Search

By Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli From COVID to Economy, China is witnessing its strongest resistance since the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. In an unprecedented development since the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, China is witnessing a series of pitched battles across the country between the commoners and the authorities on the debilitating restrictions imposed on people for the past three years in the name of controlling the pandemic. At the last count, the protests have spread to over 25 cities and over 80 universities, totalling over 50 since the last week of November when nearly a dozen residents were charred to death at Urumqi in Xinjiang in a locked-down high-rise building that caught fire. The spread of such protests geographically is for the first time in China since the Tiananmen Square incident, although the 1989 movement attracted more protestors. COVID Protests Echo Tiananmen Square Movement Moreover, the communist party was split vertically between pro-student leaders like Zhao Ziyang and hardliners like Li Peng. Today, while political tensions exist between rival factions in the communist party such as the “New Zhijiang Army” of Xi Jinping and the Communist Youth League of Hu Jintao and Li Keqiang, the protests have not divided the crucial party centre yet. China witnessed “mass incidents” periodically after the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. According to official estimates, over 5500 such incidents were reported in 1991, rising continuously to over 87,000 in 2005 and to 1,80,000 in 2010. However, China’s Premier has discontinued providing such statistics anymore. The protests continued as the economic growth rates declined in the past decade from nearly 10 percent to an estimated 3 percent for this year. The crisis of confidence in the party-state is also that while it promised to maintain economic growth rates if students do not question the party’s legitimacy, such high growth rates have vanished in thin air. While a majority of the “mass incidents” were against the grievances related to the withdrawal of subsidies and the retrenchment of the party-state duties, the current protests are against the excessive political control exercised by the authorities in the name of pandemic control for the past three years. Pandemic Control or Political Crackdown? Given the nature of the surveillance state in China and other repressive mechanisms like the “social credit” system, it would be hard to think of scores of people joining any protest in China today. However, the fact that many people ranging from students to workers, ethnic minorities to Han Chinese were participating in large numbers not only indicated that COVID control mechanisms have enraged a large section of the population but also the ability to express openly their dissent to the top powers. Also, despite the domination over the cyber domain and curbs on social networking sites in China, many have utilised such channels to assemble and organise protests across the country. Even though such protests remained decentralised and devoid of backing, funding, and nationwide networks, the fact that they were able to spread like wildfire indicates the growing political dissent in China and the limitations of the authoritarian regime. The COVID prevention efforts provided a chance to furthering the intrusive policies of the party-state and controlling people with arbitrary procedures, unpredictable lockdowns of whole localities and cities without providing for basic provisions of food and sanitary facilities. For the newly anointed Xi Jinping with a third term at the 20th party congress this October, the widespread political protests across the country are challenging if not unnerving. While Xi enjoys an absolute majority in the crucial party hierarchies, the protests tend to undermine his political authority and in the medium term, his legitimacy. What Is Xi’s Strategy To Retain His Term? Even though there is no imminent threat to Xi’s political leadership, despite some slogans in this regard by the protestors, he is expected to broad-base his appeal to the public for any meaningful solution to the problem at hand. Xi had earlier jettisoned rival factional leaders like Li Keqiang, Wang Yang, Hu Chunhua, and others from gaining a foothold in the politburo standing committee. Now, he needs coalition partners to douse the protests across the country. Xi also faces the dilemma of the intensity of the crackdown on the protestors and could easily stamp out dissent, given the overwhelming internal security build-up in China for the past several decades. In fact, today, China has more internal security budgetary allocations than on the defence sector. The nature of surveillance has also been sharpened. However, the more the repression, more is the intensity of protests likely in the current context, thus, creating regime security anxieties. In such a scenario, rethinking the “dynamic zero-COVID” policies earlier reiterated at the 20th party congress in October, might be Xi government's best bet. #China #XiJinping #TiananmenSquare #ChinaEconomy Originally published: Open, December 05, 2022. https://www.thequint.com/voices/opinion/china-churning-can-xi-jinping-retain-premiership-amid-protests-party-crisis-anti-covid-economy-protests-chinese-communist-party#read-more#read-more Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli is Dean of School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University.

By Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli More than nine decades ago, on January 5, 1930, Mao Zedong wrote a letter titled “A single spark can start a prairie fire” offering an optimistic view of the communist movement that eventually spread across the country, seizing state power in 1949. On the reverse, years of mishandling the country’s affairs — specifically imposing a relentlessly draconian policy of “dynamic zero Covid” — created conditions for the spreading of such a fire across the country recently. China witnessed unprecedented protests last month, a first since the massive protests at Tiananmen Square in 1989. The current upsurge — against the excessive intrusion of the party-state in the lives of hundreds of millions of people who are subjected to arbitrary lockdowns, strict border controls, food shortages, unemployment, debilitating quarantine procedures, intensive surveillance, misuse of authority and enormous hardships — is spontaneous, rapid and inclusive. Stringent Covid policies benefited certain business interests of the pharmaceutical and health industry at the cost of the social sector. Even though nearly 90 per cent of the people are said to be vaccinated, the number of infections is rising substantially to nearly 30,000 infections a day, suggesting the ineffectiveness of the China-developed vaccines. In fact, Brazilians found to their chagrin that the effectiveness of Chinese vaccines was just over 56 per cent. Even then, China refuses to procure advanced vaccines from abroad. China bragged about how “open, transparent and efficient” it was in its “victorious” war against the pandemic in the last three years and how its centralised political leadership responded concertedly in controlling infections. It also threw mud on several democratic countries in an all-out ideological campaign. China’s Communist Party organs even practised “vulture diplomacy” when infections increased in India and other countries last year. The protests found resonances in far-flung western areas of Xinjiang when a locked-down apartment caught fire on November 24, killing nearly a dozen according to official figures. It found echoes from nooks and corners of China with “Urumqi Road” placards becoming iconic symbols. Urumqi protests spread to Korla and Hotan cities, usually hotbeds of Uighur insurgency. Major cities in China, including Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Wuhan, Chongqing, Chengdu, Xian, Taiyuan, Jinan and Hangzhou, were engulfed in the fast-spreading prairie fire. These are unprecedented pitched battles of affected people with the police and clearly indicate a loss of political legitimacy of the powers that be. That the protests happened soon after the 20th Communist Party congress has surprised many despite Xi Jinping’s bulldozing of the party leadership with his factional leaders’ domination and demolishment of rival political groups. Political triggers In the political landscape of China, the death of a major political leader provides an opportunity to rally public opinion. The first Premier Zhou Enlai’s death in 1976 led to protests at Tiananmen Square in favour of the “people’s Premier”. Chinese Communist Party leader Hu Yaobang’s death on April 15, 1989 resulted in a cascading effect, leading to massive protests in the next couple of months. However, Jiang Zemin’s claim to power that year was based on clamping down on protests in Shanghai. Unlike the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, where anti-corruption and ushering of democracy were the main slogans raised by students and others, the current round of spontaneous protests in China are overwhelmingly related to the stringent Covid protocols across the country. Also, unlike the 1989 massacre of students, when the Army was brought in and the police forces remained relatively dormant, in the current protests, the police and paramilitary forces are taking the lead in countering protestors. The police were seen verifying even the mobile phones of commuters to find if they have accessed or were transmitting protest-related information. The official narrative considered these to be “grey rhino” phenomena with “ulterior motives”, short of calling the protestors “counter-revolutionaries” such as in 1989. That economic hardship is one of the main problems of extensive lockdowns is reflected in the removal of metal barriers in Guangzhou and a rampage in the Foxconn factory at Zhengzhou for employment retention benefit issues and others. Pitched battles were also seen elsewhere based on economic demands. Social media Unlike in 1989, the current protests rapidly dominated the imagination of hundreds of millions of people across the country, given the widespread use of social networking sites such as WeChat, Weibo, Douyin, Douban and others, despite the presence of “wumao” cyber police across the spectrum. Much like the “guerrillas” that Mao spoke about in 1930, the Chinese netizens were waging a high-tech “guerrilla” warfare against the party-state. While diversity marks the nature of the protests across the country, minimal demands include allowing public vigils and mourning, ending lockdowns, release of protestors and protecting civil rights. Another innovative protest method is public display of blank white papers – alluding to “coloured revolutions” that battered Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Egypt, Myanmar and other countries. Of course, there was also the message for Shanghai metro commuters on December 1, calling for the resignation of Xi Jinping. That at least some have targeted the highest leadership for the current pandemic debacle suggests two things — the loss of political legitimacy of Xi’s Covid policies which could be amended with relative relaxation under popular resistance and the possible intensification of popular struggle and further clamping down by authorities. Already, on November 20, the National Health Commission announced 20 measures that could be seen as removing stringent rules to counter the pandemic, including lifting the mandatory PCR tests, access to provision stores, travel and others. On November 30, Covid pandemic in-charge, Vice Premier Sun Chunlan, announced measures that indicated possible stepping down from high alert to medium levels with implications for a relaxation in current policies. Sun alluded to the Omicron variant becoming less lethal, in addition to vaccination drives and prevention control experience. These amendments, of course, must be vetted through the politburo meeting due this month. However, questioning the centre of power by the protestors soon after Xi began acquiring absolute leadership at the just concluded 20th party congress surprised many. For the party congress was amended to include “two establishes,” — Xi as the “core” of the leadership of the party and his “thought” as having the “guiding” role for the rank and file. Further, the amendments also included “two safeguards” — that of safeguarding the “core” status of Xi and his centralised authority. The popular protests depleted these newly enshrined tenets in the party constitution. It contests the recent phrase of “the party leads everything.” Given the overwhelming support in the political establishment, control of all levers of coercive state apparatuses, it is likely that the prairie fire raging across the country could be doused in the coming months. However, despite such crushing strength of the party-state apparatuses, the protests spread to over 20 cities, indicating the possible resurgence of the movement in the coming years in different forms, even after lifting pandemic-related curbs. #China #Covid #Protest Originally published: Open, December 04, 2022. https://www.deccanherald.com/amp/specials/prairie-fires-rage-across-china-1168212.html Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli is Dean of School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University.

By Aishwarya Pathak There was a headline on the Hindu on September 26, 2022 that read “Apple starts production of iPhone 14 at Foxconn’s plant near Chennai”, yet again, a September 30, 2022 headline stated “State’s second iPhone manufacturing facility opens at Chengalpattu” which said Taiwanese firm Pegatron will make iPhones at the Mahindra World City, Chengalpattu, near Chennai. I will attempt to explain these events through the lens of liberalism. Liberals are in favour of free flow of trade, finance, capital and people across borders. They also argue that markets through the interaction of demand and supply will find an equilibrium and that there should be no or minimum interreference by the state. Liberalism also considers Multi-National Corporations as a catalyst for globalization that have positive effect in terms of employment generation, growth and development of a country. One such MNC is Apple. As we all know, it is the one of the biggest companies in the world in terms of its market capitalization. Although, three contract manufacturers of Apple (Foxconn, Wistron and Pegatron) were already manufacturing low end models of iPhone in India, but in a first, newer models of iPhone like iPhone 14 will be produced almost simultaneously and close to the device’s launch world-wide in India along with China. The decision of Apple to diversify its supply chain is due to the US-China trade tensions and the covid zero policy of the Chinese government which disrupted its supply chain. The above two factors are in direct contrast to liberalism that condemns the use of protectionist instruments such as tariffs ,which were seen being imposed by the US on commodities imported from China along with other non-trade barriers. Besides this, restrictions put by the Chinese government during the pandemic such as the covid zero policy is frowned upon by the liberals who want minimum state intervention. Furthermore, liberals who favour democracy which has individuals interests at the core believe that China could sustain the covid zero policy due to its undemocratic government. In addition, due to the hostile relations between, U.S and China, many companies including apple is apprehensive of US imposing higher import taxes on goods imported from China. Moreover, protection of intellectual property has been a focus for U.S. companies, which Apple and other big brands have had some concern about in China due to continuous disregard of international norms set by international organizations such as the UNCLOS, undermining the tenet of "global cooperation" as put forward by the liberals. Meanwhile, India has become an attractive manufacturer for Apple due to a skilled labour endowment and lower labour costs than China where these labour-intensive industries see demographic dividend diminishing due to the rising labour costs. The competitive labour cost gives India a comparative advantage. Other than that favourable government policies to attract FDI such as "make in India" and production linked incentive scheme that aims to give company incentives on incremental sales from products manufactured in domestic units. It has an objective to make domestic manufacturing competitive and efficient, create economies of scale, make India part of global supply chain, attract investment in core manufacturing and cutting-edge technology to ultimately increase exports. All of the three Taiwanese Apple suppliers making iPhones in India are under the PLI scheme. Moreover, this scheme adheres to the principles of liberalism and has been carefully constructed to adhere to World Trade Organization (WTO) rules unlike the Merchandise Exports from India Scheme (MEIS). By its very construct, the PLI scheme does not link the eligibility or quantum of its subsidy to exports and local value addition, thus making it WTO-compliant. The shifting of Apple’s supply chain to India might not be immediately beneficial to the consumers in terms of lower price as the new iPhones will only be assembled in the country; hardly any of its components are locally sourced and Apple has to pay import duty on them. Hence, the cost of production is expected to remain the same. But in the long term there should be some benefit accruing out of the incentives being offered by the government and it will definitely help in the availability of apple products in the Indian market which in the previous year’s saw a shortage in supply. Apple’s supply chain that is dominated by China is seen diversifying into India not just because of its huge demand and market but also the liberalist policies undertaken by the government in line with the international norms of trade that focuses on a free market economy. In addition, the skilled and cheap labour force in India gives it a comparative advantage. A recent report by JP Morgan on `Apple Supply Chain relocation' predicted that Apple is likely to move about 5 per cent of iPhone 14 production to India from late 2022 and reach 25 per cent by 2025. This move of Apple could boost India’s reputation as a manufacturing destination and encourage other manufacturers to come to India. Building up of India’s manufacturing sector will help reduce the dependence of people on agriculture, giving them an avenue to be absorbed by the manufacturing sector. Having a competitive manufacturing ecosystem, India can specialize in the production stage, making it a competitive supplier internationally, leading to job creation, growth and development of India, leading to being an economic power as is seen in the case of China. Although the onus lies on the government to make sure that this comparative advantage doesn’t lead to disadvantage for the workers by strengthening the labour regulations and its enforcement so that the benefits of an open market percolate to every worker in India. #InternationalPoliticalEconomy #iPhone #Liberalism #China #India #SupplyChain Aishwarya Pathak is a Student of MA (International Relations and Area Studies) at School of International Studies, JNU.

By Pratik Mall Hungary, a country in Eastern Europe, has come full circle from autocracy during the Cold War period to democracy in the post-communist world post the fall of the USSR and the end of the Cold War again back to autocracy under its current president, Victor Orban. At a broader level, Hungary is not a stand-alone case of this process of democratic backsliding. Still, it represents a more significant trend currently at play in different world geographies and more so in post-communist space. Hungary's democratic erosion has generated heated debates within the EU parliament. A recent non-binding but highly symbolic report branded Hungary as a "hybrid regime of electoral autocracy" which could no longer be considered a fully functional democracy. Hungary's transition from a once full-fledged and flourishing democracy which led to its inclusion into the European Union, to a currently flawed and fragile status is telling of a much broader and fundamental structural phenomenon at play. The Covid pandemic has only intensified the capture of the already pliable and weak democratic institutions. It has exposed the pitfalls of western liberal hegemony, so triumphantly claimed by Francis Fukuyama as the "most credible game in town" in the backdrop of the end of the Cold War. Theoretical Frameworks The degeneration of Hungary's liberal democratic credentials, which reached its peak at the turn of the 21st century, into an illiberal authoritarian and populist regime sparked significant concerns about democratic regression. Noted Political Scientist Samuel P Huntington's conceptual framework of the ebb and flow of democracies, which he explained so eloquently through his waves of democracies followed by reverse waves, serves as a critical theoretical tool to make sense of the more extensive process at work. One of the vital indicators of the decline pointed out by the EU parliament has been the regular and timely conduct of multiparty elections but with a simultaneous subversion of democratic norms and standards to unfairly benefit the ruling party. In essence, the conduct of elections could be called reasonably free but not at all fair. Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, in their seminal book "How democracies die", have tried to explain the phenomenon of subversion of democracy by elected leaders after coming to power through tactics like constitutional hardball and legal court-packing schemes to cement their power. By employing these critical theoretical concepts, one can better grasp the gravity of the process at play undermining democracy irreparably in Hungary. The method of democratic backsliding in Hungary is so slow and subtle that it is difficult to pinpoint one particular event or period when it all began. It has been an incremental process rather than a revolutionary one. Ozan Varol's concept of "stealth authoritarianism" is essential to deciphering the modus operandi of Hungary's authoritarian leader and party. They have used all the legitimate legal means to achieve anti-democratic ends by camouflaging anti-democratic practices under the garb of law. The Personality Factor Of all the other factors, the personality factor stands out as the most important in testing the resilience of democratic experiments in Hungary. The decline of democracy in Hungary began to unfold after the great economic meltdown post the global financial collapse of 2008. It gained even more steam with the victory of the Fidesz party and the installation of its leader Viktor Orban as Hungary's Prime Minister. The undermining of democracy began with a deliberate and systemic assault on democratic institutions, democratic practices, norms and standards. Forbearance, or the concept of self-restraint, is considered an essential pillar of democracy. Viktor Orban's administration, since its onset, has epitomized the complete disregard for political forbearance in its conduct. The constitution has been manipulated, and its various components were rewritten in a concerted attempt to amass unbridled power for himself and the party. Orban has packed the courts with his loyalist and has gerrymandered the parliamentary districts to break up the anti-Fidesz vote to retain his hegemonic position. This has been done as a classic example of stealth authoritarianism and through constitutional hardball to avoid questioning on purely legal grounds. The unprecedented Covid crisis gave the Orban government a golden opportunity to further tighten the stranglehold over government machinery. The covid law empowered him with unfettered powers to rule the country indefinitely by decree even as the government gagged the media, increased the propaganda campaigns against feminism, withdrew financial resources from local administrations and placed state companies under partial military rule. The gross misuse of a law penalizing fake news against political opponents speaks volumes about the lack of mutual tolerance, which lies at the heart of a genuinely democratic regime. Notwithstanding the above trends, however, the main point of contestation in Hungarian politics remains that of identity politics. Assault on free media has been another glaring example of Hungary's slow but quite pervasive strangulation of democracy. Since 2017, over 90 per cent of media outlets in Hungary have been owned by Fidesz or Fidesz allies. This brazen attempt has obscured the line between party, government and the state. Orban administration has misused media as a critical tool to silence opposition and advance its propaganda. The creation of fake political parties by the party has been yet another tactic adopted to destroy democracy in Hungary. These parties have been created solely to break up the electorates. In addition, the voter tourism law passage is yet another example of how the game rules have been distorted, and Hungary has slipped into a one-person one-party rule. Hungary has become a textbook example of how a democratically elected leader has misused the legal provisions to subvert and hijack democracy. The downgrading of Hungary to a "partly free country" in the freedom house report noted that Hungary was the first hybrid regime in Europe and could no longer be considered a functional democracy. Debates Within The EU Much debate and discussion have ensued regarding membership of Hungary within the EU. EU parliament members have discussed the degradation of the status of Hungary, primarily since the freedom house report, which served as an eye-opener. A host of draconian laws that curtailed citizen's fundamental civic liberties, including the freedom of expression and media freedom, coupled with anti-immigrants, asylum seekers and anti-LQBTQI policies, has led to significant furore about Hungary's continuing as an EU member. There has been a proposal to invoke article 7 of the Lisbon treaty since Hungary has breached the EU'S fundamental values of freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law. However, according to experts, Article 7 is toothless since it requires the unanimous support of all members to come into effect to deprive Hungary of its voting rights in the parliament. In this case, it is guaranteed that Poland will back Hungary. Interestingly, it is not the first time that democracy in Hungary has been questioned under Viktor Orban's populist authoritarian regime. Earlier in 2018, a majority of EU parliament members had voted to determine that Hungary was at risk of breaching the foundational values of the EU enshrined in article 2 of the Lisbon treaty. The 2022 resolutions assume even greater significance in the wake of Russia Ukraine war as Hungary has openly supported Russia, and prime minister Orban is an ally of Vladimir Putin. Regarding the EU voluntarily lowering natural gas usage by 15%, Hungary was one of the only two countries, along with Poland, that opposed this move. Members of the EP made three key recommendations to the EU commission. Firstly, it asked the European Commission to make the approval of Hungary's recovery and resilience recovery programme contingent upon its compliance with the relevant European semester recommendations and implementations of all relevant judgements of the EU court of justice and EU court of human rights. secondly, recommended for a more rigorous application of the Common Provisions Regulation and the Financial Regulation to contain the misuse of EU funds for political motives. Thirdly, it recommended excluding the cohesion programmes since it contributes to the abuse of funds. Conclusion The phenomenon of democratic backsliding in Hungary and the ensuing debate in the EU is but a single case study to understand the more extensive process of democratic fragility of immature democracies in Eastern Europe. The turn towards illiberal democracy could be attributed to two key factors: lack of a robust process of strong institution building and a natural process of democratization of society and polity. Thus, it makes eminent sense to heed Samuel P Huntington's advice and carefully recognize, analyze and arrest the trends of reverse waves of democracy. #Hungary #Obran #Europe #EU Pratik Mall is a Postgraduate student of Politics with a Specialization in International Studies at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi

By Dr. Priti Singh The slim win for president-elect Lula points to a deeply divided country supporting two diametrically opposite views and a defeat that has not been easily conceded by Bolsonaro and his supporters in the months leading up to it. Luiz InácioLula da Silva, the co-founder of the Workers’ Party (PT), has won the October 30 presidential elections in Brazil by a very small margin. His promises in the election campaign included defense of the Amazon, democracy and justice for all. His supporters come from the socially and the economically weaker sections—especially from the Northeast region but also include those in power who were not very happy with the authoritarian approach of the incumbent president Jair Bolsonaro. The slim win for president-elect Lula points to a deeply divided country supporting two diametrically opposite views and a defeat that has not been easily conceded by Bolsonaro and his supporters in the months leading up to it. Discussion on Brazil’s elections for the last few months has been on false news and misinformation on social media, social and economic policies, corruption and the pandemic. There were reports that the highway police were involved in voter suppression by blocking roads in areas that were in support of Lula such as the Northeast. This has been a very difficult win. Lula had been arrested in 2018 on charges of bribery thus preventing him from participating in the elections that year buthe was released the next year and charges levelled against him were dropped by 2021. Ever since then, he has been slowly making his way back to the top. What does all this mean for Brazil? Will Lula, who has been supportive of taxing the rich, attempt to redistribute wealth or maintain stability in fiscal policies as per his electoral mandate? Coming from a far-right agenda, Bolsonaro’s emphasis has been on deregulation and privatization. Lula, on the other hand, has focused on poverty, food and housing. Brazil has been struggling to recover from a deep recession which started in 2014 along with the major corruption controversy known as ‘Operation Car Wash’ which led to political turmoil and was followed by the pandemic. Even during his first two terms, Lula introduced social welfare schemes such as the Bolsa Familia which used the concept of conditional cash transfer to link welfare payments to education of children. These innovative programmes had helped Brazil lessen its poverty figures. The Lula years had seen a rise in Gross Domestic Product by 7.5 percent in 2010 (World Bank). Scholars writing on Brazil have argued over the reasons for Brazil’s enormous growth in the first decade of the twenty-first century. While many pointed to Brazil’s profits due to the sale of primary commodities mainly attributed to the demand from China, others argued that economic stability, a result of Lula’s welfare policies, had also contributed to this growth (O’Neil, Lapper et al, 2012). Whatever the reason, the economy was doing well, and Brazil was politically stable. Thus, Lula’s approval ratings even at the end of his second term were very high. This had allowed Dilma Rousseff to succeed him as president once his term was over as the Brazilian Constitution does not allow a consecutive third term for a president. The economic and political decline for Brazil had already set in by then with the economy stumbling and the corruption allegations reaching its height during Rousseff’s term, resulting in her impeachment. Ultra-conservative Bolsonaro’s election as president in 2018 has often been claimed as the result of a backlash or reaction of the people and their disappointment with the previous administrations. Described as a result of the “anger vote” and an economic recession that hit Brazil with high unemployment rates, the people chose to vote for a far-right populist, a former army captain and a firm supporter of Trump. Nicknamed as the ‘Trump of the Tropics’, Bolsonaro had appointed Paulo Guedes, a Chicago University economist as his economy minister. His term, however, was beset with problems. The uproar over Bolsonaro’s stance on the Amazon and deforestation with his foreign minister Ernesto Araujo having claimed that the climate change assertion was part of a conspiracy by “cultural Marxists” is just one such example. While Bolsonaro’s Environment Minister Joaquim Leite announced programmes for sustainable development and conservation of forests in 2021, it was not very well received by the international community as they believed that it lacked credibility and did not confront head on the problem of deforestation. Bolsonaro’s open disdain for masks during the pandemic and his inability to handle the situation effectively also instigated a lot of criticism. This is not to say that Lula has always been revered as a leader. The corruption scandal had really hit both Lula and his political party very hard. This partly explains the very thin margin by which Lula has won this election. In his first speech on Sunday evening, Lula was perhaps attempting to garner more support by assuring the people that he would broaden his outlook beyond his party by including centrists and right of centre views in his approach. This is a natural extension of any balanced and pragmatic politician. Lula is known for his international activism and his contribution to multilateralism, which falls in line with the present US president Biden’s approach. He has in the past shown his inclination for market-friendly policies that support private sector growth and foreign investments. Lula’s global outreach included India and relations between the two countries had grown in leaps and bounds during his time. He visited India thrice during his tenure in 2004, 2007 and 2008. This is also the time that the BRICS forum along with IBSA and BASIC was given form. India signed a defence cooperation agreement with Brazil in 2003 in R&D, military training and planned joint maneuvers. So much so, Brazil opened a Defence wing in its embassy in New Delhi by 2009. A proponent of Mercosur and Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), Lula’s win has raised hopes globally for environmental and indigenous rights activists as well as for advocates of South American integration. For Lula, it will be a long domestic struggle to secure his position by balancing his passion and pragmatism. #Brazil #Politics #Election Originally published: Financial Express, November 03, 2022. https://www.financialexpress.com/world-news/lulas-victory-a-win-win-for-all/2772872/ Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Dr. Priti Singh is the Chairperson, Centre for Canadian, US & Latin American Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

By Dr. Aprajita Kashyap Brazil, endowed with the Amazon Rainforest and dubbed as the ‘lungs of the earth’, is one of the countries from the Global South whose stand has often been under scrutiny by the world The 27th Conference of Parties (COP 27 is a meeting of 197 countries that have ratified the UNFCCC) (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) that begins in Egypt from 07 November 2022 will witness deliberations by several heads of states or their representatives, businessmen, scientists, indigenous community members and activists on how to keep the commitment to the 2015 Paris Agreement intact. The attainment of the assurances could be gauged through the implementation of recommendations of the earlier COPs and honouring the nationally determined contributions (NDC) towards achieving the goals of curtailing carbon emissions. One area that will attract the focus of the developing countries, especially India, would be the definition of climate finance and the extent of its flows for climate action. Brazil, endowed with the Amazon Rainforest and dubbed as the ‘lungs of the earth’, is one of the countries from the Global South whose stand has often been under scrutiny by the world. Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva’s during his two previous Presidential stints had put Brazil on a firm economic footing while ensuring a responsible environmental policy, the latter being hailed as being among the most progressive in the world. Lula’s success in declaring bold targets for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and reducing the rates of deforestation in the Amazon had put him at or near the top of the list when it came to eco-conscious world leaders. Dilma Rousseff, though a protégé of Lula, during her Presidency digressed and gave sweeping amnesty for those who had illegally deforested, outraging environmentalists and scientists. On analyzing her programmes, there were two kinds of outcomes – the skeptics’ views revolved around the key assertion that Dilma had continued to consider the environment “an obstacle to development” as she had said during the Copenhagen climate change summit while the believers opined she had emerged as a more consensus-oriented politician being convinced by arguments from the environmentalists and had continued Brazil’s positive trend of curbing deforestation. Nevertheless, the rate and extent of deforestation have always remained a debatable issue in Brazil under successive governments. Even before taking over as President, Jair Bolsonaro had decided to back out of Brazil’s offer to host the COP 25. On assumption of Presidential office, two departments of the Ministry of Environment that dealt with climate change and mitigation policies were nixed, the decision to end the environmental fine was firmed up and the selection of Cabinet members hostile to the fight against global warming was made. But then, after two years of downplaying the Amazon crisis and dismissing calls for action, the Bolsonaro administration changed the tone of its public statements in 2021 at the climate summit, where he pledged for the first time to curb deforestation and increase resources for environmental law enforcement. Lula, a pro-environmentalist, in his first and second stints had chosen to surround himself with a Cabinet made up of equally fervent Ministers- Dilma as the Minister of Energy and Marina Silva who is a staunch environmentalist, as the Minister of Environment. Despite these efforts, at the end of his term, Lula rode a great wave of popularity for his measured yet progressive approach towards development while he netted disappointment among the environmentalists for not making the preservation of nature his highest priority. Leaving aside the criticisms, Lula’s success lay in declaring bold targets for the reduction of greenhouse gases and reducing the rates of deforestation in the Amazon. In the present context, the President-elect will participate as the head of his political party and not as the President since he takes over only in January, in the COP 27 at Sharm El-Sheikh in Egypt. The environmentalists have immense expectations from Lula as the major plank of his campaign were the promises to protect the Amazon rainforest and restore Brazilian leadership on climate change. Lula’s attending the conference of parties is more of a signal to the world that Brazil is ready to take a proactive position towards halting climate change. The expectations of the world can be fathomed from several news items- the Times published under the headline: “Lungs of the Earth breathe sigh of relief at Lula’s election victory” and the New York Times’ write up quoted Lula’s victory speech -“Let’s fight for zero deforestation”. For Lula it would be a mammoth challenge, given the adverse impact of the policies under Bolsonaro on the environment and the blockade his efforts may receive due to a right-wing dominated Congress. Delving deeper into the Brazilian context, it is apparent that there are certain areas that have continued to evoke concerns regardless of the ideology of the incumbent government: deforestation as a source of greenhouse gas emissions; the role of the farmers and indigenous people; changing weather patterns; and implementation of national policies and international agreements and regime. Even though Lula’s selection shows he evinces measurable popularity among Brazilians for his positions on environmental policies, the dilemma remains- should the priority be development or the environment? Clearly, development remains important as is corroborated by the fact that Brazil needs to maintain its ranking as the twelfth largest economy in the world (World Bank 2021), yet the clout that it has acquired at the multilateral environmental fora necessitates that it must tread the path of sustainable development carefully. #Brazil #COP27 #UNFCCC Originally published: Financial Express, November 06, 2022. https://www.financialexpress.com/opinion/will-lulas-brazil-be-a-game-changer-at-cop27/2776943/ Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Dr. Aprajita Kashyap is Faculty in Latin American Studies Programme, CCUS & LAS, SIS, JNU, New Delhi. Email: aprajitakash@gmail.com; aprajita@mail.jnu.ac.in

By Prof. Swaran Singh This month, Asia is hosting back-to-back four world summits: November 6-18 Climate summit at Sharm el-Sheikh in Egypt; November 10-13 East Asia Summit at Phnom Penh in Cambodia; November 15-16 G20 summit in Bali (Indonesia); and then, November 16-19 APEC summit in Bangkok (Thailand). What is new is that after nearly three years of pandemic-driven disruptions and online meetings, these summits see world leaders and their delegations travelling to these cities and deliberating in person. On the flip side, however, this return to normal also reveals how in spite of all the talk about decoupling and recasting, the world continues to face an industrialized West who still sets the tone, tenor and agenda at all summit meetings. These summits across Asia, for instance, are bound to remain preoccupied with global shortages and price hikes for food, fuel, fertilizer and now finance - all triggered by the Ukraine crisis. Finance is the latest fourth "F" now added in face of a widely anticipated global recession reinforcing protectionist policies of Western nations. The actual deliberations of these summits are widely suspected to be hijacked by the visible US-Russia confrontation, although Russian President Vladimir Putin is expected to join only the G20 online. But the opportunity costs of Russia delegations being harangued in these summits remain incalculable. All this not only complicates challenges for host nations but threatens to distract attention away from real issues. Photo: Global Times Deeper questions to ask are why has West failed to bring an early end to the Ukraine war? Why has the resultant spree for weapons procurements been allowed to divert precious resources from healthcare or climate mitigation? Why energy shortages are being allowed as the new excuse for global revert to fossil fuels or for West defying their climate finance commitments? What explains this path-dependency on Western powers? To begin with, the very institution of summits has their origins in Europe. This fashion of holding peacetime leader summits originated in 19th century Europe. The 1648 Peace Treaty of Westphalia had finally put an end to European history of religious wars and later their mercantile and industrial revolutions enabled their colonial expansions around the world. This had drifted their mutual hatred to far away territories of their hapless colonized societies. European nations were now able to unleash destruction on these faraway lands and bargain these territories while sitting the exquisite settings of Vienna, Berlin, Paris, and London that were now the chosen venues for European summits. At least the cutlery, courtesies and conversations of summits have remained the same. Nothing changed even when they hosted anti-colonial leaders of their colonies at the same summit venues in Europe. British India's Round Table Conferences in London were British way of socializing India into so-called civilization. Even anti-colonial gatherings were initially held in Europe. In 1927, German communist Willi Munzenberg, with support from Comintern, had initiated a League against Imperialism and Colonial Oppression by convening a meeting in Brussels that was attended by leaders of the American left plus 175 leaders, 107 out of which came from 37 colonized nations. The two World Wars and the Great Depression of 1920 were to accelerate the wave of decolonization and transform these master-slave equations. The two decades following World War II saw emergence of a large number of new nations across Asia, Africa and Latin America. One matrix to measure this change was the membership of the United Nations that rose from 51 to 99 in its first 15 years of its existence. Asia was to see the arrival of world's largest new nations like India, China and Indonesia. The global ramifications of this transformation were reflected in the Asian Relations Conference held in New Delhi on March-April 1947. They agreed to set up an Asian Relations Organization (ARO) and to hold two follow-up events: First, its Southeast Asian Section was to draft an ARO Convention by April 1948 and the second Asian Relations Conference was to be hosted in 1949 in China. Only India's violent partition, first war with Pakistan, and China and Indonesia being in the last stages of their liberation struggles disrupted this momentum for Asian summitry by several years. Wars in Korea and Vietnam saw the US attempting to take over regional leadership through brute force and military alliances and "divide and rule" policy of European imperial powers. While the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) Security Treaty survived in Europe and Australasia, Southeast Asia Treaty (SEATO) and Baghdad Pact of Central Treaty Organization (CTO) remained dysfunctional. These were replaced by US "hub-and-spokes" military alignments with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Singapore. The indigenous Asian summitry was revived in April 1955 Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian nations and their five points of Bandung Spirit were to later produce world's largest ever Non-aligned Movement (NAM). Though the NAM for long remained a third pillar to reckon with, yet the Cold War succeeded in dividing Asian nations into opposite camps. It was not until the collapse of the Soviet Union which coincided with unprecedented economic rise of China that focus shifted to the emerging economies bringing Asia back to the centre. These four summits in Asia represent that historic recognition of Asian wisdom. Asia having since emerged as the locomotive of global growth and development explains why G7 had happily co-opted six Asian nations or 12 nations of Global South in its novel G20 summits from 2008. This also explains centrality of China and India to climate change and other deliberations of global governance. Of world top five economies today, China, Japan and India respectively occupy second, third and fifth positions. Among these India remains the fastest growing economy with promising potential. Asia together accounts for 40 percent of global manufacturing and East Asia alone accounts for over 75 percent of world's semiconductors production - a technology that has become the benchmark of technological progression. But like old times, divisions within Asia have not disappeared altogether. These have allowed the industrialized West to continue to master over their present and future. Having done wonders in economic parameters, this calls for putting Asia's political equations in order. If Asia has to take the lead in realizing the Asian dream of what Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi calls "no first world or third world but only one world" then Asian nations must begin by addressing their distracting mutual disputes and differences. Originally published: Global Times, November 13, 2022. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202211/1279367.shtml?fbclid=IwAR3ei4Dfm8UT2PjlvbU93gpnnP-bVXUD22aDi8ymL7MTh9KEgG5My1NTm34 Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Swaran Singh is a visiting professor at the University of British Columbia (Vancouver) and professor for diplomacy and disarmament, Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Delhi).

By Prof. Gulshan Sachdeva The real challenge is migration and mobility. Still, a ‘thin interim deal’ is possible in the coming months In the context of the upward trajectory of India-United Kingdom relations one constant reference has been the possibility of a bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA). During the then UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s India visit, a Diwali (end October) deadline to conclude negotiations was fixed. In the meanwhile, political and economic crises in the UK deepened. As a result of political turmoil within the Conservative Party, Rishi Sunak is now the third Tory Prime Minister in 2022. At 10.1 percent, inflation is at a 40-year high. The Bank of England predicts that the country would be in recession for the whole of 2023. The soaring energy bills may lead to winter of strikes. Given this, the environment is not conducive for an aggressive trade deal. Sunak’s ascent to power has naturally generated interest, and excitement in India. But his Home Secretary pick Suella Braverman, another Indian-origin leader, asserts that the UK’s current asylum system was "broken" and "out of control”. Besides, the country is facing an "invasion" of migrants. She earlier branded Indians as the largest group of migrants who overstayed in the UK. Although policy-makers from both the countries are issuing positive statements, prospectus for an early conclusion of an FTA needs to be analysed within broader British political and economic developments. No new deadline has been proposed by either side. The British High Commissioner said that both countries are set up for the ‘final ascent’ on signing the trade agreement in the next few months. Some Indian sources indicate that now it will take some time before negotiations are finalised. Although India-UK talks started only this year, both have been negotiating for a trade deal since 2007, earlier under India-EU negotiations. Some of the difficult issues are well known for years. As Indian average tariffs are higher compared to the UK, the British side will definitely benefit more from coming down of tariff walls. The immediate beneficiaries will be in companies in the food and drinks sector in both the countries. About 90 percent of UK exports to India are Scotch whisky in this sector, which attracts 150 percent tariffs. Many in India would like to believe that some loss in the goods sector could compensated through more exports in the services sector. However, the UK is also very competitive in the financial and legal services, and would expect major gains. Earlier it was reported that 16 out of 26 chapters are closed. But sometimes just a few issues can take very long, particularly when there is no new deadline. As there is a strong political will from both sides to conclude negotiations, issues concerning trade in goods and services could still be resolved without any serious difficulty. However, due to past experience of Vodafone and Cairn Energy, the UK will go for tough negotiations in the investment sector. India has terminated most of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) including with the UK. To bring British companies under specific protection, the UK would like to add a comprehensive investment chapter. Since the UK is also a major destination of Indian companies for investment, India may not be averse to this, but serious negotiations may take some time. Some issues concerning digital trade and data protection as well as stringent patent rules as indicated by the leaked text could be problematic. However, solutions could be found as enough homework has already been done to deal with such issues. The real challenge will be in the area of migration and mobility. Unless there are serious gains for India in this sector, negotiations may not conclude. The current political leadership and economic difficulties in the UK may not be very supportive in this area. At the moment, unemployment in the UK is at historic low. But it is expected to rise from next year. A bilateral deal on migration and mobility was signed last year. As per the deal India can send 3,000 young professionals annually to the UK in exchange for taking back undocumented migrants. Both sides have already raised issues on the implementation of the deal. While the UK feels that co-operation on illegal migration has not “worked very well”, India feels there is lack of “demonstrable progress” on mobility protocol. While looking at the political economy environment in the UK and India’s ambitions from the deal, conclusion of a comprehensive pact covering trade, investment, migration, data protection, procurement, and development issues may take some time. But this could also be a template for India-EU negotiations. However, if policy-makers wants to demonstrate progress, a ‘thin interim deal’ is very much possible in the next few months. #India-UKTies #Politics #Migration #NarendraModi #RishiSunak Originally published: Money Control, November 07, 2022. https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/opinion/india-uk-fta-without-migration-a-comprehensive-deal-is-unlikely-9461691.html Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Gulshan Sachdeva is Professor at the Centre for European Studies and Coordinator, Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, Jawaharlal Nehru University.

By Dr. Vandana Mishra The most attention-grabbing section of the book are the chapters which deal with the planning and preparation for 26/11 attacks in India. If the authors would have been allowed to write the real-life stories without the pretense of “fiction”, the story of Lt Col Purohit and the attempts of creating a false narrative of “saffron terror” would have been a decisive nail in the coffin of the ISI-political party-media “nexus”. Uncomfortable truth about the 26/11 terrorist attacks in India, which killed 175 people and wounded around 300 and the seemingly manipulated arrest of Lt Col Purohit were dismissed and shelved for a politically correct narrative, the author claims. Since the same government got another term, the truth was imprisoned and tortured. The naming of political leaders, both of India and Pakistan; travel schedules of leaders and terrorists; details of LeT (Lashkar-e-Taiba) terrorist training modules in Pakistan; involvement of Pakistan’s army and ISI in attacks in India; etc., are enough to give cold shivers despite the fact that the author writes in the Introduction itself that the book is a “fiction, based on information”. The lucidity in narration by Col. Khatana, retired intelligence officer, is exemplary. The author in “The Game Behind Saffron Terror” appositely traces the sequence of events leading to the 26/11 attacks and a political party’s connivance with ISI in establishing it and several other terrorist attacks as acts of “saffron terrorism”, when nothing of the sort exists. The way the conspiracy to float the non-existent jargon “saffron terror” is concocted in the presence of some political leaders in 2006 induces the reader to question the allegiance of the party. The book goes beyond hinting and insinuating, and establishes the linkages between ISI and LeT by detailing the frequent visits of ISI officials to the LeT training camps; ISI role in selection and training of fidayeen terrorists; supply of arms and ammunition; etc. If one is to believe in the chain of events that the author has established, reasoning it to be based on information notwithstanding it being fictional, then there is hardly anything left in judging that not only the jargon “saffron terror” is lodged by ISI (who works with the aid and advise of the President of Pakistan), but the political party and some major media houses have participated and helped ISI in their malicious designs. Another interesting thread that is seamlessly weaved in the narration is that of internal politics in Pakistan. The extent of political control exercised by Army in Pakistan has been significantly highlighted by notating their role in enticing Benazir Bhutto to return to Pakistan and then getting her assassinated with the help of LeT. The detailed discussions between the head of ISI and Pakistan’s President suffice the need of terrorist activities in India to keep the Indo-Pak border volatile in order to bargain internationally in the interest of Pakistan. The most attention-grabbing section of the book are the chapters which deal with the planning and preparation for 26/11 attacks in India, painstaking selection and training of terrorists from LeT, their journey to India for executing the 26/11 attacks and the timeline of the final attack. On the one hand, the account speaks volumes about ISI’s commitment and eye for perfection in their task, and on the other, it is a tale of deceit, amorality, and scabbing by a major political party on the other side of the border. The chapters that describe the love life of Col Purohit fail to harmonize with the flow of the book but at the end their importance can be well accounted for as they successfully stir the reader’s emotiveness when the author elucidates the harsh realities of existence and continuation in real world politics. The saga of Col Purohit—his hard work, accomplishments, false accusations, misled and un-notified arrest, jail, torture, fabricated tagging as saffron terrorist—can bring jitters, albeit it being fictional based on information. Col Khatana claims that the arrest of Lt Col Purohit, and Pragya Thakur, and others in the Malegaon blast case was a well-planned move conceived in Pakistan and aided and supported by a political party and a few media houses to achieve two objectives. One, to establish the existence of “saffron terror”, and two, to raise questions about the honor and integrity of the Indian armed forces. The change of government in 2014; Pragya Thakur as MP; and release of Col Purohit have turned the tables and the narrative too. The book is a radical work for understanding the nuances of intelligence agencies and “behind the curtain” politics in domestic as well as international affairs. Col Khatana’s experience as an intelligence officer adds the much-required element of thorough detailing, which was a prerequisite for a book like this. Though it is a must read for scholars of South Asia and national security, but anyone with a minutest of interest in national politics will also find it valuable. This is not to say that “it is only for scholars”. The book has a fiction-novel like unfolding which can be of interest to any avid reader. Another book, titled “An Invisible Hand Behind Saffron Terrorism”, by Anup Sardesai also takes the reader on the same course of understanding the agenda and methodology of hidden forces in India who are continuously on the move to establish the non-existent “saffron terror” by detailing the incidents and events leading to Malegaon blast and the subsequent arrest of Pragya Thakur. Both works are of the same genre but Col Khatana’s detailing of events, travels, meetings happening in India, Pakistan, UAE, Britain and the audaciousness of taking “names” is what makes this book more chilling and unnerving. On a lighter side, for reasons known only to the author, the expression “poker faced” has been used a number of times and very aptly indeed. Originally published: Sunday Guardian Live, November 12, 2022. https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/news/fact-fiction-book-exposes-game-behind-saffron-terror Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the Dean, SIS. Dr Vandana Mishra is Assistant Professor, Centre for Comparative Politics and Political Theory, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University.

By Pratik Mall “Eminent geoeconomic, geopolitical and strategic rationale underpins China's repeated attempts to block Indian bids to proscribe specific individuals as global terrorists as part of its war on terror” On 19th October 2022, in yet another brazen and misused display of its veto power, China blocked a joint resolution backed by India and the United States to designate LET leader Shahid Mahmood as a global terrorist under UNSC 1267 AL Qaeda Sanctions Committee regime. This thwarting attempt is the fourth in a row this year. A broad realist theoretical framework highlights China's more comprehensive policy of pursuing its parochial, selfish national interests without paying heed to global sensitivities. Paying lip service to the Purity of means, the Chinese have epitomized the dictum of Purity of ends over Means in the past couple of decades. China has no scruples in deploying the utmost irrational, illogical and immoral rationale behind its moves to achieve its sacrosanct foreign policy goals. In the past five years, China has foiled India's bid to blacklist terrorists of already proscribed organizations on multiple occasions. In 2016, seven years after the dreadful Mumbai terror attacks, India proposed the designation of Masood Azhar, the head of already proscribed Lashkar e Taiba, as a global terrorist. This proposal, backed by three of the five P5 of the UNSC, the UK, France and the USA, was blocked by China, citing flimsy technical grounds. It was followed by the trio moving a proposal again in 2017, only to be blocked by China again. It was only in 2019, after severe backlash and criticism faced by China in the aftermath of the Pulwama attacks, that China lifted its technical hold, paving the way for putting Masood Azhar on the global terrorist list of the UNSC 1267 Sanctions Committee Regime. Interestingly India is also currently serving as chair of the UNSC Counter-Terrorism Committee for the year 2022. While India has called for a sustained and coordinated approach to fight the menace of global terrorism, China, on the other hand, has repeatedly blocked India's efforts in this direction. Firstly, in June 2022, China blocked a joint India US proposal for blacklisting LeT deputy chief Abdul Rahman Makki. This was followed quickly by the second attempt to block the designation of Sajid Mir, the mastermind of the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks. The third attempt was in August this year when China foiled an Indian bid to designate Abdul Rauf Ashgar, one of India's most wanted masterminds of the IC814 hijacking. The fourth and latest attempt was to block the designation of Hafiz Saeed's son Talha Saeed and LeT deputy chief Shahid Mahmood as a global terrorist on vague technical grounds. The Chinese Motive Eminent geoeconomic, geopolitical and strategic rationale underpins China's repeated attempts to block Indian bids to proscribe specific individuals as global terrorists as part of its war on terror. The all-weather and iron-brother friendship between China and Pakistan is an overarching thread that runs through all of these logics. Hailed as "higher than mountains, deeper than oceans, stronger than steel and sweeter than honey", this friendship has belied the famous dictum of "No permanent friends and foes in international relations". A sound economic logic informs China's repeated attempts to foil India's bid. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which forms part of President Xi Jinping's pet project, the Belt and Road initiative (BRI), is critical to the Chinese agenda of putting forward an alternative plan for infrastructure development and connectivity. In a larger sense, it holds the key to what China has triumphantly touted as a "Beijing Consensus" model as opposed to the US-dominated neoliberal "Washington Consensus". China has invested heavily in infrastructure development and connectivity projects to the tune of $62 US billion. The Gwadar port, which constitutes the heart of CPEC, holds a lot of economic and strategic significance for China and has been widely touted as a viable alternative to the Chinese "Malacca Dilemma" in the Indian Ocean region. Multiple reports have suggested that CPEC has run into trouble owing to protests by Baloch nationalist elements and attacks on crucial projects. The massive influx of the Chinese population has led to severe demographic alteration and reports of violence against Chinese nationals and workers. A palpable sense among many of these protesting sections has been that China has essentially turned Pakistan into a colony and is imposing a debilitating impact on it in terms of both resource crunch and no tangible economic benefits for Pakistan. Debt trap diplomacy of China, especially in the case of Hambantota in Sri Lanka and its financial collapse, has further alarmed the people of Pakistan of it also falling into a similar kind of debt trap in future. It has exposed the land-grabbing nature of China, leading to protests and attacks. Masood Azhar, whose blacklisting China blocked multiple times, has been a go-to man for them. China has been paying its organization and goons to protect Chinese economic interests in protest-hit regions. At the strategic level, competition with India has been a critical factor behind china's move. China which seeks to build hierarchical world order, wants India not only to play second fiddle but also to box in India in South Asia. At the broader level, Pakistan has been pursuing a policy of “bleeding India by thousand cuts” and invocation to “thousand years of war”, with India couched as a low-intensity covert war through militancy and infiltration. In the broader scheme of things and to put India down, China uses Pakistan as a strategic ally and exploits hostility against India, the raison d'etre for Pakistan. China has cultivated the vicious China-Pakistan nexus in India's neighbourhood to stoke extremism and terrorism on its eastern and western borders to keep them unstable, hampering India's growth prospects. China's logic to put a technical hold doesn't hold water as LeT and Jaish e Mohammad has already been proscribed under UNSC 1267 sanctions committee regime. China's attempts have been primarily to buy time by citing vague grounds such as that sufficient linkages do not exist between 1267, a specific clause dealing with Al Qaeda and Islamic State and these individual terrorists. At the political level, China has tried to build a narrative in its favour through institutions like SCO, which includes a Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) specifically dedicated to combating the menace of global terrorism. However, China's double standard and double-speak are quite evident given its track record at blocking Indian bids to sanction international terrorists. Another critical factor for China's non-recognition of threats of terrorism, which it actively abets and finances in its backyard, can be attributed to a lack of proper and complete understanding on the part of the Chinese Communist Party of the debilitating impacts of terrorism. CCP and China's leadership which has embraced Communism as the party ideology for the past seven decades, has always responded to religion-based terrorism in a knee-jerk manner. The immaturity of Chinese understanding is quite apparent, whether in the Falun Gong, Xinxiang Uighur Muslim issue, its attempts against the Christian church, and specific advisories against Indian cults. #India #China #Terrorism #GlobalTerrorist Pratik Mall is an M.A. (PISM), Batch 2021-2023 student of School of International Studies, JNU. Email ID: pratikmall.h@gmail.com

By Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli The 20th Communist Party Congress in China signalled a total centralisation of powers in the person of Xi Jinping, demolishing informal political processes in the party while retaining specific Xi-nurtured factions and sectarian networks, tearing away from established party-state norms, movement towards decoupling from the US, and keeping China’s sights firmly on preparations to seize regional and global power. Xi secured a third term, and perhaps tenure for life. There is a new narrative of Chinese assertiveness and resolve. Four specific outcomes are visible from the party congress. First, the resurrection of centralised authority. Under previous presidents since Deng Xiaoping, “collective leadership” had provided stability to the decision-making process in China. Xi has driven the party to return to the principle of “core” leadership, with himself embodying that core. This has been enforced through changes in the constitution of the Chinese Communist Party. For instance, the constitution has been amended to include “two establishes” -- to establish Xi as the “core” of the leadership of the CCP and his “thought” as having the “guiding” role for the rank and file; and “two safeguards” -- that of safeguarding the “core” status of Xi and that of his centralised authority. These amendments are binding on the CCP’s 96 million cadre across the country. Xi needed this figment of constitutional legitimacy to establish his iron hand, to overcome the decades-long party dynamics of intensive shadowboxing between various factions. Hu Jintao and his Communist Youth League were jettisoned visibly and symbolically, although it may still be hard to wipe out established factions or their political influence in the party. A second, and more substantial, way in which factional politics was sought to be obliterated was in the composition of the Politburo and the Politburo Standing Committee. Defying the predictions of China analysts the world over, it was the most surprising outcome of the 20th CCP. We will never know what actually transpired at the congress, partly due to the opaque political system of China but also because there is no Chinese Julian Assange or Edward Snowden around. However, the visual image of Hu Jintao’s dissatisfaction with the list of members in the hands of Xi Jinping, and the efforts of Li Zhanshu and Wang Huning to prevent Hu from taking a look at the list at the final session of the congress point to political friction emerging soon. Nevertheless, the current Politburo and its Standing Committee are packed with Xi loyalists, mainly those belonging to Fujian, Zhejiang and Shanghai, where he worked as party secretary in the 1990s and 2000s, or from his home province, Shaanxi. Shaanxi. They belong to “new Zhijiang Army”, “Shanghai Gang” and other factions. A third outcome that has both domestic and external implications is the excessive focus on national security at the 20th CCP, compared to the Deng Xiaoping-era obsession with “economics at the centre”. Xi declared that China will “pursue a holistic approach to national security and promote national security in all areas and stages of the work of the party and the country.” In its obsession to build a “fortified China,” the party congress resolved to make national security “the foundation for national rejuvenation.” Strikingly, there was no mention of the Jiang Zemin-Hu Jintao era “peace and development” in the work report. With this, we should expect a national security state to come to the fore in China, one that seeks solutions not in diplomacy or moderate policies but in coercive postures, if not outright military onslaught. A fourth potential outcome is the acceleration of decoupling from the United States, with its implications for globalisation and the rest of the world, including India. Though Xi made these intentions known through the 14th Five Year Plan, Made in China 2025, and other schemes to restructure China’s economy to become less dependent on exports and run on domestic consumption, the signal from the 20th CCP is one of heightened paranoia and jingoism, alluding to “external attempts to blackmail, contain, blockade, and exert maximum pressure on China”. While this is meant to counter recent setbacks in relations with the US, in the backdrop of the tariff wars, a ban on semiconductor sales, and the US resolve to “out-compete” China, the party congress sends an unambiguous signal of “effectively responding” to external challenges. More acrimony is to be expected then, not just on Taiwan, of which a specific mention was made in the amended party constitution, but also over the rest of the neighbourhood. New Delhi, take note. #China #CCP #XiJinping Originally published: Open, November 06, 2022. https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/xi-jinping-the-new-mao-1159781.html Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli is Dean of the School of International Studies and Professor in Chinese Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University. Views are personal.

By Prof. Swaran Singh After failing to facilitate an end to the war in Ukraine, the Security Council tackles the escalating crisis on the Korean Peninsula The United Nations Security Council was already facing tough questions on its credibility having been further eroded by its inability to deliver an early termination of the Ukraine crisis. It was to meet again on Friday to take stock of another cascading crisis: the rapidly rising tensions and possible nuclear escalation on the Korean Peninsula. The current tensions on the peninsula can be traced to the September 29 visit by US Vice-President Kamala Harris to the heavily fortified Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that divides North and South Korea. This was followed the next day by resumption of US-Japan-South Korea trilateral naval exercises that had been suspended since 2017 when then-US president Donald Trump reached out with an olive branch to Kim Jong Un’s regime. North Korea responded to the resumption of these naval exercises by launching ballistic missiles over Japan. Tokyo took the matter to the Security Council, which saw Russia and China insisting that it was the US-led military exercises in the Sea of Japan that had provoked North Korea, and the discussion ended in a deadlock. Obviously no lessons were learned, as this Monday saw the beginning of another five-day-long US-South Korea annual air exercise, Operation Vigilant Storm, which had also been suspended since 2017. Only this time around, the response from North Korea was more than anticipated, leading the US and South Korea to extend exercises beyond their scheduled closing date on Friday, further aggravating a rapidly rising crisis in the making. Rapid buildup Against this backdrop of mutual suspicions, the last four days were especially dramatic. The news of resumption of Vigilant Storm had already triggered angry responses from Pyongyang, calling them “aggressive and provocative” and requesting their suspension. But their initiation on Monday saw North Korea begin an unprecedented cascade of missile launches. On Wednesday, it launched nearly 30 missiles and more than a hundred artillery shells. To make things worse, for the first time since the 1948 bifurcation of the Korean Peninsula into North and South, three missiles on Wednesday landed 56 kilometers south of the Northern Limit Line off the east coast. And to complicate matters further, this was responded to by South Korea’s F-15K and KF-16 jets firing three guided surface-to-air missiles into the sea approximately same distance north of the Northern Limit Line. The South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff called it their “resolve to respond sternly to any provocations,” while Japanese Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada said North Korea’s actions were “absolutely unacceptable.” On Thursday morning, taking matters forward, Pyongyang launched a Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which reportedly failed after reaching an apogee of 750km and falling into the Sea of Japan. Anticipating it crossing over Japan, Tokyo had issued a warning to its northern prefectures. To recall, North Korea had carried out the first test of its Hwasong-17 ICBM on March 24 this year. But this again is believed by some to have failed, though others believed it reached an apogee of 6,000km and traveled a distance of 1,090km in 64 minutes. The Hwasong-17, also called the “Monster Missiles,” is the most potent symbol of North Korea’s nuclear deterrence against the United States. And to endorse this conviction in Pyongyang once again, within hours US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, during a meeting with his South Korean counterpart, issued a warning that any North Korean nuclear attack, including use of non-strategic nuclear weapons, against the United States or its allies would “result in the end of the Kim regime.” UNSC deadlocked Meanwhile, the United States – backed by Britain, France, Albania, Ireland and Norway – asked for the UN Security Council to meet publicly on Friday to take stock of the efficacy (read inefficacy) of all its bans on North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests. The result of this meeting, however, can be anybody’s guess. Only last month, Japan brought this issue of North Korean missiles to UNSC with no results whatsoever. This, if anything, has perhaps further emboldened Kim Jong Un. Friday’s meeting will not be the first time the Security Council has discussed North Korea. Since 1984, Pyongyang has carried out more than 200 missile launches and six nuclear tests, and half of these have been since 2016 under Kim Jong Un. Likewise, since 1950, the UNSC has passed 21 major resolutions (plus resolutions to extend or implement earlier resolutions) related to North Korea, with the majority of these since Kim Jong Un came to power in 2012. As well, in more than one way the current Ukraine crisis has only strengthened North Korean resolve. Without doubt, the Ukraine war has exposed the limitations of the veto-based system of the UN Security Council. But the war in Ukraine – a country that once held the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal, which it surrendered in 1994 in exchange for security guarantees by the veto-wielding UNSC Permanent Five members – has also reinforced the “currency of power” argument about nuclear weapons. In a bizarre way, this has also reinforced the resolve of nuclear-aspirant nations. Does this make non-proliferation a lost cause and the future far too uncertain? Back to the future North Korea, if anything, forms part of this deeper malaise of great-power contestations. Its departure from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, first in 1994 and then finally in 2003, saw the United States for the first time outsource the non-proliferation lead to China as convener of the Six Party Talks. Those talks took place from 2003 to 2009 and, after a lot of juggling, even clinched a joint statement on denuclearization. North Korea even dismantled its plutonium-producing reactor. The United Nations set up a monitoring committee under UNSC Resolution 1718 and a Panel of Experts created under UNSC Resolution 1874 of 2009. But great-power contestations intervened, especially since Donald Trump’s tumultuous “fire and fury” phase, which was followed by his two “falling in love” summits with Kim Jong Un, encouraging Pyongyang to find solace and faith in brute force. And once again, the ongoing escalation on the Korean Peninsula seems to be getting far too intertwined with exogenous factors that vary from domestic constituencies to global equations of major powers. Resumption of the air exercises this week, for example, has been linked to the war in Ukraine, where North Korea, along with Iran, has been provisioning Russian President Vladimir Putin’s military operations. US National Security Council spokesman John Kirby had only recently accused North Korea of providing “thousands” of artillery shells to aid Russia’s Ukraine war. And the United States also remains anxious about incessant reports of North Korean ICBM tests and its next nuclear test, which is seen as imminent given that both Russia and China are unlikely to support UN sanctions on Pyongyang. With attention quickly shifting to the coming climate and G20 summits, interlocutors on escalating Korean Peninsula tensions may find brief relief in a stalemate by focusing on style rather than substance. But remember, such hedging strategies may push dangers further away into future, but they make their outcomes potentially more catastrophic. #Hwasong-17 #KimJongUn #KoreanPeninsula #NorthKoreaMissileTests Originally published: China Daily, November 04, 2022. https://asiatimes.com/2022/11/after-ukraine-unsc-faces-another-acid-test-on-korea/ Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author. Swaran Singh is visiting professor at the University of British Columbia and professor of diplomacy and disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He is president of the Association of Asia Scholars; adjunct senior fellow at the Charhar Institute, Beijing; senior fellow, Institute for National Security Studies Sri Lanka, Colombo; and visiting professor, Research Institute for Indian Ocean Economies, Kunming.