meeting in Samarkand, Xi had reiterated his readiness “to work with Russia in extending strong support to each other on issues concerning their respective core interests”. Putin, on the other hand, said he understood China’s “questions and concerns”. A week before the Xi-Putin meeting, Li Zhanshu, the No 3 Politburo Standing Committee member, visited Russia and reportedly assured China’s support for Russia. Thus, while China-Russia equations on Ukraine, Taiwan and other issues are still shrouded in secrecy, it appears that China is feeling the heat from the NATO countries – together, China’s largest trading partners, with nearly $2 trillion in trade that is heavily beneficial to Beijing. With the Ukraine war dragging on for more than seven months now, China is under tremendous pressure from all quarters. Initially, China justified the Russian invasion, blaming NATO expansion for it. This view is now relatively subdued in Chinese statements. Increasingly, China is under pressure domestically and internationally for its ties with Russia. Domestically, as China is witnessing relative economic decline, it increasingly needs the support of western countries to resurrect Chinese fortunes. With the 20th Communist Party Congress due on October 16 this year, Xi is under growing pressure from different factions in the Communist Party. Meanwhile, China’s tacit support to Russian military actions is increasingly alienating Beijing from the western countries. With the Ukrainian conflict at the cusp of the changing regional and international order, Xi must be a worried man. China dreamt of rising to the top to supplant a declining United States. Xi’s apple cart has been upset – the global and regional strategic situation has become more complex. #SCO #China #XiJinping #Russia Originally published: Deccan Herald, September 25, 2022. https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/xi-might-want-to-quickly-forget-his-samarkand-outing-1148055.html Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli is Dean of the School of International Studies and Professor in Chinese Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University. Views are personal.

By Prof. Bharat H Desai The Maldivian diplomat Abdulla Shahid, President of the 76th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), symbolically handed over gavel on 12 September 2022, at the end of his ‘Presidency of Hope’, to the Hungarian diplomat Csaba Kőrösi, the President of the 77th session. “We owe it to ourselves, to our peers, to our children, to our grandchildren, to humanity, to choose hope”, Shahid said. It is exactly that hope that lie in tatters even as millions of children worldwide face unprecedented challenges at birth, in growth, treatment on gendered lines and in violent conflicts that rage around the world. This sordid saga seriously impinges upon our future. Still, it remains mostly under wraps as jetsetter diplomats engage in glitzy state affairs, scholars quibble over geopolitics, spheres of influence, territorial disputes, bilateral photo-ops and others relish in finding faults with the UN and International Law. Global Violence Against Children A landmark 2006 UN study on violence against children emphatically asserted that “No violence against children is justifiable; all violence against children is preventable”. Globally, children now face growing violence such as bullying, including cyberbullying, sexual harassment including peer-to-peer and conscription by armed groups engaged in warfare and terrorism. Girls in particular are exposed to heightened risks of negative social norms, gender stereotypes, gender-based discrimination and sexual and gender-based violence. According to the Global Humanitarian Overview 2022, an estimated 16 million people pushed into food crises in 15 countries has exacerbated violence against women and children. In conflict zones, recurrent attacks take place on schools and hospitals and children get abducted. Protection of Children: Existing Legal Framework The global armed conflicts result in gross violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights law (IHRL). The political organs of the UN have responded to the challenge through the resolutions of the UNGA and the UNSC for protection of the rights of the children against violence including in armed conflicts. The UNGA resolution 76/147 of 16 December 2021 called upon UNSG’s SR for Children and Armed Conflict to carry out her mandate for the protection of children in situations of armed conflict. She has been mandated to pro-actively engage with relevant UN entities, Member States, regional organizations and non-State armed groups. Now world’s 25% children (aged 0-14 years) population, out of 7.95 billion (2022), face a grim future. The UNGA adopted the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) vide resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989. It acknowledges that the Convention and the Optional Protocols thereto contain a comprehensive set of international legal standards for the protection and well-being of children. The nature and gravity of the challenges faced by world’s children can be gauged from the concerted works of the Special Representatives (SR) of the UNSG on Violence against Children as well as for Children and Armed Conflict, the Special Rapporteurs (SRs) of the Human Rights Council and the Committee on the Rights of the Child. The 2021 annual report of the UNSG’s SR (Najat Maalla M’jid) on violence against children (A/HRC/49/57) highlighted how violence against children has sharply risen. It was followed by the UNSG’s own 2022 report of the UNSG on children and armed conflict that provides graphic details of the violations against children. It holds parties to the conflict responsible for “recruitment and use of children, the killing and maiming of children, rape and other forms of sexual violence against children, attacks on schools, hospitals and protected persons”. The report has enlisted 23,982 verified grave violations that have affected 19,165 children (13,633 boys, 5,242 girls, 290 sex unknown). The highest numbers of violations comprised the killing (2,515) and maiming (5,555) of 8,070 children and the recruitment of 6,310 children. In this respect, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Somalia, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen top the chart. The UNSG’s report (S/2022/272 of 29 March 2022) on conflict related sexual violence surmises that most of the cases of sexual violence continued to be vastly underreported, owing to stigmatization, the fear of reprisals, harmful social norms, the absence of services, impunity, the lack of humanitarian access and safety concerns. Any recruitment or use of children in armed conflicts is a violation of the IHL. In fact, IHL prohibits any indiscriminate attacks against civilians, including children, and they shall not be the object of attack, including by way of reprisal or excessive use of force. The role of various armed groups, as distinct from the armed forces of a State, have become a global concern as regards the recruitment and training of children in hostilities. In view of growing conscription of children in armed conflict, the Optional Protocol (25 May 2000) to the CRC, has called for raising the minimum age for voluntary recruitment of persons into the national armed forces from that set out in article 38 (3) of the CRC. The Optional Protocol (Article 2) explicitly requires that the State Parties “shall ensure that persons who have not attained the age of 18 years are not compulsorily recruited into their armed forces”. Under the CRC too, persons under 18 years of age are entitled to special protection, and to adopt safeguards to ensure that such recruitment is not forced or coerced. As a corollary to these instruments, there has been other efforts at ‘taming the beast’ in armed conflicts such as the Cape Town Principles (1997) and the Paris Principles and Commitments on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups (2007). Striving for Children’s Better Future In view of the above, as the authoritarian regimes, toxicity laden societies and violent conflicts pose grave risks to the 25% of global population (children), the UN member states need to urgently address the challenge. The road map can comprise convening of a special UN conference on the rights and protection of children including special focus at the Summit of the Future (22-23 September 2024), decided vide UNGA modalities resolution of 76/307 of 08 September 2022, to craft a concrete time bound action plan for the elimination of all forms of violence against children especially in conflict zones to ensure a better future for the world’s children. ****** Part - I: Blog Special Series-I: Use of Food as a Weapon of War: A Challenge for International Law (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com) Part - II: Blog Special Series-II: Use of Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War: A Challenge for International Law (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com) Part - III: Abused Ammunition as a Weapon of War in the DR Congo: A Challenge for International Law (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com) Part – IV: Use of Nuclear Weapons in War (Hiroshima-Nagasaki Day): A Challenge for International Law (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com) Part – V: Use of Weapons of War and the Role of Humanitarians: A Challenge for International Law (sisblogjnu.wixsite.com) #War #Children #InternationalLaw Professor Dr. Bharat H. Desai is Jawaharlal Nehru Chair and Professor of International Law at the Centre for International Legal Studies of SIS, JNU. He coordinated the Making SIS Visible initiative (2008-2013) as well as Inter-University Consortium: JNU; Jammu; Kashmir; Sikkim (2012-2020) and is the Editor-in-Chief of Environmental Policy and Law (IOS Press: Amsterdam).

प्रोफेसर श्रीकांत कोंडापल्ली शंघाई सहयोग संगठन की मौजूदा बैठक भारत के लिए काफी अहम साबित होने जा रही है। बेशक, चर्चा का यही मुख्य विषय है कि क्या चीन के राष्ट्रपति शी जिनपिंग और भारतीय प्रधानमंत्री नरेंद्र मोदी एक साथ बैठेंगे?... शंघाई सहयोग संगठन की मौजूदा बैठक भारत के लिए काफी अहम साबित होने जा रही है। बेशक, चर्चा का यही मुख्य विषय है कि क्या चीन के राष्ट्रपति शी जिनपिंग और भारतीय प्रधानमंत्री नरेंद्र मोदी एक साथ बैठेंगे? मगर कई अन्य मसले भी हैं, जिन पर चर्चा हमारे लिए मायने रखती है। प्रधानमंत्री मोदी ने ऐसे कई विषयों को अपने संबोधन में समेटा। उन्होंने विनिर्माण कार्य तेज करने, कोविड-संक्रमण काल से उबरने, आपूर्ति शृंखला को निर्बाध गति देने और विकास दर को आगे बढ़ाने पर उचित ही जोर दिया। उन्होंने खाद्यान्न की कीमतों की भी चर्चा की, क्योंकि रूस-यूक्रेन युद्ध से गेहूं का वैश्विक निर्यात प्रभावित हुआ है। वैश्विक महंगाई भी एक अहम मुद्दा था, जिसकी चर्चा प्रधानमंत्री मोदी ने की। ऊर्जा संरक्षण पर भी उन्होंने जोर दिया, क्योंकि कोविड-काल में अंतरराष्ट्रीय बाजार में कच्चे तेल के दाम घटकर शून्य के करीब हो गए थे, जो अब बढ़कर फिर 100 डॉलर प्रति बैरल पहुंच गए हैं। भारत और चीन के शासनाध्यक्षों की मुलाकात को लेकर शायद ही आधिकारिक तौर पर कुछ कहा जाए, लेकिन दोनों नेता आखिरी वक्त में मिल भी सकते हैं। सीमा पर तनातनी खत्म करने की जो पहल पिछले दिनों हुई थी, उसका यही मतलब निकलता है। कूटनीतिज्ञ जानते हैं कि बिना किसी खास प्रयोजन के ऐसा नहीं किया जाता। विश्व की दूसरी सबसे बड़ी अर्थव्यवस्था यानी चीन और पांचवीं आर्थिक ताकत यानी भारत जरूर बात करेंगे, बेशक इससे संबंधों को कोई खास गति न मिले। अच्छी बात यह है कि अगले साल शंघाई सहयोग संगठन का नेतृत्व भारत करेगा। इस पर सभी सदस्य देश राजी हैं। यह प्रधानमंत्री मोदी की यात्रा की एक बड़ी उपलब्धि होगी, क्योंकि अगली बैठक की सफलता बतौर मेजबान हमारा कद ऊंचा करेगी, और हमारी क्षमता बढ़ाएगी। यही कारण है कि अपने संबोधन में प्रधानमंत्री मोदी ने किसी विवादित मुद्दे की बात नहीं की, बल्कि कोविड से कारण सुस्त पड़ी आर्थिक गति को तेज करने का खाका खींचा। इस संगठन का हमें कई तरह से फायदा हो सकता है। पहला, आतंकवाद के खिलाफ यह हमारे काम आ सकता है। ‘रीजनल एंटी-टेररिस्ट स्ट्रक्चर’ (आरएटीएस) इस संगठन का स्थायी अंग है। यह आतंकवाद के खिलाफ अभ्यास-कार्य करता रहता है, जिससे हमारे सैनिकों को सुरक्षा की नई रणनीति बनाने का अनुभव मिलता है। फिर, जब हम ‘काउंटर-टेररिज्म’ की बात कहते हैं, तो वह ‘क्रॉस-बॉर्डर टेररिज्म’ होता है, यानी सीमा पार से संचालित आतंकी गतिविधि। इसमें स्वाभाविक तौर पर पाकिस्तान घिरता है। यह संगठन हमें मौका देता है कि हम न सिर्फ चीन और रूस, बल्कि ईरान को भी पाकिस्तान का असली चेहरा दिखा सकते हैं। आतंकवाद का विरोध करने के कारण संगठन के सदस्य देश पाकिस्तान-परस्त आतंकवाद पर बहुत दिनों तक आंखें मूंदे नहीं रह सकते। ऊर्जा सहयोग के लिहाज से भी यह संगठन काफी फायदेमंद है। 2008 की आर्थिक मंदी के समय जब कच्चे तेल की कीमत बढ़कर 140 डॉलर प्रति बैरल हो गई थी, तब हमारा बजट पूरी तरह से गड़बड़ा गया था। मध्य एशिया हमारी ऊर्जा जरूरतें काफी हद तक पूरी कर सकता है। रूस भी साल के कुछ महीने में सऊदी अरब से अधिक तेल उत्पादन करता है। इसका मतलब है कि यदि रूस और मध्य एशिया से हमारे रिश्ते सही रहे, तो हमें सस्ती दरों पर तेल मिल सकता है। पिछले दिनों रूस ने हमें करीब 35 फीसदी छूट के साथ तेल दिया था। व्यापारिक रिश्ते को गति देने में भी यह कारगर है। ‘इंटरनेशनल नॉर्थ-साउथ ट्रांसपोर्ट कॉरिडोर’ भारत को यूरोप से जोड़ेगा। हम इसके माध्यम से पाकिस्तान को किनारे करके चाबहार (अफगानिस्तान) के रास्ते रूस तक जा सकते हैं। जरांज-डेलाराम रोड भी हमारे लिए फायदेमंद है। अफगानिस्तान से निकटता लिथियम बैटरी जैसी हमारी जरूरतों को दूर कर सकती है। अच्छी बात है कि ऊर्जा, व्यापार और आर्थिकी से जुड़े कुछ द्विपक्षीय समझौते भी हुए हैं। चीन को छोड़कर शंघाई सहयोग संगठन के तमाम देशों से अभी हम 30-40 अरब डॉलर का कारोबार करते हैं। नए समझौते आपसी कारोबार बढ़ा सकते हैं, जो हमारे लिए लाभ का सौदा होगा। मूल रूप से प्रकाशित: हिंदुस्तान, 16.09.2022 https://www.livehindustan.com/blog/nazariya/story-hindustan-nazariya-column-17-september-2022-7092437.amp.html प्रोफेसर श्रीकांत कोंडापल्ली डीन, स्कूल ऑफ इंटरनेशनल स्टडीज, जेएनयू

By Prof. Swaran Singh Instead of transforming diminishing post-war institutions, the U.S. and its allies remain focused on strengthening them despite waning relevance and remit. The GSI, on the other hand, promises to address increasingly complex global security challenges with Chinese solutions rooted in the ancient wisdom of Chinese traditions. After a decade of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Chinese President Xi Jinping launched two spin-offs, the Global Development Initiative (GDI) and the Global Security Initiative (GSI), in September 2021 and April 2022, respectively. The trio of programs has its proponents, partners, fence sitters and detractors, and over time, their ideas have all gained traction and attention worldwide. As United Nations (UN) Secretary-General António Guterres prepares his ambitious 2023 Summit of the Future in September, which is expected to bring a “New Agenda for Peace,” the debate is shifting from specific conflicts to crafting a transformative overarching global security governance architecture for the future that provides interesting space for the GSI to engage in global narratives. The last time UN Secretary General issued such a proposal was in 1992, when Boutros-Boutros Ghali presented “An Agenda for Peace” that resulted in transforming the UN peacekeeping operations. This makes the GSI a significant turning point and a catalyst for making critical value additions to this evolving discussion around a new global security architecture blueprint. Various commentators have already described the GSI as one potent non-Western alternative that represents the aspirations of the combined Global South. However, to make a permanent mark on the emerging debate, China needs to convince nations of the Global North as well. They represent the architects and advocates of the existing post-World War II global security architecture. In August, as the rotating president of the UN Security Council, China convened a special session dedicated to “Promoting Common Security through Dialogue and Cooperation,” wherein China’s permanent representative to the UN Zhang Jun presented details of the GSI and expressed the country’s readiness to work with the international community to evolve consensus around the GSI in building a balanced, effective, and sustainable international security architecture together. President Xi first proposed the GSI vision to provide security for all in a short keynote address at the opening ceremony of the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference 2022 this April. As outlined in President Xi’s speech, the GSI is underpinned by “six commitments” as its pillar principles. These include: Vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security; Respecting sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries; Abiding by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter; Taking the legitimate security concerns of all countries seriously; Peacefully resolving differences and disputes between countries through dialogue and consultation; and Maintaining security in both traditional and non-traditional domains. Like the BRI and the GDI, in which various individual projects preexisted before President Xi released official blueprints for transforming global infrastructure, at first glance, the principles of the GSI have also been the mainstay of China’s foreign policy. What was novel here was that President Xi also urged all countries to uphold the principle of indivisible security and build a balanced, effective, and sustainable security architecture. The GSI’s recalibration of these principles in the new era changes central connotations, especially in terms of the addition of the principle of indivisibility of global security. As the saying goes, any system always contains more than the total sum of its parts. Also, parts often preexist before they are recalibrated in a new innovative design to maximize their collective outcome. Likewise, individual principles of the GSI can be traced back as far as the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, or the Panchasheel, originating in talks between China and India in the 1950s. In the same vein, the fact that the GSI now seeks to connect them with the noble principle of indivisible nature of global security enhances its critical contribution. The GSI must be read in tandem with the BRI and the GDI, as the trio of programs form part of China’s overarching vision and strategy of creating public goods to build a community with a shared future for humanity. These initiatives aim to eliminate the global deficit in material infrastructure, development, and peace. The central axiom of the GSI is that one nation’s security cannot be built at the cost of other nations. By proposing the GSI, China aims to emerge as a leading alternative provider of global security. No doubt, Western powers have looked at China’s GSI apprehensively and seen it delegitimizing the Cold War mindset of power politics and hegemony, thereby diminishing much of the outdated global governance architecture which no longer reflects the new realities of the 21st century. Addressing such suspicions will be an uphill task that must be done to earn credibility. After a decade of similar suspicion of the BRI, experience has paved a path to overcoming challenges, and today the many participating nations include many allies of the U.S. The progress of China’s GDI showcases the speed with which Beijing seeks to operationalize the GSI even more. The announcement of the GDI in September 2021 was followed by President Xi expounding it on the eve of 14th BRICS Summit in June 2022 as he chaired the High-level Dialogue on Global Development. This meeting was attended by BRICS leaders plus a dozen other invited national leaders from around the world. They agreed to work together and harness China’s GDI as an accelerator for realizing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The effort helped identify broad guiding principles for joint efforts while identifying eight areas for cooperation and setting up 32 specific mechanisms for collaboration towards well-defined deliverable outcomes. Just like the BRI and the GDI, the GSI has been especially agreeable to a number of African countries. Two sessions of the China-Africa Peace and Security Forum involving about 50 African states have been held. By practicing the GSI, China and Africa are expected to move towards a promising vision of jointly building a security community. Alongside building consensus on broad conceptualizations with these African nations, the GSI more specifically details help from China in areas of strategic communication, equipment and technology cooperation, joint maritime training exercises, exchange in professional fields, and other technical and financial assistance to counter terrorism and other threats in Africa. Along with serving as a development provider in Africa, China is also emerging as a security defender across many of the African nations. This trend became noticeable when some of Africa’s traditional security providers wound down their military engagement with African countries. As part of UN peacekeeping operations, thousands of Chinese peacekeepers are currently deployed to some of Africa’s most dangerous locations in Congo, Liberia, Mali, and Sudan. Under the BRI, many of these countries have already received assistance in building highways, ports, power stations, dams, and railways. Now, China is seeking to provide African countries with comprehensive support on matters such as piracy and counter-terrorism. The drive includes providing technology, equipment, personnel, and strategic advice that form the conflict prevention core of China’s GSI. The Gulf of Aden has already seen China emerge as an active player in counter-piracy operations. In addition to its coordinated naval patrols and rescue operations, China has provided naval assets, equipment, and financial assistance to local anti-piracy networks. But like the BRI and the GDI, the GSI is also expected to develop both conceptual and operational outreach far beyond Africa and this will have its challenges. Most importantly, GSI presents an alternate vision of global security governance that has implications for the existing post-World War II architecture that props up U.S. world leadership. Embroiled in pandemic-driven resource deficit and domestic instability, the Biden administration has increasingly depended on its friends and allies, many of whom now show varying trajectories in their engagement with Beijing. The ongoing Ukraine crisis has made the issue even more public as the U.S. has sought to build consensus for imposing severe economic sanctions on Russia. These internal issues affecting both the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization also shine light on the urgent need for reformation of global security architecture. However, the U.S. and its allies remain focused on strengthening internally instead of transforming post-World War II institutions that are revealing their fast-diminishing relevance and remit. Consequently, the GSI has this space to ignite a new debate on the optimal method to address the world’s increasingly complex security challenges. It, of course, seeks to do so by providing Chinese solutions rooted in the ancient wisdom of unique Chinese traditions. #GSI #BRI #GDI #China Originally published: China Daily, September 19, 2022 http://chinaindiadialogue.com/global-security-initiative-off-to-a-promising-start-but-an-uphill-task Posted here with the authorization of the author. Swaran Singh is a Professor of International Relations at Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Delhi) and currently visiting professor at the University of British Columbia (Vancouver, Canada).