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By Prof. Swaran Singh The world’s two largest economies need to get back to facing issues of real importance On the heels of their unending trade and technology wars of several years, the recent simmering controversy about a US Air Force F-22 fighter aircraft shooting down a Chinese high-altitude balloon off the coast of South Carolina on February 4 has become more complicated. This is because since then three more flying objects have been identified as threats and shot down – one each on Friday, Saturday and Sunday – over Alaska and Idaho in the United States and over Lake Huron in southern Ontario, Canada. What is especially intriguing is that compared with the the preliminary analysis of the US teams investigating the debris of the first balloon linking it to “a surveillance program” run by China’s People’s Liberation Army and accusing it of being used to gather intelligence on US military installations, comments from Beijing began by seeking to play it down, asking US to handle the balloon incident in a calm, professional and restrained manner. Indeed on February 5, China sought to placate the US by firing the chief of the China Meteorological Administration, Zhuang Guotai, but at same time called the US shooting down its weather balloon “clearly an overreaction that seriously violates international practice.” China claims it was an innocent weather research balloon and Washington should not make any fuss about it. However, the bipartisan unity of American anger was exemplified in the February 9 resolution in the House of Representatives condemning China that was passed by an unprecedented vote of 419-0. Meanwhile, diplomatic channels stand suspended. Requests from US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin to speak to his Chinese counterpart, Defense Minister Wei Fenghe, to explain to him the US position has been rebuffed. The long-pending visit of Secretary of State Antony Blinken was postponed indefinitely at very last minute. Such inordinate acrimony over what could have been resolved over a phone call reveals deep underlying anxieties on both sides that could further derail their already complicated relations. Ballooning controversy The fact is that since the incident of February 4, something that could have died down as a one-off event, a spate of other flying objects have been discovered and identified as threats, and four of these have been shot down by the USAF, pushing the needle of suspicion further toward Beijing. Inflating the controversy is the change in Beijing’s response that has seen Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesmen going on an offensive, accusing the US of flying similar balloons over Chinese airspace 10 times in the last 12 months. Beijing wishes to portray these balloons as routine parts of their weather research. Also, this is how China seeks to explain why it did not bother to informing the US or Canada when its so-called weather research balloon went adrift and was flying over North American airspace for a week before it was shot down. But Beijing’s silence even after this balloon had hit global media headlines remains intriguing. And now, adding fuel to fire, China has accused the US of 657 air surveillance sorties last year and 64 similar flights last month over the South China Sea, which it regards as its sovereign territory, though its claims are seriously contested. The United States clearly does not recognize Beijing’s claims over the South China Sea and has been at the forefront campaigning to ensure freedom of aviation and navigation over the airspace and in the sea lanes of that body of water. On Monday, the White House also chose to further expand the remit of this ballooning controversy by accusing China of violating sovereignty of not just the United States but of more than 40 other nations across five continents. Other nations as of now have remained restrained. Even Canada has chosen to stay mute. On being asked a straight question, Canadian Defense Minister Anita Anand said it was “far too early” to say that an “unidentified object” shot down on Saturday over southern Ontario was from China. The controversy therefore is not likely to expand beyond the US-China precipice, and possibly China has its own friends as well. Last week, another Chinese balloon reportedly flew over three Latin American countries – Costa Rica, Colombia and Venezuela – and there has been complete silence from all sides, not just from China but also from both the ruling and opposition parties in these countries. Balloon bombs This however does not mean that anger in the US can be called completely misplaced. The US has to keep in mind the fact that emerging China is its most serious strategic challenge. Also, China indulging in intellectual-property theft and surveillance has been a constant refrain from the United States. The specter of September 11, 2001, remains very fresh in American minds. Also, recent decades have witnessed a complete transformation in tools and techniques of war-fighting involving unthinkable instruments and elements. For instance, the idea of balloons and even of balloon bombs has been around for centuries. The oldest known use of balloons in war was recorded in China, where the use of lanterns as signaling devices was popularized by the famous Zhuge Liang way back in the 3rd century. Even today China’s annual Lantern Festival still celebrates his contributions. In Europe, the Montgolfier brothers perfected balloon flights during 1782-84 using silk or cotton stretched over wooden frames, introducing the feasibility of semi-controlled flight. Being a latest technology of those times, silk balloons were used during the French Revolution of 1789, though Napoleon Bonaparte did not think too highly of these and disbanded his balloon brigade in 1799. Half a century later they were revived in Italy, which from early modern times had come to be the leader in defensive fortifications making them impregnable against time-tested siege strategies in war-fighting. At the siege of Venice of 1848-49, Austrian Lieutenant Franz von Uchatius was the first to develop hot-air balloon bombs, though they proved ineffective, being dependent on wind direction and often going adrift toward his own forces. In America, from the 1860s, the Union forces were very invested in balloons and successfully used them as instruments of war for locating and attacking Confederate positions. During World War II, between 1942 and 1944, the British dispatched nearly 100,000 balloon bombs to Germany to maximize the war cost for the Nazis. The Japanese started experimenting with balloon bombs even earlier, in 1933. Their balloon program was revived in 1943 and about 9,300 Fu-Go balloon bombs were launched, of which 385 actually landed in the US. Another set of 200 balloon bombs from Japanese submarines were deployed off the American coasts. Indeed, experts have called balloon bombs the first successful intercontinental weapons. While the US suffered more than 400,000 casualties during World War II, it lost only six people on the continental US; this was caused by a Japanese balloon bomb that killed a family of six on May 5, 1945, in rural Oregon. Is the US overreacting? The question is whether President Joe Biden’s administration is overreacting to unite the nation as it moves closer to presidential elections. Has its political campaign and especially its frequent use of advanced missiles to shoot down small unidentified flying objects been disproportionate, as suggested by Beijing? Should not the US come out with hard evidence on its assessment of these flying objects being identified as threats and whether its use of force was not excessive? What message do these actions send to other countries that may also see their airspace infringed on by similar flying objects? Canberra is now seeking urgent clarifications on whether the US can provide any details on whether Australia was among the 40 countries over which the US says China has been flying similar balloons. The United States has denied Chinese claims that American balloons often fly over Chinese airspace and has slapped sanctions on six Chinese entities suspected of supporting Beijing’s balloon program. Would the US expect all its friends and allies likewise to sanction these companies? As anger unites Americans of all hues, the mystery remains; press briefings have been full of “we don’t know” and “it’s not in our domain” responses, weakening the case of justifying American accusations of these objects posing a national-security threat. This is not very reassuring for the friends and allies of the United States. With the world’s most advanced military and intelligence machine at its disposal – supported by a defense budget larger than the next 10 largest spenders combined – the world surely expects more definite expositions from the United States and possibly an early end to such disconcerting episodes. As the world’s second-largest economy and second-largest defense spender, China is no less responsible for ensuring efforts to bury the hatchet at the earliest and let the world focus on real challenges. The two nations must get their act together lest other nations begin to ignore them and begin to seek their own solutions to their problems. #CanadaChina #ChineseBalloons #USChinaRelations Originally published: Asian Times, February 15, 2023. https://asiatimes.com/2023/02/china-us-must-deflate-ballooning-controversy/ Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Swaran Singh is visiting professor at the University of British Columbia, fellow of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute in Calgary, Alberta, and professor of diplomacy and disarmament at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

By Prof. Swaran Singh For all IPEF partners, the pandemic experience has revealed an acute urgency for redesigning global supply chains — origins, structures, flows — to fight against the twin evils of monopolies as well as protectionism On Wednesday New Delhi started hosting a four-day long, third in-person, ministerial special negotiations session of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). Last May in Tokyo, at the second in-person summit of the Quadrilateral Security Framework — constituting of the national leaders of the US, Japan, Australia and India — President Joe Biden had launched IPEF. Leaders of additional 10 regional partner nations had joined Quad leaders online making it a 14-nation initiative. Hectic ministerial parleys have continued since to evolve their final shape and structure. To begin with, the Framework focuses on four pillars covering a huge spectrum of economic cooperation: from fair and resilient trade to supply chain resilience to infrastructure, clean energy and decarbonisation and finally tax and anti-corruption. However, in their very first in-person ministerial meeting in Los Angeles last September, their third largest economy, India, had opted out of the first pillar of fair and resilient trade casting some doubts about its future. India opting out of trade pillar had rekindled comparisons with India, in November 2020, walking out of China-dominated 15-nation Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). India had explained that exit in the name of its large trade deficit with 11 of its 15 member nations, their access denial for India’s skilled workforce and, most of all, vulnerabilities of India’s Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs). This was soon followed by India showcasing a newfound enthusiasm by signing trade deals with Australia and UAE respectively in April and May 2022. But India’s trade negotiations with Canada and European Union, and even the United States, have since become lacklustre. How then can India use this 14-nation IPEF to provide a boost to its trade and commerce which must become its locomotives in making India a $5 trillion economy by 2025? India’s agenda First and foremost, supply chains resilience has come to be the key issue for India’s interlocutors at IPEF deliberations. This is because for all IPEF partners, pandemic experience has revealed an acute urgency for redesigning global supply chains — origins, structures, flows — to fight against twin evils of monopolies as well as protectionism. In September 2021, India and Australia had joined Japan’s trilateral Supply Chain Resilience Initiative. India has since accelerated reforms and diversifications in a whole range of sectors. Highlighting Modi’ government’s priorities, President Droupadi Murmu’s inaugural speech to both house of Parliament on 31 January reiterated commitment to “reinforcing the trust in the global supply chains.” India has also sought to redress core vulnerabilities of MSMEs that were the primary cause for Modi government’s exit from the RCEP. In addition to structural reforms and a slew of budgetary announcements for 2023-2024, ensuring resilience and integration of MSMEs into global value chains was mentioned thrice in last week’s budget speech of India’s finance minister. Tensions with China have been a major driver behind this determination. India must rectify its inordinately enduring dependency on . imports from China. The bulk of these can be produced in India. But, even in face of border tensions, the year 2022 saw India’s imports from China reaching $118 billion accounting for 17 per cent of India’s total imports. Pandemic has especially exposed India’s pharmaceutical sector, that makes India the pharmacy of the world, being hugely dependent on China’s active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs). But the same is true of industrialised Europe that imports 45 per cent of APIs from China. Indeed, most of the IPEF partners, over the decades, have developed similar dependencies with China. This dichotomy of India as world’s biggest producer of generic medicines and vaccines and at the same time inordinately dependent on China not just unites IPEF together and make India an ideal venue to redesign global supply chains. To set the stage for New Delhi negotiations, already all of them have been talking of friend-shoring and on-shoring their supply chains. Aligning with US The second round of in-person IPEF ministerial special negotiations was held in-person in December in Brisbane (Australia). India’s Commerce and Industry Minister Piyush Goyal had joined them online and extended invitation to host their third special negotiations in India. Only, this is their first IPEF ministerial to not have the first of their four pillars up for discussion which could trigger a difficult start for the host. However, instead of looking at it as its limitation, India has argued that IPEF should focus on early harvest of deliverables. New Delhi hopes to clinch consensus on supply chain resilience and has already earmarked pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, critical minerals and clean technologies. India proposes to deploy these beyond IPEF partners as well. But experts are not sure if, at this third round of ministerial negotiations, the first of its four pillars, on fair and resilient trade, can be separated from the other three pillars? What brings hope is that the leading economy of the IPEF, the United States, seems inclined to support India’s argument. Responding to this question during her December visit to New Delhi to participate in US-India Economic and Financial Partnership Dialogue, US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen had reinforced India’s role in friend-shoring the supply chains resilience pillar of the IPEF. To carry forward these confabulations, US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken — who recently cancelled his visit ot China — is scheduled to visit New Delhi’s to participate in Raisina Dialogue 2023 to be held during 2-4 March. Last Tuesday, India’s national security advisor, Ajit Doval’s was in Washington to attend the inaugural meeting of the US-India Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET) that was launched by Quad leaders summit last May seeks. This too aims to enhance “bilateral collaborations on resilient semiconductor supply chains” and some in media have compared the potential of iCET to the historic Indo-US nuclear deal of 2005. More seriously, the iCET is part of Biden administration’s countering of China by expanding collaborations with India. So, it promises to facilitate technology transfers in security sector with specific focus on advanced artificial intelligence and semiconductors. Contrary to slapping severe restrictions on its companies and personnel working with China, iCET welcomes India’s chip specialists and will deploy western 5G networks in India. The General Electric will produce jet engines for India’s indigenously built aircraft. In spite of half a century of license production of Russian weapons systems, engines remain a weakest link in India’s defence production. Doval’s Washington visit has also led to reports of President Biden’s invitation to Prime Minister Narendra Modi to visit White House and this may take place before President Joe Biden visits India for the G20 summit in September. The month of May will see both leaders meeting back to back at the third Quad and 49th G7 summit in Sydney and Hiroshima. This line up of summits is bound to rub off some enthusiasm on their interlocutors at IPEF that holds great promise for representing 40 per cent of global GDP and 28 per cent of global trade. Of course, these interlocutors will also be conscious of their enduring disjunctions. Given India’s niche in trade in services, especially with the United States, the issue of data flows has been one persistent bone of contention. India’s propagation of localisation data is met with the US demanding for free cross-border flows to ensure its global dominance. This has impacted India’s trade in services just as linking labour and environmental standards to meet US expectations generates barriers against India’s commodity exports. It is to bridge these gaps that, like in the past, their strategic partnership will see them negotiate some tactical accommodations. #IPEF #India #Economy Originally published: First Post, February 09, 2023. https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/can-ipef-help-india-reach-its-target-of-5-trillion-economy-by-2025-12127842.html Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Swaran Singh is visiting professor at the University of British Columbia, fellow of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute in Calgary, Alberta, and professor of diplomacy and disarmament at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

By Prof. Swaran Singh Canada’s visiting foreign minister has reason to hope for improved ties with New Delhi Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Mélanie Joly is on a two-day visit to New Delhi, and both sides hope to cast a reset in their bilateral relations. These have been rather lukewarm despite many enduring linkages of their past histories, politics and people. Two things immediately make this visit more than promising for both sides. First is Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy that was issued last November. While it calls China “an increasingly disruptive global power,” it describes India as Canada’s “critical partner” for its regional and global objectives. This is music to Indian ears. Indeed, this 23-page report mentions India 27 times, underlining their “shared tradition of democracy and pluralism, a common commitment to a rules-based international system.” These words of bonhomie and their driving structural factors deepening their connotations become even more revealing in face this visit’s second interesting backdrop. The second reason this visit is significant is that it is being seen as an inflection point in the gradual U-turn in India-Canada relations that had hit their nadir during Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s week-long visit in February 2018. In spite of clarifications from both sides, Trudeau had expressed how that visit had exposed him to “blaring, negative wall-to-wall international ridicule” and even grumbled that he might never visit India again. That controversy had erupted from a photograph showing the PM’s wife Sophie Trudeau, at the couple’s first reception in Mumbai, standing next to Jaspal Atwal, a Canadian national of Indian origin who was linked to the Khalistan (Sikh separatist) movement and in 1987 was sentenced to 20 years by a Canadian court for his role in an attempted murder of an Indian provincial minister on a visit to Canada. Even media of Canada’s closest friends, the United States and the United Kingdom, called Trudeau’s India visit a “total disaster” and a “facile, foolish fiasco” for “being snubbed by his Indian counterpart” and so on. The gradual U-turn India’s Ministry of External Affairs, having first expressed dismay at such a lapse, quickly sought to play it down, saying there was nothing unlawful about Atwal’s presence. However, the incident resulted in India-Canada interactions coming to a near standstill, and it was to take long time to recover. Eighteen months later, the prime ministers of Canada and India were to meet again informally in August 2019 at the Group of Seven Summit in Biarritz, France, where India was invited as a special guest while Canada is a full member. Soon, the world faced the Covid-19 pandemic, which showcased India disbursing large quantities of hydroxychloroquine and paracetamol and then vaccines the world over, including to Canada. This period saw Trudeau and Modi speaking twice – in April 2020 and February 2021 – on their shared fight against the pandemic but also on various other regional and global matters, indicating a thaw in their bilateral equations. Their body language was especially warm during their last two brief bilateral meetings on the sidelines of the June 2022 G7 Summit in Elmau, Germany, and the November 2022 Group of Twenty Summit in Bali, setting the stage for a possible reset in their bilateral relations. This is where this week’s visit by Joly carries the promise of making a fresh start by setting the stage for Prime Minister Trudeau’s second visit to India in September to join the G20 Summit to be hosted by India. India sees that G20 summit as a historic opportunity for a major reset in its foreign relations, and it is likely to find Canada a willing partner for such a jumpstart. Newfound enthusiasm This newfound enthusiasm was visible in the press release issued in Canberra on the eve of the Canadian foreign minister’s visit to India. Its opening lines read: “Because of its strategic, economic and demographic importance in the world, India is a critical partner in Canada’s pursuit of its objectives under our Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) and on the global stage.” That press release underlines how the rise in importance of the Indo-Pacific region has created “opportunities for prosperity, economic growth and better-paying jobs across Canada. From Cleantech to critical minerals and education program, there is a demand in India for what Canadians make, and grow, and the services we provide.” So after her meeting with Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar on Monday, Joly reiterated the same sentiment on Twitter: “India’s growing strategic, economic and demographic importance makes it a critical partner for Canada in the Indo-Pacific. In turn, Canada can be a reliable supplier of critical minerals, a stronger partner in the green transition, as well as a major investor.” Her meetings with business leaders and civil society are expected to strengthen constituencies for an even stronger, more open and prosperous partnership. A similar tweet from Jaishankar “recognized the centrality of people to people ties to the expansion of our [India-Canada] cooperation,” which perhaps also alludes to “miles” they have to walk in materializing their optimistic visions. The next step would now be to identify and address their serious limitations. For instance, while China remains a shared challenge that brings them together, China also remains largest trading partner of India and Canada’s second-largest trading partner after the United States. This should make the early conclusions of their long-pending Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), under negotiations from 2009, their top focus. In fact, in their Canada-India Strategic Dialogue the two foreign ministers reportedly underlined how they looked forward to their proposed Early Progress Trade Agreement (EPTA) before they finalize their CEPA. From EPTA to CEPA To begin with, India is Canada’s 13th-largest trading partner, but bilateral trade that had reached US$10.1 billion for 2019 faced a downswing in the pandemic years. Likewise Canada has made foreign direct investment of just $4.9 billion, though its institutional investments, especially its pension funds, have reached $70 billion. But now, with Canada’s expressed focus on the Indo-Pacific region – with this region’s rapidly growing $35 trillion gross domestic product – this promises to boost their bilateral trade and commerce. As regards India’s track record on free-trade agreements, it has signed 13 such deals so far, with the most recent being those with the United Arab Emirates and Australia that became effective respectively in May and December 2022. India is currently engaged in similar negotiations with Canada, the European Union, the United Kingdom and the United States . It was in January 2009 that Canada and India started their exploratory talks for a CEPA and initial years saw several rounds of talks at various levels. Their first Ministerial Dialogue for Trade and Investment (MDTI) was held in September 2010 in Ottawa, and by their third round in 2016 they had identified energy, agriculture, education and infrastructure as areas for cooperation. Given the disastrous 2018 India visit by Trudeau and the snail’s pace of negotiations, the fifth MDTI round held in March 2022 agreed to re-launch their CEPA negotiations, but both sides will have to work hard to harness their historic opportunities and materialize their visions. Indian students The Indian diaspora, and lately students, have come to be another irritant in the two countries’ interactions. With 183,000 Indians studying in its academic institutions as of September 2022, Canada has come to be the second most popular foreign destination for Indian students. In 2021, this figure was put at 217,410 and the first half of 2022 saw Canada granting permits to 82,810 Indian students. Despite administrative hiccups, Canada has remained receptive to Indian immigrants. Indeed, the past decade had witnessed an exponential growth in international students coming to Canada. The flip side of this expansion was an explosion of profit-driven education entrepreneurs on both sides. This has seen a large number of new institutions being set up in Canada to accommodate foreign students, up to 40% of total seats, taking their tuition revenues from C$1.5 billion in 2007 to $6.9 billion (about US$5.1 billion) for 2018 before the pandemic forced a short hiatus. The pandemic was to exacerbate challenges of this expansion with campuses not fully prepared for online teaching and other protocols. This also challenged Canada’s capacities in health care, housing and in providing employment opportunities for immigrants. This is raising doubts about the promise of better life that attracts young post-secondary Indian students in hoards to join short-term diploma courses across mushrooming Canadian institutions. Only last week, the Times Higher Education accused Canada’s small private colleges overlooking immigration rules to pursue foreign tuition dollars aggressively. The list of challenges does not end here. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs press release on the two foreign ministers’ meeting on Monday mentioned recent tension over vandalism by suspected pro-Khalistan groups in Canada. So no doubt this visible bonhomie makes a great start, yet both sides have to really work hard to emerge as enduring partners. #Canada #Diplomacy #IndianForeignPolicy #JustinTrudeau #Khalistan #MélanieJoly #NarendraModi Originally published: Asia Times, February 07, 2023. https://asiatimes.com/2023/02/can-canada-india-reset-their-bilateral-relations/?fbclid=IwAR06m4lquwb6qjRmBS8GXFbQ4dEe2V8zBeiY2LAMjXQfN8WKynZWM7QLZsQ Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Swaran Singh is visiting professor at the University of British Columbia, fellow of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute in Calgary, Alberta, and professor of diplomacy and disarmament at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

By Prof. Bharat H Desai A long awaited yet unprecedented development finally took shape in hydro-diplomacy and treaty law with India formally sending a notice to Pakistan for modification of the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty (IWT). This 62 years old treaty has weathered all the twists and turns in bilateral relations, three wars and multiple terror attacks from the launch pads in Pakistan including the attack on the Indian Parliament (2001) and the incidents in Uri (2016) and Pulwama (2019). Significance of the IWT The former U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower described the IWT as "one bright spot...in a very depressing world picture that we see so often." IWT is a unique experiment in transboundary water resources governance. The Karachi treaty was signed on 19 September 1960 by the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan. The IWT has a preamble, 12 Articles and 8 detailed Annexures (A to H). It comprises the World Bank as a third party and a guarantor. The “Indus Waters Treaty was a great achievement of Pakistan and India and of the World Bank, and it remains so”, said Judge Stephen M Schwebel, Chairman of the seven member Court of Arbitration (CoA) in the Kishenganga Arbitration award (20 December 2013). A road at confluence of the Indus and Zanskhar rivers in Ladakh (Photo: Reuters) Article XII (3) of the IWT provides that this “Treaty may from time to time be modified by a duly ratified treaty” concluded “between the two Governments”. The Indian notice seizes the initiative in a tactical step for modification of the IWT. At the 60th anniversary of the IWT, this author suggested in 2021 article (Environmental Policy and Law (vol.52, no.3-4, 2021, 175-184) that “it will require India to take the lead fromthe front to bring the review of the 1960 IWT, especially in the light of the climatic changes, to the negotiation table at an appropriate time”. It seems that time has now come. In the celebrated work on Rivers in International Law (London: 1959), F.J. Berber described the water relations between the states as forming “an extensive legal problem”. The customary International Water Resources Law has recognized the concept of an international river. It has been defined as any river flowing through the territory of two or more states.IWT is a global model for harnessing and governance of the shared international rivers. IWT provides India an unrestricted access to the Eastern rivers (Sutlej, Beas and Ravi) while the water of the Western rivers (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab) can be used in a non-consumptive manner for agriculture and generation of hydro-electric power. However, India does not fully utilize all the accessible water of the Eastern rivers and the irrigation and hydropower potential of the Western rivers. Growing Disputes under the IWT The growing number of disputes raised by Pakistan on the Tulbul Project, Baglihar Dam and Kishenganga hydro project have affected the spirit of the IWT. How to tame Pakistani discontent remains a challenge. It makes resolution through negotiations difficult and the Permanent Indus Commission (Article VIII) remains stranded. A ‘difference’ or a ‘dispute’ raised is left to a neutral expert or expensive international arbitration. All the major projects suggested by India became bones of contention. The pressure of growing population and developmental needs have been exacerbated by shrinking water availability in the Indus River basin due to climatic changes. In seminal 2020 work of colleague Shakil Romshoo of University of Kashmir, one of the partner universities of the IUCCCC coordinated by this author, showed that the “indicators of climate change are clear in the Indian Himalayan region”. Thus, in the changed circumstances after 62 years, making use of cutting-edge technologies and hardware such as remote sensing satellites, geographical information systems (GIS) and artificial intelligence (AI) could play an important role in the planning, construction and maintenance of large hydropower projects. The 2021 report of the Standing Committee on Water Resources suggested that “There is a need to re-negotiate the Treaty so as to establish some kind of institutional structure or legislative framework to address the impact of climate change on water availability in the Indus basin and other challenges which are not covered under the Treaty”. Hence, the Committee recommended the government take necessary diplomatic measures to renegotiate the treaty with Pakistan to address the impact of climate change on water availability in the Indus basin. In 2016, even the Pakistani senate passed a resolution that suggested “revisit” of the IWT. Thus, after a formal notice by India, the response of Pakistan remains to be seen. The IWT after 62 Years The indicators of climate change seem to be quite visible in the Indus basin. The receding glaciers, scanty snowfall, the changing land system patterns, increasing demands for water to meet irrigation, industrial and domestic water demands, all appear to impact the water availability in the Indus basin. This harsh reality due to the climatic changes has now set the stage for India raising the issue formally with Pakistan to reach common understanding for the common hydrological resources. Climate change is now consideredmost potent threat to the sustainability of global water resources. There has been simmering quest for re-negotiation of the IWT on the groundthat the treaty “does not reflect all of the mainand future challenges” suchas the climate change, population growth, environmental flow needs, transboundary aquifer management, and growing water needs in the Indus Basin. This would necessitate use of benefit-sharing approach instead of engineering river-dividing approach to water management could deliver mutual benefits. Since there is no provision in the IWT for unilateral withdrawal by a party, reneging from the treaty commitment could be only on the ground of ‘fundamental change of circumstances’, as provided in Article 62 of the 1969 Vienna Convention of Law of Treaties (VCLT). IWT wascrafted before advent of the VCLT. Since VCLT contains time-tested principle of customary law, it can still be applicable to IWT. However, the threshold laid down in Article 62 is toughfor any of the parties to meet. Road Ahead In orderto harness the hydro potential of the shared water courses in the Indus basin, this author suggested in the EPW (vol. 49, no.7, Feb 15, 2014) article that both the countries need to considerjoint design and implementation of hydroelectric power projects. It requires taking a holistic hydrological view and maintaining the environmental integrity of the entire Indus River Basin without compromising on thedevelopmental needs of the riparian states. In the changed circumstances after 62 years, it would require political sagacity, sensitivity and legal acumen to take the IWT forward on the basis of legacy of common waters heritage by jettisoning the misplaced animosity. The current stage of freezing of India-Pakistan bilateral relations does not offer immediate prospects for modification of the IWT. In the absence of a miracle, the beleaguered Pakistani establishment may remain recalcitrant and resort to legalese to avoid seizing the gauntlet thrown by the Indian initiative. As this author wrote in 2021, only time will provide us the answer as to how long will it take for the inevitability of IWT review to materialize. #India #Pakistan #IndusWaterTreaty #InternationalLaw Professor Dr. Bharat H. Desai is Jawaharlal Nehru Chair and Professor of International Law at the Centre for International Legal Studies of SIS, JNU. He served as a member of the official Indian Delegations to various multilateral negotiations (2002-2008), coordinated the Making SIS Visible initiative (2012-2020) and Inter-University Consortium: JNU; Jammu; Kashmir; Sikkim (2012-2020) as well as contributes as the Editor-in-Chief of Environmental Policy and Law (IOS Press: Amsterdam).

By Prof. Swaran Singh Biden and Republican House Speaker need to look beyond US borders as they negotiate the debt ceiling This Wednesday, the newly elected Speaker of the US House of Representatives, Kevin McCarthy, is set to sit down with President Joe Biden to resolve what could become a global problem. It involves the much-hyped deadlock between the White House proposing that Congress raise America’s debt celling one more time while the Republican-controlled Congress seems determined to push Biden into accepting major cuts on spending in his proposed budget. The US Treasury indeed already hit this debt limit on January 19 and has since invoked extraordinary measures to cover its expenses, which could push actual default on debt repayments to June 5, 2023. It is nevertheless important that the debt limit is either raised by that time or at least suspended to allow both sides time for negotiations. As already clarified by Kevin McCarthy in a media interview this week, the soft sectors of social security and medical care are not up for discussion. His indirect comments allude to Biden’s proposed defense budget of $858 billion being a possible target for cuts, but in the midst of the Ukraine war that remains a difficult option as well. In the worst case, if no resolution is clinched by end of May or so, the US government may have to resort to another extreme step of ensuring its debt repayments to its major creditor nations by defaulting of government pensions and salaries and so on. Lessons of 2011 This of course is not the first time such a deadlock has created anxieties for markets, yet recent years have witnessed increasing intensity and frequency of such standoffs between the presidency and Congress. The last major standoff triggering a similar crisis occurred in 2011 when Joe Biden was vice-president and the US had suffered its first ever credit downgrade, sending shivers through the markets and power elites as stocks took a major hit. President Barack Obama had to accede to $2 trillion in spending cuts, and this “grand bargain” embedded the Republicans, who today wish to repeat it with Joe Biden. The year 2021 witnessed another credit downgrade for the United States. History of course is replete with examples of Congress relenting and only a few times managing to win a showdown with the presidency. The US Congress, for example, has suspended or raised debt ceilings 93 times during last 70 years, and the highest number was five times during 1963. Indeed, until 1917, Congress used to approve specific debt proposals to raise borrowings from home or abroad. It was in the wake of economic disruptions of the World War I that Congress decided to set an overall ceiling granting the presidency full freedom to raise debt from multiple sources and on varying schedules of payments. During more recent times this debt ceiling was raised to $6 trillion under Bill Clinton (1997), to $11 trillion under George W Bush (2008), $18 trillion under Barrack Obama (2015) and $22 trillion under Donald Trump (2019). During the Covid-19 pandemic, Congress suspended the debt ceiling to allow the presidency to spend without any restraint, and the debt rose to $27 trillion, making Congress finally set the debt ceiling at $31.4 trillion in 2021. It is this ceiling that currently stands breached, as the debt today stands way above the total size of US economy of $25.66 trillion for last year. The recent period has also witnessed an increasing mismatch between the growth of US debt and its gross domestic product as well as a growing mismatch of who have become its major creditors. The US debt today is 10 times what it was in 1990. This means that the US government had to spend a record $213 billion in mere interest payments on its debt for just the fourth quarter of last year. Whom the US owes Other than the exponentially growing size of the US debt, the list of countries to which the US owes this debt makes it equally intriguing puzzle with serious implications for US global leadership in coming times. As of last October, the top three owners of US debt were Japan ($1.1 trillion), China ($980 billion) and the United Kingdom ($870 billion). Of these, both Japan and the UK are close US allies, but they have already committed a big chunk of their GDP to US Treasury bonds. So Japan with a GDP of $5 trillion and the United Kingdom with a GDP of $3.1 trillion may not hold much promise to supply any more cash to the US. This leaves China, with its rapidly growing GDP reaching $18 trillion for 2022, which could become an increasingly attractive source for more US borrowing. What makes this logic convincing is that compared with the economies of both Japan and the United Kingdom, which have witnessed negative growth rates of minus-0.3% on a three-year average, China’s growth rate has been projected between 4.8% and 5.2%. The only difficulty is that a whole range of the US policy reports have described China as their main competitor and challenge. This should make the Biden presidency cautious about milking this low-hanging opportunity any further. Indeed, given their complicated equations, the last few years have seen China downsizing on US Treasuries, and it could potentially decide to sell off its holdings. This would have a disastrous effect for US economy, which is already bracing for a global recession. With the US manufacturing sector already in recession, the housing market slumped and the tech sector witnessing large layoffs, President Biden’s choices remain complicated. In such difficult times, the private sector could emerge as another source, but recourse to its intervention will have its own vulnerabilities as well. Apple, for instance, has become a $3 trillion company and could be potentially staking claims to finding innovative means to redeem the US economy. Germany, Europe’s strongest economic powerhouse, could be another new source to supply money to support US efforts in the Ukraine war. Global implications The most serious consequence, according to experts, of this continuing deadlock could be implications way beyond the United States. In the worst case, it could mean a collapse of the US dollar and its replacement as global trade’s unit of account. China has already been staking claims for the yuan to become a global currency for trade and transections. This would without doubt have implications for US pre-eminence and power but would further disrupt the US-led liberal global order. The US Treasury bond market remains a bedrock for the global financial system and backbone for central banks and global investors. But Kevin McCarthy, who endured 15 rounds of voting to be elected as House Speaker, is a tough negotiator, while President Biden seems to have limited space to maneuver. This makes speculating on outcomes of their first meeting rather difficult. What gives hope is that never in history has Congress pushed the executive off the cliff; never has the US ended up with a debt default so far. It is hoped that both leaders will keep in mind how a US debt default could further accelerate ongoing layoffs and further weaken US efforts in bracing for the onset of global recession. There is perhaps too much at stake for egos or ideologies to ignore. #US #Congress #JoeBiden #KevinMcCarthy #Debt Originally published: Asia Times, January 31, 2023. https://asiatimes.com/2023/01/us-debt-default-could-have-serious-global-implications/ Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Swaran Singh is visiting professor at the University of British Columbia, fellow of Canadian the Global Affairs Institute and professor of diplomacy and disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

By Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli The Taliban has promised not to allow terrorist attacks on others from Afghan soil, but it is unable to keep its word Last month’s attack on Chinese nationals at a hotel in Kabul has rattled Beijing. For it had hoped to overcome the “graveyard of empires” and reap the benefits of its resources as well as fill the geopolitical vacuum in Afghanistan. The December 12 attack by the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP) on Longan Hotel, which housed scores of Chinese nationals, left five Chinese national seriously injured and four militants dead. This followed a series of attacks on Pakistani and Russian missions and on the airport. It took more than a month for the new Chinese foreign minister Qin Gang to call his Taliban counterpart Amir Khan Muttaqi to urge “strong measures” to protect “Chinese personnel, institutions, and projects” in the country. The ISKP’s renewed focus on China comes as the Taliban is seen moving close to Beijing. China has also been close to the Taliban’s interior minister Sirajuddin Haqqani and his faction in the Taliban over the past two decades. However, Beijing has not officially recognised the Taliban regime. The Taliban has promised not to allow terrorist attacks on others from Afghan soil, but it is unable to keep its word at a time when Afghanistan is teeming with terrorist and militant groups -- the ISKP, Al Qaeda, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, the Balochistan Liberation Army and others – and all of them are attempting to recruit or poach cadres. The violent attacks at Dasu hydro-electricity dam, Karachi Confucius Centre, Gwadar port and other areas signal the rise in militancy in Pakistan-Afghanistan. China’s gambit of softening the leaders in these countries through investments is thus not working. Nevertheless, China is enticing Kabul to link up with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor by proposing to build cross-border railway networks from Peshawar to Kabul and Quetta to Kandahar. Beijing is also using the trilateral cooperative arrangement with Afghanistan and Pakistan since 2017 to extend CPEC to Afghanistan. However, with India opposing CPEC projects, Afghanistan has been circumspect about them. The June 2004 attack on Chinese railway workers at Had Bakshi, when 11 of them were killed, is fresh in China’s memory. China signed in June 2012 a “strategic cooperative partnership” with Afghanistan. It also signed an MoU with Afghanistan on the Belt and Road Initiative in May 2016. In April 2019, Beijing signed a BRI energy cooperation agreement with Afghanistan. Last year, Xinjiang Central Asia Petroleum and Gas Co and the Afghan government signed a $540 million agreement to drill for oil in the Amu Darya basin and to create an oil reserve in Sar-e Pul province. Several Chinese companies are keen to invest in Afghanistan. The 14th Bureau of China Railway, the 19th Metallurgical, Huawei, ZTE and Zhengtong Construction Engineering have all participated in the construction of Afghanistan’s telecoms, power transmission, water and road projects. China’s Shuangdeng Group has signed a 5.5-MW photovoltaic project contract in Daikondi province. But several factors, such as lack of connectivity to the resource-producing areas, scarcity of water and power, and the high operating costs for Chinese companies, hamper China’s efforts. The rise in militancy means that these companies have to pay “protection” money to different central and local governments, militants and warlords. Life is scary for Chinese workers in the eight most vulnerable provinces in Afghanistan. China is taking countermeasures to counter the slide in the security situation. It has begun construction of the crucial $5-million road through Wakhan Corridor that connects to Xinjiang. It is also financing a military base in the bordering Badakhshan province, hoping to create a buffer zone. China also intends to tie down Afghanistan in a mesh of multilateral arrangements such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation dialogue mechanism on Afghanistan; Himalayan Quadrilateral with Pakistan, Afghanistan and Nepal, or in a quadrilateral with Pakistan, Afghanistan and Tajikistan. However, none of these initiatives have helped Beijing make much headway. China provided military equipment and training to the Mujahideen during the anti-Soviet days of the 1980s. In post-Soviet Afghanistan, Beijing kept the Taliban, Al Qaeda (specifically, the Hekmatyar group) and the Pakistani ISI close, with the bottom line that they would not aid the Uighur insurgency in Xinjiang. It also helped Taliban and Pakistan’s efforts in the Panjshir attacks. However, as the surge in attacks on Chinese interests shows, Beijing’s efforts seem to be faltering. The Longan Hotel attack in Kabul last month could be the harbinger of a new type of militancy in the region. Beijing’s myopic view and double standards on terrorism may be backfiring. #China #Afghanistan #Taliban #Pakistan Originally published: Deccan Herald, January 29, 2023. https://www.deccanherald.com/amp/opinion/in-afghanistan-china-s-double-dealing-is-coming-back-to-bite-it-1185612.html Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli is Dean of School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University.

By Prof. Santishree Dhulipudi Pandit India's growth story in recent years can best be visualized as a tale of ‘two cities’ told through the discourses of gaps, divides and disparities. The Covid crisis made these fault lines more visible and uglier. Much of the technological transformation underway in urban and metropolitan parts was spearheaded to create deliverables for the less fortunate counterparts in rural India. One major endeavour has been in the field of education. The paradigm shift began in 2014 where a courageous rediscovery into civilizational values of balance between tradition and modernity, realm and region, continuity with change, excellence with equity and innovation with inclusion. The paradigm shift began in 2014 where a courageous rediscovery into civilizational values of balance between tradition and modernity, realm and region, continuity with change, excellence with equity and innovation with inclusion. Education would be a major collaborative multilateral vertical in India’s Presidency of G20 India’s commitment to making G20 multilateral collaboration promote learning opportunities is illustrated by the event of special university connect that virtually brought together students from 75 universities across the country on December 1, 2022 Digital India gives thrust to education When personal contact and mobility became difficult, India took a giant leap towards creating a digitally empowered and inclusive society. The challenges were immense, and access to the Internet was low, especially in rural India. However, with 560 million internet subscriptions in 2018, up from 238.71 million in 2013, India is the second-largest internet subscription market in the world and could provide a conducive focus ecosystem for the tech market companies to innovate in the field of education. Urban India benefited immensely from the mushrooming of edutech companies offering a wide spectrum of online educational services. The edutech market in India was about US$2.5 billion in 2020 and is estimated to increase four-fold in the next five years to reach about US$10 billion. During the Covid crisis, it was realized that schools must undergo digital transformation. Therefore, all efforts were made to make learning more inclusive and intuitive. Diksha portal embeds technology for students with visual, hearing impairments India has about 3,12,000 common service centres across the country, providing 350 Internet- enabled services, including education. In 2020, during the Covid crisis, the Diksha—one- nation-one-digital-platform—was launched to post a large number of educational content published by NCERT, CBSE and others to give universal and uniform access to students across all states and union territories to quality knowledge. The portal has embedded technology for students with visual and hearing impairments. Video recordings of more than 2,000 textbooks have been uploaded on the portal and can be accessed in 31 Indian languages. Dispelling the darkness of ignorance India’s tech-driven education has been ensuring digital access and digital inclusion to children and students in the remotest parts of the country. Edutech platform ‘first-in-class’ flags its social values and has signed MoU with the Rotary India literacy mission to create the largest free edutech initiative in India and worldwide. The initiative was taken to mark India’s 75th year of independence-Azadi ka Amrit Mahotsav; nothing could be more significant than dispelling the darkness of ignorance. Many non-profit organizations took the initiative to bridge the digital divide by empowering teachers with technology like AI-enabled WhatsApp Chatbot. The interactive chatbots helped teachers adopt and learn digital skills for teaching and learning purposes. Local languages thrive on digitalisation Many Indians can read and write only in one of India’s more than 30 official languages. They cannot access the information on personal computers and laptops with English keyboards. Several Indian software developers have enabled the reach of information and education to the Indian masses in the local languages. In 2020, India had one of the highest gender gaps in technology access. In 2015, only 10 percent of internet users in India’s rural areas were women. They suffered from information poverty due to the digital divide. However, smartphone usage among Indian women has increased phenomenally. India has a little more than 300 million households; smartphone usage is in about 200 million households, with at least one or more women user in each household. Internet became handheld through the usage of smartphones trickling down to villages. Digital technology facilitated formal education and contributed immensely to building skills in the informal sector. People learned new skills from Internet-enabled devices, became self- employed, and ran small businesses, which was a lifesaving opportunity during Covid. India’s contribution to ensuring inclusiveness is illustrated in the falling costs of data. India is the second largest smartphone user in the world, and the cost of data is among the lowest and has come down to Re 0.10 per GB. Open Learning offers affordable education One major concern in India’s education sector has been the rising cost, and several Indian students opted to study in countries like Ukraine and others to get professional education at affordable cost. Edutech companies provide digital access to quality education and smart governance options, thereby reducing the institutions’ overhead costs. The Open Learning is a successful example of offering affordable education and has broken the boundaries to deliver education to the learner’s doorstep. It offers a flexible learning model blended with online education-aided and social tools like Moodle, WhatsApp, etc. Moreover, it strives to embed audio and video recorded lectures on online applications, facilitating the teaching and learning process for educators and learners. Ahead of China in tech-driven content creation India aims to become a major education hub with tech-driven content creation and dissemination within an inclusive, multidisciplinary framework. In 2021 India broke the Chinese record of having the largest number of unicorn start-ups in one year; Edutech start- ups have a sizeable presence among them. Moreover, with new technologies like AI and Blockchain, learning is accelerated, and careers are transformed. Booming demand for online higher education After the Covid experience, the new normal is beset with greater comfort and confidence in online educational platforms. The students favourably weigh the cost-benefit and flexibility of online courses vis-à-vis traditional campus learning. Online learning platform Coursera reported 49 percent growth from students in India over the past 12 months, illustrative of the country’s booming demand for online higher education. By June 2022, India had become the second largest market after the US, with over 24.6 million course enrolments. Coursera also cooperates with 1,100 campuses across India, co-creating courses for its students,. They report accessing more than 1.5 million learners and 14.1 million course enrolments since January According to the Bengaluru-based market research firm RedSeer, the online higher education market is estimated to grow from 90 million individuals in 2020 to 133 million individuals by 2025. Global digital leader in the making India is in a take-off phase of digital adoption; being the second fastest digitizing country among the emerging and mature digital economies. It is set to become a global digital leader. A range of e-learning apps has increased and captured significant market share. There are innovative experiments in interactive learning through problem-solving assignments and elaborate discussions and feedback during online classes. Among existing challenges are connectivity and limited bandwidth. Internet penetration is usually associated with greater social progress of a nation. In this context, despite existing challenges of not having a uniform or universal access to the Internet, the sheer growth of Internet usage and enabled devices speaks volumes of strides India has made in the last few years in bridging the gaps. Reimagining and reinventing the educational ecosystems Education would be a major collaborative multilateral vertical in India’s Presidency of G20 because it touches the lives of people directly and thus has the potential to build stronger cooperation between G20 member-states. India can help G20 member-states and other low and middle-income countries reimagine and reinvent the educational ecosystems taking a leaf from its own National Education Policy 2020 and digital and technological transformations and in an Open Tech Model that promotes lifelong learning opportunities in a blended approach. India can showcase to the world its knowledge systems that promote sustainability and the ability to reinvent crisis into learning opportunities. India’s commitment to making G20 multilateral collaboration promote learning opportunities is illustrated by the event of special university connect that virtually brought together students from 75 universities across the country on 1 December 2022, marking the first day of India’s G-20 presidency. The Amrit Kaal is inclusive,and innovative as leading internally and internationally in the world that it sees as Vasudeiva Kutumbakam. #India #G20 #Education #G20Presidency Originally published: Navjeevan Express, January 25, 2023. https://navjeevanexpress.com/g20-tech-driven-education-in-india-bridges-the-gap-between-urban-and-rural-students/ Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the Dean, SIS. Prof. Santishree Dhulipudi Pandit is the Vice Chancellor of Jawaharlal Nehru University, JNU.

By Prof. Swaran Singh US Secretary of State Blinken is on his way to Beijing but it’s not clear yet how China’s new leaders will receive the diplomatic overture On the eve of China’s next generation of leaders formally taking office for President Xi Jinping’s third term, set to start in early March, the Joe Biden administration has stepped up its efforts to engage the new leaders. The latest among these was US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen’s meeting with Chinese Vice Premier Liu He on January 18 in Switzerland to discuss the possible onset of a global recession that could see the United States default on its debt as early as this spring. China holds nearly a trillion dollars of US debt in Treasury holdings, a very close second to Japan. An advanced team of US Treasury officials will be traveling to Beijing in early February to plan for Secretary Yellen’s visit to familiarize herself with China’s new leaders. Biden’s presidential term so far has seen the pandemic and Ukraine war add new irritants to relations that were first driven down by the Trump administration’s trade and tech wars, which began soon after he took office in 2016. US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August last year marked a new bilateral nadir. China responded by launching its biggest-ever military exercises in the Taiwan Strait and suspended most of its official interactions with the United States, stoking fears the world has entered a new cold war. Icebreaking summit President Joe Biden has held four online meetings with President Xi Jinping but none brought a breakthrough. Meanwhile, the pandemic and prolonged Ukraine war have further widened the gulf as a strengthening Russia-China axis creates new US-China fault lines. Biden and Xi were able to turn the tide somewhat at their first face-to-face meeting at the Bali G20 summit last November. On the occasion, the two leaders agreed to “maintain open lines of communication” and revive their official interactions as early as possible. In that direction, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken is scheduled to visit Beijing and meet his newly-appointed counterpart Qin Gang between February 5-6. Qin was until recently China’s ambassador to Washington. Significantly, Blinken is following through with the meeting despite a massive surge of Covid cases in China that have opened a new rift in relations due to Washington’s restrictive response, which have added logistical challenges to the visit. There is even speculation Blinken may be granted a meeting with President Xi, though this is still unconfirmed. Last month, Blinken’s State Department set up a dedicated Office of China Coordination, nicknamed the “China House”, to manage relations with Beijing. This is arguably all part of the Biden administration’s attempt to stabilize relations with China and familiarize US officials with China’s new crop of leaders promoted during the 20th Party Congress last October. They will formally take their respective offices following China’s 14th National People’s Congress endorsing their positions in a session scheduled to begin on March 5. Reports suggest that Yellen could follow Blinken as the next US official to visit Beijing. On Wednesday (January 18), the US Treasury Department announced that Yellen also “looks forward to traveling to China and welcoming her counterparts to the United States in near future.” Like Blinken, Yellen has also lots of bilateral knots to untie. The Biden administration has tightened trade and investment regulations on China while slapping punitive restrictions on technology transfers, including on advanced semiconductors and chip-making equipment, in the name of national security. Successive US administrations have accused China of intellectual property theft including through forced technology transfers from American investors based in China. Chinese checkers US overtures to meet with China’s next-generation leaders make good diplomatic sense. What is intriguing is that most of these interactions are increasingly being initiated by Washington rather than Beijing. This dynamic arguably gives at least a tactical advantage to Chinese leaders in setting the tone and tenor of their interactions. Recent years have also seen China becoming increasingly wary of any preconditions, redlines, or predefined agendas for such meetings, which it prefers to keep more open-ended. As such, China has been less inclined to accept US diplomatic invitations. Most recently, Washington’s offer this month to hold deconfliction talks following an air encounter involving US and Chinese aircraft over the South China Sea via a phone call between US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe was declined by Beijing at perhaps the very last minute. This should have been a standard communication under the two sides’ Military Maritime Consultative Agreement of 1998. Likewise, it remains unclear whether Austin will soon discuss these matters with Li Shangfu, who is expected to take over as China’s next defense minister, any time soon. Li, promoted at the 20th Party Congress as a new member of China’s Central Military Commission, was the former head of its Equipment Development Department. What may make matters complicated is that Li was sanctioned by the US in 2018 for China’s purchase of S-400 missiles from Russia. The coming weeks will be critical to see whether this new wave of US diplomatic outreach will improve or further degrade their bilateral equations. While Washington appears to see hope for better ties under a new crop of Chinese leaders, it’s not yet clear that Beijing sees the situation similarly. #Biden-XiSummit #BlinkenChinaVisit #China #USChinaRrelations Originally published: Asia Times, January 23, 2023. https://asiatimes.com/2023/01/will-us-outreach-to-chinas-next-gen-leaders-bear-fruit/?fbclid=IwAR0LEeOeU249JwuXyM2yfEgTzSLFtcScB6QeKYvj40h3NrdOe2vHbU7uLms Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Swaran Singh is visiting professor at the University of British Columbia and professor of diplomacy and disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He is president of the Association of Asia Scholars; adjunct senior fellow at the Charhar Institute, Beijing; senior fellow, Institute for National Security Studies Sri Lanka, Colombo; and visiting professor, Research Institute for Indian Ocean Economies, Kunming

By Prof. Bharat H Desai The beginning of 2023 came with resounding audacity of hope for Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) – the oldest problem inherited by the United Nations (UN) from its predecessor the League of Nations. In a divided world, it vividly reflects the relevance of the UN as well as underscores the majesty of International Law for resolution of long-standing intricate global disputes. In a communication of January 17, 2023 to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) President Joan E. Donoghue, the UN Secretary-General (UNSG) Antonio Guterres transmitted the General Assembly resolution 77/247 of December 30, 2022 (adopted by 87-26-53 votes). The resolution has explicitly recalled the previous UNGA requested ICJ advisory opinion (9 July 2004) entitled: Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Invoking Legal Technique of ICJ Opinions The UNGA resolution came in the wake of the Human Rights Council resolution S - 30/1 of May 27, 2021 (24 in favor, 9 against, 14 abstention) as well as October 3, 2022 report of the GA mandated (resolution 76/80 of December 9, 2021) Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Palestinian People. The UNGA has reiterated that all measures and actions taken by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, in violation of the relevant provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, and contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, are illegal and have no validity. It has demanded that Israel, the occupying Power, comply fully with the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and cease immediately all measures and actions taken in violation and in breach of the Convention. The UN Charter has explicitly conferred competence (Article 96) on the UNGA to “request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question”. In turn, the Court has competence under Article 65 of its own Statute to render an advisory opinion. The UNGA as a plenary organ with 193 member states has spread a very wide canvass for the UN’s principal judicial organ to examine the legal issues on the basis of the rules and principles of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, international humanitarian law, international human rights law, relevant resolutions of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council as well as the ICJ advisory opinion of the Court of 9 July 2004. The Legal Questions The UNGA resolution comprises two well-calibrated concrete legal questions that encapsulate the entire history of the vexed Palestinian question. It shows drafting dexterity, expectation from the Court and the indication of future trajectory for resolution of the issue: (a) What are the legal consequences arising from the ongoing violation by Israel of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, from its prolonged occupation, settlement and annexation of the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including measures aimed at altering the demographic composition, character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, and from its adoption of related discriminatory legislation and measures? (b) How do the policies and practices of Israel referred to in paragraph 18 (a) above affect the legal status of the occupation, and what are the legal consequences that arise for all States and the United Nations from this status? Towards an Opinion: What May Happen The Palestinian question has over the years witnessed many ups and downs including direct negotiations between the Israeli Government and the Palestinian Authority (initially headed by late Yasser Arafat and now Mahmoud Abbas). Many interlocutors played roles for its resolution starting with the UN Mediator in Palestine (vide UNGA resolution resolution 186 of 14 May 1948) Count Folke Bernadotte who was assassinated on September 17, 1948 by the Jewish militia Stern Gang of the time. It led to the celebrated April 11, 1949 ICJ advisory opinion on Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Latest developments | Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations | International Court of Justice (icj-cij.org). The connoisseurs of International Law have marveled at the sheer engineering skills marshalled by the ICJ (largely due to election of outstanding International Law scholars with wide horizons as judges) in the development of International Law. In providing legal opinions as well as through interpretation and elaboration of complex questions of the time, the ICJ has made enormous contribution. Article 65 (ICJ Statute) empowers the Court to “give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever body may be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such a request”. As a corollary, such legal questions need to be “laid before the Court by means of a written request containing an exact statement of the question upon which an opinion is required”. Upon receipt of the request the Court calls upon the UN member states and others to provide written and oral statements on the issue at stake. Neither the ICJ is bound to give an opinion nor the requesting organ is under any obligation to adhere to the Court’s legal opinion. Notwithstanding this, the ICJ has, as the practice show, always provided an opinion sought by the UNGA and, in turn, it has accepted in letter and spirit the opinions rendered by the ICJ. India Needs to Help the ICJ Though India abstained in the UNGA resolution (77/247 of December 30, 2022), it shall have vital stakes in the future ICJ opinion on the OPT in view of consistent Indian legal claim to the Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK), as contended by this author (EPW (vol. 52, no.5, February 4, 2017), based on the “title to the entire territory of erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, as reflected in the exercise of sovereign will of the Maharaja (Hari Singh)” who signed the Instrument of Accession to join India on October 26, 1947. Hence, it would be advisable for the Indian External Affairs Minister to put into place a robust mechanism comprising genuine outstanding Indian International Law scholars, for preparation of a written statement for the ICJ proceedings. India provide a written statement (June 20, 1995) for the advisory opinion (July 8, 1996) on Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. In fact, India needs to help the Court in the elaboration of International Law of Occupation as the ICJ also came to India’s help in the resounding judgement of July 17, 2019 in the Jadhav Case (India v. Pakistan). As the ICJ proceedings unfolds in the coming months, it would provide yet another opportunity to the ICJ to elaborate on International Law of Occupation. It would provide concrete legal contours for the negotiated advent of the Palestinian State (currently a non-member Observer State in the UN). #UNGA #ICJ #Palestine #India Professor Dr. Bharat H. Desai is Jawaharlal Nehru Chair and Professor of International Law at the Centre for International Legal Studies of SIS, JNU. He served as a member of the official Indian Delegations to various multilateral negotiations (2002-2008), coordinated the Making SIS Visible initiative (2012-2020) and Inter-University Consortium: JNU; Jammu; Kashmir; Sikkim (2012-2020) as well as contributes as the Editor-in-Chief of Environmental Policy and Law (IOS Press: Amsterdam).

By Ankit Tiwari The US and the USSR were directing huge resources towards R&D in Outer Space capabilities in order to gain a strategic advantage over each other but today all spacefaring nations, including US and China, are entangled in interdependencies, primarily because of the vital need for satellite communications as a backbone of globalization, and this itself is a massive deterrence for the weaponization of space. On 7th December 2022, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution asking member states not to conduct direct ascent Anti-Satellite (ASAT) missile tests that create space debris. The resolution was praised by Vice President Kamala Harris, who chairs the White House National Space Council, she tweeted “Back in April, I announced the United States will not conduct destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile tests, and I called on other nations to join us. Today, 155 countries voted in favor of a UN resolution, helping establish this as an international norm for space.” It’s worth noting that out of the four countries that have ASAT capabilities - the US, India, China, and Russia - only the United States voted in favor of the resolution. Russia and China along with 6 other nations voted against the resolution and nine more nations abstained, including India. While the US moratorium on kinetic ASAT tests, which was joined by France and several other countries, and the UN resolution are optimistic steps in the right direction to create important international norms for conduct in outer space, it is not nearly enough. To begin with, ASATs are not the only threat or attempt at the weaponization of outer space. In fact, space-based assets can often be dual-use and repurposed for military use as demonstrated by China’s Scavenger Satellite program. And more importantly, resolutions undertaken by the UN General Assembly are non-legally binding and only reflect the views of the member states. And moratoriums can always be reversed, with regime change for example, and do not carry the weight of international law. In general, only the resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council are considered legally binding, in accordance with Article 25 of the UN Charter, and negotiations over comprehensive regulation of strategic activities in space have stalled, if not outrightly failed, for decades at various levels of international co-operation. The negotiation over the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) Treaty is a good case in point. For 40 years, PAROS has had near-universal support among the UN Member States, with the US and Israel being notable exceptions, either voting ‘no’ or abstaining. The UN General Assembly has passed it, as a resolution, every year and urged states to ‘consolidate and reinforce’ the existing legal regime for outer space and to ‘enhance its effectiveness’. But to date, no nations have made any serious efforts to actually implement the stated goals of PAROS in their policies. The treaty effectively acts as a ritual for space powers, signaling their empty support every year while doing next to nothing to initiate any official work on PAROS, supposedly due to national strategic interests in outer space. At the international level, while PAROS remains an important agenda item at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) at the UN and negotiations are ongoing to come up with a legally-binding instrument to implement PAROS’ stated goals, the diverging interests of its constituent nations and great power rivalry within the body make it difficult to converge on common interests and make decisions, and PAROS is no exception. In fact, the Conference on Disarmament hasn’t produced a single treaty in this century, a dire situation, given that it is the only multilateral disarmament forum for the international community. China’s ASAT test in 2007, followed by the US, Russia, and India has shattered the complacency that had settled in with respect to international space security and the ‘peaceful purposes’ stipulation of the Outer Space Treaty (1967) is more or less defunct as spacefaring powers have shown they have no regard for it. Many experts argue that the space arms race conversation is often exaggerated as the situation in space is far more complex today than it was during the Cold War when the original idea of a space race originated. The US and the USSR were directing huge resources towards R&D in Outer Space capabilities in order to gain a strategic advantage over each other but today all spacefaring nations, including US and China, are entangled in interdependencies, primarily because of the vital need for satellite communications as a backbone of globalization, and this itself is a massive deterrence for the weaponization of space. Although there is merit to this argument, it is surely limited when viewed in the context age of growing mistrust between nations and, as much is demonstrated by the fact that four countries felt the need to test highly destructive and risky ASAT weapons in the 21st century even when none of them were at war with each other, hot or otherwise. The economic interdependencies between great powers are a deterrent but history has proven many times over that it is not always a reliable one and certainly not adequate when the stakes are as high as they are in outer space. To understand why the stakes are so high, there are two important facts to remember when thinking about destructive ASAT tests. First - the vast majority of satellites orbit in an area of outer space called the Low Earth Orbit (LEO), where the period of a satellite is only 90 minutes, and second - a collision with a tiny fragment of debris (potentially caused by ASAT weapons) even one centimeter-wide can damage or destroy entire satellites, as they travel at speeds of tens of thousands of kmph and every collision will create more debris that may remain in orbit for many decades. To put these facts into perspective, consider Kosmos 2251, a defunct Russian military communications satellite that collided with the solar panel of Iridium 33, a commercial American satellite in 2009, which led to catastrophic disintegration into more than 2,000 pieces of space debris with sizes greater than 10 centimeters, and potentially hundreds of thousands of smaller fragments that cannot currently be tracked from Earth. In 2012, Scientists estimate that about 10% of all known space debris accumulated over the past 55 years comes from the 2009 Kosmos-Iridium collision. Since then, Russia and India have both launched direct-ascent anti-satellite tests that have worsened the problem of space debris. And furthermore, the International Space Station has had to steer multiple times to avoid trackable debris, once as a direct result of Russia’s 2021 test. I use the word ‘catastrophic’ because this collision was a definite step towards a nightmare theoretical situation, first proposed by NASA scientist Donald J. Kessler in 1978, called the Kessler Syndrome in which the density of orbital objects in LEO is high enough that a collision between two objects (satellites) could create enough space debris to increase the likelihood of further collisions, thus setting off a chain reaction where little pieces of debris with enough kinetic energy destroy other satellites and keep multiplying till there are no satellites in low Earth orbit (LEO) and furthermore, create a cloud of debris over LEO that can potentially cut off our access to space for decades, if not centuries. It is worth noting that when Kessler proposed this paradigm, there were about 120 satellites in orbit around the Earth. Today that number stands at 8,261 and out of which, about 3500 satellites were launched by Elon Musk-owned Space-X in the last two years. It is estimated that in the next 5 years alone, the number of satellites orbiting Earth will exceed 35,000 mostly due to private players mass-manufacturing little satellites in a move to monetize space. It is also worth noting that the creation of space debris alone is not the only risk associated with ASAT weapons and their testing. Many nations have critical strategic assets in space and even the threat of destruction of their strategic assets by ASAT-capable nations could lead to significant escalation, if not all-out war. The metaphorical road ahead, which represents the implementation of a multi-lateral comprehensive arms-control treaty to prevent the weaponization of outer space and safeguard one of mankind’s most valuable resources (outer space) in the 21st century, is full of hurdles and the stakes have never been higher. Nations across the world must unite to determine an immediate future that maximizes collective security in outer space. #UN #ASAT #Missile Mr. Ankit Tiwari is pursuing M.S. in International Studies, JNU. Email - ankit.tiwari2000@gmail.com

By Prof. Swaran Singh His five-nation tour saw all his hosts strongly reiterating commitment to building closer cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida is winding down a six-day, five-nation tour that took him to France, Italy, the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States. These were the first such high-level interactions of 2023 among world leaders, triggering some interesting speculation and interpretations in world media. Two weeks ago, Japan took over the presidency of the powerful Group of Seven industrialized nations and announced it would hold a summit in Prime Minister Kishida’s home constituency, Hiroshima, on May 19-21. From this perspective, this tour saw Kishida reconnect with leaders of five of the G7 nations, with Germany being the only exception. But that is not all. This hectic multi-nation visit is also being seen in the backdrop of Kishida’s domestic troubles precipitating multiple resignations. This included the ruling Liberal Democratic Party breaking ties with the influential Unification Church over the latter’s alleged links with assassination of former prime minister Shinzo Abe. As a result, last month witnessed the Kishida cabinet’s approval ratings plummeting to an all-time low of 25%, tempting analysts to see the tour as an attempt at diverting attention. Regional implications But it is in terms of its regional implications that this tour could be seen as an inflection point. Prima facie, this hyperactive tour was goaded by Kishida’s need to seek endorsement from his allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for the National Security Strategy and New Defense Strategy reports issued by Japan last month. These two reports present the roadmap not just for doubling Japan’s military expenditure but also to add counterstrike capabilities to the so-called Self-Defense Forces (SDF). This is expected to put an end to Japan’s decades-old debate on breaking away from its self-imposed commitment to keep its annual defense budget under 1% of gross domestic product. Kishida proposes to take Japan’s defense budget within five years to more than 2% of GDP. This will not just put the country in the league of NATO nations but, given the size of Japan’s GDP, will make it the world’s third-largest defense spender after the United States and China. The most transformative import of the above-mentioned two reports is Japan’s decision to add offensive capabilities to its “Self-Defense” Forces. In defiance of the war-renouncing Article 9 of its constitution, Japan now plans to build critical counterstrike capabilities. This will not just mark a historic breakaway from its past but could trigger a major arms race in the larger Indo-Pacific region. Of course, Japan has its justifications for triggering such tectonic transformations. Intensifying Japan-US alliance Eleven months of war in Ukraine has seen Japan drift from being extremely cautious to becoming Russia’s strongest critic in Asia. Japan has had complicated relations with Moscow, Beijing and Pyongyang, including tension-ridden territorial disputes with Russia and China. The Kishida administration has become concerned with increasingly assertive behavior of these neighbors. Besides Russian’s Ukraine war and China’s large military exercises in the Taiwan Strait following then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s Taiwan visit in August, the year 2022 saw North Korea launch more than 90 ballistic and cruise missiles. This has seen Kishida lately echoing US President Joe Biden’s concerns about China and North Korea, and especially joining his refrain on Moscow’s “unprovoked” invasion having not just regional but global implications. On Wednesday, in the joint statement issued at end of their annual 2+2 meeting of defense and foreign ministers in Washington, the United States and Japan reiterated their shared commitment to “deter intensifying Chinese military threats in the East China Sea and around Taiwan,” to reorganize US Marine Corps units based in Okinawa, and to expand cooperation from outer space to cybersecurity to other sectors of advanced military technologies, including upgrading US weapons transfers to Japan. In that light, Prime Minister Kishida – formerly Japan’s long-term foreign minister – was expected to obtain “a warm embrace” by President Biden in Washington on Friday regarding his new Defense and Security Strategy reports. Such an endorsement by the United States is not just a message to Russia, China and North Korea but also to Kishida’s opponents back home as the Japanese Diet (parliament) begins a politically sensitive debate on paying for the proposed spike in this year’s defense budget. Among others, Japan’s proposed defense budget already includes US$1.58 billion for US-made long-range Tomahawk cruise missiles and for developing modern radar-evading hypersonic missiles. This would empower Japan to strike across Asia. Japan-UK defense pact The other major highlight of Kishida’s five-nation tour was his signing in London of a Reciprocal Access Agreement. British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak called it “historic” as it allows the two countries’ armed forces to be deployed on each other’s territories, thereby further reinforcing the UK’s Indo-Pacific tilt. For the United Kingdom, this marks an endorsement from Japan, which has been the oldest proponent of the Indo-Pacific paradigm and strongest advocate of a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” The United Kingdom has lately come to be a powerful player in molding Indo-Pacific geopolitical trends. The March 2021 publication of its Integrated Review followed the US lead in identifying China’s expanding footprint as their shared challenge and pronounced why post-Brexit “Global Britain” needed to “engage with the Indo-Pacific more deeply for its own security.” In September 2021, the UK was invited to join the AUKUS trilateral defense partnership for the Indo-Pacific that then-prime minister Boris Johnson had called a “new chapter” with “the first task of this partnership” being “to help Australia acquire a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines.” Japan also signed a similar Reciprocal Access Agreement with Australia in January last year. This backdrop reveals the import of the UK now signing a new defense pact with Japan. As for Japan, it seems all set to capitalize on such cultivation by its Western allies. Fumio Kishida, a resident of Hiroshima, author of Towards a World without Nuclear Weapons and perceived widely as “dove,” this drift presents itself as a demand of the times. It also comes in line with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’ Zeitenwende address after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which he called his “turning point” to reverse decades of extreme caution in military matters as he proposed to take defense expenditure to 2% of German GDP. Indo-Pacific revived The prolonged Ukraine war has heightened Japan’s concerns about Western overstretch, making it suspicious of NATO members’ appreciation of its regional security challenges, thus hurtling it toward exploring self-help options. But even these novel self-help strategies required endorsements from its allies in NATO. Against that backdrop, this five-nation tour by Kishida saw all his hosts strongly reiterating commitment to building closer cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region and redressing their shared concerns about China, North Korea and Russia. Apart from all other specific issues in their deliberations, revival of their cooperation in the Indo-Pacific remained their common refrain, starting from Kishida’s first stop in Paris and his meetings with President Emmanuel Macron. Likewise, in his meetings with Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, Rome also committed itself to working with Japan and the United Kingdom for a new fighter jet. In turn, Kishida also underlined how he saw that “the security of Europe and that of the Indo-Pacific are inseparable.” The coming weeks will show how effective this external endorsement of Kishida can be in his dealings with his domestic detractors. #FumioKishida #G7 #IndoPacificStrategy #Japan Originally published: Asia Times, January 13, 2023. https://asiatimes.com/2023/01/kishidas-rearming-of-japan-wins-support-of-allies/?fbclid=IwAR05cFZ8af-6ZFh25Ml_FLTCURmHqy-zMAXtSIHgXsjsQEez8091ATX9sBohttps://asiatimes.com/2023/01/kishidas-rearming-of-japan-wins-support-of-allies/?fbclid=IwAR05cFZ8af-6ZFh25Ml_FLTCURmHqy-zMAXtSIHgXsjsQEez8091ATX9sBo Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Swaran Singh is visiting professor at the University of British Columbia and professor of diplomacy and disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He is president of the Association of Asia Scholars; adjunct senior fellow at the Charhar Institute, Beijing; senior fellow, Institute for National Security Studies Sri Lanka, Colombo; and visiting professor, Research Institute for Indian Ocean Economies, Kunming

By Prof. Bharat H Desai In a heartening development, both the houses of the Indian Parliament finally passed a special legislation (December 19 and 21, 2022) for “repression of piracy”. This author has, over the years, consistently called for taking International Law seriously. The Anti-Maritime Piracy Bill 2019 makes International Law of Piracy work, translates into action the Indian Prime Minister’s assurance of “respect for International Law” and reaffirms the official position of “commitment to International Law”. The Standing Committee on External Affairs (SCEA) deserves the credit for providing concrete input that strengthened the original Bill introduced by the External Affairs Minister (EAM) on December 2, 2019. Ostensibly, it seeks to address the challenge of piracy on high seas and give effect to obligation under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). UNCLOS with 168 parties was ratified by India on 29 June 1995. It comes 40 years after the ‘Constitution for Oceans’ was adopted at Montego Bay (Jamaica) on December 10, 1982. Piracy has emerged as a menace in the area surrounding the Gulf of Aden that separates Somalia and Yemen. The Gulf of Aden connects the Arabian Sea to the Red Sea and through the Suez Canal, to the Mediterranean Sea. Since 2008, the Somali pirates have posed serious threat to some 2000 ships that monthly carry the cargo for trade between Asia, Europe and the East Coast of Africa. With the presence of navies in the Gulf of Aden, the pirates have shifted their base and now pose threat to the western coast of India. An intensive patrolling by the Indian Navy and the Coast Guard has led to apprehending of pirates and, in turn, the need to prosecute them under a specialized domestic law. The charge of offences such as armed robbery (section 392) under the Indian Penal Code and invocation of jurisdiction of the Admiralty Courts (dealing with shipping and maritime disputes) have been found to be inadequate. Hence, the need for anti-piracy lex specialis for prosecution of piracy related crimes for ensuring safety of the Indian maritime trade, vessels and the crew. Piracy as a Global Crime Historically, piracy has been dealt with under International Law or Law of Nations (jure jentium). It comprises any illegal act of violence or detention or depredation committed by the crew or passengers on the high seas (beyond limits of national jurisdiction). Hence, pirates can be tried and punished by any nation. In fact, pirates have been considered as enemies of humankind (hostis humani generis). For centuries, the maritime trade remained the global hallmark. The age of aero planes has not affected it. Even today, almost 90% of the global trade including oil is transported by ships that pass through the vital sea lanes. In earlier times, the sea piracies were rampant, alike dacoity on the land. Gradually, due to aggressive patrolling by the naval powers as well as regulatory frameworks designed by the global organizations such as the United Nations and the International Maritime Organization, threats to maritime routes have declined. Still, it exists in certain pockets. Eradication of piracy has assumed significance after the Indian Prime Minister’s emphasis on the Blue Economy as an important source of Aatamnirbhar Bharat. Global Crime Prosecuted in Domestic Courts Though piracy has been considered an international crime under the International Law of Piracy, it is the domestic courts where pirates have been prosecuted. In one of the well-known cases of piracy by the Chinese nationals (In re Piracy jure gentium: PC 1934) had attacked a cargo junk. They were indicted in Hong Kong for the crime of piracy and found guilty. The Appeal Court of Hong Kong concluded that robbery was a necessary ingredient of the offence of piracy and the accused were acquitted. Still, the Privy Council decided (July 26, 1934) that International law is a living branch of the law. A frustrated attempt to commit piratical robbery was equally piracy jure gentium. The charge was under the international law of piracy, and determined accordingly. The recognition of piracy as a global crime, and the trial and punishment of criminals, are left to the municipal law of each country. Invocation of the Indian Jurisdiction It is in this context that the Indian Anti-Maritime Piracy law holds significance. After its introduction in the Lok Sabha (December 02, 2019), it was referred to the SCEA. The Committee examined the Bill and suggested certain amendments in its report submitted in February 2021. Invoking the International Law of Piracy, the Bill draws the mandate specifically from obligations under the UNCLOS (Article 105). It seeks to apply the Indian law for crimes committed in the High Seas, an area “beyond the limits of national jurisdiction”. Article 100 of the UNCLOS, explicitly provides for “repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any state”. This area constitutes the area beyond the Exclusive Economic Zone of India (EEZ), beyond 200 nautical miles. Article 105 specifically enables “every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board”. It provides that the “courts of the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed”. As per UNCLOS Article 101, three essential elements are required for an act to constitute piracy: (1) there is an illegal act of violence or detention or depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft (2) committed on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft (3) it is outside the jurisdiction of any State. The letter and spirit of the 2019 Indian law reflects all these elements whose objectives comprise the following: (1) application to all parts of the sea adjacent to and beyond the limits of the EEEZ (2) make the offence of piracy on high seas punishable with imprisonment for life or with death (3) deals with acts or attempts or being accessory to the commission of the offence of piracy (4) presumption of guilt if certain conditions are fulfilled (5) makes the offence of piracy extraditable (6) designation of certain courts for speedy trial for piracy under the new legislation. The preamble to the 2019 Bill draws its mandate from the UNCLOS and uses the word repression (Article 100) of piracy instead of standard words used in a criminal legislation such as elimination, eradication, combating or prohibition. Notwithstanding this, the new law would serve as a deterrent in stamping out the menace of piracy as well as serve as a vital tool for the Navy and the Coast Guard in securing the crucial sea-trade lanes in the vicinity of the Indian waters. #MaritimePiracy #InternationalLaw #UNCLOS Professor Dr. Bharat H. Desai is Jawaharlal Nehru Chair and Professor of International Law at the Centre for International Legal Studies of SIS, JNU. He served as a member of the official Indian Delegations to various multilateral negotiations (2002-2008), coordinated the Making SIS Visible initiative (2012-2020) and Inter-University Consortium: JNU; Jammu; Kashmir; Sikkim (2012-2020) as well as contributes as the Editor-in-Chief of Environmental Policy and Law (IOS Press: Amsterdam).