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Why Ukraine war is an inflection point for India’s foreign policy


By Prof. Swaran Singh


India is once again being seen as the voice of the Global South that regards the West's attention on Ukraine as a mere diversion from more pressing issues such as food security, an impending economic recession, mounting debt, and terrorism



With the Ukraine war this Friday entering its second year, Tuesday saw Presidents Vladimir Putin and Joe Biden delivering two back-to-back imperious speeches respectively in Moscow and Warsaw; further ratcheting up their brinkmanship that threatens to further derail any prospects of an early end to this conflict.


For instance, Putin not only once again blamed this war on the United States (US) and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) seeking “limitless power” but announced the suspension of the 2010 New START nuclear arms reduction treaty. This Russia-US pact was extended for a period of five years only in February 2021. Likewise, Joe Biden not just paid a surprise visit to Kyiv but alluded to Putin as a “dictator” who “still doubts our conviction” and “staying power” saying “Ukraine will never be a victory for Russia. Never.”


In the backdrop of Russia’s continuing nuclear threats and its armed forces holding on to Ukraine’s (and Europe’s) largest nuclear power plant at Zaporizhzhia, Putin also underlined Russia’s readiness for fresh nuclear tests, that is, if the US were to do so. Joe Biden responded to him by directly addressing Russian citizens; rebutting Putin’srhetoric that the US and NATO “seek to control or destroy Russia” underscoring how last year has witnessed “autocrats” getting weaker as democracies strengthen their solidarity.



Proactive neutrality


Where do such polemics put the world’s largest democracy, India, and also its ‘proactive neutrality’ foreign policy posture in the Ukraine war? Western studies continue to club this largest democracy in the world with China, Iran and Turkey which have so far refused to condemn the Russian invasion of their neighbouring nation. Is that a fair comparison and does such labelling of India make Russia any more at ease with India’s neutral posture?

How has the rest of the world responded to India asserting its national interest and refusing to toe any line whether Russian or American? Even India’s critics agree that its visibility in global politics has increased by leaps and bounds. But, in spite of its regular connection with the national leaders of both Russian and Ukraine and its humanitarian assistance for the latter, has India been able to play any substantive role in resolving this war? Now, this has also come to be not just an expectation but a prerequisite if India has to ensure all 19 national leaders attend India’s G20 summit scheduled for coming September.


To begin with, neither Russia nor US nor its allies have been fully at home with India asserting its own foreign policy perspective of strictly pursuing its own national interest. For Russian, much pooh-poohed lack of performance of their military machine is suspected to push India towards further diversification of its defence imports. But defence imports remain but one of the four factors — history, energy, arms and influence — that have shaped India’s approach to Russia. This explains why compared to Russia, American leaders have been more vocal in airing their displeasure with India’s persistent abstentions from all UN resolutions condemning Russian actions.


Last March, for instance, President Biden had most politely called India “somewhat Shaky” in acting against Russia. Some of that murmur has since disappeared because this was followed by India hosting Russia’s foreign minister Sergei Lavrov in April and Prime Minister Narendra Modi in his September Samarkand meeting with President Putin reasserted the “unbreakable” friendship of their two nations. Foreign Minister Jaishankar was in Moscow last November calling their relationship “exceptionally steady and time tested.” Last week, National Security Advisor Ajit Doval was in Moscow and held a deliberation will all Russian leaders including President Putin.


Russian oil imports


Other than India’s assertive approach in defying some Western expectations this also makes India a glaring example of the world’s largest democracy refusing to endorse Western democracy versus autocracy formulations. More specifically, the West has been at unease with India’s oil imports from Russia that they say have undermined their sanctions campaign and funded Putin’s war efforts. This has come to be a bone of contention consuming much of India’s foreign policy community both inside and outside the Modi government.


But the Ukraine war has also made India conscious of its dependence on energy imports. No doubt India continues to rely primarily on the nations of the Middle East, mainly Oman and Saudi Arabia as suppliers of its gas and oil yet, it is Russian oil supplies that have skyrocketed in the last year. India’s oil monthly imports from Russia jumped 33 times between December 2021 and December 2022. Foreign Minister Jaishankar is often seen diligently explaining this in terms of time-tested Indo-Russian relations, India’s low per capita income levels, its exponentially growing energy demand and above all Modi government’s “moral duty” to procure energy at the most cost-effective prices available.


What is also most disconcerting to the US is that, unlike the past when India followed their dictate and stopped buying oil from Venezuela or Iran, this time India has stood its ground while conforming to all relevant global norms. But while increasing Russian oil imports, India has also become increasingly firm on its concerns about the Ukraine war.


Content analysis of India’s speeches at the United Nations shows how India’s semantics have moved from concern to regret to deplore to calling parties to show respect for UN Charter, International Law, national sovereignty and territorial integrity etc. India had called for an independent investigation into the Bucha massacre and voted against the Russian resolution to deny President Volodymyr Zelensky addressing the UN Security Council. And then, in September last, Prime Minister Modi’s saying to President Putin that this is not the era for wars was to become a mantra for global leaders.


India has also been exploring alternatives in launching International Solar Alliance, Lifestyle for Environment and domestic diversification towards renewables. But it is also true that India has already come to be the world’s third-largest oil consumer and Russia is now its third-largest oil supplier. It explains this huge change from Russia standing in the 17th spot for 2021. And, India also imports oil from the US as well. But, with its IMF-endorsed GDP growth rate of 6.8 per cent for this year — compared to 1.6 per cent for the United States — India’s energy demand is bound to grow reinforcing its connect with Russia. By the year 2030, India is expected to emerge as the world’s third-largest economy after the United States and China. India can leave no stone unturned to ensure energy security for its citizens.


West’s doublespeak


Rising India has to constantly work towards better perception management of India’s rapidly changing stature that underlies its initiatives and intentions. India’s constant narrative underlining the autonomy of its foreign policy has witnessed Indian interlocutors politely, and sometimes less politely, rebuffing old-style patronising tones amongst rich industrialised nations and their foreign policy elites. Especially their doublespeak has to be called out in a consistent manner.


Of course, over time this new assertive style of Indian foreign policy interlocutors has gained certain traction and even certain acceptability across several quarters.

Nevertheless, the mainstream Western narratives continue to paint India’s proactive neutrality as simple neutrality that they paint as in favour of Russia though several of them have begun to appreciate India’s compulsions and explanation or become increasingly resigned to emerging India’s assertions.


India for instance has once again come to be viewed as the voice for the Global South that sees the West’s focus on Ukraine largely as a distraction from more pressing challenges like food security, impending recession, mounting debt, and terrorism. India’s presidency of G20 presents a great opportunity for India to work for an early end of the Ukraine war which has already become an inflection point in India’s foreign policy becoming far more assertive and grounded in India’s own national interest. This new tone of India has surely achieved not just greater visibility though achieving greater credibility remains as yet a work in progress.



Originally published: First Post, February 23, 2023.

Posted in SIS Blog with the authorization of the author.


Swaran Singh is visiting professor at the University of British Columbia, fellow of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute in Calgary, Alberta, and professor of diplomacy and disarmament at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.



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