By Srijan Sharma
Introduction
The Middle East region is reeling under the burning ashes of war between Israel and Hamas. Once again, the Israel and Palestine conflict has come into focus, not by light flare but uncontrolled fire, which has pushed the Middle East back into its old days of heightened tensions snowballing into full-fledged war. After Russia-Ukraine crisis in Europe, another war frontier opened in the Middle East, which will alter the regional geopolitical balance. A three-pronged invasion by Hamas terrorists into the Southern part of Israel and later wreaking havoc on Israeli citizens across regions have stunned the whole world, making a 26/11 for Israelis. However, Hamas pulling off an attack of such magnitude has raised serious questions over its sterling Intel agencies, Mossad and domestic Intelligence Agency Shinbet. Didn't they see it coming, or did they underestimate it? However, the changing dynamics of Middle East geopolitics in overhang also played some role in misting Israel's Intelligence glass.
Changing Middle East Power Balance
The thaw between Israel and Arab began with a series of agreements from Camp David, Oslo to Abraham Accord which have acted as a catalyst in placing the power base of the Middle East to some rest, giving way for regional forces to converge for their regional and national interests like Saudi Arabia is doing to add pace to its Vision 2030. China- Pakistan, India- US quadrilateral on wide-ranging strategic interests also get some breathing space to up their ante in the region. Operation Sankalp's India's maritime engagement in the Middle Eastern region to ensure the security of Indian vessels in Middle Eastern waters got some breather when the Abraham Accords happened as accords to some extent will help the routes along major trade centers- Dubai and Abu Dabi do not become targets between Jerusalem and Tehran covert warfare. Similarly, New Delhi's Look West Policy got the fillip to engage with Arab, the visit of former Army Chief General M.M Narvane to UAE and Saudi in December 2020 (first Army Chief to do so) to strengthen strategic cooperation. China brokering peace between Iran and Saudi Arabia prepared a base for its economic ingressions in the region. US's mounting West Asian QUAD and IU2U to increase its geopolitical relevance in the Middle East amid the cold war with Saudi and checkmating China and Russia are some examples of geopolitical crisscrossing. From time to time, these geopolitical configurations control the possibility of conflict in the region and attempt to increase stability. Still, at the same time, the thawing of relations antagonises the Arab players sitting at the extreme ends- Lebanon, and their proxies, which again puts the Middle East on the burning matchbox. Recently, when various initiatives such as the Middle East Corridor at G20 and normalisation phenomena between Saudi Arabia and Israel came into focus, a trigger perhaps went off where the extreme ends of the region stirred the hornet nest and, therefore, the intermixing of power games with ideologies and fundamentalism kept the balance of power in a capacious position.
Israel's Vengeance
Hamas's deadliest terror strike on Israel has triggered a spine-chilling retaliation by Israel launching Operation Iron Sword, which involves heavily striking Hamas locations across Gaza. Continued pounding bombs, air strikes, targeting banks, media houses, and whatnot have paralysed the Gaza strip. There is little doubt that Israel will not stop sooner or later, and its wrath will continue. It wouldn't be correct now to say that the balance of power or the geopolitical force of the Middle East is in a capacious position; it is on the verge of collapse. Israel won't stop; the Arab world, involving, Syria, Lebanon, and Qatar, would mobilise along with Hezbollah and Hamas backed by Iran. This hot axis of the Middle East will give another strategic shock not only to the region but to the world again if not controlled as it did in 1973 by let losing the oil crises. Interestingly, Israel's vengeance mode will provide the US a small opening to establish its hard power relevance in Middle East after decades which will to some extent revive its security architecture which came under heavy storm during Russia-Ukraine war. However, the US will have some risks in navigating its hard power influence viz-a viz Israel, as many more regional players, especially Saudi Arabia, won't let this go unnoticed. How many power alterations will the Middle East see, especially the conflict of territories, which have a chance to see some makeovers in a few days? Perhaps its answer requires some patience and tight observance in the coming days.
Mossad's Colossal Miss
The memories of the 1973 Yim Kippur War seem to be refreshed when, for the first time, Israel was caught off guard in failing to rightly assess Egypt's intentions and threats emanating from them in a war-like situation. This led to a surprise hit at Israel, though it wasn't a total surprise as almost at the last moment Mossad did get some intel of Egypt launching an offensive, but as far as Mossad’s assessment was concerned, it fell flat. This failure perhaps significantly contributed to the departure of Golda'Meir's Government and the sacking of its Military Intelligence chief, Eli Ziera, after the Agranant Commission investigated the failure of Israel's defence forces and Intelligence. A close examination of Mossad's miss says that the real problem in Israel's famed intel agency does not lie in Intelligence gathering or awareness of the threat; the real problem lies in the assessment and feedback part, which is an integral part of the Intelligence cycle. Often, biased or half-baked assessments and underestimated feedback have made nations pay a heavy price. There is a difference where perhaps Mossad faltered, not in Intelligence gathering but in Intelligence management, where the Intel agency often makes errors with Intelligence in hand either by assessing it through prejudiced or biased perspective or the feedback on the Intel in hand is underestimated. The same episode of Intelligence management failure with Mossad happened in 1973, when the Intel agency failed to realise that Egypt, having no counter to Israeli air power, would attack Israel, but to surprise, Egypt hit hard from the ground by well-designed complex offensive plans through missiles. Similarly, the 7th October attack intel was perhaps well received by Mossad, but they underestimated Hamas's capability of carrying out a well-coordinated three-pronged attack. The reasons for not endorsing a good feedback and threat assessment on this intel would perhaps be three reasons:
1) Too much confidence investment in Israel's technological drive- Iron Dome, border security, surveillance capabilities, etc.
2) Middle East normalisation perhaps misted Israel's lenses as thawing rules out misadventures.
3) Israel's divided attention in domestic politics(West Bank politics) and Iran's nuclear obsession kept Mossad under the impression that Iran won't sabotage as Iran is already engaged in a diplomatic circus around JCPOA.
As strategic affairs expert and national security analyst Praveen Swami notes, "successful conduct of war demands endless intellectual creativity.". Another senior Israeli journalist notes that intelligence failure is attributed to "sinful arrogance of the Israeli defence establishment". The three-pronged attack was almost a construct of intellectual creativity that defeated Israeli famed technologies at the borders. Such realisation of error is required in the Intelligence agencies, especially those with gold status, to build strategic foresight and prevent misting their intelligence glass with prejudiced or underestimated feedback. Iran has allegedly sabotaged Middle East normalisation for now, and what scenario lies ahead is more blazing and anxiety-ridden.
This Article is an Original Contribution to the SIS Blog.
Srijan Sharma is a national security analyst specializing in Intelligence and security analysis and working as a Research Assistant in India's premier and prestigious national security and foreign policy think tank United Service Institution of India(USI). Previously, he has extensively written on matters of security and strategic affairs for various institutions, journals, and newspapers (Telegraph), The Print, and the Organiser. Also, he served as Defence Editor for a journal.
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